The Attaché Journal of International Affairs | Volume XXI Issue 1 THE ATTACHÉ | Volume XXI Issue 1

ZIHAN ALISON PANG ARJUN SINGH is a second-year International Relations is an undergraduate student at the Uni- student. She is the president of Internet versity of Toronto, studying Political About Governance Forum at U of T, a colum- Science, International Relations, and nist at Synergy: The Journal of Contem- American Studies. He is a Senior As- porary Asian Studies, a researcher at sociate Editor with The Attaché, and Engineers Without Borders, and a steer- concurrently serves as an Editor of the ing committee member of the project, NATO Association of Canada. He pre- Anti-Asian Racism during COVID-19, viously worked for the U.S. Department jointly supported by the Canada-China of State, Government of Canada and Initiatives Fund and the Canadian Insti- Parliament of India. His life’s interest has the Issue tutes of Health Research. Her research been the politics of the United States of interests include democratization/de- America, among others, and he seeks With this first issue of 2021, the Attaché is with this analysis, Pang’s policy paper to the mocracy consolidation, internet gover- a dual career in public service and the debuting a new format better suited to nav- United Nations similarly discusses the limita- nance, and East Asian politics. armed forces. In this paper, he critically igating the tumultuous state of international tions of international institutions. She begins examines the reasons for NATO’s mili- relations and politics today. In keeping with by critiquing global governance approaches Read her work The Governance of Glob- tary intervention into Libya in 2011. past years, we will still be releasing our ma- to the management of indiscriminate surveil- al Indiscriminate Surveillance: A Policy Paper to the United Nations on page 4 Read his work Love Lost and War Gained jor annual volume later in the academic year; lance, before pushing the United Nations to on page 16 however, the 2020-21 Attaché is also break- adopt an alternative framework better suited ing from tradition with our series of special is- for the particularities of the problem. At the sues. These issues will spotlight outstanding heart of her analysis is the fundamental de- student works that we believe examine our bate between civil liberties and national secu- world in nuanced and critical ways. rity, which is especially relevant in the current political context. MASTHEAD Exploring the theme of global governance through two unique lenses, Arjun Singh’s “Civ- Over the past year, governance approaches Editors-In-Chief Senior Editor il War and Ethnic Violence” and Zihan Pang’s to containing the spread of the novel coro- Erica Liu Aneesh Chatterjee “The Governance of Global Indiscriminate Sur- navirus have broadly favoured restrictions on Stephen Chankov veillance” are timely first installments in our freedom of movement alongside sweeping Associate Editor spotlight series. In this issue, we are taking expansions of state surveillance in the name Paul Huang the opportunity to showcase the high-quality of public health. Pang advocates for striking Design Editor Danielle Zhuo work of one of our very own Attaché Senior a careful balance between liberty and securi- Editors, Arjun Singh. In his paper, Singh uses ty; however, the protraction of the COVID-19 the case study of the 2011 Libyan Civil War crisis further calls into question the ability to frame a compelling critique of the United of nation-states to do so. In our current mo- Nations and NATO response. In conversation ment, will Pang’s plea fall on deaf ears?

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Section I: Current Situation and Discourse ic notion of law (i.e. legal vs. illegal, lawful of Global Indiscriminate Surveillance vs. lawless). Depending on the interested parties, soft laws, such as MoUs, can have Global indiscriminate surveillance refers to varied levels of political legitimacy and le- the state’s interception of civilian digital gal significance.4 For example, MOUs can communication on a massive scale with- be adopted more quickly and in a more out reasonable and specific grounds. It is “hyper-simplified” manner than tradition- a continuously developing technological, al legislation, which makes them attractive legal, and political phenomenon. Overlap- during crises. However, critics argue that ping multilateral and bilateral agreements, MoUs enable the executive branch to cir- sub-national contracts, and ad-hoc arrange- cumvent formal procedures and parliamen- ments constitute the global surveillance tarian ex ante and ex post control. For ex- framework. The epicentre of the network, ample, the MoU between Libya and Italy the Five Eyes Alliance, includes the US, the (2017) attracted much criticism for abetting UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. inhumane treatment of migrants.5 Informal It emerged from the UKUSA Agreement, agreements are similarly used to evade pub- THE GOVERNANCE OF which formalized intelligence collaboration lic scrutiny and constitutional restrictions in between the UK and the US after the Sec- the case of surveillance collaboration. For ond World War. Although the agreement example, the NSA and the BND, Germany’s Global Indiscriminate explicitly excluded civilians during the war- intelligence branch, expanded their collab- time, its range of surveillance targets ex- oration in 2013 through a top-secret memo. panded during the Cold War years to in- The BND agreed to provide “communica- Surveillance: clude both foreign security and domestic tions supporting counterterrorism (CT), civilian communication.1 counter-narcotics (CN), and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) missions”6 while A POLICY PAPER TO THE UNITED NATIONS a. Legal framework the NSA offered advanced hardware and Zihan Pang software, and expert supports. To facilitate The Five Eyes Alliance enabled standard- this collaboration, the German government Global indiscriminate surveillance is a of Civil and Political Rights. However, the ized and thorough sharing of collected was willing to moderate its interpretation intelligence and streamlined collection of Article 10 of its constitution, which pro- transnational legal and technological net- UN needs to expand its current efforts by 2 work that enables governments to mon- establishing a surveillance review com- methods between members. In the post- tects the communication of its citizens, “to itor and analyze digital communication mittee, constructing a knowledge and Cold War era, the network gradually in- afford the BND more flexibility in sharing comprehensively. The Five Eye Alliance, action network, and supporting artistic corporated thirty-four countries at all lev- protected information with foreign part- composed of the United States (US), activism on global indiscriminate surveil- els of development in Europe and Asia Japan, Jordan, Korea, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Nor- United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Australia, lance. These proposals draw inspiration through informal legal instruments or “soft way, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, laws”, such as memoranda of understand- Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE. Ita- and New Zealand, lead these projects. In- from existing regional and national ef- 3 mar Mann, “The Disaggregated Law of Global Mass Sur- discriminate surveillance poses a threat forts to balance accountability with confi- ing (MoUs). Soft laws defy the dichotom- veillance,” in T. Aalberts & T. Gammeltoft-Hansen (Eds.), The Changing Practices of International Law (Cambridge: to human rights, disrupts civic discourse dentiality during intelligence operations. 1 Itamar Mann, “The Disaggregated Law of Global Mass Cambridge University Press): 14. space, and negatively alters individual Although these policies face political and Surveillance,” in T. Aalberts & T. Gammeltoft-Hansen 4 Itamar Mann, “The Disaggregated Law of Global Mass online behavior. The United Nations (UN) organizational constraints, they will none- (Eds.), The Changing Practices of International Law (Cam- Surveillance,” in T. Aalberts & T. Gammeltoft-Hansen bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018): 10. (Eds.), The Changing Practices of International Law (Cam- passed resolution 73/179, “the rights to theless promote intelligence accountabil- 2 Janine McGruddym, “Multilateral Intelligence Collabo- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018): 10. privacy in the digital age”, expressing ity, facilitate informed legislation and cul- ration and International Oversight,” Journal of Strategic 5 Martino Reviglio, “Externalizing Migration Management concerns about global surveillance based tivate multifaceted understandings of the Security 6, no. 3 (2013): 219. through Soft Law: The Case of the Memorandum of Un- 3 Thirty-four tier B countries: Algeria, Austria, Belgium, derstanding between Libya and Italy,” Global Jurist 20, on the Universal Declaration of Human issue and raise public awareness. Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, no.1 (2020):1-12. Rights and the International Convention France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, 6 Mann, 15-16.

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ners.”7 system. Liberalism and neo-republicanism ful. They argue that the individual-centric surveillance led to two types of attitude: both take an individualist approach to pri- perspective overlooks the social impact active and passive. On the active side, peo- The legal framework of global surveillance vacy rights. Liberal theorists define privacy of unchecked surveillance. For example, ple expressed more concerns over govern- exhibits significant flexibility and informali- rights as those that “exclude others (such Habermasian social sphere theory criticiz- ments’ intrusive policies and more political ty. According to the Vienna Convention, the as the government) from access to certain es indiscriminate surveillance as inherently will to push for changes. However, a prevail- multilateral agreements of the Five Eyes kinds of information”.10 Thus, the right to problematic because it is a violation of col- ing sense of helplessness led to negligence Alliance are neither ratified domestically privacy is a negative right which is sup- lective rights to a well-functioning political in personal privacy protection, such as the nor registered internationally. Agreements posed to shield individual choices from ex- public sphere, as surveillance subtly alters use of weaker passwords.16 The passive re- between intelligence partners usually re- ternal intervention. Governmental interfer- social circumstances which in turn limits civ- action is exemplified in the avoidance of semble private contracts, and are signed at ence of public and private life informed by ic discourses. To understand the Haberma- certain online activities. For example, both sub-national and institution-to-institution mass surveillance would count as an abuse sian critique, it is important to understand security-sensitive and health-related web levels, effectively bypassing constitutional of such a right, and is thus unacceptable ac- social interaction and power. Environmen- browsing dropped internationally after restraints and public scrutiny.8 Intelligence cording to the liberal non-interference prin- tal factors and the social role of individuals, Snowden’s disclosure in 2013.17 Avoiding agencies, instead of the national govern- ciple. Neo-republicanism adopts a similar alongside direct incentives/disincentives, learning about controversial issues such as ment, enter agreements on intelligence criticism of surveillance for the non-domi- determine the social interactions of the terrorism due to the chilling effect of surveil- sharing. For example, the NSA and the UK’s nation value: mass surveillance is objection- relevant individuals. Thus, power, broadly lance is not conducive to public discussion GCHQ signed an agreement on giving the able because it enables the government to defined as the ability to influence others’ and informed political participation. Addi- NSA “access to and influence over Britain’s arbitrarily breach the privacy of citizens, actions, can be practiced directly (e.g. pro- tionally, avoiding searching about mental intelligence gathering programmes”.9 It even if the government has not yet done viding incentives) or indirectly (e.g. chang- and physical health due to fear of privacy was concluded between agencies, instead it.11 “The very existence of such arbitrary ing the “social space”).15 Mass surveillance loss is undoubtedly negative to wellbeing. of between the sovereign states of the US power” is jeopardizing liberty.12 However, changes the communication environment, Thus, it is necessary to address the ad- and UK. theoretically, the mass surveillance appa- a type of social sphere, thus rendering cer- verse effects of indiscriminate surveillance ratus is not abusive if it is subjected to an tain relationships and choices impossible. because of the potential harm caused by “appropriately-structured constitutional or- Hence, even passive surveillance jeopardiz- aforementioned behavioural changes. “Agreements between 13 der” that enables citizens to control and es the ability of groups to collectively con- intelligence partners usually contest its use. Yet, neo-republican schol- trol who participates in a particular social The tangible harm caused by surveillance resemble private contracts, ars criticize the lack of restraints on individ- context, which further shapes the kinds of is difficult to evaluate in most cases. Even ual officers, and claim that the lack of trans- relationships possible within that context. the U.S. Supreme Court failed to provide a and are signed at sub- parent oversight in practice compromises As such, indiscriminate surveillance inter- consistent interpretation because the harm national and institution-to- the non-domination structure.14 Therefore, feres with the public sphere. Since the po- of mass surveillance is “intangible, risk-ori- liberals and neo-republicans consider indis- litical public sphere is essential to democra- ented, and diffuse”.18 Plaintiffs against data institution levels, effectively criminate surveillance to be theoretically cy and state interference would undermine breach usually cite the future risks, anxiety bypassing constitutional justifiable, but practically dubious. its discursive rationality, indiscriminate sur- and fear, and cost of countersurveillance restraints and public veillance is objectionable even when it is measures. In the Spokeo v. Robins, the Su- In contrast, other scholars condemn indis- not used to directly interfere with individ- 16 scrutiny.” criminate surveillance as inherently harm- Stanislav Mamonova and Marios Koufarisb, “The impact ual lives. of exposure to news about electronic government surveil- 10 Titus Stahl: “Indiscriminate Mass Surveillance and the lance on concerns about government intrusion, privacy b. Ethical discourse Public Sphere,” Ethics and Information Technology 18, c. Empirical discourse self-efficacy, and privacy protective behavior,” Journal of no.1 (2016): 33-38. Information Privacy & Security 12, no.2: 64. 11 17 Global level response to the global indis- Stahl, 34. Examples of security-sensitive words: nerve agent, pipe 12 Martin Grüner Larsen, “Liberty, Liberalism and Surveil- Aside from theoretical critiques, empirical bomb, explosion, explosives; examples of personally-sen- Based on different ethics premises, var- lance: a historic overview,” openDemocracy, Dec. 24, evidence demonstrates that indiscriminate sitive words: white power, cutting, suicide, sexual addic- ious schools of thought offer diverse nor- 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocra- surveillance can have profound social ef- tion. Alex Marthews and Catherine Tucker, “Government mative assessments of the surveillance cyuk/liberty-liberalism-and-surveillance-historic-overview/ Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior,” SSRN Elec- 13 Patrick Tylor Smith, “A Neo-Republican Theory of Just fects at both the societal and individual lev- tronic Journal, 10.2139/ssrn.2412564. 7 Ibid. State Surveillance,” Moral Philosophy and Politics 7, 1 el. Exposure to news about governmental 18 Solove, Daniel J. and Danielle Keats Citron. “Risk and 8 Mann, 15-19. (2020): 51. Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms.”Texas Law Re- 9 Ibid. 14 Smith, 49-71. 15 Stahl, 35-38. view 96, no. 4 (2018): 737.

