TYPOLOGY of POST-COMMUNIST REGIMES (Conceptual Toolkit)
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
TYPOLOGY OF POST-COMMUNIST REGIMES (Conceptual toolkit) Bálint MAGYAR – Bálint MADLOVICS 2018 Content ▪ Political system ▪ Political-economic actors ▪ Economy ▪ Corruption ▪ Law enforcement ▪ Ideology ▪ Modelled trajectories of post-communist regimes Political system Illusion ➢of linear progress towards liberal democracies after the change of the political regimes in 1989-1990; ➢that any regime can be built on any kind of ruins of communist dictatorships. Transitional systems or terminal stations? The Democracy—Dictatorship Axis Liberal Hybrid regimes Dictatorship democracy Liberal Electoral Competitive Hegemonic Closed democracy democracy authoritarianism authoritarianism authoritarianism Democracy Autocracy Dictatorship ➢ First categorization: András Bozóki and Dániel Hegedűs, “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union,” Democratization, April 13, 2018, 1–17. ➢ Second categorization: Marc Morjé Howard and Philip G. Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 367 ➢ Third categorization: János Kornai, “The System Paradigm ReVisited,” Acta Oeconomica 66, no. 4 (1, 2016): 565 András Bozóki – Dániel Hegedűs: Proliferation of political regime categories Liberal democracies Hybrid regimes Dictatorships Representative Mixed regimes between democracy & Authoritarian & totalitarian democracy (consensual dictatorship: regimes: or majoritarian), and • Democradura and dictablanda (Guillermo • Communist and fascist further classifications: O’Donnell & Philippe Schmitter) totalitarian dictatorship • Polyarchy (Robert • Delegative democracy (G. O’Donnell) (Hannah Arendt, Carl Dahl) • Illiberal democracy (Fareed Zakaria) Friedrich & Zbigniew • Participatory • Managed democracy (Archie Brown) Brzezinski) democracy (Carol • Competitive authoritarianism (Steven Levitsky • Post-totalitarianism Pateman) & Lucan Way) (Václav Havel) • Deliberative • Electoral authoritarianism (Andreas Schedler) • Authoritarianism (Juan democracy (Jürgen • Semi-democracy (Larry Diamond) Linz) Habermas) • Liberal autocracy (L. Diamond) • Elitist democracy • Defective democracy (Wolfgang Merkel) (John Higley) • Postmodern despotism (Ágnes Heller) • Externally constrained hybrid regime (A. Bozóki & D. Hegedűs) Marc Morjé Howard – Philip G. Roessler: Disaggregation of Regimes János Kornai: Characteristics of Democracy, Autocracy, and Dictatorship (Primary features) Democracy Autocracy Dictatorship 1 The government can be removed The government cannot be removed The government cannot be through a peaceful and civilized through a peaceful and civilized removed through a peaceful and P procedure procedure civilized procedure 2 Institutions which concertedly Institutions which could concertedly Institutions which could R guarantee accountability are well- guarantee accountability are either allow/guarantee accountability do I established formal or weaK not exist M 3 Legal parliamentary opposition Legal parliamentary opposition exists; No legal parliamentary opposition; A exists; multiple parties run for multiple parties run for elections only one party runs for elections R elections Y 4 No terror (large-scale detention in No terror (large-scale detention in Terror (large-scale detention in forced-labor camps and forced-labor camps and executions), forced-labor camps and executions) but various means of coercion are executions) used against political adversaries (imprisonment with false allegation, or politically motivated murder) János Kornai: Characteristics of Democracy, Autocracy, and Dictatorship (Secondary features) Democracy Autocracy Dictatorship 5 No repressive means are used Repressive means are used against No parliamentary opposition against parliamentary opposition parliamentary opposition S 6 Institutions of “checks and Institutions functioning as “checks and No institutions have been created balances” are active and balances” are weak and non- to act as “checks and balances” E independent independent C 7 Relatively few officials are The ruling political group appoints its The ruling political group appoints O appointed by the ruling political own cadres to virtually all important its own cadres to all important N group offices offices D 8 Civil protest against the Civil protest against the government Civil protest against the A government has no legal has no legal boundary; weak civil government is prohibited by law R boundary; strong civil society society 9 Interested persons and their There are legal frameworks for Participation is not even formally Y organizations take part in many participation but they are practically prescribed forms