State Responses to Energy Transitions: Great Power Navies and their Transition from Coal to Oil
A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
In the Department of Political Science of the College of Arts and Sciences
by
Robert B. Nestheide, B.A.,
July 2016
Committee Chair: Thomas G. Moore, PhD
1 Abstract
This dissertation examines state and military responses to energy transitions. The research uses a methodological approach of within-case comparison to examine state and naval policy responses over time during the transition from coal to oil-fueled naval fleets. This framework for categorizing and understanding state reactions to new energy technologies explores the concurrent impact of both systemic and domestic level variables and contributes to the field of political science by exploring the process of technological diffusion. This approach can be replicated and applied to both other states and other energy transitions, providing a platform for future investigations into the impact of energy transitions and the role of state organizations in shaping the outcomes of such transitions. The dissertation contributes to the various literatures by filling a gap in the qualitative assessment of state and military experiences during energy transitions and also by tracing the process by which new energy technology diffused among different states and militaries.
2
3 Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Dr. Thomas G. Moore for his support, advice, and thoughtful feedback, provided over the course of my time as a graduate student at the University of Cincinnati. I am also very thankful for the feedback and advice of Dr. Richard Harknett, whose suggestions were integral to the completion of this project. I am particularly thankful for the support and feedback from Dr. Joel Wolfe, who was always willing to discuss the project and regularly reminded me to see the bigger picture. I would also like to thank the Political Science Department, for the years of support and encouragement they have given. I am thankful for the financial support from The
Charles Phelps Taft Research Center, the Graduate School and also the Department of Political
Science. Lastly, I would like to thank my wife, Shawna Nestheide, and my parents, Dr. Robert
Nestheide and Kathy Nestheide, for continual support and encouragement.
4 Table of Contents
Chapter 1 – Introduction……………………………………………… 7
Chapter 2 – Energy, Energy Transitions, and Modern Military Organizations: A Review of the Literature…….. 20
Chapter 3 – Military Organizations, Innovation, and Technological Diffusion A Review of the Literature:…………………… 66
Chapter 4 – The American Navy’s Transition from Coal to Oil: 1904-1918………………………………….. 108
Chapter 5 – The British Navy’s Transition from Coal to Oil: 1904-1918…………………………………... 177
Chapter 6 – Comparative Analysis of the U.S. and British Transition from Coal to Oil………………………………. 228
Bibliography……………………………………………………………. 270
Appendix …………………………………………………………… 282
5
List of Figures and Tables
1.1 – American Energy Consumption by source 1850-2000………………………… 22 1.2 – American Energy Consumption by source 1949-2011………………………… 23 1.3 – World Energy Consumption by source 1986-2012…………………………...... 24 5.1 – British Naval expenditure on battleships and cruisers 1889-1904……………… 181 5.2 – United Kingdom Oil Imports by source 1914-1929……………………………. 191 5.3 – Great Power Navy Battleships built and building 1896-1906………………….. 197 5.4 – Fuel Oil purchased by the Admiralty 1902-1912………………………………. 200 5.5 – British, French, and German expenditure on aeronautics 1911-1913………….. 208 5.6 – British Coal production 1820-present………………………………………….. 211 5.7 – British Colliers sunk 1914-1918……………………………………………….. 217 5.8 – British Oilers sunk 1914-1918…………………………………………………. 217 6.1 – General Typology of Energy Transition policies………………………………. 261
Maps 5.1 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1914-15…………………………. 219 5.2 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1916…………………………. 219 5.3 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1917…………………………. 220 5.4 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1918…………………………. 220
6
1 Introduction
The significant role of energy security in state grand strategy is widely acknowledged. However transitions by state militaries from one energy source to another are understudied. Many scholars and scientists have noted the likely future transition from fossil fuels to other, more sustainable, resources. In order to prepare for and manage future likely transitions, it is important that we examine past transitions as a contribution to security studies. This dissertation focuses on great power navies and their transition from using coal to using oil to fuel their fleets. This research will examine state responses to this energy transition and will seek to provide a generalizable framework for understanding state responses to such transitions.
Overview Of the Research Problem and Existing Literature
Issues of Energy and Energy transitions
The subject of natural resources has received considerable attention within the discipline of
Political Science, especially within the subfield of International Political Economy1 (IPE) but also in broader security-oriented debates among scholars of international relations involving
1 Simon Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991); C.J. Campbell, Oil Crisis (Brentwood: Multi-Science Publishing Company Ltd., 2005); Frieden and Rogowski in Robert O Keohane, and Helen V. Milner. eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Richard Heinberg, The Party’s Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies (Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers, 2003); Mary Kaldor, Terry Karl, and Yahia Said. eds., Oil Wars (London: Pluto Press, 2007); Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Michael T Klare, Blood and Oil (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004); Georg Koopmann, Laus Matthies, and Beate Reszat, Oil and the International Economy: Lessons From Two Price Shocks (New Brunswick: Translation Publishers, 1989); Morse in Stiles, Kendall W. Stiles and Tsuneo Akaha eds. International Political Economy: A Reader (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991)
7 balance of power theory.2 Fossil fuels, namely coal and oil, with their peculiar importance to both economic and military affairs, serve as an interesting point of intersection between the two fields. Indeed, there is a well-established literature that deals with fossils fuels and the role of oil in particular. At the same time, there also appears to be a lacuna within these literatures relating to transitions from one major energy source to another.
Given the non-renewable nature of fossil fuel resources,3 as well as the extensive and increasing consumption of these resources on a global scale, there are occasionally periods of transition
2 On the importance of deciding where to allocate scarce resources see Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. London: Palgrave, 2002. pp. 107; On the matter of differentiating between power as resources and power as capability to realize ends see Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. World out of Balance: International Relations and the challenge of American Primacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. pp. 11 and also on resources and latent power pp. 211; On the preponderance of both power and resources present within status-quo states see Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An introduction to the Study of International Relations. New York: Harper Collins, 1946. pp. 119-120; On resource scarcity and its role in his description of a Rawlsian balance of power system see Midlarsky, Manus I. “The Balance of Power as a “Just” Historical System.” Polity Vol. 16, (Winter, 1983): pp. 193 & 200; On a shortage of resources hindering internal balancing in Britain prior to WWII see Papayoanou, Paul A. Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing and War. Ann Arbor:The Univeristy of Michigan Press, 1999. pp. 107-108, also on the connection between economic resources and military capabilities see pp. 131, most importantly on US policymakers during WWII as defining power as control over and access to resources see also pp. 131. 3 Banks, Ferdinand B. The Political Economy of Oil. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1980; Bromley, Simon. American Hegemony and World Oil. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991; Campbell, C.J. Oil Crisis. Brentwood: Multi-Science Publishing Company Ltd., 2005; Hicks, Brian, and Chris Nelder. Profit From the Peak: The End of Oil and the Greatest Investment Event of the Century. Hoboken: Angel Publishing, 2008; Klare, Michael T. Blood and Oil. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004; Koopmann, Georg, Laus Matthies, and Beate Reszat. Oil and the International Economy: Lessons From Two Price Shocks. New Brunswick: Translation Publishers, 1989; Mabro, Robert. ed. Oil in the 21st Century: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities; Mills, Robin M. The Myth of the Oil Crisis: Overcoming the Challenges of Depletion, Geopolitics, and Global Warming. Westport: Prager Publishers, 2008; Mommer, Bernard. Global Oil and the Nation State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; Nore, Peter, and Terisa Turner. Oil and Class Struggle. London: Zed Press, 1980; Paul, William Henry. Future Energy: How the New Oil Industry Will Change People, Politics and Portfolios. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2007.
8 between older, waning resource usage paradigms and newer, increasing resource usage paradigms. While these events are rare, I contend that they are extremely significant to both the conduct of international affairs in their time and thus ultimately to the course of world history.
Yet these transitions have also been understudied. Understanding and explaining state responses to major energy transitions is the central purpose of this study. More specifically, why did the
American and British Navies decide to transition their naval fleets from being fueled by coal to being fueled by oil?
The Research Question and Existing Literature
Within the literature on organization theory and bureaucratic politics there is some consensus that military organizations resist change. Due to the basic values and qualities of military organizations and their attempts to reduce uncertainty, it is argued that they have little interest in change.4 If militaries are generally resistant to change, then why is it that we see great power navies make the dramatic change to a new type of fuel for their naval fleets?
The literature indicates that we do see change and innovation within militaries under certain circumstances. Barry Posen, in an excellent summary of how organization theory views military innovation and change, states that the literature sees three broad explanations for why militaries might support radical change; failure (military defeat), outside pressure (civilian), and desire for expansion.5 With these ideas in mind, the U.S. and British (and other) naval transitions from coal to oil seem problematic for organizational theory.
4 Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, pg. 46 5 Ibid, pg. 47; and pg. 55-57
9
Both the U.S. and British navies began to transition to fuel-burning ships prior to WWI and as such neither power experienced a major defeat at sea (or otherwise) that could explain their decision to switch to a new fuel for naval propulsion. Also, as the U.S. and British were the first states to pursue such a change, there was no demonstration of the effectiveness of this new fuel in wartime. Secondarily, while there was some outside pressure from the oil and gas industry for such a change it does not seem as though that effort was sufficiently substantial or impactful to explain this change on its own.6 Regarding a desire for expansion, while this could help explain the U.S. case, in this time period the British Empire was at its zenith and the maintenance of the status quo, rather than expansion, would better describe British policy.
Furthermore, both the U.S. and the British were in a strong position as major coal producers during the coal era and switching to a new, militarily unproven, type of fuel would have increased uncertainty. While the U.S. was a major oil producer at the time, Great Britain was not. These issues highlight aspects of the major puzzle that this dissertation hopes to solve.
Current theoretical literature may be helpful in understanding state responses to this energy transition, yet they are not fully adequate. Thus, I will examine these cases along four important explanatory variables to answer the central research question: Why did the American and British
Navies decide to transition their naval fleets from being fueled by coal to being fueled by oil?
6 Civilian pressure upon the U.S. government generally came from the private oil and gas sector, specifically from trade journals such as the Oil and Gas Journal.
10 Explanatory Variables and Questions
Here I will identify the questions and sub-questions that articulate the key explanatory variables along which state responses to the coal-oil transition may vary. Understanding the specific manner in which state responses differed in relation to these concepts will allow this study to better explain not only why states responded in the way they did, but it should also provide explanatory power for understanding the differences across states. As discussed later, explanations of the case studies may allow for the creation of a generalizable framework for the understanding of state responses to energy transitions. Below I describe the several dichotomous ideational constructs, which encapsulate the scope of possible state responses to energy transitions. Process-tracing the responses of states to the coal-oil transition should allow me to classify each state’s response according to each of these different qualitative possibilities.
Policy origins (who) and Policy content (how): What did states conclude was the best approach for ensuring access to this novel resource? Which branch of each state implemented policies most related to the energy transition, legislative, executive, or judicial? Which types of policies were used to shape and steer the process by which this transition took place: financial/monetary/economic, military/political, or technological/research and development?
Here the goal is to add a depth of policy categorization, and to assess which category of policies was most impactful throughout the transition. This category will be assessed by determining articulated state and navy preference for one approach or the other, statements and efforts by politicians and bureaucrats emphasizing one approach or the other, and also state-private sector interactions and agreements on the provision of the new resource for state navies.
11 Intense-Relaxed (when/pace): Upon recognition of the need/desire to make the switch from coal to oil, what was the pace of the transition? Was it rather intense or was it relaxed? Did the states pursue the transition with a sense of urgency? Was the state response seen as an emergency, as something that needed to be forced or was it thought that a slower, piecemeal approach was adequate? How quickly did government and naval officials think the transition should and could take place? What level of resources was budgeted in order to accomplish this transition; in other words, who spent the most on what? Also, how was this transition prioritized in relationship to other state and naval goals? The policies described will be divided into three time periods during the overall course of the transition: the investigative period, the pre-war transition, and the wartime transition. This approach will show changes in state transition policies over time, and will also demonstrate differences between peacetime and wartime policies.
Domestic-International: (location/where) Did states respond by developing production capability at home or abroad? Did the state encourage acquisition of this resource by its navy from domestic or foreign sources? Did it develop technological capability through its own nationals or via cooperation with foreign entities? Did the state possess a natural endowment of oil or was it forced to go elsewhere to obtain it? Did states pursue domestic or international prospecting by geologists and oilmen at home, abroad, or both and to what degree? Did states encourage this activity through domestic legal or foreign diplomatic measures and to what degree? Also did states and navies seek foreign cooperation on securing the new resource or did they rely on their own capacity?
12 Offensive-Defensive: (why) Did states see this change as something needed for the projection of power, or was it viewed as shoring up state positions? Were states hoping to use this to expand their influence and reach, or simply to maintain the status-quo? Did states believe that such a change would give them a military advantage over their rivals? Which strategic and tactical properties of oil over coal were seen as advantageous for the states and their navies? What were the possible drawbacks or risks? Was this transition seen as altering naval doctrine or was it simply applied to pre-existing coal-era doctrine? How did this transition impact naval practice?
Research Design and Methodology
As previously stated this study hopes to illuminate the nature of state responses to energy transitions. Major energy transitions are complex events, and this study is focused on the more narrow area of how state military organizations respond to broader socio-economic energy transitions. The methodology utilized is a qualitative case study to process-trace why great power navies chose to switch the primary type of fuel used by their fleets. In that sense, the case to be examined is the broader energy transition from coal to oil. Following from this, the methodological approach consists of a “within-case” comparison of state responses to the broader energy transition. That broader transition represents my independent variable, while my dependent variables are the responses to that transition by the various great power navies under consideration.
On the basis of a detailed process-tracing of the American and British responses to this transition, I will develop a generalizable framework for the classification of state responses to energy transitions. I will examine the various policies and strategies implemented by the U.S.
13 and Britain in response to the coal-oil transition by focusing on the previously discussed list of sub-questions related to the four key explanatory variables. In doing so, I hope to provide answers to the aforementioned puzzle. I will then utilize this framework to provide brief commentary on the impact of this transition, state responses to the transition, and also to describe what lessons can be learned and applied to likely future transitions.
Within Case Comparison: The United States and Great Britain
The central focus of this dissertation is to address my primary research question: Why did the
American and British Navies decide to transition their naval fleets from being fueled by coal to being fueled by oil? In order to answer this question I will process-trace state policy and policy discussions related to each state’s navy and their decisions to implement this change. The specific time period under consideration is roughly from 1900 to 1918. By 1900 the major naval powers had begun investigating the possibility of using oil to fuel their ships, and the First World
War provides the first great-power battlefield experience with the use of such ships among modern navies.
Data relevant to this study will be obtained from primary source documentation7 from the
American Navy, Congressional records related to budgetary provisions for the Navy, Executive
7 Many primary source documents related to this period have recently been made available online by both the United States and Great Britain, including records on the US Navy available through Congressional Prosearch at http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/pqpresultpage?accountid=2909&groupid =121082&pgId=cc248636-46a1-4ac6-877b-e07fdb3aaa73&rsId=1460FC1A17C . Also records from the US Department of State’s Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1914, Supplement The World War, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1914, available at
14 and policy decision-making records, and records from the State Department. For the British case, the relevant data stems from copious primary source documentation, although those documents are only available in physical form in London. As such it was necessary to rely on the extensive secondary literature and unpublished dissertations that detail the contents of those records, as the author was unable to travel to Britain to examine the records personally due to financial and time limitations. Also, important sources of information relevant to the transition are available in each state’s records from the relevant military and bureaucratic bodies during the First World
War.
I will utilize the primary source documentation along with secondary historical literature to process-trace the state and naval responses to this energy transition with an emphasis on classifying those responses categorically in terms of the key explanatory variables. In depth case studies of the U.S. and British experiences will allow for the creation of a generalizable framework for the understanding of state responses to energy transitions. The goal is to create an approach to understanding not only the cases studied in this dissertation, but also to understand and possibly anticipate state responses to future likely energy transitions.
Dissertation Outline and Overview 1) Introduction: State Responses to Energy Transitions 2) Energy and Modern Military Organizations 3) Military Organizations, Innovation, and Technological Diffusion 4) The American Navy’s Transition from Coal to Oil 5) The British Navy’s Transition from Coal to Oil 6) Conclusions and Analysis
Chapter two will focus on the role of energy in political and military affairs. More specifically, the goal is to understand the reactions by states to major energy transitions. In order to do so, one http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS- idx?type=header&id=FRUS.FRUS1914Supp&isize=M.
15 must first examine general issues within the field of energy and also understand the general behavior of modern military organizations. This chapter will provide an overview of the energy literature and will seek to identify critical concepts that will need to be incorporated into the case studies at the core of this dissertation. Additionally, this chapter will describe areas of particular interest to how states navigate periods of energy transition. Modern machines of war require fuel, or mineral resources, to fulfill their purpose as a substitute for manpower or animal power.
In the case of navies, fossil fuel supplanted the prevailing winds as a source of locomotive power. With military policy generally sitting atop, or near the top, of any given state’s list of priorities, ensuring access to resources essential for military activity became a strategic foreign policy imperative. The nature of human energy source usage indicates that in the future there will likely be energy transitions that are similar to past transitions. Consequently, this chapter will provide a summary of the relevant issues and concerns stemming from academic research in the area of military organizations and their reliance on such energy resources.
Chapter 3 focuses on the processes by which militaries investigate, consider, and either do or do not adopt new forms of technology into their doctrines and operations. At its core, an energy transition consists of the diffusion of new forms of energy technology between states and military organizations. The focus of this chapter is the development of oil-powered machinery for the purposes of defense and the projection of military power. As oil technology improved, developed, and became more widespread, military organizations began incorporating that technology into their arsenal of capabilities. They also began a process of developing and researching the possibilities presented by such technology and changing their behavior based upon the new realities of this energy transition. To trace the process of the particular energy
16 transition under examination here, the author must first summarize the relevant theories and concepts related to the diffusion of technological innovation within militaries more generally.
The next two chapters trace the processes by which the American and British Navies made the transition from coal to oil. The within-case comparison of these two navies focuses on how and why these organizations began to research, experiment with, and ultimately purchase and build the requisite technological implements needed to propel their fleets with oil instead of coal. One aspect of this work involves the development of an historical narrative detailing the important individuals, bureaucratic governing bodies, private corporations and others who played an important role in moving the transition forward. To facilitate analysis, the findings of the case studies are organized by placing the data within a three-by-three matrix that categorizes policies according to which branch of government the policy stemmed from and the type of policy that was implemented. In turn, these policies are then placed within a two-by-two matrix that categorizes them as either domestic or international in orientation, and as either defensive or offensive in strategic quality. Finally, these matrixes are organized chronologically by time- period within the transition as follows: the investigative period, the pre-war transition, and the wartime transition.
The final chapter will provide comparative analysis of the American and British navies, and will describe lessons that can be learned from the process tracing of this transition as well as the states’ responses to it. The author intends to illuminate these state responses to energy transitions, and to generate a typology of generalizable propositions about how states are likely to respond to future transitions.
17
Conclusions
This dissertation is significant for several reasons. First, this particular transition demonstrates state behavior that seems contradictory to what would be predicted by established theory. This transition dramatically impacted state capacity for war making and the projection of power. The technological breakthroughs and improvements created in the immediate aftermath of this transition still serve as the primary tools of war by state militaries across the globe today. Thus, a detailed examination of great-power naval transitions from coal to oil should illuminate state perceptions related to these matters and facilitate the development of a framework for making generalizations about state responses to energy transitions.
Secondly, this transition serves as the first major energy transition that states experienced after the initial industrial revolution. Given the widespread consensus that modern industrialized nations will experience some future transition away from hydrocarbon fuel, common sense would dictate that scholars make an attempt to understand such transitions to the fullest. While new technology in renewable energy has begun to permeate the broader economy, militaries are still firmly entrenched in their reliance on hydrocarbon fuel.
Lastly, this research finds that the primary drivers of the diffusion of oil-based technology are competition and imitation. States feared the rising power of competitors and sought advantages through new energy technology. Additionally, navies imitated rival navies, both in building capital ships, submarines, and aircraft, and also in testing the capabilities of new engines and fuel sources for battleships and destroyers. These findings directly contribute to the literature on the diffusion of technology, and in particular help to understand the diffusion of energy technology.
18 Also, the case studies demonstrate a cautious but proactive military approach to the new energy technology of the time, and thus challenge the conventional wisdom of the military organization literature that militaries resist new technology, or that militaries must witness or experience a new technology on the battlefield prior to acceptance and implementation of its use.
Moreover, this research contributes to the literature on energy by tracing the process by which two great power navies react to, manage, steer, and ultimately promote the transition from coal to oil for fueling their vessels. While there are endless written works on the importance of energy, there are very few works focused solely on energy transitions, and this work helps to begin to fill that gap. This dissertation identifies how the coal-oil transition introduced two new dimensions to warfare through submarines and aircraft, and demonstrates the myriad and dramatic ways in which energy transitions can impact military organizations and wars between them. Conversely, the case studies also demonstrate how military organizations can shape and steer the trajectory of energy transitions. Due to their function, and their status, militaries are often at the forefront of technology. From this position military organizations can alter the manner, speed, and direction in which technology spreads.
A breakthrough in energy usage for the purposes of military power projection along renewable lines would dramatically alter the position of any of the great powers. Thus, understanding the possible implications of such a transition is an important goal of this research. Through this dissertation, it is my intention to provide a framework for assessing state responses to energy transitions, while contributing to the literature regarding state behavior, international relations, and also the international political economy.
19 2
Energy, Energy Transitions and Modern Military Organizations A Review of the Literature
The goal of this dissertation is to understand the reactions by states to major energy transitions.
In order to do so, one must first examine general issues within the field of energy and also understand the general behavior of modern military organizations. This chapter will provide an overview of the energy literature and will seek to identify critical concepts that will need to be incorporated into the case studies at the core of this dissertation. More specifically, I will describe areas of particular interest to how states navigate periods of energy transition. Before reviewing that literature, a brief word on energy transitions is necessary.
The subject of natural resources has received considerable attention within the discipline of
Political Science, especially within the subfield of International Political Economy8 (IPE) but also in broader security-oriented debates among scholars of international relations involving balance of power theory.9 Since the industrial revolution there has been a complex and intimate
8 Simon Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991); C.J. Campbell, Oil Crisis (Brentwood: Multi-Science Publishing Company Ltd., 2005); Frieden and Rogowski in Robert O Keohane, and Helen V. Milner. Eds. Internationalization and Domestic Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Richard Heinberg, The Party’s Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies (Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers, 2003); Mary Kaldor, Terry Karl, and Yahia Said. Eds. Oil Wars (London: Pluto Press, 2007); Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Michael T Klare, Blood and Oil (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004); Georg Koopmann, Laus Matthies, and Beate Reszat, Oil and the International Economy: Lessons From Two Price Shocks (New Brunswick: Translation Publishers, 1989); Morse in Stiles, Kendall W. Stiles and Tsuneo Akaha eds. International Political Economy: A Reader (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991) 9 On the importance of deciding where to allocate scarce resources see Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. London: Palgrave, 2002. pp. 107; On the matter of differentiating between power as resources and power as capability to realize ends see Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. World out of Balance: International Relations and the challenge of American Primacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
20 relationship between military organizations and energy and mineral resources. Modern machines of war require fuel, or mineral resources, to fulfill their purpose as a substitute for manpower or animal power. In the case of navies, fossil fuel supplanted the prevailing winds as a source of locomotive power. With military policy generally sitting atop, or near the top, of any given state’s list of priorities, ensuring access to resources essential for military activity became a strategic foreign policy imperative.
Over time, as energy technology has developed, states that could afford to do so generally fielded the newest and most effective pieces of machinery with the goal of acquiring a military advantage over rivals. Hindsight makes quite clear the fact that those states that possess the best energy technology, as well the requisite amount of energy resources, are more likely to succeed on the battlefield compared to those who are not so well equipped. Accomplishing this task becomes more complicated during periods of energy transition. Such transitions increase uncertainty about which types of technology should be constructed, or invested in, and also increase the likelihood of conflict over access to stores of natural resources not already controlled by belligerents. Fossil fuels, namely coal and oil, with their peculiar importance to both economic and military affairs, serve as an interesting point of intersection between
International Relations and International Political Economy. Indeed, there is a well-established
pp. 11 and also on resources and latent power pp. 211; On the preponderance of both power and resources present within status-quo states see Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An introduction to the Study of International Relations. New York: Harper Collins, 1946. pp. 119-120; On resource scarcity and its role in his description of a Rawlsian balance of power system see Midlarsky, Manus I. “The Balance of Power as a “Just” Historical System.” Polity Vol. 16, (Winter, 1983): pp. 193 & 200; On a shortage of resources hindering internal balancing in Britain prior to WWII see Papayoanou, Paul A. Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing and War. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999. pp. 107-108, also on the connection between economic resources and military capabilities see pp. 131, most importantly on US policymakers during WWII as defining power as control over and access to resources see also pp. 131.
21 literature that deals with fossils fuels and the role of oil in particular. At the same time, there also appears to be a lacuna within these literatures relating to transitions from one major energy source to another. Given the non-renewable nature of fossil fuel resources10, as well as the extensive and increasing consumption of these resources on a global scale, there are occasionally periods of transition between older, waning resource usage paradigms and newer, increasing resource usage paradigms.
While these events are rare, I contend that they are extremely significant to both the conduct of international affairs in their time and ultimately to the course of world history. Yet, these transitions have also been understudied. The trajectory of human technological development has been one of increased efficiency in terms of energy usage. It has also been one of increased consumption and shifts from one energy source to another as our understanding of how to harvest and utilize different sources of energy has progressed. A graph of the primary energy sources used over time in the United States provides a simple visual representation of the type of energy transition that this dissertation will explore.11
10 Banks, Ferdinand B. The Political Economy of Oil. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1980; Bromley, Simon. American Hegemony and World Oil. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991; Campbell, C.J. Oil Crisis. Brentwood: Multi-Science Publishing Company Ltd., 2005; Hicks, Brian, and Chris Nelder. Profit From the Peak: The End of Oil and the Greatest Investment Event of the Century. Hoboken: Angel Publishing, 2008; Klare, Michael T. Blood and Oil. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004; Koopmann, Georg, Laus Matthies, and Beate Reszat. Oil and the International Economy: Lessons From Two Price Shocks. New Brunswick: Translation Publishers, 1989; Mabro, Robert. Ed. Oil in the 21st Century: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities; Mills, Robin M. The Myth of the Oil Crisis: Overcoming the Challenges of Depletion, Geopolitics, and Global Warming. Westport: Prager Publishers, 2008; Mommer, Bernard. Global Oil and the Nation State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; Nore, Peter, and Terisa Turner. Oil and Class Struggle. London: Zed Press, 1980; Paul, William Henry. Future Energy: How the New Oil Industry Will Change People, Politics and Portfolios. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2007. 11 O'Connor, Peter A. "Energy Transitions," In "The Pardee Papers,"(2010) pg. 9
22 Figure 1.1 – American Energy Consumption by source 1850-2000
(O'Connor, Peter A. "Energy Transitions," In "The Pardee Papers,"(2010) pg. 9)
In studying energy issues in general and energy transitions in particular, one finds that transitions are particularly messy events that do not fit neatly into schemes of categorization. Energy eras often overlap and older energy forms often remain in use long after ‘better’ methods for utilizing various energy resources are found.12 This can be seen below in the large worldwide reliance of coal for power generation. It is notable that coal still represents roughly one-third of worldwide energy usage, more than natural gas.13 Despite the technological development of nuclear capability, petroleum products still dominate human energy usage patterns by a wide margin.
While some nations, namely France and Japan, have made more widespread use of nuclear power, there are serious limitations to nuclear technology that prevent it from truly supplanting the role of oil in both economic, and military terms. This is demonstrated by the small overall
12 Vaclav Smil, Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects. Santa Barbara California: Praeger, 2010, pg. 225 13 "BP Statistical Review of World Energy." 1-46. London: British Petroleum, 2012, pg. 41
23 usage of nuclear power and can be seen in the graphs below in both U.S.14 and worldwide consumption.15
Figure 1.2 – American Energy Consumption by source 1949-2011
("Annual Energy Review 2011." edited by Department of Energy, 370. Washington D.C.: Office of Energy Statistics, 2012, pg. 28)
Figure 1.3 – World Energy Consumption by source 1986-2012
("BP Statistical Review of World Energy." 1-46. London: British Petroleum, 2012, pg. 42)
14 "Annual Energy Review 2011." edited by Department of Energy, 370. Washington D.C.: Office of Energy Statistics, 2012, pg. 28 15 "BP Statistical Review of World Energy." 1-46. London: British Petroleum, 2012, pg. 42
24
The focus in this research is on transitions between energy sources, and not on energy carriers, such as electricity.16 While the development of electricity is no doubt significant, the focus here is on the natural resources utilized by state militaries. Those organizations utilize electricity, but need other natural resources, coal, oil, etc. in order to produce it. Thus, on the one hand this study is limited to energy source transitions; on the other hand it is limited to understanding modern military organizations. Consequently the focus of this research will be on military organizations after the industrial revolution.
Current popular and academic discourse on energy has recently acknowledged the likelihood of future transitions away from fossil fuels and towards more renewable resources. With this in mind, the decision was made to examine the first of these modern energy transitions: Great power navies and their decision to transition their fleets to being powered by oil and away from being powered by coal encapsulate this transition. Thus, understanding and explaining state responses to major energy transitions is the central purpose of this study. More specifically, why did the American and British Navies decide to transition their naval fleets from being fueled by coal to being fueled by oil? The decision of these navies to commit to a relatively new and untested technology to utilize petroleum represents a conscious policy response to a changed environment. Thus, there are lessons to be learned from this experience that are likely to be quite relevant for current policy makers and scholars.
ENERGY AND ENERGY TRANSITIONS
From the perspective of political science, and more specifically international political economy, the energy/oil literature may be divided into four groups. The first may be called the oil-boom
16 O'Connor, Peter A. "Energy Transitions," In "The Pardee Papers,"(2010): pg. 8
25 literature, spanning from the earliest modern oil discoveries in the late 1800’s up to the late
1960’s. This catalogue of work details the various developments in oil discovery, exploration, and the related economic growth and technological development that followed, as well as the political intrigue, issues of national security and war, and the role of oil in those areas.
Developments in the early 1970s substantially impacted the popular and academic discussions related to oil, fossil fuels and energy. The most important of these developments were the various oil embargoes implemented by major producers in the Middle East, the formation of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the general realization of the limited nature of oil as a geologic natural resource. The works of this period, which constitute the second grouping, may be referred to as the oil-scarcity literature. Much of this research focuses on a litany of scarcity related themes; this includes whether or not scarcity is a geologic fact or policy induced; whether scarcity can be conquered by technology, the political and economic implications of the cartelization of the oil market and the politics of OPEC; the role of the western great powers in providing security to the energy markets, application of the first and second laws of thermodynamics to economics and politics, and discussions of the possibility of sustainable economic growth.
The third grouping of literature, spanning from the collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s to the beginning of the next period of substantial price spike in the early-mid 2000s, may be described as the second-oil-boom literature, as supply was not a serious issue. This literature varies more widely than the other two eras and includes optimistic forecasts of the early 1980s, and much work claiming human responsibility for scarcity problems.
26 The fourth and final grouping is the second oil-scarcity literature, which consists of research that focuses on the environmental impact of the oil industry and climate change, and some of the earliest research looking past the oil economy with a focus on energy transitions. This literature coincides with the higher prices of the modern era between roughly 2003-4 and the present. This grouping is a rough approximation and is meant to demonstrate the varying, yet overall growing, role of scarcity in academic discussions of energy resources, and in the opinion of the author represents a slow ‘coming to terms’ with an impending transition away from fossil fuels.
Below I review the literature from various social science fields relevant to energy and fossil fuels with the goal of isolating important concepts and elements relevant to understanding state responses to energy transitions.
The Oil Boom Literature
In order to understand the role of energy in modern military organizations, one must obtain a sense of how modern energy sources were perceived over time. The Industrial Revolution brought about a new understanding of how the capability of natural stores of energy in the form of coal could be utilized through mechanical processes for the benefit of humanity. While the term ‘Industrial Revolution’ certainly envelops much more than just a technological development17, in terms of the focus of this research the crux of that revolution was the utilization of coal for steam powered engines. Vaclav Smil’s overview of energy in human history outlines the human use of energy from animal dung and simple water and wind systems to the modern era. His work is much broader than most and clearly articulates the complex nature of technological development related to energy over time. Smil notes that human
17 Frankel, Eugene. "Energy and Social Change: A Historian's Perspective." Policy Sciences 14, no. 1 (1981): 59-73
27 understanding of the potential of fossil fuels stretches back to antiquity, in the cases of both coal18 and liquid petroleum and natural gas19. Yet, it took the steam engine to provide coal the opportunity to become central to modern industrialization; the most important role for coal was as fuel for steam engines.20 The impact of the combination of coal as an energy source and the steam engine to exploit it revolutionized water and land travel, displacing sailing ships and other traditional modes of land transport, and massively increased human capability for long distance migration.21
The later development of the internal combustion engine provided a new use for liquid petroleum and led to an increased importance for that resource in terms of military utilization. Smil describes the early development of kerosene22, and later the invention of gasoline and how these advances in refining petroleum in combination along with perfection of the internal combustion engine allow for oil to supplant coal as the most important source of energy for modern industrialized states. He also notes that the design of the internal combustion engine remained relatively unchanged during the first one hundred years of its use and credits the development of the Daimler engine, electrical ignition (invented by Karl Benz) and the Maybach float feed carburetor with the launching of the modern automobile industry.23
Helmut Mejcher details the competition over Iraqi oil between 1910 and 1928. Noting that the conversion of naval ships from coal to oil had already taken place, Mejcher indicates that what
18 Smil, Vaclav. Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects. Santa Barbara California: Praeger, 2010, pg. 159 19 Ibid, pg. 167 20 Ibid, pg. 161 21 Smil, Vaclav. Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects. Santa Barbara California: Praeger, 2010, pg. 165-166 22 Ibid, pg. 167-168 23 Ibid, pg. 168
28 oil lay in Mesopotamia was considered ‘an indispensible commodity, indeed a strategic necessity’ by the British navy.24 The area of Mosul was crucial to British war aims geostrategically both in terms of the land war and in terms of the resources that lay there. The priority on control over Mosul by the British is demonstrated by several factors, including:
British willingness to act in contrast to the Sykes Picot Agreement of 1916 in their capture of
Mosul, the British geological reconnaissance in February of 1916, and explicit statements on the part of the Admiralty that ‘physical control’ over oil producing areas was necessary.25 Mejcher describes the American ‘Open Door’ foreign policy as applying pressure on the British attempts to monopolize the resources found in the areas under their control. The British retort to American chants of ‘Open Door’ was ‘Physical Control’. In fact the British Admiralty’s oil expert explicitly articulated the need for British monopolies to develop these [Mesopotamian] oil resources to conserve domestic British resources and that this stemmed from the British Navy’s war-time experience of the importance of fuel for sustaining naval actions.26
Commenting on the same time period, William Stivers provides a detailed history of oil and its relationship to foreign policy of the Western colonial powers and the United States prior to, during, and after the First World War. Stivers sheds light on the overlap, both acknowledged and unacknowledged, between state strategic interest and private corporate interest among the various powers involved in the struggle over influence in the oil rich territories of the Ottoman
Empire as it became clear that the territorial integrity of that entity was weakening toward the end of the conflict.
24 Mejcher, Helmut. Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928. London: Ithaca Press, 1976, pg. 6 25 Ibid, pg. 28-36 26 Mejcher, Helmut. Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928. London: Ithaca Press, 1976, pg. 35- 36
29 In particular Stivers examines the diplomatic maneuverings of the British and the United States over influence in Iraq and Mesopotamia in the aftermath of the war, as well as the role of their respective oil corporations. Stivers contends forcefully that, at least in the American case, the
State department equated U.S. national interest with private corporate oil interests.27 As for the
British, Stivers demonstrates that they were willing to go to great lengths to ensure their control over the Iraqi mandate, primarily to ensure access to the oil there, as well as for geostrategic reasons.28 Conflicting interest between the British and the Americans regarding access to
Mesopotamian oil and diplomatic contention between the two powers in the post WWI period is often referred to as the “Anglo-American oil war”, and elements of that competition are highlighted by Fiona Venn, in her work on the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23.29
John Ise’s work on U.S. oil policy represents research contemporaneous to the major oil boom that took place after the First World War. First published in 1926, his work on U.S. oil policy delves into the domestic politics surrounding the oil industry from the earliest well discoveries in the U.S. to the 1920s. Of particular interest is the attempt by the U.S. Navy to ensure a sufficient supply of oil required for the new ships of the fleet. Ise’s emphasis is often on the alleged waste and corruption involved in the oil industry, and he highlights the varied established interests battling for access to federally owned and controlled land in the American West thought to be rich in oil deposits, including reserves at Elk Hills and Buena Vista in California, the Teapot
Dome reserve in Wyoming, shale reserves in Colorado and Utah, and the reserve set aside by
27 Stivers, William. Supremacy and Oil. London: Cornell University Press, 1982, pg. 194-99 28 Examples include the British decision to exclude American Geologists from the area and deception on the part of Lord Curzon related to British aims revealed in the San Remo accord. See Stivers, pg. 111-112 29 Venn, Fiona. "Oleaginous Diplomacy: Oil, Anglo–American Relations and the Lausanne Conference, 1922–23." Diplomacy & Statecraft 20, no. 3 (2009): pg. 414-33.
30 President Harding in Alaska. 30 This research provides extensive insight into the domestic wrangling over the management of American oil reserves that took place in the United States between 1900 and 1918.
John Frey labels the oil powered internal combustion engine as one of the most outstanding technological changes impacting direct military operations.31 Frey describes the military as holding the belief that petroleum in general played a key role in the Allied victory in the First
World War through its myriad uses in ships, submarines, planes, tanks and trucks.32 Writing prior to the end of the Second World War, Frey is quite clear about the preeminence of petroleum in terms of military priorities, and specifically described the importance of the naval decision to transition from coal to oil as pushing upward the overall demand for petroleum.33
Walter Voskuil sees a direct relationship between political power in Europe and the control of coal and oil resources (along with other mineral deposits). He describes the “goal of
Lebensraum” as well as the battle of the Atlantic as directly related to control over resources.
This included “Swedish iron ores, the ores of Lorraine, the Polish coal fields, the Rumanian oil fields, Yugoslavian bauxite” and others.34 Interestingly, and quite relevant for this research,
Voskuil describes different roles for coal and petroleum during the First World War. Coal is seen as the backbone of industrial production, or the thick, blunt, backside of the knife, while oil and its role in power projection is seen as the sharp cutting edge of the knife.35 Voskuil directly
30 Ise, John. The United States Oil Policy. New York: Arno Press, 1972, pg. 356 31 Frey, John W. "Petroleum Utilization in Peacetime and in Wartime." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 31, no. 2 (June 1941): pg. 113-18 32 Ibid, pg. 113 33 Frey, John W. "Petroleum Utilization in Peacetime and in Wartime." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 31, no. 2 (June 1941): pg. 118 34 Voskuil, Walter H. "Coal and Political Power in Europe." Economic Geography 18, no. 3 (July 1942): pg. 247 35 Ibid, pg. 247-248
31 correlates control over the coal (and other) resources of mainland Europe to increased bargaining power among nations with Nazi Germany as a prime example.36
Writing in The Journal of Economic History in 1947, Rezneck sums up the importance of fossil fuels to modern industrialized nations quite succinctly by stating the coal and oil comprise the
“chief components of the modern power complex”.37 Interestingly, Rezneck notes that as early as 1867 the Bureau of Navigation of the U.S. Navy had rejected petroleum as a fuel for steamers citing convenience, economy, and safety. Yet, by 1884 petroleum is recommended as an emergency fuel for warships as a supplement to coal.38 By 1914 the U.S. Navy has decided to completely fuel its fleet with petroleum and the era of the U.S. Navy building coal burning ships was over.39 That represents a relatively quick turnaround in 47 years from rejecting oil as a fuel for ships in 1867 to stating that all future naval ships would burn oil in 1914. Rezneck cites several historical important facets of the petroleum industry. This included the central economic role of fossil fuels and their relationship to American economic development and also that oil provided one of the first examples of mass production, manifested in the five-gallon oil can.40
Rezneck’s work provides a good overview of the role of fossil fuels in the American economy, and deals with issues such as monopoly, competition, the chemical relationship between coal and oil, waste and conservation and the future prospects for atomic energy.
36 Voskuil, Walter H. "Coal and Political Power in Europe." Economic Geography 18, no. 3 (July 1942): pg. 255 37 Rezneck, Samuel. "Coal and Oil in the American Economy." The Journal of Economic History 7 (1947): pg. 56 38 Ibid, pg. 63-64 39 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914. pg. 18 40 Rezneck, Samuel. "Coal and Oil in the American Economy." The Journal of Economic History 7 (1947): pg. 65-68
32 John DeNovo, writing in the mid 1950s, provides several pieces of work that are immediately relevant to understanding state reactions to energy transitions. DeNovo highlights the increased importance of petroleum in the realm of national security stemming from increased need for oil by great power navies41, while providing an excellent outline of the process whereby the
American Navy, following actions by the British, begin to convert their fleet from coal-burning to oil-burning ships42. Several aspects of DeNovo’s research are of particular importance.
First, he states that the technological arguments claiming oil-burning ships as superior to coal- burners was ‘overwhelming’ by 1911. Citing debates from the British House of commons, as well as American Naval documents and information from the American oil sector, DeNovo elaborates on the various benefits of oil-burning ships including increased speed and steaming radius, easier refueling, reduction of manpower needed for boiler rooms, tactical maneuverability, the capability to refuel at sea, reduced crew exhaustion, and lastly increased weight available for gun power.43 Secondly, DeNovo articulates the role of the private sector in the United States in protecting their established interests from what was seen as encroachment by the United States Government into the oil sector. As the Navy, and the Executive Branch
(namely the Department of the Interior), began to realize the role that oil would play in national security matters, the navy began taking measures to physically secure its own supply. In effect this debate over oil policy in the U.S. is centered on the role of the state in the economy and becomes wrapped up in the issue of state regulation of monopolies, such as Standard Oil.44
41 Denovo, John A. "Petroleum and the Us Navy before World War I." The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41, no. 4 (1955): pg. 641 42 Ibid, pg. 641-642 43 Denovo, John A. "Petroleum and the Us Navy before World War I." The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41, no. 4 (1955): pg. 645 44 Ibid, pg. 652
33 The issue of the relationship between the state and the private sector oil companies is of central importance to this research, and policy relevant to this matter is handled differently by the two primary case-study nations. In the U.S., regulation and the forced break-up of the oil monopolies45 was the chosen path, while in Britain, direct state ownership (albeit partial) was favored.46 These matters will be investigated in more detail in later chapters of this work. It is sufficient here to say that the two case-study nations, the U.S. and Britain, took different approaches in response to this particular energy transition.
While DeNovo’s research represents a narrowly tailored view of the relationship between the
U.S. Navy and petroleum resources, other work, such as that of Gerald Nash, represents a more comprehensive approach to understanding U.S. oil policy during the early and formative years of petroleum usage. Nash introduces his work as an attempt to utilize the oil industry as a prism through which to examine the relationship between government and business. Noting that between 1890 and 1960 the oil industry consistently ranked as one of the five largest within the
United States, Nash emphasizes that understanding the government-oil-industry relationship will
‘illuminate trends in other industries’.47
Nash describes the era from 1815-1890 as the age of steam and the era after 1890 as the age of oil and electricity. He attributes the increased role of petroleum during this era to the newly developed diesel powered ships and locomotives as well as the internal combustion engine.
According to Nash the period of 1890-1917 saw oil output double in the U.S. and a seven-fold increase in demand for oil products; this increase results in oil supplanting coal as the leading
45 Ibid, pg. 654 46 Ibid, pg. 655-66 47 Nash, Gerald D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968, pg. vii
34 energy source in the United States. 48 Nash, like DeNovo, also saw the crucial role of the U.S.
Navy as well as other marine transport during this transition:
“The magnitude of this shift was greatest in marine transportation, however. Greater convenience and lower cost were important factors in prompting shipping officials to make the change from coal to petroleum. By 1914 they had converted about 5 percent of the world’s merchant fleet. The United States Navy Fuel Oil Board had recommended as early as 1904 that American war vessels convert to oil. Only ten years later Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels reported that all American battleships and destroyers were burning fuel [oil]; fuel oil consumption of the United States Navy rose from 360,000 barrels in 1912 to almost 6 million barrels in 1919. Together with about 44 million barrels consumed by the American merchant marine, these requirements accounted for about one-fifth of total fuel oil sales.”49
On top of emphasizing the role of the U.S. Navy, Nash extensively details the triangular tug-of- war over oil policy involving the U.S. Navy, state level economic interests, and the large oil monopolies. This competition between various interests largely centered on 1) U.S. Naval concern over consistency and price of oil supply for the fleet;50 2) state concerns related to their economic rights and those of small independent producers (which were seen as threatened by the power of large oil monopolies and51); 3) the concern of the oil industry over what was seen as excessive or ‘socialistic’ state interference in private industry.
The converse of this last point of concern is the view of the federal government that massive industry monopolies needed to be regulated or even broken up; these two points of view are essentially different sides of the same coin52. In the first decade of the twentieth century these battles over energy policy in the United States were largely settled in the courts. Yet over time
48 Ibid, pg. 2-5 49 Ibid, pg. 5 50 Ibid, pg. 10 51 Ibid, pg. 12 52 Nash, Gerald D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968, pg. 13-15
35 that approach changed. The role of energy in national security is key to understanding the developments within this story over time.
For the great powers, most pointedly the great naval powers, continued or increased access to the fuel necessary for their ships was essentially synonymous with national security. Thus, as war became increasingly likely, competition over policy in the area of energy slowly gave way to increased cooperation between the state apparatus and the private oil sector.53 This can be seen in the formation of the Advisory Committee to the Council on National Defense by the
Woodrow Wilson administration in April of 1916. In July of 1917 Wilson dissolved the council of National Defense and created the War Industries Board and the Advisory Committee became the National Petroleum War Service Committee. By early 1918 Wilson had enlarged U.S. bureaucratic mechanisms for the purposes of managing the American petroleum industry by creating the United States Fuel Administration along with an Oil Division within that administration. These various committees were largely comprised of oil industry leaders and the goal was to ensure access to petroleum for the war effort. In essence, concern over appropriate levels of competition in domestic oil markets decreased as the need for naval access to product supply became more urgent with the likely onset of great power war. Nash sums up this change in strategy by the federal government:
“Thus, the wartime demands for maximum oil production, in addition to changes in the structure of the oil industry after 1911, forced the Wilson Administration to reorient federal petroleum policies. Wilson took the initiative in shifting the emphasis of public policy from antitrust measures to cooperation, from efforts to dissolve large integrated corporations toward attempts at their more effective regulation. Such a change did not emanate primarily from ideological considerations. Rather it was worked out pragmatically by various interest groups in response to specific problems, and reflected petroleum’s new role in the economy and in national defense.”54
53 Ibid, pg. 24 54 Nash, Gerald D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968, pg. 29-30
36
Nash’s work covers the period from 1890-1964. This represents the golden era of the oil industry. His overview of the pre-WWI era and the wartime period itself is particularly relevant for understanding the American case. This work can also be seen as one of the last thorough overviews of the oil industry that possesses a perspective unaltered by the subsequent oil crises that take place in the 1970’s.
While the concept of scarcity, and correspondingly conservation, were both present and impactful in this earlier oil literature, particularly closer to the turn of the century, these issues dominate the discussion of petroleum and its role in the economy and national security after the two crises. These events provide a clearly distinguishable boundary between subsets of the literature related to energy resources in general and fossil fuel resources in particular.
The Oil Scarcity Literature
Scarcity, as a concept related to human usage of natural resources in general, and human usage of fossil fuels in particular, was not new in the early 1970s. In fact, the initial oil boom of the early 1900’s was rife with commentary on the need for conservation, the excessive amount of waste present within the oil industry, and the need to preserve precious natural endowments for future generations.55 In retrospect, the prevalence of discussions about resource scarcity appear directly related to price levels of primary resources. Scarcity was a popular theme during periods of high prices, and as those prices declined, so too did the emphasis on a need to conserve exhaustible resources. This is important because increased concern for, or attention to, notions
55 Rezneck, Samuel. "Coal and Oil in the American Economy." The Journal of Economic History 7 (1947): pg. 68-69
37 of scarcity relate directly to energy transitions. Increased scarcity, in actuality or perception, is likely to impact the energy transition process, and reactions to that process by relevant actors.
During the 1970s, political developments in the Middle East led to a resurgence of commentary on the need to deal with energy scarcity on a political and economic level. This included discussions of OPEC, its politics and economic impact, as well as its ability to manipulate prices and supply, introduction of thermodynamic laws into the discussion of human energy usage patterns, and hypothesizing about the ability to create economic growth in an era of scarce energy resources. Given the reality of the source of oil scarcity in the aftermath of the oil embargoes implemented by OPEC, a discussion of cartels and how they impact the international political economy is appropriate.
