TYPOLOGY OF POST-COMMUNIST REGIMES (Conceptual toolkit)

Bálint MAGYAR – Bálint MADLOVICS 2018 Content ▪ Political system ▪ Political-economic actors ▪ Economy ▪ Corruption ▪ Law enforcement ▪ Ideology ▪ Modelled trajectories of post-communist regimes Political system Illusion ➢of linear progress towards liberal after the change of the political regimes in 1989-1990; ➢that any regime can be built on any kind of ruins of communist .

Transitional systems or terminal stations? The — Axis

Liberal Hybrid regimes Dictatorship democracy Liberal Electoral Competitive Hegemonic Closed democracy democracy authoritarianism authoritarianism Democracy Dictatorship

➢ First categorization: András Bozóki and Dániel Hegedűs, “An Externally Constrained : Hungary in the European Union,” Democratization, April 13, 2018, 1–17. ➢ Second categorization: Marc Morjé Howard and Philip G. Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 367 ➢ Third categorization: János Kornai, “The System Paradigm Revisited,” Acta Oeconomica 66, no. 4 (1, 2016): 565 András Bozóki – Dániel Hegedűs: Proliferation of political regime categories Liberal democracies Hybrid regimes Dictatorships

Representative Mixed regimes between democracy & Authoritarian & (consensual dictatorship: regimes: or majoritarian), and • Democradura and dictablanda (Guillermo • Communist and fascist further classifications: O’Donnell & Philippe Schmitter) totalitarian dictatorship • Polyarchy (Robert • Delegative democracy (G. O’Donnell) (Hannah Arendt, Carl Dahl) • () Friedrich & Zbigniew • Participatory • Managed democracy (Archie Brown) Brzezinski) democracy (Carol • Competitive authoritarianism (Steven Levitsky • Post- Pateman) & Lucan Way) (Václav Havel) • Deliberative • Electoral authoritarianism (Andreas Schedler) • Authoritarianism (Juan democracy (Jürgen • Semi-democracy (Larry Diamond) Linz) Habermas) • Liberal autocracy (L. Diamond) • Elitist democracy • Defective democracy (Wolfgang Merkel) (John Higley) • Postmodern (Ágnes Heller) • Externally constrained hybrid regime (A. Bozóki & D. Hegedűs) Marc Morjé Howard – Philip G. Roessler: Disaggregation of Regimes János Kornai: Characteristics of Democracy, Autocracy, and Dictatorship (Primary features)

Democracy Autocracy Dictatorship 1 The can be removed The government cannot be removed The government cannot be through a peaceful and civilized through a peaceful and civilized removed through a peaceful and P procedure procedure civilized procedure 2 Institutions which concertedly Institutions which could concertedly Institutions which could R guarantee accountability are well- guarantee accountability are either allow/guarantee accountability do I established formal or weak not exist M 3 Legal parliamentary opposition Legal parliamentary opposition exists; No legal parliamentary opposition; A exists; multiple parties run for multiple parties run for elections only one party runs for elections R elections Y 4 No terror (large-scale detention in No terror (large-scale detention in Terror (large-scale detention in forced-labor camps and forced-labor camps and executions), forced-labor camps and executions) but various means of coercion are executions) used against political adversaries (imprisonment with false allegation, or politically motivated murder) János Kornai: Characteristics of Democracy, Autocracy, and Dictatorship (Secondary features) Democracy Autocracy Dictatorship 5 No repressive means are used Repressive means are used against No parliamentary opposition against parliamentary opposition parliamentary opposition S 6 Institutions of “checks and Institutions functioning as “checks and No institutions have been created balances” are active and balances” are weak and non- to act as “checks and balances” E independent independent C 7 Relatively few officials are The ruling political group appoints its The ruling political group appoints O appointed by the ruling political own cadres to virtually all important its own cadres to all important N group offices offices D 8 Civil protest against the Civil protest against the government Civil protest against the A government has no legal has no legal boundary; weak civil government is prohibited by law R boundary; strong civil society society 9 Interested persons and their There are legal frameworks for Participation is not even formally Y organizations take part in many participation but they are practically prescribed forms and to relevant degrees in dysfunctional preparations for decision-making (significant levels of participation) 10 of the press is is constrained by No freedom of the press guaranteed by law, and is actually legal and economic means enforced János Kornai: Post-communist countries of Eurasia by political institutional system

Democracies Dictatorships

Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, , Vietnam, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, North Korea Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Macedonia , Moldova, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine Stubborn structures ➢the lack of proper separation of the three spheres of social action (political, market, communal) (Claus Offe) ➢collusion of power&ownership (Rusztem Nureev, Andrey Ryabov) ➢patrimonialization: private appropriation of the public authority (, Oleksandr Fisun) ➢patron-client relations (Henry Hale) ➢informality / discretionality (Alena Ledeneva) ➢centralized and monopolized forms of corruption

Whether these features of post-communist regimes are

▪ system defining features, or ▪ just unpleasant side-effects? Stubborn structures Lack of separation of spheres of social action (Claus Offe)

Patrimonialization Informal networks (Oleskandr Fisun) (Alena Ledeneva)

