Iran in Syria From an Ally of the Regime to an Occupying Force © Naame Shaam, 2nd edition, April 2016 Iran in Syria From an Ally of the Regime to an Occupying Force © Naame Shaam, 2nd edition, April 2016 Foreword The first edition of this report, released in November While drawing on a wide range of sources in a variety 2014, was the result of a year of Naame Shaam’s work. of languages, the author has deliberately avoided using It drew largely on information gathered from monitoring many Syrian opposition groups and media outlets as a Syrian, Iranian and the international media’s coverage source, except when that was unavoidable. The reason of events in Syria. The majority of the information and for this is to avoid accusations of bias and unreliability. sources found in this report are thus in the public do- main. The author drew on private sources only on a few A note on language and spelling: The author has mostly occasions. This was the case, for instance, with the used the Iranian English spelling of names and plac- Syrian ‘crisis cell’ assassination story towards the end of es, even when these are originally Arabic. Thus, he chapter II. Even in such cases, however, the author did uses ‘Hezbollah’ rather than ‘Hizbullah’, and ‘Sepah his best to verify and corroborate the information con- Qods’ rather than ‘Quds’. The reason is that numerous veyed to him from other, publicly available sources. This quotes from Iranian reports originally in English are used second edition of the report follows the same pattern. throughout the report, so the author opted for keep- ing the spelling of such words consistent as much as Readers will notice that the author has made a special possible. effort to reference almost every piece of information mentioned in the report. This is because he wants The author would like to thank all his Syrian, Iranian and readers to be able to verify the information and to Lebanese correspondents, colleagues and friends who expand on it if necessary. The references should also be provided him with the information and news that formed useful for legal practitioners and organisations wishing the core and basis of this report. to use the original sources as evidence in any future lawsuits against war criminals in Syria. Naame Shaam has backed up and made copies of all the web pages referenced in the report, just in case they ‘disappear’, as many Iranian news reports concerning Syria have done in the past. Foreword 3 This report was written by Shiar Youssef, the head of Naame Shaam’s Research and Advocacy Team. © Naame Shaam, 2nd edition, April 2016 Naame Shaam is a group of Iranian, Syrian and Lebanese activists and citizen-journalists which focuses on uncovering the role of the Iranian regime in Syria. For more information, see: www.naameshaam.org. Naame Shaam is supported by the Netherlands-based Rule of Law Foundation, www.lawrules.org. 4 Iran in Syria 2nd edition Contents Foreword 3 Introduction to 2nd Edition 6 Executive Summary 10 I. The Iranian Regime in Syria 15 1. Sepah Pasdaran ‘advisors’ 16 2. Foreign militias 29 3. Iranian fighters 76 4. Iranian weapons 87 Conclusion 102 II. Syria Under Military Occupation 111 III. Iran’s Vietnam 137 I V. Appendix 177 Contents 5 Introduction to 2nd Edition A lot has changed in Syria and the wider region since would serve as a deterrent against any possible attacks the first edition of this report was published in November on Iran’s military nuclear facilities, much like the Hezbol- 2014. But a lot has also remained unchanged. lah stronghold in southern Lebanon was established in 1980s. The section describes these strategic areas as Major developments over the past months include the ‘useful Syria’ and argues that the Iranian military strategy expansion of Daesh (the so-called Islamic State) in Iraq in Syria revolves around defending and securing these and Syria; signing a comprehensive nuclear deal with areas in order to serve the Iranian regime’s interests in a Iran in July 2015; the Iranian-backed coup by the Houthi post-Assad Syria. militias in Yemen and the subsequent military campaign led by Saudi Arabia against them; and the Russian mili- - A subsection about Hezbollah’s recruitment efforts in tary intervention in Syria. Lebanon provides previously unknown details about the formation, arming and training of various pro-Iranian Yet none of these developments seem to have prompted non-Shia militias in Lebanon with the help of Hezbollah. the US administration and its allies to change their strat- The section argues that all these sub-militias, which are egy towards Iran – and now toward Russia – in Syria. described among Hezbollah circles as a “reserve pool”, This report describes it as a policy of slowly bleeding are being prepared to secure the group’s ‘home front’ in Iran and Hezbollah in Syria at the expense of continued Lebanon in the event of escalation there. Some