Waverman describes what is takes to be a successful cartel in a commodity market including: 1) low elasticity of demand for the product; 2) high elasticity of demand for the product of any one producer; 3) similar costs and goals among producers; and 4) a small number of ‘firms’ within the cartel. Waverman points out that while many have attempted to create commodity cartels, none have been successful, a point with which one could easily argue. While he may, or may not, be correct in his assertion that all commodity cartels are unsuccessful, he is most certainly wrong about his assertion that oil is ‘a perfectly non-differentiated commodity’. Waverman uses the phrase ‘given the same sulphur content’ as a qualifier to that statement, a substantial qualifier indeed. There are many sources of oil, and they all differ in their geologic qualities. These qualities range from ease of extraction, to distance to market, to cost of refining and have a substantial impact upon the profitability of any given source of petroleum and on the likelihood of eventual extraction. This fact can be demonstrated by the recent cancellation of some
38 contracts in the America shale oil drilling industry due to substantial drop in prices.56 The fact is that at less than fifty dollars a barrel, shale oil is not worth extracting and refining. There are many different types of oil, and they are most certainly not “perfectly non-differentiated”.
Alternatively, Waverman provides some useful analysis related to OPEC, namely that its source of power stems from certain realities. The two most important are: 1) the lack of a low cost substitute for oil and; 2) increasing demand for its product.57 He also describes one of the important consequences of the 1970s price spikes in the form of sovereign wealth funds, yet he does not think that such enormous sources of financial power will be used for economic warfare on the part of OPEC nations.58
Robert North, in his analysis of scarcity and conflict, articulates very clearly the fact that the first and second laws of thermodynamics and their implications, although well known to most people, are often ignored in the areas of politics and economics.59 North outlines the basic disagreement over resource scarcity between environmental optimists and the “Neo-Malthusians”. North states that while both the optimists and pessimists are technically correct on various points of their arguments, he emphasizes that in the long run the pessimists are more correct and states that environmental variables require just as much attention from researchers as cognitive and behavioral variables60. More importantly, he does not think that technology alone can pry
56 “Sub-$50 Oil Has U.S. Shale Producers Cutting Rigs Loose Early.” www.bloomberg.com January 1, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-08/shale-producers-in-u-s- cutting-rigs-loose-early-amid-oil-slump 57 Waverman, Leonard. "Oil and the Distribution of International Power." International Journal 29, no. 4 (1974), pg. 628. 58 Ibid, pg. 632 59 North, Robert C. "Toward a Framework for the Analysis of Scarcity and Conflict." International Studies Quarterly 21, no. 4 (1977), pg. 570 60 Ibid, pg. 573
39 humanity from the grip of scarcity61, arguing that generally technological development results in both increased consumption and increased expectations from the populace.
Furthermore, he quotes an important conceptual statement from Lasswell, that “Man, pursues
Values, through Institutions, on Resources”.62 This notion, according to North, “implies an intensive interactive relationship among values, institutions, resources, and behavior. It suggests that each variable must be critical to an explanation of the other three.” This conceptual relationship is central to understanding how military organizations might attempt to navigate an energy transition and will be useful in the analysis of such history. Relating scarcity to conflict,
North indicates that attempts by states to secure foreign supply of resources often leads to conflict, and that once acquired, such access is generally defended.63 He concludes by noting the major disparity between industrialized and non-industrialized nations in terms of their resource consumption, noting that advanced industrialized countries consume ‘20 times more resources per capita than the poor countries’.64 North’s analysis indicates areas in the literature related to scarcity that require further attention and improvement, and this dissertation aims to utilize several of his contributions.
One of the central elements of the scarcity literature consists of a critique of modern capitalistic economic philosophy and ideology. The scarcity crises of the 1970s and the fear that those scarcities were likely to be a permanent fixture of future economics and politics, led to a re-
61 North, Robert C. "Toward a Framework for the Analysis of Scarcity and Conflict." International Studies Quarterly 21, no. 4 (1977): pg. 579-80 62 Ibid, pg. 574 63 Ibid, pg. 580 64 Ibid, pg. 582
40 visitation of Malthus65 with an emphasis on the relationship between economic philosophy of growth and political reality of finite resources. Jack Salmon provides an example of such research. Salmon describes modern economics as being based upon infinite growth and labels that philosophy as the ‘dominant social paradigm’.66 Salmon sees technological optimism as an attempt by economists and others to find an escape from the reality of resource scarcity, and like
North, he highlights the fact that much of the economics literature ‘cavalierly’ ignores the second law of thermodynamics.67 This technological optimism is equated by Salmon to defense of established interests by various institutional authorities and individuals and also notes that if scarcities persist the likely outcome is war over resources.68
Ferdinand Banks examines the political economy of oil, and the impact of scarcity related to that resource in a less philosophical fashion than some of the earlier authors. In particular, Banks highlights the economic impact of the crises of the 1970s in various industries, emphasizing the broad economic reach of oil as a resource. This includes the possibility of oil scarcity impacting other non-fuel minerals, as well as the impact of oil scarcity substantially reducing profitability in major industries such as automobile production.69 He sees the crises of the 1970s as the beginning of a shift from an era of low cost energy to one that requires high capital inputs.
However, his technological optimism is unabated and he believes that once those capital investments have been made energy costs overall should remain relatively low.70
65 Much ecological pessimism stems from Malthus, Robert. "An Essay on the Principle of Population." The Online Library of Liberty: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1826. 66 Salmon, Jack D. "Politics of Scarcity Versus Technological Optimism: A Possible Reconciliation." International Studies Quarterly 21, no. 4 (1977): pg. 701-02 67 Ibid, pg. 702, 705. 68 Ibid, pg. 704-705 69 Banks, Ferdinand B. The Political Economy of Oil. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1980, pg. 12, 17 70 Ibid, pg. 27
41 Although the technological optimism in Banks’ work is quite clear, his view of the political impact of scarcity remains pessimistic. He sees increased conflict over resources and specifically attributes this to different values held in relation to what cooperation in the area of energy means for energy consuming nations and energy producing nations. Western views of cooperation mean an outcome that maintains the status quo of low cost and high consumption of energy resources. The major producers however, believe that higher costs are a way of encouraging diversification of the energy market as well as conservation. Thus Banks sees “the outcome of this palpably different way of viewing the same phenomenon” as guaranteeing
“economic and eventually political turmoil throughout the entire world, over an indefinite future”.71
Robert Lieber provides a glimpse of the impact of energy economics on state security and alliance politics. He views the oil embargoes as a moment of realization by Western European states of their vulnerability to energy supply disruptions and traces the various developments and reactions of states to that awakening. Lieber states that the Yom Kippur War, and the resulting embargo, revealed to industrialized states that oil and energy had become ‘security issues par excellence’.72 This was really more of a reminder than a revelation as Lieber recognizes later in the article, noting that the appearance of energy security on the international ‘chessboard’ was not unprecedented, and in fact had been used as a casus belli before.73 Lieber uses the example of Japan and its need for foreign energy sources during its imperial expansion and the role of
71 Banks, Ferdinand B. The Political Economy of Oil. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1980, pg. 126 72 Lieber, Robert J. "Energy, Economics and Security in Alliance Perspective." International Security 4, no. 4 (1980): pg. 144 73 Ibid, pg. 161-162
42 energy in Japanese entry into World War II. Such issues were present much earlier than that war; they can for example, be clearly seen in the period prior to, and during, World War I.
In terms of the impact of the oil embargoes and resultant energy scarcity on contemporaneous state policy, Lieber highlights several important developments. These include the role of
American leadership during the time period74 (foreshadowing a more detailed examination of that leadership by Robert Keohane), the divisions among traditional allies caused by such scarcities75 (such as French willingness to halt shipments to the Dutch to comply with the Arab embargo, and tensions between the Europeans and Americans over American oil import policy) as well as a shift towards bilateral negotiation (again exemplified by France), and efforts by various institutions to research long term oil availability, such as the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the
International Energy Agency (IEA)76.
Overall, Lieber sees such scarcity events as having a negative impact on inter-state cooperation, yet believes that the negative impact of these crises can be cushioned by advance preparation and that the outcomes likely depend upon the nature of the shortages, indicating that global shortages will be easier for allies to manage.77 In concluding, Lieber emphasizes the need to deal with scarcity by reducing demand, indicating that supply-side attempts to manage the impact of scarcity in the oil availability were unlikely to be available in the short term, and while Lieber limits his analysis to the decade of the 1980s, his assessment no doubt applies to the future of the supply of oil in the long term.
74 Ibid, pg. 153 75 Lieber, Robert J. "Energy, Economics and Security in Alliance Perspective." International Security 4, no. 4 (1980): pg. 147, 156-57 76 Ibid, pg. 145-46, 156 77 Ibid, pg. 159
43 Crawford Goodwin provides several insights in his 1981 article entitled “The Lessons of
History”, with a central theme of an inability on the part of Washington policymakers to find a happy medium between the economic philosophies of free market and central planning within the energy industry. Goodwin begins by describing the post World War II testimony of a State
Department official who says “the Allies won because the United States had oil in abundance;
Germany and Japan fought for it in Baku and Kirkuk, in Burma and Indonesia, and they lost because they were unable to capture it, or to capture it in time.”78 This testimony before the U.S.
Senate took place in 1945 and while Goodwin is right to describe the statement as ‘simplistic’, he is also correct in calling the implicit warning ‘sound’. This emphasis on the role of oil in
WWII echoes the earlier assertion by Voskuil, correlating political power with control over mineral resources.79
Examining U.S. oil policy in the aftermath of the oil crises of the 1970s Goodwin is particularly critical. He highlights the unpredictability of the energy markets and the difficulties present due to the broad impact of energy as a conceptual framework, the latter of which Goodwin claims forced the compartmentalization of energy policy to more manageable sub-sectors, slowing and complicating the policy process.80 His discussion is couched in terms of energy transitions yet his terminology regarding those transitions is vague. Goodwin points out that post-WWII energy policy in the United States has often consisted of ad-hoc executive agencies reacting to current events rather than long-term comprehensive energy policy in the form of legislation from
Congress.81 This is similar to Nash’s description of the various executive bodies created by the
78Goodwin, Craufurd D. "The Lessons of History." The Wilson Quarterly 5, no. 2 (1981), pg. 91 79 Voskuil, Walter H. "Coal and Political Power in Europe." Economic Geography 18, no. 3 (July 1942): pg. 255 80 Goodwin, Craufurd D. "The Lessons of History." The Wilson Quarterly 5, no. 2 (1981): 91-97. 81 Ibid, pg. 94
44 Wilson administration prior to WWI. The result of these various deficiencies in Washington have resulted in a bias for the status quo in terms of energy policy, instead of an appropriate policy response to our long-term energy prospects.
Theodore Moran’s analysis of OPEC behavior is quite representative of oil-scarcity literature with a central emphasis on the major producing states during the immediate post crises period.
Moran describes OPEC as a ‘diverse oligopoly’ and in particular the role of Saudi Arabia in controlling the course of OPEC policy, a position conferred upon the Saudi Kingdom by its ability to act as a swing producer.82 Moran also offers a nod to the general optimist-pessimist divide within the geological and other academic communities regarding possible recoverable world supplies.83 Moran models OPEC behavior building off of the work of Harold Hotelling related to the economics of exhaustible resources. This is combined with assessment of exogenous variables related to “supply and demand for energy—on the demand side, elasticities of price, income, and substitution; and on the supply side, elasticity of energy outputs not under
OPEC control—the cost of backstop technology, the extent of nonrenewable reserves possessed by OPEC, and OPEC’s discount rate”84 This is Moran’s suggested method for predicting price over time. Moran sees Saudi Arabia as having several preferences stemming from their position in OPEC, these include a preference for high prices on the low end, prioritization of political ends over economic ones, and a view that possession of such large reserves provides a tool to achieve those ends via supply disruptions as messages.85
82 Moran, Theodore H. "Modeling Opec Behavior: Economic and Political Alternatives." International Organization 35, no. 2 (1981): pg. 272 83 Ibid, pg. 251 84 Ibid, pg. 244 85 Ibid, pg. 269-72
45 Eugene Frankel’s assessment of the relationship between energy and social change provides a concise message to those aiming to wade into the energy debate. Frankel is critical of the dominant model of assessing new energy technology and its diffusion, what he describes as the technology assessment or impact assessment model. Second, he offers some broad guidelines for learning from the historian’s perspective, specifically: 1) a need for input from a multiplicity of disciplines 2) modesty in attempts at quantification and prediction and 3) an emphasis on understanding the technological diffusion process.86 Several of Frankel’s arguments support the approach used here to examine great power naval transitions from coal to oil. This includes the methodological approach of process tracing, as well as modesty in causal determination.
Regarding process tracing as methodology and its role in understanding how new technological developments are introduced, regulated, and spread within and between societies, Frankel is worth quoting at length. He articulates the need to focus on the social process of technological development for the purpose of understanding their final social effects, and provides a useful generalized set of answerable questions directly relevant to this research.
“Historians view the process of the introduction of a technology as an interaction between individuals, institutions and social groups with different stakes in the new technical system. That interaction determines the final outcome of the technology- introduction process and shapes, to a large degree, the final social effects. It resolves such issues as where facilities get sited, who owns them, what kinds of regulatory constraints are placed on the systems, what kinds of operating practices are tolerated. It involves a set of actors who can be identified and a process of interaction that is well known because it is part of the fabric of the social and political life of a nation. By following the historian’s lead and focusing on the social process of technological development and diffusion we can ask questions that are capable of being answered: Who are the stakeholder groups? What kind[s] of interactions are likely to take place between them? How will these interactions affect the outcome of the technology-introduction process? What can we learn about the interests and values of social groups and institutions that will allow us to analyze the form and content of that interaction? What constraints do these values and interests place on the likely outcome? The historian’s
86 Frankel, Eugene. "Energy and Social Change: A Historian's Perspective." Policy Sciences 14, no. 1 (1981): pg. 59
46 emphasis on the social process of technology development and diffusion thus appears to lead to a more tractable analytical agenda for research in both the field of technology assessment and that of energy policy analysis.”[Emphasis added]87
Frankel provides an excellent starting point for crafting the relevant research questions to understand state and military responses to energy transitions. This involves outlining the various stakeholders and their relationship to one another. In the following case studies of great power naval transitions from coal to oil, the primary stakeholders are the respective governments, their navies, and various private corporate interests. More will be said about those institutions and their qualities and relationships in the next chapter.
Benny Temkin describes the various perspectives present in the debate on the U.S. response (or lack thereof) to the energy crises of the 1970s. He articulates six differing ideological positions, providing a basic classification of the various arguments made about how the US ought to respond to the new post-crisis reality. Those positions consist of: 1) free market; (2) energy independence; (3) liberal New Deal; (4) liberal conservationist; (5) orthodox leftist and (6) solar leftist.88 While the terms describing these varying approaches to energy policy are relatively self explanatory, some clarification and distinction is needed.
The most important disagreement that differentiates between these groups revolves around the source of scarcity: is scarcity supply or demand driven? In effect, this issue boils down to a belief that scarcity either stems from a physical lack of supply of petroleum or that scarcity stems from human, political, and economic deficiencies in its discovery, production and distribution within our societies. Temkin sums up the point:
87 Ibid, pg. 70 88 Temkin, Benny. "State, Ecology and Independence: Policy Responses to the Energy Crisis in the United States." British Journal of Political Science 13, no. 4 (1983), pg. 442-443
47 “Four perspectives, free market, energy independence, liberal New Deal and orthodox leftist shared a supply-oriented view of the energy problem, while the liberal conservationist and the solar leftist approaches stressed the need for conservation. The four supply-oriented approaches did not see resource depletion as a serious problem. In spite of differences in other respects, their advocates agreed that the crisis was not the result of natural or environmental constraints but the product of either mistaken state policies, or of self-serving monopolistic practices, conspiracies, and so on. To put it shortly, the energy crisis was wholly human-made.
The supply-oriented approaches shared also a highly optimistic assessment of the capability of technology to solve ecological and social problems including those generated by technology itself…”89
This division among energy perspectives along the lines of where they stand on the source of scarcity is important, because how one answers that question will likely determine the scope of policy responses seen as possible, or necessary, to address the problem. Thus, if one sees physical scarcity as the source, then conservation becomes more important among policy responses. If one views the problem of scarcity as simply stemming from poor policy, and human mismanagement, then conservation is seen as less important as a policy prescription.
This is an important structural distinction embedded in the debate over energy resources during the scarcity period. Temkin indicates two other main areas of disagreement in addition to environmental constraints: the role of the state as a crisis manager in capitalist societies, and the realism of policies that hope to achieve resource autarky.90
The crises of the 1970s caused much debate in the political science, economics, and international political economy literatures. The steadily declining prices of the early 1980s allowed for a relaxation of concern over supply, yet continued emphasis on the role of oil in political and economic affairs. The scarcity literature that is born out of the oil price shocks of the 1970s
89 Ibid, pg. 459-460 90 Temkin, Benny. "State, Ecology and Independence: Policy Responses to the Energy Crisis in the United States." British Journal of Political Science 13, no. 4 (1983), pg. 461
48 provides an important intellectual foundation upon which those who wish to further human understanding of energy transitions must build.
The Second Oil-Boom Literature
By 1984 the price of oil had dropped significantly from its highs stemming from the oil crises of the 1970s. Scarcity remained a theme within much of the literature on the political economy of oil and resources, but lost ground to other areas such as hegemony, the role of the state, how to manage OPEC, and learning from the crises, the impact of market volatility and a search for stability. Divisions regarding the source of scarcity remain yet are often not as pronounced because the low prices of the period (1984-2004) instilled a perception that the price spikes and concerns about supply of the scarcity period were abnormalities caused by politics and poor policy, not environmental constraints per se. Structural and environmental concerns existed, and are present during this period, but are not seen as the cause of the crises. Thus the discussions during this era often focus on the central importance of oil and issues of managing oil politics and economics instead of addressing consumption or envisioning a transition away from fossil fuel usage.
Several authors describe the importance of access to, and management of, petroleum markets on the part of the United States as a hegemonic power. Robert Keohane describes resource provision as the work of the hegemon to protect the international political economic order, and notes its use as a casus belli.91 Keohane ascribes to oil a much more important role than many other authors at the time, describing oil as “the most important raw material involved in
91 Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, pg. 39-40
49 international trade’ and ‘the center of the redistributive system of American hegemony”.92 The active maintenance and provision of stability to oil markets is seen as one of the fundamental three benefits provided by American political and economic hegemony to those who participated within that order. Those three benefits are: a stable international monetary system, the provision of open markets for goods, and access to oil at stable prices.93
Keohane is not the only author to tie control of oil to American Hegemony. Simon Bromley describes oil as a strategic commodity and notes high level of state intervention in oil markets as a result of its strategic importance.94 Bromley is critical of market-based accounts for, in effect, ignoring the supply limitations of a non-renewable resource and the arguments of ecologists.95
While disagreeing with Keohane as to the decline of American hegemony96 Bromley agrees that the role of oil to a hegemonic power in the modern industrial age, and its non-renewable nature, will likely present constraints on such hegemonic power in the future.
Not everyone was as pessimistic as Keohane and Bromley. David Glasner in his discussion of the political economy of energy argues that free market capitalism will efficiently and effectively distributes resources and that these resources will not be depleted. He states: “Although there are to be sure environmental problems that have a strong claim on our attention, the exhaustion of resources allocated by COE [competition by offers of exchange] is not among them.”97
Glasner’s perspective represents an extreme technological optimism and faith in the ability of
92 Ibid, pg. 140 93 Ibid, pg. 139 94 Bromley, Simon. American Hegemony and World Oil. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991, pg. 50 95 Ibid, pg. 50-51 96 Ibid, pg. 66 97 Glasner, David. Politics, Prices and Petroleum: The Political Economy of Energy. San Francisco: The Pacific Institute for Policy Research, 1985, pg. 19-20
50 capitalism to manage what scarcities arise and to prevent actual exhaustion. Ted Gurr, on the other hand, sees scarcity as directly related to economic decline and fears that the political consequences are underappreciated. Gurr stakes out a position between the extremes of technological optimism and ecological pessimism and in particular is critical of what he describes as a strong optimism about political adaptability.98 Gurr states:
“The general thesis of this essay is that just as there are ultimate ecological constraints on economic growth, political constraints weigh heavily on what might be achieved collectively in the face of serious scarcity. Most of the political prescriptions and possibilities…whether by ecological pessimists or technological optimists, rest on unexamined premises about the malleability of political values and institutions.”99
Gurr claims that the optimists are most optimistic about the way we deal with scarcity in a political sense and suggests an increased political realism about the prospects of politically managed scarcity, arguing that the negative political consequences will only increase as scarcity becomes more prevalent.100 Gurr warns that one of the historically common manifestations of these political consequences is imperial aggression, and war.101
John Ikenberry’s Reasons of State provides an interesting examination of U.S. response to the oil crises of the 1970s, using a two by two typology of adjustment strategies. This typology describes state strategies as either international/domestic, in terms of the target of policy, and defensive/offensive in terms of the strategic quality of that policy.102 He argues that the oil crises forced the United States to ‘explore the scope and limits of its international and domestic
98 Gurr, Ted Robert. "On the Political Consequences of Scarcity and Economic Decline." International Studies Quarterly 29, no. 1 (1985), pg. 50-52 99 Ibid, pg. 53 100 Ibid, pg. 54 101 Ibid, pg. 65 102 Ikenberry, G. John. Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, pg. 16
51 capabilities’.103 His fundamental argument is that state capacity was dictating state policy, and that this process can be seen both during the two crises and also in the varying policies pursued by different states with different capabilities.104 Importantly, Ikenberry notes that different state capacity impacted the likelihood of inter-state cooperation. More specifically, if a state could take domestic measures to increase their capability to manage a crisis, they were likely to do so, and thus less likely to participate within an international cooperative framework.105 Another important issue discussed by Ikenberry is the relationship between the state and the private oil sector. In particular he describes state reliance on the private energy sector for information and analysis of market realities and that attempts by American policy makers to increase the role of the federal government in the energy sector proved futile.106
Ikenberry concludes his discussion by calling for a more nuanced descriptor of state power, one that differentiates types of capacities between states and their organizational foundations.107 He concludes his assessment of state power through the lens of state energy adjustment policies by describing three propositions about state strength: 1) that states (strong or weak108) are tied to past policy commitments and tools for state intervention can also be used to thwart that intervention; 2) state inaction can be just as powerful as state action (this is described as
‘imposing the market’); and 3) that flexibility may be just as important as the degree of state control. Ikenberry juxtaposes his conclusion that these variances in state capability often preclude state participation in international regime agreements with the conclusion of Keohane.
103 Ibid, pg. 20 104 Ibid, pg. 198 105 Ibid, pg. 199-200 106 Ibid, pg. 200 107 Ibid, pg. 203 108 Ikenberry is critical of the simplicity of the strong state weak state divide, see pg. 203
52 Keohane argues that states would benefit from sacrificing flexibility for the sake of international rules and stability of mutual expectations.109 Ikenberry’s methodology of crafting a typology of state energy adjustment policy provides a useful starting point for this dissertation. In this examination of state responses to energy transitions, more specifically great-power navy transitions from coal to oil, the author intends to expand on this approach, and build a broader typology of their responses that can be generalized and applied to other future likely transitions.
Where Ikenberry emphasized the role of energy adjustment policy to understand state strength,
Koopman, Matthies, and Reszat attempt to assess more strictly economic lessons from the two price shocks of the1970s. The authors emphasize the future forecasts of growth in the developing world and argue that such growth effectively offsets any conservation efforts that may be implemented in the west.110 They also describe the financial impact of mass amounts of liquidity entering the international monetary system as a result of price spikes and the subsequent profits they create, and are critical of the lack of international protocol for dealing with sovereign debt crises.111
Koopman, Matthies and Reszat are not alone calling for improved international agreements for the purposes of stabilizing the oil market, a common theme throughout this period. Edward
Morse calls for a dialogue between producers and consumers as well as a need for an
109 Ikenberry, G. John. Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, pg. 204-208 110 Koopmann, Georg, Laus Matthies, and Beate Reszat. Oil and the International Economy: Lessons From Two Price Shocks. New Brunswick: Translation Publishers, 1989, pg. 38 and 43 111 Ibid, pg. 142
53 international regime to stabilize the oil market.112 Morse calls the oil market ‘out of control’ and supports direct state intervention in the oil market due to its importance.113 In his analysis of the price shocks of the 1970s, Stephen Krasner describes three effects of the first shock: 1) increased concern over supply, 2) loss of economic production due to increased cost and 3) the impact of recycling of petrodollars.114
The period from the mid to late 1990s to the first few years of the 21st century saw a substantial amount of literature produced within the field of International Political Economy. While much of this literature did not focus explicitly on resources or scarcity, it did consistently acknowledge the central importance of resources, the impact of volatility within resource markets, and the role of the state in these markets. Peter Evans described the central role of Petrobras in the creation of the Brazilian petrochemical industry as well as the vulnerability of ‘petro-states’.115
Many of the authors in Robert Keohane and Helen Milner’s Internationalization and Domestic
Politics highlighted the role of oil and its ability to impact both international and domestic economic policy. Jeffry Frieden and Ronald Rogowski articulated the devastating effect of the price spikes on oil-importing nations as well as the ripple effect of oil market volatility116;
112 Morse, Edward L., “After the Fall: The Politics of Oil”, pg. 407, in Stiles, Kendall W, and Tsuneo Akaha. Eds. International Political Economy: A Reader. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991. 113 Morse, Edward L., “After the Fall: The Politics of Oil”, pg. 407, in Stiles, Kendall W, and Tsuneo Akaha. Eds. International Political Economy: A Reader. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991.pg. 412 114 Krasner, Stephen. “Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism”, pg. 415, in Stiles, Kendall W, and Tsuneo Akaha. Eds. International Political Economy: A Reader. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991. 115 Evans, Peter. Embedded Autonomy: States & Industrial Transformation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, pg. 65 and 85 116 Jeffry A. Frieden and Ronold Rogowski, “ The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies”, pg. 30 and 41, in Keohane, Robert O, and Helen V. Milner. Eds. Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
54 Matthew Evangelista described how the volatility of the oil market is even able to penetrate closed economic systems such as that of the USSR117; Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield described the role of oil price shocks in some cases of sovereign debt.118
David Held also highlighted the role of massive pools of liquidity created by the oil price spikes and subsequent increased pressure on the international financial system. He noted that the massive transfer of capital that occurred with the price spikes injected roughly $50 billion into the international banking system between 1974 and 1976 alone.119 Held described the collapse of the Bretton Woods system as having precipitated an intensification of financial globalization spurred by neoliberal deregulation, international communications infrastructure and an influx of petro-dollars, overall increasing global trade and investment.120
Meredith Woo-Cummings investigated the policy responses of several states to the oil crises of the 1970s, including France, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The French utilized their capability to impact supply side issues within the energy markets, namely diversification in the nuclear area.
They increased public investment to keep energy costs down, and used foreign capital markets to borrow currency for two purposes, to balance against capital flight and to buoy the franc from
117 Matthew Evangelista, “Stalin’s Revenge: Institutional Barriers to Internationalization in the Soviet Union”, pg.168-69, in Keohane, Robert O, and Helen V. Milner. Eds. Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 118 Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield, “The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World” pg. 216, in Keohane, Robert O, and Helen V. Milner. Eds. Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 119 Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, pg. 201-202 120 Ibid, pg. 426
55 depreciation against the dollar.121 Woo-Cummings briefly stated the variance of state responses to the energy crisis among several East Asian nations:
“The export orientation critical to all three economies is centralized in Korea, decentralized in Taiwan, oligopolistic and highly competitive in Japan. When the 1973 oil crisis struck all three, state responses could not have been more different: Korea expanded and inflated, while Taiwan contracted and stabilized; Japan confronted massive inflation but began extensive deficit financing to cover the social costs of inflation control.”
The varying responses to the 1973 oil crisis among these East Asian economies (as well as the
French) is interesting in that it demonstrates that state policy responses to exogenous shocks are likely to depend on their domestic circumstances as much as on international economic conditions. This in turn relates directly to Ikenberry’s analysis of state capacity: states that are more capable of taking domestic measures to manage exogenous shocks will do so; on the other hand, states with little room for domestic policy responses are likely to seek international cooperative arrangements to manage systemic shocks.
Robert Gilpin described the 1973 oil crisis as having an important role in stemming the rapid economic growth in the post-war era, indicating that dramatic cost increases led to the decline in economic productivity in Western Europe and the United States.122 Gilpin described the oil market prior to 1973 as being very favorable towards the advanced industrial economies and noted that the United States lost control of the oil market as a weapon, control of which shifted towards OPEC, along with enormous sums of wealth. Like other authors Gilpin saw this
121 Woo-Cumings, Meredith. The Developmental State. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, pg. 244 122 Gilpin, Robert. The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, pg. 54
56 development as a serious blow to American power and prestige and simultaneously the beginning of a truly global financial system when the producers began investing that wealth. 123
Gilpin described the central role of a stable oil market and noted that volatility in that market in terms of relative prices had a ‘disproportionately huge impact’ on international political and economic affairs.124 In describing the cause of this volatility, Gilpin emphasizes the human cause of the crisis, and states that without the Yom Kippur War, the huge rise in the cost of oil would not have occurred.125 Thus Gilpin saw the source of scarcity as one of human policy, and error, and not a structural supply issue, or as an environmental constraint. With that perspective in mind he suggests that economic analysis, while important, cannot substitute for “historical, political, and sociological analysis”.
Overall, the literature of the second-oil-boom era, while it recognized the importance of scarcity, and the exhaustible nature of fossil fuel resources, saw the crises of the 1970s as problems that stemmed from supply-side issues of poor policy, planning and distribution. This includes decisions by producers to dramatically alter the market status quo through embargoes for political purposes. There is much emphasis on the role of the United States in exercising influence over the oil markets, the loss of that influence to OPEC as a result of the embargoes, the financial and economic impact of petro-dollar recycling, and how to best inject stability into a volatile market that is central to our international political order.
The most recent spike in oil prices shaped the last sub-set of the energy and oil literature.
Beginning in 2003-4 and continuing until 2013-14, the second oil scarcity literature saw a rise in
123 Ibid, pg. 71 124 Ibid, pg. 58 125 Ibid, pg. 59-60
57 an ecological perspective, an emphasis on the need to transition away from fossil fuels, and increased discussion of the role of fossil fuel usage in global climate change. While there are still some optimists who insist that scarcity can be solved with technological development, the debate during this era shifts markedly toward demand driven policy responses and a belief that a transition towards renewable energy lies in our immediate future.
The Second-Oil-Scarcity Literature
The Second-Oil Scarcity era began around 2003 and continued until the most recent collapse of oil prices in late 2014. In this period there was a marked increase in emphasis on scarcity, ecological and structural constraints on energy consumption, conservation, and the need to transition beyond fossil fuels due to global climate change. There were also optimists who contended that there existed plenty of oil and gas left to last a long time and technological developments could assist humanity in using those resources most efficiently. A middle ground between these positions is sought and issues most relevant to energy transitions are emphasized.
Richard Heinberg represents the far end of the pessimistic spectrum. Taking an energy-centric approach with an emphasis on the ecological problems present within the oil economy, Heinberg states that the social sciences are really subcategories of ecology.126 Heinberg views complex societies as energy-processing structures, building off the ideas of archaeologist Joseph Tainter, and his conclusion that ‘complex societies tend to collapse because their strategies for energy capture are subject to the law of diminishing returns.’127 Heinberg argues that our matter-energy system, which is finite, is fundamentally incompatible with our economic-financial-monetary
126 Heinberg, Richard. The Party’s Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies. Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers, 2003, pg. 20 127 Ibid, pg. 33
58 system, which is based on continued growth.128 Heinberg is particularly critical of the shale oil extraction process and the projections for future oil supply published by the United States
Geological Survey.129
For Heinberg, the oil crisis is a matter of physical scarcity and dealing with the problem appropriately requires tailoring our economic, financial, and monetary systems to better reflect the finite realities of our resource base. This will require the placement of ecological issues at the center of our economic philosophy.130 Colin Campbell also finds fault in our economic ideals and believes that excessive faith in markets as arbiters of economic justice is flawed. For
Campbell our natural resource constraints should be paramount in our economic prescriptions and evaluations, and as someone who has worked as a geologist within the oil industry for a long time, his warnings about supply are particularly resonant.131 Others are equally pessimistic about the future of oil and its role in the international political economy, yet for reasons that are more political than economic, or philosophical. Michael Klare sees an increased role for the U.S. military in protecting access and supply routes for the oil markets:
“[S]oldiers from the…regional commands are increasingly being committed to oil-related operations…Already troops from the Southern Command (Southcom) are helping to defend Colombia’s Cano Limoǹ pipeline, a vital link between oil fields in the interior and refineries on the coast, which has been under recurring attack form leftist guerrillas. Likewise, soldiers from European Command (Eurocom) are training local forces to protect the newly constructed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in Georgia. Eurocom also oversees all U.S. forces deployed in Africa (except in the Horn, which falls under Centcom’s jurisdiction) and has begun seeking bases from which to support future operations to defend the region’s oil facilities. Finally, the ships and planes of the U.S. Pacific Command (Pacom) are patrolling vital tanker routes in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the western Pacific. Taken together, these developments lead to an
128 Ibid, pg. 91 129 Ibid, pg. 111-115 130 Ibid, pg. 91 131 Campbell, C.J. Oil Crisis. Brentwood: Multi-Science Publishing Company Ltd., 2005, pg. 227
59 inescapable conclusion: that the American military is being used more and more for the protection of overseas oil fields and the supply routes that connect them to the United States and its allies. Such endeavors, once largely confined to the Gulf area, are now being extended to unstable oil regions in other parts of the world. Slowly but surely, the U.S. military is being converted into a global oil-protection service.”132
For Klare the activity required to protect pipelines and sea routes, and to maintain access and stability in the oil market is a part of the hidden cost of oil for the U.S. and its allies.
Additionally he sees a direct relationship between global petroleum shortages and economic recessions133, a view also shared by Jeremy Rifkin.134 Overall Klare argues that increased reliance on petroleum combined with increased scarcity is likely to increase conflict over that resource.
Hicks and Nelder also argue that there are hidden costs to oil, arguing that oil takes millions of years to form geologically and that given this reality, oil’s price tag should be considerably higher.135 Importantly, Hicks and Nelder highlight the massive oil consumption by the U.S. military:
“For one thing the sheer scale of the military’s dependence on oil is absolutely immense. The Department of Defense is the largest single energy consumer in the country and the single largest oil-consuming government entity in the world. The Defense Department consumed 132.7 million barrels of oil in 2005; that’s nearly 2 percent of all oil used by the United States. And thanks to incredibly oil-thirsty machines, the military also has the unfortunate need to burn a lot of fuel just to move more fuel. More than half of all the cargo moved by the military is just fuel. And 80 percent of the material transported on the battlefield is fuel.”136
For Hicks and Nelder, the increasing scarcity of oil resources will present a massive challenge to militaries and they are pessimistic about our ability to maintain oil consumption at current levels.
132 Klare, Michael T. Blood and Oil. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004, pg. 6-7 133 Ibid, pg. 9 134 Rifkin, Jeremy. The Third Industrial Revolution: How Lateral Power is Transforming Energy, the Economy, and the World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pg. 13-14 135 Hicks, Brian, and Chris Nelder. Profit From the Peak: The End of Oil and the Greatest Investment Event of the Century. Hoboken: Angel Publishing, 2008, pg. 72 136 Ibid, pg. 82
60
Kaldor, Karl, and Said’s edited work also highlights the relationship between oil and conflict, in places such as Angola, Chechnya, and Nigeria.137 They see a negative impact domestically on oil producing countries, including a reduction in non-oil economic production and a disincentive to work.138 While pessimistic about the future of the oil economy, they see depletion as stemming from oil becoming obsolete instead of a physical depletion of the resource, citing a statement from a former Saudi Oil Minister: ‘The Stone Age did not come to an end because we had a lack of stones, and the oil age will not come to an end because we have a lack of oil.’139
Jeremy Rifkin describes a third industrial revolution shifting away from concentrated resource distribution in the form of fossil fuels to a lateral production of electricity via renewable resources.140 In his compelling discussion of the likely impending energy transition, Rifkin emphasizes a five point plan that he believes will develop based upon the technological prospects for providing humanities future energy needs.141 He sees such a program as necessary stemming from his pessimism regarding the capability of the oil industry to maintain production levels for increased consumption of a growing human population, comparing such prospects to the collapse of Rome.142
Across the aisle, so to speak, from the pessimists are those who view peak oil, and the likelihood of future scarcity, quite differently. Robert Mabro remains positive in his outlook on the future availability of oil resources. He cites statements by Sheikh Ahmad Fahad Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah
137 Kaldor, Mary, Terry Karl, and Yahia Said. Eds. Oil Wars. London: Pluto Press, 2007. 138 Ibid, pg. 12-13 139 Ibid, pg. 16 140 Rifkin, Jeremy. The Third Industrial Revolution: How Lateral Power is Transforming Energy, the Economy, and the World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pg. 5 141 Ibid, pg. 37 142 Ibid, pg. 80-82
61 indicating that proven reserves, reserve growth and new discoveries are plenty to ensure adequate supply throughout the first half of the twenty-first century and beyond.143 He sees the impact of peak oil as simply meaning higher prices; an adjustment that will likely reduce demand and ultimately such a price increase will relieve pressure on the oil market.144 Yet, despite his acknowledgement of the fundamental geological reality of peak oil, he argues that the when one assesses the numbers on oil reserves and estimates for future production they will see a more positive outlook. In short, Mabro sees overall estimates for worldwide oil reserves as being on the high end of the spectrum, and that, combined with increased capability for extraction due to unconventional sources and technological developments, peak-oil will not become problematic for a long time.145
Robyn Mills is equally optimistic, to the point of describing the oil crisis as a ‘myth’. She emphasizes the capability of technology and human adaptability to manage the impact of scarcity.146 Mills is critical of claims made by pessimists related to EROEI, or energy returned on energy invested, arguing that unconventional sources of oil are more feasible than pessimists claim, and emphasizing that EROEI is based upon profitability.147 As long as such resources are profitable, they will be utilized. Optimists see pessimists as alarmists, and describe a reserve of oil resources that is more than capable of continuing to fuel modern industrialization and economic growth. While they acknowledge the finite nature of fossil fuel resources, they believe that increasing technological development, increased technological efficiency and
143 Mabro, Robert. Ed. Oil in the 21st Century: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pg. xii 144 Ibid, pg. 9 145 Ibid, pg. 159-161 146 Mills, Robin M. The Myth of the Oil Crisis: Overcoming the Challenges of Depletion, Geopolitics, and Global Warming. Westport: Prager Publishers, 2008, pg. 219 147 Ibid, pg. 211-212
62 unconventional resource supplies will be plentiful enough for humanity to continue down its chosen energy path.
Conclusions
What aspects of the body of research on energy and fossil fuels are central to understanding the ways in which states and their military organizations respond to energy transitions? What central themes of this literature must guide further exploration of how energy transitions impact state decision-making and policy? There are several important factors:
1) Fossil fuels are central to current military power 2) Fossil fuels are central to economic growth and prosperity 3) There are no current alternatives for these resources 4) These resources are becoming increasingly scarce
The significance of energy issues for states and their militaries since the Industrial Revolution is indisputable. Between the late 1890’s and the First World War, great power navies experienced a transition between their primary source of energy. If a future transition from fossil fuels to some new, and as yet undetermined, source of energy is likely, scholars will benefit from a detailed understanding of similar earlier state experiences.
Within political science generally, and International Political Economy more specifically, energy, its availability, cost, and its central role in our economic and political order, has often been emphasized. The patterns of our energy usage demonstrate transitional periods that arise as dominant energy sources become less and less available, and are usually overtaken and diversified from through new sources of energy or by improved energy technology. Almost every author cited in the chapter recognizes one fundamental geological reality: Our primary source of energy, oil, is a finite resource that cannot continue to fuel further industrialization,
63 economic growth and other uses, based upon current consumption patterns. This fact has forced a realization that a future energy transition is likely, and in many ways is already underway.
Yet the finite nature of fossil fuels is not new. What is new is a consensus that some future transition away from fossil fuels is likely, if not inevitable. If this is agreed upon, then there should be a concerted effort to understand these transition periods as much as possible. This process begins with studying past transitions. The energy literature is lacking in focused examinations of the impact of energy transitions on economic, political, and military matters. In this way this dissertation hopes to contribute to that body of scholarly knowledge.
Specifically, the case studies will help scholars to understand the impact of energy transitions on militaries. Much of the energy literature is not explicitly focused on the relationship between military organizations and energy technology. However, modern militaries have a unique relationship with technology in that they regularly can afford to purchase the premier tools and machines currently available. The energy literature would expect that renewable energy technologies such as solar, wind, and geothermal or hydro-electric, along with nuclear energy, will replace fossil fuel dominance in our energy framework. The lack of military emphasis in the energy literature is evident here, as none of the above energy sources have demonstrated a capability to improve on what the Department of Defense refers to as operational energy.148 The dissertation finds that the next step in the energy transition for operational purposes is likely to be a bridge technology, or some slightly more renewable liquid fuel to be burned by machines quite similar to those used now. The case studies demonstrate the significance of the bridge
148 "Annual Energy Review 2011." edited by Department of Energy, 370. Washington D.C.: Office of Energy Statistics, 2012, pg. 28
64 technology approach to spanning the various energy sources present in any given energy transition.
This has provided the author with his ultimate goal, to understand modern state responses to major energy transitions. If scholars are to understand how states cope with a major structural change, such as an energy source transition, they must begin by examining examples of such transitions in detail.
This line of reasoning has led the author to propose detailed case studies of such transitions, beginning with the transition by great power navies from coal to oil as their primary fuel for their fleets. This transition, which begins with the initial experiments with oil-powered ships and trains and is solidified by the end of the First World War, represents the first major energy transition experienced by great powers after the industrial revolution. If scholars hope to anticipate ways in which states may adapt and change to a future transition away from fossil fuels, it will be necessary to better understand similar past experiences.
65 3 Military Organizations, Innovation, and Technological Diffusion A Review of the Literature
As stated throughout the dissertation, the primary aim of this project is to understand state military responses to energy transitions. More specifically, my focus is the development of oil- powered machinery for the purposes of defense and the projection of military power. As oil technology improved, developed, and became more widespread, military organizations began incorporating that technology into their arsenal of capabilities. They also began a process developing and researching the possibilities presented by such technology and changing their behavior based upon the new realities of this energy transition.
To those involved in the process, it became clear that petroleum, not coal, was the fuel of the future for military organizations. Thus, the fundamental phenomenon to be examined in this research is the diffusion of energy technology within and between military organizations, their state governments and allies, and corporate oil interests. The goal is to create a typology that will classify the various responses to this diffusion on the part of the American and British navies. What developments led to the decision to embrace this new energy technology? How and by whom was such a decision reached? What individuals, organizations, branches of government, or corporations were advocating for such a change and which were not? How did such a change impact military doctrine, policy, and posture? By answering such questions, this work hopes to shed light on how states perceive the role of energy in terms of military security and also on how impactful energy transitions can be. Increased understanding of these issues will provide some guidance on how states and their militaries might respond to likely future energy transitions.
66
To obtain a clear picture of how this energy transition impacted states, and their respective military organizations, one must first be familiar with the body of literature centered on military organizations generally, and on innovation and the diffusion of technology within those institutions more specifically. Organizations and institutions are critical components of human interaction and daily life. Much research in political science has focused on the characteristics and behavior of humans through the social action of organizations. Yet, not all organizations are created equal, and non-military organizations are significantly different than military organizations. Military organizations are unique for multiple reasons. First, they possess the legitimate monopoly on the use of force and the prosecution of wars; secondly, they are responsible for the survival of the nation they serve. These organizations are also uniquely situated as case studies for scholars examining phenomena with both domestic and international variables. Within international relations and domestic level political analysis, the state and its military serve as the preeminent actor straddling both arenas.149
Militaries have always received plenty of attention from scholars. Military histories fill the shelves in every university library. In political science the formal study of military organizations, institutions, firms, and other bureaucracies has long been debated. Scholars have sought to determine what fundamental principles help shape and determine courses of action, often with the goal of hoping to explain differences, discrepancies, and outliers to the prevailing theories of military doctrine and the state. A review of the post-World War II literature on military organizations is presented here with the goal being to enhance the theoretical clarity of
149 Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.
67 this work. My aim is to demonstrate that the case studies outlined later are interesting cases that require exploration, and that successful review of state responses to the aforementioned energy transition will contribute to the lively debates in organizational theory.
In his address to the Academy of Political Science in January 1941, Hanson W. Baldwin, Military and Naval Correspondent to the New York Times, spoke on the subject of military organization.
Much of that commentary is spent on emphasizing the need for certain improvements due to the increasing probability of America becoming entangled in the European War. He stressed the need for open criticism and consideration of military policies and operations, as well as articulated the need for increased levels of coordination across the branches of the military for the purposes of comprehensive defense planning.150 Yet it is his discussion of the possibility of the creation of a third branch of the military, an Air Force, that is emblematic of military reaction to revolutionary technology. Baldwin emphasizes that the American military has certainly developed airpower, describes the Navy as the having the world’s best naval air service, and cites the appointment of Hap Arnold to Deputy Chief of Staff as evidence of the impact of airpower on military doctrine. Yet, despite the substantial impact of airpower, and its obvious advantages, Baldwin argues on organizational grounds against creating the ‘third branch’ at the time.
“…[T]he question of a separate air arm should not be forever quashed; it is quite possible that in quieter times a third separate fighting service should be evolved. But there seem to me to be compelling reasons against any such change today. First, it would be a mistake to assume that coördinated operations and unity of action could be achieved merely by the creation of a third service, when it is obvious that coordination is far from perfect today when only two fighting services exist. Second, the dislocation to our defense effort incident to such a sweeping reorganization, coming at this most crucial time in the history of the world, might jeopardize that effort and even jeopardize the
150 Baldwin, Hanson W. "Military Organization." Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 1941.
68 nation. Third the service jealousies and heartaches thus created would be a persistent root of evil for years to come.”151
For Baldwin, the creation of a separate third arm would complicate already imperfect coordination of the various branches of the military. First, he emphasizes the fact that simply creating a separate and specialized organization for air power would not necessarily result in better coordination. More importantly, he stresses that the risk of war meant that there would likely not be enough time to create, test, and integrate this new military organization with the two already in existence. While he could not know that Pearl Harbor was just under a year away, he was correct nonetheless. A drastic overhaul of the U.S. military command structure in a mere eleven months would certainly strain the capabilities of the most effective state bureaucracy.
The perspective put forward by Baldwin is emblematic of military reactions to technological change. Militaries have always adapted; they would not survive otherwise. Yet, because of the unique characteristics of military organizations and their universal, singular purpose (to fight and survive/win wars and thus preserve the existence of the state and society) they often resist change, and generally implement change on their own terms. Baldwin concludes by telling the audience what military organization is, and, from his perspective, what it should be. For
Baldwin, military organization is the skeletal framework of the national war effort, a means to an end.152 That end is the very survival of a state’s people, and as such changes to military organization, doctrine, and strategy are treated slowly, carefully, and deliberately. Similar themes are prevalent throughout the literature on military organizations.
151 Ibid, pg. 16 152 Baldwin, Hanson W. "Military Organization." Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 1941, pg. 128
69 While Baldwin’s address represents a very grounded approach to military organization of a specific military at a particular time, Herbert Kaufman provides a more abstract and theoretical treatment of organization theory and it similarities with much political theory. Writing in 1964,
Kaufman draws attention to the interesting fact that men of “divergent training…differing objectives, and displaying varied concerns” could study phenomena believed to be “quite distinct” and yet develop “findings and inferences [that] should turn out to be closely parallel in many important respects.”153 For Kaufman, organizational theorists and political theorists are simply studying similar human phenomena manifesting in different disciplines. He points out that the two disparate areas of study have developed similar approaches to similar phenomena.
Kaufman is describing what he sees as a parallel between organization theory within mid-sixties sociology and the political theory of the time; between the study of relations of governments and subjects, as well as inter-state relations studied in political theory, and the study of other forms of human association, focused on in sociological organization theory. These include understanding why individuals submit to some higher authority (justified by rationality); how to best achieve coordination in social activity (hierarchy is conducive to coordination); and similar debates revolving around reconciling individual goals and interests with collective goals and interests.154
Kaufman stresses that organizations, conceptually, are massively broad, capable of encompassing almost all daily life. Importantly, he insists that all organizations are in some sense political, needing to manage the “problems of leadership, policy formation, succession, strategy, rivalry, resistance, revolution, and influence that this implies.” Military organizations
153 Kaufman, Herbert. "Organization Theory and Political Theory." The American Political Science Review 58, no. 1 (March 1964): 5-14. 154 Ibid, pg. 5-9
70 present themselves as distinctly political, beyond the inherent political qualities possessed by all other organizations, manifested in state possession of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and responsibility for national survival.
