The Peace Process in Northern Ireland Since 1998: Success Or

THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND SINCE 1998: SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF POST-AGREEMENT RECONSTRUCTION? Stefan Wolff1 Introduction With the conclusion of the Good Friday Agreement on 10 April 1998, a long-lasting peace process in Northern Ireland moved into a qualitatively new stage, which in relation to other conflicts, is often described as post-conflict reconstruction. In the case of Northern Ireland, this would be a misleading term: the fundamental conflict between the proponents of two competing visions of national belonging is far from over; (some of) the conflict parties have merely agreed on a new framework in which they want to pursue these distinct visions. From this perspective, it is more appropriate then to speak of post-agreement reconstruction. In order to examine and assess this latest stage in Northern Ireland’s current peace process, I will look at three distinct, yet closely related dimensions of any post-agreement reconstruction process: the building of political institutions, economic development, and social reconstruction. Following a conceptual clarification of ‘post-agreement reconstruction’, I proceed in three steps. First, I outline the dynamics of post- agreement reconstruction in Northern Ireland. Second, I look at some general developments in each of the three dimensions and examine to what extent they have been influenced by past and present conditions in Northern Ireland and whether, and how much, they have contributed to achieving a degree of sustainability in the peace process. Finally, I draw some conclusions as to whether the current post-agreement reconstruction efforts will be able to succeed in bringing a permanent and stable peace to Northern Ireland. 1 Fieldwork for this article was supported by a Research Grant from the British Academy. I would also like to thank Colin Irwin, Arthur Aughey, Antony Alcock and Mari Fitzduff for fruitful discussions and personal insights. All shortcomings and mistakes are entirely my own responsibility. Copyright (c) Stefan Wolff. All rights reserved. No reprint without permission. 2 Post-agreement Reconstruction: Conceptual Clarification Protracted ethnonational conflicts shape the societies in which they take place in many different, yet almost always exclusively negative ways, resulting in a lack of functioning or legitimate political institutions, weak economic performance, non- existing or polarised structures of civil society, and antagonised elites. Thus, the setting in which post-agreement reconstruction is to begin is often unfavourable in the extreme for the task to be accomplished. However, without a comprehensive programme aimed at rebuilding a conflict-torn society, no settlement would be worth the paper on which it had been written. Post-agreement reconstruction is an extraordinarily complex challenge, and in order to understand its dynamics, a number of distinct dimensions need to be examined, including the various elements it needs to involve, its place in the overall timeline of conflict settlement, the factors that will determine its success, and the indicators by which its success can reliably be measured. Elements of Post-agreement Reconstruction The essential aim of post-agreement reconstruction is to create a set of political, economic, and social structures in accordance with an agreed conflict settlement that allow the conduct of a non-violent, just, and democratic political process. As such, it is distinct from similar efforts made to facilitate the negotiation processes at the end of which a settlement can be agreed. It is important to bear in mind the multi-dimensionality of post-agreement reconstruction and take a holistic and long-term view of transforming conflicts, as ‘rushed agreements aimed primarily at stopping conflict may not be the best base on which to try to build a viable democratic state’ (Harris and Reilly 1998). The nature of post-agreement reconstruction also means that reconstruction is, in fact, a Copyright (c) Stefan Wolff. All rights reserved. No reprint without permission. 3 misleading term, as it really involves ‘the creation of new, sustainable, institutions which are more democratic, fair and responsive to the needs, concerns, and aspirations of an entire population’ (Bush 1998: 34). That is, the aim is to establish institutions that are superior to those that existed before the violent escalation of the conflict in that they do not contain the same failures that led to the conflict in the first place. In order to achieve this, post-agreement reconstruction needs to address three different areas – the building of (political) institutions, economic recovery, and establishing conditions conducive for the development of civil society. At the level of political institutions, one of the foremost tasks is the restoration of law and order and of a judicial system. Equally important is the setting-up of a system for democratically accountable government bound by the rule of law. While democratic accountability is important in the long run and from the perspective of consolidating an inclusive and democratic political process after conflict, it is critical to realise that democratic elections alone are insufficient to guarantee this particular outcome. In most cases of agreed settlements, elections figure prominently as part of the rebuilding of political institutions, yet at the wrong time and based on the ‘wrong’ electoral system they can just as easily destroy a beginning post-agreement reconstruction process by giving opponents of an agreement an opportunity to polarise public opinion, to encourage ‘ethnic’ voting, and to limit the room for manoeuvre and compromise for moderate political leaders. Thus, institution-building needs to focus on establishing a system of governance that is appropriate for the particular conflict and that is created in a way and by people most suitable for the particular conflict situation. This can mean both immediate elections or elections after a transitory period. The primary task of the institutions set up in accordance with an agreed settlement is to create conditions that are conducive to the success for a comprehensive programme of post-agreement reconstruction. From this perspective, the roots of potential success or failure of Copyright (c) Stefan Wolff. All rights reserved. No reprint without permission. 4 post-agreement reconstruction may lie in the agreed settlement itself. At the same time, however, the way in which the implementation of an agreement is carried out, and thus how politicians act during the implementation stage, is another major factor that has bearing on the eventual success or failure of post-agreement reconstruction. This means, with respect to Northern Ireland, that the analysis of post-agreement reconstruction needs to include a thorough examination of the Good Friday Agreement and its suitability, or lack thereof, to serve as a framework for sustainable peace, as well as an assessment of how actions by political and paramilitary leaders have affected its implementation. At the level of economic reconstruction, the task is normally one of transforming a conflict-driven economy into a robust ‘peace economy’ with sustainable levels of growth, benefiting all communities. This includes the integration of former combatants into the economic process. In Northern Ireland, there are two additional economic problems that are directly related to the consequences of the particular nature of the conflict over the past thirty-some years. On the one hand, the most obvious effect of the conflict on the economy, apart from overall economic decline and high unemployment rates, has been the disproportionately strong developed security sector, providing employment almost exclusively to Protestants.2 Downsizing the security sector will therefore also primarily affect Protestants, thus potentially contributing to disaffection and resentment. The other major economic problem in Northern Ireland during the years of conflict (and before) has been the decline in its traditional industries (mainly linen and ship-building), also affecting suppliers and service industries, which combined with low levels of inward and Foreign Direct Investment. This resulted in high levels of unemployment throughout the period from the late 1960s onwards. The worst affected population group has 2 This has been a result of discrimination against Catholics within the police service and the army as well as of peer pressure in the Nationalist/Republican community not to join security forces. Copyright (c) Stefan Wolff. All rights reserved. No reprint without permission. 5 been that of Roman Catholic males, who, at persistently high levels of unemployment, were on average more than twice as likely not to have a job than Protestant males. The challenge for post-agreement reconstruction in the area of the economy, therefore, is not merely one of creating new jobs, but also one of addressing long-standing and potential new inequalities in the labour market. With regard to civil society, conflict-torn societies are either faced with a complete lack of any civil society, or with a strongly polarised one, i.e., the existence of two separate civil societies. To (re)build civil society is crucial for the long-term consolidation of democracy, and thus for the establishment of social and political processes in which conflict issues are addressed by non-violent means. After often decades of conflict, this is clearly an extremely difficult task. It requires both trust and reconciliation between (formerly)

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