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preme Court recognized the risk of injuries “In practice, the harm of such ried out on a mass scale”.24 The resolution In 2015, the United Nations Human Rights as sufficient grounds to establish harm. Yet, faced backlash during its drafting because Council also appointed Joseph Cannataci similar risk-oriented lawsuits against priva- ubiquitous violence of privacy the Five Eyes Alliance member states in- as a Special Rapporteur on the right to pri- cy violations, such as Clapper v. Amnesty is easily overlooked because sisted on amending provocative wordings, vacy in the digital age.27 A Special Rappor- International and Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., such as “metadata, extraterritoriality, and teur is an independent human rights expert were dismissed because the potential harm it is mostly intangible and the scope of ‘unlawful’ or ‘arbitrary’ inter- who investigates and reports from a the- had not yet come to fruition, or could not diffused, taking the form of ference”.25 Extraterritoriality in particular matic or national perspective.28 The Right have been proven due to the secrecy sur- is controversial because the US justified to Privacy Rapporteur is supposed to pro- 19 self-censorship, psychological rounding the relevant information. How- its surveillance program as legal by stress- duce reports on governmental interception ever, surveillance can cause substantial stress, and extra spending on harm by compromising the right to fair trial. digital security.” Agron Hasbajrami was charged with sup- porting terrorism based on an email from Section II: Current Solutions foreigners obtained without a warrant.20 The Supreme Court justified the legality of Current human rights discourse on privacy the warrantless search based on States v. rights derives from the Universal Declara- Verdugo-Urquidez, in which American law tion of Human Rights (UDHR) and the In- enforcement physically searched a Mexi- ternational Convention of Civil and Political can national’s estate in Mexico. The Ameri- Rights (ICCPR). UDHR Article 12 and ICCPR can Civil Liberty Union (ACLU) argued that Article 17 both state that “no one shall be State v. Verdugo-Urquidez does not apply subjected to arbitrary interference with his to warrantless digital surveillance when privacy, family, home or correspondence, “Americans like Mr. Hasbajrami on U.S. nor to attacks upon his honour and reputa- 21 soil” are at stake. As such, legal interpre- tion. Everyone has the right to the protec- tations of indiscriminate surveillance and its tion of the law against such interference or harms are varied and still in development. attacks”.22 23 However, the response to in- In principle, indiscriminate surveillance vio- discriminate surveillance has been inchoate lates people’s right to privacy as granted and restrained. in Fourth Amendment of the US Constitu- tion, Article 12 of the UDHR, and Article 17 a. Responses: conventions and IGOs ing that it only collects information from of communication data, unjustified privacy of the ICCPR. In practice, the harm of such foreigners who are not protected by the breaches, and best practices on bring glob- ubiquitous violence of privacy is easily over- Responding to Snowden’s revelations in Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. Al- al surveillance under rule of law and human looked because it is mostly intangible and 2013, the United Nations General Assem- though many legal scholars argued that the rights norms. The UN contributed mainly to diffused, taking the form of self-censorship, bly (UNGA) adopted resolution 73/179, US should abide by international law even setting the normative standard on privacy psychological stress, and extra spending “the right to privacy in the digital age”, cit- when conducting extraterritorial surveil- rights and surveillance and initiating rele- on digital security. However, indiscriminate ing the aforementioned human rights docu- lance, the US did not recognize the privacy vant international actions. However, there 26 surveillance can compromise one’s right to ments to express concern “at the negative rights of foreign nationals. fair trial (e.g. States v. Hasbajrami), which terterrorism,” Fordham Law Review 82(2014): 2143. impact that surveillance…[has] when car- 24 27 leaves tangible damage. “Rights to Privacy in the Digital Age,” United Nations “Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy,” United 22 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights | United Na- Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, The Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 19 Solove and Citron, 737-786. tions,” United Nations, United Nations, Accessed 9 Mar. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 20 Jacques Singer-Emery,“The Second Circuit Rules in 2020, https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-hu- accessed 9 Mar. 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/ Accessed 10 Mar. 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Is- United States v. Hasbajrami,” Lawfare, Lawfare, Dec. man-rights/. digitalage/pages/digitalageindex.aspx sues/Privacy/SR/Pages/SRPrivacyIndex.aspx. 24th, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/second-cir- 23 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 25 Carly Nyst and Tomaso Falchetta, “The Right to Privacy 28 “Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council,” cuit-rules-united-states-v-hasbajrami. - OHCHR,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the in the Digital Age, Journal of Human Rights Practice,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commis- 21 United States v. Agron Hasbajrami, 15-2684(L), 17-2669 High Commissioner, The Office of the High Commissioner Journal of Human Rights Practice 9, no.1 (2017): 104-118. sioner, The Office of the High Commissioner for Human (CON), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_doc- for Human Rights, accessed 9 Mar. 2020, https://www. 26 Peter Margulies, “The NSA in International Perspec- Rights, Accessed 10 Mar. 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/ ument/114._aclu_eff_amicus_brief_10.23.17.pdf. ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. tive: Surveillance, Human Rights and International Coun- en/hrbodies/sp/pages/welcomepage.aspx.

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are significant obstacles involved in trans- for public revelation—establishing a confi- numerous competitive bureaucracies of the cy, raise public awareness, and encourage lating humanitarian rhetoric to substantial dential report system, protecting qualified US Congress and Executive Branch share diverse discourses. Moreover, these initia- changes in countries of concern. whistle-blowers, and assessing the poten- the responsibility of oversight.32 In contrast, tives will serve as valuable mechanisms for tial damage of disclosure case by case.31 Canada33 and Australia’s34 intelligence over- coordinating domestic efforts to check in- Some regional organizations, such as the To conclude, the UN only responded nor- sight systems are more unified and legisla- discriminate surveillance. European Union (EU), implemented politi- matively to the Snowden leak and indiscrim- tive in nature. Regardless of the difference cal and legal measures to mitigate the im- inate surveillance. It objected the practice in details, there are common shortcomings a. Surveillance Review Committee under pact of unchecked global surveillance. The in principle and sought to promote greater in all of these countries’ efforts to imple- UNHRC EU has a longstanding tradition of valuing protection of privacy right, but there is no ment intelligence oversight. Legislators privacy protection over national security, legally binding regulation on surveillance lack adequate knowledge and constituen- The United Nations Human Rights Coun- especially after the shock of Snowden’s globally. In comparison, regional organiza- cy support for improving oversight mech- cil should establish an oversight commit- disclosure.29 It started to improve internal tion like EU took more concrete measures, anisms.35 Moreover, the US and UK do not tee called Surveillance Review Committee disclosure mechanisms and national secu- such as by promoting better whistle-blow- hold intelligence agencies accountable for (SRC) which investigates claims of inappro- rity whistle-blower protections, which are er protection, to put checks on mass sur- violating the privacy of foreign states, at priate surveillance. It is an expansion of intended to prevent the abuse of surveil- veillance programs. It is worthy for the UN least not to the same standard as they do the Special Rapporteur’s current function: lance. to learn from the EU initiatives. domestically.36 The sovereignties of these the collection and dissemination of rele- individual member states, and their varied vant information and the communication It is constructive for the UN to adopt the “However, there are characteristics, make a universal oversight of such information to states involved in EU approach to establishing a confiden- mechanism difficult to achieve. the alleged violation.37 The international tial whistle-blowing system. Currently, significant obstacles review system will be a crucial supplement only four of the EU member states have involved in translating Section III: Policy Proposal for the United to the currently inadequate domestic whis- comprehensive whistle-blower legislation, Nations tle-blowing systems. First, it reduces the while most EU member states exclude na- humanitarian rhetoric to risk of direct public disclosure of national tional security personnel from protection. substantial changes in The United Nations should take a leading security material by offering an additional Instead of solely relying on the European countries of concern.” role in the governance of global indiscrim- platform for confidential whistle-blowing. Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the inate surveillance both substantially and Second, it addresses the negligence of for- Council of Europe (EOC) proposed several b. Responses: multilateral and domestic normatively. Establishing a Surveillance eign nationals’ rights, which is common in principles on whistle-blowing and encour- Review Committee, whistle-blower protec- domestic intelligence oversight. aged member states to adopt them in do- Governments of the Five Eyes Alliance tion, and knowledge and action network mestic legislation. These principles focus member states also made some efforts to will help prevent surveillance-induced hu- The Committee will review alleged abuses on striking a balance between state secrecy check indiscriminate surveillance, including man rights abuses, cultivate intelligence of surveillance which have a transnational and right to free speech, and on protecting the establishment of domestic intelligence communities’ accountability and legitima- impact or constitute human rights viola- “all bona fide warning against various types tions, as defined in the nine core human 30 oversight and national security whistleblow- of unlawful acts”. The EOC recommend- 32 38 ing procedures. These actions confront Amy B. Zegart, “Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelli- rights treaties. Although indiscriminate ed defining offences—which is appropriate gence Oversight,” Political Science Quarterly 126, no.1 the dilemma of holding intelligence com- (2011): 4~5. 37 “How to Talk About the Right to Privacy at the UN,” 29 Anna Dimitrova and Maja Brkan, “Balancing National munities accountable while ensuring con- 33 “About SIRC,” Security Intelligence Review Committee, Privacy International, Privacy International, Mar. 2017, Security and Data Protection: The Role of EU and US Pol- fidentiality. However, there is no universal Security Intelligence Review Committee, accessed 10 Mar. accessed 11 Mar. 2020, https://privacyinternational.org/ icy-Makers and Courts before and after the NSA Affair,” 2020, http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/abtprp/index-eng.html. sites/default/files/2017-12/UN_Guide_Final.pdf. Journal of Common Market Studies 56, no.4 (2018): 751- intelligence oversight among the Five Eye 34 Peter Hanks, John D. McCamus, National security: 38 The nine core human rights treaties are International 753. Alliance countries because of their different Surveillance and Accountability in a Democratic Society Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis- 30 Unlawful acts includes 1) violations of international hu- political and legal systems. For example, (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais): 1~18. crimination (ICERD), International Covenant on Civil and man rights and humanitarian law (such as the prevention 35 Damien Van Puyvelde, “Intelligence Accountability and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Eco- of torture, violations of the right to life); 2) decisions to the Role of Public Interest Groups in the United States,” In- nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention use military force or acquire weapons of mass destruction, 31 Dimitrios Kagiaros, “Protecting ‘National Security’ Whis- telligence and National Security 28, no.2 (2013): 149~157. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against mass surveillance; 3) mismanagement or waste of funds; 4) tleblowers in the Council of Europe: An Evaluation of 36 Ilina Georgieva, “The Extraterritorial Application of Women (CEDAW), Convention against Torture and Other constitutional and statutory violations; 5) abuses of power Three Approaches on How to Balance National Security Human Rights Treaties in the Context of Foreign Surveil- Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and issues relating to public health, public safety or the with Freedom of Expression,” The International Journal of lance,”Utrecht Journal of International and European Law (CAT), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Inter- environment. Human Rights 19, no. 4 (2015): 409-421. 31, no.80 (2015): 105. national Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All