Collusion of power and Patron-client relations ownership (Andrey Ryabov) (Henry Hale)

Centralized/monopolized forms of corruption Henry Hale: Legacies of Patronalism at the End of Communist Rule

Most Patronalistic Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Moderately Patronalistic Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Serbia, Slovakia

Least Patronalistic Croatia, Czech Republic, East Germany (DDR), Hungary, Poland, Slovenia

Source: Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics – Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 60 Henry Hale: Formal Constitutions and Patronalism in Post- Communist Countries since the Mid-1990s Degree of Type of Executive Power Patronalism Presidentialism Divided Executive Parliamentarism High Azerbaijan*, Belarus*, Georgia*, Armenia*, Ukraine * Albania, Bulgaria*, Kazakhstan*, Kyrgyzstan (until 2010*), (2006-10; 2014-), Kyrgyzstan Hungary (2010-), Macedonia*, Moldova (until 2000*), Russia*, Tajikistan*, (2010-*), Moldova (2016-*), Moldova (2000-2016) Turkmenistan*, Ukraine* (1991-2006; 2010- Romania* 2014), Uzbekistan*

Moderate Estonia, Hungary (1998- 2010), Latvia, Lithuania*, Serbia*, Slovakia* Low Croatia (until 2000*), Croatia (2001-*), Czech Poland* Republic (2012-*), Hungary (until 1998), Slovenia*

* Countries having direct presidential elections; Source: based on Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics—Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 459, but revised and modified in some particulars. Renewing and restructuring the language tools to describe post-communist regimes The problems with the purely political institutional approach

• Under each category, there is a heterogeneous set of cases • It sticks to the political level, disregarding the stubborn structures connected to it

• How can we incorporate into the typology of Post-Communist regimes further dimensions? ▪ ownership relations; ▪ economy; ▪ structure of the ruling elite? Interpretative Framework of Post-Communist Regimes (combining the political, economic and sociological dimensions)

Conservative autocracy Communist dictatorship Estonia North Korea Poland

Romania Market-expoliting Patronal democracy China dictatorship

Ukraine

Hungary

Uzbekistan Russia

Patronal autocracy (Countries depicted as of 2018.) Presumption of Dominant Principles of State Functioning

▪ Subordinated to public interest ➢night watchman state ➢welfare state ➢developmental state ▪ Subordinated to private interest Patronage Politics: State Functions Subordinated to Private Interests The basis for the term Alternative terms used for the description of used patronage in post-communist regimes

1. Actor network / patronal / clan / 2. Action (targeting patrimonial / neopatrimonial / sultanistic state power) 3. Action (targeting rent-seeking / kleptocratic / predatory goods) state 4. Legality corrupt / partially captured / criminal state Who is the actor? Interpretative layers of categories to describe patronage regimes The type of Interpretive layers of the category To which features of the state the state category refers to 1. State (operated Monopoly on the right to authorize the Institution by which the ruling elite by formal legitimate use of violence exercises legitimate coercion institutions) 2. Network 1st feature + increasing informal character of the The ruling elite’s exercising power state connections within and between the units of the through mainly informal power network state 3. Patronal 1st + 2nd features + the personal, patronal, The ruling elite’s internal dependency, state hierarchically dependent character of the ruling patron-client relations (patronal power elite network) 4. Clan state 1st + 2nd + 3rd features + the adopted political The ruling elite’s anthropological family (political-economic clan) structure of the structure and cultural patterns ruling elite 5. Mafia state 1st + 2nd + 3rd + 4th features + the illegal The legality of the ruling elite’s actions character of the ruling elite’s practice of power What is the action for private appropriation of the means of power? Interpretative layers of categories to describe patronage regimes

The type of state Interpretive layers of the category To which features of the state the category refers to

1. State (of legitimate Monopoly on the right to authorize the Institution by which the ruling elite domination) use of violence with constitutional exercises legal coercion (binding) constraints 2. Patrimonial state 1st feature + the private appropriation Treatment of society as a private of governmental sphere to the extent of domain traditional (hard) constraints 3. Neopatrimonial 1st feature + 2nd feature + continued Patrimonial rule operating in a new state appropriation to the extent of legal institutional setting (the façade of (soft) constraints democratic institutional system)

4. Sultanistic state 1st + 2nd + 3rd feature + continued Lack of constraints to arbitrariness in appropriation to maximal extent (no treating society as private domain constraints) What is the action for private appropriation of goods? Interpretative layers of categories to describe patronage regimes

The type of Interpretive layers of the category To which features of the state state the category refers to

1. State (driven by Monopoly of taxation (tax, rent, etc.) for Primary source of state revenues public good) maintaing public functions 2. Rent-seeking 1st feature + legal overtaxing in favor of Favoritism to expand state state public or private actors bureaucracy for supporters 3. Kleptocratic 1st + 2nd features + non-legal diverting of Illegal favoritism state current incomes to private hands 4. Predatory 1st + 2nd + 3rd features + expropriation Illegal predation state of non-monetary property using non-legal state coercion

