Citizens' Wellbeing in Competitive Authoritarian
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UNIVERSITA’ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali e Politiche Graduate School in Social and Political Sciences Doctoral programme in Political Studies (SPS/04) CITIZENS’ WELLBEING IN COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES Candidate Andrea Cassani Supervisor Prof. Giovanni Marco Carbone Ph.D. Programme Director Prof. Antonella Besussi Doctoral Committee Prof. Matthijs Bogaards, Prof. Stefano Sacchi; Prof. Claudius Wagemann Academic Year 2012/2013 XXVI Cycle Contents Introduction. p. 4 Chapter 1. Competitive autocracies: A definition, their classification, and p. 10 measurement. 1.1 How to define, classify, and measure competitive authoritarianism. p. 11 1.1.1 Conceptualization. p. 11 1.1.2 Classification. p. 12 1.1.3 Operationalisation. p. 13 1.2 Defining competitive authoritarianism. p. 14 1.2.1 Political regime. p. 15 1.2.2 In the background of competitive authoritarianism: The identity p. 17 question. 1.2.3 Defining competitive authoritarianism. p. 19 1.3 Classifying competitive authoritarianism. p. 23 1.3.1 CA vs. Democracy. p. 24 1.3.2 CA vs. Mass-based regimes. p. 27 1.3.3 CA vs. Non-inclusive regimes. p. 30 1.4 Measuring competitive authoritarianism. p. 33 1.4.1 Periods of no authority. p. 33 1.4.2 Open regimes: Competitive authoritarianism and democracy. p. 35 p.37 1.4.3 Full authoritarian regimes: Single-party, hereditary, and military regimes. 1.5 Checking validity. p. 38 1.5.1 Comparing alternative measures. p. 40 1.5.2 Competitive autocracies: Origin, diffusion, duration. p. 41 Appendix 1.A: Coding Rules. p. 47 Appendix 1.B: List of Political Regimes. p. 51 Chapter 2. Competitive authoritarianism and citizens’ wellbeing: Theory and p. 56 hypotheses. 2.1 Literature review. p. 57 2.2 Citizens’ well-being: Concept and measurement. p. 61 2.3 The consequences of competitive authoritarianism on citizens’ wellbeing. p. 64 2.3.1 A premise. p. 64 2.3.2 Incentives. p. 65 2.3.3 CA vs. Democracy. p. 67 2.3.4 CA vs. Full authoritarian regimes. p. 71 2.4 The role of time and context. p. 83 2.4.1 Consolidation of competitive authoritarianism. p. 83 2.4.2 Regional context. p. 90 Chapter 3. Empirical analysis: Evidence from a TSCS analysis and a cross- p. 104 regional comparison. 3.1 Dataset. p. 105 3.2 Dependent variable(s). p. 106 3.3 Control variables. p. 110 3.4. Statistical model. p. 115 3.4.1 Main alternative dynamic specifications. p. 116 3.4.2 Application. p. 118 3.5 Analysis. p. 123 3.5.1 Hypotheses. p. 124 3.5.2 Diagnostics and robustness checks. p. 126 3.6 A note on tables. p. 129 3.7 Findings: Hypotheses 1 and 2. p. 133 3.7.1 CA vs. Democracy. p. 134 3.7.2 CA vs. Full authoritarian regimes. p. 137 3.7.3 CA vs. Full authoritarian subtypes. p. 142 3.7.4 Robustness checks. p. 146 3.7.5 Control variables. p. 148 3.8 Findings: Hypothesis 3. p. 149 3.9 Findings: Hypothesis 4. p. 153 Appendix 3.A: Descriptive Statistics. p. 157 Appendix 3.B: Short- and Long-term Effects. p. 159 Appendix 3.C: Marginal Effects Analysis. p. 167 Appendix 3.D: Regression Analysis. p. 174 Chapter 4. Whether, how and to what extent competitive authoritarianism p. 194 counts: Drawing conclusions. Bibliography. p. 206 Introduction The idea that living in countries ruled by different political regimes matters beyond the political sphere is a fascinating one. It echoes in the words of politicians, international agencies’ practitioners, non-governmental organizations’ activists, journalists. Recently the issue has also become object of thorough academic research. In both cases, however, the debate has been characterized by a marked ‘democratic bias’. We naturally tend to associate improvements in citizens’ material living conditions with democracy. We thus tend to focus, exclusively or so, on democratic reforms. In doing so, we are implicitly consigning about half of developing world to neglect and hopelessness at once. In a even more superficial way, we are overlooking the complexity of the processes of political transition occurred in the past three decades. Democracy is only part of the story. The present research aims to start filling this void, by studying the consequences of political change short of democratization on the wellbeing of citizens. (re-)Introducing competitive authoritarianism. Between the mid 1970s and the first half of the 1990s, a sensational number of transitions from authoritarian rule took place in close sequence all over the globe. One after the other, a wave of democratization overwhelmed Mediterranean Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe, part of Asia, and finally reached the shores of Africa. Beyond that evocative image reality was much more varied. Many of these processes