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surveillance is in itself a violation of rights issue a brief public report. There are two the SRC should explore flexible means to faith groups, professional associations, and to privacy granted by UDHR and ICCPR, it phases of communication: evidence ex- represent the interest of various affected unions.44 However, these organizations’ is currently impractical to effectively pres- amination and policy negotiation. The first groups, advocating for their inclusion when activities are national or regional-focused sure the Five Eyes Alliance into making phase resembles an adversarial trial, albeit appropriate. with little international coordination. In drastic concessions in dismantling global not a formal international law suite, for the this case, the UN should play the role of surveillance networks.39 Thus, incremen- state to cross-examine SRC’s evidence and b. Knowledge and Action Network on coordinator, sponsor, and bridge-builder to tal changes instead of radical policies on challenge the impact assessment. Indepen- Rights to Privacy facilitate research and activism conducted global surveillance would yield better out- dent international legal experts will medi- by civil society groups. The Sustainable De- comes. The committee will focus on the ate between the state delegation team and The United Nations should also establish a velopment Networks (SDN), affiliated with problematic use of intelligence collected the SRC representatives. The appointment Knowledge and Action Network on Surveil- the UN and the World Bank, set a mean- through indiscriminate surveillance, such as of the state delegation team depends on lance and Privacy to support and coordinate ingful precedent for this undertaking.45 The for discriminating demographic groups,40 the state’s preference, but it commonly the efforts of non-state actors. It is crucial Knowledge and Action Network on Rights for inappropriately seizing legal evidence, consists of diplomatic personnel, techni- to engage the global civil society, despite to Privacy should absorb successful practic- and for harassing political opponents.41 The cal and legal experts, and intelligence per- the secrecy and power-asymmetry of this es of the SDN while avoiding repeating its Committee will examine cases submitted sonnel. SRC and the state representatives field. Global indiscriminate surveillance has structural deficiencies, such as narrow dis- confidentially by whistle-blowers, civil so- will discuss policy changes based on the profound sociocultural influences on both ciplinary focus and inability to bridge the- ciety groups, or representatives of affect- agreement that is established from the first public and private life, which cannot be ory to practice. Like the SDN, it will host ed communities. Confidentiality serves to phase. Although the states and the SRC are addressed by solely promoting reforms in academic conferences on surveillance and protect both the national security interest the chief negotiators, they can invite rele- the intelligence or national security sector. related issues, and establish online archives of the relevant states and the identities of vant interest groups to attend. Moreover, preservation of privacy rights42 to store and share research. Such initiatives the complainants. Preliminary examination overlaps with other fields of human rights can assist legislators in making informed of the cases will determine if they are with- defence, such as defending political rights, policies. The network can also serve as a in the jurisdiction of the nine core human “The international review reproductive rights,43 and equality. partnership-building platform between rights treaties. If they are, independent in- system will be a crucial professional researchers and activist vestigations will then follow to verify the supplement to the currently Currently, non-governmental organizations, groups (especially media and grass-root complaints and assess the scope of impact. academic institutions, and intelligence NGOs with less investigative resources), inadequate domestic oversight committees in the US, UK, Can- which reduces inaccurate and sensational The committee will then communicate con- whistle-blowing systems.” ada, and Australia monitor their respective portrayals of global surveillance.46 fidentially with the states in question and governments, advise legislators, research, The Surveillance Review Committee will and disseminate knowledge on surveillance The proposed network needs to overcome Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW), face various organizational and political and privacy rights. Most of them recog- major challenges though, such as a narrow International Convention for the Protection of All Persons challenges. Organizationally, since the in- nize the importance of multidisciplinary disciplinary focus. They are relatively easy from Enforced Disappearance (CPED), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). ternational monitoring of intelligence prac- and multi-stakeholder approaches. For to overcome since the existing epistemic “The Core International Human Rights Instrument and tices is extremely controversial and an in- example, the International Civil Liberties community is already diverse and has an their Monitoring Bodies,” United Nations Human Rights vasion of state sovereignty, the committee Monitoring Group is a coalition of NGOs, interdisciplinary preference. However, the Office of the High Commissioner, The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed 9 Mar. 2020, will need to emphasize rigorous procedure, 42 Knowledge and Action Network would research privacy UN still needs to allocate funds judicious- https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ instead of efficiency, in order to win the con- issues in a broader sense, not only limited to indiscrimi- CoreInstruments.aspx. fidence of governments. The Committee nate surveillance conducted by the US and its allies. It shall 44 “Members and Partners,” International Civil Liberties 39 The difficulty of implementing privacy rights protection also include privacy breach by other states and non-state Monitoring Group, International Civil Liberties Monitoring is exemplified in the Five Eye Alliance’s challenge of the needs to demonstrate competency in pro- actors. Group, accessed 11 Mar. 2020, https://iclmg.ca/https:// UN report “The Right to Privacy in Digital Age”. tecting sensitive information and conduct- 43 For example, pro-choice institutions used geo-fenc- iclmg.ca/about-us/members-and-partners/. 40 James Renton, “The global order of Muslim surveillance ing well-grounded and impartial reviews ing, an intrusive surveillance technology, to locate and 45 Diane Stone, “The ‘Knowledge Bank’ and the Global and its thought architecture,” Ethnic and Racial Studies send advertisement to women in abortion clinics waiting Development Network,” Global Governance 9 (2003): 43- 41, no.12 (2018): 2125-2140. with rigorous procedures. Politically, the room. “A documentation of data exploitation in sexual 61. 41 Kristen Hoerl, Erin Ortiz, “Organizational Secrecy and Committee will struggle with inclusion. The and reproductive rights| PI,” Privacy International, Priva- 46 Damien Van Puyvelde, “Intelligence Accountability and the FBI’s COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist Hate Groups participation of interest groups in the pol- cy International, accessed 4 Jan. 2021, https://privacyin- the Role of Public Interest Groups in the United States,” Program, 1967-1971,” Management Communication ternational.org/long-read/3669/documentation-data-ex- Intelligence and National Security 28, no.2 (2013): 145- Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2015): 594-596. icy negotiation process is optional. Hence, ploitation-sexual-and-reproductive-rights. 148.

12 13 THE ATTACHÉ | Volume XXI Issue 1

ly to ensure fair disciplinary and regional art exhibitions in collaboration with media offering partnerships to scholars and art- enable the UN to engage in states’ policy representation, instead of deliberately and companies, existing film festivals, and mu- ists. This would be especially helpful for changes through the Surveillance Review narrowly supporting a single field or school seums. The UN has successful experience non-fictional artists, such as documentary Committee. Supporting the non-state sec- of thought as the World Bank did.47 in implementing such creative projects. For filmmakers, by providing them with access tor, including academia and civil society example, it collaborated with YouTube and to research sources (especially informants groups, is crucial for fostering informed the European Union to host the Stand Up and affected communities), helping them to policy making and raising public aware- “Global indiscriminate For Human Rights film contest, which re- understand the technicality of surveillance, ness. The UN can achieve this through surveillance has profound ceived over 700 short films from 81 coun- and encouraging them to find inspiration to constructing the Knowledge and Action sociocultural influences on tries.50 There are also existing human rights retell surveillance-relevant stories. Network and sponsoring artistic activism. film festivals with UN affiliation, such as the In conclusion, the UN should take a more both public and private life, United Nations Association (UNAFF)51 and In summary, since indiscriminate surveil- active role and multifaceted approach on which cannot be addressed the International Film Festival and Forum lance has profound impact on public dis- surveillance and privacy issues by engaging on Human Rights (FIFDH),52 which set help- course and cultural imagination, the UN various stakeholders. by solely promoting reforms ful precedents. The UN should also encour- should also focus on raising awareness and in the intelligence or age UNAFF and FIFDH to take on a privacy facilitate critical discussions. It can collab- Zihan Alison Pang is in her 2nd year national security sector.” rights focus while promoting these agen- orate with media, film production compa- studying International Relations at the cies’ publicities. nies, museums, and individual artists to University of Toronto. c. UN Film and Art Festival host relevant exhibitions and film festivals. The UN can also sponsor activist artists and Works Cited (contd. on page 35): collaborate with museums to host artistic Conclusion Surveillance is becoming a cultural phe- "About the FIFDH." Geneva 6-15th 2020 FIFDH, nomenon instead of an institutional estab- exhibitions. The viability of this second op- FIFDH. Accessed 11 Mar. 2020. lishment. After the 9/11 attack, security tion has increased as increasingly more mu- The United Nations is responsible for both https://fifdh.org/en/the-festival/about-the-fifdh. and privacy became a pair of incompati- seums have started to recognize the value setting norms and for pushing for imple- 48 of protest or political art in representing mentation because global indiscriminate “About SIRC.” Security Intelligence Review Com- ble concepts in popular discourse. How- mittee, Security Intelligence Review ever, discourse is changeable as seen by contemporary culture. However, the UN surveillance poses a challenge to a range of human rights (not limited to privacy rights) Committee. Accessed 10 Mar. 2020. http://www. Greenpeace, which transformed the public should seek adequate legal and communal sirc-csars.gc.ca/abtprp/index-eng.html. perception of whaling from a courageous consultancy when sponsoring provocative guaranteed by the UN. The UN has assert- sport to a cruel practice by disseminating artwork. For example, US laws restrict mu- ed that “governments should rein in mass Broek, Tijs van den, Merel Ooms, Michael Friede- 49 seums registered as NGOs to participate in surveillance and respect the privacy of all wald, Marc van Lieshout and Sven Rung. abhorrent photography of whale-hunting. “Privacy and Security: Citizen’s Desire for an Equal Thus, the UN should similarly raise public excessive lobby activities. The UN will have Internet users, no matter where they are located”.54 Despite this statement’s wide- Footing.” In Michael Friedewald, J. Peter Burgess, awareness on surveillance through sup- to balance the need to support activism Johann Cas, Walter Peissl, Rocco Bellanova (Eds.), porting artistic expressions on the topic, and the long-term operation of museums spread socio-political impact, its resulting Surveillance, Privacy and Security: Citizens' Per- presenting surveillance as a procedure that in regions with tighter governmental con- efforts to translate rhetoric into concrete spectives. London: Routledge, 2017. 53 requires regulation rather than outright re- trol. The Knowledge and Action Network policies have faced various obstacles, in- can also contribute to creative activism by cluding national security interests and con- Cohen, Elliot D. “A History of the Mass Warrantless jection or irrational fear. The UNHCR and Surveillance Network.” In Technology UNESCO should host film festivals and fidentiality in the intelligence field. There- of Oppression: Preserving Freedom and Dignity in 50 “Human rights on film: International festival celebrates fore, it is important to pursue a multi-level an Age of Mass, Warrantless Surveillance. Berlin: 47 Diane Stone, “The ‘Knowledge Bank’ and the Global mobile phone films for a cause,” UN News, the United solution capable of reaching both the state Springer, 2014. Development Network,” Global Governance 9 (2003): 48. Nations, accessed 11 Mar. 2020, https://news.un.org/en/ 48 Tijs van den Broek, Merel Ooms, Michael Friedewald, story/2018/12/102761. and non-state actors. The UN needs to es- Dimitrova, Anna and Maja Brkan. “Balancing Na- Marc van Lieshout, Sven Rung, “Privacy and Security: Citi- 51 “Mission,” UNAFF 2020, UNAFF, accessed 11 Mar. 2020, tablish its legitimacy and credibility in mon- zen’s Desire for an Equal Footing,” in Michael Friedewald, http://www.unaff.org/2020/mission.html. itoring the abuse of surveillance. This will tional Security and Data Protection: The J. Peter Burgess, Johann Cas, Walter Peissl, Rocco Bel- 52 “About the FIFDH,” Geneva 6-15th 2020 FIFDH, FIFDH, Role of EU and US Policy-Makers and Courts before lanova (Eds.), Surveillance, Privacy and Security: Citizens’ accessed 11 Mar. 2020, https://fifdh.org/en/the-festival/ and after the NSA Affair.” Journal of Common Mar- Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2017): 15. about-the-fifdh. 54 “United Nations: Rein in Mass Surveillance,” Human ket Studies 56, no.4 (2018): 751-767. 49 Paul Wapner, “Politics Beyond the State: Environmen- 53 Mary Elizabeth Williams, “A Noble Balancing Act: Muse- Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch, 17 Jul. 2017, accessed tal Activism and World Civic Politics,” World Politics 47 um, Political Activism and Protest Art,” Museum Interna- 11 Mar. 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/17/ (1995): 320-322. tional 69, no.3-4 (2017): 69-72. united-nations-rein-mass-surveillance.