Internal dimensions: public policy vs. private goals; normative vs. discretional; legal vs. non-legal Is the action legal? Interpretative layers of categories to describe patronage regimes

The type of Interpretive layers of the category To which features of the state state the category refers to

1. State (respecting Monopoly of taxation (tax, rent, etc.) for Primary source of state revenues the consitution) maintaing public functions 2. Corrupt state 1st feature + the abuse of entrusted Corruption = deviant element of power for private gain (occasional, non- the system stable chains of vassalage) 3. Partially 1st + 2nd features + chains of corrupt Corruption = structural element of captured state vassalage with a permanent character the system

4. Criminal state 1st + 2nd + 3rd features + subordinated Corruption = constituting element to and monopolized by a political of the system enterprise (governance led as a criminal organization) Organizational connections of people to power institutions in three ideal-type political regimes

Liberal democracy Post-communist Communist regime patronal autocracy multi-pyramid system single-pyramid system single-pyramid system non-patronal network patronal network patronal network dominance of dominance of dominance of formal institutions informal institutions formal institutions State – society relationships in three ideal-type political regimes Liberal democracy Post-communist patronal Communist regime autocracy democracy autocracy dictatorship constitutional state criminal state / mafia state party state („rechtsstaat”) separation of powers connected powers merger of powers separation of church and state church bought by state church blackmailed / repressed by state conflict of public and private fusion of public and private interests repression of private interests interest public policy patronal policy power policy transparent/regulated non-transparent / informal collusion subordination of private interests cooperation and connections of public and private spheres to public sphere between public and private spheres Political-economic actors The formal position of the chief patron, the decision making “body” and the type of patronal networks in Russia

The formal position The ruling Ruling elite Type of the of chief patron (as „body” (the according to the patronal state the head of decision making type of patronal executive power) center) networks before tsar court service gentry, feudal state 1917 feudal „orders” 1917 - party general politburo nomenklatura party state 1991 secretary 2003 - president patron’s court adopted political mafia state family The patronal network in a post-communist single-pyramid system does not resemble the service gentry or feudal „order” (as in pre-revolutionary Russia) because in the adopted political family:

➢ there is no corporate-type organization, no rank order-type separate positions in relation to the chief patron, no corporate self-consciousness; ➢ the client/vassal does not have the legal status of a vassal but only the vassal’s social position; while equal are not de jure eliminated, the social position of vassals is created en masse; ➢ there is no “contractual” relation to the chief patron; ➢ the client/vassal does not possess property as an unquestionable consequence of its orderly status; subpatrons and clients can be deprived of their property by arbitrary means. The patronal network in a post-communist single-pyramid system does not resemble the nomenklatura (as in the Soviet Union), because the adopted political family:

➢ extends the network of political and bureaucratic administration beyond its formal institutions; ➢ is not necessarily the adoption of single individuals, but of a “family”, whereas individuals belonged to the nomenklatura; ➢ has privileges that may bring not only extra consumption and income, but property as well; and the privileges gained in property are not restricted for the duration of being in “service,” but can be kept and inherited. The patronal network in a post-communist single-pyramid system cannot be characterized as a class, because the adopted political family:

➢ is not a fundamentally economic phenomenon, linking people of similar economic status or relation to productive property within a capitalist society of legal equality; ➢ is not caused by, but it is the cause of, the patterns of social inequality, association, and distance; ➢ is characterized by vertical, hierarchic connections between its members instead of horizontal relations; ➢ the cohesion thereof is based not on class consciousness or identity, but on personal loyalty and consequent protection; ➢ creates a society where class-based, horizontal status organizations for collective bargaining are disrupted; ➢ co-opts and subordinates other social groups instead of struggling against them. The patronal network in a post-communist single-pyramid system can be characterized as an adopted political family, because:

➢ different networks of extended personal acquaintance are organized into a single adopted political family (quasi clan); ➢ not only individuals, but families / adopted families are incorporated; ➢ it is informal, without formal membership; ➢ it extends over formal institutions; ➢ it is based on patronal, and not organizational loyalty (there is no free entrance into or free exit from it); ➢ the position within the adopted political family does not converge necessarily with the formal administrative positions; ➢ its power was based on the merger of political and economic “resources”; ➢ it follows the cultural patterns of rule of the patriarchal family or clan. Alena Ledeneva: Types of Networks

INDIVIDUAL Strong ties

1. ‘Inner circle:’ sharing 3. ‘Core contacts:’ sharing life (family and the most career (patrons and clients, trusted, private affairs) public affairs) Private settings Public settings (centered) 4. ‘Mediated, or periphery, (de-centered) 2. ‘Useful friends:’ sharing contacts:’ sharing leisure (sport, dacha) affiliation (alumni, associates, co-members)

Weak ties INSTITUTION

Source: Ledeneva, Alena (2013): Can Russia Modernise? New York: Cambridge University Press (p. 172) Interpretative Framework of Post-Communist Regimes (combining the political, economic and sociological dimensions)

• Conservative autocracy • Liberal democracy • Communist • (Estonia, Czech dictatorship Republic) • (North Korea)

• • Patronal democracy Market-exploiting dictatorship • (Bulgaria, Romania) • (China, Vietnam)