of regime change effectively resulted in the introduction of political democracy. For several others the outcome was less certain. Often the crisis of an existing authoritarian regime caused its collapse, started a phase of transition typically accompanied by the partial opening of the political system, yet it did not lead to democracy. Not always the call of free multi-party elections, nor their 4 institutionalization as the main instrument to gain political power corresponded to the democratization of a country. Contrary to the sequence theorized by Huntington, however, the partial failure of these democratic experiments did not represent an ebb. Rather than getting reversed, many of the new multiparty systems survived. The explanation of the non-linear trajectory of political change followed by these regimes differed from one case to another. Scholars focused either on the absence of economic, social, cultural pre- requisites (Diamond et al., 1989 and 1995), on political elites’ merely instrumental commitment to democracy, the lack of linkages to the West (Levitsky and Way, 2010), or on a combination of them. Invariably, however, the result was the institutionalization of some hybrid form of political regime, characterized by co- existence of formally democratic institutions with persistently authoritarian practices of governance. The side-effect of this wave of democratization has been the formation of a “gray zone” between democracy and autocracy (Carothers, 2002). By the end of the 1990s, hybrid regimes became the predominant institutional setting of the developing world (Schedler, 2006), although they took different configurations. In several cases multi-party elections failed to reduce the ruling party’s hegemony and its control of political power, In Kazakhstan, for instance, President Nursultan Nazarbayev postponed multi-party presidential elections until 1999, while his People’s Unity party won 1994 and 1995 legislative elections virtually unchallenged. In many others, a larger degree of political competition was allowed. Sometimes this corresponded to replacement of the old ruling elite, as it happened with the victory of Sali Berisha’s Democratic Party in 1992 Albanian elections. Typically, however, this took place under the medium-to-long term reign of the same party, be it the Movement for Multi-party Democracy in Zambia or the Kenya African National Union in Kenya. These latter competitive variants of authoritarianism are regimes in which “formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an 5 extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy” (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 52). Research goals and relevance. Despite initial scepticism about its non-ephemeral nature, competitive authoritarianism has triggered a lively academic debate. The relative novelty of this political phenomenon challenged most consolidated theories of democratization and raised many new questions. Researchers studied the origins of these regimes, theorized about their functioning, and analyzed their ability to endure. These works made a valuable contribution to our understanding of the phenomenon. We learned about the causes of its recent spread in conjuncture with the end of the Cold War. We discovered that, rather than a source of fragility, the interaction of democratic and autocratic institutions may even strengthen incumbents’ hold on power. To date, however, relatively little attention has been paid to another relevant issue: the consequences of this form of political regime on the wellbeing of citizens living under its rule. The reversal of the usual perspective – treating competitive authoritarianism as the explanatory factor of something else, rather than the object to be explained – represents a new ramification of the debate. It may improve the comprehension of the phenomenon by providing insightful feedbacks for the study of both the functioning and the future prospects of these regimes. More generally, it has been anticipated, research on the topic also adds to the debate on the consequences of democratic reforms. Given its hybrid nature, competitive authoritarianism represents the ideal place where to compare the effects of the fundamentally different institutions – democratic and authoritarian – that within it coexist, to evaluate the consequences of their interaction, to weigh their respective impact. Beyond the academic debate, studying the consequences of competitive authoritarianism on citizens’ wellbeing sheds light on issues of even more substantive interest. First, the phenomenon currently affects about one-fourth of people living in so-called developing countries. To study the socioeconomic impact of this form of political regime means to evaluate how the living conditions