of them bloodshed in the country and rising extremism and insta- could also be deployed to Syria in the future if Hezbol- bility in the region. lah and other Iranian-controlled militias fighting there become ‘overstretched’. This second edition provides detailed updates on some of the key issues raised in the first edition: - An update on Iraqi Shia militias’ involvement in Syria examines the increasing geographical distribution and - A new section on restructuring the notorious Syrian the more prominent role played by these militias in key militia known as the National Defence Forces (NDF) battles. Among other things, this has meant that these provides an overview of reports about Iranian plans to Iraqi militias can no longer justify and recruit for their fight merge and restructure pro-Assad militias, both local in Syria solely on the basis of defending holy Shia shrines. and foreign, and turn them more disciplined and more Fighting Daesh in Syria as a motive is increasingly found loyal ones. The motivation behind this move appears in their literature offline and online. Meanwhile in Iraq, to be an attempt by the Iranian regime to control these under the pretext of fighting Daesh, Iranian-controlled Shia militias that have partly gone out of control and become militias have expanded and consolidated their influence mafia-style gangs riddled with crime and corruption. throughout the country to such an extent that they have Particular attention is paid to efforts to form ‘Hezbollah practically replaced the army and security forces in many Syria’, sometimes also called the National Ideological areas. Dozens of them recently united, under the auspice Resistance, which would be similar to Hezbollah Leb- of Haider al-Abadi’s government, under the name The anon: a parallel army that is intended to safeguard the Popular Mobilisation Forces. Details of the ways in which Iranian regime’s interests in Syria even after fall of the these militias cooperate with Baghdad and Tehran, and Assad regime. the role that Iranian ‘advisers’ play, both inside these groups and on the frontlines, are also provided. - An update on Hezbollah Lebanon’s involvement in Syria details how the group’s role in the war has grown - An update on Afghan Shia fighters’ involvement in Syria in significance and scale at the expense of Syrian regime traces how their number and role in Syria has become forces. The section particularly focuses on key strate- more prominent and more open, thanks to concerted gic battles in the Qalamon region, along the Lebanese propaganda and recruitment efforts by the Iranian regime border, and in the south, near the borders with Israel and and its media outlets. The section provides new details Jordan. It examines Sepah Pasdaran’s and Hezbollah’s of the origins and development of the Fatemiyoun Bri- efforts to establish a foothold in southern Syria, which gade, and new details about Iranian recruitment efforts could gradually grow into another front with Israel that among Afghan refugees and migrants in Iran. It also 6 Iran in Syria 2nd edition provides an overview of Afghan casualties in Syria and - A new case study on the death of Iranian Briga- the official funerals held for them in Iran. It then sheds dier-General Hossein Hamedani, who was killed near light on new legislative reforms in Iran allowing Afghan the Syrian city of Aleppo on 8 October 2015, provides and other non-Iranian fighters fighting in Syria to apply details and admissions about his role in Syria, particularly for permanent residency permits and Iranian citizenship, in setting up the notorious National Defence Forces, also which is being used by Sepah Pasdaran as a recruitment known as the shabbiha. incentive besides monthly salaries. - As with Iranian fighters, an update on Iranian weapons - A new section on Pakistani Shia fighters in Syria pro- provides an overview of new evidence of Iranian-made vides an overview of their numbers and role in the war. weapons being used in Syria, despite international sanc- It also provides an overview of Pakistani casualties in tions on Iran and Syria and despite losing control over Syria and the official funerals held for them in Iran. The all of Syria’s border crossings to the Free Syrian Army formation of the Zaynabiyoun Brigade suggests that or to Daesh. The section also provides details of new the number of Pakistani fighters deployed to Syria is types of Iranian weapons being used in the ongoing war increasing and may increase even further in the future. as a result of the changing nature of the battles. These The section warns that the Shia community in Pakistan include Iranian Sukhoi-22 fighter-bombers, which have is larger than in Afghanistan, and most of the Pakistani been at the forefront of the aerial bombardment cam- Shia live in border areas, making their potential recruit- paigns against rebel and civilian areas across Syria.