• Patronal autocracy • (Hungary, Russia, Central-Asian Rep.) The Ruling Elites in a Liberal Democracy: Autonomous Elites The Ruling Elite in a Communist Dictatorship: The Nomenklatura Ruling Elite in a Patronal Autocracies: The Adopted Political Family

cultural

secret service, military

economy

administrative Political media The Ruling Elites in Patronal Democracies: Competing Patronal Networks

cultural

economy

administrative

Political media Political (government) (opposition) secret service, s s., m military (1) (2) The Ruling Elites in a Conservative Autocracy: Authoritarianism without Dominating Other Elites

political

admi- economic cultural media secret nistra- service, tive military The Ruling Elite in a Market-Exploiting Dictatorship: Dominant Party Elite

political

economic adminis-trative

secret service, military media cultural Key system components and political processes in three ideal-type political regimes Liberal democracy Post-communist patronal Communist regime autocracy head of the executive power chief patron general party secretary (president / PM) (patronal presidentialism) govern dispose command (within formal authorization) (beyond formal authorization) (within formal authorization) government patron’s court politburo autonomous elites adopted political family nomenklatura multi-party system dominant-party system one-party system fair election manipulated election uncontested election assesment of political alternatives loyalty demonstration enforced ritual action real choice constrained choice no choice governing party transmission belt party state party politicians’ party vassals’ party cadres’ party democratic party patron’s party centralized party joining cooptation / adoption enrollment opposition party marginalized / domesticated / n.a. liquidated / virtual party Main types of political and economic actors in three ideal-type political regimes Liberal democracy Post-communist patronal Communist regime autocracy citizen client / servant subject politician poligarch (political enterpreneur) / high level party cadre/functionary political stooge (frontman, strohman) trustee смотрящий („holder”) (middle and low level) party cadre/functionary public servant patronal servant administrative cadre aппаратчик (apparatchik, bureaucratic functionary) state’s security services patron’s security services party’s security services entrepreneur oligarch / minigarch state enterprise leader lobbyist corruption broker толкач, „pusher” business interest facilitating corrupt exchange plan or barter bargain representation n.a. economic stooge (front man, strohmann) n.a. Types of oligarchs in patronal regimes Initial source of wealth Patronal connections To which feature the category refers to Inner circle oligarch Patronal network Embedded Being founder of a patronal network Patron-bred oligarch Patronal network Embedded Being fostered by a patron Private sector / patronal network Having been accepted as member of an already Embedded Adopted oligarch (different from present) existing network Having no patronal allegiance (maintaining Private sector Not embedded Autonomous oligarch equally good relations to every network) Maintaining constrained autonomy from the Private sector Not embedded Escort oligarch single-pyramid network Private sector / patronal network Embedded Having been subjugated by the chief patron Surrendered oligarch (different from dominant) Private sector / patronal network n.a. Being removed from the game (alive or dead) Liquidated oligarch (different from dominant) Private sector / patronal network Resisting domination attempt of the single- Not embedded Rival oligarch (different from dominant) pyramid network Private sector / patronal network Being undecided as to what attitude he should Not embedded Recalcitrant oligarch (different from dominant) have toward the chief patron : in both regime types : only in patronal democracy : only in patronal autocracy : temporary categories (in patronal autocracy) The „separation of branches of power” within a single pyramid patronal network Executive Party Economic Media power Personal power background power wealth Chief patron + + + + +

Poligarch (1) + - + - - +

Poligarch (2) - + + - - + Oligarch (1) - - + - +

Oligarch (2) - - - + + Front man - + - - - (political) Front man - - - - + (economic) Economy Economy Presumption of Dominant Principles of State Functioning

▪ Subordinated to public interest ➢night watchman state ➢welfare state ➢developmental state ▪ Subordinated to private interest Karl Polányi: The Two Approaches to the Economy

Formal Substantive description description (economy in general) (price-making markets) Instituted Process (Material elements changing ‘hands’ or place) As ecological, technological, and societal Locational Appropriative elements connect and equilibrate movements movements Forms of Fundamental Transpor- Production Circulation Administrati- integration types of tation of of goods of goods on of goods goods structure Transaction Disposition • reciprocity • symmetry Between One-sided act • redistribution • centricity hands • exchange • market

Karl Polányi : The Economy as Instituted Process Social/economic integration schemes/coordinating mechanisms in three ideal-type political regimes

Capitalist system Socialist system Relational economy Planned/command economy Socially/politically Patronally „embedded Bureaucratically „embedded „disembedded economy” economy” economy” Dominant integration scheme/coordinating mechanism Market coordination Relational Bureocratic market-redistribution resource-redistribution • regulated • non-formalized • formalized • impersonal • personal • impersonal • normative • discretional • normative • dominant • dominant • general/total of the impersonal Visible hand of the patron interfering Central planning of the nomenklatura market forces with market forces bypassing market forces Horizontal Vertical Vertical Political preconditions of three ideal-types of economic regimes