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ties between the regime and civilian op- granting foreign oil companies explora- ponents, many of whom had taken up tion rights to its large petroleum reserves.8 arms against the former, Security Coun- Two years preceding the intervention, in cil member-states portended indiscrimi- 2009, Libya had been elected to chair the nate reprisals against the latter.3 To that African Union and preside over the U.N. end, they authorized “all necessary mea- General Assembly – a marked reversal in sures” (i.e. direct military action) under its geopolitical standing, which suggest- the provisions of Chapter VII to protect ed foreign state incentives to maintain Libyan civilians.4 This was implemented the regime.9 In this context, foreign mili- by the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tary intervention in Libya, swiftly follow- tion (NATO), which initiated ‘Operation ing the commencement of protests, was Unified Protector’ to enforce a “No-Fly incongruous with structural conditions at Zone” (i.e. prohibition of Libyan air traf- the time. Consequently, it merits examina- fic) and launch airstrikes on Libyan ground tion to determine both the motivations of forces.5 Running for seven months, the the intervention, as well as its success in Operation concluded on October 31, fol- achieving its intended objectives. Love Lost lowing the regime’s removal from power & and proclamation of a National Transition- As a result, this essay will evaluate the ma- al Council (NTC) to facilitate a democratic jor factors prompting NATO’s UNSC-au- transition.6 Both the decision to intervene thorized military intervention in Libya, as War Gained and the domestic eruption of hostilities well as the success of such intervention in represented a marked departure from pursuance of both the alliance’s motiva- Arjun Singh the status quo. The incumbent regime tions and the objective of “protecting ci- Valentine’s Day of 2011 was, perhaps, the last had remained in power for over four de- vilians” under Resolution 1973.10 It will ar- time Muammar Al-Gaddafi ever felt “loved” by cades, having developed both consider- gue that such intervention was impelled his people; for on February 15th began a series of able coercive capabilities and a robust, by the doctrine and sentiment of the ‘Re- events that would transform the Libyan state. The oil-exporting economy, enabling both the sponsibility to Protect’ (R2P), advanced in day marked the beginning of sustained protests effective repression of opponents and 2005, the geopolitical interests of NATO against his regime in the city of Benghazi, whose maintenance of performance legitimacy, member-states and the individual actions participants – unlike previous instances of opposi- with these two factors mitigating politi- of Gaddafi – which prevented the - oper tion – remained defiant amidst coercive and violent cal transformation.7 Moreover, over the ation of traditional structural inhibitions regime responses.1 Taking their cues from move- previous decade, Libya had begun to nor- on U.N. humanitarian interventions. Sub- ments in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt (part of malize its international relations – sharing sequently, it will assert that such inter- the then-nascent ‘Arab Spring’), demonstrators intelligence against Jihadist groups, and vention has evinced selective successes, perceived momentum on their side as they resist- fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UN- fulfilling certain interests of NATO mem- ed the regime – responding to its coercion in equal SCR-1973.pdf. ber-states, yet paradoxically prompting measure, with violence, to force its removal. 3 Alan J. Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? the emergence of an ongoing civil war in Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” International Secu- rity 38, no. 1 (2013): 105-136. Libya, and contradicting the stated objec- A month later, on March 17th, the United Nations 4 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1973,” 1. tives of the Resolution. Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1973. 5 Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reas- Receiving no negative votes, the resolution was sessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” 108. 6 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- 8 Ethan Chorin, “NATO’s Libya Intervention and the Con- passed in response to “the deteriorating situation tect in North Africa. tinued Case for a Responsibility to Rebuild,” Boston Uni- [and] escalation of violence” in Libya by govern- 7 Andrew Fawthorp, “Oil becomes the key battleground versity International Law Journal 31, no. 2 (2013): 365-386. 9 ment forces “against civilians.”2 From the hostili- in Libya’s civil war,” February 18, 2020. Accessed Decem- Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- ber 5, 2020. https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/features/ tect in North Africa. 10 1 Karin Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Protect in libya-oil-blockades/. United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1973,” 3. North Africa, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020). 2 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1973,” March 17, 2011. 17 Accessed November 11, 2020. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_ THE ATTACHÉ | Volume XXI Issue 1

A “Date with History”: crimes” and “crimes against humanity.”14 “manifest failure” to protect its citizens… ous rambling at public events, the regime’s Libyan and the R2P To this end, three classes of these develop- from “crimes against humanity.” 18 record of violence – particularly, the Abu ments were responsible for triggering such Salim massacre of 1996, in which over 1600 In the standard mould of the Arab Spring, R2P sentiments. The first was real-time re- prisoners were executed without trial – cor- the Libyan uprising began with the sup- ports from Libya, which had been rapidly “Both the decision to roborated his willingness to act on the stat- pression of peaceful protestors. Civilians produced following the initial outbreak of intervene and the domestic ed coercive intentions.22 Broadcast to the who had assembled in Benghazi to oppose hostilities on February 17th and described eruption of hostilities international community, the speeches vin- the detention of an opposition lawyer, Fathi government violence against protestors. dicated notions of regime brutality against Terbil, were fired upon by Libyan forces on On February 20th, Human Rights Watch re- represented a marked civilians being potent – tantamount, again, February 17th.11 As civilian protestors re- leased a preliminary report suggesting 233 departure from the status to ‘crimes against humanity.’ Additional- sisted the violence and – upon engaging deaths from state forces’ violence since the ly, the rhetoric of Al-Islam (who until then security forces in municipal combat – be- commencement of protests.15 Additionally, quo.” had been viewed as a reformist figure and gan to overrun government installations in the subsequent day, two Libyan Air Force moderating influence on Gaddafi) served The second of such events were speeches Benghazi, similar skirmishes arose in other pilots had defected from the regime by fly- to indicate the absence of internal restraint delivered by regime officials following the parts of the country.12 Given the govern- ing to Malta – citing their orders to “bomb within the regime on the use of force.23 To developments – specifically, by Muammar ment’s asymmetric military advantage, as Benghazi,” where opponents had by then that end, nations came to view Libya as the Al-Gaddafi, and his son Saif Al-Islam – which well as the regime’s history of violently sup- overrun government authority in the city.16 scene of an impending “mass atrocity,” ne- enhanced the aforementioned characteri- pressing protestors, U.N. member-states In conjunction, the news reports of aeri- cessitating preventative action under the sation. Both addresses struck a violent tone came to view the situation as one with an al strafes against protestors continued to R2P.24 Thirdly, activity at the United Na- with international observers that affirmed alarming potential for reprisal against civil- be broadcast by international media, sug- tions served to crystallize ‘R2P’ as the lens assumptions of government violence ians.13 As a result, they were prompted to gesting systematic armed reprisals against through which U.N. member-states viewed against civilians. In the government’s initial act under provisions of the ‘Responsibility protesting civilians.17 In relation to other the events in Libya. A commission of inquiry response to the protests, Saif Al-Islam on to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine of 2005 – allow- Arab Spring uprisings, these reports were conducted by the U.N. Human Rights Coun- February 20th openly threatened forceful ing for international intervention in states unprecedented; neither Egypt nor Tunisia cil concluded, after testimony from Libyan retaliation against protestors, in a speech that fail in their duties to protect popula- (Libya’s Saharan parallels) had utilized mili- military officials, that “shoot-to-kill opera- with brutish allusions. He claimed “rivers tions from, inter alia, “genocide,” “war tary force to suppress protests. The release tions” had been ordered against peacefully of blood” would flow should “sedition” of such reports enhanced the ‘shock’ of in- protesting civilians.25 Simultaneously, the not cease against the regime.19 The speech 11 Debora Malito, “The Responsibility to Protect What in ternational observers – at both the rapid es- U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Advisers also confirmed the government’s deploy- Libya.” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Science 29, no. calation of hostilities and the purported will on Genocide Prevention and R2P – Fran- 3 (2017): 289-298. ment of the Libyan Army to restore securi- 12 of the regime to violently retaliate against cis Deng and Edward Luck, respectively – Ibid. ty, which would “fight to our (sic) very last 13 Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reas- initially peaceful protests. Consequently, publicly announced that both “war crimes man, woman and bullet.”20 Two days later, sessing NATO’s Libya Campaign.” they lay the groundwork for the event’s in- and crimes against humanity” may have Gaddafi himself delivered an address that terpretation as an act of Libyan state-spon- been committed by the government in its underscored such imagery. He vowed that sored violence vis-à-vis the R2P – i.e., its responses to the situation.26 While media the military would advance “inch by inch, 14 United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution A/60/1,” house by house, home by home, alley by 22 Ibid. 23 September 16, 2005. Accessed December 5, 2020. alley and individual by individual” to quell Ibid. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/ 24 Hardeep Puri, “Libya: Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice and migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_ protestors’ “insurrection,” which he an- the Ghost of Rwanda,” October 27, 2016. Accessed RES_60_1.pdf. nounced would be “punishable by death.”21 November 11, 2020. https://www.theglobalist.com/libya- 15 Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Governments Should While Gaddafi had been known for -spuri the-ghost-of-rwanda-west-united-states/. Demand End to Unlawful Killings,” February 20, 2011. 25 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- Accessed December 5, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/ 18 United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution A/60/1,” tect in North Africa, 102. news/2011/02/20/libya-governments-should-de- 30. 26 Francis Deng and Edward Luck, “Press Release on the mand-end-unlawful-killings. 19 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- Situation in Libya,” February 22, 2011. Accessed Decem- 16 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- tect in North Africa, 99. ber 5, 2020. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/ tect in North Africa, 98. 20 Ibid. documents/media/statements/2011/English/2011-02- 17 Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reas- 21 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- 22-OSAPG,%20Special%20Advisers%20Statement%20 sessing NATO’s Libya Campaign.” tect in North Africa, 101. on%20Libya,%2022%20February%202011.pdf.