In James March’s Handbook of Organizations Kurt Lang presents a useful introduction to the basic qualities of military organizations. He describes several of the basic principles of international relations theory, including the anarchic nature of the state system, the “milieu of competitive force”, the lack of information and high amount of uncertainty, and the lack of a supranational authority.155 For Lang, a state’s domestic structure is important and it is generally reflected in its military organizational makeup, and thus there are perceivable differences between democratic and totalitarian military organizations.156 Lang highlights the complexity of military organizations as well as their need for large reserves of resources for sustained operation. These qualities stem from the core function of militaries, making war. Lang notes that the ‘normal’ state of operation for a military is peacetime, yet the institutions of the military must be prepared for war at any time. Thus, they need a large pool of resources and the ability to quickly alter their operations from peacetime to wartime needs. This requires a large and complex organizational structure, the resources necessary to maintain it, and the flexibility to act according to the specific need of the threat of war in a particular instance.157
Lang also comments importantly on an often-cited quality of militaries, a generalized resistance to change. On this Lang should be quoted at length:
155Lang, Kurt. Military Organizations, in March, James G., ed. Handbook of Organizations. Edited by Edgar F. Borgatta, Rand Mcnally Sociology Series. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965, pg. 839 156 Ibid, pg. 844 157 Ibid, pg. 856
71 “Major innovations in military technology have usually met with strong resistance from important segments of the military leadership. The resistance has its source in the uncertainty of all strategic evaluations and in the need for confidence in existing procedures. Thus, there is a natural reluctance to scrap older forms before the tactical and strategic advantages of innovations have received full and complete test. The realism demanded from the military has its counterpart in the romanticism of the profession, so that distrust of change may very well be the price paid for the military man’s dedication to the cultivation of martial arts in peacetime. Moreover, faith in one’s weapons is essential to the maintenance of espirit de corps and morale. The remote and uncertain advantages promised from change instituted in peacetime must therefore be balanced against the costs and disruption that any changeover entails.”158
A ‘full and complete’ test of new technology applicable to warfare can only take place on the battlefield. Correspondingly, new technology is rarely adopted by militaries prior to evidence of successful use in war. Lang states that this resistance stems first from uncertainty about technological performance compared to the current dominant modes of war, and secondly from
“vested interests that develop around established practices”.159
James Q. Wilson, while not describing military organizations per se, provides several important insights about organizational innovation and change. Wilson begins by pessimistically stating
“little can be said about the correlation between firm [read organization] characteristics and innovation.”160 Regarding government organizations, he notes that scholars have observed different patterns of innovation between different bureaucracies, namely the New York City Fire department, which rarely innovates, and the New York Port Authority, which continually innovates. Yet despite such observed difference, he claims that the only point in thinking broadly
158 Ibid, pg. 857 159 Lang, Kurt. Military Organizations, in March, James G., ed. Handbook of Organizations. Edited by Edgar F. Borgatta, Rand Mcnally Sociology Series. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965, pg.857 160 Wilson, James Q. “Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory”. In Thompson, James D., ed. Approaches to Organizational Design. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966, pg. 195
72 about innovation may be to demonstrate that “not much can be learned that way.” 161 Wilson is particularly pessimistic about the likelihood of theorizing about specific organizational innovation in any specified set of circumstances. In fact he explicitly articulates that his unit of analysis is the organization and not the organization in its environment. For Wilson the environmental impact can only be determined to “increase or decrease” the prospect of innovation, not determine what that likely innovation will be.162 With those limitations in mind,
Wilson provides a few hypotheses on when and why innovation may occur. He describes three stages of innovation: 1) the conception of the change (invention) 2) the proposing of the change
(discussion/consideration) 3) and adoption, or implementation of the change (action).
The likelihood of change during any of these stages, according to Wilson, is primarily a function of diversity. He sees diversity as increasing the likelihood of change conception and proposals, yet sees diversity as an obstacle to the actual implementation of change.163 He concludes that the implementation of innovation and innovative change within organizations is essentially political bargaining. The cost-benefit assessments of proposed change within complex and diverse organizations will be different across sub-units of that organization. Increased complexity and diversity decrease the likelihood of adoption. Much as Kaufman finds interesting parallels between organization theory and political theory, Wilson describes the policy innovation process as essentially political bargaining, requiring reconciliation of disparate claims and interests, the
161 Ibid, pg. 195-196 162 Ibid, pg. 198 163 Wilson, James Q. “Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory”. In Thompson, James D., ed. Approaches to Organizational Design. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966, pg. 200-203
73 possible need for side payments, and information gathering on the tolerability parameters of the various sub interests.164
Barry Posen compares organization theory with balance of power theory, in an effort to determine which of the two can better explain military doctrine. Posen likens these two bodies of theory to various perspectives, lenses, or levels of analysis commonly used to divide approaches to political analysis. These correspond to political analyses at the individual level, domestic political analyses, and inter-state analyses. Due to the nature of military organizations,
Posen indicates that understanding the sources of military doctrine will likely require using both balance of power theory and organization theory in tandem, stating that both theories “abstract the constraints that affect the behavior of national security decision-makers in the modern state.”165 This is important because while both theories claim to explain state policy and action, they differ on the source of motivation for those policies and actions; do they stem from the internal political bargaining of the military organization, or do they stem from the situational context of the state relative to other states? Posen concisely describes the cross-forces at work on military doctrine:
“Military Doctrine, as discussed here is a response to both national and international influences. It represents the state’s response to the constraints and incentives of the external world, yet it encompasses means that are in the custody of military organizations. These are perhaps the most “organized” of organizations. It is from their basic structure that most subsequent organizations take their inspiration. Thus, military doctrine provides an excellent ground upon which the two theories can do battle.”166
164 Ibid, pg. 203 165 Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, pg. 37 166 Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, pg. 38
74 In this excellent work, Posen describes the difference between these two sets of theoretical scholarship on how military organizations innovate. Organizational theory, according to Posen, stresses the organization’s desire for predictability, stability, and certainty; these values are not compatible with innovation and change. As he points out, however, we do see large innovative changes take place within organizations over time, so how is this explained by organization theory? Posen states that the organization literature suggests that organizations change under three circumstances: failure, outside pressure, or a desire for expansion.
Posen develops more specific propositions about when a military will likely innovate. He argues
(1) that, due to institutionalization, militaries will rarely sponsor radical change; (2) that doctrinal innovations will increase uncertainty, (3) that new technology will likely be combined with old doctrine rather than spawn a new doctrine, and (4) that militaries do not learn well from observation, but instead require direct experience in battle to induce drastic doctrinal change.167
Thus, there are three likely causes of military doctrinal innovation: failure on the battlefield, civilian intervention, and direct combat experience with new technology. For Posen, the sources of innovation are more likely to be found in the balance of power and organizational variables than to stem from geographical or technological variables. Between the former two he argues that balance of power theory is more convincing, conceding however that in times of relative calm organizational determinism is likely to be prevalent. 168
167 Ibid, pg. 55-57 168 Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, pg. 80
75 In downplaying the possibility of direct impact on military doctrine and military innovation by technology and geography, Posen seems to unnecessarily group the two factors together. In relation to how militaries change and innovate, this is unfortunate. Technology is constantly changing, developing and improving. Because of the role of industrialized machinery in modern warfare the opportunities for technology to directly impact, shift, or render entirely obsolete existing doctrine is high. This has been shown with countless technological developments and their impact on the battlefield, from the chariot, to Mongol archery tactics, the pike, the internal combustion engine, manned flight, and harnessing atomic energy. Technological developments can also directly impact our relationship to geographical barriers, as has been demonstrated by cyber-attacks on physical infrastructure.169
As for geography, it is unlikely to directly impact changes or innovations in doctrine, yet it is certainly more determinative of state grand strategy than Posen indicates. First, geography dictates the spatial relationships between states, and humanity’s ties to the land are important.
Defense of the homeland, conceptually, is paramount in military organizations. They also derive most of their required resources from that land and thus are, to some extent, bound by its provisions. Many of the most well known strategic issues among the states examined by Posen are directly determined by geography, as he acknowledges, including British reliance on naval power, the German two-front problem, and the French decision not to fortify its border with
169 Clayton, Mark. "Exclusive: New Thesis on How Stuxnet Infiltrated Iran Nuclear Facility." The Christian Science Monitor, 2014. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2014/0225/Exclusive-New-thesis-on-how- Stuxnet-infiltrated-Iran-nuclear-facility
76 Belgium.170 While Posen certainly concedes the role of technology and geography, he deemphasizes their role in relation to organization theory and balance of power theory to the detriment of his argument, particularly in the case of technology.
In his discussion of the effectiveness of military organizations, Alan Millett outlines the four levels of analysis for military activity. These are political, strategic, operational, and tactical.
Millett argues that military effectiveness must be assessed separately at each level and demonstrates that varying levels of effectiveness across levels is possible and likely. His measure for effectiveness is different from military victory. He describes military victory as an outcome, not an organizational characteristic. Effectiveness is instead a cost/benefit assessment of military activity at one of the levels of analysis, and there are likely to be interaction effects across levels.
He gives the example of American military effectiveness in South Vietnam, noting that if the
Americans had relied less on indirect firepower and more on engaging the enemy closely on foot, they could have improved their tactical effectiveness. However, they would have likely incurred increased casualties and thereby reduced their political effectiveness by creating increased domestic opposition to the war.171
Millet’s work is an effort to gauge something slightly different than how militaries respond to change and their likelihood of innovation. Yet in his discussion he provides several interesting insights into that process. He compares several militaries in similar situations and demonstrates varying effectiveness in the integration and utilization of the respective states industrial bases for
170 Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, pg. 237-238 171 Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, Kenneth H. Watman. "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations." International Security 11, no. 1 (1986), pg. 38
77 defense purposes. In doing so he shows that militaries indeed can and will adapt and innovate in response to the development of new technology, but he also shows that militaries do not do so equally.
Importantly, he demonstrates that failure to appropriately change in the face of new technological realities can be devastating. Millet compares the Soviet Union and the Italy during the inter-war period, finding that the Soviets made much better use of their industrial capabilities than the Italians did, citing the Soviet development of the T-34 tank, and the Italian rejection of an aerial torpedo.172 He also compares the varying utilization of available industrial capacity between Germany and the Allies. He argues that the allied strategy and its emphasis on airpower required continuous technological innovation and mass production, whereas the Germans failed to fully mobilize “virtually the entire manufacturing capacity of Europe” until late 1941 to early
1942.173 Thus, Millet emphasizes the varying effectiveness of incorporating industrial technological capability across military organizations.
Millet offers several reasons as to why a military may reject (or only slowly adopt) new technology. Those reasons include 1) insufficient funding from political authorities; 2) military assessment that new technology may not be either reliable or significantly superior to existing technology; 3) a slow acceptance of technology due to high levels of uncertainty; 4) rejection due to the new technology threatening either the status of a military branch (the way aircraft
172 Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, Kenneth H. Watman. "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations." International Security 11, no. 1 (1986), pg. 41 173 Ibid, pg. 47-48
78 carriers were seen as a threat to the navy, or the way tanks threatened the cavalry) or the social environment of the military.174
For Millett, rejection of technological development by militaries is an indication of operational ineffectiveness, and conversely, true effectiveness stems from successful integration of new technology with operational doctrine. Such effectiveness is exemplified by the RAF’s work with single engine fighters and radar in the 1930s and 1940s.175
In sum, for Millet, technology can certainly drive military innovation, but only if it is appropriately integrated with military doctrine; accomplishing this task is likely to result in overall military effectiveness. On the other hand, his arguments indicate that militaries must manage technological change and development, and failing to do so can dramatically reduce military effectiveness.
Stephen Rosen offers a significant contribution to the discussion, in several different works. The first is an article in International Security. In it he addresses the role of ideology, the need for appropriate career paths for innovators, and the need for cooperation between military leaders and civilian authorities to accomplish innovation in military doctrine. He begins by offering a definition of innovation, or major innovation. A ‘major innovation’ is one that requires a primary combat arm of the military to change its concepts of operation and its relations to the other branches.176 In analyzing why militaries innovate, Rosen provides several propositions, 1) defeat in wartime is not necessary; 2) military ‘mavericks’ do not cause innovation; 3) internal
174 Ibid, pg. 56 175 Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, Kenneth H. Watman. "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations." International Security 11, no. 1 (1986), 55 176 Rosen, Stephen Peter. "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation." International Security 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988), pg. 134
79 military innovation can occur when supported by senior officers who act in a two part strategy of
A): translation of new capabilities and their implications into new service wide critical tasks and
B): creation of new career paths for officers related to those new capabilities; 4) civilian intervention is most successful when utilized in combination with number 3.177
Rosen emphasizes the complex political character of military organizations, arguing that these communities require an ideological shift in order to accept major innovations. Rosen’s emphasis on the need for appropriate careers for officers with expertise in new technological capabilities is significant. This point brings to mind earlier work by Thomas Hammond, who demonstrated that organizational structure could determine the outcome of bureaucratic battles.178 Hammond points out that one of the primary difference between legislative decision making and bureaucratic decision making is that often times the crucial decisions within bureaucratic organizations are made by individuals.179
Thus, it is important that individuals supportive of new technology are able to reach important decision-making positions of authority within military hierarchical structures. For Rosen, without these career path possibilities, officers supportive of certain technological developments who understand the impact they are likely to have on doctrine may never be in a position to approve their adoption and use. In his book published just a few years later, Rosen takes a deeper look at innovation in modern militaries. Significantly, he distinguishes between peacetime and wartime innovation. The “malevolent, violent chaos of war” alters the nature of
177 Ibid, pg. 135-36 178 Hammond, Thomas H. "Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics." American Journal of Political Science 30, no. 2 (May 1986), pg. 379-382 179 Ibid, pg. 383
80 organizational learning and can and should be treated differently than peacetime innovation.
This also means that theories about organizations that do not face war will differ fundamentally from theories of military organizations.180
Rosen also highlights the impact of technological change on military and organizational decision-making. He argues that technological change introduces a new component to the decision making process, namely, scientists. For Rosen there is the possibility for disagreement regarding who – military men or scientists – is in the best position to assess the impact of technological innovation, or the likely future impact of possible technological innovation on the battlefield?181 Rosen delves into several cases of successful, and unsuccessful, innovation in both peacetime and wartime. Most relevant for this particular study is the comparison of the U.S. and
British naval responses to the emergence of the aircraft carrier.
The nature of aviation in the immediate post WWI years led most to believe that the best military function for aviation was for reconnaissance and as the ‘eyes of the fleet’. However, as aviation technology developed during the interwar period the Americans altered their notion of naval aviation while the British did not. Up to 1938, the British still saw naval aviation as primarily useful for surveying the battlefield and conveying information to the military leadership, not as a tool for the projection of power.182
180 Rosen, Stephen Peter. Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, pg. 23 181Rosen, Stephen Peter. Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, pg. 40 182 Ibid, pg. 97-98
81 The Americans conceived of naval aviation differently, and as early as 1931, under the direction of Rear Admiral William Moffett, had reconceived aircraft carriers as a replacement for battleships, not as adjuncts to battleships.183 This different understanding of how aircraft carriers would likely alter naval combat was manifest as early as 1928 by which time the Americans had substantially improved carrier capability and aircraft capacity.
“The reformulation led directly to a new set of military tasks. If an aircraft carrier was not primarily a part of the battle fleet, to be maneuvered as part of that fleet, but a floating airfield, it would have to maneuver to take advantage of the wind in order to launch and recover airplanes most easily. The fleet would have to follow the carrier, not the other way around. Carrying and launching as many aircraft as possible became the new critical task of aircraft carriers. It was not by accident, therefore, that Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves, a battleship admiral who was an ally of Moffett, ordered the Langley, the first American aircraft carrier, to take on board forty-two aircraft, more than three times her normal complement, without the knowledge and against the wishes of her captain, prior to the 1928 fleet exercises off Hawaii. At that time, the Royal Navy was not able to operate more than a dozen aircraft from a carrier, and British visitors refused to believe that the Langley operated with even twenty-four aircraft.”184
In his excellent contribution to the discussion of military innovation and adaptation to technological change, Rosen highlights the importance of several factors. First is the difficulty of imposing change upon the military from outside by civilians. He indicates that without cooperative senior officials, civilian attempts to force change onto a military are likely to fail.185
Secondly, he emphasizes the role of war games and combat simulation in providing the ‘key to the intellectual breakthrough’ needed to re-conceptualize military doctrine in light of technological developments. He cites the naval war games in the 1920s as providing the impetus
183 Ibid, pg. 70-71 184 Rosen, Stephen Peter. "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation." International Security 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988), pg. 71 185 Regarding the development of helicopter airmobility in the 1960s Rosen notes that there is some impact by McNamara’s office, but the ‘larger contribution’ is credited to the military officials in the Army. Ibid, pg. 92
82 for naval understanding of the future role of naval aviation and aircraft carriers.186 Rosen’s work is important in that it demonstrates that two similarly structured military organizations, with similar goals, and similar governing state structures, reacted differently to the same technological development. How does one explain such differences in organizational learning and reactions to technological diffusion? For Rosen the momentum needed to obtain major innovation in military organizations needs to come from within that organization; while exogenous factors can and often do play a role, they are unlikely to achieve such innovation in the face of resistance from military organizations.
In his work on the political economy of international arms transfer systems, Keith Krause provides several interesting concepts that are directly relevant to this research. The first is an emphasis on the role of the economic, social and cultural context in which arms transfers, or the diffusion of military technology, occur.187 Also, he discusses several characteristics of the military arms economy that are quite important. The first of these characteristics is that any given paradigm for military arms is generally accompanied by several centers of production.
Early examples include centers of sword and armor production in Northern Italy, the Rhine-
Westphalia region, and the Low Countries.188 Diffusion of military technology tends to emanate outward geographically from these centers.
186 Rosen, Stephen Peter. "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation." International Security 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988), pg. 68-69 187 Krause, Keith. "The Political Economy of the International Arms Transfer System: The Diffusion of Military Technique Via Arms Transfers." International Journal 45, no. 3, Israel & the Arabs since the Intifadah (Summer 1990), pg. 689 188 Krause, Keith. "The Political Economy of the International Arms Transfer System: The Diffusion of Military Technique Via Arms Transfers." International Journal 45, no. 3, Israel & the Arabs since the Intifadah (Summer 1990), pg. 691-696
83 The second characteristic of arms transfer systems is political salience. States are not likely to allow for a free-market in arms; alliances and enmities are likely to produce winners and losers in the arms production system. Third, this political salience is likely to impact the nature of technological diffusion. Essentially, the political nature of arms technology will impact its diffusion. This stems from a desire by various political authorities to possess some sense of autarky in terms of military technological production. States, and their militaries, are often not content to simply buy weaponry. Instead, they generally hope to create some level of domestic productive capability. Fourth, Krause notes that diffusion of military technology is an imperfect process involving and impacted by several variables, including technological knowledge, skills and attitudes, and political will. Krause emphasizes that state support is generally necessary for such efforts to be successful. Also, Krause describes the role of possessing an adequate ‘social and cultural infrastructure’ in a state’s ability to ‘sustain production at the technological frontier.’
For Krause, without the requisite socio-cultural context, military technological development is not likely to be maintained, and improved. Instead such states will likely only be capable of imitating the true innovators. This leads to his fifth point about the arms transfer system: its structure.
For Krause, there are four tiers of actors in any given military technological paradigm. First Tier
Producers are states that possess the requisite qualities to be true innovators. Second Tier
Producers are capable of producing arms and military technology at the technological frontier, but are unable to move that frontier forward on their own. Third Tier Producers are able to copy technologies through design transfer, yet unable to reproduce the underlying process. In other words, they might be able to reverse engineer a particular technology, but will have trouble
84 maintaining it, or replicating or changing it. Third tier producers imitate the technological frontier without truly understanding it. Lastly, Consumers obtain only the tools of war, and are capable of using them, but not producing them.189 Such a framework for understanding the structure of diffusion of military technology is quite useful, and can be applied to the diffusion of petroleum based technology among the great power navies at the turn of the 20th century.
In their 1991 article in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Karen Rasler and William Thompson investigate the relationships between technological innovation, capability positional shifts, and systemic warfare. This article differs from much of the other literature on diffusion of military technology in that the authors attempt to draw direct connections between the diffusion of military (particularly naval) technology and the likelihood of great power warfare. Their work emphasizes the various developmental trajectories of states, as either ascending powers or powers experiencing relative decline. For the authors, state goals and strategies will likely be impacted by their position along such a trajectory. Also, states that fall into different positions along the ascending/declining trajectory are likely to have directly conflicting interests.190 In particular, they see the mid-way point between naval capability concentration and non- concentration as periods that are likely to experience great power war.191 Ultimately, attempts to predict the likelihood of systemic war based upon systemic leadership and relative capabilities go well beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, several aspects of Rasler and
189 Krause, Keith. "The Political Economy of the International Arms Transfer System: The Diffusion of Military Technique Via Arms Transfers." International Journal 45, no. 3, Israel & the Arabs since the Intifadah (Summer 1990), pg. 691-696 190 Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson. "Technological Innovation, Capability Positional Shifts, and Systemic War." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 3 (September 1991), pg. 412 191 Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson. "Technological Innovation, Capability Positional Shifts, and Systemic War." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 3 (September 1991), pg. 415
85 Thompson’s work are relevant to understanding energy transitions as diffusions of energy technology. First, there is the distinction they make between land powers and maritime powers.
The development of oil-based technology for the projection of power is something that takes place primarily within great power navies; thus understanding the perspectives of naval powers is important.
“The sea-land power dichotomy assumption is important because some of the processes in which we are interested work differently for different types of powers. Given their different strategic perspectives, it sometimes seems as if they are operating in two separate worlds. The classical continental powers operated almost exclusively in their immediate regions. The sea powers have been focused predominately on the global political economy. Occasionally, maritime powers have been forced, if for no other reason than to protect their home base, to intervene in continental affairs. Otherwise, only the hybrid powers have sought to operate in both regional and transoceanic worlds simultaneously, even if not always on a continuous basis.
Accordingly, the concentration/deconcentration [sic] of global reach capability is more applicable to the transoceanic world of political economy than it is to the realm of regionally bound territorial concerns. On the European continent, it is the rise and fall of the large land/hybrid powers (Spain, France, and Germany) that is important to an assessment of the regional distribution of power.”
With such a distinction in mind, only the naval powers, (including ‘hybrid-type’ powers such as
Germany) are relevant for understanding the diffusion of oil-based technology as it was applied in the time period under consideration (1900-1918). Also, Rasler and Thompson assume that technological diffusion is inevitable.192 This inevitability, however, is interfered with by other factors leading to diminished innovation over time. This interference allows for less-powerful states to catch up with the leading innovators.
Rasler and Thompson offer several explanations for diminished innovation including complacency among leadership, institutional rigidities, and increased social wealth, leading to
192 Ibid, pg. 420
86 increased expense for innovation.193 For the authors, these factors slow leader innovation, and result in relative decline. Like many of the authors that follow in this discussion, Rasler and
Thompson see various social factors as playing an important role in the success/failure of military innovations.
Jonathan Shimshoni takes aim at the popular offense/defense approach to analyzing the WWI period. This approach traditionally argues that the policymakers of the time failed to recognize that technological developments (such as machine guns, razor wire, railroads etc.) had created an insurmountable advantage for the defender in military conflicts. Shimshoni artfully deconstructs this perspective and demonstrates several of its major flaws. First, he critiques the assertion that offense and defense can be neatly separated. Shimshoni argues that both offense and defense are necessary within military operations as important parts of a state’s grand strategy. He is also critical of the notion that one could deduce the existence of an offensive/defensive advantage a priori based upon the qualitative differences in military technology (with the possible exception of nuclear weaponry).194 The central thesis of his article is that the great powers failed to create an offensive advantage for themselves based upon the technology available to them. He argues that advantages do not stem directly from technology, but instead are created by “entrepreneurs” through how they use technology.195 His analysis of the French, British, and German militaries activities throughout the war demonstrate this failure. He argues that the British and French
193 Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson. "Technological Innovation, Capability Positional Shifts, and Systemic War." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 3 (September 1991), pg. 420 194 Shimshoni, Jonathan. "Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship." International Security 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990-1991), pg. 190-191 195 Ibid, pg. 213
87 failed to adapt/adopt new technologies, while the Germans acted in the most entrepreneurial fashion of the three militaries.
Shimshoni describes the French preparations for the coming war as completely failing to engineer the battlefield to their advantage. This is best exemplified by their stubborn adherence to the traditional red trousers of the French military. Also, and more importantly, the French possessed the largest industrial capacity for motor-car construction, yet failed to utilize this capacity.196 As for the British, he argues that they failed to adopt several forms of military technology, despite their knowledge of their effectiveness, namely the machine gun and the submarine.197 While it is difficult to explain British reticence regarding the machine gun,
Shimshoni fails to mention the moral and maritime law issues that affected several states’ willingness to employ submarines in warfare. As for the Germans, Shimshoni credits them as being the most entrepreneurial of the great powers in terms of their preparations for the war. He notes that the Germans innovated in several ways, namely through their heavy use of reserves, incorporation of heavy artillery and machine guns, and also through their attempts to work around several problems related to offensive maneuvers.198 Remarkably, he fails to mention the
German innovation of offensive U-boat warfare. Shimshoni is also highly critical of all the major powers in what he sees as their failure to appropriately incorporate tanks and motor-cars into their land offensives and doctrine.
“However, all the major actors failed to foresee or apply the opportunities for massive capitalization of the intended land offensives. The knowledge and basic technology to produce tanks or armored cars was surely available to all by 1912. But the British only introduced them in 1916, and only after the original development was pushed, oddly
196 Shimshoni, Jonathan. "Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship." International Security 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990-1991), pg. 208-209 197 Ibid, pg. 209-210 198 Ibid, pg. 211
88 enough, by the Admiralty, while the Germans refused to introduce tanks until the bitter end. Similarly, all failed to foresee the potential of motorization for logistics and troop transport in the coming war, despite the well-developed European motorcar industries at the time.”199
In his conclusion, Shimshoni attributes the failure to act in an entrepreneurial fashion to organizational factors on the part of the respective great power armies. He cites the propensity for armies to adhere to doctrines that were successful in the past, as well as their general desire for the reduction of uncertainty, and the goal of going to war on their own terms. These factors led armies to choose certain doctrinal options, often at the expense of innovation.200
Chris Demchak provides an interesting analysis of the impact of modernization on states and their militaries. She argues that advanced technology complicates civilian control and understanding of military systems, procedures, and war-fighting capabilities and needs. While modernization is conceptually distinct from military innovation, and is likely often best described as emulation, her work on modernization remains directly related to the concept of technological diffusion. Demchak focuses on the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe and highlights the negative impact of their acquisition of modern complex military arms systems.
Her primary argument is that these complex systems are likely to strain the capability of newly created democratic institutions to oversee and control them.201 While it is true that the former
Warsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe have imported democratic institutional structures along the lines of their Western European neighbors, she notes that such institutional mimicry is not enough to ensure effective civilian control over such weapons systems. For Demchak, there are
199 Ibid, pg. 211-212 200 Shimshoni, Jonathan. "Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship." International Security 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990-1991), pg. 214-215 201 Demchak, Chris C. "Modernizing Military Organizations and Political Control in Central Europe." Journal of Public Policy 15, no. 2 (May - Aug 1995), pg. 113
89 deeper cultural properties, such as transparency and governmental openness that are critical to civilian/democratic control over military budgets, doctrine, and decision-making. These qualities are not necessarily prevalent in the Eastern European nations. Also, the organizational propensities of military organizations, it is argued, will likely push them to seek control over the new weapons system, independent of civilian interference.202
Interestingly, Demchak argues that such modern, complex, and esoteric military equipment is likely to directly alter the preferred doctrine among the militaries that obtain them. This argument claims that, at least in part, the military doctrines of Eastern European states will to some extent be determined by the military equipment they seek to obtain. She describes two ways in which this is likely to happen. First, the expense of such systems, and heavy reliance on such systems for security, mean that these militaries will likely alter their military doctrine in such a way that ensures the survival and viability of the new systems.203 Secondly, she argues that modern complex systems are likely to induce early mobilization on the part of these militaries, due to their need to ensure appropriate functionality and also to reduce risk to those systems.204 Thus, Demchak, unlike other authors, sees doctrinal change as likely to stem directly from technological diffusion, at least in the case of the modernizing militaries of the former
Warsaw Pact.
Deborah Avant offers a perspective on military innovation that attributes more weight than other authors to the domestic civilian state structure, taking aim at the civil-military relations model
202 Demchak, Chris C. "Modernizing Military Organizations and Political Control in Central Europe." Journal of Public Policy 15, no. 2 (May - Aug 1995), pg. 128 203 Ibid, 128-129 204 Ibid, pg. 140
90 articulated by Barry Posen. For Avant, several cases contradict the notions put forward by
Posen, namely the failure of the U.S. military to create an effective counter-insurgency warfare in Vietnam and the successful adaptation of the British Army to the conditions on the ground in the Boer War, despite the unpreparedness of the British home government.205
Avant argues that the structure of the civilian governing bodies will have an impact on their ability to impose ideas or action on military organizations; in particular, she argues that authoritative divisions among those bodies will have a negative impact on any such attempts.206
She also argues that military organizations do not possess the same goals based solely on the fact that they are military organizations, and demonstrates that the U.S. military possesses qualities that allowed it to resist civilian intervention, namely its isolated professionalization, its organizational structure, and adherence to the “science of war.” These factors allowed the U.S. military to take advantage of the division of power between the President as Commander in
Chief and Congress, with its powers of the purse and oversight, to maintain a level of autonomy from civilian direction not found in Britain.207
In Britain, Avant contends, the unorganized structural quality of the British Military was a mechanism utilized by those in parliament, and the cabinet, to control the military and ensure civilian direction was followed. This, along with the centralized authority over military matters in the Cabinet (which also rewarded military men who followed civilian instruction) meant that the British military was less able than its American counterpart to resist the goals, changes, and
205 Avant, Deborah D. "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars." International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 (December 1993), pg. 412 206 Ibid, pg. 413 207 Ibid, pg. 415-416
91 innovations sought by Britain’s civilian leadership.208 Avant ultimately sees domestic governing institutions as filters through which international systemic developments impact military doctrine. Changes and issues become more or less relevant based upon civilian leadership and its interpretation of those developments. These in turn are impacted by the short-term political goals of those leaders. Their need for re-election shapes their reactions to those developments along with the policy changes that are viewed as necessary in light of those developments.
In these ways civilian institutional structure directly impacts the prospect for military change and innovation.209 To this point, the factors that are claimed to directly impact capacity for military change and innovation have been traditional balance of power arguments, such as external threats or competing powers, or organizational arguments related to the structural qualities of militaries or their domestic state structures. However, during the mid-1990s a third argument related to culture became increasingly prominent. Again, Stephen Rosen offers an important contribution to the discussion. In his article "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,"
Rosen describes the relationship between a society’s cultural properties and the structural qualities of its military. He argues that cultural factors can create divisive loyalties that create problems for militaries in terms of domestic order as well as impacting the available surplus capability for power projection.
More importantly, as military institutions are generally somewhat reflective of the society they serve, those divisions and fissures present in society are also likely to be found within military
208 Ibid, pg. 416-426 209 Avant, Deborah D. "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars." International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 (December 1993), pg. 427
92 organizations themselves. 210 Rosen counters the realist argument of military organizational and functional alignment by stating that military goals are not limited to survival, but instead are also concerned with defending a way of life, or culture.211 Posen utilizes the notion of ‘strategic culture’ to frame the way national decision makers perceive matters of war. He credits Jack
Snyder as having first used the term to describe the differences that became apparent between the
United States and the Soviet Union regarding the possibility of nuclear warfare.
Significantly, Rosen emphasizes the need for scholars to explain how, in using strategic culture as an explanatory variable, they are able to appropriately understand the ‘subjective preferences’ of the leaders and decision makers within any particular strategic culture. For Rosen, strategic culture ‘tries to explain the complex behavior of small groups of powerful individuals’. Yet he points out that there are methodological problems with utilizing culture, and argues that using the concept of social structures may be simpler and also more amenable to generalized explanations for state and military behavior. In short, “one can study and assess variations in social structure more reliably than one can study subjective beliefs,”212 and social structures, their presence or lack thereof, is an empirical matter that is easily observable. Rosen seems somewhat critical of utilizing culture on epistemological grounds, arguing that the role of subjective beliefs in determining ‘culture’ makes it difficult to demonstrate the role of culture in state and military policy.
“The political unit thus acquires characteristic strengths and weaknesses that are the result of its internal social structures. Differences in these strengths and weaknesses can become evident when compared with foreign societies with different social structures. In
210 Rosen, Stephen Peter. "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters." International Security 19, no. 4 (1995), pg. 5 211 Ibid, pg. 6 212 Rosen, Stephen Peter. "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters." International Security 19, no. 4 (1995), pg. 23-25
93 short, the dominant social structures of a group of people might lead to characteristic strengths and vulnerabilities of each society when making money or making war. Whether or not the dominant social structures vary or remain constant across cultural boundaries is an empirical question, not determined a priori or by definition.” 213
It seems that Rosen is arguing that social structural variability can, in effect, substitute for cultural differences, encompassing cultural variability without addressing the epistemological and methodological difficulty of defining culture itself or the subjective qualities of beliefs.
With that in mind, Rosen offers several explicit claims about how social structure can impact the military power of the state.
First, he notes that social structures determine how individuals in societies treat one another.
Second, various military structures will reflect the societal qualities of their nations differently.
Here he cites the differences between, say, a mass conscription army and a small, professionalized navy or air force. The former is much more likely to bring with it the various cleavages and fissures present within society at large. Third, “the social structure of the political unit can affect its ability to generate military power.”214 This can happen both if within a military there exists the same cleavages and fissures and also if the military has managed to isolate itself from them.215 Rosen concludes by suggesting that comparative case studies that control for cultural and socio-organizational qualities could provide some insight into how social structure, organizational structure, and strategic behavior interact.
Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason also provide several important contributions to the literature on the diffusion of military technology and military innovation. They point out that
213 Ibid, pg. 23-25 214 Rosen, Stephen Peter. "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters." International Security 19, no. 4 (1995), pg. 27 215Ibid, pg. 29-30
94 emulation by military organizations is not as frequent or certain as much international relations theory would suggest. Such developments are shaped by local conditions.216 Goldman and
Eliason emphasize the dual aspects of technological innovation describing the ‘hardware’ and
‘software’ components of new technological capability. They argues that how different societies utilize various hardware is filtered through existing socio-cultural beliefs, norms, and institutionalized practices. This process can impact the likelihood of technological adoption, adaptation, emulation, or offsetting responses by state militaries.217 It is also noted that a distinction is necessary between causes of diffusion and the mechanisms by which diffusion occurs.
Understanding transmission paths is seen as a way to better understand motives of state and non- state actors, as well as to either encourage or discourage certain technological diffusions218, and this has obvious implications in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, as well as intellectual property rights and cyber-security. More directly relevant to this work is their treatment of several other authors’ work related to diffusion, in which they coalesce varying terminology used by the authors into an overall typology.
“The typologies advanced by DiMaggio and Powell, Bennett, and Ikenberry to identify the causal mechanisms driving diffusion are similar. Bennett’s emulation resembles DiMaggio and Powell’s mimetic processes and Ikenberry’s policy bandwagoning. Elite networking and harmonization resemble normative pressures and social learning; penetration is similar to coercive pressures and external inducement. All concur that competition, socialization, and coercion are three social mechanisms that help spread new policy practices across societal boundaries.” [Emphasis Added]219
216 Emily O. Goldman, Leslie C. Eliason, Ed. The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003, pg. 8 217 Ibid, pg. 8-9 218 Emily O. Goldman, Leslie C. Eliason, Ed. The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003, pg.14-15 219 Ibid, pg. 18
95 Beyond the causes of innovation, Goldman and Eliason highlight the various forms taken by diffusion mechanisms. The concept of hierarchical diffusion, where innovations emanate from the most advanced nations to the periphery is described as the conventional wisdom.
Hierarchical diffusion differs from spatial diffusion, occurring between states that are geographic neighbors, and from diffusion stemming from “cultural proximity”, whereby states that share language or religious beliefs. Thus these shared traits, or shared borders, can serve as conduits for the diffusion of ideas and technology. The authors point out that these are empirical questions that would allow scholars to test theories about technological diffusion.220 It would seem prudent here to add that one mode of transmission not mentioned by Goldman and Eliason could be described as political/security proximity. Allies are likely to share technological developments with those states that they have agreed to cooperate with in national defense and security matters. This would likely overlap with both geographical proximity and cultural proximity variables.
Goldman and Eliason are critical of assumptions in international relations theory related to the efficiency and consistency of technological diffusion. They suggest that a middle ground of conditional and contingent lesson drawing exists between the extremes of cultural and social obstacles on the one hand, and technological determinism on the other hand. They are emphatic that finding that middle ground and understanding the process by which states respond to emerging technological developments requires the utilization of the comparative case study approach:
“The analytical approach informing this volume is the comparative case study method. Case studies are used inductively to develop and refine typological theory though a “building block” approach. This approach is particularly useful in new or emerging
220 Ibid, pg. 18-19
96 research programs to generate theory. The authors in this volume employ methods of within-case analysis, particularly process tracing, in order to trace the causal pathways for diffusion… [This] allow[s] us to trace the impact of a variety of factors (cultural, economic, political, organizational, and technological) affecting how innovations are assimilated, and their consequences for strategic behavior.”221
Goldman and Eliason offer important contributions to the literature on technological diffusion and innovation. Their emphasis on methods is highly relevant, and has directly impacted the methodological approach taken in this dissertation. Their articulation of the typology of causes of innovation (competition, socialization, coercion) serves as a useful starting point for discussing possible causes of energy transitions, and their description of the various diffusion mechanisms provide direction for the research into the diffusion of oil-based technology in the
U.S. and British Navies.
In his article in the Journal of Strategic Studies, Geoffrey Herrera describes the impact of railroad and rifle technology on military doctrine and the rise of Germany. Herrera demonstrates that the possession of these technologies alone was not enough for a fighting force to make effective use of them on the battlefield. An information revolution related to how these technologies were most effectively employed was necessary, and this process was not uniformly imitated across militaries in Europe at the time. Herrera begins by stating that rifles and railroads themselves were not so revolutionary until combined with industrialized steam power and mass-producing technologies of the industrial revolution, including steel for the railroads.222
221 Emily O. Goldman, Leslie C. Eliason, Ed. The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003, pg.22-23 222 Herrera, Geoffrey L. "Inventing the Railroad and Rifle Revolution: Information, Military Innovation and the Rise of Germany." The Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 2 (2004), pg. 246
97 The argument presented here is one of “hardware” and “software”, similar to that discussed earlier by Goldman and Eliason. The rifle directly altered military doctrine and tactics through its ability to spread firepower over a wider distance, reducing the need for tight soldier formation, and creating quicker, more powerful army units.223 Conceptual and organizational adaptation was necessary for appropriate and effective utilization of the rifle. The same applies to military utilization of railroads. This process was more complex for railroads. Herrera points out that at the time railroads were the most expensive capital projects in society, and that they were not built with military goals, strategy, and tactics in mind. Instead, the posture and placement of a nation’s railway system was determined largely by market forces.224 Herrera provides an interesting contribution in noting the three major organizational changes brought about by these technological developments: 1) the officer class needed to become more capable bureaucrats and engineers (instead of brave warriors); 2) military planning had to become more extensive and technical; and 3) military activities and civilian activities needed to be better coordinated, even in peacetime.225
It seems that these three organizational responses are more directly related to the development of rail and the growing size and complexity of militaries in the post-Napoleonic period than the development of the rifle, yet Herrera is certainly correct that both the rifle and the railway were technological developments that forced militaries to alter their basic organizational principles.
However, his description of the impact of these technologies on the dimensions of warfare is more interesting, and relevant, to this research.
223 Ibid, pg. 248 224 Ibid, pg. 249 225 Ibid, pg. 251-252
98 “The railroad transformed the capabilities of armies along three dimensions: force, time and space. Railroads enabled armies to increase in size and accordingly in power. Transporting soldiers in rail cars, by carrying more men in a shorter period of time, increased the feasible size of armies. More troops could be brought to a potential battlefield in less time; battles could be fought with larger and larger armies. Larger armies of course meant that battles were more destructive and carried out over larger expanses of space.”226
This alteration of the dimensions of warfare stems from steam-powered technology and is equally applicable to naval power as it is to the utilization of railroads on land. Herrera fails to mention the role of energy itself and the emergence of a new energy technology; instead his discussion of steam is lumped in with the overall industrial revolution that takes place at the time. While he misses the obvious energy transition at work in the development of railway transportation, he does demonstrate its ability to dramatically alter the nature and dimensions of warfare, something demonstrated again by a different energy transition in the First World War.
If one were searching for a useful summation of the theoretical perceptions on diffusion of military technology, one would find it in Emily Goldman’s 2006 article, Cultural Foundations of
Military Diffusion. Goldman provides a concise overview of competing theories on military diffusion including Neorealism, Neo-Institutionalism, Domestic Politics (I & II), Spatial
Diffusion, and Culture (I & II). Goldman identifies three aspects of each of these theories, namely what they perceive to be the a) drivers of policy change; b) causal chain or mechanisms; and c) predictions about the nature of diffusion.
Goldman’s emphasis is on demonstrating the role culture can play in determining the likelihood of innovation. She is critical of attempts to measure and compare culture per se, citing
226 Herrera, Geoffrey L. "Inventing the Railroad and Rifle Revolution: Information, Military Innovation and the Rise of Germany." The Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 2 (2004), pg. 245
99 methodological problems in finding a ‘cultural match’, as well as the problem of variable cultural resonance.227 Instead she builds on the work of Goldstone, whose work was not focused on comparing cultural content, but instead on establishing whether or not states enforced certain cultural norms and practices. In other words, to what degree was there an enforced cultural orthodoxy?
For Goldman, “When elites enforce an ideological orthodoxy in order to restore or consolidate existing traditions, diffusion will be partial at best. Broad, deep diffusion occurs only after official orthodoxies are overturned, paving the way for greater tolerance of new ideas and practices.”228 Goldman contrasts the examples of Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan, with the former only slowly and painfully adopting innovative military technology and doctrines and the latter demonstrating a more enthusiastic adoption of Western practices, with dramatically different outcomes. Goldman demonstrates that cultural factors can both interfere and augment the diffusion of technology and related organizational principles and doctrines. Any case studies or research programs intent on contributing to the body of work on the diffusion of military technology must account for the possible impact of cultural variables.
William Thompson provides a deep historical look at the evolution of military organizations, tracing the various military revolutions that have been pivotal to the development of what is described as the “western” military style. Building off of the work of John A. Lynn, Thompson highlights the relationship between military technology and military organizational type, extending his analysis further back in history, describing Lynn’s approach as unnecessarily
227 Goldman, Emily O. "Cultural Foundations of Military Diffusion." British International Studies Association 32 (2006), pg. 74 228 Ibid, pg. 75
100 limiting.229 Thompson seeks to examine the relationship between the co-development of revolutionary military technology and state organizations. He notes that in some instances technological developments precede corresponding organizational changes, and yet in others, revolutionary military technology can only be produced by modern state organizations.
Thompson derives six important variables that can impact the co-evolution and diffusion of technology and state organizations, including war, military technology, threat environment, political and military organizations, and political-economic milieu.230 Regarding culture,
Thompson would argue that it is an attribute of political and military organizations, and that if it is not, it is often used as a ‘convenient explanation for behavior that seems different from what might otherwise be expected.’231 Unlike other authors discussed above, Thompson would not describe culture as an independent variable impacting a state’s adoption, or rejection, of a particular military technology or doctrine.
While Thompson’s work on the long term co-evolution of state organizations and military technological revolutions is particularly broad, and seeks to create an all-inclusive theory of the relationship between military technology and military organizations, other research is more narrowly tailored to investigate the nature of technological diffusion. Etel Solingen’s recent article in International Studies Quarterly seeks to understand the domestic, regional, and international factors that impact technological diffusion. Solingen seeks to create a common discourse on diffusion through the introduction of a shared vocabulary of relevant concepts
229 Thompson, William R. "A Test of a Theory of Co-Evolution in War: Lengthening the Western Eurasian Military Trajectory." The International History Review 28, no. 3 (September 2006), pg. 473-474 230 Thompson, William R. "A Test of a Theory of Co-Evolution in War: Lengthening the Western Eurasian Military Trajectory." The International History Review 28, no. 3 (September 2006), pg. 480 231 Ibid, pg. 480, see footnote 1
101 important to the diffusion process. These include stimulus, medium, social agents, and, outcomes of diffusion. Solingen describes a useful, and parsimonious, definition of diffusion
(borrowed from David Strang), and elaborates on the terminology relevant to diffusion:
“A useful starting point in the effort to conceptualize international diffusion is Strang’s parsimonious definition of diffusion as any process in which prior adoption of a trait or practice alters the probability of adoption for remaining nonadopters. A more complete conceptualization of the policies of transnational diffusion, however, requires identification and characterization of four main ingredients that help transcend purely structural or purely agent-based formulations of this process:
1. An initial stimulus, trigger, even model, archetype, or innovation. 2. A medium, context, structure, milieu, or environment through which information about the initial event may or may not travel to given destination. 3. Social agents affected by the positive or negative externalities of the initial stimulus, who aid or block the stimulus, who aid or block the stimulus’ journey to other destinations. 4. Outcomes that enable adequate discrimination among different degrees of diffusion and resulting equilibria.” 232
This set of terms provides a useful starting point for understanding the variables that impact the process of diffusion. Any attempt to process trace the diffusion of a given concept, policy, technology, or doctrine must assess these factors. Using this terminology will allow for better cross-disciplinary discussion and debate of the diffusion process and will make research in any given field more accessible to those from other fields.
Solingen also describes the importance on non-diffusion. If one hopes to explain how and why a particular instance of diffusion has occurred, one must also be able to explain how and why a particular concept, policy, technology, or doctrine did not diffuse. While she points out the methodological difficulties and counter-factual qualities of studying non-diffusion, she nonetheless emphasizes its importance. The term firewall plays an important role in this
232 Solingen, Etel. "Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and Global Politics of International Diffusion." International Studies Quarterly 56 (2012), pg. 632
102 discussion. While Solingen does not provide a definition of the term, it is presumably some factor (political, social, organizational, cultural etc.) that hinders the diffusion of a given idea, technology, or policy. Examples of firewalls described by Solingen include institutions such as the G20,233 which acted as a firewall against the spread of economic recession among member states, natural resource endowments234 which acted as a firewall restricting the spread of ‘Arab
Spring’ style protests among GCC states, as well as literal electronic network firewalls which selectively prevent the spread of information via the internet (examples include Iranian firewalls as well as the ‘great firewall’ of China). Regarding firewalls, Solingen is worth quoting at length:
“Crucial in this regard are auxiliary concepts such as firewall, so central to a world of strategic interaction and political resistance. Political agents with imperfect readings of the medium’s possibilities cannot always assess the robustness of firewalls accurately, influencing the incidence of free-riding and increasing uncertainty and unpredictability. Yet proper estimation of the strength of firewalls is crucial for our ability to gauge a medium’s relative immunity or vulnerability to diffusion. Weaker firewalls arguably amplify the original stimulus’ externalities for agents disposed to take action. Stronger firewalls typically dilute incentives to act, reinforcing a medium’s immunity against diffusion. Prior diffusion, via different degrees of sedimentation, can alter the nature and strength of firewalls, and hence the medium’s conductivity. Agents erecting or dismantling firewalls can change the odds of diffusion by learning from, improving, diversifying, and adapting causal mechanisms to their medium and to domestic levels of sedimentation.”235
In sum, Solingen provides several important contributions to the study of diffusion. The first is her list of common terminology that describes the basic variables involved: stimuli, medium, social agents, and outcome. To understand any form of diffusion, these basic facts related to that diffusion must be clearly articulated. Second, non-diffusion is just as important as diffusion, and although it presents certain methodological difficulties, efforts to improve our understanding of
233 Ibid, pg. 624 234 Ibid, pg. 633 235 Solingen, Etel. "Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and Global Politics of International Diffusion." International Studies Quarterly 56 (2012), pg. 641
103 what does not diffuse should be made. Understanding firewalls is also important in this regard, as are the factors that hinder/allow diffusion to take place. She also emphasizes the ‘coalitional analysis of regional orders’ and suggests that studying diffusion requires an integration of domestic, regional and global considerations, highlighting the need for multiple levels of analysis in studying such phenomena.
Conclusions
Several important themes emerge from this discussion of military organizations and technological diffusion. First, there are the three basic steps to technological diffusion, namely, the conception of change or innovation, discussion of the proposed change by the relevant parties, and ultimate adoption or implementation of the innovation. Process tracing these three steps should provide a rough picture of the nature of any given technological diffusion among great power militaries. Situating this information within its socio-political and historical context should help to explain why and how this diffusion occurs. Rosen’s definition of a major innovation as one that fundamentally changes the relationship of a military branch towards other branches helps to distinguish smaller tactical or operational innovations from major technological innovations. Rosen also points to an important distinction between types of innovation, namely between peacetime and wartime innovations. The time period under examination (1900-1918) allows for a comparison of how states differentially treated the diffusion of oil-based technology both prior to and during the First World War.
Krause provides a useful framework for understanding the structure of diffusion networks based upon production capabilities of the actors, divided into first, second, and third tier producers, as
104 well as basic consumers of that technology. Rasler and Thompson indicate a need to distinguish between land, maritime, and hybrid powers, supplying a justification for a narrow emphasis on those powers possessing the requisite naval capability. Shimshoni and Demchak represent different perspectives on whether technology can directly alter military doctrine.
Thus, process tracing the diffusion of oil-based technology and the subsequent doctrinal changes
(or lack thereof) will help to illuminate possible answers to that question. All of the authors discussed here argue that both domestic organizational and structural international variables will impact the nature of technological diffusion. Examining the U.S. and British (two states with similar domestic organizational structures) cases may partially control for organizational structure, offering insight into which variables are most important.