Communist regime à party state Administrative market

Liberal democracy à constitutional state Competitive market

Post-communist patronal autocracy à Relational market mafia state Administrative market Mechanisms of coordination Actors of transaction Goods of transaction Main Burocratic Authorised members of the nomen- Production and consumer mechanism of resource- klatura inputs coordination redistribution Legal Queuing, waiting Admin.cadre ßà Private person Consumer goods ßà Time lists Seller ßà Buyer

Plan bargain Party cadre ßà Party cadre Production ßàPolitical influence, Party cadre ßà Administrative cadre inputs loyalty Correc- Admin.cadre ßàState Enterprise Leader ting Under-planning Admin.cadre ßàState Enterprise Leader Soft budget ßà Illusion of hard mecha- constraint budget constrait nisms Future prod.inputs Barter State Enterprise ßà State Enterprise Production ßà Production Leader Leader inputs inputs Illegal Corruption Administrative cadre ßàPrivate person Consumer goods ßà Money Seller ßàBuyer Three coexisting economic modes under command economy ➢ State ownership was the basis of the “first economy,” which was a determining force of the economy following the expropriation of via the waves of nationalizations. ➢ The private businesses linked to the state sector meant the “second economy” which filled in the market gaps of the general shortage stemming from the centrally planned economy in a rather surprising bounty of forms: in retail, retail services and the family farms, so called backyard farmsteads.

➢ The category of the “third economy” used to designate the myriad market maneuvers oiled by corrupt transactions, also in the context of the consumer bottlenecks of the shortage economy. The great variety of forms of corruption, both solicited and expected, permeated the gamut of society—from the reception desk to the party chairs—rather evenly. At virtually all points of economic contact across the shortage economy that accompanied state monopoly, individuals would find themselves equipped with some stock, service, or competency in a discretional decision to sell, for which they could pocket a tip, gratuity or corrupt allowance. The everyday Hungarian terms for kick-back money, such as “kenőpénz” meaning grease-money, or “csúszópénz” sliding-money, were indicative of the fact that without oiling the machinery, the planned economic system itself would have in fact been paralyzed. The unavoidable, system-preserving character of these mutual reciprocities that could be placed anywhere on the scale of legitimacy and illegitimacy made this web of corrupt transactions a morally accepted convention. For this system worked in a quasi egalitarian manner, after all the opportunities for illegitimate ways of accumulating wealth were greatly limited even for leaders in the economy built on state monopoly, while by means of their mini-monopolies the hundreds of thousands people in the lower strata of the system could also impose their “allowances.” Competitive market Mechanisms of Actors of transaction Goods of transaction coordination Main Market mechanism of Private and public actors Goods and services coordination coordination

State regulations and subsidies ßà Political Legal Lobbying Entrepreneur ßà Politician success

Discount on goods/services ßà Tax Grey market Buyer ßàSeller evasion Distor- ting Petty corruption mecha- Entrepreneur ßà Public servant Bureaucratic facilitation ßà Bribe nisms (administrative)

Petty corruption (law Criminal ßà Public servant Non-enforcement of law ßà Bribe Illegal enforcement) Relational market Mechanisms of coordination Actors of transaction Goods of transaction Relational Main mechanism of market Corrupt private and public actors Power + ownership/revenues coordination redistribution

Oligarchic state Future state protection ßà Party Oligarch ßà Party leader(s) Bottom-up capture (party) financing, bribe Annexing annexing Oligarchic state Oligarch, criminal ßà Political eli State protection ßà Bribe mecha- capture (state) nisms Political Servitude derived Paid with (collusion patronalization + Poligarch ßà patronal servant from unconditional ßàadministr. loyality position of legal and Top-down patrimonialization illegal annexing Economic Wealth ßà discretional access elements) Poligarch ßà oligarch/ to resources and patronalization + strohmann patrimonialization markets Primary characteristics of state and private property relations in three ideal-type political regimes Liberal democracies Post-communist patronal Communist regime autocracy The political group in power The political group in power The political group in power, the ensures the dominance of controls and partially appropriates communist party emposes private property and market private property and coordination dominance of state property and coordination of the market bureaucratic coordination Private property is the Power&ownership State property is the dominant dominant form of property (власть&собственность) is the form of property determinative form of ownership Market coordination is the Relational coordination: the Bureaucratic coordination is the dominant mechanism of determinative coordinating dominant coordinating coordination mechanism overseen and directed mechanism by the adopted political family (competitive market) (relational market) (administrative market) Features of “property rights” in three ideal-type political regimes

Liberal democracy Post-communist patronal autocracy Communist regime private property power&ownership state property власть&собственность market economy relational economy command economy competitive market relational market administrative market competitive market relational market-redistribution bureaucratic resource- redistribution taking (taxation, rents, tribute, plunder) and centralised allocation: trading and taxing rent-seeking (administrative, budgetary, (re)distributing natural resources) privatization прихватизация, „grabitization” n.a. nationalization deprivatization, renationalization, nationalization / patrimonialization collectivization hostile takeover reiderstvo (centrally led corporate raiding) expropriation The nature of nationalization in three ideal-type political regimes