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reportage of the uprising had suggested as by authoritarian standards.28 Member-state leadership was on the line” in Libya.31 En- at the time. Alan Kuperman makes the much, statements by U.N. institutional enti- representatives were thus compelled by dogenously, individual potentates within most authoritative argument on this front, ties – authoritative within the organization their Libyan colleagues to support interven- the Security Council voiced equivalent mo- pointing out that Libyan protestors had on human rights and the R2P – yielded for- tion. As a result, the combination of these tivations – i.e., to prevent acts of genocide been “armed and violent from the first day mal evidence of congruity between Libyan three event-classes reinforced the notion should they be evinced in Libya. Susan Rice, of the uprising” – a fact incongruous with Government’s activities and the doctrine’s that Libya was engaged in ‘war crimes’ the United States’ permanent representa- their presentation as ‘peaceful’ protes- cognizable offences. Therefore, they gave and ‘crimes against humanity,’ directed at tive, claimed that she would “go down in tors.34 Contrary to that notion, opponents legitimacy to Libya’s assessment by mem- its civilians to suppress popular opposition flames” to prevent “ a crisis” (i.e. geno- of the regime had deployed “firearms, Mo- ber-states as a case for ‘R2P’. to the regime. Such characterization ex- cide in Libya) if necessary, while French lotov cocktails, bulldozers and bomb-laden ercised key influence on Security Council representative Gérard Araud claimed the vehicles” against security forces, obtaining member-states to impose Chapter VII sanc- “Council had to meet this date with history them from government armouries overrun “The release of such reports tions and, eventually, authorize armed in- on the side of the Libyan people”.32 Thus, by protests.35 Indeed, as he notes, reports enhanced the ‘shock’ of tervention against Libya to protect civilians when Libya’s defecting Permanent Repre- of “live ammunition” being used against international observers – at (which, until that moment, had not been sentative, Abdel Rahman Shalgam, publicly protestors were, in reality, rubber bullets taken for other Arab Spring states). As the described the situation in his own country and non-lethal rounds designed to disperse both the rapid escalation authorizing Resolution for the intervention as equivalent to “atrocities…of the Khmer protestors.36 These facts were ignored by of hostilities and the laid out, the “widespread and systemic at- Rouge in Cambodia or Hitler in Germany,” Western media organizations in their initial tacks…may amount (sic) to crimes against the U.N. and NATO received permissive reportage of the incident, who had –amid purported will of the regime humanity,” with the intervention’s principal conditions for action, with little room to difficulties due to the regime’s censorship to violently retaliate against “determination” being the “protection of avoid it.33 – initially neglected to verify reports con- 29 initially peaceful protests.” civilians and civilian populated areas.” In veyed to international audiences. The U.N. conjunction with the aforementioned fac- “The act was unprecedented High Commissioner for Human Rights, Most markedly contributing to this view, tors, the institutional memory of both the Navi Pillay, admitted as much – claiming however, was the en masse defection of Lib- United Nations and NATO significantly im- in the history of the U.N. that “reports are (sic) still patchy and hard yan diplomatic personnel from the regime, pelled such a conclusion vide R2P principles. and demonstrated to other to verify” concerning violence by different By 2011, both organizations had continued parties.37 As a consequence, the regime who subsequently endorsed protestors’ states that high-ranking claims of brutality and called for Gaddafi’s to grapple with the memory of their inac- was presented as an initial aggressor rather removal. Beginning with Libya’s U.N. Dele- tion to prevent genocides in international regime officials – selected than acting in response to civil strife, thus gation on February 21st, the country’s mis- conflicts during the previous two-decades assuming a ‘genocidal’ character. Such is 30 for their loyalty and sions in the United States, Australia, Indo- – i.e. in Rwanda and Srebrenica. Having corroborated by Debora Malito, who fur- nesia, Malaysia, Poland, India, Bangladesh faced severe public criticism for such past judgement – themselves ther contends the validity of the application 38 and the Arab League joined the defection inaction – being viewed as contrary to the viewed Gaddafi’s activity as of R2P principles to Libya. Citing the doc- thereafter.27 The act was unprecedented in tenets of their establishment and threaten- trine’s sequential processes – first involv- the history of the U.N. and demonstrated ing to their continued relevance – both or- unconscionable.” ing pursuit of a non-violent resolution via ganizations faced expectations to respond regional organizations – Malito notes that to other states that high-ranking regime of- However, the premises for such assessment ficials – selected for their loyalty and judge- oppositely to identical future situations, in member-states sought to use force at the whose mould Libya presented itself. Then- have come to be questioned by scholars, “first resort,” and “prematurely dismissed” ment – themselves viewed Gaddafi’s activity who suggest that claims of governmen- as unconscionable. Moreover, that they had U.S. Senator John Kerry captured this sen- the African Union’s proposed settlement timent at the time, claiming that “U.N. tal action tantamount to ‘state-sponsored process.39 This dismissal, consequently, un- defected after four decades of supporting genocide’ were unsupported by evidence Libya’s suppressive regime suggested the 34 Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reas- sessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” 108. 28 emergence of a new paradigm in Gaddafi’s Ibid. 31 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- 35 Ibid, 109. 29 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1973,” 1. tect in North Africa, 113. 36 Ibid. coerciveness, which was intolerable even 30 Nguirane Cheikh, “Stories behind the western-led 32 Ibid, 127; Puri, “Libya: Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice and 37 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- humanitarian intervention in Libya: A critical analysis,” the Ghost of Rwanda.” tect in North Africa, 120. 27 Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- African Journal of Political Science and International Rela- Wester, 33 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- 38 Malito, “The Responsibility to Protect What in Libya.” tect in North Africa tions , 106-107,110. 7, no. 3 (2013): 154-163. tect in North Africa, 122. 39 Ibid, 290-291. 20 21 THE ATTACHÉ | Volume XXI Issue 1

dermined the intervention’s congruity with ly articulated by Nguirane Cheikh, several prochement with Libya post-2003, the Eu- tential for a Libyan Civil War (between the R2P, given their non-adherence to the strategic considerations are evinced, – cor- ropean Union and Libyan regime had taken the regime and opponents) to foster the doctrine’s normative framework.40 roborated by state officials’ testimony, to joint measures (e.g. maritime operations) to emergence of a Jihadist concentration in have compelled the intervention. prevent “illegal immigration” to Europe.46 proximity to Europe, which would threat- To date, the exact factual circumstances of Libya – with its robust, oil-fuelled economy en European national security through the February’s events remain disputed among Institutionally, NATO’s decision to intervene and Gaddafi’s welcoming migratory policy emergence of Islamist rebel.51 While Jihad- scholars. However, the certitude of the up- was undergirded by its key systemic logic – – was an alternative to Europe as a key ab- ism in Libyan territory did not ipso facto rising’s circumstances, and its congruence the defence and security of the European sorbent of Sub-Saharan migrants.47 affect European interests, the potential for with the R2P frameworks, matter little vis- continent.43 Established for this purpose in Upon Libya’s descent into conflict, howev- its externalization to Europe caused signifi- à-vis states’ decisions to intervene. Rather, 1949, then primarily as a strategic deter- er, Europe’s strategic calculus to deter mi- cant concern among NATO member-states. the mere ‘perception’ of potential genocide rence against the Soviet Union, NATO has gration was upset and the possibility of a In this context, the recollection of Afghani- at the time – putatively validated by U.N. since the Cold War sought to continue this large-scale refugee influx from the former stan (where NATO combat operations were and Libyan officials’ testimony – triggered mission through action in other proximate became latent. With 90% of Libya’s popu- then-ongoing) as an effective ‘safe harbour’ principled objection and critical memories theatres deemed threatening to Europe. lation located on its Northern Coast, the for Al-Qaeda and anti-Western terrorism by member-states, impelling them towards As a consequence, the alliance intervened prospect of thousands of refugee-laden was latent in NATO’s strategic calculus at swift intervention with relatively little re- in Bosnia and Herzegovina (without U.N. boats crossing the Mediterranean Sea to the time. Consequently, they assumed that straint. As evinced from the testimony of authorization) as well as began ‘Operation the French Riviera or the Italian Peninsu- a Jihadist-laden Libya would serve as a base Rice and Araud, member-states were in- Sea Guardian’ to intercept migrant vessels la – without a buffer jurisdiction to inhib- for anti-Western terrorism against Europe clined to err towards action and preclude that may reach European shores, thus sat- it passage – deeply concerned Europe- – whereby extremist fighters, controlling civilian atrocities before they were able isfying European interests. In this context, an leaders.48 Consequently, they came to territory and funded by Libyan natural re- to occur. To that end, the ‘Responsibility its engagement in Libya was no different – view the restoration of Libyan stability a source extraction (largely to oppose Gadd- to Protect’ became the key principle that seeking to preserve three key security and key strategic objective to deter migration afi), would also cross the Mediterranean pushed the U.N. and NATO towards inter- economic interests of Europe, both linked – paradoxically, via the removal of the Lib- Sea to plot attacks across Europe.52 “Do we vention. to Libya’s proximity to member-states. yan regime with whom they had previously want a failed pariah state on Europe’s bor- The first of these was the prevention of mi- cooperated. Gaddafi’s replacement with a ders?” asked British Prime Minister David “Unified Protector” of Self-Interest grant inflows. Before the Arab Spring, Eu- democratic state, European states rea- Cameron at the time, conscious of the ef- rope had (albeit, to a lesser degree) long soned, would complement Libya’s econom- fects a Jihadist-laden Libya would have on A ‘critical’ analysis of NATO’s Libyan interA been the recipient of asylum seekers from ic strength with political stability – ensuring continental security.53 To that end, NATO ‘critical’ analysis of NATO’s Libyan inter- Middle Eastern and North African states its continued ability to absorb African mi- was likewise impelled to intervene, seek- vention – vide the term’s Marxist connota- seeking physical safety and financial prom- gration and enabling the new state to fulfil ing to replace the crises’ principal instiga- tions – would warrant the consideration of ise.44 Given the latter region’s instability, agreements previously made to curtail mi- tor (i.e. Gaddafi) to avoid further instability ‘actor-interests’ as influential variables.41 In European leaders were acutely conscious grant outflows.49 Consequently, in interven- and, thus, Jihadist radicalism in the country. conjunction with the realist view of interna- of increased migration’s potential to cause ing, NATO’s European member-states were While the necessity of intervention in Lib- tional relations, seeing state action as ob- and compound socio-economic problems – “motivated by the need to defend national ya to European security (NATO’s principal jected towards preserving or maximizing of resource and residential scarcity – in do- interests.”50 objective) held patent currency with the al- their power/interests, member-states inter- mestic settings, particularly as the Eurozone liance’s European membership, the impact vening in Libya would have been impelled faced a fiscal crisis following the Great Re- Secondly, and more potently, NATO mem- of these specific objectives on NATO’s prin- by “political and economic motivations,” cession.45 To that end, amidst Western rap- ber-states were concerned about the po- cipal member-state was less acute. If the notwithstanding the aforementioned nor- 43 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Why was NATO 51 Kristina Trauthig, “IS in Libya: From Force to Farce?” mative factors under the R2P.42 When ex- founded?” Accessed December 5, 2020. https://www. tect in North Africa. March 1, 2020. Accessed December 5, 2020. https://icsr. 46 amined through this framework, principal- nato.int/wearenato/why-was-nato-founded.html. Ibid. info/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ICSR-Report-Islamic- 44 Daniel Howden, Apostolis Fotiadis and Zach Camp- 47 Cheikh, “Stories behind the western-led humanitarian State-in-Libya-From-Force-to-Farce.pdf. bell, “Revealed: the great European refugee scan- intervention in Libya: A critical analysis.” 52 Aaron Zelin, The Others: Foreign Fighters in Libya, 40 Ibid. dal,” March 12, 2020. Accessed December 5, 2020. 48 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East 41 Cheikh, “Stories behind the western-led humanitarian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/12/re- tect in North Africa. Policy, 2018). intervention in Libya: A critical analysis.” vealed-the-great-european-refugee-scandal. 49 Malito, “The Responsibility to Protect What in Libya.” 53 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- 42 Ibid. 45 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- 50 Ibid, 292. tect in North Africa, 146.