Goldman and Eliason demonstrate that diffusion of military technology and military innovation is not as straightforward and efficient as many realists would argue. Thus, their work indicates that other factors must impact diffusion. They describe the role of both hardware and software components, and like Shimshoni, emphasize that what is important is not just the spread of technology, but its particular use by humans. This argument opens the door for some discussion of cultural impact on the diffusion process. Goldman’s discussion of the Ottomans and Meiji
Japan demonstrates clearly that cultural properties can be either a hindrance or a facilitator of diffusion. Solingen provides four useful properties of the diffusion process as well as useful terminology that can ease the process of cross-disciplinary discussion and debate in the form of stimuli, medium, social agents, and outcomes. She also indicates that non-diffusion is just as
105 significant as diffusion itself, noting that understanding firewalls is necessary for studying the diffusion process.
This research fits uniquely within the body of research on modern military organizations. It draws directly on Rosen’s conception of major innovations, as oil-technology embodied in more powerful battleships and destroyers, submarines, and aircraft fundamentally changed the relationship between the existing military branches. Moreover it assesses the distinctions in these cases between peacetime and wartime innovations.
By highlighting problems with supply and infrastructure, as well as rejections of new technology such as the British rejection of the earliest aircraft, the case studies also corroborate the findings of Goldman and Eliason that technological diffusion is neither straightforward nor efficient. The research also confirms the work of Goldman and Eliason, as well as the work of Shomshoni, by demonstrating that “software” components are equally as significant as “hardware” components as regards new technology. This is demonstrated by the different ways in which the Allies and
Germany utilized the submarine. All major naval powers had submarines, but it was the
Germans who used them most effectively.
Importantly, this research is driven by the role of domestic level variables in shaping and steering energy transitions. This is demonstrated by several instances, including British efforts to create a large British owned oil monopoly, American breakup of the Standard Oil monopoly, British naval emphasis on certain tactical qualities (namely speed), and German decisions related to tactical use of the submarine. Further understanding of differences between state reactions to
106 energy transitions can be accomplished through extending the approach used here to several other cases within this energy transition, namely Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and Russia.
The literature related to organization theory and the diffusion of military technology and military innovation is central to studying energy transitions. These transitions, at their core, represent instances of international diffusion of oil-based technology utilized for military purposes. This literature provides useful concepts, frameworks, and terminology around which the author will construct his case studies of energy transitions within great power navies.
107 4 The American Navy’s Transition from Coal to Oil: 1904-1918
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the process of the U.S. Navy’s transition from coal to oil in fueling their ships. This energy transition provided a new wave of technological development that continued the trajectory of innovation begun by the Industrial Revolution. Generating motive power by harnessing energy stores present in fossil fuels such as coal, as happened through the development of the steam engine, is often seen as the beginning of the modern industrial age. This notion of a ‘revolution’ is misleading, however, and fails to encompass the gradual, incremental, and evolutionary process of industrialization.236 These qualities are often present in energy transitions, and such transitions generally take place over a generation or more.
The process of replacing an older energy system with a newer one is both slow and experimental.
In this case study, the focus is much more narrow than a society-wide examination of an energy transition might otherwise be. The aim is to understand how military organizations adapt to an energy transition. How did the emergence of a new, improved source of motive power affect the
U.S. Navy? Did the organization resist such change? Did the Navy embrace the new technologies? Was the Navy responding to developments from civil society and the private sector or was it developing new energy technologies on its own? What degree of cooperation existed between the Navy and the private companies working on the technologies under examination? Were there disagreements within various parts of the Navy over the new source of energy or was there a general consensus? How did this energy transition impact the manner in which the Navy operated?
236 Smil, Vaclav. Energy in World History. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pg. 192-193
108 As discussed in the previous chapter, at the core of the idea of an energy transition is the diffusion of energy related technology. As the requisite technology emerged for fueling engines with liquid petroleum, including its refined products such as gasoline, and as increasing amounts of working knowledge relevant to such machines spread to interested parties, the organizations most heavily involved in engineering became increasingly engaged in the subject. In this instance, those organizations were primarily great power navies. The earlier developments of steam-powered marine vessels had prompted navies to appropriate and invest large sums of money for building steam powered fleets. These early steam fleets presented new abilities to the
Navies that possessed them, while also demonstrating new weaknesses. The need for fuel actually reduced the radius of action in comparison to ships powered by sail and also meant that secure line of communications needed to be maintained.237 Yet, despite these difficulties the benefits to steam power were evident, and by 1869 the British had built their first sail-less warship, the Devastation.238
For the American Navy, the first major transitional experience involved the building of what are known as the ABCD ships, so called for their names, the Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, and the
Dolphin. Contracts for the construction of these ships were awarded to John Roach of
Pennsylvania, who subsequently ran into numerous difficulties in the construction process including staggering cost overruns and other flaws that drew heavy criticism from all sectors.239
Completing the ships construction was a complicated effort best described as a public-private partnership including various steel interests, work by the U.S. Navy itself, and foreign
237 Brodie, Bernard. Sea Power in the Machine Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941, pg. 110-111 238 Ibid, pg. 111 239 Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America's Military-Industrial Complex. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1979, pg. 38-40
109 suppliers.240 This process led to several important developments. First, it led to a rather explicit self-examination on the part of the U.S. government, the goal of which was to determine the proper state-private relationships that would be needed to sustain the industrial capability to build modern machines of war.241 Second, an important part of this process was the building of some element of state autarky in construction of needed weapons, making the American capital an important center of modern industrial manufacturing.242 By 1889 the ABCD ships were operating adequately, and the Dolphin had completed a 58,000-mile world cruise without any major problems.243
The American victory in the Spanish American War provided further impetus for improvement of the American Navy. Increased territorial holdings obtained from the Spanish gave the
American Navy increased purpose and importance. The Roosevelt administration pushed hard for increased naval construction, as well as for an overhaul of the Naval bureaucracy.244 In these efforts Roosevelt was largely successful. From 1901 to 1905 President Roosevelt was able to obtain Congressional authorization for ‘ten first class battleships, four armored cruisers, and seventeen other vessels of different classes.’ 245 While Roosevelt’s attempts to reorganize the
Naval bureaucracy are seen as less successful246, his reorganization and augmentation of the U.S.
240 Ibid, pg. 40-41 241 Ibid, pg. 41 This came in the form of the Gun Foundry Board, or Simpson Board, established in the 1883 naval appropriation bill, it was a joint army-navy committee charged with assessing the most desirable arrangements for industrial military production. This subject is central to this work and will be addressed again in later chapters. 242 Ibid, pg. 77 243 Miller, Nathan. The U.S. Navy: A History. 3rd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, pg. 150-151 244 Sprout, Harold and Margret. The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, pg. 261-276 245 Ibid, pg. 263 246 Ibid, pg. 276
110 Navy fleet remains his ultimate Presidential legacy. His reorganization of the American fleet into two oceanic fighting forces demonstrated an understanding of what naval warfare was, a contest between big gun ships. For Roosevelt, battleships were made to fight and destroy other battleships, not to provide a static defense of coastal harbors and towns.247 The cacophony of naval construction in the Roosevelt era represents the epitome of coal power in naval and marine terms. The nature of coal as a fuel is limited by its physical form, size and weight. The first
American appropriation for investigating the use of petroleum to power naval vessels came in the wake of the Spanish American War.248 Under Roosevelt, the experiments on liquid fuel oil to power marine vessels for naval purposes continued.249
The time period that follows the Roosevelt Administration witnessed a massive outburst of military technology, and naval ship construction. This naval arms race is coincident with the emergence and substantial improvement of the utilization of petroleum products for motive power. In 1899 the US oil demand stood at 12 million barrels per year and twenty years later that demand had ballooned to 224 million barrels per year.250 Gerald Nash claims that the
‘magnitude of this shift was greatest in marine transportation. For the purpose of understanding an energy transition, and its impact on institutions, the great power navies during the first twenty years serve as excellent case studies. These organizations were already largely dependent upon coal, and were highly industrialized. They generally possessed intimate relationships with their respective state democratic institutions as well as private sector industrial entities, namely the
247 Ibid, pg. 283 248 Nash, Gerald D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968, pg. 9-10 249 DeNovo, John, A. “Petroleum and the United States Navy before World War I.” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review (1955): 41:4,641-642; 250 Nash, Gerald D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968, pg. 5
111 steel companies, shipbuilders, and coal and oil companies. As a new energy replaced previously dominant methods, these institutions were thrust into a new phase of uncertainty, intense competition, innovation, and war. As such, this transition is ripe for an intellectual exploration drawing upon comparative international political economic theory, institutional organizational theory, theories related to the diffusion of military technology, and theories of energy transitions.
The American Navy: 1902-1916
Before any application of the aforementioned theories, one must obtain the requisite data. What was the experience of the American Navy during this formative period in our modern world?
During this time some of the most significant and influential technological developments in our history were invented. The submarine, the aircraft, the automobile, wireless telegraphy, the tank etc. all had an impact on state militaries. Oil based technology, in the form of propulsion for navies in general, and submarines and aircraft more specifically, dramatically transformed warfare and sea power, while also creating airpower. It is also worth mentioning that electricity, as an energy carrier (not an energy source) played an important role during this time period.
However, the focus of this work is to understand energy source transitions.
The diffusion of petroleum-powered machines dramatically altered what militaries could do, how military branches interacted, as well as where and how they could travel, and project power. In the following case study, the author aims to trace the process by which the American Navy transitioned away from powering their machines with coal, replacing it with liquid petroleum products, including fuel oil and also diesel fuel and gasoline. Correspondingly, the focus of the case studies revolves around the development and diffusion of oil based technology related to
112 traditional ship propulsion (including small destroyers and large battleships) and also the revolutionary new machines made possible by oil technology, submarines, and aircraft.
The case study draws its evidence from the annual reports of the Navy Department, which are generally compiled by the Secretary of the Navy, and include commentary from the Secretary as well as the respective Bureau heads. While the form of the documents changed slightly over time with the coming and going of new Naval Secretaries under Roosevelt (there were five of them), the documents also reflect the longest tenure for a Naval Secretary in U.S. history (up to that time) in the form of Josephus Daniels (1913-1921). These documents are, in a word, extensive. They average around 900 pages and demonstrate the copious bureaucratic recordkeeping common during the period, for which this author is thankful.
The starting point for a concerted effort to examine the use of petroleum by the American Navy can be found in the year 1902. Naval Secretary William H. Moody describes attempts to utilize oil for naval purposes as having occurred for the ‘past forty years’.251 Secretary Moody elaborates briefly on the benefits that are understood to come from this technology, including reduced labor on board ship, increased steaming radius and he even notes the strategic location of recent American oil discoveries (presumably in California and Texas), namely that they are near tidewater. The clarity with which Moody expresses the pressing nature of understanding the military and political implications of liquid petroleum technology is astounding.
“The following are some of the more urgent problems in the solution of which the Navy should lead: (a) The best means of utilizing liquid fuel for naval and maritime purposes. The Naval power that can successfully install a liquid-fuel plant in a war ship will possess a great
251 The Navy Department, 'Annual Reports of the Navy Department', ed. by The Navy Department (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), pg. 27
113 military advantage. It is not at all improbable that the liquid-fuel problem will have a very important effect in determining which nation shall possess the carrying trade of the world.”252
In just a few sentences Moody encapsulates the crux of the issue that would come to dominate international affairs for the next century. The Navy, however, could not simply adopt such a new fuel, with an uncertain future supply, and one that had not been thoroughly tested. The
Navy had been prodding Congress to appropriate monies for such experiments and in the previous session of Congress had obtained a small amount ($20,000) to do just that.253 The
Bureau of Steam Engineering notes in its report that such a sum was only one-sixth of that estimated necessary by the navy to complete the experimental work. More importantly the
Bureau identifies that the technological breakthrough that was needed to make liquid petroleum the primary source of motive power for naval vessels had been realized, namely, the atomization of the oil with either steam or heated air prior to combustion.
“The numerous experiments that have been made by several naval powers during the past forty years in the attempt to use oil as a fuel show how important this question is regarded by military experts. It is now plain why success was not attained. There was too much effort exerted to burn oil in the same manner as coal. It is now realized that the oil should be atomized (it is impossible to completely gasify it) before ignition, and the calorimetric area are factors which must be considered. In fact, it is highly probable that it may be found advisable to design a special boiler for burning oil.” 254
Demonstrating the traditionally assumed military conservatism, the Navy created the Liquid Fuel
Board, operating under the Bureau of Steam Engineering, to oversee experiments designed to directly compare the relative efficiencies of burning coal versus burning oil.255 While some of the early findings of the liquid fuel board are discussed in the 1902 and 1903 reports, their full findings are first published in 1904. Yet despite the tests of the Liquid Fuel Board only having
252 Ibid, pg. 720 253 Ibid, pg. 717 254 Ibid, pg. 737 255 Ibid, pg. 27
114 barely begun, the recommendations of the bureau of steam engineering already described positively the potential of liquid petroleum fuel. The Bureau recommends that at least one-third of the torpedo boats and destroyers should be provided with a liquid fuel burning installations.256
Alternatively, there is still a demonstrative uncertainty about the ability of the fuel, which is shown by the bureau’s reluctance to state that liquid petroleum will propel full size armored cruisers or battleships in the near future.257
One of the more interesting aspects of the Naval report from 1902 is the issue of experimental engineering laboratories. Given the state of technological development, this is not surprising.
However, the explicit emphasis in the Navy’s call for such an experimental naval lab on technological innovation and experimentation belies the notion that militaries are slow to innovate or incorporate new technologies. The Bureau of Steam Engineering cites the example of the German experimental naval laboratory in Charlottenburg as proof of the benefits of such an installation.258 The language related to naval experimental research used in the report emphasizes the rapidity of technological change, the need to be on the cutting edge of that development, as well as the need to be able to anticipate future desirable technological changes.259 In the language of Keith Krause, the Navy wanted to be a first tier producer of military technology; in other words, a true innovator.260
256 Ibid, pg. 740-741 257 The Navy Department, 'Annual Reports of the Navy Department', ed. by The Navy Department (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), pg. 740-741 258 Ibid, pg. 715 259 Ibid, pg. 719 260 Krause, Keith. "The Political Economy of the International Arms Transfer System: The Diffusion of Military Technique Via Arms Transfers." International Journal 45, no. 3, Israel & the Arabs since the Intifadah (Summer 1990), pg. 691-696
115 The Board conducted comparative tests, burning both coal and oil in Hollenstein water tube boilers, measuring relative evaporative efficiencies of the respective fuels under forced and natural draft conditions. Admiral George Melvile directed the tests.261 The Board’s report begins by clearly stating the positive strategic advantages of using oil over coal. These include economy of space for carrying fuel, ease of refueling, speed in raising steam, capacity for extreme duty on the part of the boilers, smoke reduction under light duty, reduction of stack height necessary for exhaust, reduction in labor for firerooms, and lastly a higher maximum speed with the new fuel.262 The need for larger boilers, thus requiring a larger portion of total ship volume for oil-only boilers, is offset by the higher fuel efficiency, increased capacity and greater endurance of the boilers, referred to as the “lungs of the vessel”.263
The oil used for the experiments was provided by Standard Oil,264 which, along with other private commercial interests had over the previous year expended a large sum of money on similar tests related to oil burners and steam turbines for marine purposes.265 The data from those tests was shared with the Liquid Fuel Board.266 While the naval documents do not name
Standard Oil, the phrase “one of the leading oil centers of this country” seems very much to
261 U.S. Naval Liquid Fuel Board. "Report of the U.S. Liquid Fuel Board of Tests Conducted on the Hollenstein Water Tube Boiler, Showing the Relative Evaporative Efficiencies of Coal and Liquid Fuel under Forced and Natural Draft Conditions as Determined by an Extended Series of Tests Made under the Direction of Admiral George W. Melville." edited by The Navy Department, 512. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904. 262 Ibid, pg. 309 263 Ibid, pg. 319 264 Ibid, pg. 389 265 Nash, Gerald D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968, pg. 9-10 266 U.S. Naval Liquid Fuel Board. "Report of the U.S. Liquid Fuel Board of Tests Conducted on the Hollenstein Water Tube Boiler, Showing the Relative Evaporative Efficiencies of Coal and Liquid Fuel under Forced and Natural Draft Conditions as Determined by an Extended Series of Tests Made under the Direction of Admiral George W. Melville." edited by The Navy Department, 512. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904, pg. 385
116 imply it, and this would make sense in light of Standard’s already public participation in the naval board’s tests. The oil giant clearly had an interest in a naval decision to use oil to fuel the fleet and it was obviously willing to spend the needed money to demonstrate the capability of liquid oil fuel.
The Navy paid special thanks to two gentlemen, Dr. C.T. Deane, secretary of the California
Petroleum Miners’ Association, and Col. W.M. Bunker, Washington Representative of the San
Francisco Chamber of Commerce for the delivery of the needed oil for the naval tests.267 The availability of the needed oil for the naval tests in California was likely related to recently increased refinery capacity in that state, including the second biggest oil refinery in the United
States at the time, owned by Standard Oil.268 Thus in its attempt to explore the possibility of utilizing liquid petroleum the Navy found itself, to a degree, at the mercy of the private sector oil companies, who controlled production, refinery and delivery of the necessary product.269 This reliance on the capabilities of the private sector becomes a recurring theme in the Navy’s attempts to acquire the necessary materiel for construction and supply of its fleet in the years before the war.
It is that aspect of the economy of oil that the navy saw as potentially problematic. The board describes the “structural, transportation, and supply features which present the only serious difficulty to the adoption of the use of liquid fuel by the navies of the world.” The Navy’s chief
267 Ibid, pg. 390 268 "The Petroleum Industry of California in 1902." The American Gas Light Journal, 1903, pg.48. 269 U.S. Naval Liquid Fuel Board. "Report of the U.S. Liquid Fuel Board of Tests Conducted on the Hollenstein Water Tube Boiler, Showing the Relative Evaporative Efficiencies of Coal and Liquid Fuel under Forced and Natural Draft Conditions as Determined by an Extended Series of Tests Made under the Direction of Admiral George W. Melville." edited by The Navy Department, 512. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904, pg. 394-395
117 engineer, writing in 1902, described the complex nature of the problem, indicating that for military purposes “the oil requirements of naval vessels for service conditions might only be met by the Government establishing oil-fuel stations.” With the oil industry still in a relatively undeveloped stage, the largest obstacle seemed to be ensuring appropriate supply, delivery, and price.
Overall, the Board’s findings on the use of oil are positive, but cautious. There are some concerns related to the structure of naval vessels and the storage of oil fuel, while the fear of accidental combustion of the liquid oil also caused some discussion. However these problems are not dwelled upon, and technologically speaking are solved in a few short years after the publishing of this report. The Board stressed that the lack of adequate coal along the American
West coast was a strategic weakness of the United States, one that had become particularly pronounced in the wake of territorial concessions that resulted from the Spanish American
War.270 Correspondingly, it is argued that at least one naval vessel ‘cruising the Pacific’ should be fitted to burn oil exclusively, and that it be used for experimental purposes related to burning oil for marine propulsion. In support of this idea, the Board cited the British naval-boiler commission, noting that the British Admiralty has placed the services of several warships at that body’s disposal.271 In this, as well as the reference to the German experimental lab at
Charlottenburg, the US Navy seemed to have been imitating rival tactics for naval technological innovation.
270 U.S. Naval Liquid Fuel Board. "Report of the U.S. Liquid Fuel Board of Tests Conducted on the Hollenstein Water Tube Boiler, Showing the Relative Evaporative Efficiencies of Coal and Liquid Fuel under Forced and Natural Draft Conditions as Determined by an Extended Series of Tests Made under the Direction of Admiral George W. Melville." edited by The Navy Department, 512. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904, pg. 421-22 271 Ibid, pg. 423
118
The year of 1904 can be described as an important watershed moment for the oil industry. The realization by the United States Navy that oil, and not coal, would likely be the predominant fuel for naval ships in the future, becomes increasingly noticeable in naval documentation. On the one hand the U.S. Navy is clearly reacting to its surroundings, as it witnesses the use of oil by other navies, locomotive companies, and domestic power plants, and in a sense being pushed by socio-economic change toward the future use of oil to power its ships. Comparative investigative efforts by private shipping on long journeys had demonstrated the capability, economy, and efficiency of burning oil for marine purposes. 272
On the other hand, the Navy was actively pursuing experimental methods and machines that were pushing the bounds of what oil-based technology could do for them, as a warfighting organization. The realities of warfare are the lens through which the Navy viewed this new source of fuel for motive power. If the Navy intended to convert from coal to oil, it would need certain conditions to be met. Tests would need to be performed, appropriate understanding of the positive and negative aspects of the fuel, availability of supply, different methods of burning, storage and safety problems, and other factors all impacted the process by which the Navy transitioned from one fuel to the other. The Naval Fuel Board report of 1904, along with the
Annual Navy report of the same year, make clear that if the transition to oil was not certain, it was extremely likely. The early steps along this transition were small, and took the form of plans for installation of turbine and water tube boiler installations on the scout cruisers Intrepid and Alarm. Such plans followed naval investigation of the performance of turbine propulsion on
272 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904, pg. 16
119 three yachts, the Revolution, Lorena, and Tarantula, and also the passenger steamer, the
Turbina.273
Between 1902 and 1904, the U.S. Navy moved from experimenting with oil burning installations to preparing plans for oil burning scout cruisers and retrofitting other small ships.274 The
American navy had demonstrated a desire to innovate, and improve upon the technologies required to operate their ships. While the Americans had demonstrated great capability in the most recent war with Spain, the newfound responsibility for far-flung territories in the Pacific brought into sharp relief the limitations of the Navy, along with some of the difficulties it might face in maintaining American gains. Elsewhere in the Pacific, in 1904-1905, the world witnessed one of the earliest modern naval battles between the Russians and the Japanese. This war received much attention among navies, and demonstrated several important facets of naval warfare using modern ships.
Describing the nature of the lessons to be learned from the Russo-Japanese war, U.S. Naval secretary Charles J. Bonaparte had this to say:
“On other points professional opinion, at least, is practically unanimous. It is universally recognized by those qualified to speak that morale and gunnery being equal, victory will usually fall to the heavier battery; that torpedo craft and mines have a real, although a somewhat restricted, field of usefulness in naval warfare, and that superior speed is of value in a fleet, not merely because it enables the commander to force or avoid battle, but because it is a source of strength in actual conflict.
On yet other questions, however, we can not say that any such unanimity exists. The recent war has taught us little, if anything, about the utility of submarines. It has caused, or at least left, much difference of opinion as to the value of armored cruisers, and it has created a still more serious divergence of views respecting the best limit of size for the future battle ship. As a matter of fact, no battle ship of as much as 16,000 tons
273 Ibid, pg. 902 274 Ibid, pg. 902
120 displacement was used by either belligerent, and while, on the one hand, at least one great power has determined upon the construction of an 18,000-ton battle ship, and others are reported to have in contemplation vessels of from 20,000 to 22,000 tons, on the other, some authorities think these leviathans will prove less formidable and more vulnerable than battle ships of 16,000 tons, such as our contemplated South Carolina and Michigan.”275
This reaction seems to support what was conventional wisdom both before and after the 1905 conflict, that big battle ships were still the standard of great naval power, and that such ships are likely to get bigger, get faster, and wield bigger guns. This was one of the many lessons great power navies learned from the two major naval battles that effectively ended the war.
Correspondingly, the reaction to the role of sea power, and its immeasurable impact on the outcome of the war is captured in the comments of a “Russian captain of reputation” who articulates the relationships between sea power and armored battle squadrons:
“The definite result of the battle—that is to say, the command of the sea—can not be decided except by the battle between the two divisions of battle ships and armored cruisers. Battle ships and armored cruisers necessarily compose the real strength of every squadron. Before this war it was the fashion with us to laugh at these monsters of the sea, and to try to make believe that a few torpedo-boat flotillas and submarines were sufficient to sink them. I hope that we have now given up such delusions. I do not say that the torpedo boats and submarines could not succeed in destroying some battle ships, because if that were not so they would indeed be of little use, and it would be quite unnecessary to build any; but I repeat that light flotillas will never be able to contend with squadrons composed of armored ships, and that in a naval battle a decisive victory will never be obtained without a squadron of battle ships and armored cruisers.”276
Beyond the battleship, the new technology whose use during this war that was most impactful on naval practice was the torpedo, and the torpedo boat. While this weapon was not extensively used in the naval battles of the Russo-Japanese War, it was dramatically effective when it was used. On the first night of the war, February 8-9, 1904, the Japanese scored an important
275 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 1255. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905, pg. 19-20 276 Ibid, pg. 392
121 success, which, according to the U.S. Navy, “paralyzed the initiative of one sea power [Russia], giving the other the command of the sea.’ The report continues to say that, “These successes alone would more than justify the existence of a large fleet of torpedo vessels…”277 While the risks of manning a torpedo boat were evident, and their use generally limited to nighttime and weather induced stealth operations, it was certainly noted that such vessels can dramatically alter the balance of power at sea, primarily through impacting the state of mind, and willingness to operate of enemy sea captains. This lesson also increased the likelihood of continued expenditure on torpedo vessels as well as to support the experimental trials of submarines.
Although it is worth noting that no submarines participated in the war, the Bureau of Ordnance still called for continued development of American submarines despite the lack progress in their use.278 Between 1899 and 1904, the U.S. Navy had contracted with two companies, the J.P.
Holland Torpedo Boat Company and the Electric Boat Company, for the building of twelve submarine craft, 10 of which were built by Holland, and two by the Electric Boat Company.279
Beyond the U.S. Naval reaction and assessment of the technological implications of the Russo-
Japanese War, 1905 saw some early testing of gasoline engines on small vessels, with some success.280 The Navy at this time continued to increase utilization of oil fuel for power generation at its stations and hospitals, particularly along the west coast at locations such as Mare
Island.281 Such installations are often described by the Navy as experiencing increased fuel efficiency and reduction in cost, and this process became more rapid, and widespread over the next several years of reports. Despite these technological developments, the real center of
277 Ibid, pg. 393 278 Ibid, pg. 501 279 Ibid, pg. 690 280 Ibid, pg. 721 281 Ibid, pg. 1202
122 attention among navies at this point in time was the emergence of the Dreadnought class of battleships. These ships were often described as all-big-gun ships. The HMS Dreadnought was the first of this type to be laid down, although The American version of this type of ship, the
South Carolina class, was also designed in 1905. Due to American construction delays, the
British finished building their version first.282 Opinion on the utility of such large ships was divided in the U.S. with Admiral Dewey and President Roosevelt supportive of the new designs, while the legendary Alfred Mahan and some Congressional supporters remained skeptical of both the utility and the need for such large ships.283
In 1906, Secretary Bonaparte clearly stated that although new inventions (including torpedoes, torpedo boats, submarines and even dirigible balloons) have been described as bringing about the end of the dominance of the battleship, he viewed these claims as false. For Bonaparte, the “only trustworthy safeguard” for U.S. national defense was the battleship.284 The Navy, however, continued to explore ways to improve their ships and expand upon the positive benefits of burning oil. The U.S.S. Wyoming was adapted to burn only oil fuel with the purpose of learning about how this process would impact future ship design. In addition, discussions of double- bottomed structure for the purpose of carrying oil, which would not substantially impact a ships capacity to carry coal, indicated a hint of caution. Availability of fuel oil is often the most significant limitation cited throughout the naval reports. Here also, the navy seems to worry that if it switched to oil completely, or too abruptly, the price for fuel oil would quickly become
282 O'Brien, Phillips Payson. British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998, pg. 62 283 Ibid. 284 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 1113. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906, pg. 20
123 prohibitive. Thus, the Navy calls for a conservative policy of ship design that would allow for the burning of either coal and/or oil.
“As fuel oil can be obtained in a very limited number of places, as compared with coal, and as the general use of oil as fuel for steaming purposes would soon reduce the supply to such an extent that the price would become prohibitive, the Bureau is of the opinion that the designs for new vessels for the Navy should accord with the practices which now obtain with regard to the allotment of space for the stowage of coal.
But as the oil carried in the double bottoms of a battleship would be equivalent to several hundred tons of coal, and increase her steaming radius proportionately without occupying space required for other purposes, the Bureau recommends that in all future battleships the double bottoms be constructed with the view of carrying oil in them, and that all necessary pumps, pipes, and appliances for burning oil be placed on board.”285
In conjunction with preparations for oil carrying capacity in all future ships, submarine development and experimentation continued apace at this time. The navy obtained appropriation for comparative performance tests of differing types of submarines to be performed in
Narragansett Bay in early 1907.286 These trials of submarines take place under the purview of the Bureau of Ordnance, because the submarine was in its origin, a torpedo-boat, and the Bureau of Ordnance was the appropriate bureau to oversee the development of such a weapon. Notable technological innovations, experiments, and developments in 1906 include a new submerged torpedo,287 the aforementioned submarine trials, and also increased use of oil in new ways, particularly by naval blacksmiths in furnaces and open forges.288
In 1907 the Navy continued to premise its battleship designs on dual fuel capacity, including the necessary equipment to burn both coal and/or oil. The cautious approach of dual fuel capacity is
285 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 1113. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906, pg. 370-371 286 Ibid, pg. 19 287 Ibid, pg. 515 288 Ibid, pg. 611
124 indicative of military organizational conservatism, and demonstrates continued uncertainty regarding availability of fuel oil for naval ships while in service.289 By building battleships that could burn either fuel, the Navy ensured that in the event of a fuel oil supply disruption coal could be used to fuel the most important vessels in the fleet. On the other hand, the insistence on dual fuel capacity, and expressed concern over supply, seem strange given the large share of world production in the United States at that time. As early as 1904, the Navy itself noted that the United States accounted for forty eight percent of world petroleum production and that much of that production was near maritime ports.290 Coincident with Naval uncertainty about building battleships that run only on oil, was a rapidly spreading practice of replacing coal completely with oil in myriad ways throughout the institution of the Navy.
“Oil fuel.—Oil Fuel is now used very extensively in this department. In the shipsmith shop two rotary blowers driven by 40-horsepower electric motors provide the necessary air for atomizing the oil and for combustion in the forges. Most satisfactory results have been obtained in not only the furnaces but in open forges, atomizing at 4-pound pressure. The galvanizing pots, savining oven, coppersmith forges, and core ovens are also heated by oil. Oil has been burned for several years under the main boilers. The plate and angel furnaces in the shipfitters’ shop are heated by oil. In the foundry the brass furnaces have used oil for several years. Lately an experimental furnace for melting pit iron by means of oil has been installed and is in satisfactory operation. With oil at less than $1 per barrel and coke at $16 per ton, pig iron can be melted by means of oil at about one-eighth the fuel cost as compared with coke. The results of also show that a very much better grade of castings is obtained from the oil furnace than from the cupola. When the foundry is transferred to the new foundry building, No. 128, it is expected to install an oil-burning furnace for melting pig iron of about 2,500 pounds capacity. This will enable a small heat for iron castings to be taken out whenever necessary. With the cupola it is necessary to get a large heat, which frequently delays pouring iron as much as a week. At the present time for large heats the cupola will be used, but it is believed that in the near future the oil furnace will be developed to such an extent as to replace the cupola. The burning of oil in the forges in the blacksmith shop has resulted in great economy. Not only is there economy in the fuel cost, but the amount of work gotten out is
289 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 1304. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907, pg. 17-18 290 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904, pg. 16
125 considerably greater than with coal as a fuel, as the heats are taken very much quicker. The comfort of the men is also much greater with oil as a fuel than with coal.”291
As can be discerned, the benefits of oil over coal in construction, repair, power production and other naval installations were substantial, including economy, cleanliness, increased heat/power generation, speed of reaching needed temperatures, and even in the comfort of the men due to increased ease of the work. Yet despite these improvements, the Navy was still investigating various forms of burning coal (briquetted versus raw), to determine comparative evaporative efficiency,292 and also began early testing and acquisition of small 2-cylinder gasoline motors of up to 100 horsepower for launching small craft.293 This demonstrates the willingness of the
Navy to explore all options available to it, and also a willingness to gain advantages wherever they may be found through technological innovation. These experimental tests and trials of different burners, boilers, fuels, and various new marine technology and machines highlight the natural innovative tendencies present in the American Navy at that time.
1908 proved a very busy year in the realm of naval technological development. Oil based technology was also witnessing marked improvement in its capabilities. The great power navies were expanding the size, speed, and range of their torpedo craft, submarines, and destroyers. The
American Navy claims much of these gains were directly attributable to ‘oil fuel and turbine machinery’.294 The improvement in German naval technological capability over the previous few years had instigated a panic and reactionary building program in Britain, and the result was a
291 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 1304. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907, pg. 616-617 292 Ibid, pg. 766 293 Ibid, pg. 740, 763-764 294 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 1031. Washington D.C. : Governemnt Printing Office, 1908, pg. 8
126 naval arms race.295 The Americans too, were involved in a major naval buildup under the direction of Theodore Roosevelt, whose administration continually struggled to convince
Congress of the need to continue building more, bigger, and better battleships.296 1908 also saw the first investigation into the possibility of flight for military purposes when the army was convinced by Roosevelt to test an advanced model of a Wright brother airplane. While the Army purchased the machine the Navy sent Lieutenant George Sweet to participate in the first test.
Sweet would have almost certainly died in the crash, had he not given up his place on the test flight to Army Lieutenant Thomas E. Selfridge. Despite the death of Selfridge, Lieutenant Sweet came away from the event with a positive impression of the possibility of using flight for military purposes.297 With oil becoming increasingly ubiquitous throughout the naval world, submarine development proceeding apace, and the beginning of the age of manned flight, the world’s most powerful navies were experiencing a major transformation in their technological capabilities. Correspondingly, these capabilities would impact what those navies could accomplish, as well as what those navies would want to accomplish. Additionally, these new technological developments would alter the geostrategic environments in which these military organizations operated, as well as the very organizational structure of the navies themselves.
The American Navy, while embracing the full utilization of fuel oil on most middle sized and smaller ships, including the 10 torpedo boat destroyers Nos. 22-31, were still designing
295 Rose, Lisle A. The Age of Navalism 1890-1918. Vol. 1, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007, pg. 53-54 296 O'Brien, Phillips Payson. British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998, pg. 63-65 297 Miller, Nathan. The U.S. Navy: A History. 3rd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, pg. 175-176
127 battleships to burn both coal and oil fuel.298 Despite uncertainty about the reliability of utilizing only fuel oil for battleship propulsion, the Navy was still investigating various efficiencies of new and different technologies. Battleships Nos. 30 and 31, the Utah and Florida, respectively, included designs for both reciprocating engines and turbine engines. Regarding battleship design for carrying fuel, since the Navy was unable to definitively choose one fuel over the other, they simply settled for both.
“XI. The design herewith forwarded provides for a trial speed of 21 knots, and can be arranged for the installation of either reciprocating or turbine machinery, outline specifications for both types of machinery having been prepared. Provision is also made for the stowage of a large amount of oil fuel without in any degree reducing the capacity of the coal bunkers.”299
This is indicative of the transitional nature of the energy technology of the time. The benefits of burning oil are relatively clear, but the American Navy (in fact all great power navies) were operating within a pre-existing system designed to fuel naval vessels with coal. While technology related to burning oil for naval propulsion developed quickly, the infrastructure underlying the production, distribution and delivery of that fuel lagged behind. Consequently the
American Navy began to build vessels that could use oil to maximize efficiencies of burning coal when needed. Oil became at first an adjunct to the already established coal-burning infrastructure. With the amount of capital, resources, and energy already invested in the network of coal provisions, it is understandable that the Navy would be slow to completely switch away from the fuel, which had served them quite well.
While manned flight was just beginning to catch the attention of the world’s militaries, submarines were nearly accepted as parts of the fleet. How to use those submarines was,
298 Department, The Navy. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 1031. Washington D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1908, pg. 665-666 299 Ibid, pg. 467
128 however, still up for debate. In the U.S. Navy it was believed that the primary purpose of submarines torpedo boats was in coastal and harbor defense.300 There had been recent improvements in turbo diesel generators, which were used to charge storage batteries needed for submarine propulsion. The Navy notes that by using the process whereby the destroyers serving as tender for a small group of submarines charge their batteries using the turbo diesel generators, an increased level of efficiency and reduced level of wear and tear was accomplished.301 These improvements ensured that submarine construction would continue to be authorized by
Congress. Competitive bidding was opened by the Navy for eight more submarines in November of 1908.302
Teddy Roosevelt is widely considered the “godfather” of the U.S. Navy, and this perception is generally connected with the immense building program that he was able to convince Congress to approve during his two terms in office. This consisted of the construction of sixteen battleships (more than a doubling of the U.S. fleet) and the ballooning of the amount of money spent on the Navy from $48 million in 1899 to $137 million in 1909.303 However, the nature of this naval buildup is criticized by some for being unbalanced, with an unnecessary emphasis on capital ships and a lack of adequate auxiliary ships to support them. Another criticism of the buildup under Roosevelt is that those ships were shortly declared obsolete, due to the emergence of the Dreadnought class of battleships.304 There are several factors that impacted the nature of the buildup of the U.S. Navy under Roosevelt, the most important being Roosevelt’s inability to convince those in Congress that the continuing increase of the size and capability of the U.S.
300 Ibid, pg. 38 301 Ibid, pg. 301 302 Ibid, pg. 17 303 O'Brien, Phillips Payson. British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998, pg. 50 304 Ibid, pg. 51
129 Navy was vital to American security and national defense. American geostrategic isolation and its ever-increasing economic strength, in tandem with the lack of a clear external threat, meant that there was substantial resistance to the continually rising costs of naval buildup.305
However in March of 1909, when William Howard Taft entered the White House, he chose a friend of his, and Roosevelt’s, to take the position of U.S. Naval Secretary: George Von
Lengerke Meyer. Unlike Roosevelt, who appointed a new naval secretary almost every year,
Meyer served his term through to its end, in 1913.
“A personal friend of both Roosevelt and Taft, Meyer had served as ambassador to Italy, ambassador to Russia and postmaster general between 1900 and 1909. When Taft chose him to be secretary of the navy, Meyer already had some idea of what he wanted to do. He was able to maintain a personal control over the navy that would have been unimaginable for one of Roosevelt’s secretaries. Meyer used his power to make some much-needed changes. He tried to streamline the navy’s bureau system with the appointment of four aides, one each for operations, personnel, material and inspections. These aides reported directly to the secretary and, it was hoped, would lead to greater centralization of the navy’s business. Unfortunately for Meyer, this reform had only limited impact at the time, as Congress, fearful of anything that smacked of a general staff, refused to give the aides statutory sanction…
Meyer also proved his worth in the areas of warship maintenance and auxiliary vessel construction. In 1909 much of the American Navy was badly in need of repair. Forty- four percent of all American warships were tied up in port or undergoing repairs. By 1912 this figure was down to twelve percent. Battleships were particularly well attended to. In 1909 seventeen battleships were on active duty, while ten were tied up. By 1912 all American battleships were ready for duty.
Meyer also began to redress the imbalance that had grown up in the American fleet between capital and auxiliary ships. For instance, in eight years Theodore Roosevelt was able to coax Congress into authorizing only sixty-three non-capital ships. Meyer, meanwhile, was able to secure congressional approval for fifty-seven auxiliaries in four years. For every capital ship approved under Roosevelt, only 3.15 auxiliary vessels were sanctioned. The corresponding figure for Meyer was one capital ship to 9.5 auxiliaries.”306
305 Ibid, pg. 63-65 306 Ibid, pg. 100-101
130 Meyer focused on several areas where the Navy desperately needed improvement, namely its organizational structure and the quantity and quality of its auxiliary ships. The concept of a general staff, able to implement military policy without excessive interference from democratic institutions, had recently gained favor in many European militaries. Although this move was resisted by the U.S. Congress, who liked its ability to micro-manage military policy via the committee system, Meyer was able to begin the process of building a general staff for the Navy.
Also impressive for Meyer was his ability to severely curtail the pork-barrel spending generally attached to naval appropriation bills related to naval bases, which had become so large that spending on ship construction had dropped down to only 25% of the total naval expenditures. 307
Thus, in many ways Meyer was a particularly successful naval secretary, but the question remains, how did Meyer manage the ongoing transition from coal to oil?
Just prior to Meyer assuming his position with the Navy, there had been revisions to the Navy regulations that had placed the Bureau of Navigation in charge with transporting, storage, handling of all coal utilized for naval purposes.308 The Bureau of Navigation would also be in charge of building and maintaining fuel oil depots, as well as arranging for contracts to purchase fuel oil.309 Once in office, Meyer began to expand the design and construction of fuel oil depot’s in several locations along the U.S. east coast, from Bradford, Rhode Island to Guantanamo,
Cuba, citing the need for such depots in light of the fact that ‘all battleships and a large proportion of the destroyers and submarines now building will burn oil.’310
307 Ibid, pg. 102, 111 308 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 1063. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909, pg. 307 309 Ibid, 746 310 Ibid, pg. 311
131 The day after he took office Meyer signed the contracts awarded to the Electric Boat Company for the construction of submarines Nos. 20-23, and later in April signed the contracts for submarines Nos. 24-27, with the latter vessels divided between the Lake Torpedo Boat
Company, the American Laurenti Company, and the Electric Boat Company.311 And while the dreadnought class battleships the Wyoming and the Arkansas were still built for dual fuel capacity, the plans for the next five American destroyers indicated that their propulsion machinery would burn only oil.312 The commentary on the performance of oil burning installations in 1909 is generally positive, the one exception being a complaint about the size and weight of air compressors needed for the oil atomization process.313
Under Meyer the Navy continued to experiment with new ways of producing the requisite propulsion power needed for its fleet as well as the needed power on land at the various naval bases. For smaller vessels the utilization of gasoline motors had become more prevalent, and the
Navy sought to test new designs of such motors provided by private companies in the summer of
1909.314 The Navy was also experimenting with coal-gas power plants on land and insisted that more investigation into this form of power generation be conducted. Interestingly, it is noted in the 1909 report that the private sector had not been able to provide such machinery adapted for naval use on the open market.315 Thus in the first year of Meyer’s tenure as Secretary of the
Navy, the policy of dual fuel capacity battleships remained firm, yet innovation and experimentation with other forms of propulsion, from small gasoline engines to large coal-gas power plants continued. In some instances the Navy relied on the capacities of the private sector,
311 Ibid, pg. 458 312 Ibid, pg. 672 313 Ibid, pg. 714 314 Ibid, pg. 672-673, 682 315 Ibid, pg. 714
132 while in others the Navy could not find what it wanted in the private sector. The Navy continued to push forward in the area of fuel oil, and petroleum powered propulsion, while at the same time ensuring continued ability to burn coal.
By 1910 the amount of oil used by the U.S. Navy was picking up steam. Practically all navy vessels were being designed and built to burn primarily oil as fuel, with only the large battleships built with dual fuel capacity. Correspondingly the Navy was increasing the amount of physical storage capacity for naval oil supplies. The Navy found itself dangerously reliant on private oil companies for supply of the fuel and argued that the Navy itself must build fueling depots and stations at outlying strategic locations where such commercial supply did not exist.316 Also, the
Navy had established a special standard quality of fuel oil necessary for naval use, a type of fuel oil that was not readily available in the needed amounts at commercial fueling stations.317
Moreover, the Navy was conducting comparative tests between reciprocating boilers and turbine type engines in similarly sized ships assessing comparative efficiencies. These ships included the Scout Cruisers Birmingham [reciprocating], and the ships Chester [Parsons turbines], and
Salem [Curtis turbines], and the tests provided ‘an authoritative indication of the relative backing power of the three types of machinery.’ Testing the use of fuel oil as a coal auxiliary on battleships was also conducted, using the battleships Delaware and North Dakota, with the navy reporting some difficulty with the process. 318
316 Department, The Navy. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 832. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910, pg. 25 317 Ibid, pg. 520-521 318 Ibid, pg. 488
133 One of the most impressive developments in naval technological innovation in 1910 was the success of Mr. Eugene Ely in taking off of the U.S.S. Birmingham in a Curtiss biplane. This experiment demonstrated the practicality of operating airplanes from ships for scouting purposes, and the report from 1910 is worth quoting at length:
“November 14 Mr. Eugene Ely made an experiment at Hampton Roads in flying in a Curtiss biplane from the deck of the U.S.S. Birmingham, which had been furnished by the department. The object was to demonstrate the possibility of an aeroplane of the existing type leaving a ship for scout purposes. A temporary platform was placed forward on the Birmingham for the purpose of assisting the aviator with the ship’s speed by steaming ahead to wind. Mr. Ely did not, however, need this help, and easily succeeded in making the flight while the ship was at anchor, thereby increasing the value of the experiment.
This experiment demonstrated the conditions governing the location of future platforms on shipboard for this purpose, and showed that they could be installed without interfering seriously with the other features of the ship.
Landing on or near a ship on returning with information after a scouting trip appears to be practicable.
This experiment and the advances which have been made in aviation seem to demonstrate that it is destined to perform some part in the naval warfare of the future. It appears likely that this will be limited to scouting. A scout which is not strong enough to pierce the enemy’s line can get as near as possible and then send an aeroplane 30 or 40 miles, obtain valuable information and then return to the scout. Even if the aviator did not land on the scout he could be brought on board and deliver his information. The loss of an aeroplane would be of no moment, as the ship may easily carry others. The distinct value of service of this kind is easily seen.
The department contemplates further experiments along these lines, with the belief that it will be necessary in the near future to equip all scouts with one or more aeroplanes to increase the distance at which information can be secured.”319
While this early example of using ships to launch planes certainly provided a justification of naval expense on planes for the purposes of scouting, the process was rudimentary and, given the state of the technology, would likely require the sacrifice of the plane once launched. On the
319 Department, The Navy. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 832. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910, pg. 23
134 other hand, the navy had clearly demonstrated that manned flight would certainly have military applications for navies in the very near future.
Submarine construction continued with the awarding of contracts for vessels Nos. 28-31, three of which were built by the Electric Boat Company and one built by the Lake Torpedo Boat
Company.320 Increased usage of submarines by the U.S. Navy led to understanding more completely the hazards entailed in such work, namely the difficult sanitation and air quality conditions generally present on submarines.321 This issue receives increasing attention over the next several years by naval medical officers.
In 1911 the Navy sought to improve overall performance of the fleet by instituting competitive awards for achieving top marks for fuel efficiency on the part of the various crews. These tests placed ‘practically all the vessels of the Navy’ on a competitive standing, with bragging rights and even trophies on the line.322 While efficiency and economy are always issues of concern for modern steaming navies, at the time the United States Navy was warning in its annual report about ‘fatal’ shortages of fuel storage capacity at several of its strategically important bases, such as Guantanamo, Puget Sound, and Pearl Harbor. Secretary Meyer thus called for $500,000 in funding to build the needed storage depots.323
Oil fuel technology for large ship propulsion continued to advance and the Navy had seen improvements in capabilities in ships using oil as an auxiliary, such as the U.S.S. Delaware. The
Delaware had made the trip from the U.S. to England and back without taking on any extra fuel,
320 Ibid, pg. 378 321 Ibid, pg. 733 322 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 551. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911, pg. 9-10 323 Ibid, pg. 32
135 and apparently it even had 660 tons of coal left over when it finished.324 On top of that, the transition from coal to oil had been completed for the largest of battleships. The machinery designs of the battleships that were appropriated in the previous congress are described “as mark[ing] a distinct advance over any previous machinery of this or any other Government.
These vessels will be oil burners and will carry no coal.”325 Thus the U.S.S. New York and the
U.S.S. Texas would be the last American battleships built with the capability to burn coal, and the U.S.S. Nevada and the U.S.S. Oklahoma the first that could only burn oil.
Comparing the nature of the Nevada and the Oklahoma to the Delaware, the Navy stated:
“As compared with the Delaware, of equal power, the machinery weights in the boiler compartments have been reduced by 300 tons, or about 30 per cent. The length of the space required for boilers has been reduced one-half, and the fireroom force required is one-half that of the Delaware. The tactical qualities of the vessels have improved by diverging the shafts from aft forward, this having been made possible by a radical change in the arrangement of engine-room auxiliaries. Each main engine will be fitted with two condensers, instead of one as heretofore, and provision is made for running on one condenser in the event of trouble with the other. As a result of the reduction in machinery weights of the boiler rooms of these vessels, it has been possible greatly to increase their armor protection. It has been possible to group the boilers of these vessels under one smoke pipe, thus clearing the upper deck and improving the arc of train of the turrets.” 326
In addition to these benefits, it would be possible to reduce the crew of the fire by half the number of men.327 Those sailors that would remain in the fire rooms of battleships, and other vessels, would need to be trained and educated in the science of burning liquid petroleum. As such, the Navy articulated a need for schools to train sailors for this purpose, and announced/ declared that preparations were being made to create such a school at the Philadelphia naval yard.
324 Ibid, pg. 47 325 Ibid, pg. 48 326 Ibid. 327 Ibid, pg. 47
136 While fuel oil had just become the primary mover of the future for the U.S. Navy, other mechanisms by which to utilize the energy stored in petroleum products was also advancing.
The internal combustion engine burning gasoline was receiving much attention, and its use was spreading. The British Navy had begun using internal combustion engines in tandem with turbine installations in their destroyers.328 The Americans too had begun to prefer gasoline powered internal combustion engines over heavy fuel oil models for various purposes.