Liberal democracy Post-communist patronal Communist regime autocracy taking into taking under the taking into state ownership control of the dominant state ownership patronal network and operated and operated and operated along the principles of along the principles of along the principles of competitive market relational market administrative market Ownership rights (1) – Expropriation of exogenous rights in the patronal autocracy/mafia state

Fields of patronalization /expropriation Right to security and nationalization Ordinary renationalization is the complete seizure of a formerly privatized company by the protection of property state for a longer-lasting period Deprivatization is the expansion of state shareholding among privatized companies and Hot nationalization state-led holding structures Bandit nationalization, which means the nationalization of private assets Transit nationalization is the taking of a private company into “temporary state care” Money-pump nationalization is the nationalization of the losses of an economic activity and the privatization of its profits corporate raiding Centrally led corporate raiding Right to certain nationalization Market-acquiring nationalization is the nationalization of an economic activity or the right economic activity to it Competency nationalization means a central appropriation of municipal responsibilities Monopolization market raiding licences (normative à discretional) Right to fair treatment resources public procurments (competitive àpatronal) state supports/projects (normative à discretional) Cold nationalization private resources (chanelled à neutral/tolerated à sanctioned) obligations taxes (general à sectoral à discretional) public authorities fines (normative à arbitrary) tax office/attorney’s office (normative à politically selective law enforcement) Ownership rights (2) – Expropriation of exogenous rights in the patronal autocracy/mafia state Dominant form in...

Liberal democracy Patronal autocracy

legal quasi legal / illegal Character of state coercion normative discretional

Legislative normative legislator creator of custom tailored laws

Formal Executive a body that governs a person who disposes institutional actors of State bureaucracy a body of public servants a body of patronal servants state coercion Local autonomous bodies subordinated bodies Law enforcement normative law enforcement politically selective law enforcement legal tools (regulations, taxes, fines legal + illegal tools (threatening, Tools of state coercion etc.) blackmailing, corporate raiding etc.) Ownership rights (3) – Expropriation of endogenous rights Result of patronalization Market economy Relational economy De jure = de facto De jure =/= de facto /expropriation Matching Collusion (offshore, strohmann) Normative / persistent Discretional / ad hoc regulations regulations Endogenous rights The right Politician Entre- Poligarch Front man Oligarch preneur Access to enter a defined physical - + + + + property Use With- to obtain the ‘products’ of a - + + - + - rights drawal resource Manage- to regulate internal use - + + - + - + ment patterns and transform the resource by making Control improvements rights Exclusion to determinate who will have - + + - + - an access right, and how that right may be transferred

Alienation to sell or lease the rights of - + + - + - management and exclusion Corruption vs. Crimimal State Main Features of the Four Levels of Corruption

Character of Regularity and Direction of Distribution of Form of Economic Medium of Nature of Spread of relationship scope of corrupt corrupt corrupt nature of corrupt corruption corruption between the corrupt action transactions networks corruption exchange actors transactions

Petty Corruption Non- corruption Non- Ad hoc and Kickback without state Bottom-up systemic or n.a. Competitive Voluntary centralized partial money capture systemic

Oligarchic Non- Oligopolistic / Temporary / Moderately Parallel Voluntary / Kickback state Bottom-up systemic or locally permanent and centralized verticals Coercive money capture systemic monopolistic partial

Non- Oligopolistic / Permanent and Party Partially Parallel Protection Top-down systemic or locally Coercive partial state capture centralized verticals money systemic monopolistic (vassal chains)

Permanent and Criminal Single Protection Top-down Centralized Systemic Monopolistic Coercive general state Grand vertical money (vassal chains) corruption Patterns of corruption in three ideal-type political regimes

Liberal democracy Post-communist patronal Communist regime autocracy competitive market corruption relational market corruption administrative market corruption surplus corruption n.a. shortage corruption sellers’ corruption n.a. buyers’ corruption system destroying corruption system constituting corruption system lubricating corruption generally/normatively selectively preferred (крыша, moderately tolerated sanctioned „roof”) or sanctioned Types of Relational Economies (Political ) Type of Dominant form Initiating actors Types of Type of state Corruption political of corruption captures market Free competition Crony Crony corrupt Cronies Market capture Rent-seeking state (free entry / free transaction capitalism exit)

Oligarchic Oligarchic state Oligarchs capture capitalism Market + state capture Patronal Kleptocratic state Party state capture Poligarch capitalism

Mafia Adopted political Market + state + Criminal state family oligarch capture Monopoly capitalism (adoption / casting Predatory state out) Types and some features of reiderstvo in post-communist regimes Strength of „Legiti-macy” The initiator or client of the corporate raiding the state of raiding Organized upperworld: Low or middle level Rival entrepreneurs or Organized chief patron (top level public authority oligarchs underworld: criminal public authority) groups White raiding XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Strong state XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Gray raiding I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX I Weak XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX state Black raiding XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Criminal state State crime Corporate crime Crime Institutional environment Single-pyramid Multi-pyramid patronal system and features of the raiding patronal system action Monopolized Oligarchic Competitive Market + state + Market + state capture n.a. oligarch capture Legality, law enforcement The role of law and legality in three ideal-type political regimes