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offered an opportunity for his removal.57 ed. Hence, when the presented with the The first of these was Libya’s opposition to opportunity to remove Gaddafi (previously U.S. foreign policy. Throughout the Cold attempted by the United States, in Opera- War and into the 21st Century, Gaddafi tion El Dorado Canyon), the United States was a Pan-Africanist and fervent support- “reverted to the patterns” of strategic con- er of the Non-Aligned Movement, op- tainment – and supported intervention to posing the influence of Western states on this end.63 the African continent and in Third World Nations.58 Viewing the United States as a In conjunction, Libya’s significant steps ‘neo-imperialistic’ power threatening these towards producing Weapons of Mass De- objectives, he consequently took steps to struction served to enhance U.S. opposi- oppose U.S. interests in both realms during tion to the regime’s existence. Continuing the Cold War.59 These included, inter alia, throughout the Cold War and into the new the funding of armed insurrections against millennium, Libya’s nuclear weapons pro- U.S.-allied states e.g., the Palestinian Liber- gramme threatened the longstanding U.S. ation Organization, Irish Republican Army, objective of global non-proliferation – par- African National Congress, the Sandinistas ticularly by Arab states opposed to Isra- in Nicaragua and the New People’s Army el.64 While the regime never constructed of the Philippines. Additionally, Gaddafi’s a nuclear weapon and voluntarily agreed regime supported established socialist re- to end its effort in 2003 (in exchange for gimes– e.g., the Derg in Ethiopia and Fidel the rescinding of economic sanctions), its Castro in Cuba, in opposition to U.S. con- prior aggressive momentum towards the tainment interests.60 Deriving fiscal ballast same, along with its large chemical weap- from its petroleum industry, Libyan support ons stockpiles, stood counter to U.S. disar- for these entities was sustained and consid- mament interests.65 These, too, fomented aforementioned realist framework – em- NATO’s intervention from an endogenous erable – often proving essential to their vic- permanent suspicion between both nations phasising individual actor interests – is to perspective – whereby the same would sat- tory and, consequently, the erosion of U.S. – leading to Libya’s designation as a “rogue be followed, the United States of America isfy U.S. strategic interests to merit partic- interests in those regions.61 For these rea- state” by the United States that, in 2011, would see little reason to participate in a ipation. sons, the United States came to rank Libya impelled the latter towards intervention.66 foreign engagement bearing few conse- as its “fourth potential enemy” during the Secondly, the Libyan regime’s long-stand- quences for itself, given its relative isolation Such an examination yields a three-pronged Cold War – after the Soviet Union, China and ing support for international terrorism from region-centric externalities.54 More- case for the United States’ intervention to North Korea.62 Although the Communist placed it in additional opposition to U.S. in- over, the then-incumbent Obama Adminis- seek “regime change” in Libya, albeit for Bloc’s dissolution ended Libyan support for terests. While Gaddafi had supported left- tration had been elected on a platform of different reasons than its European NATO its regimes, the longstanding antagonism it wing terrorist movements in Europe during avoiding military engagement (after Iraq), allies.56 Whereas the latter viewed Gadda- developed with the United States persist- the Cold War – e.g. the ‘Rote Armee Frak- and would seemingly contradict its posture fi’s removal as transitive to the aim of Lib- 57 Cheikh, “Stories behind the western-led humanitarian tion’ in Germany and Red Brigades in Italy, if it entered another without a perceptible yan stability, thereby entailing its material intervention in Libya: A critical analysis.” with “sanctuary, support and training” – his 58 domestic threat.55 In this context, it is nec- interests, the United States’ realistic end Ibid. regime’s intelligence services were suspect- 59 Yehudit Ronen, “Vestiges of the Cold War in Libya’s essary to examine American support for lay with the removal of Gaddafi himself. “Arab Spring”: Revisiting Libya’s Relations with the Soviet ed of direct involvement in several terrorist This end stemmed from the United States Union,” Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies in 63 54 Puri, “Libya: Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice and the Ghost Asia 8, no. 2 (2018): 66-95. Ronen, “Vestiges of the Cold War in Libya’s Arab longstanding animosity with the Libyan re- 60 of Rwanda.” Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- Spring,” 67. gime, which prompted American support 64 55 The White House, “Remarks by the President in Ad- tect in North Africa. Ibid. 61 65 dress to the Nation on Libya,” March 28, 2011. Accessed for NATO intervention when the uprising Cheikh, “Stories behind the western-led humanitarian Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- November 11, 2020. https://obamawhitehouse.archives. intervention in Libya: A critical analysis.” tect in North Africa. 62 66 gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-ad- 56 Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reas- Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- Cheikh, “Stories behind the western-led humanitarian dress-nation-libya. sessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” 134. tect in North Africa, 69. intervention in Libya: A critical analysis,” 161. 24 25 THE ATTACHÉ | Volume XXI Issue 1

acts targeting American citizens.67 Chief to intervene in Libya in cooperation with powers viewed the State of Libya.75 Conse- temporaries (e.g. Gamal Nasser and Hafez among these was the bombing of Pan Am its equally, yet differentially, self-interest- quently, the effect of these traits served to Al-Assad), what distinguished him further Flight 103 (i.e. the ‘Lockerbie Bombing’), ed European partners under the aegis of characterize Libya in a manner conducive to was his theory’s mandating of the abolition which killed 190 American passengers, and NATO. In his address explaining the deci- foreign intervention (i.e., as intrinsically ob- of state institutions – which he considered the bombing of West Berlin’s “La Belle” sion to participate in the intervention, U.S. noxious and unpredictable), and mitigated “tyrannical” and “fraudulent” to democ- nightclub in 1986 – both acts being under- President Barack Obama admitted as much: other structural factors that, traditionally, racy.78 To that end, Gaddafi did not hold taken by Libyan intelligence agents.68 As a claiming “our interests…are at stake,” and have prevented such interventions from oc- any position within the pro forma state consequence, the United States remained making reference to “Americans killed by curring. but styled himself as the “Brotherly Lead- affixed in a hostile position towards Libya, Libyan agents” – alluding to both the Unit- er and Guide of the Revolution”– ruling leading to Libya’s designation as a “state ed States’ strategic imperatives as well as informally via corporatist “People’s Con- sponsor of terrorism,” and motivating ef- its retribution-fuelled opposition towards “Colonel Muammar Al- gresses” acting under his aegis and which forts to remove the regime in the context the regime.73 Subsequently, the manner of Gaddafi, upon assuming were effectively authoritarian in nature.79 In of “the War on Terror”.69 such intervention (a No-Fly Zone, with the leadership of Libya via coup addition to implementing these principles targeting of Libyan assets via air) served to domestically, Gaddafi would often raise Thirdly, the United States viewed access undermine Gaddafi’s capacity for resistance d’état in 1969, established them in conversation with foreign leaders to Libyan oil and natural gas reserves as while conforming to Euro-American strate- an unconventional persona – seeking to influence them towards the a key strategic objective. At the outset of gic preferences for military conflict i.e. the theory’s adoption.80 To these leaders and the 21st Century, Libya had been ranked absence of ground troops (in contrast with for a Head of Government international observers, Gaddafi’s ideolog- as “the top exploration spot in the world” R2P recommendations of “peacekeeping in the international ical framework was perennially viewed as a 70 by American prospectors. While such ac- forces”) whose casualties would yield do- community.” vague and quixotic attempt to present him- cess had been granted to Western compa- mestic political opposition.74 The interven- self as a pseudo-’Philosopher King’ – being nies following Libyan liberalization in 2003, tion’s actual achievement of such realistic At the outset, Gaddafi’s unique reputation unreflective of a modern, Westphalian na- the commencement of hostilities in 2011 objectives for NATO member-states via in- was shaped by his idiosyncratic personal tion-state with stable institutions. For U.N. led the United States to view the regime’s tervention was less evident and will be dis- behaviour in matters of state and foreign and NATO members, following a Weberian presence (being the instigator of opposi- cussed subsequently. relations, which may be classified into three legal-rational structure, this fact prevented tional violence) as a threat to their installa- categories. First among these was his do- them from conceiving of Gaddafi’s regime 71 tions’ operational security. To this end, it ‘The Great Dictator’ mestic reform according to the ‘Third Uni- beyond the mould of an authoritarian state assessed that a different regime would be versal Theory’ – a political theory devel- with an unpleasant ruler – making him “un- 81 largely conducive to foreign petroleum li- In assessing the reasons for NATO’s inter- oped by Gaddafi himself and ‘Green Book,’ predictable” in action. When coupled with censing and extraction on Libyan territory – vention into Libya, no evaluation is complete which he presented as a fundamental al- accusations of ‘genocide’ and hesitance with oil access, therefore, being a “driving without analysing the principal political fig- ternative to capitalism and Marxism.76 The concerning the fulfilment of obligations force” towards American support for inter- ure around whom both the uprising and mil- theory proposed an odd amalgamation of such unpredictability bolstered the case for 72 vention. itary response revolved. Colonel Muammar tribal Islam and socialism, whereby Sharia Gaddafi’s removal via intervention. Al-Gaddafi, upon assuming leadership of law would form the legal system of a ‘peo- Thus, the United States was motivated Libya via coup d’état in 1969, established ple’s state’ or “Jamahiriya” that redistrib- Secondly, Gaddafi’s character and conduct an unconventional persona for a Head of 77 at international summits – where, as Lib- 67 uted wealth via nationalization. While this Sara Obeidat, “Muammar Qaddafi and Libya’s Legacy Government in the international commu- was markedly different from the secular ya’s de facto sole authority, he represented of Terrorism,” October 13, 2015. Accessed December 5, nity. Given the highly personalized nature 2020. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/muam- Ba’athist socialism of Gaddafi’s initial con- 78 Bazzi, “What Did Qaddafi’s Green Book Really Say?” mar-qaddafi-and-libyas-legacy-of-terrorism/. of the Libyan regime, a cult of personality 79 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- 68 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- around his leadership, Gaddafi’s character 75 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- tect in North Africa, 65. 80 tect in North Africa, 70, 72. traits considerably influenced how foreign tect in North Africa. John Hudson, “Inside the Strange World of Muam- 69 Cheikh, “Stories behind the western-led humanitarian 76 Mohammad Bazzi, “What Did Qaddafi’s Green Book mar Qaddafi,” February 23, 2011. Accessed December intervention in Libya: A critical analysis,” 161. Really Say?” May 27, 2011. Accessed December 5, 2020. 5, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ 70 Ibid, 86. 73 The White House, “Remarks by the President in Ad- https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/books/review/ archive/2011/02/inside-the-strange-world-of-muammar- 71 Cheikh, “Stories behind the western-led humanitarian dress to the Nation on Libya.” what-did-qaddafis-green-book-really-say.html. qaddafi/342146/. intervention in Libya: A critical analysis.” 74 Chorin, “NATO’s Libya Intervention and the Continued 77 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- 81 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- 72 Ibid, 161. Case for a Responsibility to Rebuild,” 368, 379. tect in North Africa, 64. tect in North Africa, 179. 26 27 THE ATTACHÉ | Volume XXI Issue 1

