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MAP A.1 Multidimensional Poverty

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MAP A.1 Multidimensional Poverty MAP A.1 | Multidimensional Poverty Contribution of Deprivation in Appendices Dimension to Overall poverty Standard of living Health Maps Education Population in Multidimensional Poverty (%) Population Vulnerable to Multidimensional Poverty (%) More than 15% From 2% to 3% Jordan FYROM From 10% to 15% From 1% to 2% Serbia From 5% to 10% Less than 1% Tunisia Bosnia … 331 From 3% to 5% Data unavailable Montenegro Palestine Algeria Population living below income poverty line (%) Egypt Albania National poverty line Syria 40 Libya Morocco 30 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 20 10 Population in severe multidimensional poverty (%) 0 Bosnia … Palestine Libya Jordan Serbia PPP $1.90 a day Montenegro 5 Albania 2019 4 Tunisia 3 FYROM Algeria 2 Egypt 1 Syria 0 Morocco 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mediterranean Yearbook Med. Med. Own Production. Source: UNDP. IE MAP A.2a | Vote for Far-right Parties in the European Elections 2019 Appendices % of vote Maps >40% 10-15% 30-40% 5-10% 20-30% 1-5% 15-20% 0-1% 332 Seats obtained in each EU Member State in the European Election 2019 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 2019 30 20 10 0 total number of seats per country seats obtained by far-right parties seats obtained by FdI in Italy Mediterranean Yearbook Med. Med. Own production. Sources: European Parliament, Robert Schuman Foundation; Interior Ministries and Electoral Commissions of the 28 EU Member States; Georgiadou, V.; IE Rori, L.; Roumanias (2018); Davis, L.; Deole, S.S. (2017). MAP A.2b | Far-right Performance in National Parliamentary Elections since 2001 (% of votes) Appendices Maps 333 Austria: Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ). Belgium: Flemish Block / Flemish Interest (VB). National Front / National Democracy (FN/DN). Bulgaria: National Union Attack (ATTAKA). National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB). Will (Volya). Croatia: Croatian Party of Rights (HSP). Cyprus: National People's Front (ELAM). Czechia: Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). Worker's Party of Social Justice (DSSS). Dawn - National Coalition (USVIT). Denmark: Danish People's Party (DF). Hard Line (SK). Estonia: Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE). Estonian Independence Party (EIP). Finland: True Finns / Finns Party (PERUS). Finnish People First (SKE). Blue and White Front (VP). France: National Front / National Rally (FN/RN). Germany: Alternative for Germany (AfD). National-Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). Greece: Golden Dawn (XA). Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS). Hungary: Movement for a Better Hungary (JOBBIK). Italy: Northern League 2019 / League (LN/Lega). Brothers of Italy (FdI). CasaPound Italia (CPI). New Force (FN). Tricolour Flame (FT). Latvia: National Alliance All For Latvia! – For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK (NA VL-TB/LNNK). Malta: Maltese Patriots Movement (MPM). Netherlands: Party for Freedom (PVV). Forum for Democracy (FvD). Pim Fortuyn List (PFL). Poland: Kukiz'15 - National Movement (K15 – RN). League of Polish Families (LPR). Portugal: National Renovator Party (PNG). Romania: United Romania Party (PRU). Greater Romania Party (PRM). Slovakia: Slovak National Party (SNS). People's Party - Our Slovakia (L'SNS). Slovenia: Slovenian National Party (SNS). Spain: Vox. Sweden: Swedish Democrats (SD). United Kingdom: Brexit Party (BP). UK Independence Party (UKIP). Mediterranean Yearbook Own production. Sources: IFES Election Guide, NSSDS European Election Database; Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), OSCE. Interior Ministries Med. and Electoral Commissions of the 28 EU Member States; Georgiadou, V.; Rori, L.; Roumanias (2018); Davis, L.; Deole, S.S. (2017). IE MAP A.3 | Gross Domestic Product in Mediterranean Countries (2017) Appendices Maps Gross Domestic Product per capita, current prices Gross Domestic Product, current prices (purchasing power parity; international dollars) (purchasing power parity; in billions of international dollars) More than 2,000 More than 40,000 From 20,000 to 25,000 From 35,000 to 40,000 From 15,000 to 20,000 From 1,000 to 2,000 334 From 30,000 to 35,000 From 10,000 to 15,000 From 500 to 1,000 From 25,000 to 30,000 Less than 10,000 From 100 to 250 From 250 to 500 Data unavailable From 50 to 100 From 20 to 50 Less than 20 Gross Domestic Product Based on Purchasing-power-parity (PPP) Share from Mediterranean countries of word total Algeria Israel Egypt Spain Portugal Greece Morocco Turkey Tunisia Rest of Med Countries Serbia 2019 the world Croatia Jordan Lebanon Slovenia Italy France Libya Rest of Med Countries Mediterranean Yearbook Med. Med. IE Source: IMF. MAP A.4 | Government Debt in Mediterranean Countries (2017) -131 -113 -43 General Goverment Gross Debt