Liberal democracy Post-communist autocracy Communist regime : rule by law, law of rule: lawlessness: citizen subordinated to law law subordinated to the adopted political law subordinated to the party family normative individually tailored / politically selective repressive law-enforcement law-enforcement law-enforcement impartial jurisdiction politically selective jurisdiction show trials evidence kompromat fabricated accusation crime committed, process launched crime committed, process launched on the basis of crime not committed, process launched on the automatically political decision basis of political decision Institutions of state coercion in post-communist regimes (non-military) Type of organization Typical institution Particular state function in… Liberal democracy Post-communist patronal autocracy Extortion through selective law Police, SWAT (Special Weapons and Normative law enforcement Law enforcement agency enforcement, protection of the adopted Tactics forces) through (threats of) violence White political family Tax office, accounting office, Collection of normatively Extortion through selective inspection and Revenue agency coercion customs office imposed levies penalties (legal; formal Courts, office of state attorney or Neutralizing legal threats to the adopted Legal agency Adjudication of legal disputes state connections) public prosecutor political family (selective law enforcement) Surveillance and neutralizing Surveillance of formal and informal Intelligence agency Secret service(s) national security threats opposition (parties, NGOs, individuals) Part-time reserves of national Helping law enforcement agencies in Grey Auxiliary police Self-defense organizations police force serving the adopted political family coercion Protection of people and Protection of people and objects of Private enterprise Guarding companies (legal; semi- objects of public importance patronal importance formal state Neutralizing protests and other opposition- connections if Fan clubs Ultras n.a. related activities applicable) Intimidation, violent resolution of mass Black Paramilitary group Militias, extremist groups n.a. opposition activities coercion Extortion and liquidation of specific targets (illegal; informal Criminal groups, mafia, protection Organized underworld n.a. or opponents of the adopted political state connections rackets family if applicable)

Legend: = normal state coercion; = outsourced state coercion (repressive functions) Ideology, media, elections Ideology and media in three ideal-type political regimes

Liberal democracy Post-communist partonal Communist regime autocracy ideology neutral ideology applying ideology driven constitutionalism with the populism, nationalism etc. communist propaganda feedback of right-left / conservative-liberal ideologies balanced sphere of dominated sphere of totalitarian sphere of communication communication communication free speech domination and censorship ghettoization open media ownership crowding out state ownership and ban Political functions of ideological slogans

Slogan The phenomenon the Function Stigmatized groups slogan refers to God Unquestionable moral Depriving opponents of Atheists, liberals, etc. position moral acceptability

Nation Adopted political family Excluding opposition from Opposition parties, multinational the nation, eliminating companies, international public accountability organizations, civil society (NGOs, intellectuals etc.) Family Patriarchal family Exclusion of alternative Minorities (singles, LGBTQ, lifestyles homeless, unemployed etc.) Types of Elections

Adoption of Campaign Access to Access to media Neutrality of electoral funding of the campaign for the (real) public institutions system ruling party funding opposition Open Neutral Fair elections Consensual Legal Balanced

Unfair Consensual Legal (+ illegal) Imbalanced elections Restricted Biased Manipulated Highly One-sided Legal + illegal elections imbalanced

Uncontested Extremely One-sided Legal + illegal elections imbalanced No Hand-guided Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes Interpretative Framework of Post-Communist Regimes

• Conservative autocracy • Liberal democracy • Communist • (Estonia, Czech dictatorship Republic) • (North Korea)

• • Patronal democracy Market-exploiting dictatorship • (Bulgaria, Romania) • (China, Vietnam)

• Patronal autocracy • (Hungary, Russia, Central-Asian Rep.) Post-Communist Regime Types by Political Criteria

Political regime Removabilty/accountability

Cons. autoc. Cons. autoc. Lib. dem. Com. dict. Lib. dem. Com. dict.

Fair No / Lib. dem. Closed elections auth. uncontested Electoral dem. elections Unfair elections

Pat. dem. Mark. ex. dict. Pat. dem. Mark. ex. dict. Competitive auth.

Manipulated elections Hegemonic auth.

Pat. autoc. Pat. autoc. Post-Communist Regime Types by Party Criteria

Ruling party’s function Ruling party’s members

Cons. autoc. Cons. autoc. Lib. dem. Com. dict. Lib. dem. Com. dict. Politicians’ party State party Cadres’ party Governing party

Pat. dem. Mark. ex. dict. Pat. dem. Vassals’ party Mark. ex. dict. Transmission belt party

Pat. autoc. Pat. autoc. Post-Communist Regime Types by Elite Criteria

Behavioral motives Limited nature

Cons. autoc. Cons. autoc. Lib. dem. Com. dict. Lib. dem. Com. dict. Ideology Ideology-led Totalitarian neutral Limited

Ideology-applying Unconstrained Pat. dem. Mark. ex. dict. Pat. dem. Mark. ex. dict.

Pat. autoc. Pat. autoc. Post-Communist Regime Types by Social Criteria

Formality of institutions Autonomy of civil society

Cons. autoc. Cons. autoc. Lib. dem. Com. dict. Lib. dem. Com. dict. Free Non-existent Formal

Subjugated Semi-formal Pat. dem. Mark. ex. dict. Pat. dem. Mark. ex. dict.