During the year the fitting of sailing launches, dories, and other service types of boats with gasoline engines has been proceeded with. The collective horsepower of these boat installations now exceeds 4,250, exclusive of installations in submarine boats. The manufacture of a service design of gasoline motor has been undertaken at the navy yard, Norfolk, with a view of standardizing all installations. The substitution of oil engines for gasoline engines is very desirable, but thus far it has been impossible to obtain these in small units suitable for boat installations. Three types of motors suitable for aeronautical work have been purchased and will be tested during the coming year.329
The Navy often found it difficult to find these new types of engines in the specifications needed for naval and marine purposes, and through the experimentation of its own engineers, as well as through its interactions with those in the private sector, it continually pushed and prodded oil technology forward. Alternatively, the Navy was also closely following the technological developments in Europe. There, Diesel model engines were having more success and seeing more development than in the United States. The U.S. Navy was using some Diesel engines for submarines, and was hopeful that future development would allow for use of these engines on larger vessels.330 The relatively limited adoption of Diesel type engines in the United States is a fascinating story revolving around Adolphus Busch’s failed attempt to establish an American monopoly on Diesel patents.331 Busch’s efforts, along with other factors such as rapid
328 Ibid, pg. 42 329 Ibid, pg. 261 330 Ibid, pg. 262 331 Lytle, Richard H. "The Introduction of Diesel Power in the United States, 1897-1912." The Business History Review 42, no. Summer (1968): 115-48.
137 technological development of the time, plentiful fuel supply and competition, resulted in
America lagging behind Europe substantially in Diesel development.332
Despite these general difficulties the Navy continued to explore every new energy technology available, Diesel included. And while the Navy was realizing that oil was its fuel of the future, other institutions of the U.S. Government were taking measures to ensure fair competition in the oil market. The battle between the U.S. Government and Standard Oil concerning Standard’s business practices and monopoly had been dragging out since the turn of the century, and the
Bureau of Corporations report on Standard’s business practices published in May of 1906 alleged widespread monopolization by Standard primarily through its rebate scheme with the railroads, but also included charges of discrimination, price-cutting and bribery.333 That year the
United States Attorney General filed a bill in equity against Standard for violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and by 1911 this case had reached the Supreme Court. The following excerpt from the majority opinion written by Chief Justice White demonstrates, despite the ruling of the court, the mixed perceptions of Standard. The result was incredulity toward their monopolistic practices on the one hand, and on the other hand an appreciation for their role in bringing about the age of oil in the United States.
“Both as to the law and as to the facts, the opposing contentions pressed in the argument are numerous, and, in all their aspects, are so irreconcilable that it is difficult to reduce them to some fundamental generalization which, by being disposed of, would decide them all. For instance, as to the law. While both sides agree that the determination of the controversy rests upon the correct construction and application of the first and second sections of the Anti-Trust Act, yet the views as to the meaning of the act are as wide apart as the poles, since there is no real point of agreement on any view of the act. And this also is the case as to the scope and effect of authorities relied upon, even although, in some instances, one and the same authority is asserted to be controlling.
332 Ibid, pg. 147-148 333 Nash, Gerald D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968, pg. 13-15
138
So also is it as to the facts. Thus, on the one hand, with relentless pertinacity and minuteness of analysis, it is insisted that the facts establish that the assailed combination took its birth in a purpose to unlawfully acquire wealth by oppressing the public and destroying the just rights of others, and that its entire career exemplifies an inexorable carrying out of such wrongful intents, since, it is asserted, the pathway of the combination, from the beginning to the time of the filing of the bill, is marked with constant proofs of wrong inflicted upon the public, and is strewn with the wrecks resulting from crushing out, without regard to law, the individual rights of others. Indeed, so conclusive, it is urged, is the proof on these subjects that it is asserted that the existence of the principal corporate defendant -- the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey -- with the vast accumulation of property which it owns or controls, because of its infinite potency for harm and the dangerous example which its continued existence affords, is an open and enduring menace to all freedom of trade, and is a byword and reproach to modern economic methods. On the other hand, in a powerful analysis of the facts, it is insisted that they demonstrate that the origin and development of the vast business which the defendants control was but the result of lawful competitive methods, guided by economic genius of the highest order, sustained by courage, by a keen insight into commercial situations, resulting in the acquisition of great wealth, but at the same time serving to stimulate and increase production, to widely extend the distribution of the products of petroleum at a cost largely below that which would have otherwise prevailed, thus proving to be, at one and the same time, a benefaction to the general public as well as of enormous advantage to individuals. It is not denied that, in the enormous volume of proof contained in the record in the period of almost a lifetime to which that proof is addressed, there may be found acts of wrongdoing, but the insistence is that they were rather the exception than the rule, and, in most cases, were either the result of too great individual zeal in the keen rivalries of business or of the methods and habits of dealing which, even if wrong, were commonly practised at the time.”334
Chief Justice White here encapsulates U.S. policy at this time toward the large industrial monopolies. While there was a general sentiment that monopolization is bad, there was also an understanding that those large industrial interests provided important goods and services to the public, and to the state. Throughout this time period, and up to the beginning of the First World
War, the Navy found itself caught between national security imperatives and the need for the industrial products large corporations could provide, and the belief that more competition in
334 Standard Oil Co. Of New Jersey V. United States, 221 1 (1910).
139 those industries could reduce the price of those goods, thereby saving the American public a substantial amount of money.335
The efforts to have the U.S. government provide the needed industrial products for its Navy often led to suggestions that the state itself enter those industries to provide for its needs. This is clearly seen in the petroleum industry,336 as well as in the steel armor and shipbuilding industries.337 As the need for oil in the Navy grew, the concern over undue influence over markets by large corporations subsided. As the likelihood of war became greater, the focus on continued supply became more prevalent. The focus of U.S. government efforts also shifted, from combating monopoly to creating a cooperative atmosphere between private producers and the government.
The last two years of the Taft Administration saw a continued increase in oil consumption, including increased number of battleships and destroyers burning solely oil, increased capability in aviation, the first tandem deployment of submarines and aircraft in naval maneuvers, and continued innovation in naval technologies, such as the airboat. The Navy was at the time experiencing adequate supply of oil products, and Secretary Meyer was anticipating a reduction
335 "Government Oil for Navy: Would Result in Saving of Nearly 50 Per Cent., Expert Figures." The New York Times, February 5 1914, 8. 336 In the petroleum industry the Navy begins seeking to physically control its own oil reserves by 1909, see Ise, John. The United States Oil Policy. New York: Arno Press, 1972, pg. 356; and by 1914 the USG was seeking to build its own pipeline, and refineries, to produce and maintain its oil for naval use, see "Will Uncle Sam Produce Oil." Oil and Gas Journal (January 22 1914): 4., and also Special to The New York Times. (1914, Jan 25). U.S. to look deeper into oil ownership. New York Times (1857-1922). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/97583536?accountid=2909. Accessed on 4/16/13. 337 For a detailed examination of the U.S. Navy’s relationship with the steel industry from the 1880s to WWI, see Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America's Military-Industrial Complex. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1979.
140 in price of oil in the near future, as the upcoming opening of the Panama canal, which was almost finished, would make west coast oil supplies more readily available for Naval installations in the Gulf as well as along the Atlantic.338 Meyer describes a need for more vessels for oil transport, while T.J. Cowie, the Paymaster General, states that during the fiscal year of
1912, Naval vessels had consumed over 16 million gallons of fuel oil.339
The most significant area of innovation in 1912 for the U.S. Navy was in aviation. The Report of Capt. W.I. Chambers to the Bureau of Navigation provides one of the earliest American articulations for naval doctrine concerning the use of aircraft in war. Captain Chambers begins his report by noting that experimental aviation work had moved substantially past the initial pioneering stage, and that although the state of aviation engineering was not at “the state of perfection required by all of the work contemplated for it in naval warfare,” it was certainly close.340
The work contemplated by the Navy for manned flight included to reconnoiter enemy ports and advanced bases and to assist in blockade operations, to locate and destroy submarine mines, submarines, dirigibles, and to operate in support of torpedo boats and destroyers, to damage enemy dock, and harbor installations, and to act as the ‘eyes of the fleet’ by scouting.341 Here
Captain Chambers described using aircraft for limited attack, and work to create requisite weaponry for aircraft was also a part of the Navy’s efforts, albeit at the time the Bureau of
Ordnance stated that such work was not satisfactory.342 This exemplified how the Navy was not
338 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 608. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1912, pg. 47 339 Ibid, pg. 266 340 Ibid, pg. 144 341 Ibid, pg. 156 342 Ibid, pg. 214
141 just responding to private technological developments, but pushing innovation forward by seeking to shape new technology for its specific purposes. While the Navy noted that the
Europeans were intensely interested in improving and developing aviation, particularly the
French343, the American achievements at this time are impressive. These include pursuit of hydro-aviation and discussion of “ships as hangars” for “hydro-aeroplanes”, or in other words one of the earliest articulations of the concept of an aircraft carrier, or ships as mobile air bases344; high altitude flights of over 3,000 feet,345 and experimentation using catapults to launch aircraft from a ship346 (which, it should be noted, is how aircraft are launched from carriers today, albeit with drastic improvements). Along with these advances, improvements in the air compass and aircraft motors made the work of the early aviators safer.347
The Naval buildup that had begun under Teddy Roosevelt, and slowed only slightly under Taft, ultimately ran headlong into partisan Congressional politics. The Republicans were generally the champions of the Navy, and as their fortunes declined, so did the likelihood of continued naval buildup. The losses of the Republicans in the midterm elections of 1910 marked the rise of the Democrats, a development described as the “waterloo” of Taft’s naval policy.348 The
Republicans managed to maintain a slim majority in the Senate, and used this advantage to hold off Democratic attacks on the construction programs advocated by the Navy and the Taft administration.349 The election of 1912 put the entirety of the Congress and the White House
343 Ibid, pg. 156 344 Ibid, pg. 157 345 Ibid, pg. 158 346 Ibid, pg. 159-160 347 Ibid, pg. 160-161 348 O'Brien, Phillips Payson. British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998, pg. 104 349 Ibid, pg. 105
142 firmly into Democratic hands, and brought about a change in the position of secretary of the
Navy. Josephus Daniels was relatively unknown, at least in naval circles; however, he was well known and liked among the Democratic congressmen, and his influence helped Woodrow
Wilson obtain the Democratic nomination for President.350 Daniels faced rather stiff resistance and criticism of his ability to manage the U.S. Navy from both the Navy and influential individuals such as Colonel Edward House, and was even accused of failing to prepare the fleet for WWI.351 Daniels was criticized for neglecting broad strategic matters important to the
Navy,352 and much of his interest and effort in managing the service seemed provincial, focusing on issues such as sailor education and training. On the other hand, Daniels was adamant about obtaining fair prices on the resources and machinery needed for the use of the Navy. In addition, in the words of Harold and Margaret Sprout:
“He had ambitious plans for reopening and expanding all the government navy yards, and for establishing publicly owned armor-plate, ordnance, and powder factories, oil refineries, and coal mines, as a means of breaking the grip of powerful industrial corporations which, he maintained, were exploiting the government by means of collusive bidding for contracts, and by “exorbitant” prices charged for equipment, supplies, and services.”353
Here his approach to the state-private sector relationships was firmly in line with the economic policies of the Democratic Party of the time. For Daniels, there was more to this relationship than just fair prices. Daniels sought state autarky and control for much of the essential industrial needs of the Navy, and this was made abundantly clear in his first annual report. This applies not only to provision of oil fuel needed for the navy, but also to steel production needed for ships and guns.
350 Ibid, pg. 107-108 351 Ibid, pg. 108 352 Ibid, pg. 109, see also Sprout, Harold and Margret. The Rise of American Naval Power 1776- 1918. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, pg. 309-310 353 Sprout, Harold and Margret. The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, pg. 309-310
143
Regarding the transition from coal to oil, Daniels viewed the matter as settled, and saw Naval control of its own oil reserves, production, and refining as crucial to keeping Naval expenses manageable.354 Daniels cites the decision of the British to switch to oil and even describes that the British have taken this step despite its “geographic handicap.” Furthermore, he notes that if
Britain has made this important decision despite not possessing substantial oil deposits, that the
United States would be wise to follow suit, given its immense natural petroleum resources.355
R.S. Griffin, writing from the Bureau of Steam Engineering, shared the belief that Naval ownership, and production of petroleum would result in substantial savings for taxpayers, indicating that the sale of byproducts of refining fuel oil, such as gasoline and illuminating oils, could further reduce cost.356 Daniels’ emphasis on the important role of fuel oil belies the criticism that he ignored strategic matters.
Elsewhere in the Navy, experimentation with the bounds of oil technology continued. In
Philadelphia, at the naval fuel testing plant, improvements in efficiency and smoke reduction were being obtained.357 Increasing numbers of large oil fuel tanks at naval stations were being built and installed at locations such as Pearl Harbor, Guantanamo, Charleston, Key West,
Newport, and Norfolk.358 The Navy’s increasing oil fuel consumption also required the construction of fleet oilers, including the Kanawha and the Maumee, the latter being one of the first large ships to be propelled by an internal combustion engine installation.359 Undoubtedly oil fuel usage was consistently increasing, but this energy transition was still in its early stages. This
354 The Navy Department. "The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 558. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913, pg. 14-15 355 Ibid, pg. 15 356 Ibid, pg. 227 357 Ibid, pg. 43 358 Ibid, pg. 102-107 359 Ibid, pg. 218
144 is attested to by the figures of total cost for the two fuels at the time reported by the Navy. The amount of money spent on coal was over $4.5 million dollars, while the total cost of fuel oil for naval purposes was just under $500,000.360
Meanwhile the advancement of aircraft technologies and submarines marched forward. The
Navy was aware that European nations had been more aggressive in their development of aircraft for military purposes. However, they also state that the scientific community had agreed that aviation could not be ignored. The Europeans, for whom the threat of war was more tangible, had a more urgent need to stay ahead of the curve in developing aircraft, while the distance between the United States and the European theatre allowed for a more relaxed approach to the militarization of flight. An American naval officer was sent to Europe to obtain information on aviation from those nations and the Navy was taking requisite precautions to ensure a reserve of aircraft was ready if needed in the event of a war.361
Additionally, the Navy sought to streamline the process of technological development and innovation taking place in this new field of engineering. Organizationally, the Navy sought to institute an atmosphere of cooperation and information sharing across and within existing state institutions, as well as across sectors, reaching into the private corporate and academic spheres.
This approach was certainly proactive and demonstrates concerted efforts to ensure the Navy was at the front line of technological innovation.
“The continuance of the Langley Aerodynamic Laboratory has been authorized by the Regents of the Smithsonian Institution on certain limited funds available by endowment, and the President has approved of cooperation between the various Government departments and this laboratory.
360 Ibid, pg. 239 361 Ibid, pg. 17
145 An “advisory committee on aeronautics” has been appointed, the Navy having two representatives, the functions of which are to advise in relation to the work of the laboratory and the coordination of its activities with those of other governmental and private laboratories in which questions concerning the problems of aeronautics can be experimentally investigated.
A broad scheme of cooperation has been inaugurated and is now in cooperation, whereby all institutions in the country, public and private, are enabled to work together in harmony, all fully informed of the work done by each on problems involving the scientific development of aerial navigation. It is now possible to coordinate the work so that all can pull together and so that all technical institutions of learning throughout the country may be able to educate that element most lacking at the present moment, a body of scientific and practical aeronautical engineers, instead of many minds working separately, many going over the same ground uselessly, and all working with separate objects in view. The Navy Department has taken the initiative in this cooperation by detailing an officer to visit Europe to obtain information about the latest laboratory methods and developments, not only to facilitate the experimental work of the Navy, but to actively cooperate with the Langley Laboratory and the Institute of Technology in their efforts to build up an effective course of instruction on the science of aeronautics.”362
How the Navy was likely to use aircraft in future warfare was becoming increasingly clear. Fleet exercises in Guantanamo Bay in 1913 showed that naval aviators could spot submerged submarines, sight enemy vessels undetected and also take photographs from as high as 1,000 feet.363 Continued progress utilizing both submarines and aircraft prompted references to both
Tennyson and Jules Verne, indicating a realization of the technological transformation from science fiction to science fact.364
By 1914 war had erupted in Europe. Woodrow Wilson, who had won the Presidency by campaigning to keep the United States out of any war that might break out in Europe,365 declared
362 The Navy Department. "The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 558. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913, pg. 126-127 363 Miller, Nathan. The U.S. Navy: A History. 3rd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, pg. 177 364 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914, pg. 6 365 Miller, Nathan. The U.S. Navy: A History. 3rd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, pg. 182
146 American neutrality, with the goal of acting as an impartial arbiter.366 In his address, President
Wilson implored American citizens to remain neutral, and also imposed restrictions on providing supplies, including coal, to any belligerent vessels.367 Despite its neutrality, the American Navy was able to witness the early performance of much of the new technology that had been developed prior to the war’s outbreak. In its recommendation for further naval construction, which included two dreadnaughts, six destroyers, eight submarines, one gunboat and one oiler, secretary Daniels described the ways in which new technology had impacted the progression of the conflict. In particular, it was the submarine that emerged as the most effective new machine of war. Yet despite this effectiveness, Daniels reiterates the position of the General Board:
“There are many (very many more than a few weeks ago) who believe the time has come when the advice of Sir Percy Scott should be taken. Months ago that able English officer declared that the submarine was the most effective ship of the navy of the future and advised a cessation in the rapid construction of dreadnaughts and the utilization of the money thus spent in building large numbers of submarines. The lay mind has accepted this view of the policy, but the trained naval officers making up the general board are convinced that, while the submarines have a large part to play in naval warfare, they do not replace the larger craft, and the board makes recommendation to the department for an increase in the Navy, embracing four dreadnaughts and the usual complement of destroyers, submarines, and auxiliaries. These naval statesmen hold to the opinion that the dreadnaught remains the central and chief fighting force of a well-proportioned navy.
The General Board reiterates the opinion it has always held that “command of the sea can only be gained and held by vessels that can take and keep the sea in all times and in all weathers and overcome the strongest enemies that can be brought against them.” It declares “other types are valuable and have their particular uses,” but “the backbone of any navy that can command the sea consists of the strongest seagoing, sea-keeping ships of its day, or, of its battleships.””368
Clearly the Navy, while acknowledging the impressive abilities of submarines, remained committed to the dreadnaught. However, it also clearly called for increased construction of
366 Tuchman, Barbara. The Guns of August. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962, pg. 370 367 Wilson, Woodrow. "Warning against Violations of Neutrality During War between Austria- Hungary and Servia, and Germany with Russia and France. August 4, 1914." Washington D.C., 1914. 368 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914, pg. 8-9
147 submarines and saw them as a necessary tool for any great navy.369 While at this point the war was still young, and much of the impact of the submarine was to come later, it was clear such an impact would come.
Daniels also clearly recognized the energy transition that had been developing. In fact he does so quite explicitly.
“Each year marks more distinctly the passing of coal, with its attendant discomfort and engineering and military inferiority as fuel for ships of war. Henceforth, all the fighting ships which are added to the fleet will use oil, and the transition from coal to oil will mark an era in our naval development almost comparable with the change from black powder to smokeless powder four our guns. The ease with which oil can be handled, its superior steam-producing properties, the reduced number of men required for handling it, and the decreased exertion required from the firemen, to say nothing of the ease with which the cleanliness of the ship can be maintained, all combine to make oil the ideal fuel for naval use.”370
On top of his explicit declaration of the passing of the age of coal, Daniels continued with his efforts to develop governmental ownership, production, transport, and refining of the needed oil for naval purposes. Under Daniels, the Navy began to investigate the cost, feasibility and desirability of constructing a government owned pipeline to carry oil from the midcontinent field in Oklahoma to the Gulf of Mexico.371 These efforts received much attention from the press in general and oil industry journals in particular, and were not particularly well received. In January
1914, the New York Times described the efforts of the U.S. government to deal with the monopoly over oil pipelines in the United States controlled by Standard Oil.372 Despite the recent ruling of the Supreme Court, forcing the breakup of the Standard Oil empire, the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) continued to describe the monopolistic control over oil prices and
369 Ibid, pg. 9 370 Ibid, pg. 17-18 371 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914, pg. 18 372 Special to The New York Times. (1914, Jan 25). “U.S. to look deeper into oil ownership”. New York Times (1857-1922). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/97583536?accountid=2909. Accessed on 4/16/13.
148 supply held by Standard. Also, at the time this article was written, Congress had attempted to declare oil pipelines as common carriers. Standard appealed and won an injunction against the ruling.373 The newspaper also described the investigation into the Oklahoma situation, to be led by Commissioner Cato Sells of the Indian Office and Lieutenant Commander David F. Boyd of the Navy.
This investigation came in response to the passing of the Gore resolution (S. 5559) calling for the regulation of the transportation of oil via pipelines by the ICC. By February of 1914, Sells and
Boyd had begun to hear commentary on the possibility of state owned and operated production, transport, and refining of oil, from men in the oil industry in Oklahoma.374 Boyd, in his estimates of what the government could accomplish in terms of production, had made public the figures of his own calculation stating that the Oklahoma project could produce up to one million barrels of oil annually.375 These figures were criticized by those in the oil industry as ignoring the realities of the industry and much of the cost that is required in this type of work.
“The purpose, as set forth in the report of one of the members of the board of investigation is to provide the United States Navy with cheap fuel oil. On theoretical figures a very good showing was made for the Government, but everyone acquainted with the business realizes how little dependence can be placed on theory in the oil trade. The producing end of it is wholly speculative, and it is upon this speculative side(?) that the other branches of transportation and refining has to depend.
The Government’s plan is to provide for 1,000,000 barrels a year, or about 3,000 barrels a day. This is not a large amount of the total produced, but many a producer and producing firm has never been able to obtain that much in a life’s effort. Most of those who have that much have obtained it largely by purchase rather than by wildcat work.”376
373 Ibid, paragraph 6 374 "Will Hear Oil Men on Friday." Oil and Gas Journal (February 5 1914): 1-2, 30-31. 375 K., C. H. "Lieut.-Com Boyd's Figures." Oil and Gas Journal (February 5 1914): 30-31. 376 "Public Oil Dealers." Oil and Gas Journal (February 19 1914): 4-5.
149 More so than criticism of the technical specifics of the government plan, the industry was critical of the philosophical and ideological spirit of the venture. Claims of socialism were rife and prominent oilmen were opposed to the venture ideologically, believing that the duty of the government was to regulate the business, not enter said business as a competitor.377
Additionally, the National Petroleum Association dismissed the notion that the oil industry suffered from excessive monopolization, albeit they seemed to only count for the number of business entities, rather than the size and influence of any one of those entities, e.g. Standard Oil.
“The above is the list as published by the National Petroleum Association, with a few added since it was complied. The figures of capacity are also those of the association in most instances, A total of 129 independent refineries are here represented besides those of Wyoming, covering the whole territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the Gulf to the Lakes. Surely here is enough competition to warrant the Government giving it encouragement, and likewise sufficient to expect the bottom prices for the product without plunging the Government into an expensive and hazardous scheme.”378
As the commission moved forward with its investigation, it planned to make inspections of the oil fields of Oklahoma in March of 1914. In addition to inspecting the fields in Oklahoma, they intended to inspect the likely route of the proposed pipeline from Oklahoma to the Gulf.379
Much of the testimony and committee proceedings related to this process were confidential, per a decision by Commissioner Sells. This approach received much criticism, which took aim not only with Sells, but the Department of the Interior more broadly.380
377 "Is Opposed to Government Pipe Line: W. H. Gray, a Prominent Citizen of Texas Tell Why He Does Not Approve of Governmental Activity in the Oil Business. An Interesting Interview." (February 19 1914): 30-31. 378 "Public Oil Dealers." Oil and Gas Journal (February 19 1914): 4-5. 379 "To Make Inspection in March." Oil and Gas Journal (March 12 1914): 2. 380 "Secret Pipeline Hearings." Oil and Gas Journal (March 19 1914): 5.
150 By May, Lieutenant Boyd was ordered back to active duty at sea in connection with the U.S.
Navy’s activities in Mexico, and Lieutenant J.O. Richardson was appointed to take his place.381
By July, it had been announced that the report from Sells and Richardson had been postponed until December of the following year, however, the entire project had lost its importance in the wake of the Supreme Court ruling which declared that oil pipelines would be common carriers, thus removing the monopolistic control over said pipelines by Standard Oil.382 Domestic wrangling related to state vs. private sector control of oil supplies continued through the 1920s, particularly over the naval oil reserves, which had been created between 1909 and 1923.383
Despite difficulties in achieving its ends in the area of oil production and refining, the Navy under Daniels continued to search for ways to ensure its own control over the resources, materials, and machinery needed to ensure its ability to defend the country at sea. This applied to oil384, submarine construction385, and later steel for armor and guns need for navy ships.386
Submarines and aircraft continued to progress in their capabilities while impressing navy men around the world, including Daniels. So-called fleet submarines, which were larger, with increased sailing radius and the ability to act in tactical tandem with the other large ships of the fleet, were beginning to be produced. The earlier construction of such vessels by the U.S. Navy had been stymied by the lack of an appropriately capable internal combustion engines. By 1914
Daniels claimed that such problems had been overcome. Daniels stated that the value of such
381 "Appoints Lieutenant Richardson." Oil and Gas Journal (May 7 1914): 4. 382 "Has Lost Its Force." Oil and Gas Journal (July 2 1914): 34. 383 Ise, John. The United States Oil Policy. New York: Arno Press, 1972, pg. 356-358
384 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914, pg. 19 385 Ibid, pg. 27-28 386 Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America's Military-Industrial Complex. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1979, pg. 201- 203
151 vessels “can hardly be overestimated.” Consequently, the Navy called for the construction of a fleet of four such vessels to be built, the latter three of which would be apart of the 1916 construction program.387
Meanwhile, aircraft development in Europe was seen as outdistancing similar work in the United
States. The General Board report of 1914 described the lack of aircraft available to the Navy as
“deplorable.” The Navy was adamant that in the current environment, the utilization of aircraft were essential for warfare on both land and sea, and that in any contest against a state that possessed the requisite air power, the U.S. would not only be blind, but that its operations would be an open book to the enemy. The Navy further supported its strong statements with a recommendation of Congressional appropriation of $5,000,000 for the purposes of establishing a
“proper air service.”388 When viewed alongside the massive size of the proposed 1916 construction program, it is clear that the onset of war in Europe spurred the General Board to call for increased preparedness on the part of the Navy. That building program included 4 battleships, 16 destroyers, 3 fleet submarines, 16 coast submarines, 4 scouts, 4 gunboats, 2 oil- fuel ships, 1destroyer tender, 1 submarine tender, 1 transport ship, 1 hospital ship, 1 supply ship, and the needed money to create a proper air service.389
With the war continuing in Europe, the U.S. Navy continued to increase ship construction, submarine and aircraft experimentation and construction, and also continued to push for Navy control of the oil resources needed to fuel these machines. The Navy had also completed the
387 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914, pg. 63-64 388 Ibid, pg. 64-65 389 Ibid, pg. 67
152 transition from coal to oil for battleship propulsion, and while much of the fleet still burned coal, all future capital ships would be designed to only burn oil. The first of such ships was the U.S.S.
Nevada. Daniels emphasized in the 1915 annual report that once the switch to oil for motive power has been made, switching back to coal would be impossible. He also reiterated his belief that state control of physical oil reserves, where they lay in the ground, is the only way to ensure the needed supply for the navy.
Taking a long view of the need of the navy, Daniels describes the importance of Naval control and ownership of actual oil producing land along with long term contracts for purchase of oil currently available on market. His stated goal was to ensure adequate supply for at least 25 years, and he indicates that the primary purpose of the naval reserves set aside by Presidential decree was to protect that supply from possible leakage, fire, or evaporation. As Daniels saw it, oil was absolutely essential for warmaking, and the lack of Naval control over a substantial supply of this particular product was a national security risk.390
Submarine and aircraft development continued at a quickening pace. The appropriations bill for
1914 had provided one million dollars towards an aircraft service for the Navy, the first appropriation specifically for naval aeronautics. While pleased with this development the Navy was requesting double that amount for the next appropriations bill. A naval aeronautics base had been created at Pensacola and included over seven million dollars of investment in that Navy yard. The Navy continued to push the bounds of aircraft technology through experimentation
390 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 796. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, pg. 62-65
153 and innovation. Such experimentation, included tests on different types of lubricating oils, grades of gasoline, floats for hydro-aircraft and other specialized equipment for aviators.
The war had disrupted the ability of the Navy to obtain European aircraft engines, and as a result the Navy was forced to seek the requisite engines and motors for aircraft domestically. At this time the Navy’s outlook on obtaining engines powerful enough for its aeronautical purposes
(about 200 horsepower) was “rapidly improving.” Moreover, the weaponization of aircraft was progressing dramatically. This included testing on types of bombs and bomb dropping appliances to be attached to aircraft. 391 1915 was the year that the Navy built its first airplane independently of private interests. This was accomplished at the Washington Naval Yard and demonstrated the desire on the part of the Navy for self-sufficiency. Interestingly, the Navy, while describing its difficulty in obtaining needed planes and aircraft engines, noted that from the beginning of the war in Europe to July 31st 1915, 288 airplanes (valued at 1.8 million dollars) and over $650,000 worth of airplane parts had been exported by American companies overseas to Europe.392 Here also, the Navy articulated its vision for the limitations on how it intended to utilize aircraft tactically. The Navy specifically stated that its institutional purview is the sea, and that it did not intend to fly aircraft extensively over land, reflecting both the limited capability of the new machines, and also a limited vision on the part of naval leaders.
“It is not in the purview of the Navy to utilize air craft except in connection with the fleet or for strictly naval purposes. It is because the Navy intends to restrict its air craft to over-sea service or as eyes of the fleet that it has not asked for as large an appropriation as would have been required if it had in view, as some erroneously suppose, the use of these new scouts of the air on land as well as on water. Land utilization is not a function
391 Ibid, pg. 40 392 Ibid, pg. 40-42
154 of the Navy. The Navy is an institution afloat and must leave land flying to other departments and agencies.”393
While European Armies were increasingly driving demand for aircraft technology, this newfound ability to fight from the air impacted the trajectory of the war much less than did the submarine. In describing the lessons learned from the war up to that point, the General Board tells of the ‘spectacular’ successes of submarines, although it should be noted that these successes were attributed to the novelty of the submarine, as well as to surprise, rather than to any inherent combat superiority. The Board reports that allied navies had been learning how to defend against submarine attacks, and it was emphatic that, in terms of naval combat, the battleship remained supreme. Additionally, the utilization of submarines against merchant shipping on the part of the Germans had begun, and up to mid 1915, had sunk 183 merchant vessels and 175 trawlers.394
The General Board appeared at this time optimistic that such losses were not fatal to the allied naval effort; a view that would turn out to be short lived. The Navy, much as it sought the ability to build its own aircraft, also had begun to design its own submarines. These vessels had generally been designed and built by private sector companies, yet after almost a decade of experimentation and use, the Navy believed that it had the needed experience to design its own submarines, and bid out the construction process.395 Given these successes on the part of the
German submarines, the U.S. Navy sought to improve the capabilities of their own submarines, seeking to increase their size and radius of operation. The Navy called for construction of a large fleet submarine of over 1000 tons displacement, describing such a vessel as the first of its kind
393 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 796. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, pg. 42 394 Ibid, pg. 74-75 395 Ibid, pg. 318
155 worldwide.396 In calling for increased submarine construction, the Navy urged Congress to take the wartime developments in Europe into consideration, specifically in terms of the impact of the submarine. Congress responded enthusiastically, by passing the largest naval appropriations bill in American History.397
Furthermore, the Navy responded to how the war altered its threat environment by seeking longer-term construction and appropriation programs. Previously, the Navy made annual recommendations and Congress would make annual appropriations. Yet, this process generally resulted in partisan wrangling, consuming a large amount of effort and man-hours in the process.
Consequently, the Navy altered its approach and requested a five-year building program, which was described as “a distinct innovation.”
“Thorough consideration of the present and future requirements of the service has led to the recommendation of the five-year program, to which reference is made in my report of this year. The adoption of a continuing program by the executive department of the Government is a distinct innovation. No previous administration has espoused a program looking to meet the needs of the service beyond the current year, and, as the foregoing résumé of recommendations demonstrates so conclusively, the only continuing program which has heretofore existed, that of the General Board, has, almost without exception, been disregarded by both the legislative and executive departments of the Government.”398
In addition to the attempt to institute long-term building programs, the Navy was pursuing other organizational innovations. This was primarily focused on building the Navy’s cooperative relationship with civilian scientists as well as with the Army.399 The Navy recognized that much
396 Ibid, pg. 93 397 Ibid. 398 Ibid. 399 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 26-27
156 of the initial technological innovations and inventions that it appropriated for its purposes had their origins in the private sector.
However, the Navy viewed these developments generally as needing improvement and perfection, a process that took place within the Navy. The Navy sought a way to institutionalize and streamline the process whereby it could utilize the natural talent, and inventive genius present within American society. However, it found itself without any capability to offer compensation for such efforts on the part of civilian scientists.
“One of the imperative needs of the Navy is facilities for utilizing the natural inventive genius of the country to meet the new conditions of warfare as illustrated by the lessons of the war in Europe. When new engines and new devices came to our notice in the summer, I determined to establish a department of inventions and development to which all ideas and suggestions from the service or from civilian inventors could be referred for determination as to whether they were practical enough for us to take up and perfect. Some of the greatest improvements utilized by the Navy came from civilian inventors and civilian engineers. It was a civilian who gave us the Monitor, who built the first submarine, who mastered the science of flight, who perfected wireless communication, who invented the gyroscope compass, electric steering gear and electrical propulsion, and silk floss life preservers. Most of the developments of the larger naval ships, throbbing with electricity and delicate engines of all sorts, were perfected by naval officers. There has been a feeling among civilians that their suggestions did not receive friendly consideration from naval experts. This feeling was not well founded, but it was widespread, and doubtless grew up because there was no well-organized method of getting the naval expert and civilian expert together. How can the Navy obtain the united service of civilian and service experts? There was no provision of law authorizing the payment even of the necessary expenses of civilians whose patriotism might impel them to serve their country by helping in the improvement of the Navy. Indeed, there is a congressional prohibition against the use of public money for such purpose.”400
In an attempt to rectify this problem, the Navy sought the assistance of Thomas Edison, asking him to lead a board consisting of members of eleven leading scientific societies. Called the
Naval Consulting Board, this body would be a voluntary one, depending on the patriotism and willingness of those involved to offer their services in exchange for nothing other than the
400 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 796. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, pg. 45-46
157 gratitude of the Navy, and the American people.401 Thus by 1915, roughly two years prior to
American entry into the war, the Navy found itself awash with innovation, both technological and organizational.
Innovation and related efforts to develop and obtain newer and better technologies for Naval use continued, as did efforts to improve the organizational structure managing this process. With oil firmly established as the new fuel of naval vessels of all types, a level of urgency related to ensuring supply began to develop. The Navy expected future oil requirements to be over 6 million barrels per annum in peacetime, and estimated a need of triple that amount in the event of war.402 In 1913 the Navy requested assurances from the Department of the Interior that such a supply would be available before definitively altering ship design to use only oil as fuel. The
Department of the Interior had replied that while it was most likely to be necessary for the Navy to own and develop its own reserves, existing supplies would be adequate to cover the needs of the Navy for the next decade.403
However, the agreement between the Navy Department and the Department of the Interior on the issue of naval oil reserves prompted an articulation in the 1916 annual report of the difficulties experienced in naval efforts to obtain legal ownership of the previously set aside tracts of oil producing land. These difficulties stemmed primarily from Congress, which according to the
Navy had turned a blind eye to the need for naval reserves.
“Since the withdrawal of September, 1909, scores of bills have been introduced in Congress bearing upon the withdrawal and the administration and disposition of the public lands containing oil and gas deposits, but few of them have recognized the Navy’s
401 Ibid, pg. 46 402 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 31 403 Ibid.
158 rights and none of them have offered adequate protection to the deposits of oil which have been set aside for the exclusive use and benefit of the Navy.”404
The Navy explicitly outlined the various factors that had complicated the process by which it hoped to establish legal and physical control over the various naval oil reserves. In this commentary the position of the navy was as clear as its frustration, and it was evident that the
Navy saw Congress as acting against its interests.
“The status of the naval petroleum reserves is now complicated by the following conditions: 1. The existence of numerous claimants to these lands whose claims are asserted notwithstanding the provision of the Pickett Act, which were initiated in defiance of the withdrawal order or are more or less fraudulent. 2. The suits in progress, about to be instituted, or contemplated. 3. The proposed legislative action which in the form of the “general leasing bill” (H.R. 406) passed the House of Representatives and is to be considered by the Senate when it meets.
This “general leasing bill” passed the House of Representatives but was so amended by the Senate Committee on the Public Lands as to omit all reference to coal lands and, as presented to the Senate was virtually an act nullifying the decision of the Supreme Court in the Mid-West case, abolishing the naval petroleum reserves, dismissing all suits instituted, and leasing or patenting outright to the claimants the lands claimed. This bill was so amended in spite of the fact that, first, the Navy Department fully presented its claims; second, that the Department of Justice pointed out that few of the beneficiaries possessed even equitable claims, that many were fraudulent, and that the chief beneficiaries were very large corporations and not the poor, hard-working prospector pictured by the oil-land claimants; and third, that individuals pointed out that many of the claimants had already recovered in the value of the oil extracted far more money than they had expended, and further that some of them had willfully and irreparably damage the oil-bearing formations. It is to be hoped the litigation will be soon terminated and that Congress will turn a deaf ear to all pleas to give relief to those who have no legal claim to the Naval reserve lands.”405
In making its case for naval control over these reserves, the Navy clearly articulated the many reasons why oil was the fuel of the future, including more speed per unit of fuel, absolute control over smoke emission, greater radius of action, reduction of fire room manpower by over half, increased ability to refuel at sea with a consequent improvement of fleet efficiency by twenty-
404 Ibid, pg. 31-33 405 Ibid, pg. 33-34
159 five percent, greater flexibility in acceleration and deceleration, and also reduction in likelihood of a ship sinking due to the increased ability to subdivide the ship.406
The Navy continued by describing the broad impact on national security of building an oil- burning fleet. Amazingly, the Navy explicitly charged Congress with putting forward legislation that was designed to benefit not only individuals, but also large corporations (presumably
Standard Oil). For the Navy, failure on the part of Congress to act accordingly to protect these reserves for naval use would have been a “national calamity”:
“The conditions may be succinctly stated as follows: An oil-burning naval vessel is incomparably superior to a coal burning vessel of the same class. If this Republic is to maintain a Navy, it is worse than useless to have that Navy made up of inferior vessels. We have adopted the policy of building exclusively oil-burning vessels, relying for the future supply of fuel oil upon naval petroleum reserves created under the authority of an act of Congress. This future supply of fuel oil for the fleet is threatened by legislation designed to benefit certain large corporations, other companies and individuals possessing no legal title to the lands claimed.
Shall such legislation be enacted, thereby forcing the Navy to decide whether it shall continue to build oil-burning vessels, which will depend for their usefulness to the country in time of danger upon an uncertain commercial supply of fuel, or build coal- burning vessels which will be admittedly inferior to those of a nations that can control the supply of oil? or
Shall the national good be placed above private interests without legal rights? The legal rights of claimants can be recognized and cared for without prejudice to the rights of the Navy and the need of the country for an adequate available supply of fuel oil for the fleet. If private parties have any equities that should be preserved, the Navy Department would not stand in the way of adjustment of such rights. But to legislate to give title to oil lands set apart as a naval reserve might jeopardize national defense. Against legislation which would defeat the Naval Reserve orders, affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Navy Department has protested and will continue to protest. Failure to oppose any steps to deprive the Navy of these oil reserves would be to neglect the highest interest of the Navy. If oil can not be obtained at reasonable figures now and in future years, the Navy may be compelled to end the construction of oil-burning ships, losing the manifold
406 Ibid, pg. 34
160 advantages which make them superior to those ships which burn coal. Foreign nations, looking to this country and to Mexico for their oil supply, are constructing ships which burn oil. It would be a national calamity for this country to fail to preserve the oil reserves already set aside and to find and set aside other oil-bearing reserves. Present local interests in producing oil ought not to be permitted to stand in the way of this conservation for preparedness, particularly in cases where those asking relief have no legal claim to the lands for which they are seeking titles. National preparedness in an oil reserve is essential to the highest efficiency of the greater Navy.”407
The Navy was not pleased by the efforts of Congress to support individual and corporate claims to tracts of land within the boundaries of the oil reserves, and disagreements on this issue dragged out well into the 1920s. The story of competitive efforts to obtain access to these reserves is long and fascinating, involving corruption, scandal, the forced removal of Mammoth
Oil Company from the Teapot Dome reserve (Reserve no. 3),408 the investigations of the Walsh committee, and even several important oil men fleeing to Europe to avoid providing testimony and possible prosecution.409 Unfortunately, the large majority of this story lies outside the scope of this work.410
As America crept closer to war, preparations for such a development by the Naval Consulting
Board intensified. The Navy had convinced Congress to allow for monetary compensation of those scientists working for the Board with the appropriation of $25,000 for such a purpose.411
Also, $1.5 million was appropriated for the construction of an experimental laboratory for the explicit use of the Board. The focus of this experimental laboratory consisted of gun erosion, torpedo motive power, the gyroscope, submarine guns, protection against submarines, torpedo and mine attack, improvement in submarine attachments, improvement and development of
407 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 35-36 408 Ise, John. The United States Oil Policy. New York: Arno Press, 1972, pg. 369 409 Ibid, pg. 382 410 For a detailed account of the issue of the Naval oil reserves, see Ise, John. The United States Oil Policy. New York: Arno Press, 1972, chapter 25 411 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 67-68
161 submarine defense, storage batteries and propulsion, aeroplanes and aircraft, and radio installation research. 412
1916 also witnessed the creation of the committees of industrial preparedness, which consisted of over 240 members, with members of various academic and business societies from each of the states as well as the territory of Alaska and the District of Columbia. These individuals were considered associate members of the Naval Consulting Board, and were specifically engaged in providing an industrial inventory of the various materials and supplies that the United States would likely need during a war. These state level committees were sub-units of the Organization for Industrial Preparedness, and their directors were officially designated “State Directors” of the
Organization.413 Secretary Daniels sums up the purpose of these committees.
“This means that if it were ever necessary to mobilize to defend our country against foreign aggression, at least this number of concerns might, when prepared by this Government with proper gauges and drawings, be counted on at short notice to transfer the energies and machinery of industrial peace into the manufacturing of munitions of war. In other words, it means that America can never be caught off her guard with an insufficient number of shells and cartridges and other implements of defense, as was the case with some of the countries of Europe at the beginning of the present conflict.”414
The committees of industrial preparedness shortly became subsumed under the Council of
National Defense, which was created to coordinate the industry and resources of the United
States in preparation for its probable entrance into the war. Throughout 1916 and 1917 the
United States created multiple committees, boards, and other bureaucratic entities designed to provide organizational leadership and manage the war effort. The Council of National Defense would not be the last. The Council of National Defense was replaced with the War Industries
412 Ibid, pg. 69 413 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 68 414 Ibid, pg. 68
162 Board on July 28, 1917, within which, the Petroleum War Service Committee had replaced the earlier Petroleum Advisory Committee.415 The War Industries Board, under its chairman, A.C.
Bedford, would become the most powerful of all the wartime government agencies.416 Under a month later, Congress passed the Food and Fuel Control Act (known as the Lever Act), which gave the president broad powers over the direction of the petroleum industry through wartime planning.417 Through the authority granted under this legislation, President Wilson created the
U.S. Fuel Administration and within that organization was created an Oil Division, headed by
Mark Requa.418 Requa, who had been one of the leading voices of the Independent Oil
Producers Agency, was widely respected within the oil industry. In cooperation with Bedford,
Requa managed to introduce a “voluntary” crude oil price ceiling, regulations on wellhead prices, government involvement in exploration and production, regulation of market entry by new firms, mandatory conservation, exemptions from military service for drilling personnel, price limits on certain drilling equipment, as well as special tax breaks for production.419 These provisions covered the period after May 17, 1918, and were extended until after the war.
In 1916, the Navy began to express its disappointment in the progress of aeronautical development. The Navy indicated that much of the progress in aeronautics had taken place within the framework of traditional ‘over-land’ flight, and that there had been a particular absence of progress in the specific area of ‘sea-flight.’ Its description of naval aeronautics emphasized the several peculiarities of this type of manned flight, including the differences in
415 Jr., Robert L. Bradley. Oil, Gas & Government: The U.S. Experience. 2 vols. Vol. 1: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, pg. 224 416 Ibid 417 Ibid, pg. 225 418 Ibid 419 Jr., Robert L. Bradley. Oil, Gas & Government: The U.S. Experience. 2 vols. Vol. 1: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, pg. 227-28
163 landing and takeoff and a lack of development of sea planes.420 The Navy was working to address these deficiencies and by this time had three ships, the North Carolina, the West
Virginia, and the Washington, fitted with catapults for launching airplanes at sea. These ships were cooperating in fleet work to develop ‘the tactics of aircraft at sea.’421
Submarine development in 1916 also experienced some difficulties, albeit less serious ones. The previous year the Navy had completed its own design for a fleet submarine, but did not receive any bids to build the vessel from the various submarine building companies. By November of
1916 the Navy had altered its design and opened bids for submarines nos. 78 to 104 (the 27 coastal submarines approved in August of that year) and nos. 105 to 106 (the fleet submarines).
While the Navy was hopeful to build one of the fleet submarines in a Navy Yard, the two 800 ton fleet submarines described here were to be designed and built by outside contractors.422 In submarine construction, although the Navy had begun to attempt construction itself in a minimal number of instances, the service was very much reliant on a small number of companies, namely the Electric Boat Company, the Lake Torpedo Boat Company, and the California Shipbuilding
Company of Longbeach. This was often the case with cutting edge technologies and can be seen in aeronautics, submarines, steel armor for battleships and general battleship construction.
While the U.S. Navy was pushing forward in the oil-fueled technologies of both aircraft and submarines, the first of the all oil-burning battleships had completed its trial run successfully and
420 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 88 421 Ibid. 422 Ibid, pg. 307
164 had joined the fleet.423 Other demonstrations of the onset of the age of oil had appeared, namely, the plans for the first large oil tanker built to the specifications necessary to sail with the fleet.424
Also, the Navy’s almost obsessive emphasis on oil supply became justified in light of a sudden jump in prices in mid-1916. In this matter, much of the Navy’s planning and efforts to obtain long-term supply contracts at reasonable rates began to pay off.
“The sudden advance in the price of fuel oil, gasoline and other products of crude petroleum has been the subject of much discussion, even to the extent of congressional inquiries; but, long before these investigations began, action had been taken toward laying in large stocks under the advantageous contracts then in force.
During the year, oil was purchased at 64 cents per barrel delivered at Port Arthur, Texas; and, prior to the expiration of those contracts, practically all tankage under Navy control was filled to capacity.
This oil, taken in bulk from the contractor’s pipe line, cost the Government less than one- third of the price that would have been asked for the same oil delivered at the various fuel-oil stations under the prevailing market prices. At the end of June 1916 there was in storage more than half a million barrels. Navy tankers were used in delivering a large part of this.” 425
The Navy had consistently expressed its concern about oil availability since 1913, and in the process it had taken multiple measures to build up storage capability as well as supply. The
Navy was continually working to improve its technological capabilities, most specifically in technologies related to oil fueled propulsion. Large oil burners and turbine technology for the battleships and destroyers, heavy oil internal combustion and electric propulsion for submarines, and small gasoline powered engines for aircraft were the new weapons changing the nature of the battlefield. All of these technologies are developed prior to the outbreak of war in 1914.
423 Ibid, pg. 341 424 Ibid, pg. 308 425 Ibid, pg. 349
165 While the large capital ships were certainly improvements on their predecessors, it was the new technologies of submarine vessels and aircraft that altered the dimensions of armed conflict.
Between aircraft and submarines, it was the submarines that had the most dramatic impact on the
First World War. On land the war had ground to a halt in the form of trench warfare, and aircraft of the time were simply not powerful enough to alter that situation. As the war dragged on, the
British blockade of Germany and Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare response were where the battle truly balanced. In February of 1917 Germany ordered the resumption of this effort and by April the United States would formally enter the war.426
The American Navy: 1917-1918
Just prior to its entry into World War I, in March, Congress passed its last pre-war appropriations bill. That bill called for three battleships, a battle cruiser, three scout cruisers, fifteen destroyers, and eighteen submarines.427 This building program represented an idealized version of what the
Navy needed prior to actual war experience. Upon its entry into the war in April of 1917, the
United States was immediately focused on the submarine problem and required more ships specifically designed to deal with that threat. While all of the great navies had built submarines, only Germany had truly utilized the vessels to the fullest extent of their potential as offensive weapons. The clamor and uproar over the nature of the submarine included questions of morals, ethics, international law and war. The Navy needed to provide certain protections to merchant ships, which were being sunk without warning.
426 Miller, Nathan. The U.S. Navy: A History. 3rd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, pg. 182 427 Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America's Military-Industrial Complex. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1979, pg. 209
166 “Many of the problems encountered have been due to the novel developments of marine warfare, and particularly the breach by Germany of the accepted principles of international law as regards naval war and the indiscriminate sinking of merchant ships without warning. As a minor case may be cited the fact that life-saving appliances and methods suited to recognized conditions of naval warfare had to be materially modified in the case of vessels primarily engaged in opposing submarines. To cite a major instance, the Navy had a moderate provision of guns and ammunition for arming naval auxiliaries to be taken into service in time of war. When Germany undertook early this year the indiscriminate sinking of merchant vessels, it soon became evident that all merchant vessels should be armed and ready to fight submarines. This involved not only providing guns but also providing skilled gun-crews. The Navy has taken care of this, the guns being placed first on the most important merchant vessels and on others as fast as available.