the entirety of his regime – enhanced his Gaddafi spoke in a rambling manner on a his sons (engaging in intra-state conflict for terests – was unexercised owing to Gadd- aforementioned reputation as reckless, ob- bizarre collection of topics – inter alia, re- Gaddafi’s favour) and hiring Western pop afi’s poor disposition with all such nations. noxious and even insane. On foreign trips, ferring to Barack Obama as his “son,” call- artists to perform at island parties.88 Gadd- he would engage in conspicuous ethnic rit- ing for nations to enable an Iraqi Civil War, afi himself was known to possess gold-plat- The voting logic of the United States, Unit- uals and traditional practices that departed tearing a copy of the U.N. Charter, suggest- ed personal weaponry and maintained an ed Kingdom and France – in favour of the from the sober and Westernized conduct ing Israel’s involvement in the assassination all-female personal security team and med- intervention – has been previously exam- of other leaders. Rather than residing at of John F. Kennedy and accusing the U.N. ical staff of Ukrainian nurses.89 Taken to- ined. In addition to them, however, NATO’s hotels, Gaddafi would pitch Bedouin tents of “bringing about the Holocaust.”86 Pre- gether, these patterns of behaviour led in- intervention was tacitly supported by per- in outdoor public locations while attending sented before assembled world leaders, ternational observers to question Gaddafi’s manent members Russia and China, which international summits, which also were the the speech cemented Gaddafi’s reputation cognitive health and whether he was men- abstained.92 Traditionally, both states have venue of his bilateral meetings.82 Erected at as an inexplicable figure –insensible, inco- tally fit to govern, enhancing the character- voted against armed interventions in for- the Kremlin, Champs-Élysées, Villa Pamphi- herent and incapable of governance. Two ization of Libya’s leadership instability.90 As eign conflicts by international coalitions li in Rome and across the New York Met- years later, the characterization served to a consequence, upon the Libyan uprising’s comprised, largely, of Western states. Rus- ropolitan Area (while attending the U.N. buttress U.N. representatives’ support for commencement, U.N. member-states were sia’s use of the veto, in this regard, has General Assembly) – Gaddafi’s tents be- intervention – having personally witnessed primed to expect further unorthodox be- been exercised to prevent the enlargement came a symbol of his eccentricity, viewed Gaddafi and thus believing “new -leader haviour by Gaddafi – more conducive to a of NATO interests in Europe and its sur- as distasteful by observers.83 This practice ship” was necessary.87 crisis’ conflagration of the crisis and further rounding theatres – being pathologically was complemented by his attire at such violence, rather than diffusion in a peace- suspicious of the alliance vis-à-vis its count- 93 summits, which was equally peculiar. Dress- “As a consequence, upon ful manner. The United Nations and NATO er-Soviet origins. China, historically af- ing in traditional Bedouin garments while were thus impelled toward intervention fected by European imperialism (via forced others leaders wore Western business at- the Libyan uprising’s seeking the removal of Gaddafi’s regime. trade liberalization), has exercised its veto tire, Gaddafi would adorn himself with or- commencement, U.N. member- In aiding the NTC assumption of dominion, to uphold the principle of state sovereignty naments – e.g. rows of military ribbons, states were primed to expect they envisioned a de-personalized and pre- against Western intervention – particularly, 94 breast-stars and even pendants of the Af- further unorthodox behaviour dictable political order that could be trust- in resistance to the concept of ‘R2P’. To rican continent – that appeared inflationary ed to prevent mass atrocity and support this end, it had joined Russia in prevent- vis-à-vis his achievements, conforming to by Gaddafi – more conducive international interests.91 ing Security Council resolutions against the caricature of a ‘Third World Dictator’ to a crisis’ conflagration of Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Syria from being in the mould of Idi Amin or Ferdinand Mar- the crisis and further violence, However, more potent than the repug- passed – the frustration of Western inter- cos, i.e. oddly extravagant and aggrandiz- rather than diffusion in a nance of his idiosyncrasies to NATO mem- ests serving their strategic objectives. In ing.84 Gaddafi undoubtedly served as the ber-states, Gaddafi’s behaviour served to this context, it appears irregular for both global archetype of this image throughout peaceful manner.” prevent the operation of structural factors states to have abstained from voting on his leadership of Libya. Most markedly re- that previously limited humanitarian inter- Resolution 1973. An examination of Gadda- Thirdly, in congruence with his diplomatic flective of his character, however, were his vention in Third World States by Western fi’s relationship with these states, however, activity, Gaddafi’s international reputation speeches at such summits – most notably, nations. The factor in question – the use of reveals tensions advanced by his behaviour for bizarre behaviour was enhanced by his his 2009 Address to the U.N. General As- a Security Council veto by permanent mem- – which precluded their support. domestic conduct. As noted by U.S. authori- sembly during Libya’s presidency of the bers to protect states with coterminous in- Paradoxically, while the regime’s ties with ties in diplomatic correspondence (released body.85 Speaking for one-and-a-half hours Russia had remained stable throughout by Wikileaks before the uprising), Gaddafi 88 (exceeding his allotted fifteen minutes), John Hudson, “Inside the Strange World of Muam- 2011, the instability fomented by Gadda- was known to use state funds for person- mar Qaddafi,” February 23, 2011. Accessed December 82 Ibid. al expenditures aberrant from the conduct 5, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ 83 Phil Reeves and Caroline Hawley, “In a Bedouin tent, archive/2011/02/inside-the-strange-world-of-muammar- 92 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- Gaddafi lectures world leaders,” April 5, 2000. Accessed of most authoritarian rulers. These includ- qaddafi/342146/. tect in North Africa. December 5, 2020. https://www.independent.co.uk/ ed establishing personal militias for each of 89 Hudson, “Inside the Strange World of Muammar Qadd- 93 Ronen, “Vestiges of the Cold War in Libya’s Arab news/world/africa/in-a-bedouin-tent-gaddafi-lectures- afi.” Spring.” world-leaders-282139.html. 86 NY Post, “Khadafy’s UN Ramble,” September 23, 2009, 90 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- 94 Christopher Holland, “Chinese Attitudes to Interna- 84 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- https://youtube.com/watch?v=VXKBpycMvd0. tect in North Africa. tional Law: China, the Security Council, Sovereignty, and tect in North Africa. 87 Malito, “The Responsibility to Protect What in Libya,” 91 Chorin, “NATO’s Libya Intervention and the Continued Intervention,” New York University Journal of International 85 Ibid. 293. Case for a Responsibility to Rebuild.” Law and Politics (2012): 3-43. 28 29 THE ATTACHÉ | Volume XXI Issue 1

fi’s personality led the latter to withdraw ering such history, and the prospect of re- eign policy interests.102 its support for the regime amid its impact placement with a more amenable regime, on Russian strategic interests. The latter – the general sentiment towards intervention However, for the United Nations, Libyan comprising greater commercial relations, was a simple, exasperated “Go ahead.” population and NATO’s European mem- as well as the placement of a naval facility ber-states, the alliance’s intervention to in the Mediterranean Sea – were not served Post-Haste: A Bitter Success support Gaddafi regime’s removal has been by the regime’s instability and civil unrest, a “manifest failure.”103 Stemming from the mirroring concerns of the United States vis- To assess the ‘success’ of NATO’s interven- emergence of a Civil War within the country, à-vis petroleum industries.95 To this end, tion in Libya, the relative balance of effects Libya has – post-intervention – descended its abstention stemmed from Gaddafi’s on each key stakeholder needs to be ana- into state failure, with a stalemated conflict behaviour, which had led to the uprising lyzed. Doing so enables an intricate assess- between belligerent parties. The conflict – believing that a successor regime would ment of its consequences, as well as the has since prevented the consolidation of or- maintain Libya’s strategic ties to Russia with comprehensive revelation of impacts for a der in Libya to substantively fulfil either the greater stability.96 In contrast, the regime’s gestalt evaluation. strategic interests of parties or the objec- relationship with the People’s Republic of tives of the United Nations Security Council China had been considerably strained, with For the principal actor – the NATO alliance, in Resolution 1973. While this conflict does Gaddafi having criticized the former asa as well as its constituent member-states – not stem from the act of intervention itself, ‘traitor’ to socialism that engaged in “co- the intervention evinces slight success vis- the swift withdrawal of NATO forces follow- lonial” activity in Africa.97 To this end, while à-vis the stated objectives, both realistic ing Gaddafi’s removal facilitated its -emer China (akin to Russia) maintained econom- and principled. In implementing a No-Fly gence via two key consequences enabling ic ties with Libya, its abstention – thus, fa- Zone over Libya and targeting land assets the persistence of “underlying problems cilitating NATO’s intervention – served to of the regime, Operation Unified Protector that produced the original intervening ac- impel Gaddafi’s removal from power in re- precluded the regime from utilizing its key tion.”104 sponse to his antagonism towards Chinese military assets for coercion.99 To this end, interests. they aided insurrectionist militias in over- Foremost among the consequences of the running the Libyan Government – thus, intervention was the collapse of state insti- Thus, as a consequence of Gaddafi’s -de preventing it from undertaking armed re- tutions in Libya, which facilitated national meanour, traditional inhibitions on Security prisals against civilian opponents and meet- fragmentation and the emergence of “war- Council-authorized humanitarian interven- ing their ‘responsibility to protect’.100 The lordism” within the country, particularly tion – i.e., Sino-Russian opposition – were operation was later labelled by NATO Sec- along ethnic lines. As Paul Collier notes, mitigated, thus enabling the resolution’s retary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen as ethnically-diverse authoritarian states often passage and NATO’s intervention in Libya. among “the most successful in NATO his- maintain “cohesion” through a “hierarchi- Both countries’ relationship with the Gadd- tory,” and contrasted favourably with NA- cal, dictatorial decision structure, with most afi regime had been principally motivated TO’s inability to prevent the genocide in power vested in a charismatic leader.”105 In by material interest – which, upon perceiv- Srebrenica – thus remedying the damage to the absence of such state authority – es- ing his regime’s instability as threatening the organization’s reputation.101 Addition- pecially amidst moments of national tran- 95 them, contributed to their abstention. In the Tom Pfeiffer, “Gaddafi visits Russia on arms, energy ally, Gaddafi’s removal from power – with sition – actors with differential interests words of Security Council observer Bruno drive,” October 30, 2008. Accessed December 5, 2020. Gaddafi himself being killed – fulfilled a key can, per Kimberley Marten, both assert and reuters.com/article/us-libya-russia/gaddafi-visits-rus- Ugarte, Gaddafi’s personality had succeed- sia-on-arms-energy-drive-idUSTRE49S90G20081030. strategic objective of the United States: the 96 ed in uniting uncommon allies against him 102 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Pro- removal of a longstanding rival to their for- Cheikh, “Stories behind the western-led humanitarian tect in North Africa. – being a leader “who had lost all friends, intervention in Libya: A critical analysis.” 97 Andrew Higgins, “Libya policy a balancing act for who had demolished too many bridges, who 99 Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reas- 103 Chorin, “NATO’s Libya Intervention and the Continued China as Moammar Gaddafi’s rule collapses,” August 27, 98 sessing NATO’s Libya Campaign.” Case for a Responsibility to Rebuild,” 373. 2011. Accessed December 5, 2020. https://www.wash- had become too unpredictable.” Consid- 100 Chorin, “NATO’s Libya Intervention and the Continued 104 Ibid, 378. ingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/libya-policy-a-bal- Case for a Responsibility to Rebuild.” 105 Paul Collier et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War ancing-act-for-china-as-moammar-gaddafis-rule-collaps- 98 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to 101 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to and Development Policy (Washington D.C.: Oxford Uni- es/2011/08/26/gIQAnlKKgJ_story.html. Protect in North Africa, 179. Protect in North Africa, 217, 223. versity Press, 2003), 69. 30 31 THE ATTACHÉ | Volume XXI Issue 1