Informal

Pat. autoc. Pat. autoc. Post-Communist Regime Types by Economic Criteria

Coordinating mechanism Normativity of state regulations

Cons. autoc. Cons. autoc. Lib. dem. Com. dict. Lib. dem. Com. dict. Bureaucratic resource Normative Market coordination redistribution

Pat. dem. Relational market Mark.-ex. dict. Pat. dem. Discretional Mark.-ex. dict. redistribution

Pat. autoc. Pat. autoc. Features of the six ideal-type regimes (1) Removability / Ruling party’s Ruling party’s Behavioral Political regime accountability function members motives

Ideology Liberal democracy Liberal democracy Fair elections Governing party Politicians’ party neutral

Conservative Electoral democracy / Competitive Unfair elections Governing party Politicians’ party Ideology led autocracy authoritarianism Electoral democracy / Patronal Ideology Competitive Unfair elections Governing party Vassals’ party applying democracy authoritarianism Hegemonic Manipulated Transmission belt Ideology Patronal autocracy Vassals’ party authoritarianism elections party applying

Market-exploiting Closed No / uncontested Ideology State party Cadres’ party dictatorship authoritarianism elections applying

Communist Closed No / uncontested State party Cadres’ party Ideology led dictatorship authoritarianism elections Features of the six ideal-type regimes (2) Formality of Autonomy of Coordinating Normativity of Limited nature institutions civil society mechanism state regulations Liberal Limited Formal coordination Normative democracy Conservative Limited / Formal Subjugated Market coordination Normative autocracy Unconstrained Patronal Market coordination / Limited Semi-formal Free / Subjugated Discretional democracy Relational Patronal Unconstrained Informal Subjugated Relational Discretional autocracy Market- Bureaucratic resource Formal / Semi- Normative / exploiting Unconstrained Non-existent redistribution / formal Discretional dictatorship Relational res.red.

Communist Bureaucratic resource Totalitarian Formal Non-existent Normative dictatorship redistribution Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes: 1. Hungary

• Conservative autocracy

• Liberal democracy • Communist dictatorship 1998 1990-1998

-2002

2002-2010

2010 • Market-exploiting • Patronal democracy - dictatorship

• Patronal autocracy Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes: 2. Poland

• Conservative autocracy

1990-2015 • Liberal democracy • Communist dictatorship 2015-

• Market-exploiting • Patronal democracy dictatorship

• Patronal autocracy Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes: 3. Romania

• Conservative autocracy

• Liberal democracy • Communist dictatorship

-2002 1990

2002

- • Market-exploiting • Patronal democracy dictatorship

• Patronal autocracy Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes: 4. Ukraine

• Conservative autocracy

• Liberal democracy • Communist dictatorship -1994 1990

2004 2004 2009 - - 2014 2009 • Market-exploiting -2014 1994 • Patronal democracy 2015 dictatorship -2015 -

• Patronal autocracy Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes: 5. Russia

• Conservative autocracy

• Liberal democracy • Communist dictatorship

-1999 1991

-2003

1999 • Market-exploiting • Patronal democracy 2003 dictatorship

-

• Patronal autocracy Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes: 6. Uzbekistan

• Conservative autocracy

• Liberal democracy • Communist dictatorship

- • Market-exploiting 1991 • Patronal democracy dictatorship

• Patronal autocracy Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes: 7. China

• Conservative autocracy

• Liberal democracy • Communist dictatorship

-

1990

• Market-exploiting • Patronal democracy dictatorship

• Patronal autocracy State of post-communist countries (2018) Removability / Ruling party’s Ruling party’s Behavioral Political regime accountability function members motives Competitive Manipulated Transmission belt Hungary Vassals’ party Ideology applying authoritarianism elections party

Fair / unfair Poland Electoral democracy Governing party Politicians’ party Ideology led elections

Politicians’ party Romania Electoral democracy Unfair elections Governing party Ideology applying / Vassals’ party Competitive Ukraine Unfair elections Governing party Vassals’ party Ideology applying authoritarianism Hegemonic Manipulated Transmission belt Russia Vassals’ party Ideology applying authoritarianism elections party Hegemonic Manipulated Transmission belt Uzbekistan Vassals’ party Ideology applying authoritarianism elections party Closed No / uncontested China State party Cadres’ party Ideology applying authoritarianism elections State of post-communist countries (2018) Formality of Autonomy of Coordinating Normativity of Limited nature institutions civil society mechanism state regulations

Hungary Unconstrained Informal Subjugated Relational Discretional

Poland Limited Formal Free Market coordination Normative

Limited / Free / Market coordination Normative / Romania Semi-formal Unconstrained Subjugated / Relational Discretional Semi-formal / Ukraine Unconstrained Subjugated Relational Discretional Informal

Russia Unconstrained Informal Subjugated Relational Discretional

Uzbekistan Unconstrained Informal Subjugated Relational Discretional

Formal / Semi- Bureaucratic / Normative / China Unconstrained Non-existent formal relational discretional Thank you for your attention.