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Mechanisms to Implement Un Security Council Resolutions by Using Military Force (Libyan Crisis 2011 As a Model) Analytical Study

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Mechanisms to Implement Un Security Council Resolutions by Using Military Force (Libyan Crisis 2011 As a Model) Analytical Study MECHANISMS TO IMPLEMENT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BY USING MILITARY FORCE (LIBYAN CRISIS 2011 AS A MODEL) ANALYTICAL STUDY ADNAN ABDULLAH RASHEED Dr. SALAHADDIN University – Law & Political Sciences College ISHIK University – Law faculty E-mail: [email protected], [email protected] Abstract- The forms of international organizations varied according to the purpose of their establishment. These types of international military organizations were formed, which aim to defend by all means (even military ones) the security and safety of the members of these organizations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of those military organizations that emerged after the end of the Second World War with the victory of the Allies over the Axis Powers, and then the Cold War between the allies of yesterday and today's adversaries. Most of the countries of the world are divided into supporters of this or that camp. The end of the Second World War marked the outbreak of another war called the Cold War between the two international poles: The Western pole led by the United States of America and the Eastern Pole led by the former Soviet Union. This Cold War has resulted in the emergence of international military organizations, and these international military organizations continued even after the demise of one of the two poles (the Soviet Union). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains and its last intervention in the emerging crises was its intervention to topple Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011. Because no military force was established under the UN, The UN Security Council (as a principal organ of the United Nations responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security), in the implementation of its resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, It depends on states and international military organizations, including NATO ((Libyan Crisis 2011 as a model). Key words- UN Security Council, The NATO, Libyan Crisis, Arab Spring Revolutions. I. UN SECURITY COUNCIL(1) permanent members, each has veto power and 10 others are elected for two years by the General The UN Security Council is one of the main organs of Assembly and among its members. The five the United Nations in the first place - in terms of permanent members are: United States - Russia - importance - although it was mentioned later in the China - France – United Kingdom(3). Non-permanent General Assembly, and the basis of this importance is members are elected as follows(4): 2 from Latin those powers vested in it. Article 24/1 of the Charter America, 5 from Asia and Africa, 2 from Western of the United Nations has affirmed that importance by Europe and 1 from Eastern Europe. The non- stating that "the desire for the work of the United permanent member may not be re-elected Nations to be swift and effective is that the members immediately after the expiry of its term in order to of that body entrust the Security Council with the give the opportunity to represent other States. At the main consequences of the maintenance of beginning of its composition, the Security Council international peace and security and agree to this consisted of 11 members, 5 permanent and 6 non- Council to act on its behalf in the performance of its permanent. In 1956, States proposed to increase the duties imposed by these consequences.” Accordingly, number of non-permanent members of the Security the Members of the United Nations agreed that the Council to 8 in line with the increase of the number Security Council, when carrying out its duties under of the members of General Assembly. Consideration this responsibility, acted on their behalf. The UN of that issue was deferred to a subsequent session Security Council consists of 15 members(2), five of although the proposal was initially supported by most whom are States. But the issue was not decided until 1963, where the number of members of the General Assembly at that time raised to 112 members, and (1) For more information see: David Malone, The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st (2) Susan Breau , Q & A Revision Guide International Century, lynne rienner publishers, Inc, London, 2004. Law 2013 and 2014, 1st edition, oxford university Sabine Hassler , Reforming the UN Security Council press, U.K., 2013, p. 16. Membership: The Illusin of Representativeness, 1st (3) Benedetto Conforti , The Law and Practice of the edition, Routledge , new York, 2013. Peter Nadin, United Nations, 3rd edition, martinus nijhoff UN Security Council Reform, 1st edition, Routledge , publishers, leiden / boston, 2005, p. 61. new York, 2016. And Dimitris Bourantonis , The (4) Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom , United Nations at History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, the Millennium: The Principal Organs, 1st edition, , 1st edition, , Routledge , new York, 2005. continuum, London and new York, 2000, p. 245. Proceedings of 176th The IIER International Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 18th-19th July 2018 25 Mechanisms to Implement un Security Council Resolutions by using Military Force (Libyan Crisis 2011 As A Model) Analytical Study then it was decided to raise the number of non- peace and security is made with the entry into force permanent members of the Security Council to 10(5). of the United Nations Charter is a matter for the benefit of the international community and not (9) II. THE BINDING UN SECURITY COUNCIL limited to the parties to the conflict . RESOLUTIONS III. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY If the procedures set forth in Article 6 of the Charter ORGANIZATION (NATO) fail to end international disputes(6), the conflict which continues to worsen until a conflict becomes a threat On April 4, 1949, twelve countries signed the NATO or a breach of international peace and security or a Treaty(10). NATO was established under Article 51 of case of aggression has occurred, the Charter of the the Charter of the United Nations(11). United Nations has set out a whole chapter which is On July 6, 1948, contacts began between the Chapter 7 where the UN Security Council can issue countries of Western Europe and the subsequent entry binding decisions in accordance with this chapter into the new alliance consecutively, on March 18, which, in its content, carries an objective solution to 1949, the provisions of the new charter were the settlement and termination of the conflict. announced and the date of signature was set in April Therefore, if the UN Security Council decides that 1949 in Washington. But the Soviet Union has put there is a threat to the peace, breach or aggression, the pressure on the 12 countries that have announced UN Security Council may issue such binding their participation in the alliance, giving a note to decisions as it deems appropriate. States do not have each of them, describing their participation in the the right to challenge them. These decisions are: alliance as aggressive. However, they signed the A- Interim measures(7). North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on April B- Non-military measures(8). 4, 1949, in Washington, and ratified by the C- Military measures: The Security Council parliaments of the signatories, within the five months may, if it deems it necessary, and the measures following the signing, which came into force on 24 already mentioned do not lead to the suppression of August. These countries are: United States, Canada, aggression, resort to the use of armed forces against Britain, France, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, the aggressor State or States in accordance with Portugal, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations, which Then other countries gradually joined the alliance(12). (13) states: That the measures provided for in Article 41 4. Arab Spring Revolutions : The revolutions of the are not sufficient or proven to have not been fulfilled, Arab Spring began first in Tunis, but did not stop may be taken by the air, sea and ground forces for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and (9) See: Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: security”. Accordingly, the adoption of repressive The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, measures does not depend on the request or consent of the State being attacked, but the UN Security University of Pennsylvania Press , 1996, p. 76. Shirley Council may proceed by itself to take such measures, V. Scott and Charlotte Ku , Climate Change and the which confirms that the maintenance of international UN Security Council, Edward Elgar Publishing , Northampton, 2018, p. 27. Tarcisio Gazzini , The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International (5) Klaus Hüfner(Ed.) , Agenda for Change: New Law, Manchester University Press , U.K., 2005, p. 7. Tasks for the United Nations, springer fachmedien And Neyire Akpinarli , The Fragility of the 'Failed Wiesbaden, 1995, p. 108. State' Paradigm: A Different International Law (6) See: the article 6 of the UN charter, that about perception of the absence of effective government, Recommendations of the UN Security Council. For martinus nijhoff publishers, leiden / boston, 2010, P. more about this issues see: Renata Sonnenfeld, 116. Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, (10) HARRY S. TRUMAN, on this date: Twelve Martinus Nijhoff Publishers . 1988. Loraine Sievers Foreign Ministers Sign North Atlantic Treaty in and Sam Daws , The Procedure of the UN Security Washington, available on: Council, 4th edition, oxford university press, 2014. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org. last visiting at 12-10- And Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd , The UN Security 2017. Council and the Politics of International Authority, 1st (11) Article 5 of The North Atlantic Treaty, edition, , Routledge , new York, 2008. Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949, available on: (7) Jan Kittrich , The Right of Individual Self-Defense http://www.nato.int.
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