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An Introduction to the Congressional Budget Office November 2012

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An Introduction to the Congressional Budget Office November 2012 An Introduction to the Congressional Budget Office November 2012 Contents The Congressional Budget Office’s— Founding 1 Products 1 Organization 4 Staffing 4 Processes 6 Transparency and Objectivity 9 Contact Information 12 Location 13 Appendix A: CBO’s Managers 15 Appendix B: Panel of Economic Advisers and Panel of Health Advisers 19 CBO An Introduction to the Congressional Budget Office Since its founding in 1974, the Congressional Budget grams that were inconsistent with his policies (a process Office (CBO) has produced independent analyses known as impoundment). The dispute led to the enact- of budgetary and economic issues to support the ment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Congressional budget process. The agency is strictly Control Act of 1974 in July of that year. nonpartisan and conducts objective, impartial analysis, which is evident in each of the dozens of reports and hun- The Budget Act reasserted the Congress’s constitutional dreds of cost estimates that its economists and policy ana- control over the budget by establishing new procedures lysts produce each year. All CBO employees are for controlling impoundments and by instituting a for- appointed solely on the basis of professional competence, mal process through which the Congress could develop, without regard to political affiliation. CBO does not coordinate, and enforce its own budgetary priorities inde- make policy recommendations, and each report and cost pendently of the President. In addition, the law created estimate discloses the agency’s assumptions and method- new legislative institutions to implement the new ologies. All of CBO’s products apart from informal cost Congressional budget process: the House and Senate estimates for legislation being developed privately by Budget Committees to oversee execution of the budget Members of Congress or their staffs are available to the process and the Congressional Budget Office to provide Congress and the public on CBO’s website. the budget committees and the Congress with objective, impartial information about budgetary and economic CBO’s Founding issues. The agency began operating on February 24, In the early 1920s, the President began to assume more 1975, when Alice Rivlin was appointed its first director. prominence in setting the federal budget. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 gave the President overall CBO’s Products responsibility for budget planning by requiring him to CBO provides budgetary and economic information in a submit an annual, comprehensive budget proposal to the variety of ways and at various points in the legislative Congress; that act also expanded the President’s control process. over budgetary information by establishing the Bureau of the Budget (renamed the Office of Management and Baseline Budget Projections and Budget, or OMB, in 1971). By contrast, the Congress lacked institutional capacity to establish and enforce bud- Economic Forecasts getary priorities, coordinate actions on spending and rev- CBO’s reports on the budget and economic outlook enue legislation, or develop budgetary and economic cover the 10-year period used in the Congressional bud- information independently of the executive branch. get process. Those reports present and explain CBO’s baseline budget projections and economic forecast, which Conflict between the legislative and executive branches are generally based on current law regarding federal reached a high point during the summer of 1974, when spending and revenues. The reports also describe the Members objected to then-President Richard Nixon’s differences between the current projections and previous threats to withhold Congressional appropriations for pro- ones, compare the economic forecast with those of other CBO 2 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE NOVEMBER 2012 forecasters, and show the budgetary impact of some Cost Estimates alternative policy assumptions. CBO provides formal, written estimates of the cost of vir- tually every bill “reported” (approved) by Congressional Produced: Several times annually. The budget projections committees to show how the bill would affect spending and economic forecast are generally issued each January or revenues over the next 5 or 10 years, depending on the and updated in August. In addition, the budget projec- type of spending involved. Each cost estimate includes a tions are updated in March. section describing the basis for the estimate. For most tax legislation, CBO uses estimates provided by the staff of Analysis of the President’s Budget the Joint Committee on Taxation, a separate group that CBO estimates the budgetary impact of the proposals in works closely with the Congressional tax-writing com- the President’s budget using the agency’s own economic mittees. In addition to formal, written estimates, CBO forecast and estimating assumptions. CBO’s independent provides a far greater number of preliminary, informal “reestimate” of the President’s budget allows the Congress estimates as committees are considering what legislation to compare the Administration’s spending and revenue to advance, as amendments to legislation are being proposals with CBO’s baseline spending and revenue pro- debated, and at other stages in the legislative process. jections and with other proposals using a consistent set of economic and technical assumptions. Produced: Throughout the year, with formal estimates typically numbering between 500 and 700 annually. Produced: Annually. The budgetary analysis is generally issued in March, followed in April by an analysis of the Analyses of Federal Mandates impact of the President’s budgetary proposals on the CBO analyzes the costs that proposed legislation would economy and, in turn, indirectly on the federal budget. impose on state, local, and tribal governments and on the private sector. If the estimated five-year cost of such a Budget Options mandate exceeds specified thresholds, the agency reports Periodically, CBO produces a reference volume examin- the cost and provides the basis of the estimate. CBO pro- ing options for reducing budget deficits. The volume duces mandate statements with its cost estimates for each includes a wide range of options, derived from many committee-approved bill. sources, for reducing spending and increasing revenues. For each option, the volume presents an estimate of its Produced: Throughout the year. In addition, CBO pro- effects on the budget and a discussion of its pros and cons duces a report each spring listing all of its work analyzing mandates in the previous year. but makes no recommendations. In addition, CBO pro- duces numerous reports (discussed below) that examine Monthly Budget Review policy options for specific federal programs and aspects of CBO issues a monthly analysis of federal spending and the tax code. revenue totals for the previous month, the current month, and the fiscal year to date. Those analyses help to Produced: Generally in odd-numbered years, to inform the Congress and the public about the monthly correspond to the beginning of each new Congress. status of the budget. Long-Term Budget Projections Produced: The fifth working day of each month. CBO provides the Congress with budget projections that go beyond the standard 10-year budget window. Those Scorekeeping for Enacted Legislation projections typically span 25 years but can extend as far as CBO provides the budget and appropriations committees 75 years into the future. The projections show the impact with frequent tabulations of Congressional action affect- of long-term demographic trends and rising health care ing spending and revenues. Those scorekeeping reports costs on federal spending, revenues, and deficits. CBO provide information about whether legislative actions are also projects the economic impact of alternative long- consistent with the spending and revenue levels set by the term budget policies. budget resolution. Produced: Annually, usually in June. Produced: Periodically during the year. CBO NOVEMBER 2012 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE 3 Compilations of Unauthorized Appropriations and aspects of the tax code, and budgetary and economic Expiring Authorizations challenges. The reports cover a wide range of subjects, CBO prepares a report listing all programs and activities including health care, economic growth, income security, funded for the current fiscal year for which authorizations education, taxes, energy, the environment, national secu- of appropriations have expired or will expire during the rity, financial issues, infrastructure, and more. Most CBO current fiscal year. reports present a set of options for changes in the federal programs or tax rules being examined. Such reports gen- Produced: Annually, in January. erally include estimates of each option’s budgetary effects, economic effects, or both, as well as a discussion of each Reports on the Troubled Asset Relief Program option’s pros and cons. As with the agency’s other prod- The Congress established the Troubled Asset Relief ucts, these reports make no recommendations. Some Program (TARP) in 2008 to stabilize financial markets. CBO reports provide background information about Twice each year, OMB reports on the costs of the CBO’s other analyses to enhance the transparency of the program, and as required by law, CBO then assesses agency’s work. each OMB report. Most CBO reports are written at the request of the Produced: Twice per year, within 45 days of the TARP Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of a committee report produced by OMB.
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