challenge “genuine sovereign control”.106 to the absence of professional expertise social and economic hardship concurrent vals from obtaining gains.115 Such has been Should these entities have the agency to to run such distributive institutions. Previ- with ongoing conflict. The country’s pover- the principal objective of the LNA – whose use force, competition to resolve such dis- ously, while neither of these regions had ty rate (33%) – coupled with the absence military strategy against the GNA has in- putes – irreconcilable by other means – will developed a unified national identity, the of drinking water and the constant threat volved attacking oil facilities to destabilize eventually turn violent, leading to conflict coercive capability and redistributive mech- of violence – presents little opportunities the latter’s power grid, thereby seeking ca- between the parties.107 anisms of the regime – inclusive of universal for employment and economic develop- pitulation.116 Simultaneously, the ability to healthcare and education – had facilitated ment.113 The previous engine of the nation- capture oil installations has further satiat- their fusion.109 al economy – petroleum extraction – has ed private financial interests of “warlord” “Stemming from the been severely disrupted as a consequence factions, who have been utilizing revenues emergence of a Civil War Thus, following NATO’s disengagement, of such hostilities, thus being unable to pro- from their controlled facilities for klepto- within the country, Libya Libyans from across the aforementioned vide financial resources for economic assis- cratic accumulation and patron-clientelist tribes came to view the NTC with deep tance.114 To this end, NATO’s intervention disbursement to fighters, rather than to has – post-intervention apathy – amid its inability to provide such has released the effects of Libya’s ‘resource economically support populations under – descended into state support, particularly after the economic curse’ – whereby, upon the deprivation of their control.117 In the context of economic damage sustained during the uprising. To oil revenues (owing to regime absence), hardship, Libyans have thus viewed mem- failure, with a stalemated that end, per Marten’s thesis, tribal fac- Libya’s population has been rendered eco- bership of military factions as a mechanism conflict between belligerent tions emerged to establish parallel au- nomically destitute. to access conflict rents for basic sustenance thority structures with the NTC – seeking – creating a vicious cycle for the conflict’s parties.” 118 to support their populations through both “To this end, NATO’s prolongation. Separately, NATO mem- Such has been the case with Libya since security (via militias) and economic activity, ber-states seeking accessibility to Libyan 110 2011. Upon the facilitation of Libyan insur- largely through criminal enterprise. As intervention has released the oil reserves have been equally hindered by gents’ defeat of regime forces, neither the pre-Gaddafi tribal distinctions emerged, effects of Libya’s ‘resource the conflict – being unable to achieve a key United Nations nor NATO took concrete efforts by the NTC and its successor, the objective that had impelled their interven- curse’ – whereby, upon the 119 steps to support the National Transitional Government of National Accord (GNA), to tion. Council’s consolidation of political order – assert national authority over tribal author- deprivation of oil revenues specifically, providing it with resources (i.e. ities was rejected – resulting in a military (owing to regime absence), For Europe, the ensuing conflict in Libya as financial and military) to consolidate its au- conflict between them and inviting other a result of NATO’s intervention has yielded thority. Hence, the NTC was unable to com- potential actors to contest GNA legitima- Libya’s population has been detriments – ironically, vis-à-vis both their 111 mence the delivery of public goods equi- cy. To this end, several factions – most rendered economically initial motivations for engagement. The on- tably to tribal ethnicities (i.e. the Toubou, significantly, the Khalifa Haftar-led Libyan going Civil War has ensured the migratory Tuareg and Arab-Berber) across Libya’s National Army (LNA) – continue to oppose destitute.” crisis that the former sought to prevent three distinct provinces – Fezzan, Cyrenaica the internationally-recognized GNA’s au- – compelling many Libyans to cross the thority, with the latter being forced to de- Secondly, concerning petroleum, NATO’s Mediterranean Sea and seek refuge.120 The and Tripolitania, respectively – thus failing intervention to facilitate the regime’s re- to develop performance legitimacy.108 This fend its control of the capital city (Tripoli), ensuing surge has not only constituted Lib- rather than construct institutions to negate moval led to their loss of effective domin- was compounded by the exodus of regime 115 Michael L. Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence 112 ion over Libya’s oil reserves – serving to personnel (e.g. civil servants and state of- the aforementioned alienation. Simul- Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,” International taneously, Libya continues to experience facilitate conflict between the parties for Organization 58, no, 1 (2004): 40. ficers) during the intervention, which led 116 their control. Per Michael Ross’ hypothe- Fawthorp, “Oil becomes the key battleground in Lib- 109 Puri, “Libya: Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice and the Ghost sis, armed groups have sought control over ya’s civil war.” 106 Kimberley Marten, Warlords: Strong-arm Brokers in of Rwanda;” Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsi- 117 Marten, Warlords: Strong-arm Brokers in Weak States. Weak States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 25. bility to Protect in North Africa. Libyan oil installations to “raise money” 118 Emily Estelle, Vicious Cycles: How Disruptive States and 107 Ibid. 110 Kuschminder, “Once a Destination for Migrants, to fund operations, as well as preclude ri- Extremist Movements Fill Power Vacuums and Fuel Each 108 Katie Kuschminder, “Once a Destination for Migrants, Post-Gaddafi Libya Has Gone from Transit Route to Con- Other (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, Post-Gaddafi Libya Has Gone from Transit Route to tainment.” 113 Jennifer Faulkner, “Causes of Poverty in Libya,” August 2020). Containment,” August 6, 2020. Accessed December 5, 111 Wester, Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to 15, 2017. Accessed December 5, 2020. https://borgen- 119 Malito, “The Responsibility to Protect What in Libya.” 2020. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/once-des- Protect in North Africa. project.org/causes-of-poverty-in-libya/. 120 Kuschminder, “Once a Destination for Migrants, tination-migrants-post-gaddafi-libya-has-gone-tran- 112 Fawthorp, “Oil becomes the key battleground in Lib- 114 Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reas- Post-Gaddafi Libya Has Gone from Transit Route to Con- sit-route-containment/. ya’s civil war.” sessing NATO’s Libya Campaign.” tainment.” 32 33 THE ATTACHÉ | Volume XXI Issue 1

yan nationals but also migrants from third the Al-Qaeda aligned Ansar al-Sharia’s at- countries transiting the country – owing to tack on the U.S. Diplomatic Compound in the absence of border control – for pas- Benghazi in 2012 (leading to the death of sage to Europe via sea.121 To this end, the the United States Ambassador to Libya) European Union has been forced to fund – confirming the potential for new Libyan the GNA-controlled Libyan Coast Guard, Jihadism to target Western interests.127 which frequently turns back migrant ves- In a gestalt sense, therefore, the Libyan sels before they enter European waters Civil War’s emergence post-intervention – incurring greater expenditure than its demonstrates a failure of the latter’s prin- pre-intervention migratory arrangements cipal objectives, as envisioned by the Unit- with the regime.122 ed Nations in Resolution 1973. Instead of ‘protecting civilians’ under the aegis of the Additionally, while Islamic extremism has R2P, the Libyan population has been sub- not been externalized to Europe, it has ject to prolonged violence, instability and certainly taken root in Libya – where com- hardship.128 Within this framework, both peting militias have often adopted Jihad- NATO and the United Nations neglected ism to recruit more followers, as well as the ‘responsibility to rebuild’ as an en- tervention into Libya are revealed as mul- to act. access support via the former ideology’s tailed consequence of intervention under tiplex – with several variables impacting international network of adherents.123 R2P.129 The result – escalating violence and each. The consequences of NATO’s intervention, While these groups had previously been leaving Libyans in a more precarious state however, have been largely detrimental “suppressed under Gaddafi,” the absence than under the regime – has led to wide- Concerning the former, the United Nations for all stakeholders – including members of state structure and coercive capability spread criticism of both organizations, as Security Council was impelled to act based of the alliance. Apart from the removal of (due to the intervention) facilitated their well as newfound opposition from states on the Responsibility to Protect doctrine – the Gaddafi-led regime, Libya’s devolution re-emergence.124 To that end, Jihadism to the concept of humanitarian interven- seeking, based on putative assessments into Civil War has adversely affected both has proliferated in Libya – with groups tion.130 of the Libyan uprising, to prevent poten- U.N. and NATO interests. Neither have recruiting foreign fighters and accessing tial crimes against humanity by the Gadd- civilians been protected (amidst ongoing the former regime’s armouries to gain afi-led regime. Moreover, the legacy of hostilities) nor have migration or Jihadist weaponry to wage territorial conflict.125 “Instead of ‘protecting previous genocidal acts (Rwanda, Srebren- radicalism been precluded. In an ironic de- Although no post-regime terrorist attacks civilians’ under the aegis ica, Cambodia and even, as evoked by Lib- parture from the regime years, the Liby- yan defectors, in Germany) hung over the an population suffers from more violence, in Europe have been explicitly linked to of the R2P, the Libyan Libyan Jihadist groups (barring the Libyan organization and its member-states, who economic precarity and frequent shifts of presence of the Islamic State) the poten- population has been subject believed that swift action in Libya (despite political order – as warring factions gain tial for such an attack remains latent given to prolonged violence, conflicting evidence) was a necessary step and lose territory in the struggle for na- their proximity and access to Europe via towards absolution. Principled concerns tional authority. Nearly a decade after the the Mediterranean sea.126 NATO mem- instability and hardship.” were supplemented by pragmatic inter- intervention, Libya remains a failed state bers experienced such a possibility with ests of member-states – who viewed the in the archetype of modern conflicts: ef- Conclusion removal of Gaddafi as a chance to fulfil forts to broker peace continue but have 121 Puri, “Libya: Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice and the Ghost longstanding strategic policy goals and fa- yet to yield progress towards a lasting res- of Rwanda.” From the aforementioned evaluation, both cilitate the realization of others. Although olution. 122 Howden, Fotiadis and Campbell, “Revealed: the great European refugee scandal.” the causes and effects of NATO’s 2011 in- opposition toward Security Council action 123 Claudiu Bolcu, “NATO’s Intervention in Libya: The 127 Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? was latent – i.e., from non-NATO perma- Arjun Singh is in his last year studying Pathway Towards a Legitimate Humanitarian Interven- Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign.” nent members resistant to intervention – Political Science, International Relations, tion,” Studia Ubb Europaea 58, no. 1 (2013): 107-124. 128 Puri, “Libya: Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice and the Ghost 124 Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? of Rwanda.” the longstanding effect of Gaddafi’s dis- and American Studies at the University Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” 127. 129 Chorin, “NATO’s Libya Intervention and the Contin- position towards them uniquely mitigated of Toronto 125 Zelin, The Others: Foreign Fighters in Libya. ued Case for a Responsibility to Rebuild.” traditional structural inhibitions on action, 126 Puri, “Libya: Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice and the Ghost 130 Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? of Rwanda.” Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign.” enhancing the resolve of member-states Works Cited (contd. on page 37) 34 35 Margulies, Peter. “The NSA in International Per- lageindex.aspx. spective: Surveillance, Human Rights and Interna- tional Counterterrorism.” Fordham Law Review 82 “Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy.” Unit- (2014): 2137-2165. ed Nations Human Rights Office of the High Com- missioner, The Office of the High Commissioner Marthews, Alex and Catherine Tucker. “Govern- for Human Rights. 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