The nature of the necessary naval operations today has emphasized the necessity for vessels of greatest value against the submarine. In view of united naval opinion that, all things considered, the destroyer is the most desirable type for this purpose, particular efforts have been devoted to increasing the number of our destroyers.”428
The navy utilized emergency provisions to alter the nature of construction, putting more emphasis on the destroyer. This need for destroyers was so great that the Navy was willing to delay further construction of capital ships.429 Given the limited contact between belligerent fleets, and the massive destruction of the U-boat campaign, the effort to combat submarines was most vital. In combination with German efforts in the air, the U-boat campaign represented
German dominance of the new dimensions of warfare. In the spring of 1917 the British fleet was in a state of crisis, and they explicitly acknowledged that these two new dimensions of warfare could destroy traditional British naval dominance. This message is conveyed to the Admiralty by Sir John Jellicoe.
“In a memorandum to First Lord of the Admiralty Eric Geddes near the end of April 1917, with the Americans just in the war, Jellicoe wrote of the necessity to make clear to His Majesty’s government “the very serious nature of the naval position….the real fact of the matter is this: We are carrying on this war…as if we had the absolute command of the sea. We have not—and have not had for many months…or anything approaching.” The Grand Fleet remained “absolute masters of the situation as far as surface ships are
428 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 872. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917, pg. 3 429 Ibid, pg. 28-29
167 concerned,” but in the aggregate, practical German control of the skies above the North Sea together with the rapidly growing enemy submarine offensive had stretched the Royal Navy beyond its breaking point. There were simply too few resources to cover too many commitments. Naval policy had to be changed and reshaped “to conform with the fact that we have neither the undisputed command of the sea, nor even a reasonable measure of this command.”…
Britain’s loss of command did not imply that mastery had shifted to Germany. But by the spring of 1917 Germany clearly ruled the skies above the North Sea and the depths beneath it, their submarine campaign now extending into the Irish Sea and out into the eastern Atlantic as well.”430
The seriousness of the U-boat threat prompted intensified efforts to counter the vessels. The
Naval Consulting Board had increased the frequency of its meetings in an attempt to find some sort of solution to the problem.431 The most effective weapon developed to combat the submarine was the depth charge, although other means for dealing with submarines were being explored, including submarine nets and aerial bombardment with specialized shells.432 While the
U-boat campaign and respective counter-efforts get much of the attention, aviation was also witnessing ramped up efforts and qualitative improvements.
The amount of appropriated monies in the previous year for naval aviation was a staggering
$63,633,000.433 Although the Navy had suffered the unfortunate destruction of the Pensacola flying school by a hurricane, it had made substantial progress in the development of an American engine powerful enough for its purposes. The ‘Liberty’ engine, which had been developed by the Aircraft Board, had shown itself to be satisfactory in preliminary tests.434 Development in aircraft technologies was being promoted with cross military cooperation among the allies
430 Rose, Lisle A. The Age of Navalism 1890-1918. Vol. 1, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007, pg. 237-238 431 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 872. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917, pg. 70-71 432 Ibid, pg. 225-229 433 Ibid, pg. 35 434 Ibid, pg. 36
168 fighting Germany. The Americans had been testing an engine of French design, although they found it lacking. The Navy had also sent technical officers to visit England, France, and Italy, to study the latest aeronautical developments.435 The importance of aircraft to warfare was beginning to have organizational impact. It was clear that both services, the Army and the Navy, would operate independent flying divisions, and the Aircraft Board was created to coordinate between the two services as well as with the civilian sector. Its membership was divided into thirds representing those different interests and, unsurprisingly, the Aircraft Board did not recommend a separate aeronautic department.436
The Navy also, in its 1917 report, reflected on its decision to transition its fleet from coal to oil, and commented on the performance of these new machines in their first real wartime application.
Analysis of this performance prompted a reiteration of the Navy’s position regarding the naval oil reserves issue:
“The present war has demonstrated that our Navy to be of the maximum efficiency must be composed of oil-burning units. The splendid work which has been accomplished by our destroyers could not have been carried out by coal-burning vessels. Neither could other tactical units of the fleet be constructed with their necessary military characteristics except by the employment of oil-burning boilers or internal-combustion engines. No other power is in sight and we can not assume that other power suitable for ship propulsion will be discovered.
In order that the Navy may be justified in building oil-burning vessels, no matter what may be their military advantages, it must be assured of the future supply or fuel. This supply has been a most serious problem during the present war for the European nations, which are blessed with the natural supply which this country enjoys. But the supply of oil in the ground is being rapidly depleted and, according to the most reliable estimates, will be exhausted in less than 20 years.
In order that this vital supply of oil might be assured, the President of the United States set aside Naval Petroleum Reserves No. 1 and No. 2 in California and No. 3 in Wyoming. Of these No. 2 only is a proven field. The orders creating these reserves stated that the area “shall be held for the exclusive use or benefit of the United States Navy.” The validity of the withdrawals was upheld by the Supreme Court in its decision in the
435 Ibid, pg. 37 436 Ibid, pg. 38
169 Midwest case in February, 1915. In the belief that the question of future supply was thus settled, the naval program has provided almost exclusively for oil-burning vessels.”437
For the American Navy, as well as the other great navies, even before the war had ended there was an understanding that the new oil-based technologies would dominate war in the future. If one intended to have a great navy, one needed a rather large supply of oil with which to operate it. Figures for the U.S. Navy’s consumption of fuel oil and other products such as gasoline in
1918 are staggering: 4.5 million barrels of oil fuel, and over 11.5 million gallons of gasoline.438
Modern warfare was absolutely dependent upon oil-based machines for transportation, and in a few short years this technology had gone from experimental to central.
“The war on sea and in the air as well as on land has depended so much on transportation that it can be laid down as a basic principle that no nation that does not control an adequate oil supply can successfully maintain its forces in the field; the Navy must be supplied with fuel oil and lubricants and the air forces with gasoline and lubricating oil if operations are to be successfully conducted.
The Nation and the Navy can view with pride the work of our ships, but our vessels, especially the destroyers and other patrol craft engaged in antisubmarine warfare, could not have proved so effective if they had not been equipped with oil-burning boilers or internal-combustion engines. Our most powerful dreadnaughts are oil burners, as will be the huge new battle cruisers. That the Navy may be justified in building oil-burning vessels possessing such great military advantages, it must be assured of an adequate future supply of fuel. Oil supply was one of the most serious problems of the war for European nations which do not possess the natural sources found in this country. However, this resource is not unlimited and if the present increase in consumption continues it will not be many years before it is depleted.”439
With substantial increase in demand for all types of fuel,440 the issue of supply was of serious concern for the U.S. Navy. However, comparatively, the American situation was much less dire, due to its large domestic supply of all types of fuel. In addition to the problem of obtaining an adequate supply of the various fuels themselves, the Navy also found itself short on the requisite
437 Ibid, pg. 59 438 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 1766. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918, pg. 99 439 Ibid, pg. 138-139 440 Ibid, pg. 634-635
170 fueling vessels, particularly for fuel oil. In an effort to rectify this problem the Navy found it necessary to requisition six vessels of the oil tanker variety from the commercial oil suppliers.441
The fuel problem was made worse by the increasing intensity of Germany’s U-boat campaign.
In April 1917 alone U-boats sent over 860,000 tons of shipping to the bottom of the ocean, and concerns about tankers being sunk by U-boats had prompted the construction of an oil pipeline across Scotland:
“The destruction of tankers carrying oil to our own ships and the British fleet in the North Sea gave much anxiety, and in order to avert the submarine menace in sending the tankers around the north of Scotland it was determined by the American and British Navy to build a pipe line across Scotland. Our naval experts undertook the big task, and thereby reduced the distance and danger of supplying the fleet with oil.”442
In the end, the answer to the threat of the U-boat was not technological, as much as it was organizational. The convoy system, by grouping ships together, was able to substantially reduce the effectiveness of U-boats. While the convoy system was operational, from the summer of
1917443 to the end of the war, the allies were able to reduce by around half the number of vessels sunk by German U-boats. From September 1917 to April 1918 submarines sank 548 allied ships. From May 1st 1918 to November 1918 the number of allied vessels sunk by U-boats decreased to 252. 444
While the convoy system was strategically successful for the allies, the U.S. Navy continued to seek technological answers to the tactical problem of destroying submarines at sea. This included research into electronic devices designed to locate subs in cooperation with General
441 Ibid, pg. 638 442 Ibid, pg. 12 443 Ibid, pg. 14-15 444 Rose, Lisle A. The Age of Navalism 1890-1918. Vol. 1, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007, pg. 260-261
171 Electric and the Western Electric and Submarine Company.445 Additionally, the Navy was developing improved bombs for the purpose of aerial bombardment of submarines by aviators.
“Formerly, bombs were of a more or less delicate nature and impact with the surface of the water was sufficient to detonate them. A submarine running below the surface was therefore practically immune from damage from aircraft attack; but these bombs can be set to explode at considerable depth below the surface and in all they make the aeroplane a much more formidable antisubmarine asset than ever before.446
By 1918 the allies had also turned to submarines themselves, as well as aircraft, as tools to combat the German U-boats. Regarding the development of the naval air service, Secretary
Daniels articulated the impressive growth of that area along with its increased needs. While in
July of 1917 there were only 45 naval aviators, by that same date the next year, there were 823 active aviators, over 2,500 student officers, and over 400 ground officers involved in naval aviation.447
The Liberty engine continued to see increased use, including in an improved flying boat, and cemented itself as the preferred aircraft engine of the Navy during the war.448 Rose describes the air services of both Britain and the U.S. as having ‘swelled to enormous’ size, and describes their
‘chief contribution’ as being the ‘drastic curtailment of submarine operations near convoys and in coastal areas.’449 Rose’s summary of the massive growth and role of the air services is fitting:
“Perhaps the chief contribution made by Allied aircraft was their drastic curtailment of submarine operations near convoys and in coastal areas. “When aircraft could provide aerial cover for a convoy, the convoy was virtually immune.” British and American
445 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 1766. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918, pg. 21 446 Ibid, pg. 52-53 447 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 1766. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918, pg. (page number needed) 448 Ibid, pg. 511-512 449 Rose, Lisle A. The Age of Navalism 1890-1918. Vol. 1, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007, pg. 274-275
172 airmen detected enemy submarines in a broad arc from the southern North Sea through the Channel and the Dover Straits around to the Irish Sea. Initially, U-boats operating at the limit of their range in the eastern Atlantic off Ireland were immune to detection and assault from the air due to the limited range of British and U.S. aircraft. But the inauguration of the convoy system forced the U-boats to seek independently steaming prey in the coastal waters around the British Isles. Here flying boats, the smaller seaplanes, and land-based naval aircraft, together with reconnaissance blimps, could spot them readily and send them beneath the surface for hours at a time while shipping was rerouted or nearby antisubmarine vessels were directed against them. The average daily strength of the Royal Air Force (RAF) against the U-boats during the last six months of the war was impressive: 85 large flying boats, 216 seaplanes, 189 land-based aircraft, and 75 airships. America’s naval-aviation buildup in the European theater was nothing short of stupendous. On April 6, 1917, the day Congress formally declared war against Germany, the United States Navy and Marine Corps possessed 54 aircraft—45 seaplanes, 6 flying boats, and 3 land based aircraft. Nineteen months later, on Armistice Day, the navy and marine corps squadrons had 2,107 machines in hand: 695 seaplanes, 1,170 flying boats, and 242 land-based aircraft. The navy established hasty, forced-draft training programs on university campuses, on new air bases, and even in private industry. Most of the aviators and ground-support personnel were naval reservists. Twenty-five hundred officers and twenty-two thousand enlisted men flew or serviced the aircraft, auxiliary kite balloons, and the 3 dirigibles operating from three large bases in France and Britain aw well as smaller installations in the Azores. U.S. naval aircraft flew more than three million nautical miles and attacked and damaged a dozen U-boats. Not only did American seaplanes and flying boats provide essential aerial reconnaissance and protection over the convoys, but land-based naval and marine corps aircraft also participated (with the RAF’s new Handley Page heavy bombers) in major air raids against German U-boat facilities at Zeebrugge, Ostend, and Brugge, and for a time air units near Calais and Dunkirk directly supported the British Army in Flanders.”450
By the end of the war, allied militaries possessed multiple new tools for the purpose of projecting military power. The submarine dramatically altered the balance of sea power, and while
Germany never truly threatened to dominate the sea and control it the way the British had, it certainly threatened to limit the control the British could exercise. If Germany had practiced unrestricted U-boat warfare beginning in 1914 and maintaining it throughout the war, it is
450 Ibid.
173 possible that the British would have conceded, or otherwise come to terms before the Americans entered the war.451
Aircraft too altered the nature of sea power. The impressive show of skill made in the air above the battlefields of Europe by the (often quite young) aviators of the First World War mark the first effective use of manned flight in combat in human history. The way in which flight would change naval tactics and strategy were still only beginning to be understood. The light weight and limited carrying capacity of these early planes fundamentally limited the amount of damage that they could cause. Regardless, it was obvious to participants and observers alike that these oil-based technologies had dramatically changed what warfare would look like in the future.
The American Navy demonstrated several characteristics in the time period covered in this chapter. While the technological breakthroughs that so dramatically impacted this period and its wars were almost always invented by private scientists and engineers, they were generally purchased, tested and substantially improved by the Navy. Utilization of liquid fuel oil in the private sector demonstrated its usefulness to the Navy, and the Navy demonstrated its ability to improve and innovate in that area of technology to achieve its standard of readiness for warmaking. The Navy consistently demonstrated its ability to push forward the bounds of technology through experimental laboratories and cooperative agreements with other military branches, civilian scientists, and inventors.
The Navy also found a need to innovate organizationally, by providing career opportunities for those in the engineering sector of the Navy, as well as through the creation of subject matter
451 Alternatively, it must be said that such a maneuver would likely have simply dragged the United States into the war sooner, and hastened a German defeat. This is representative of the inherent danger of counterfactual arguments.
174 specific committees and boards designed to direct efforts at mastering new technological developments. While in the future a third branch of the U.S. military would be created, that was still a long way off, and both the Army and the Navy, through their cooperation in the form of the Aircraft Board, articulated a desire to control aviation within their branches.
The Navy demonstrated several characteristics consistently throughout this energy transition.
First, there was a desire to test out all available options and methods for fueling ships, and any possible improvement or advantage that could be gained was investigated. Secondly, as the benefits of oil-fueled machinery became more widely known, organizational bodies were created to streamline the learning process. Third, they found it necessary to utilize both the old form of propulsion (coal) along with the new (oil) for a time as a bridge from one era to the next. This occurred for several reasons.
First, the perfection of methods to burn oil developed over time and it was first used as an auxiliary to the already established coal system. Second, there was an inherent uncertainty regarding the necessary supply of oil and dual fuel ships were seen as an insurance policy against possible disruption or depletion of oil supply. Third, there was already a fleet that burned coal, and construction of an all-oil fleet would take a long time (25-30 years) so even as the Navy decided that all its future ships would burn strictly oil, they were still in possession of a large number of ships that used coal. These factors of technological improvement and change, uncertainty of supply and stability of new energy sources, and periods of overlap between energy systems, are likely to be common in any energy transition. Fundamentally, energy systems are central to the socio-economic-military orders of humans, and replacing one with another entails
175 risks, and rewards. The United States found itself as the world’s leading producer of a newly recognized dominant form of energy used for machine power and ship, submarine, and ultimately aircraft propulsion. This was indeed a fortuitous position, one not shared by the
European great powers.
176 5 The British Navy’s transition from Coal to Oil: 1904-1918
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the process of the British Navy’s transition from coal to oil in fueling their ships. The historical period under examination here is one in which Britain was at the apex of its power and global influence, due primarily to the British Navy. As such Britain was at the forefront of research and development of new naval technologies. More so than the other great powers, Britain was heavily reliant on naval power for national defense and the maintenance of economic relations with its empire. This reliance, and fear of rising competitors, spurred Britain to consistently strive for naval dominance, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
To understand the nature of the transition from coal to oil by the British Navy, the author will address the same questions that were explored in the American case. How did the emergence of a new, improved source of motive power affect the British Navy? Did the Admiralty resist such change? Did the British Navy embrace or resist new technologies? Did the British respond to developments in civil society or the private sector, or did it develop new energy technologies on its own? What degree of cooperation existed between the Royal Navy and the private sector in the realm of technological development and innovation? Was there disagreement or consensus among the various parts of the Navy? How did this energy transition impact the manner in which the Navy operated?
As in the previous chapter, this case study will briefly describe the British energy situation around the turn of the century, with a particular emphasis on the relationship between the British
Navy and coal. From there, the focus turns to the transition from coal to oil, both before and during the First World War. The emergence of engines powered by fossil fuels had already
177 transformed the face of naval power. The use of coal-fired steam engines in the mid-to-late
1800’s had put an end to the age of sail.
This technological innovation favored Britain far more than it did any other great power navy.
The British Islands were rich in coal, and in particular, they were rich in the right type of coal.
Welsh steam coal possessed the most desirable qualities for burning in marine steam engines; it did not burn too hot, it was not too dirty and lastly it was not too fragile.452 Tests by the
Admiralty in 1848-1849 conducted by Sir Henry De La Bèche and Dr. Lyon Playfair demonstrated the superiority of Welsh coal, and these results were corroborated for the British during the Crimean War.453 Britain’s first sail-less ship was built in 1869.454 The diffusion of coal mining proceeded slowly to areas outside Britain.455 The British dominated the coal industry throughout the period, producing more than all other nations combined up to 1880.456
Production of Welsh coal in the area of Rhondda’s Valleys grew dramatically, with thirty-seven collieries by 1861, and four million tons of coal exported by 1874.457
The technological developments that accompanied increased use of steam powered engines and iron ships imposed new advantages, as well as new difficulties. Difficulties arose in management of reserve parts and tools, storage and record-keeping, and forced revision of naval
452 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003. pg. 12 453 Ibid, pg. 13 454 Brodie, Bernard. Sea Power in the Machine Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941, pg. 110-111 455 Smil, Vaclav. Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects. Santa Barbara California: Praeger, 2010, pg. 161 456 Brodie, Bernard. Sea Power in the Machine Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941, pg. 115 457 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 16
178 practices that began in 1875 and dragged on until 1882.458 Increased complexity of naval needs due to technological advancement also drove a need for more labor, complicated and burdened the planning process, and also dramatically altered ship construction processes.459 There were also difficulties in the area of energy technology. Coal presented several problems to the navies that used it. Using coal to fuel ships can best be described as laborious, dirty, dangerous and time consuming. The British Navy was constantly seeking to reduce coaling time and labor via organizational changes, introduction of new equipment, and inter-ship competitions for prestige and prizes.460 The Navy was actively seeking solutions, organizational or technological, to any problem that it viewed as hindering satisfactory performance. This practice reflected sentiment about the relationship between science and war. Former War Office civil servant Sir Norman
Lockyer remarked in a speech in 1902 that
“Every scientific advance is now, and will be in the future more and more, applied to war. It is no longer a question of an armed force with scientific corps; it is a question of an armed force scientific from top to bottom. Thank God the navy has already found this out. Science will ultimately rule all the operations both of peace and war, and therefore the industrial and the fighting population must both have a common ground of education.”461
While negative aspects of using coal were present, and constantly examined, reliance and expenditure on the fuel continued to grow. By 1903-1904 the Admiralty was spending
458 Hamilton, C. I. The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making 1805- 1927. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pg. 160-161 459 Ibid, pg. 162 460 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 16-17; Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo-American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 66 461 Paul Forman, Jose M. Sanchez-Ron, ed. National Military Establishments and the Advancement of Science and Technology: Studies in 20th Century History. edited by Robet S. Cohen, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, pg. 6
179 £1,604,501 per year on coal, equating to 4.79% of “total effective services”.462 Other qualities of the coal industry conferred substantial advantages to Britain. Its domestic supply was seen as a serious strategic advantage in wartime.463 The structure of the coal industry itself in Great
Britain was one that the Admiralty viewed as favorable, meaning diversity in supply and a lack of large coal monopolies.464 Additionally, the British controlled the vast majority of the world’s coaling ports and coal infrastructure.465 This infrastructure had been the strategic vision of
Captain John Charles Ready Colomb, and implementation of construction of British worldwide coaling stations had proceeded under Admiral Sir Alexander Milne.466
“Slowly, link by link,” Britain “Forged a wonderful chain, binding India, the Yellow Sea, Australia, and the Cape to the mother country.” Over a fifty year period, the British government spent an estimated $500 million on acquiring, developing, and fortifying coaling stations. As one British naval authority commented, any power that hoped to compete with the Royal Navy for control of the seas would “have to pour out money like water” to build a logistical infrastructure on a par with that of the British Empire.”467
The British were able to use control of this infrastructure to limit the availability of coal to enemies, as they did during the Russian journey to Japan in 1905.468 Supplementing these advantages was the private fleet of British colliers, the largest in the world.469 The net effect of these conditions allowed the British to do two things; first in normal conditions the Admiralty
462 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 23. Total effective services consist of total naval expenditure minus payments for pension and gratuities. See Brown footnote 57 463 Ibid, pg. 24 464 Ibid, 25-26 465 Brodie, Bernard. Sea Power in the Machine Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941, pg. 116 466 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 52-53 467 Ibid, pg. 76 468 Black, Jeremy. Naval Power: A History of Warfare and The Sea from 1500. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pg. 149 469 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 29
180 could allow the large majority of logistics and fuel supply operations to be managed by the private sector, and secondly the Admiralty could feel secure that in time of war they could take control of the coal industry by force if necessary.470 Thus, around the turn of the century the
British energy situation could not have been any better. Control over a large portion of the world’s coal production (and, moreover, qualitatively superior coal), control over most of the world’s naval coaling infrastructure, and possession of the world’s largest private collier fleet added up to a very secure British navy, and Empire. Yet despite all this, the details of British policymaking reveal very worried British officials, both in the Admiralty and in the Cabinet.
The rising power of Germany and the United States, as well as increased construction from
France and Russia, seemed to threaten Britain’s privileged position.471 The British were losing their enormous lead in naval power, and facing a period of relative decline.472
The British Navy: 1902-1914
The competition in building bigger, faster, more powerful, and more deadly battleships was driven by rapid technological change and improvement in various industrial technologies, including engine design, steel armor techniques, improved steel tube design for big guns, range- finding and automatic gun-aiming technologies. British efforts to maintain her traditional advantage in ship quantity and quality can be seen clearly in expenditures on battleships and first class cruisers, as well as expenditures on naval works.473 British spending on battleships between 1897-1904 almost doubled what was spent between 1889-1896. British spending on
470 Ibid, pg. 40. 471 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 53-54 472 Friedberg, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895- 1905 Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, pg. 152 473 Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pg. 21 and 22
181 first class cruisers in that time period more than tripled. Naval works spending during the same period increased by more than £20,000,000.
Figure 5.1 – British Naval expenditure on battleships and cruisers 1889-1904
(Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pg. 21).
The trajectory of such spending was unsustainable and was decried as early as 1901 by Sir
Michael Hicks Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who claimed it would lead to Britain’s financial ruin.474 By 1903, the First Lord Selborne described Britain’s continued spending increases as reaching the limits of British capabilities, and was subsequently forced to promise dramatic cuts in the naval estimates for the years 1905-1906.475 Selborne continued to warn the
Sea Lords that they must reign in spending and increase efficiency, and was presented with an opportunity to effect real change with the retirement of the First Naval Lord, Lord Walter Kerr,
474 Ibid, pg. 23 475 Ibid, pg. 24-25
182 in 1904.476 Kerr’s replacement, Admiral Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher, was seen as someone who could impose appropriate measures of economy and efficiency on the Navy.477 Additionally he played a substantial role in the decision to transition the British Navy from coal to oil, and had been working to convince Lord Selborne of oil’s advantages since 1901.478
Two of the earliest proponents for burning oil to fuel British naval vessels were J.H. Selwyn and a Mr. Richardson, who convinced the Admiralty to investigate using oil fuel as early as 1865.479
While this trial, as well as others conducted in the United States, demonstrated the increased evaporative efficiency of oil, the technology needed was large and cumbersome. Moreover, the price of the fuel was not competitive with coal, and some of the critical technological components (such as the hardware needed to vaporize the oil for most efficient burning) were still rudimentary.480 Yet by the beginning of the new century the advantages to burning oil were becoming more widely known, and naval minds such as Jack Fisher and the Italian Cuniberti were advocating for the use of oil for naval purposes.481 Those advantages included the following: less fuel per pound of water was evaporated, an ability to pump the fuel for quicker loading, fuel tanks could be more completely filled (up to 11% more fuel per tank by volume), tanks could easily be measured by wall markings or dipsticks, reduction of smoke, ships could more quickly raise steam, more precise control over ship speed, reduction in engine damage due
476 Ibid, pg. 26 477 Ibid, pg. 26 478 Mackay, Ruddock F. Fisher of Kilverstone. London: Oxford University Press, 1973, pg. 269 479 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 42 480 Ibid, pg. 42-43. 481 Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989. See footnote 161 on page 69
183 to less corrosive qualities in oil, and lastly a reduction in the needed crew to manage and maintain the engines.482
Yet, despite the increasingly obvious technical superiority of oil, other factors remained that hindered its adoption, as one would expect of any major technological change. One of the most concerning issues to the Admiralty was risk of fire from oil’s lower flash point.483 Additionally, stowing oil fuel instead of coal was believed to reduce ship defenses from the impact of incoming fire, the force of which was dissipated and absorbed by full bunkers of coal.484 Using oil also required improved construction techniques for ships to prevent leaks, a problem only solved by the introduction of welding. Since oil fuel also needed to be kept warm, requiring heating contributed to the fact that fuel depots for oil were more expensive to build and maintain than coal depots.485
Nonetheless, the British began to investigate the possibility of burning only oil to propel ships of war. Several developments played a role in this decision. The first included new methods of supply, namely the use of large ocean going oil tankers; such tankers were first used by Marcus
Samuel, and this change is described as having ‘revolutionised’ the oil industry.486 Samuel had been developing the Kutei fields in Borneo, and the oil there was a heavy variety that produced a larger percentage of fuel oil to kerosene. Samuel’s need to find a market for this product drove
482 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 44-47 483 Ibid, pg. 46-47 484 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 46-47 485 Ibid, pg. 46-47 486 Ibid, pg. 47
184 him to adapt the burners on his large tankers, and he became a strong advocate for the use of fuel oil for marine purposes.487
Also, the improvement of burner technology, spurred on by French, Italian, and Russian torpedo boat development, increased the prospects for British use of oil for its fleet.488 More importantly, there were several major oil field discoveries at this time that dramatically altered the supply situation. This included discoveries at Sumatra (1885), Borneo (1897), Burma (1889-1901),
California, Texas, and Oklahoma (1900-1905).489 According to Michael Warwick Brown, these conditions substantially increased the likelihood of the great power navies transitioning to oil fuel. In Britain, however, there were still hurdles to its adoption, including the required emergence of a personality of great force and determination who also happened to hold the appropriate position of influence within the Admiralty.
Although John Fisher never commanded a fleet in combat, his influence on the dramatic changes in the Royal Navy are second to none. Fisher aimed to concentrate the forces of the Royal Navy, focus on technologically superior ships, and increase overall fleet efficiency. He was also the first member of the Admiralty to advocate forcefully for the use of oil fuel, diesel engines, and also turbine propulsion.490 Fisher’s main tactical reasoning for the need to adopt oil fuel was that it had been shown to increase the steaming speed of naval vessels.491 Fisher had supported early
487 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 150 488 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 47 489 Ibid, pg. 49 490 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 125 491 Ibid, pg. 125
185 tests on oil fuel in late 1898, early 1899, and June 1901 when he was Controller of the Navy.492
These tests demonstrated the effectiveness of oil’s evaporative capacity, and thus prompted not only further tests, but also the building of a preliminary experimental plant at Devonport.493
Over the next few years the British navy embarked on an intensive and focused examination of what course of action should be taken on liquid petroleum as a source for fuel for the Royal
Navy. In July 1902, the Admiralty Fuel Experiment Station (AFES) was established and according to Snyder, the AFES was to serve as both an experimental laboratory, as well as a
‘clearinghouse for information pertaining to the use of liquid fuel in other navies.’494
The lack of domestic or even British imperial control over major oil resources was a recurring strategic headache for the Admiralty, prompting occasional cautious policy suggestions in the form of burning coal/oil mixtures.495 In 1904 the navy completed work on its own oil burning system, one that importantly did not require compressed air or steam for atomization prior to burning.496 This was a significant improvement as the air compressors and machinery needed to produce steam were large and heavy. Accordingly, this new method was treated as a state secret, and in June a secret patent for this technology was granted.497
1905 saw the creation of the first all oil burning ships of the Royal Navy, the Tribal F class of destroyers.498 However, the ‘G’ class was reverted to coal burning, primarily due to fear of
492 Ibid, pg. 126 493 Ibid, pg. 127 494 Ibid, pg. 129 495 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 51 496 Ibid, pg. 51 497 Ibid, pg. 51 498 Ibid, pg. 52
186 supply during wartime, but there were also more complex reasons, namely the structure of the oil market abroad, conflict of interests between current producers and the Admiralty, and a lack of trust between the British and those who had the oil.499 It is here that one finds the true beginning of the transition in Britain. Initial moves to build oil burning ships were cautioned by fear of a lack of supply during war, and this fear translated into dual-firing ships, as well as limitations on the circumstances in which British ships would rely on its on-board oil supply for propulsion.500
In addition to concerns about supply, there were other factors that were problematic for implementing a transition to oil. These included costs related to increasing prices for oil (as well as its generally higher price relative to coal), and also the cost associated with increasing oil storage.501
While by 1905 naval policy on the actual use of oil fuel was cautious and conservative, the
British government’s search for a stable and affordable supply had begun in earnest, and only increased in intensity over time. After the Admiralty tests conducted in 1904, all major navy ships in service were converted to dual-firing ships, and correspondingly, a committee was established to investigate the matter of supply, known as the Pretyman Committee, named after committee president Financial Secretary to the Admiralty E.G. Pretyman.502 C.I. Hamilton notes that one of Fisher’s preferred mechanisms for accomplishing his ends was through appointing
499 Ibid, pg. 52 500 Ibid, pg. 55 501 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 13 502 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 52-53
187 committees503, and although Fisher did not create the Pretyman Committee, he did substantially influence the work of the Committee on Designs,504 the Decentralisation Committee, and the
Naval Establishments Committee.505
Through the creation and direction of various committees, as well as skillful delegation of authority to what is called the “Fishpond” (a cadre of naval officers and staff loyal to Fisher and his ideas), Fisher was able to exert an inordinate amount of influence on Britain’s naval policy.506 His ideas on ship construction were revolutionary, including developing the
Dreadnaught class of capital ship and the concept of the fast battle cruiser.507 Fisher was obsessed with the role of speed in naval warfare, and this was the source of his adamant support for using oil as fuel, as well as his belief that there was very little need for thicker armor.508 For
Fisher, speed was a better defense than thick armor. Despite Fisher’s appointment to the position of First Sea Lord corresponding to a decrease in oil purchased by the Admiralty, cited by Jones as evidence that Fisher’s tenure as First Sea Lord was not a ‘great advance in the use of oil,’
503 Hamilton, C. I. The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making 1805- 1927. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pg. 215 504 Drolet, Marc. "The Anatomy of the British Battle Cruiser and British Naval Policy, 1904- 1920." McGill University, 1993. 505 Hamilton, C. I. The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making 1805- 1927. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pg. 215-216 506 Ibid, pg. 221 507 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 15 508 Fisher saw thicker armor as counterproductive in regards to achieving high speeds, and argued that if you were faster than the enemy, they would be unable to hit you, see Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889- 1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pg. 258-59
188 somehow Jones ignores the dramatic increase in Admiralty oil purchases between 1905-1910.509
In 1905 the Admiralty purchased roughly 10,000 long tons of fuel oil, and by the time of Fisher’s retirement from the position of First Sea Lord that number had increased over ten-fold, to roughly 130,000 long tons.510
Fisher also had contact with several of the most important British oilmen of the day; in 1903 he met William D’Arcy who shared with him maps and documents related to his recent oil concession acquisition in Persia.511 Fisher also met Marcus Samuel, a man eager to sell oil to the
Admiralty and founder of Shell Transport, in 1899.512 Despite not having created the Pretyman
Committee, Fisher was in the appropriate position within the Admiralty to influence interpretation of its results. The Committee is explicit in its two primary concerns about reliance on fuel oil, price stability, and supply.513 In mid-1904 the Committee, working with the Colonial office, developed policies that would encourage commercial production of fields that produced the heavy fuel oil.514 Here we have the first real instance of British state intervention in the petroleum industry, a practice that would increase substantially over time.
The Committee explicitly placed an emphasis on private commercial development of oil fields, and later even suggested that the British Government act as a lender of last resort by acquiring
509 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 14-16 510 Ibid, pg. 12 511 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 15 512 Ibid 513 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 159 514 Ibid, pg. 160
189 oil fields directly and leasing them to private companies for development.515 This intervention into the oil markets, which included other provisions such as right of first refusal to purchase production, was codified in the Oil Mines Act of Barbados.516 As Snyder points out, however, such laws and practices did the British little good, as oil-production within the Empire was almost non-existent.517 Notably, the Oil Fuel Committee believed that state involvement in the oil industry was needed to counter the influence of Standard Oil.518 This fear led to efforts by the British Government to thwart Standard’s access to oil bearing lands in the Empire; in particular, the Committee and the Admiralty supported the Indian government’s position denying oil concessions to Standard’s subsidiary, the Asiatic Petroleum Company.519 These efforts led to the British government entering negotiations with the Scottish owned Burmah Oil Company, and on the advice of Sir Boverton Redwood, the two parties began to work out terms for a long-term supply contract.520 On November 21, 1905, the Admiralty signed its first long term contract for fuel oil with the Burmah Oil Company, and by 1907 the company was required to create the capacity of supplying the Admiralty with 80,000 tons of fuel oil annually, with a price set on a sliding scale between 20-25 shillings per ton, and lastly, the contract included a clause that there would be no alterations in Company ownership without the consent of the Admiralty.521 While this deal did not solve the supply problem faced by the Admiralty, it did represent a first step toward securing a stable supply and developing a capacity for wartime reserves. Additionally, this contract – and the efforts invested to ensure its success on the part of the Admiralty – mark the beginning of a period of substantial willingness on the part of the British government to
515 Ibid, pg. 160-161 516 Ibid 517 Ibid, pg. 162 518 Ibid, pg. 161 519 Ibid, pg. 162-63 520 Ibid, pg. 164-67 521 Ibid, pg. 178-179
190 interfere in the private oil industry. The heavy lobbying of the Indian government for not only preferential access within the Empire, but also for the exclusion of rival interests, set the precedent for likely future British state involvement in the oil industry.
Outside of the Empire, the Admiralty relied heavily on American sources of oil, namely Texas and California, although it was conceded that California was not a secure wartime source.522
Between 1902-1906 the small amounts of oil being purchased by the Admiralty came solely from the United States, and even by 1912, as Admiralty purchases increased dramatically, the
United States provided well over half of this oil.523 Between 1902 and 1929, the United States was the largest supplier of oil to the United Kingdom by a substantial margin.524 Despite consistent reliance of Britain on American supply, the Committee remained committed to developing a British controlled and owned source, and for this reason was particularly interested in the Persian oil concessions owned by William Knox D’Arcy.525
522 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 186 523 See Figure 3; Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981. 524 Ibid, pg. 232 525 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg.187
191 Figure 5.2 – United Kingdom Oil Imports by source 1914-1929
(Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 232)
D’Arcy had first obtained his Persian concessions in May 1901.526 The nature of the deal is best described as remarkable. D’Arcy obtained exclusive rights to all of Persian territory (excluding five northern provinces) for the next 60 years, was authorized for pipeline construction, exempt from taxation and customs, and the Persian government only took a 16% annual royalty.527 The
526 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 130 527 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 130
192 concession produced its first oil in 1903-04.528 When these first wells started to dry up, D’Arcy considered selling off his concession to Standard Oil and Rothschild interests.529 Pretyman himself suggested to D’Arcy that he write officially to the Admiralty to ask for help, and through the efforts of Pretyman, Lord Selborne, and Sir Boverton Redwood, the Persian concession remained in British hands.530
Such advice turned out to be very advantageous to the British. The first gushers to rupture in the
D’arcy concession did so on May 26th 1908 at Maidan-i-Naftun, and represented a landmark development in oil history.531 The Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC) was incorporated in
April 1909.532 Despite early difficulties in construction of infrastructure and pipelines, refining difficulties533 and also major marketing hurdles,534 the prospects for this upstart oil venture were quite good.535 Most importantly, the quality of the petroleum discoveries in the Persian concession were very favorable for the production of a high quality fuel oil for naval purposes.536
By 1912 the A.P.O.C was in need of capital, and found itself with a need to rely on an agreement with Shell in order to market the majority of its production.537 This situation was not palatable to
528 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 89 529 Ibid, pg. 89 530 Ibid, pg. 91 531 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 138-40 532 Ibid, pg. 141 533 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 91 534 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 142-143 535 Ibid, pg. 144-145 536 Ibid, pg. 145 537 Ibid
193 Charles Greenway, formerly involved in Burmah Oil, who had some experience in dealing with the Admiralty.538 Greenway played an important role in convincing the Admiralty that the large oil monopolies of Shell and Standard were collaborating against British interests, and displayed a serious distaste for the large oil combines.539
“Greenway always regarded the Admiralty as the most promising market. The Admiralty had involved itself in the Persian company’s affairs in 1904/5 and in 1909, and on both occasions the question of the company’s future role as a supplier of fuel oil to the Royal Navy held a central place in the discussions. Greenway made considerable use of these precedents in his negotiations with the Admiralty after 1912, though since a strong departmental memory and consistency of policy were not the Admiralty’s most notable characteristics, the argument carried less weight than one might have expected.”540
Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, the British had been working diligently to discover a secure supply of petroleum. The discovery of large quantities in Persia under a British controlled company increased the region’s relative importance for British national security. The
British Admiralty was fearful of being taken advantage of by the large oil monopolies due to their lack of domestic supply and almost total reliance on imports. Greenway was able, through his various sales pitches to the Admiralty, to leverage this fear of the large oil monopolies to secure an agreement with the British government.541
That agreement, signed on 20 May 1914, consisted of £2,200,000 investment (£2,000,000 ordinary shares, and £1,000 preference shares, the difference made up of debentures).542
Additionally, the Treasury was granted two ex officio directors on A.P.O.C’s board, as well as all
538 Ibid, pg. 95-96 539 Ibid, pg. 96 540 Ibid, pg. 146 541 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 151-52 542 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 97
194 of its subsidiary companies, one of which was nominated by the Admiralty.543 Two other conditions of the agreement that are of importance include the British Government’s right to veto an action viewed as harmful to their interests, and the stipulation that the company remain British in ownership and not enter any form of trust or combination.544 Britain had just obtained a controlling share of its first national oil company.545 To better understand this decision one must understand the work of the Packenham committee and the role of both Jack Fisher and Winston
Churchill.
By 1910 oil burning on its own in destroyers and in adjunct to coal in battleships was firmly established, and the concerns about supply were beginning to be mitigated by diversity of sources as well as increasing tanker storage needed for domestic emergency stocks.546
Additionally the fact that oil did not break down over time when stored also alleviated some supply concerns and made it easier to store large amounts in reserve.547 In less than ten years the
British Navy had taken the lead in oil-burning technology, and demonstrated that its use was possible, as well as beneficial, in all classes of warships.548
However concerns about not only supply, but more importantly, supply that would not be interrupted in the case of war, forced the British into a period of building dual-fired battleships, while building destroyers that burned only oil. Brown sees this process as an effective means of
543 Ibid 544 Ibid 545 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 191 546 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 58-61 547 Ibid 548 Ibid
195 matching consumption with supply, thus mitigating possible negative consequences of the transition from coal to oil.549 A similar process was implemented in the Unites States.550 The function of dual-burning technology served as an important bridge between two different sources of fuel. This can be seen as a form of insurance policy during times of uncertainty, and is a crucial element to state strategy during energy transitions.
At this time Jack Fisher had retired as First Sea Lord. He was replaced by Admiral Sir A.K.
Wilson, and although retired he continued to agitate from the outside for the use of oil fuel, and was consistently ahead of the curve in supporting improved oil burning technologies, namely internal combustion engines, diesel engines, and turbine propulsion.551 Fisher first met Winston
Churchill in 1907, during Churchill’s time as the Under Secretary at the Colonial Office, and clearly had an impact on Churchill’s views.552 Churchill himself stated: “…as soon as I knew for certain I was to go to the Admiralty I sent for Fisher.”553
The period of 1895-1905 was one in which the British had lost a clear-cut naval supremacy over its European rivals.554 Correspondingly, Fisher was brought in as First Sea Lord in May 1904, with the aim of reforming and restructuring the Navy.555 In Fisher’s scheme four pre-conditions were needed to accomplish such reforms. Those pre-conditions were a reconsideration of
549 Ibid, pg. 63 550 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 1304. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907, pg. 17-18 551 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 64-65 552 Ibid, pg. 65 553 Churchill, Winston S. The World in Crisis. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928, pg. 56 (double check page number here) 554 Friedberg, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895- 1905 Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, pg. 152 555 Ibid, pg. 192
196 strategy, the elimination of out of date vessels, a rearranging of the fleets and squadrons, and lastly a reduction in the number of ships in commission, without a corresponding reduction in the fighting value of the overall fleet.556 Winston Churchill came to the Admiralty with a similarly reform oriented purpose and state of mind, being brought in as the First Lord of the Admiralty by
Prime Minister Asquith in October of 1911 with the goal of instituting a naval staff.557 In addition to his role in the creation of the Chief of War Staff, as well as separate Intelligence,
Mobilization, and Operations divisions, Churchill had a substantial influence on the British decision to convert their navy completely to an oil burning fleet.558
After Churchill’s appointment in late 1911, the First Lord of the Admiralty had initially planned on bringing Fisher back to serve as First Sea Lord, but instead hired Francis Bridgman; although
Churchill kept in regular contact with Fisher on naval matters.559 Through the influence of
Fisher, War College studies that emphasized speed for capital ships, and also the influence of both Charles Greenway and Marcus Samuel, Churchill was convinced that naval supremacy could only be achieved through an all oil-fired navy.560 At this time the Admiralty was specifically considering whether or not to completely transition all naval vessels to oil burning technology and Churchill sought the advice of Fisher on the matter.561 These factors along with
556 Ibid, pg. 193 557 Hamilton, C. I. The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making 1805- 1927. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pg. 224 558 Ibid, pg. 225 559 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 66 560 Ibid, pg. 66-67 561 Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pg. 258
197 increased great power Battleship construction, led to the creation of the Pakenham Committee in
December of 1911. 562
Figure 5.3 – Great Power Navy Battleships built and building 1896-1906
Friedberg, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, pg. 153) (From left to right, Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, the United States, Japan, Italy)
The goals of the Pakenham committee were laid out:
“1) How can a sufficient supply of oil be obtained and a sufficient reserve stored in the United Kingdom to enable us to use oil fuel only in all new construction. 2) What steps should be taken to establish the reserve of Oil? From what sources, in what ship, and along what routes should it be obtained? 3) In what circumstances, at what expense and up to what date will it be possible to convert the four battleships and one cruiser of the 1911-1912 programmes into “oil only”? What addition to the existing reserves of oil would be necessary on this account alone? 4) Generally to report on the advantages, or otherwise, of relying upon oil for Naval Service including effects on personnel and cost.”563
The Pakenham report recommended no less than a year’s worth of wartime petroleum reserves, and also suggested a re-examination of naval fuel specifications, which had often been seen by men in the industry as too stringent.564 More importantly the committee failed to endorse an
562 Friedberg, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895- 1905 Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, pg. 153 563 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 67-68 564 Ibid
198 expansion of the use of oil, and in the process ensured that the programmes of 1911-1912 and
1913-1914 remained dual-firing ships.565 Churchill believed that these ships needed to be oil burning ships, and moved to secure support for this policy by forming a Royal Commission, The
Royal Commission on Fuel and Engines, and chose Fisher to head the inquiry. Fisher’s position on the imperative of oil for fueling the fleet was directly tied to his perception of naval tactics of the time, and he was substantially affected by consistent changes and improvements in technology. Specifically, he called for fast battle cruisers (26-30 knots), powered by oil, light on armament, and armed with the largest guns possible.566 Later, Fisher’s stance would prove to be supported by early naval engagements in the War, a point noted by Jellicoe, who had been supportive of the same concepts as Fisher at the time of the Royal Commission.567 Churchill was using every policy option available to him to convince the Admiralty of his position on oil. The
Pakenham Committee did not give him exactly what he wanted, so he created the Royal
Commission.568 Also Churchill ensured that the Commission would be advisory in nature, not executive, and its work was to be secret, and separate from the Admiralty bureaucracy.569 These political maneuverings allowed Churchill use various conclusions and suggestions of the
Commission as he needed, and ultimately to present to Parliament policies that the Commission disagreed with. The primary point of disagreement between the conclusions of the Commission and Churchill had to do with the ability of Britain to import food and oil in wartime.
565 Ibid 566 Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pg. 258-262 567 Ibid, pg. 209-291 568 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 68 569 Ibid, pg. 69
199 Other circumstances increased the urgency of the supply problem for Britain, namely the major increase in prices for fuel oil in the year after February 1912.570 This factor, in tandem with the
Admiralty’s desire for long-term contracts for supply, and its fear of being at the mercy of the two large oil monopolies, Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Shell, limited British options to Anglo-
Mexican Petroleum Products and APOC.571 In March 1913 the Commission recommended that the government should take whatever steps necessary to make the Persian supplies of A.P.O.C. available, yet stopped short of calling for direct state ownership of an oil company.572 Churchill was to go a step further with his announced policy of July 1913, in which he explained to the
Parliament the…
“logic behind the ‘fast division’ of battleships. Tactically they were an innovation. Historically, they were the latest manifestation of a long line of battleships that technically stole a march on the opposition, as the ‘Dreadnought’ and the ‘Super- Dreadnoughts’ had done before. When Churchill came to mention oil supplies he diverged from the Commission’s views, in fact he almost ignored them completely. Instead, he argued that as long as Britain retained command of the sea she could import oil…Churchill’s solution to the supply problem diverged from the previous policy in which private industry competed for one-off tenders to supply oil. Nor was it that recommended by the Fisher Commission. Instead he announced two policies – an interim and an ultimate. The interim involved a series of forward contracts lasting about five years ‘to secure a regular and adequate supply,’…[]… ‘while the complicated, administrative, scientific and financial questions involved in the ultimate policy are settled.’ Inspired by the operation of the Government-owned Naval Dockyards and Cordite Factories he said, ‘the Admiralty should become the independent owner and producer of its own supplies of liquid fuel.” Initially, the creation of a large reserve would give the Admiralty ample supplies in wartime and the ability to ride out price fluctuations in the market. Ultimately, the Admiralty was to refine its own fuel. In short, the Admiralty was to become a speculative oil trader and create its own chemical industry.”573
570 Ibid, pg. 75 571 Ibid 572 Ibid 573 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 76-77
200 The policy announced by Churchill was politically palatable to both the Socialists and the
Tories,574 and although described by Brown as ‘parliamentary hyperbole,’ the figures on British consumption of Persian oil relative to other sources at the time support the assertion that this was a momentous change in policy. On 17 June 1914 the contract between Anglo-Persian Oil
Company and His Majesty’s Government was submitted at the Registry Office.575 In 1912 the
Admiralty imported oil from the United States, Borneo, Burma, Rumania, and utilized some domestic shale oil, the total amount of which was just over 270,000 long tons.576
Figure 5.4 – Fuel Oil purchased by the Admiralty 1902-1912
(Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History, edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 12)
By June 1913 A.P.O.C.’s Abadan refinery had begun production of fuel oil to Admiralty specifications and for their use.577 In wartime Abadan produced fuel oil principally for the
574 Ibid, pg. 77-78 575 Ferrier, R. W. The History of the British Petroleum Company: The Developing Years 1901- 1932. Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pg. 202 576 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 12 577 Ferrier, R. W. The History of the British Petroleum Company: The Developing Years 1901- 1932. Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pg. 274
201 Admiralty, which consumed 65% of the total output of the refinery.578 In 1914-1915, that output was 255,000 long tons.579 Sixty-five percent of Abadan’s total output equated to just over sixty- one percent of total Admiralty imports for 1912.580 The British saw state control over production of this particular resource as imperative for its national security, and were scrambling for physical control of a major source of the fuel.
In addition to the serious concern of British Admiralty regarding source and supply of this new and important naval fuel, the impact of oil technology and its diffusion can be directly observed in the form of new naval technologies that emerged at the time. Both the Submarine and the airplane were developed into critical tools of war. Both types of vessels were made possible by propulsion capabilities, as well as the particular qualities of petroleum fuels. British (and
French) interest in submarines was first piqued by Robert Fulton’s Nautilus, which was built in
France in 1800 and supported by Napoleon.581 After the Peace of Amiens dissipated, Fulton was to become a consultant for the British Admiralty, although British interest in the submersible waned after the victory of Trafalgar.582 Interestingly, although the British did not pursue submersible development at that time, they did purchase the Nautilus from Fulton, and, more importantly, offered him $75,000 to ‘refrain from providing his services to other European countries.’583
The age of steam propulsion did not substantially improve the possibility of effective submarines.