and to relevant degrees in dysfunctional preparations for decision-making (significant levels of participation) 10 Freedom of the press is Freedom of the press is constrained by No freedom of the press guaranteed by law, and is actually legal and economic means enforced János Kornai: Post-communist countries of Eurasia by political institutional system Democracies Autocracies Dictatorships Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Vietnam, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, North Korea Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Macedonia , Moldova, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine Stubborn structures ➢the lack of proper separation of the three spheres of social action (political, market, communal) (Claus Offe) ➢collusion of power&ownership (Rusztem Nureev, Andrey Ryabov) ➢patrimonialization: private appropriation of the public authority (Max Weber, Oleksandr Fisun) ➢patron-client relations (Henry Hale) ➢informality / discretionality (Alena Ledeneva) ➢centralized and monopolized forms of corruption Whether these features of post-communist regimes are ▪ system defining features, or ▪ just unpleasant side-effects? Stubborn structures Lack of separation of spheres of social action (Claus Offe) Patrimonialization Informal networks (Oleskandr Fisun) (Alena Ledeneva) Collusion of power and Patron-client relations ownership (Andrey Ryabov) (Henry Hale) Centralized/monopolized forms of corruption Henry Hale: Legacies of Patronalism at the End of Communist Rule Most Patronalistic Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Moderately Patronalistic Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Serbia, Slovakia Least Patronalistic Croatia, Czech Republic, East Germany (DDR), Hungary, Poland, Slovenia Source: Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics – Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 60 Henry Hale: Formal Constitutions and Patronalism in Post- Communist Countries since the Mid-1990s Degree of Type of Executive Power Patronalism Presidentialism Divided Executive Parliamentarism High Azerbaijan*, Belarus*, Georgia*, Armenia*, Ukraine * Albania, Bulgaria*, Kazakhstan*, Kyrgyzstan (until 2010*), (2006-10; 2014-), Kyrgyzstan Hungary (2010-), Macedonia*, Moldova (until 2000*), Russia*, Tajikistan*, (2010-*), Moldova (2016-*), Moldova (2000-2016) Turkmenistan*, Ukraine* (1991-2006; 2010- Romania* 2014), Uzbekistan* Moderate Estonia, Hungary (1998- 2010), Latvia, Lithuania*, Serbia*, Slovakia* Low Croatia (until 2000*), Croatia (2001-*), Czech Poland* Republic (2012-*), Hungary (until 1998), Slovenia* * Countries having direct presidential elections; Source: based on Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics—Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 459, but revised and modified in some particulars. Renewing and restructuring the language tools to describe post-communist regimes The problems with the purely political institutional approach • Under each category, there is a heterogeneous set of cases • It sticks to the political level, disregarding the stubborn structures connected to it • How can we incorporate into the typology of Post-Communist regimes further dimensions? ▪ ownership relations; ▪ economy; ▪ structure of the ruling elite? Interpretative Framework of Post-Communist Regimes (combining the political, economic and sociological dimensions) Conservative autocracy Communist Liberal democracy dictatorship Estonia North Korea Poland Romania Market-expoliting Patronal democracy China dictatorship Ukraine Hungary Uzbekistan Russia Patronal autocracy (Countries depicted as of 2018.) Presumption of Dominant Principles of State Functioning ▪ Subordinated to public interest ➢night watchman state ➢welfare state ➢developmental state ▪ Subordinated to private interest Patronage Politics: State Functions Subordinated to Private Interests The basis for the term Alternative terms used for the description of used patronage in post-communist regimes 1. Actor network / patronal / clan / mafia state 2. Action (targeting patrimonial / neopatrimonial / sultanistic state power) 3. Action (targeting rent-seeking / kleptocratic / predatory goods) state 4. Legality corrupt / partially captured / criminal state Who is the actor? Interpretative layers of categories to describe patronage regimes The type of Interpretive layers of the category To which features of the state the state category refers to 1. State (operated Monopoly on the right to authorize the Institution by which the ruling elite by formal legitimate use of violence exercises legitimate coercion institutions) 2. Network 1st feature + increasing informal character of the The ruling