General Goverment Net Lending Borrowing 2019 5 More than 150% From 60% to 80% 0 From 100% to 150% From 40% to 60% -5 From 80% to 100% Less than 40% -10 Data unavailable -15 2015 2016 2017 2018 Mediterranean Yearbook Source: IMF. Med. Med. IE 335 Maps Appendices MAP A.5 | Labour force in Mediterranean Countries by Age and Sex, 2017 2017 Appendices Maps Median Age of the Labour Force (in years) Evolution of Median 45 Age of the Labour More than 45 From 37.5 to 40 Force 35 Male From 42.5 to 45 From 35 to 37.5 Female From 40 to 42.5 Less than 35 25 336 1990 1999 2008 2017 Persons (age 15-65) Inside/Outside the 1990 Labour Force, by sex and age (%) 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 15-19 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 2030 Male Outside Labour Force Male Labour Force Female Outside Labour Force Female Labour Force 2019 ALBANIA ALGERIA Mediterranean Yearbook Med. Med. IE Own Production. Source: ILOStat, ILO modelled estimates. MAP A.5 | Labour force in Mediterranean Countries by Age and Sex, 2017 BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA CROATIA CYPRUS EGYPT Appendices Maps FRANCE GREECE ISRAEL ITALY JORDAN LEBANON LIBYA MALTA MONTENEGRO MOROCCO NORTH MACEDONIA PALESTINE 337 SERBIA PORTUGAL SLOVENIA SPAIN SYRIA TUNISIA Unemployed in Mediterranean Countries, by sex and age North Mediterranean Countries South and East Mediterranean Countries 11.73 million 12.28 million 2019 TURKEY 15-24 Male 15-24 Female 25+ Male 25+ Female Mediterranean Yearbook Med. Med. Own Production. Source: ILOStat, ILO modelled estimates. IE MAP A.6 | International Trade in Digitally-deliverable Services (2016-2017) Appendices Maps Percentage of Total Trade in Services US dollars at Current Prices in millions More than 55% From 15% to 25% From 45% to 55% From 10% to 15% 2,000 30,000 From 35% to 45% 338 Less than 10% <200 6,000 From 25% to 35% Data unavailable 2019 Mediterranean Yearbook Med. Med. IE Own Production. Source: UNCTAD. MAP A.7 | Indian Trade with Mediterranean Countries (2017) EXPORTS Appendices Maps Indian Trade with Mediterranean Countries Evolution of Indian Trade with Med (in thousands of dollars) 2017 Countries (1996-2017) More than 5,000,000 From 250,000 to 500,000 Data unavailable From 3,000,000 to 5,000,000 From 100,000 to 250,000 From 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 From 50,000 to 100,000 339 From 750,000 to 1,000,000 From 20,000 to 50,000 From 500,000 to 750,000 Less than 20,000 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 IMPORTS 2019 Mediterranean Yearbook Med. Med. Source: UNCTAD. IE MAP A.8 | Vaccination and Immunization in Mediterranean Countries (2018) Appendices Maps BCG (Tuberculosis) DTP 3rd dose (Diphteria, Tetanus, Pertussis) HepB 3rd dose (Hepatitis B) Hib 3rd dose (Haemophilus influenzae) 340 MCV 2nd dose (Measles) PCV 3rd dose (Streptococcus pneumoniae) 2019 RCV (Rubella) Pol 3rd dose (Poliomielitis) Percentage of vaccinated children 99% 90%-94% 80%-84% 70%-74% 50%-59% vaccine not administered - no estimate made 85%-89% 75%-79% 60%-69% <50% Mediterranean Yearbook 95%-98% Data not available Med. Med. IE Source: UNICEF. MAP A.9 | Suicide Rates in Mediterranean Countries 2000-2016 Suicide Rates 2000-2016, per gender and 100,000 inhabitants Total Suicide Rates, 2016 per 100,000 inhabitants 2019 40 More than 13 From 5 to 7 30 male From 10 to 13 From 3 to 5 20 female From 7 to 10 Less than 3 10 0 2000 2010 2016 Mediterranean Yearbook Own Production. Source: WHO. Med. Med. IE 341 Maps Appendices MAP A.10 | Food Supply in Mediterranean Countries (2013) Appendices Maps º Food Supply (kcal/capita/day) Food Supply (kcal/capita/day) by Type of Products More than 3,550 From 3,150 to 3,250 From 3,450 to 3,550 From 3,050 to 3,150 Animal Products Vegetal Products From 3,350 to 3,450 Less than 3,050 342 From 3,250 to 3,350 Data unavailable Food Supply: Oilcrops Oil (kcal/capita/day) by type Food Supply: Meat. Type of Meat that Provides more Kcal in each Country Israel Spain Italy Greece Turkey Jordan Portugal France Tunisia Lebanon Cyprus North Macedonia Algeria Slovenia Croatia Morocco Montenegro 2019 Malta Albania 30-40% 40-50% 50-60% More than 60% Bosnia and... Egypt Bovine Meat Serbia Mutton & Goat Meat 0 200 400 600 800 Pigmeat Olive Oil Soyabean Oil Poultry Meat Mediterranean Yearbook Sunflowerseed Oil Oilcrops Oil Other Med. Med. IE Source: FAO. MAP A.10 | Food Supply in Mediterranean Countries (2013) Food Supply (kcal/capita/day) Appendices Animal Products Vegetal Products Albania Maps Algeria Bosnia and … Croatia Cyprus Egypt France Greece Israel Italy Jordan Lebanon Malta 343 Montenegro Morocco North Macedonia Portugal Serbia Slovenia Spain Tunisia Turkey 2019 Meat Alcoholic Beverages Starchy Roots Milk - Excluding Butter Cereals -Excluding Beer Vegetable Oils& Oilcrops Eggs Fruits -Excluding Wine Sugar, Sweeteners & Sugar Crops Animal fats Vegetables Other Vegetal products Fish Seafood Pulses Mediterranean Yearbook Med.
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