Despite its improvements over manpower, its properties made underwater use of coal-fired steam
578 Ibid, pg. 275 579 Ibid, pg. 278 580 This is based upon the author’s own rough calculations. 581 Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University, 1970, pg. 7 582 Ibid, pg. 8 583 Ibid, pg. 9
202 power particularly difficult. Yet, steam powered submarines were built and some of them operated up until the 1930’s.584 It was the development of oil fuel, the internal combustion engine, as well as electric motors and generators that truly brought about the age of the submarine.585 By 1900, seven nations possessed at least one submarine, and Great Britain was not among them. Those nations were France, Italy, the United States, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey.586 Although Britain was not among the earliest nations to develop steam powered submarines, she certainly understood the implications of sub-surface sea power. British member of parliament H. O. Arnold Foster articulated the idea that Britain’s reliance on seafaring commerce meant that Britain had the most to fear from such technology, a grim foreshadowing of the impact of the submarine in the First World War.587
The First British built submarine was the H-1, one of the Holland type vessels, and was completed in February of 1902.588 By the end of that year the British had four more delivered;
Britain ordered an additional four vessels in the 1902-1903 program, and by 1907 had systematically developed her submarine fleet to a ‘high degree of qualitative excellence.’589 Jack
Fisher had describe the impact of the submarine in 1904 as revolutionary, and by 1911, the
British had overtaken the French as the leader in submarine ownership.590
584 Ibid, pg. 14 585 Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University, 1970, pg. 14 586 Ibid, pg. 15 587 Ibid, pg. 17-18 588 Ibid, pg. 31 589 Ibid, pg. 32 590 Ibid, pg. 39-40
203 By the outbreak of the war, Britain had developed submarine technology that was superior to most of its rivals.591 Jack Fisher was again ahead of the curve in his appreciation of the dangers that such vessels posed to the Empire, and he saw a direct connection between oil technology and submarine technology.
“I have been unceasingly and assiduously devoting both my waking and even my sleeping thoughts to submarines, and oil and the oil engine is the germ of their vitality…..The oil engine will govern all sea-fighting, and all sea-fighting is going to be governed by submarines…”592
The British demonstrated patience when implementing new naval technology, relying upon their capability to build ships quickly, and cost-effectively, to ensure naval dominance. By 1913 the
British had not only taken the lead in submarine construction, they had built a two to one margin.
“On 29 November 1913, Fisher informed Julian Corbett that “we have 3,000 trained submarine officers and men, and are 2 keels to 1 against Germany and MORE SO.” A week later, however, he warned Churchill that the German construction of submarines for foreign nations would give them the capacity to out-build Britain in war.”593
By July 1914, the Germans possessed twenty-eight submarines and were building twelve, while the British had seventy-six, with twenty more under construction.594 Quantitatively the British had again demonstrated their dominance in the construction of naval vessels, yet Britain, along with the other allies, had underestimated the qualitative developments of the Germans, whose
U19 class had a range of operation four times larger than the best submarines built by France or
Britain.595 This underestimation contributed to the belief among the allies that the submarine was still predominately a defensive weapons, and as Douglas describes it:
591 Ibid, pg. 18 592 quoted in Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pg. 263 593 Ibid, pg. 264 594 Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University, 1970, pg. 40-41 595 Ibid, pg. 41
204 “All the major naval powers were unaware of the full potential of this weapon, and it was only after the early phase of employment of the German U-Boats in a strictly military fashion-the adolescent period of the submarine-had ended that the awesome power of this weapon wrought in the arsenals of the world was fully realized.”596
During the war the submarine was “by far the most serious problem of a maritime nature faced by Britain”, and this threat prompted the creation of the Board of Invention and Research.597
While this body played an important role in the understanding and introduction of new technology during the war, the submarine problem for Britain was solved by more traditional approaches, among them, the convoy.598 Before continuing to discuss the role of oil during the war, the author must briefly describe the emergence of another oil-dependent weapon, the aircraft.
More so than the submarine, the airplane, as a critical tool of war, was brought on by the war, not achieved prior to the war. Unlike submarines, aircraft began to find use in both Armies and
Navies. Unlike her position in relative naval terms, Britain was relatively behind the pack in terms of experimentation with airships and airplanes. In 1907 the Wright Brothers offered their patents to the British Navy, but were rejected, being told by Lord Tweedmouth that the
Admiralty thought there was no practical use for such machines in the naval service.599
Opportunities for early naval support for experimentation in aviation were limited due to limits on spending, the naval arms race in progress at the time, and also by the belief that the aircraft of
596 Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University, 1970, pg. 43 597 Gusewelle, Jack Keeney. "The Board of Invention and Research: A Case Study in the Relations between Academic Science and the Royal Navy in Great Britain During the First World War." University of California Irvine, 1971, pg. 42 598 Ibid 599 Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981, pg. 29
205 the time had minimal military applications.600 The Committee for Imperial Defense Sub-
Committee on Aerial Navigation was created in October 1908 to assess how Britain should react to increased expenditure on aeronautics by both the continental powers but also the United
States; it concluded that Britain could leave the experimentation to the private sector.601 Both
France and Germany had provided official support to their respective private aircraft manufacturers, whereas complications in the British contractual relationships with various small producers, and lack of state support for private development of aircraft, hindered British progress.602 While British spending on aviation did increase from £9,000 in 1909-1910 to
£52,000 in 1910-1911, by 1910 the French had flown the first seaplane, and the United States had seen Eugene Ely take off from, and land, a plane on a US Navy ship.603 At the time the
Navy was not even training its own pilots, outsourcing experimental training to the Royal Aero
Club in Eastchurch604 and other naval men obtaining pilots certificates “in their own time and at their own expense.”605 After the pilots who had trained at Eastchurch completed their training, one of the pilots, a Commander Samson, managed to convince First Sea Lord Wilson that naval support for aviation was needed, resulting in the Admiralty’s purchase of one of the planes that had been used at Eastchurch as well as a few experimental machines from the Short Brothers.606
600 Ibid, pg. 30-31 601 Cooper, Malcolm. The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World War. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pg. 3 602 Ibid, pg. 4 603 Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981, pg. 30-31 604 Cooper, Malcolm. The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World War. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pg. 6 605 Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981, pg. 35 606 Ibid, pg. 39
206 By late 1911 the Naval Flying School was officially organized, supervised by Commander
Samson.607
“The government’s response to increasing pressure for decisive action was to charge the Standing Sub-Committee of the CID, chaired by Haldane, ‘to consider the future development of aerial navigation for naval and military purposes, and the measures which might be taken to secure to this country an efficient aerial service’. The Sub- Committee responded by recommending the creation of a Royal Flying Corps, consisting of a Military Wing, a Naval Wing and a Central Flying School. The report, considered by the prime minister as a matter of some ‘urgency’, was approved in April 1912 and an Air Committee of the CID established under Haldane to preside over the experiment in inter-service co-operation.”608
The Air Committee was given no executive power and its role was considered advisory, similar to the nature of the Royal Commission on Fuel and Engines, under Fisher.609 Cooper’s description of this committee and its relationship to British military organizational change stemming from the coal-oil transition is particularly relevant.
“The official historian spoke of it [the Air Committee] fading away ‘like the Ghost in Hamlet’ having fulfilled its task of prompting the army and the navy into action. It is crucial to any understanding of early British air policy to realize that the prewar organization of the Flying Corps was not in any way a blueprint for the Royal Air Force [created 1918]. While there already existed a vocal minority, both inside Parliament and without, arguing for a stronger air organization, the bulk of official opinion was concerned merely to put aviation on a sound footing within the existing two-service structure.”610
Effectively, British aviation for military purposes before the war was pulled in two different directions by the gravity of the two service organizations. The Army and the Navy had different conceptions about the possible strategic and tactical uses of this new technology, and correspondingly they held different opinions about how best to design, order, and build the new
607 Ibid 608 Cooper, Malcolm. The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World War. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pg. 7 609 Ibid 610 Ibid
207 machines.611 While cross services complications impacted British aviation development, the role of the Air Department at the Admiralty was also uncertain. The Director Air Department
(D.A.D) was not an official member of the board of the Admiralty, and consequently, had limited access to its leaders and limited influence.612 Pulshiper states this reality clearly, writing that “aircraft were not important enough to be given a separate vertical organization; instead
D.A.D. was required to arrange with each more or less independent Admiralty department to fulfill his needs, competing with the established services and the battle fleet for attention.”613
Pulshiper argues that between the two services, it was the Navy who was better positioned to investigate, experiment with, and implement new mechanical weapons systems such as aircraft due to its previous experience with such processes as in the cases of steam, torpedoes, dreadnoughts, battle cruisers, and submarines.614 For Pulshiper, “…the Navy had entered the machine age, but the Army had not.”615 Britain had begun to turn substantial effort toward the development of air technology for its military, but even by the start of the War in 1914 it had not reached parity with its continental rivals in terms of the number of airplanes sent to the fighting front.616 Prior to the War, Britain’s air industry was underdeveloped, as Cooper notes:
“The air industry was underdeveloped in comparison to its French and German counterparts, [and] did not possess adequate research or production facilities to allow for rapid expansion. The two air services were proceeding about their business without reference to each other and were already showing signs of coming into conflict over areas of responsibility and allocation of resources.”617
611 Cooper, Malcolm. The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World War. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pg. 8 612 Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981, pg. 42 613 Ibid 614 Ibid, pg. 45-46 615 Ibid, pg. 45 616 Graham, Glenn William. ""We Shall Deliver the Goods": The Developement of British Air Power During the Great War, 1914-1918." Simon Fraser University, 2003, pg. 4 617 Cooper, Malcolm. The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World War. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pg. 10
208
When comparing British support for aviation development one must keep in mind that the earliest planes were best suited for land use. Consequently, states with large armies tended to invest more in the early aviation technology, and as Britain traditionally did not maintain a large army, its air investment was less robust.618 Additionally, the British Navy outspent the French and German navies in aeronautic expenditure (See table below). Also, as Pulsipher notes the
Cabinet memorandum on total aeronautic expenditure does not include almost £450,000 that the
British devoted to rigid airships (Zeppelins). When this sum is included in the British overall aeronautic expenditure total, overall British aviation expenditure is almost the same as France, falling short by around £120,000.619
Figure 5.5 – British, French, and German expenditure on aeronautics 1911-1913
(Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981, pg. 55)
While submarine and aircraft development prior to the War had not been completed, nor perfected, the military use of these technologies certainly had a substantial impact on the Royal
Navy, as well as the British war effort. Submarines undoubtedly had a larger impact on the War itself, while the development of aircraft had a larger impact on British military organization,
618 Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981, pg. 55 619 Author’s own calculations.
209 resulting in the separate Royal Air Force. As John Abbatiello describes the impact of these technologies: “Most importantly, aircraft and submarines pushed naval warfare into three dimensions, adding height and depth to the two-dimensional naval engagements of the past.”620
The British Navy During the War: 1914-1918
By summer of 1914 Britain was in a precarious position regarding its oil supply. Oil technology had proven itself very capable of replacing coal, and there was no technical reason why all naval ships could not burn oil.621 Both Fisher and Churchill had attempted to utilize various committees and commissions to produce reports that he could leverage to convince the
Parliament that not only should Britain make this transition but also that enough supply could be secured to ensure wartime needs would be met. Both the Pakenham Committee, and the Royal
Commission led by Fisher, had supported the conceptual use of the fuel, but demanded larger reserves than Churchill thought necessary.622 Additionally, the British were not confident that they could rely on the market to provide the necessary supply due to the influence of the large oil monopolies, Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Shell.
Part of the British policy response to this situation was to purchase controlling shares in, and otherwise support and provide capital investment to, the Anglo-Persian-Oil Company. While
A.P.O.C.’s survival was a central aim of Churchill’s oil policy, the upstart British Oil Company
620 Abbatiello, John J. Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I. Cass Series: Naval Policy and History. edited by Geoffrey Till New York: Routledge, 2006, pg. 12 621 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 87 622 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 87
210 could not provide all the oil needed by the Admiralty, who sought to diversify supplies.623 Two other important pre-war suppliers for Britain were the Anglo-Saxon Oil Company and Anglo-
Mexican Petroleum Products Company Limited.624 It was the Pakenham Committee that had explicitly examined issues of supply and needed reserves, and the figures provided from its report were pessimistic. On the eve of the war Britain imported 93 percent of its oil fuel, and storage facilities to hold reserves were minimal.625 The Pakenham report noted that by the end of 1914 Britain was estimated to complete enough storage for 471,000 tons of oil, and considered the need to build enough storage for at least 1,000,000 more tons essential.626
“If Pakenham’s recommendations were fully implemented the Admiralty would have to find at least an additional £8,079,000 for 2,190,000 tons of oil over the next eight years, on top of the £9,152,000 required for normal consumption and a reserve of four months’ war expenditure…The practicality of paying for it all was not considered by the Pakenham, a luxury the First Lord could not ignore.”627
Churchill had not obtained his desired results from the Pakenham Committee or the Royal
Commission, and found he needed to reject the conclusions of these bodies and instead rely on the newly created Naval War Staff (NWS).628 Thus, Churchill placed tighter restrictions on the work of the NWS; in particular, he limited the assumptions to be made about oil price, oil availability, and Britain’s ability to retain command of the sea in wartime.629 Churchill’s various maneuverings represented an attempt to reconcile two factors, the extremely large and expensive reserve requirements demanded by the Navy, and the limits on spending demanded by the
623 Ibid, pg. 100-101 624 Ibid, pg. 101-102 625 Ibid, pg. 102 626 Ibid 627 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 103 628 Ibid, pg. 107 629 Ibid, pg. 108
211 Cabinet.630 Churchill’s achievement was to convince Parliament to fund an increase in the oil reserves from four months estimated consumption to six months estimated consumption.631
The beginning of hostilities in August tipped the scales in Churchill’s favor regarding the British coal-to-oil transition, particularly when it came to new construction of capital ships, as the R
Class was converted from a dual-firing class to a strictly oil burning class.632 Churchill’s retort to concerns about cost and the price of oil was that during a war, money would be no object.633
The First World War witnessed a dramatic increase in the use of petroleum fuel for all involved,
Britain in particular.634 Also, the beginning of the War represents the high water mark for British domestic coal production.635
Figure 5.6 – British Coal production 1820-present
(Rutledge, David. "Estimating Long-Term World Coal Production with Logit and Probit Transforms." International Journal of Coal Geology 85, 2011)
630 Ibid, pg. 114 631 Ibid 632 Ibid, pg. 106 633 Ibid, pg. 134 634 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 240 635 Rutledge, David. "Estimating Long-Term World Coal Production with Logit and Probit Transforms." International Journal of Coal Geology 85 (2011): pg. 24
212
British overall oil imports doubled between 1914 and 1917, from roughly 2.5 million tons to 5 million tons, and 70% of all British oil imports by 1917 were fuel oil for naval use.636 All of the recently developed vehicles utilized in the war effort relied on petroleum, including 60,000 trucks, and 22,000 airplanes, while oil even became a crucial component of munitions, supplying toluol needed for TNT.637 British dependence on imported oil was particularly acute, however oil was not extraordinarily unique in this sense. The British populace relied upon imports for roughly one-half of its daily caloric intake.638 British grain consumption was made up of four- fifths imported grain.639 Much raw material for the British Steel industry was also imported, including iron and manganese.640 This reality highlights why the assumption that Britain could maintain command of the seas during a war was such a contentious one between Churchill,
Fisher, Pakenham, and others at the Admiralty. The Germans, aware of these vulnerabilities, aimed to disrupt this trade and force Britain to sue for peace, a policy that culminated in unrestricted submarine warfare; and it almost succeeded.
The British need to protect a global network of trade would have been difficult to administer even in peacetime, and with the fleet concentrated in home waters to manage the conflict with
Germany, using any part of the fleet to protect far flung trade ships and routes was not practical.
The British strategy entailed calling on Imperial governments (including India, the Gold Coast,
636 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 240 637 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 177 638 Patee, Phillip G. "A Great and Urgent Imperial Service: British Strategy for Imperial Defense During the Great War, 1914-1918." Temple University, 2010, pg. 2 639 Ibid, pg. 4 640 Ibid, pg. 7
213 South Africa, Australia, New Zealand,) and allies such as Japan, to lead efforts to take control of, or destroy, German outposts and radio stations in their colonial territories.641
“These campaigns, the British hoped, would keep German commerce raiding disorganized, and probably curtail it altogether by denying advanced-base support to German naval operations. Success would enhance British control of the seas without drawing essential naval resources away from the North Sea. Great Britain would maintain its crucial flow of food, raw materials and oil, and still concentrate its professional army in Europe. In addition to providing an economy-of-force method of protecting British interests, this strategy simultaneously struck a blow at Germany by curtailing German sea commerce.”642
British capacity for tracking the world’s ships on the high seas was impressive, and in part, this was because of British experience as the world’s leading coal producer. The Naval Intelligence
Department, by pooling its efforts with the Trade division, was able to effectively track all the world’s ships of war.643 This was made possible in part because of the predictable needs for coaling, and British control of much of the coaling industry provided experience and relevant information regarding trade routes and coaling stops of ships.644 With the speed of communications increased by wireless radio, the British could direct ships out of harm’s way preventatively, instead of using naval ships to respond to merchant ships after they had been attacked.
“The Board of Trade pooled economic intelligence with Admiralty intelligence. The Post Office, which controlled most of the world’s telegraphic communications, shared any intercepted and decrypted foreign communications with British Intelligence services. The NID Trade and Intelligence divisions pooled their efforts and maintained a daily track of every ship of war, foreign and British, worldwide…Sighting reports from regional intelligence officers, customs, consular and diplomatic sources, and of course, the Lloyds signal stations were collated with other relevant data and the results plotted daily on a large wall chart in what quickly became known as the “war room.” This was not all. War room plotting factored in predictions of likely movements based on analysis
641 Patee, Phillip G. "A Great and Urgent Imperial Service: British Strategy for Imperial Defense During the Great War, 1914-1918." Temple University, 2010, pg. xvii - xix 642 Ibid 643 Ibid, pg. 119 644 Ibid
214 of ship logistics. The Admiralty also tracked the world’s colliers, about 75 percent of them being British; coal supply largely governed the destination of any ship and assisted the Admiralty in forecasting a potential enemy’s strategy. In 1905, the plot was updated daily, by 1908, every four hours. By 1914, the process had been refined so that a plot was maintained almost in real time.”645
Yet even this level of efficiency could not track ships that could not be seen. The German utilization of submarines in an unrestricted manner began to decimate British and Allied shipping, and the success of the German U-boats negatively impacted British ability to import goods to the point of crisis.
Germany had not been among the early pioneers of submarine technology, due in part to the order of Alfred von Tirpitz that no money was to be spent on experimental vessels until their effectiveness had been completely proven.646 Additionally, the British, as well as her allies, generally underestimated the capability and endurance of German U-boats prior to the beginning of unrestricted submarine warfare in February of 1917.647 There were four types of German U- boats; patrol U-boats, fleet U-boats, coastal U-boat minelayers (UC class), and coastal patrol U- boats.648 Increase in German U-boat construction during the war was dramatic and the Germans appeared to be the only belligerent insistent on using these craft in an offensive manner.
“In August 1914, the Germans had 24 operational U-boats, all base with the High Seas Fleet in north-western Germany. A rapid expansion of the U-boat Construction programme coupled with opportunities for service in other theatres meant that by February 1917, the start of the unrestricted campaign, the Germans had 105 operational boats: 46 of these served with the High Seas Fleet flotillas, 23 were in Flanders, 26 worked from the Mediterranean bases at Pola, Cattaro, and Constantinople, and 10 more served in the Baltic. If training units are added, the total number of U-boats in
645 Ibid, pg. 28 646 Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University, 1970, pg. 39 647 Ibid, pg. 41 648 Abbatiello, John J. Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I. Cass Series: Naval Policy and History. edited by Geoffrey Till New York: Routledge, 2006, pg. 36-37
215 commission during that time was 152. This total U-boat strength peaked in mid-1918 with about 175 commissioned boats in German service.”649
During early 1915 the loss of the German battle-cruiser Blucher at Dogger Bank led to a new
German Commander in Chief of the High Sea Fleet, Admiral Von Pohl, and a week later the
Kaiser announced that the territorial waters around the British Isles would be considered a war zone.650 The Germans intended to sink any merchant ship they encountered, beginning the first round of unrestricted U-boat warfare.651 In the spring of 1915 the German U-boat inspectorate made plans to dramatically increase U-boat construction over the next year.652 In September
1915, amongst serious policy disagreements in the German leadership over U-boat policy,
Henning von Hotzendorff was appointed by the Kaiser to the position of German Navy Chief of
Admiralty Staff.653 On August 27th, 1916, Holtzendorff submitted his memorandum advocating the advantages of removing the restraints on U-boat warfare.654 Based on the research of Dr.
Richard Fuss, Holtzendorff believed that Germany could compel Britain to sue for peace in as quickly as six months by sinking roughly 630,000 tons of merchant shipping per month.655 If this strategy were to be successful, increased U-boat construction would likely be necessary.
Gary Weir argues that the wait-and-see approach that the Germans took to U-boat technology in the decade prior to the war had a serious negative impact on German ability to accomplish the
649 Ibid, pg. 37 650 Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University, 1970, pg. 46 651 Ibid 652 Weir, Gary E. "Tirpitz, Technology, and Building U-Boats, 1897-1916." The International History Review 6, no. No. 2 (May 1984), pg. 185-186 653 Steffen, Dirk. "The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December 1916 and Germany's Declaration of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare." The Journal of Military History 68, no. 1 (2004), pg. 215-16 654 Ibid, pg. 216 655 Ibid
216 construction goals that had been set out.656 Nonetheless, the periods of unrestricted submarine warfare, particularly after February 1917, had a tremendous impact on Britain’s ability to import needed resources and supplies, in particular, supplies of oil.657 By May 1917, British petroleum reserves were at 60% of their preferred level, and by the beginning of the summer:
“…the situation had grown critical. German Submarines had sunk tankers totaling sixty thousand tons of cargo capacity in just the first three weeks of June 1917, leaving Britain with but six weeks worth of oil fuel. Officials in London requested that the United States take drastic action, including diverting oil shipments bound for neutral ports to the United Kingdom instead.”658
Jones describes this crisis as fully revealing the British Navy’s dependence on foreign fuels, and that the situation forced the British to send “urgent and humiliating” messages to the United
States that if the Americans did not send more oil, the Royal Navy would be immobilized.659
This situation resulted in various responses by the British, as well as the Allies. First, the increased use of ballast tanks on cargo steamers and liners as “double-bottoms,” authorized by the Cabinet in June 1917, helped to improve the supply situation by successfully bringing in over
240,000 tons of oil.660 Yet the most significant solution to the submarine menace itself was the use of the convoy system, which reduced the tactical efficiency of the submarine.661 The convoy system is credited with the reduction in U-boat sinking of oil tankers from three per month in
656 Weir, Gary E. "Tirpitz, Technology, and Building U-Boats, 1897-1916." The International History Review 6, no. No. 2 (May 1984), pg. 186 657 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 240, See also Jones, G. Gareth. "The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The Search for an Oil Policy." The Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (September 1977), pg. 657 658 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 240 659 Jones, G. Gareth. "The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The Search for an Oil Policy." The Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (September 1977), pg. 657-58 660 Ibid, 664 661 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 248, See also Jones, G. Gareth. "The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The Search for an Oil Policy." The Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (September 1977), pg. 664
217 mid 1917, down to an average of only one per month.662 The figures on colliers and oil tankers lost to submarine attacks clearly demonstrate the increased effectiveness of unrestricted submarine warfare.
Figure 5.7 – British Colliers sunk 1914-1918
(Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg 301)
Figure 5.8 – British Oilers sunk 1914-1918
(Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 302)
The number of tanker and collier sinkings demonstrate clearly that unrestricted warfare could be terribly successful. The amount of total mercantile tonnage sunk by German U-boats was
662 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 153
218 astounding, even before January 1917; in the last part of 1914 only four merchant ships were sunk by U-boats, yet by the end of 1915 that number was 568.663 Political Science Quarterly published data on the first two years of the war indicating that the Germans had sunk 2,400 ships, with a gross tonnage of 4,000,000 tons, equating to roughly 8.5% of the world’s total mercantile tonnage.664 The high water mark in the unrestricted U-boat campaign was in April
1917, during which 423 vessels were destroyed.665 The total number of allied losses due to U- boats during the war were staggering, tallied at 5,711 vessels, or roughly 12,000,000 tons, and over 20,000 non-combatant lives.666 Jellicoe was convinced that if something were not done to counter the U-boat, the Germans would win the war.667 While the number of ships lost are frankly astounding, a visualization of the U-boat war prosecuted by the Germans can more readily demonstrate the scope and impact advantage of using new energy technologies in new ways, as these maps of U-boat attacks throughout the war demonstrate (Red dots represent passenger ships, blue dots military ships, and orange dots commercial ships).668
663 Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University, 1970, pg. 49 664 "I. The European War." Political Science Quarterly 32, no. 3 (September 1917), pg. 12 665 Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University, 1970, pg. 50 666 Ibid 667 Ibid, pg. 51 668 All maps are screenshots from an interactive map of submarine attacks during world war one which may be found at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/map-shows-full-extent- devastation-wrought-uboats-world-war-i-180955191/?no-ist, on the website of the Smithsonian.
219 Map 5.1 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1914-15 1914-1915
Map 5.2 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1916 1916
220 Map 5.3 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1917 1917
Map 5.4 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1918 1918
(all maps from www.smithsonian.com, interactive map application can be found at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/map-shows-full-extent-devastation-wrought-uboats-world-war-i-180955191/?no-ist; accessed on June 21, 2016)
221 The British Government was convinced by this crisis to dramatically re-organize its “ramshackle organization” responsible for the control and regulation of petroleum supplies.669 Responsibility for this re-organization fell to Walter Long and John Cadman, who in December 1917 created the Petroleum Executive and planned for a full ministry of petroleum affairs.670 Snyder describes the various bureaucratic bodies created by the British as “bewildering”; such bodies included the Mineral and Oil Production Department (domestic production), the Pool Board
(allied effort regarding distribution), the Petrol Control Department (concerning conservation efforts),671 and the Petroleum Imperial Policy Committee (tasked to develop a long term oil strategy).672 The Petroleum Executive was charged with overseeing all general matters regarding oil policy.673
Through the Petroleum Executive, Long and Cadman instigated a change of view toward the
Shell group among those in the British government, and in the process agitated Charles
Greenway and Admiral Slade, who saw this as likely to erode the position of privilege held by
A.P.O.C.674 Slade had resigned from his government position to become director and vice- chairman of A.P.O.C. and yet continued to advise the Admiralty on matters related to oil.675
669 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 195 670 Ibid, pg. 196 671 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 242 672 Jones, G. Gareth. "The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The Search for an Oil Policy." The Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (September 1977), pg. 665 673 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 242 674 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg.196-97 675 Ibid, pg. 197
222 Slade took advantage of his unique position to place a memorandum in front of the War Cabinet that appeared to be an official Admiralty memorandum, the content of which included two important aspects: 1) it stressed that the Persian and Mesopotamian oil fields were likely the largest undeveloped oil resources on the planet and 2) it urged that the Shell group ought not be allowed to participate in the development of these fields.676
This maneuver by Slade irritated the Admiralty, as Slade had bypassed several Admiralty officers who should have had a role in reviewing any memorandum prior to it being sent to the
War Cabinet, namely, the Fourth Sea Lord as well as the Civil Lord E.G. Pretyman.677
Additionally, this move by Slade annoyed the newly created Petroleum Executive, and Cadman expressed irritation that an oil company vice-chairman was able to write such a memorandum directly from the Admiralty.678
In the end, Slade’s attempt to ensure the Shell Group did not obtain an interest in the
Mesopotamian oil field development backfired, and although the deal was not signed until after the War, the British government ultimately decided to purchase a controlling stake in the Shell group.679 The British were able to leverage their strong geopolitical position in Mesopotamia at the end of the War to procure financial control over Shell.
“The attempts at securing British Control of the Shell Group were intensified with the support of the Petroleum Executive…At first the negotiations with Shell were difficult, and the committee rejected a Shell proposal to acquire the governments shares in APOC. Progress began to be made after the Armistice. The British domination of most of the areas in the Middle East where oil was suspected proved a strong incentive to the Group
676 Ibid, pg. 197 677 Ibid, pg. 199 678 Ibid, pg. 200 679 Jones, G. Gareth. "The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The Search for an Oil Policy." The Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (September 1977), pg. 666
223 to make itself amenable to the government’s wishes. The promises of oil concessions, above all in Mesopotamia, were made conditional on the rearrangement of the Group in such a way as to give British interests a majority shareholding. The prospect of Shell’s management of the Mesopotamian oilfields, Deterding wrote to Cadman in January 1919, was ‘the main thing which induced [him] to all the other considerations. The agreement, as initialed between Lord Harcourt and Henri Deterding in March 1919, did indeed re- establish the Group’s strong position in the TPC which it had lost because of the British government in 1914. The Shell Group was to have an equal 34% share with APOC in any company formed to exploit the Mesopotamian oil-fields, as well as control of that company for the first seven years of its existence. In return, the Shell Transport and Trading Company and a certain number of the Group’s operating companies in various parts of the world were to become controlled by British subjects with a government nominee, the governor of the Bank of England, on their boards.”680
British efforts to ensure their control over large oil companies stemmed from anxiety about a lack of domestic supply, and a desire to develop some sense of independence from the influence and supply of the large oil monopolies. Many of these decisions and policies were aimed at the long-term supply situation and could not impact the immediate fuel crisis brought on by unrestricted submarine warfare. Thus, cooperation with the allies, and cooperation with the large oil companies was ultimately needed to ensure success of the war effort.681 The Allies created the Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference (IAPC) in early 1918 in order to centralize and pool the oil supplies among themselves.682 However, the “inescapable reality”, as described by Snyder, is that the United States provided 80% of the oil used by the Allies.683 The percentage of oil imports to the UK provided by the United States was even higher.684
680 Ibid 681 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 174 682 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 242-243 683 Ibid, pg. 243 684 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 232
224 British domestic regulatory measures to ensure state influence over the oil markets also proceeded, with a bill introduced in August 1917 that reserved to the Crown the exclusive right to explore for oil in the British Isles.685 Although this legislation was rejected, it was replaced in
1918 by the Petroleum Production Act, which allowed the British government to control oil drilling through the provision of licenses.686 Yet, British domestic regulatory policies could have only minimal impact on Britain’s oil security, as physical supply lay elsewhere. The British were left with financial control over those corporate entities that could access oil as their ultimate recourse in their attempt to reduce their reliance on the Americans, and the large oil monopolies.
From 1914-1920, A.P.O.C. shipped 1,625,000 long tons of fuel oil to Britain, primarily from its
Abadan refinery.687 The United States shipped some 55 million barrels of oil to Britain prior to the American entry into the war, which equates to 7,401,248 long tons.688 After the Americans joined the Allies, its role in supplying allied oil increased further.689
Britain had taken quite a leap of faith in its transition from coal to oil for fueling its Navy. The
Admiralty did not need convincing of the usefulness of the resource; instead, consistent and secure supply in wartime was the primary obstacle. Even this issue was not resolved fully until well after the war. The development and diffusion of oil based technology by competitors, as well as research and development domestically, pushed Britain into a compromising position.
Naval technology had been the cornerstone of British national security for hundreds of years, and at this time that technology was being revolutionized by the utilization of a resource that Britain
685 Ibid, pg. 202 686 Ibid, pg. 202-203 687 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 257 688 Ibid; barrels to long tons conversion calculated by the author 689 Ibid
225 did not possess. During the war attacks on the importation of this resource (by a newly created, oil centric technology) came dangerously close to being an “Achilles heel” for the British. This was dramatically different than the circumstances Britain experienced in the age of coal fired vessels, and rectifying what was seen as a serious strategic weakness drove British oil politics and policy.
Conclusions
The transition from coal to oil for fueling industrial machinery began in force among the world’s naval organizations. The British, with their historical reliance on the Royal Navy for national security and protection of the Empire, in many ways were ahead of their competitors in exploring and implementing this transition. In designing and building modern oil-burning warships, both battleships and cruisers, the British had a substantial edge. In exploring the new modes of travel spurred by oil technological developments prior to the war, the British led the world in submarine construction, with seventy-six boats built and twenty building by 1914.690 Ironically, it was the German use of submarines that was to cause the greatest threat to the British during the war, despite German delay in initially constructing the new vessels. As for aircraft, while the
British had been initially slow to see the potential of such craft, they did ultimately create the
Royal Flying Corps by 1912, launched seaplanes off of the Hermes,691 as well as launched a torpedo from a seaplane before the war began.692 These events represent examples of relatively rapid diffusion of oil-based technology, and in the case of submarines, the British demonstrated a commitment to building such vessels in large numbers prior to the outbreak of war.
690 Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University, 1970, pg. 40-41 691 The Americans had accomplished this feat a few years earlier, see chapter 3 692 Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981, pg. 369-370
226
British commitment to oil technology was slowed by several factors. The first was the enjoyable position the British held in terms of coal. Britain exercised a large degree of control over the coal industry, and in particular control over the type coal preferred for Naval use. To transition away from such a favorable circumstance seemed dangerous to many. Yet the British did transition the large majority of its major ships to oil-burning prior to the war, with the exception of the building program of 1913-1914, which was converted late in construction to be oil- burning after War broke out.693 The second factor was geologic in nature. The British Isles simply did not possess any major competitive source of oil. Differing views about the degree to which this should impact the decision to transition were held by various individuals, including
Jack Fisher, William Pakenham, Ernest Prettyman, and Winston Churchill. It is this second factor that prompted a change in how the British government interacted with the oil market and major oil companies, and this substantially impacted overall British oil policy. In the concluding chapter, the author will compare and contrast the policy decisions and actions of the Navies and governments of the United States and Great Britain. The objective is to highlight the impact of this energy transition on the relationship between the respective states, their naval organizations, the oil industry and its primary corporate actors.
693 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 106
227 6 Comparative Analysis of the U.S. and British transition from Coal to Oil
Overarching goal of the research
The larger goal of this dissertation is to understand the reactions by states to major energy transitions. Current popular and academic discourse on energy has recently acknowledged the likelihood of future transitions away from fossil fuels and towards more renewable resources.
With this in mind, the decision was made to examine the first of these modern energy transitions: from coal to oil. Great power navies and their decision to transition their fleets to being powered by oil encapsulate this transition.
The more specific goal of this dissertation is to create a typology of state responses to energy transitions. The author has traced the process by which the US and British navies and their respective governments investigated, debated, and decided to leave coal behind, choosing to build their primary tools for power projection on oil based technology. In doing so the author hopes to illuminate these state responses to energy transitions, and to generate a typology of generalizable propositions about how states are likely to responds to future transitions. The primary case studies are the United States Navy and the British Navy. From these case studies a typology will be created, and then used to briefly discuss other state navies, namely the German,
Japanese, French and the Russians. First, I will briefly reiterate my methodological approach, and describe the role of the comparative case study.
The approach used here to understand state responses – and military responses in particular – to energy transitions has followed the lead of historians and political scientists in focusing on the
228 social process of technological development.694 Relevant questions that this research has aimed to answer in investigating the nature of energy transition from coal to oil include:
“Who are the stakeholder groups? What kind[s] of interactions are likely to take place between them? How will these interactions affect the outcome of the technology- introduction process? What can we learn about the interests and values of social groups and institutions that will allow us to analyze the form and content of that interaction? What constraints do these values and interests place on the likely outcome?”695
More specifically, the goal is to create a typology that will classify the various responses to this diffusion on the part of the American and British navies. What developments led to the decision to embrace this new energy technology? How and by whom was such a decision reached? What individuals, organizations, branches of government, or corporations were advocating for such a change and which were not? How did such a change impact military doctrine, policy, and posture? By addressing such questions, this work hopes to shed light on how states perceive the role of energy in terms of military security and also on how impactful energy transitions can be.
Increased understanding of these issues will provide some guidance on how states and their militaries might respond to likely future energy transitions. This type of research is well suited for the methodology of comparative case studies. Detailed, historical, qualitative case studies can be used as building blocks to develop and refine typological theory.
“The analytical approach informing this volume is the comparative case study method. Case studies are used inductively to develop and refine typological theory though a “building block” approach. This approach is particularly useful in new or emerging research programs to generate theory. The authors in this volume employ methods of within-case analysis, particularly process tracing, in order to trace the causal pathways for diffusion… [This] allow[s] us to trace the impact of a variety of factors (cultural, economic, political, organizational, and technological) affecting how innovations are assimilated, and their consequences for strategic behavior.”696
694 Frankel, Eugene. "Energy and Social Change: A Historian's Perspective." Policy Sciences 14, no. 1 (1981): pg. 80 695 Ibid 696 Emily O. Goldman, Leslie C. Eliason, Ed. The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003, pg.22-23
229 In this study, the case under examination is the transition from coal to oil as the primary energy resource used for machine power by state navies. My examination and “tracing” of this process entails explication and description of the various governmental and naval policies that were both reactions to aspects of this transition, and also in some instances actions that propelled the transition forward. The British and American navies were at times re-active, and at other times pro-active, in their relationship with the broader energy transition. Accordingly, this research can be described as a within-case comparison of state and naval energy policies during an energy transition. The independent variable is the overall socio-economic and technological transition.
The dependent variables consist of the litany of policies implemented in relation to that transition.
The Typology
The various policy actions taken by states and their navies during this energy transition will be outlined and categorized by type, and then will be placed within the two-by-two typology described in chapter two. This typology originates in John Ikenberry’s work on state reactions to the oil crises of the 1970s.697 In that work he categorizes state adjustments to the dramatically different energy environment of that time. Such adjustments are categorized based upon policy location (international/domestic) and strategic objective (defensive/offensive). Ikenberry used this framework to analyze the American and international cooperative adjustment policies utilized in reaction to the price spikes in oil during the 1970s; here the same framework will be applied to the various policies of the U.S. and Britain during the transition from coal to oil.
Several factors justify the use of this typology, most importantly that it was created with the
697 Ikenberry, G. John. Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
230 purpose of categorizing state responses to major change in the energy sector, and also that this typology was created to analyze and assess state power and capability. Additionally, each of the four categories created by this typology represent substantially different types of policy options that often entail substantially different actions, possibilities, difficulties, and chances for success.
For example, Ikenberry notes that international offensive strategies, such as creation of international institutions, are the most ambitious, requiring high levels of international cooperation and institutionalization and often involve the creation of new “rules of the game.”698
Conversely, domestic defensive strategies, such as the erection of trade barriers or tariffs, can be implemented unilaterally. By using this typology, the aim is to situate my research on state and naval reactions to energy transitions within the broader debate about energy policy, national security policy, and the theoretical debates described in chapter 3, as well as to make an original contribution to that debate about the role of energy transitions. Lastly, another layer of categorization must be added to this framework to better understand how the U.S. and Britain navigated the transition from coal to oil.
Types of policy responses and transition eras
States have a variety of tools and mechanisms to affect policy change. In addition to categorizing policies by their location (international/domestic), and their strategic objective
(offensive/defensive), one may categorize policies along different lines. Ikenberry’s typology accounts for the where and the why of adjustment policies, but it does not account for the who and the how of adjustment policies. Thus, my approach will first label policies as legislative, executive, judicial, financial/monetary, political/military, or technological/research and development policies. Once organized along these lines policies can be placed within the two-
698 Ibid, pg. 16
231 by-two matrix, and subsequent analysis will provide a more nuanced understanding of the overall strategies taken by the U.S. and Britain during this energy transition, as well as of how state strategies changed over time. Additionally, the historical narrative covered in this research is divided into three stages, the investigative era from 1898-1905, the prewar transition from 1905-
1913, and the wartime transition from 1914-1918. Matrices of categorized policies will be created for each of the three eras, and will demonstrate how policies of state reaction changed over time, as well as how they differed prior to, and during, World War I.
Comparative Analysis of US and British transition policies
The United States and Britain occupied different positions among the great powers at the turn of the century. The U.S., having won the Spanish American war, had recently obtained its first overseas colonial possessions, and was only beginning to come to terms with the realities of being a global, colonial power. The British, on the other hand, were at the peak of their power, with a vast global empire stretching from the North Sea to the Indian Ocean. Different concerns, interests, and strategies accompanied these different positions. However, there was one major quality shared by these two states, their geographic separation from mainland Europe. In comparison to their French, German, and Russian counterparts, the British and Americans were primarily maritime powers. As such, responsibility for their national security was mostly in the hands of their respective navies. In this section, I will summarize the process by which these navies transitioned away from coal, and towards the use of oil as the primary fuel for their fleet, including the creation of oil burning fleets, and the development of oil-dependent submarines and aircraft.
232 The United States
The Spanish American War prompted the first Congressional authorization of funding for the purpose of exploration of the use of oil fuel to power naval vessels. Naval Secretary William H.
Moody described attempts at the use of oil for naval purpose as having occurred for forty years prior to 1902.699 Moody clearly understood the implications of successful use of oil for powering ships, and forecast that whichever military accomplishes this feat first would possess a substantial military, and economic, advantage.700 In 1902 the Navy created the Liquid Fuel
Board under the Board of Steam Engineering to examine the relative qualities of coal and oil, publishing their first report in 1904. One of the first achievements of this Board was the realization that new methods for burning this fuel were necessary, and that many of the past failures were the result of attempts to burn oil in the same fashion as coal.701 The Board also emphasized the need for state support of experimental facilities, a need that stemmed from the rapid nature of technological change at the time. The Board believed that the U.S. Navy needed to be able to anticipate future desirable technological changes.702 At this stage, the Navy had a cooperative relationship with certain private oil interests, interests that provided the needed oil for experimental purposes. Additionally, in 1902 Congress appropriated $20,000 for further experimentation.703
By 1904 the Navy recommended that one-third of U.S. torpedo boats and destroyers should burn oil, and had begun planning for oil burning installations on various ships, namely the scout
699 The Navy Department, 'Annual Reports of the Navy Department', ed. by The Navy Department (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), pg. 27 700 Ibid, pg. 720 701 Ibid, pg. 737 702 Ibid, pg. 719 703 Ibid, pg. 717
233 cruisers Intrepid and Alarm.704 Also in 1904 the U.S. had completed the contracts for 12 submarine boats, most of which were built by Holland company.705 In 1905 the U.S. completed the designs for its first “Dreadnaught” class ship, the South Carolina, following the lead of the
British in capital ship design. In 1906 the US converted the U.S.S. Wyoming to oil burning, with the expressed purpose of learning how burning oil might impact ship design, and also began discussing the use of double-bottoms so that ships could carry oil as well as their regular complement of coal.706 This marks the beginning of the “dual-firing” ship design period, whereby navies understood the benefits of oil, but were unable, or unwilling, to forego the use of coal. Outside of the Navy, in 1906 the Bureau of Corporations alleged illegal activity on the part of Standard Oil, which led to legal action by the Attorney General, and ultimately led to the forced breakup of Standard Oil in 1911. While the ruling of the Supreme Court in United States v. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey was lauded by most at the time, it likely had negative effects on petroleum market coordination and cooperation, qualities that the U.S. government found itself attempting to induce during the war.707
In 1907 the Navy continued testing various submarine designs,708 and also continued designing capital ships as “dual-firing.”709 Outside of fueling ships and submarines, the Navy noted by
704 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904, pg. 902 705 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 1255. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905, pg. 690 706 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 1113. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906, pg. 20 707 Jr., Robert L. Bradley. Oil, Gas & Government: The U.S. Experience. 2 vols. Vol. 1: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, pg. 230 708The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 1113. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906, pg. 19 709 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 1304. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907, pg. 17-18
234 1907 an increased general use of oil for various purposes, including use in furnaces, foundries and by blacksmiths.710 Also, in 1907 the Navy first began testing the use of small gasoline engines.711 1908 saw the first investigation into the possibility of manned flight for military purposes, and although, this initial test was sponsored by the Army, the Navy came away from the test impressed by the possibilities that manned flight offered it.712 While experimentation with flight on the part of the world’s militaries was in its infancy, submarines had become accepted as a part of the fleet, although their usefulness was considered primarily defensive.713
The navy did continue to improve its use of submarines, however, and progress was achieved in the utilization of turbo-diesel engines on submarine tenders for the purpose of charging submarine batteries.714 By 1909 George Von Lengerke Meyer had taken several steps to prepare for the ultimate conversion from coal to oil by the U.S. Navy, including increased construction of oil depots and storage, and consolidation of the bureaucratic management of oil matters in the hands of the Bureau of Navigation.715 By 1909, Meyer notes in the annual report that all future battleships, and most destroyers, would be oil burning.716 Although this was not exactly the case, as large battleships would be “dual-firing” until 1911, by 1910 practically all naval vessels were built as oil burners and as a result the Navy began to discuss the need to build even more oil storage facilities at outlying strategic locations.717 Moreover, in 1910, the U.S. Navy became the
710 Ibid, pg. 616-617 711 Ibid, pg. 740, 763-764 712 Miller, Nathan. The U.S. Navy: A History. 3rd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, pg. 175-176 713 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 1031. Washington D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1908, pg. 38 714 Ibid, pg. 301 715 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 1063. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909, pg. 307 716 Ibid 717 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 832. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910, pg. 25
235 first to have a plane successfully take off from a ship, demonstrating proof of concept for the aircraft carrier.718
In 1911 the Navy sought to increase the efficiency of its crews, and instituted competitive testing for fuel efficiency, while the U.S.S. Delaware demonstrated the efficiency of using oil as an adjunct to coal by steaming to England and back without the need to take on extra fuel in the process. Moreover, Congress provided appropriations for the first American battleships to burn only oil, the U.S.S. Nevada and the U.S.S. Oklahoma, both subsequently laid down in 1912.719
Naval fuel oil consumption at this time stood at 16 million gallons in the fiscal year of 1912, and as this number rose Naval Secretary Meyer called for more oil transport vessels, which indicated a need for improvement in oil infrastructure.720 1912 saw substantial progress in the articulation of Naval air doctrine, including discussion of ships as mobile air bases, development of catapults for launching planes from ships and high altitude flight tests of up to 3,000 feet.721 At this time the Navy still saw the primary purpose of planes as that of reconnaissance, yet the annual reports began describing the possibility of using airplanes for attack purposes.722 1913 saw the beginning of cooperation between the Navy and the Langley Aerodynamic Lab, as well as the creation of the Advisory Committee on Aeronautics. Also in this year, the U.S. Navy discovered that it could use airplanes to spot submarines during fleet exercises in Guantanamo Bay.723
718 Ibid, pg. 23 719 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 551. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911, pg. 48 720 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 608. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1912, pg. 266 721 Ibid, pg. 159-160 722 Ibid, pg. 156 723 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914, pg. 6
236 The elections of 1912 obtained for the Democrats control of both Congress and the White House.
President Wilson nominated a naval outsider, Josephus Daniels, as naval secretary. While
Secretary Daniels had been criticized for ignoring strategic matters, he did not ignore the importance of the transition from coal to oil. In 1914 Daniels explicitly described coal as the fuel of the past and in his first annual report extolled the benefits to be had from switching to oil.724 Moreover, Daniels believed that it was crucial that the Navy independently control the necessary resources to provide for the national defense, including oil.725 Under Daniels, the
Navy began to investigate the cost, feasibility and desirability of constructing a government owned pipeline to carry oil from the midcontinent field in Oklahoma to the Gulf of Mexico.726
This project never came to pass, however, due to the Supreme Court ruling in 1914 that declared oil pipelines as common carriers.
By 1914 the U.S. had launched its first all oil burning battleships, while continuing to pour money into the new oil-dependent technologies of submarines and aircraft. The Navy designed its first “fleet submarines” which were intended to operate in tandem with the larger fleet, the development of which relied upon appropriately capable internal combustion engines.727
Meanwhile the Navy was pursuing a large investment of $5,000,000 for the purpose of developing a “proper air service,” as aircraft development in Europe was seen as more advanced than in the United States.728 While the Navy did not receive this amount of funding at this time, such funding increased dramatically over the next several years, with $1.5 million appropriated
724 The Navy Department. "The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 558. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913, pg. 227 725 Ibid, pg. 14-15 726 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914, pg. 18 727 Ibid, pg. 63-64 728 Ibid, pg. 64-65
237 for the Naval Consulting Board, although only part of that Board’s work was focused on aeronautics.729 It was America’s entry into the war that ultimately opened up the coffers for aviation, and during the fiscal year beginning July 1 1916, total expenditure on aviation for the
Navy was an astounding $67,633,000.730
During the last two years of American neutrality there were several important developments related to the transition from coal to oil. In 1915 the Navy designed and built its first airplane independent of private interests.731 Congress passed the largest naval appropriations bill in
American history, while it was also agreed that the Navy should operate on five-year building programs, instead of legislation being required annually. 732 Additionally, the Navy recruited
Thomas Edison to help lead the newly created Naval Consulting Board. This is significant as it can be seen as a concerted effort by the Navy to harness the inventive and innovative capabilities of the American scientific community. While at first these scientists were required to operate voluntarily, by 1916 Congress had appropriated funds ($25,000) to ensure that these patriots were paid for their endeavors.733 In addition to the Naval Consulting Board, the Committees of
Industrial Preparedness was created to provide an industrial inventory of various materials and supplies that would likely be needed in wartime.734 In many ways the Committees of Industrial
729 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 68 730 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 872. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917, pg. 35 731 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 796. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, pg. 40 732 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 796. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, pg. 93 733 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 796. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, pg. 45-46 734 The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 68
238 Preparedness can be seen as an important part of the mobilization process. This could also be described as lesson-drawing, as the Americans had witnessed European nations fall short on important industrial products needed for their war efforts such as shells and cartridges, a point explicitly made by Secretary Daniels.735
In mid 1917 President Wilson created the War Industries Board, which replaced the Council of
National Defense. Within that bureaucratic structure, the Petroleum Advisory Committee was replaced with the Petroleum War Service Committee.736 The War Industries Board, described as the most powerful of all wartime agencies, was chaired by the former President of Standard Oil of New Jersey, A.C. Bedford.737 This represents a rather dramatic shift in policy toward
Standard, from charges of corruption and the forced breakup of the monopoly in 1911 to cooperative market regulation under the leadership of the former Standard President in 1917.
Under the authority of the Lever Act, President Wilson created the U.S. Fuel Administration, and its sub-division, the Oil Division, which was headed by Mark Requa, an oil producer.738 Requa was unable to implement price controls as head of the Oil Division, and thus was required to persuade the industry to accept the current price quotations (of May 1918) as effective price ceilings. This was a reversal of Requa’s previous laissez-faire position on the matter of regulatory price controls for oil prices.739 This system was the first effective federal regulation of the oil industry since its inception.740
735 Ibid 736 Robert L. Bradley Jr. Oil, Gas & Government: The U.S. Experience. 2 vols. Vol. 1: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, pg. 224 737 Ibid 738 Ibid, pg. 226-227 739 Ibid 740 Ibid
239 During the War, much of the activity of the U.S. Navy was focused on the threat of German submarines, which was appropriate given that German use of submarines to attack merchant shipping without warning had initially drawn the United States into the war. The Navy utilized emergency provisions to alter the nature of vessel construction, putting more emphasis on the destroyer. The need for destroyers was so great that the Navy was willing to delay further construction of capital ships.741 The submarine had proven itself the most destructive new weapon of the war, and prompted substantial efforts to create effective tools to counter it, including depth charges, nets, specialized shells and the use of airplanes for spotting subs.742 In its work on aviation, the Navy had developed the Liberty engine, which proved quite satisfactory, becoming the Navy’s preferred engine for aviation during the war.743 Also,
America’s official status as a belligerent eased the process of cross-military cooperation and information sharing on new developments in aviation among the allies.744 The progress of aeronautical science prompted discussions of the creation of a third military branch by the
Aircraft Board, although this was ultimately rejected.745 Instead the Aircraft Board continued to serve as a coordinating body between the Army, the Navy, and their respective aviation units.
In the summer of 1917 the implementation of the convoy system by the allies managed to dramatically reduce the number of vessels sunk by German U-boats.746 As this campaign by the
Germans had substantially impacted the availability of oil tankers, the U.S. found a need to
741 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 872. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917, pg. 28-29 742 Ibid, pg. 225-229 743 Ibid, pg. 511-512 744 Ibid, pg. 36-37 745 Ibid, pg. 38 746 Rose, Lisle A. The Age of Navalism 1890-1918. Vol. 1, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007, pg. 260-261
240 requisition six such vessels from the private sector.747 The magnitude of this problem is evident in the staggering level of oil consumption reached by allied navies during the war; the U.S. Navy alone in 1918 consumed 4.5 million barrels of oil fuel, and over 11.5 million gallons of gasoline.748 Fear that the Germans would continue to sink oil tankers even prompted the construction of a trans-Scottish oil pipeline to shorten the distance that oil tankers needed to travel.749
Before the war had ended, the role of petroleum in the provision of American national security had become widely understood. While coal would still be needed for those ships built prior to the transition to oil, the American navy would never again build vessels of war that required coal for propulsion. The strategic qualities of the energy industry had changed. To sum up this point in the Navy’s own words: “[A] nation that does not control an adequate oil supply can[not] successfully maintain its forces in the field; the Navy must be supplied with fuel oil and lubricants and the air forces with gasoline and lubricating oils if operations are to be successfully conducted.”750 This statement equally applies to current military organizations.
The British Navy
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Great Britain was at the apex of her power but also experiencing a period of relative decline. Other powers, namely the United States and Germany, were beginning to erode the industrial dominance that the British had enjoyed since the industrial
747 The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy Department, 1766. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918, pg. 638 748 Ibid, pg. 99 749 Ibid, pg. 12 750 Ibid, pg. 138-139
241 revolution. 751 The major theme in British naval circles from the turn of the century until the
First World War was a focus on how Britain could maintain its naval dominance, and thus protect its empire. This manifested itself in the form of the “two-power standard,” or the idea that the British Navy should be greater in size and capability than the next two greatest navies.
Although this idea had been implicit in British naval planning for “well over a century,” it became official British policy after joint maneuvers with the French navy in 1888.752 This idea drove the British to consistently seek ways to improve their naval capabilities, both qualitatively and quantitatively. As early as 1865 the British had experimented with oil as a fuel for naval vessels.753 Yet it was not until tests led by Jack Fisher in 1898, 1899, and 1901, that the British began to seriously examine the feasibility of an oil-powered navy.754
Fisher was a particularly important individual in the British transition from coal to oil, and he was consistently ahead of his time in understanding the implications of technological change on naval warfare. His experimental testing while he served as Controller of the Navy led to the creation of the Admiralty Fuel Experiment Station at Davenport in 1902. Significantly, he had social interactions with several of the most important oil-men of the time, meeting Marcus
Samuel in 1899 and William D’Arcy in 1903.755 In 1902 the British began testing oil-burning
751 Friedberg, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895- 1905 Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, pg. 24 752 Hamilton, C. I. The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making 1805- 1927. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pg. 210 753 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 42 754 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 125-126 755 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 15
242 machinery on destroyers, and also built their first submarine.756 The next year the British ordered eight more submarines, demonstrating their commitment to being at the cutting edge of naval technology.
In 1904 Fisher was made First Sea Lord. Considered an “oil-maniac,” Fisher worked tirelessly to convince the admiralty and cabinet that oil was the fuel of the future.757 That same year the
British developed a process by which oil could be atomized without the use of compressed air and made this technology a state secret by granting a secret patent for the device. This development prompted Britain to adopt oil as an auxiliary fuel on all of its vessels, making the royal fleet a “dual-burning” navy. 758 This decision cemented oil’s future use by the royal navy, at a minimum as an adjunct to coal, and prompted official investigation of matters of oil supply.
The Prettyman Committee discovered what was likely known to many in the oil industry at the time, namely that the British Empire produced very little oil, and also that the oil market was dominated by large monopolies. Thus the Committee worked with the Colonial Office to create policies that would encourage oil production.759 The Committee explicitly placed an emphasis on private commercial development of oil fields, and later even suggested that the British
Government act as a lender of last resort by acquiring oil fields directly and leasing them to private companies for development.760 This intervention into the oil markets, which included other provisions such as right of first refusal to purchase production, was codified in the Oil
756 Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University, 1970, pg. 31 757 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 105 758 Ibid, pg. 51 759 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 159-160 760 Ibid, pg. 160-161
243 Mines Act of Barbados.761 Britain found a need to intervene in the oil market, a practice that was not necessary for coal. From 1905 on, Britain began implementing increasingly interventionist policies for the purposes of ensuring access to oil for its Navy. The Admiralty and the Indian government, took steps to exclude a subsidiary of Standard Oil, Asiatic Petroleum Company, from the Indian Oil Market, while at the same time the Admiralty signed its first long term contract with the Burmah Oil Company.762 This agreement with Burmah oil demonstrates
British concern over the nature of its oil suppliers, particularly that the British wanted to work with British owned companies and feared that foreign oil interests would not be reliable suppliers in wartime. As a result the contract with Burmah oil included the stipulation that there be no alterations to the ownership of the company without the consent of the Admiralty.763
In 1907 the Admiralty rejected an offer from the Wright brothers, which would have given the
British the patents on the Wright’s planes. The Committee for Imperial Defense sub-committee on aerial navigation was created in 1908, but concluded that aircraft development should be left to the private sector due to minimal military applications for the technology.764 In hindsight these decisions are difficult to understand, and Britain’s pre-war aeronautical development was lacking in comparison to other powers, as Britain entered the war with only “200 ill assorted aircraft.”765 The army dominated British air policy, and substantial airpower development in
761 Ibid 762 Ibid, pg. 164-167 763 Ibid, pg. 178-179 764 Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981, pg. 29 765 Cooper, Malcolm. The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World War. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pg. xv
244 Britain was only brought on by the war, by the end of which the British were producing 2,000 aircraft per month.766
In 1907 Jack Fisher first met Winston Churchill, and over time Fisher managed to convince
Churchill on the importance of transitioning the navy from coal to oil. 1908 saw the rupturing of the first gusher oil well within the D’Arcy concession in Persia, a development that prompted the incorporation of the Anglo Persian Oil Company in 1909.767 British desire for physical control of a major oil supply led to the purchase of a controlling share of this company in 1914.768 By
1910, British destroyers were all oil burning ships, while battleships continued to use oil as an auxiliary to coal.769 British funding for experimental aviation, while still lagging behind other nations, was beginning to catch up, and in 1911 the Naval Flying School was organized.770
Where the British did not lag behind was in submarine construction. In 1911 the British had become the leading builder of submarines in the world.771 By 1913 the British had a two to one lead in submarines over the Germans, although it was the Germans who most effectively used this new weapon during the war.772
766 Ibid, pg. xviii-xix 767 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 138-141 768 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 97 769 Ibid, pg. 58-61 770 Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981, pg. 39 771 Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University, 1970, pg. 39-40 772 Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pg. 264
245 Churchill became the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911. He was determined by this time that the Royal Navy would need to become an all oil-burning navy. When the Pakenham committee failed to recommend such a transition, Churchill created the Royal Commission on Fuel and
Engines, appointing Fisher to head the effort. Displeased with the Royal Commission recommendations regarding reserve supply necessary, Churchill turned to the newly created
Naval War Staff. Explaining his position to Parliament, Churchill boldly declared that the
British government should directly enter the oil business, thus arguing for a state created petro- chemical industry.773
The 1913-1914 R-Class of British battleships was initially designed to burn coal, however after the beginning of hostilities in 1914, these ships were converted to oil-burners.774 These would be the last coal-burning ship designs ever produced by the British navy. Throughout the war, the primary supplier of oil to the British was the United States. This was due to several factors.
First, the United States was simply the world’s largest producer at the time. Secondly, the U.S. was conveniently located geographically so that such a supply was not particularly interrupted by the war. Third, the U.S. and Britain were allies once the Americans joined the war, so
Washington had a vested interest in ensuring that the British had the supply they needed. This third point likely explains the dramatic spike in U.S. oil imported to the U.K. in 1917 (see chart on page 15 of chapter 5). Also at that time in the war, the British were experiencing reduced supplies as a result of Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare. By May of 1917 British oil reserves were at 60 percent of their preferred levels and by June Britain had only six weeks of
773 Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 103-114 774 Ibid, pg. 106
246 supply left.775 The allied response included increased use of double bottoms for oil transport, and more importantly, the implementation of the convoy system, the latter of which dramatically reduced the effectiveness of the German submarine campaign.
In 1916 the British had agreed to particular spheres of influence in Mesopotamia with the French in the infamous Sykes-Picot Treaty. By 1918 the British no longer supported the arrangement, and instead sought to take control of the oil producing areas in Mesopotamia directly. The
British were aware that imperial conquest of this region was unlikely to be palatable to the other powers, much less to the region’s inhabitants. Consequently, the British articulated their interest in the region in terms that would appear more favorable to world opinion, while working to ensure that they would control the mandate for the newly created state of Iraq after the war.
British political maneuvering over Iraq continued until well after the war’s end, however there can be no doubt that early in the war the British were aware that oil reserves in the area were likely the world’s largest, and that official British war policy was to maintain physical control from Mosul to Basra.776
By the end of the war Britain had created the Petroleum Executive (PE). Overseen by John
Cadman, the PE was responsible for control and regulation of petroleum supplies, and was planning for a full ministry of petroleum affairs.777 The number of other bureaucratic bodies created by Britain related to oil is described by one scholar as “bewildering,” and included the
775 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 240 776 For an excellent discussion of British policy in Iraq/Mesopotamia during this period see Mejcher, Helmut. Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928. London: Ithaca Press, 1976. 777 Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 195-196
247 Mineral and Oil Production Department (domestic production), the Pool Board (allied effort regarding distribution), the Petrol Control Department (concerning conservation efforts),778 and the Petroleum Imperial Policy Committee (tasked to develop a long term oil strategy).779 Lastly, in 1918 Britain passed the Petroleum Production Act, which allowed the British government to control oil drilling through the provision of licenses.780
The transition from coal to oil for fueling industrial machinery began in force among the world’s naval organizations. The British, with their historical reliance on the Royal Navy for national security and protection of the Empire, in many ways were ahead of their competitors in exploring and implementing this transition. In designing and building modern oil-burning warships, both battleships and cruisers, the British had a substantial edge. In exploring the new modes of travel spurred by oil technological developments prior to the war, the British led the world in submarine construction, with seventy-six boats built and twenty building by 1914.781 Ironically, it was the German use of submarines that was to cause the greatest threat to the British during the war, despite German delay in initially constructing the new vessels. As for aircraft, while the
British had initially been slow to see the potential of such craft, they did ultimately create the
Royal Flying Corps by 1912, launched seaplanes off of the Hermes,782 as well as launched a torpedo from a seaplane before the war began.783 These events represent examples of relatively
778 Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo- American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 242 779 Jones, G. Gareth. "The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The Search for an Oil Policy." The Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (September 1977), pg. 665 780 Ibid, pg. 202-203 781 Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University, 1970, pg. 40-41 782 The Americans had accomplished this feat a few years earlier, see chapter 3 783 Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981, pg. 369-370
248 rapid diffusion of oil-based technology, and in the case of submarines, the British demonstrated a commitment to building such vessels in large numbers prior to the outbreak of war.
Britain’s reliance on naval power led to an early start to its transition from coal to oil, and yet lack of British domestic supply, and corresponding uncertainty about access to oil in wartime, slowed this process. Thus the British relied on financial control, direct company ownership, and imperial conquest to ensure physical control of supply, although the British were primarily dependent upon the United States for the oil it needed throughout the period examined in this work. The national security imperatives involved in fueling the Royal Navy led the British state to directly and extensively interfere in the petroleum market, a dramatic change from the relationship that had existed between the British state and the coal industry.
The research presented here traces the events between roughly 1900 and the end of the First
World War related to the transition from coal to oil made by great power navies of the time.
Using the American and British navies as within case comparison, one can distinguish between different types of strategies used by these two maritime powers to navigate this transition and best provide for their own national security. The development and diffusion of oil based technology occurred primarily in the area of maritime propulsion technology used by navies for power projection, the protection of sea trade routes and overseas possessions, the blockade of enemies, and the attempted destruction of other similar fleets. By systematically classifying and categorizing the litany of policy responses to this energy transition, I hope to provide a more vivid picture of the impact of such transitions, and the strategies states may find useful in reacting to them. Additionally, the research intends to show changes in these policy responses
249 over time, and through the different periods of the transition itself. Those periods are the
Investigative period from 1898-1905, the Pre-War Transition period from 1906-1913, and the
Wartime Transition period from 1914-1918. Moreover, I will seek to apply some lessons learned from this research to the anticipated future energy transition away from oil and other fossil fuels, toward more renewable and sustainable alternative.
The Investigative Period: 1898-1905
In this period the United States and Britain began examining whether or not fuel oil was a viable alternative to using coal to power their ships. The United States obtained small amounts of money from Congress for the purpose of experimental tests and in general these tests were seen as demonstrating the great potential of fuel oil, albeit there were some difficulties. The U.S. created the Liquid Fuel Board to examine oil-burning technology in 1902, which conducted the
Hollenstein water tube boiler tests in 1904. This led to the installation of oil burning engines on scout cruisers, as well as retrofitting smaller ships for oil burning. Also, in 1904 the U.S. made its first major submarine purchase, and designed its first “dreadnaught” battleship, representing the zenith in coal powered ship technology.
Early recommendations that smaller ships should burn oil occurred in both navies. Britain’s earliest thorough oil engine testing had come earlier than in the U.S., administered by Jack Fisher between 1898 and 1901. This process instigated the building of two experiential laboratories for developing oil burning technology, in Davenport in 1901 and at Haslar in 1902. These testing facilities and their results led to a wholesale implementation of “dual-firing” ships, with its policy of using oil as an auxiliary to coal on all vessels by 1904. Additionally the British had
250 developed a major innovation by inventing a way to atomize fuel oil without the use of steam or compressed air, granting a secret patent for the device in 1904. Britain had also obtained its first effective submarines earlier than in the United States, building its first Holland submarine in
1902, and ordering eight more the following year. In comparison with the United States it was
Britain’s policies designed to increase British control over supply that truly differentiated the two states. The lack of British domestic supply induced policies intended to allow for state control and manipulation of the oil industry, a process that was not as evident in American policy. The
British passed the Oil Mines Act of Barbados in 1904, giving the Admiralty certain privileges and rights in terms of access to supply developed by private entities. Additionally the Admiralty and British government encouraged British corporate control, and development of supplies outside of the Empire, for example by ensuring requisite capital to keep the D’arcy concession in
British hands, and by signing long term contracts with British owned oil producers such as
Burmah Oil. Those contracts also included mercantilist clauses that ensured continued British ownership of Burmah Oil Company.
Both states sought to be on the cutting edge of naval technology, yet for different reasons. The
United States was a rising power, and a newly colonial power, and thus needed to improve naval capability to protect its new possessions. The British were losing their traditional edge in naval power and spent an enormous amount of capital and effort to maintain that lead. Both states created new bureaucratic organization and committees to establish how best to use this new fuel for their own purposes, and in doing so, they impacted the trajectory of the transition. The oil industry had been focused primarily on kerosene for illumination since the 1860s. As the
American and British navies began to increase their use of heavier fuel oil, they substantially
251 increased the market demand for something that had previously been a little used by-product of kerosene refining. Additionally, as these navies continued to build more impressive, larger, faster, and more powerful battleships, the problems with coal became more manifest, increasing efforts to develop an alternative to the dirty and difficult-to-manage fuel.
The Pre-War Transition Period: 1906-1913
Between 1906 and 1913, the superior performance of burning oil for maritime purposes became widely acknowledged. Accordingly, the American and British Navies sought to utilize oil as widely as possible, where it was feasible and affordable. The United States, despite being the world’s largest producer of oil at the time, was still concerned about cost and supply, and felt as though it was at the mercy of large oil monopolies, such as Standard Oil. Such sentiment was not new, having had existed in U.S. government and naval relations with the steel companies during ship construction in the late 1800’s. To ensure supply the U.S. set aside certain oil producing lands for the purposes of naval oil reserves, an issue that was to become a contentious one between Congress and the Navy. The U.S. government also began taking measures to reduce the amount of influence that Standard Oil had in the oil industry, with charges of corruption and illegal activity coming from the Board of Corporations, and a lawsuit brought by the Attorney General in 1906 that ultimately led to a Supreme Court ruling forcing the breakup of Standard in 1911. The U.S. Navy continued to experiment with submarines, seeking improved performance and capability, and also began to experiment with small internal combustion gasoline engines. The latter of these developments related directly to the emergence of manned flight, which was first accomplished in 1903. Within seven years of the Wright brothers’ accomplishment, the Navy had managed to have a plane take off from a ship.
252
The U.S. Navy performed a litany of technological tests and experiments, including on 2- cylinder engines, and also on the comparative efficiencies of reciprocating engines and turbines.
Where it could not develop the technology on its own the Navy sometimes turned to the private sector, as it did in 1909 when seeking new gasoline engine designs. It sent officers on cooperative missions seeking new knowledge from European nations while also beginning official cooperation with the Langley aeronautics labs. By the end of this period several policies were firmly established. By 1909 it was believed by the Naval secretary that all future ships would burn oil, not coal. Submarines were accepted as regular elements of the fleet, and a doctrine based around coastal defense had developed. Aircraft were still primarily experimental, yet it was firmly accepted by naval leaders that such machines would play an important role in reconnaissance. In 1913 naval exercises in the Caribbean demonstrated that airplane pilots could easily spot submarines, foreshadowing their role in anti-submarine operations in World War I.
Importantly, by 1913, the Navy was calling for direct control over the oil resources that it needed for its operations, and as demonstrated by the breakup of Standard Oil in 1911, the U.S. government felt that market competition was more conducive to its interests than monopolization. Also, construction of needed oil infrastructure began in earnest during this period, the logical corollary of the decision to switch the fleet to oil.
During the pre-war transition period, the British had firmly committed to being a leading submarine power, having more of the submersible vessels than any other nation by 1911. This is in contrast to their earlier rejection of manned flight technologies in 1907, although they quickly
253 reversed course on airpower by 1912. Moreover the Air Committee recommended the creation of the Royal Flying Corps in 1912, which included both military and naval sections. In terms of the Royal fleet, all but the largest battleships were burning only oil, yet Britain was not ready to completely transition its battleships to oil. Britain favored dual-firing ships for several reasons.
First, Britain possessed a particularly large amount of coal. This supply was seen as completely secure, even in wartime, and as long as its ships still possessed coal-burning machinery, Britain could ensure that its fleet could operate, a strategic necessity for the island nation. Secondly,
Britain’s lack of domestic oil supplies produced substantial anxiety among the Admiralty as well as the government, and induced caution in transitional policies. Maintaining dual-burning ships was seen as an insurance policy against supply disruption. However, there were those who felt that the benefits from making the transition complete were so great that it was risky for Britain to fall behind rising competitors. Thus Churchill expended substantial effort, through the
Pakenham Committee, the Royal Commission of Fuel and Engines, and ultimately the Naval
War Staff, to convince the government and Parliament that such a transition was necessary, regardless of the nature of the supply question. Much of Britain’s policy efforts to ensure physical control of supply were financial and otherwise economic in nature. Through restrictive contract agreements the British sought a long-term supply of oil, and also imposed ownership requirements upon several suppliers that would ensure these corporate entities remained quintessentially British. Churchill called for direct state participation in the oil industry, arguing that the British government already owned businesses that produced other implements needed for war. Over time, Churchill’s idea would come to pass, with British purchase of several oil companies.
254 The Wartime Transition: 1914-1918
The onset of hostilities in Europe accelerated the transition from coal to oil, as control of, access to, and the capability to utilize this new resource took on added urgency. In 1914 Britain purchased controlling shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The British also reversed its decision to fuel the 1913-1914 class of battleships with coal, and converted them to oil-burning, as, in the face of war, improved performance would carry elevated significance. By 1916 Britain had established that conquest of oil producing areas of Mesopotamia would be first class war aims, and set out to take control of the region from Mosul in the north to Basra in the south. The unrestricted U-boat campaign took an extraordinary toll on British shipping, most importantly on oil tankers bringing in oil supply, leading to a severe shortage in which Britain only possessed six weeks of supply. In response the British began using double-bottom ships in earnest, and also implemented the convoy system to reduce U-boat effectiveness. It is difficult to overstate the dangerousness of this situation for Britain, and many Naval leaders, including Jellicoe, felt that the U-boats might win the war for Germany. In 1918 the allies created the Inter-Allied
Petroleum Conference to coordinate supply sharing between the Americans, the British, and the
French. While the majority of allied oil came from the United States, Britain continued to try and improve its own domestic control of supply, including the passage of the 1918 Petroleum
Production Act, creating a licensure system for any oil production at home. Technologically, this period saw a dramatic increase of investment and production in airpower for Britain, including the construction of 2,000 aircraft monthly. Organizationally, the British had several bodies with specific jurisdiction related to oil matters, all of which fell under the Petroleum
Executive.
255 The United States did not join the war until April 1917, dragged into the conflict by the unrestricted German U-boat Campaign. Yet the war’s beginning clearly impacted American policy. In 1914 the U.S. government began examining the feasibility of building an oil pipeline from Oklahoma to the Gulf of Mexico, including a refinery intended to sell refined product to help pay for the process. Effectively, this resembles Churchill’s call for direct state involvement in the oil markets. This move by the Americans was ultimately unnecessary, due to the ruling of the Supreme Court making pipelines common carriers. The U.S. Congress, President Wilson, and Secretary Daniels were convinced by the beginning of the war to dramatically increase military spending, including the largest naval appropriations bill in U.S. history, and by 1917 there was over sixty-seven million dollars in spending on aircraft. The emergence of airpower prompted discussion of a separate air branch of the military, although the Aircraft Board did not recommend such a move. The creation of the American Air Force did not occur until 1947, after the next world war. Like the British, the Americans also created multiple organizations designed to oversee oil matters, including the Council of National Defense, the War Industries Board, the
U.S. Fuel Administration and its Oil Division, the National Petroleum War Service committee, and the Petroleum Advisory Committee. The reasons for such a confusing mess of committees and bureaucracies are several, including changes in available authority stemming from
Congressional legislation, and also pre and post wartime bodies that had different level of authority.
Prior to the transition to oil by their respective navies, Britain and the United States imposed very little regulation on the oil industry. As the fuel gained in popularity, and its role in national security became more clear, each state demonstrated a willingness to intervene in the industry to
256 induce preferred conditions, despite the widely held laissez faire economic ideologies of the time period. The British were so deeply tied to their naval dominance that it was seen as imperative that they remain on the cutting edge of naval technologies. The United States was emerging as a world power, continuing to grow in power, population, and geographic size. To maintain such trends, and to project power across the two oceans that separated it from Europe and Asia, a modern navy capable of competing with the European powers was necessary. The British seemed slightly out in front in terms of adopting new technology, with the exception of the airplane, although the British caught up relatively quickly. Both states utilized investigative bureaucratic bodies to participate in scientific examinations of the benefits, and detriments, of new oil technology, and both navies sought independent control over this new fuel outside of market structures. Policies toward the oil markets differed substantially. The Americans initially took steps to reduce the control of the oil industry by Standard Oil, successfully using a judicial strategy to weaken the monopoly, although the approach toward the state’s relationship with large oil companies became decidedly more cooperative once war was inevitable. In
Britain there was a substantially higher level of anxiety about the ability of oil monopolies to take advantage of the British need for oil. The British sought not to break up oil monopolies, but instead to create one of its own, resulting in the purchase of A.P.O.C., and also, albeit after the war, of Royal Dutch Shell. While much of the American policy efforts were inward looking due to high levels of domestic production, the British were forced to look outward, to her empire, and took measures not only to increase imperial production levels but also to ensure that the Navy would be the preferred customer for any oil production that did develop. Additionally, the
British felt compelled to resort to the outright conquest of oil producing territories, as demonstrated by British policy in Mesopotamia. Interestingly, in the case of Iraq, Britain
257 understood that this would be widely unpopular, and took measures to establish non-oil related arguments as to why the Iraqi mandate should be under the control of Britain.
This energy transition was likely to happen regardless of naval policy in the United States and
Britain. However, as these navies became involved in determining what use this fuel could be to them, they shaped the nature of the emerging oil industry, developed new technologies, and directly steered the activity of oil production, transport, and refinery operations worldwide. In that sense, naval and state policy related to oil can be seen as both reactive and proactive, as it relates to the energy transition. There was innovation stemming from the private sector that was then coopted by the navies, and there was also independent innovation within the various navies.
The British navy developed oil atomization technology independently, and then kept it a secret.
The American navy was the first to demonstrate that a plane could take off from, and then land back on, a ship. The Americans also did not invent manned flight, but without military demand for better and better engines and aircraft design, aeronautical technology would certainly not have developed as quickly as it did. Oil technology did not result in the creation of the submarine, but naval research and development of improved submarine designs allowed for the emergence of the most dangerous new weapon of the war. Thus this energy transition was pushed forward by the interaction between private entrepreneurs and state national security needs. The interplay of these different elements represents the primary transmission path for the diffusion of oil related technology. The historical process by which such energy transitions impact and change our society, our economy, and our militaries is extremely detailed and complex, and more research must be done, even in the narrow context of the American and
British navies between 1900 and 1918. What is presented here is not a complete picture, but
258 instead an attempt to create building blocks upon which further research can be laid down. In the next section, I will describe what lessons may be learned from this research, as well as the implications that can be drawn about likely future transitions.
Conclusions
The primary driver of the diffusion of oil-based technology in this within-case comparison is competition and imitation. As naval technology improved, and as states such as Germany and the United States chipped away at traditional British naval advantages, the British responded with continued construction and development to maintain their superiority. The Germans were explicitly seeking to challenge British naval dominance, which provided a clear element of political threat to what may have otherwise simply been regarded as technological development.
A similar situation existed in terms of the American-British relationship, as the United States had finally constructed the tools necessary to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, although the relationship between the United States and Britain was considerably more friendly than the relationship between the British and the Germans. The naval arms race that developed has been described as the most celebrated arms race in modern history, and is usually tabulated by a simple counting of major naval vessels.784 In addition to this simple tally of ships, the type of vessel, namely the dreadnaught, is said to have revolutionized warfare at the time. This approach to the development of naval power misses the underlying energy transition that was occurring. The dreadnaught did not bring about a new age of naval warfare; rather, it represented the end of the older era. It was not the dreadnaught but the submarine, and later the aircraft carrier, that truly revolutionized naval war. The new oil-centric technology had opened up two new dimensions of
784 Lambert, Nicholas A. "British Naval Policy, 1913-1914: Financial Limitation and Strategic Revolution." The Journal of Modern History 67 (September 1995), pg. 596
259 warfare. The submarine instilled a substantial amount of fear in men who had spent their lives at sea. Although aircraft, and manned flight, had been dreamt about for hundreds of years, it was made possible with small petroleum powered engines. The early twentieth century arms race was effectively an oil technology race. This was not widely understood until the war was well underway, and those states that had been at the forefront of the process prior to the war did possess an advantage in understanding just how important oil would become.
This shift in energy resource technology had dramatic implications for national security policy.
State policy responses to the transition changed as the transition itself progressed through the three stages described above. The investigative era saw exploratory testing of oil propulsion technology comparatively against coal. Navies in particular involved themselves in the scientific research and development process. This was done, instead of simply relying on the private sector, because navies had particular goals and needs. In seeking to accomplish these goals, navies pushed oil technology in certain directions. Also, this period saw proof of concept of the oil burning process, and thus the policy decision to use oil in tandem with coal burning. This was the establishment of bridge technology. This allowed navies to reap the benefits of oil, without completely discarding the stability and security of coal burning technology. This process also demonstrates the incomplete nature of the transition at this time. Most were unwilling to discard the proven and reliable coal burning machinery until oil as a fuel was better established, and until the requisite supply and infrastructure set in place.
The pre-war transition was an era in which states were testing the scientific bounds of oil- powered engineering. While there was still some experimental scientific research and testing, it
260 was firmly established that oil was a better fuel than coal. Much of the transition policy in this period focused on obtaining the requisite supply, or steering market conditions towards state preferences. Additionally, further developments in oil fuel technology brought about completely new modes of transport in the form of manned flight. At this point building machines based upon the previous energy sources ceased, and navies had fully committed to making oil their primary fuel for ships of war. States began to seek ways to stockpile the new energy source, and to exercise financial and/or legal control over the resource. It is in this period where the new energy technology begins to impact established military doctrine. Submarines and airplanes were worked into military strategy and tactics, including in live military exercises. States and their navies began to visualize, quite specifically, how this new energy technology was likely to change the nature of the battlefield, without these things being demonstrated in war.
The wartime transition accelerated funding and appropriations for construction of oil powered tools of war. Where financial limitations had played a role in earlier discussions related to where states should put their resources, the war altered the nature of state financial considerations. The war demonstrated which new energy technologies were most effective and thus altered resource allocation. Namely, this meant allied response to the German U-boat offensive. Additionally, the conflict had proven the usefulness of this energy resource, removing any lingering doubt that may have existed in the minds of skeptics. This raised the stakes for access to and control over oil deposits, resulting in direct state purchase of oil companies, as well as military conquest to ensure physical control over areas now known to be the most oil rich territories on the planet.
Also, the new technologies prompted discussion of completely new branches of state militaries, at least in the case of airpower. The significance of the new energy technology also prompted
261 allied creation of international cooperative organizations for the purpose of appropriate resource allocation. For those involved in the pre-war consideration of oil technology, the war had proven what they already knew. Yet that proof was particularly significant per se.
Below are two forms of matrices that categorize selected examples of state policy. The first matrix type is a three by three matrix identifying which branch of government was responsible for the policy (legislative, executive, judicial) and also categorizes the policy by area of focus
(financial/economic, military/political, and technological/research and development). Items from the selected timelines were first classified by the three by three matrix, and then inserted where appropriate into the two by two matrix, indicating the location of the policy (domestic, international) and the strategic quality of the policy (offensive, defensive). One of each type of matrix was created per state per transition period and there are thus six matrices per state examined, and twelve matrices total (see appendix for both the selected timelines and the twelve matrices). These matrices are color coded by transition period to ease quick viewing by the reader. Subsequently, various types of these policies are displayed in the two by two matrix format to provide a generalizable typology of energy transition policies. This typology will serve as a lens through which to view future research of other great power naval energy transition response policies.
262 Typology of Domestic International energy transition policies Defensive Energy research and development expenditure Major weapons Bureaucracy creation purchases/construction/design Requests for technology from private sector Major weapons expenditure (proven) Intra-organizational competition New military doctrine for new energy Major military appropriations technology State secrecy and secret patents Construction of new energy infrastructure abroad Cross military cooperation State corporate cooperation Offensive Laws creating state control of resources Shows of force Court ordered monopoly break-up Wartime change in tactics due to new Creation of new independent military branches technology State regulation of energy production State purchase of multinational corporations Military conquest
Future energy transitions
Academic literature and popular discourse related to energy over the last decade has been focused primarily on a shift away from fossil fuels, namely oil, and toward more renewable energy sources. Much of this discourse has been directly related to the issue of climate change, a subject matter not dealt with here. A different subset of this literature relates to the concept of peak oil, or put simply, the issue of fossil fuels as finite resources that cannot last forever. Thus it is widely believed that in the relatively near future, states, and even militaries, will choose to transition away from the use of oil-based technology. In many economic sectors, the technology to accomplish such a transition exists already. The use of solar, geothermal, hydroelectric, wind, tidal, and nuclear sources to generate electricity is becoming increasingly common and increasingly competitive in price when compared to fossil fuels. However, the one area in which such technology has not made significant progress is in propulsion for military purposes. The only other energy source for propulsion of military vehicles is nuclear energy, used in submarines and aircraft carriers. While nuclear power has proven relatively safe, albeit with a
263 few exceptions such as Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and the more recent disaster at
Fukushima,785 there are other problems associated with its use and spread. These risks include the proliferation of uranium enrichment capabilities, and the related likely increase of knowledge needed to create nuclear weapons. Moreover, the use of nuclear technology as a means to combat climate change is quite unlikely, and is described by some as a process that would require 2,500 one-GW nuclear plants to be constructed by the year 2050, or a new nuclear power plant every six days between 2010 and 2050.786 While nuclear energy has increased by around five percent since 1980, it has also been surpassed by renewable energy as a source for domestic consumption in the United States.787 Nuclear energy is likely to be limited in military use to powering large aircraft carriers and large submarines, as well as in the form of nuclear weapons for deterrence. It is safe to say that nuclear energy, while useful and an important element in our energy future, is no silver bullet.
The lessons to be learned from this research are most relevant to what the Department of Defense
(DOD) calls operational energy.788 The DOD distinguishes between the energy needs of military bases and facilities, primarily electricity generation, and liquid fuel required for “training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military operations.”789 Also, this construct of operational energy excludes “nuclear energy used for the propulsion of the U.S.
Navy’s aircraft carriers and submarines” as these systems “by their nature, avoid many of the
785 For details about the Fukushima disaster, see http://www.world-nuclear.org/information- library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx 786 Brice Smith, Arjun Makhijani. "Nuclear Is Not the Way." The Wilson Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2006): 64-68. 787 "Annual Energy Review 2011." edited by Department of Energy, 370. Washington D.C.: Office of Energy Statistics, 2012, pg. 28 788 Department, Defense. "Department of Defense Annual Energy Management Report." Washington D.C., 2015, pg. 8 789 Ibid
264 challenges associated with resupplying other military air, sea, and land capabilities with liquid fuel.”790 Total DOD liquid fuel consumption is staggering. In fiscal year 2014 the DOD consumed 87.4 million barrels of fuel.791 One half of this fuel was consumed by the United
States Air Force, and one third consumed by the United States Navy.792 If the United States military is to experience an energy transition that is comparable to the events and processes described in this research, it is this form of operational energy that must transition to some new form or source. In short, the next major operational energy transition will require a new type of fuel or energy resource than can provide the necessary propulsion to bombers, jets, helicopters, and non-carrier and non-submarine naval craft. A transition of this variety is shaped by several factors. First, the DOD seeks to reduce the use of liquid fuels to provide electricity for bases and other military installations to reduce strain on the need for such fuels for operational purposes.793
Secondly, for a transition to not require new hardware, the DOD will need a fuel that can be used in current platforms. For that purpose the primary alternative is biofuel, or a mix of biofuel and traditional liquid petroleum fuels.794 Finally, there is a substantial emphasis on efficiency. This is similar to the emphasis on efficiency seen during the U.S. and British Naval energy transitions described above. The cost of modern military liquid fuel needs is astronomical, and is greatly impacted by even small increases in market rates. In 2011, the revolution in Libya pushed oil prices up by $30/barrel, resulting in an increase in the fuel bill for the U.S. Navy of $1 Billion, according the U.S. Naval Secretary Ray Mabus.795
790 Defense, Department of. "Department of Defense 2016 Operational Energy Strategy." Washington D.C., 2016, pg. 3 791 Ibid, pg. 4 792 Ibid, pg. 5 793 Ibid, pg. 13 794 Ibid, pg. 13-14 795 Matthews, William, “Bio Fleet: The Navy’s pursuit of an ambitious alternative energy program,” Government Executive and republished at
265
As modern militaries have begun to understand the level of vulnerability attached to military platforms based upon liquid petroleum, they have recognized that a transition away from oil is necessary. However, there is currently no substitute for the capabilities offered by petroleum in terms of operational energy. To compare where modern militaries are now to a similar position in the past, one could make the case that 2016 much resembles the late 1890s. It has only recently been recognized that a major transition from our current energy paradigm toward something different is likely. This time around, the need to transition has come before a demonstrated capability. Much like dual burning ships of the early twentieth century, the first steps of this transition will center around bridge technologies, such as the usage of bio-fuel as an adjunct to oil, along with efforts to increase efficiency and reduced oil consumption where possible. While these efforts are implemented, modern militaries will likely begin to explore the most feasible alternatives to oil for operational energy needs. Further research in this area is needed to better understand how states respond to energy transitions. The British and American cases described above provide an important building block for moving forward. First, this line of inquiry must by continued by applying the same approach used here to the other great powers of the time, namely, Germany, Japan, France, Italy, and Russia. Secondly, this same approach should be applied to other types of energy transitions, such as the development of atomic energy.
Finally, this framework for understanding energy transitions and state responses can be applied to future energy transitions. Lessons learned from the past should be capable of providing some guidance for how states and their military organizations formulate their policy responses to the likely shift away from fossil fuels. http://www.nextgov.com/defense/2011/12/bio-fleet-the-navys-pursuit-of-an-ambitious- alternative-energy-program/50380/.
266 Lastly, I will discuss my position on the central research question presented in this dissertation, how this research fits within the various literature discussed in chapters two and three, and also what lies ahead for this line of scholarly inquiry. The central research question posed in Chapter
One was why did the American and British navies decide to transition their naval fleets from being fueled by coal to being fueled by oil? The case studies demonstrate that both the
Americans and British were focused on building navies that were comparable to the navies of rival states. There were different policies regarding what the U.S. and British navies should look like when measured against others, yet in both states policymakers articulated concerns over the naval power of others as a driving force for a continued naval buildup throughout the period.
The British emphasis on the two-power standard, and the American belief that its navy should be comparable to Britain’s, were the central motivators for overall naval construction policies.
As navies continued to build bigger and faster ships, oil-burning technology was introduced from the private sector, and as its capabilities became more clear to those investigating the matter, important individuals within these navies began to visualize and articulate the demonstrated and likely operational and tactical advantages of new energy technology. These advantages and the concurrent elimination of a litany of annoyances associated with the use of coal convinced many important naval officials in both states to push for a wholesale shift away from coal to oil.
Where the military organizational literature would suggest resistance to such a dramatic and unpredictable change, this dissertation depicts military organizations that were open to change, willing to expend resources to answer questions, and capable of envisioning the longer term impact of such an energy transition. While both states studied here did demonstrate a degree of caution, manifest in bridge technologies and concern about supply and infrastructure, they
267 nonetheless moved rather quickly to implement the transition, once convinced that such a transition would possess important military advantages. Additionally, these states also embraced the new vessels of war that stemmed from the energy transitions, albeit with slightly different degrees of enthusiasm. While the military organization literature would suggest that states would need to see and/or experience these new technologies perform on the battlefield prior to their adoption, the case studies find that such dramatic, major innovations were investigated, improved upon, adopted and implemented prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Moreover, where the military organizational literature would indicate that war could cause major innovations, the case studies suggest that in terms of this particular energy transition, the outbreak of the war accelerated changes already taking place, as opposed to stimulating the change itself.
Importantly, these case studies also demonstrate that military organizations can and will imitate the actions of others, while it also shows that this does not happen in all instances. The
Americans cited German use of experimental laboratories for military technological research in deciding to build such facilities of their own. The British began building dreadnaughts, and many of the other major powers followed suit. These instances show that states will imitate other states in the use of new technology, and policy makers often cite fear of disadvantage, or concerns about competition, to justify such policies. There are also important instances of non- imitation. The Germans experienced spectacular success with their controversial use of submarines to bring down commercial ships without warning. The Allies did not adopt these tactics during the war. Such non-imitation demonstrates the impact of the “software” element of technological diffusion. While all major navies adopted the submarine as an integral part of their fleets, they did not imitate what can be easily described as the most effective demonstrated use
268 for the new type of vessel. This demonstrates that the diffusion of military technology is not automatic, and that states will incorporate such technology into their operations in ways unique and particular to their own perceptions and ideas about how a military should act. These findings show that states will react to outside pressures, but not necessarily in the same way as other states, which raises important issues regarding levels of analysis. As previously mentioned, both systemic level variables and domestic level variables must be assessed to obtain a truly clear picture of how energy transitions impact military organizations and states. State level variables and market forces dramatically impact the trajectory of this energy transition, and must be considered as co-determinants in driving state policy along with traditional realist variables. States are not black boxes; they are both impacted by the world around them and also shape and impact that world.
Further research must be done in order to understand the interplay between these variables and systemic level variables. Consequently, I will discuss the trajectory of my future research in this area, and briefly describe some of the important research questions that I intend to address moving forward from this dissertation. First, several other cases will be added to broaden and deepen the cross state comparisons and augment the conclusions drawn from them. Those cases include Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and Japan. Later in my post-dissertation career, I may examine other examples of the diffusion of energy technology and energy transitions, including the development and diffusion of nuclear technology, as well as the development and diffusion of renewable energy technology.
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281 Appendix
THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH POLICY MATRICES THE UNITED STATES INVESTAGIVE ERA 1898-1905 POLICY CLASSIFICATION FINANCIAL/MONETARY/ECONOMIC MILITARY/POLITICAL TECHNOLOGICAL/ RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
LEGISLATIVE 1898: $15,000 APPROPRIATION BY CONGRESS FOR OIL BURNING EXPERIMENTS 1902: $20,000 APPROPRIATION BY CONGRESS FOR OIL BURNING EXPERIMENTS
EXECUTIVE 1904: FIRST MAJOR SUBMARINE PURCHASE 1889: WORLD CRUISE OF THE DOLPHIN 1904: HOLLENSTEIN WATER TUBE BOILER 1902: CREATION OF THE LIQUID FUEL BOARD TESTS 1902: MOODY DESCRIBES OIL AS THE BEST 1904: NAVAL FUEL BOARD OIL ENGINE TESTS MEANS FOR NAVAL PROPULSION ON INTREPID AND ALARM 1904: NAVAL FUEL BOARD RECOMMENDS 1/3 1905: FIRST DREADNAUGHT DESIGN OF TORPEDO BOATS BURN OIL 1904: SCOUT CRUISERS TO BURN OIL, RETROFIT OF SMALL SHIPS
JUDICIAL
282
THE UNITED STATES PRE-WAR TRANSITION 1906-1913 POLICY CLASSIFICATION FINANCIAL/MONETARY/ECONOMIC MILITARY/POLITICAL TECHNOLOGICAL/ RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
LEGISLATIVE 1911: CONGRESS PASSESS APPROPRIATIONS 1909: CONGRESS CREATES FIRST NAVAL OIL FOR LAST COAL BURNING SHIPS RESERVES
EXECUTIVE 1909: NAVY SEEKS NEW GASOLINE MOTOR 1906: BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS ALLEGES 1906 EARLY TALKS OF USE OF DOUBLE DESIGNS FROM PRIVATE SECTOR STANDARD ILLEGAL ACTIVITY BOTTOMS 1913: NAVY SEEKS SUPPLY ASSURANCES 1906: NAVY PLANS FOR DUAL FIRING SHIPS 1906: FIRST BATTLESHIP CONVERTED TO FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR 1908: SUB DOCTRINE OF COASTAL DEFENSE BURN OIL 1908: DUAL BURNING BATTLESHIPS (UTAH 1907: SUBMARINE PERFORANCE TESTS AT AND FLORIDA) NARRAGANSET BAY 1908: DIESEL GENERATORS TO CHARGE SUB 1907: COAL V. OIL EFFICIENCY TESTS BATTERIES 1907: TESTS ON 2-CYLINDER GAS ENGINES 1909: MEYER DECLARES ALL BATTLESHIPS 1908: ARMY/NAVY FLIGHT TESTS WILL BURN OIL (PREMATURE) 1910: RECIPROCATING V. TURBINE TESTS 1909: BUREAU OF NAVIGATION GIVEN 1910: DUAL FIRING TESTS (DELEWARE & AUTHORITY OVER OIL CONTRACTS, ETC NORTH DAKOTA) 1909: OIL BURNING DESTROYERS 1910: FIRST PLANE TAKEOFF FROM SHIP 1910: NAVY BEGINS EXPANDING FUEL DEPOT 1911: DESIGNS COMPLETE FOR FIRST ALL OIL CONSTRUCTION AT OUTLYING STRATEGIC BURNING BATTLESHIPS (NEVADA AND BASES OKLAHOMA) 1910: NAVY SETS FUEL OIL STANDARDS (NOT 1912: EARLIEST DISCUSSION OF SHIPS AS WIDELY AVAILABLE) AIRBASES, AIRCRAFT CARRIER CONCEPT 1911: COMPETITIVE SHIP EFFICIENCY TESTS 1912: EARLY HIGH ALTITUDE TEST FLIGHTS 1912: NAVAL AIR DOCTRINE OF MAINLY 1913: BEGIN NAVAL COOPERATION WITH RECONNAISANCE) LANGLEY LABS 1913: DANIELS CALLS FOR NAVAL CONTROL 1913: NAVAL OFFICER SENT TO EUROPE TO OF ITS OWN OIL RESOURCES EXAMINE AIRCRAFT ADVANCES 1913: NAVAL EXERCISES DISCOVER PLANES CAN SPOT SUBS JUDICIAL 1911: US SUPREME COURT BREAKS UP 1906: AG SUES STANDARD OIL STANDARD OIL
283 THE UNITED STATES WARTIME TRANSITION 1914-1918 POLICY CLASSIFICATION FINANCIAL/MONETARY/ECONOMIC MILITARY/POLITICAL TECHNOLOGICAL/ RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
LEGISLATIVE 1915: CONGRESS PASSES LARGES NAVAL 1915: CREATION OF LONG TERM 5 YEAR APPROPRIATIONS BILL IN HISTORY NAVAL FUNDING BILLS CONCEPT 1916: APPROPRIATIONS FOR NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD SCIENTISTS 1916: 1.5 MILLION APPROPRIATION FOR NCB (AVIATION) 1917: $67 MILLION APPROPRIATED FOR AVIATION
EXECUTIVE 1914: NAVY BEGINS EXAMINING OKLAHOMA 1914: NAVY CALLS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF 1914: CREATION OF US AERONAUTICS BASE PIPELINE OWNERSHIP/OPERATION FLEET SUBMARINES IN PENSACOLA 1914: NAVY CALLS FOR $5,000,000 IN AIR 1914: NAVY LAUNCHES FIRST ALL OIL 1914: FIRST NAVY DESIGNED AIRPLANE POWER INVESTMENT BATTLESHIP USS NEVADA 1915: RECRUITMENT OF THOMAS EDISON 1918: NAVAL REQUISITION OF SIX OIL 1915: NAVY CALLS FOR 1000 TON FLEET AND CREATION OF NAVAL CONSULTING TANKERS SUBMARINE BOARD 1918: CONSTRUCTION OF SCOTTISH PIPELINE 1916: NAVAL COMPLAINTS ABOUT 1916: CREATION OF COMMITTEE FOR WITH BRITAIN CONGRESSIONAL EROSION OF NAVAL INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS RESERVE RIGHTS 1916: CATAPULT AIRCRAFT LAUNCHING 1916: CREATION OF COUNCIL OF NATIONAL EXPERIEMNTS DEFENSE 1917: DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF 1916: FIRST ALL OIL BATTLESHIP JOINS LIBERTY ENGINE FLEET USS NEVADA 1916: CREATION OF COMMITTEE FOR INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS 1917: AIRCRAFT BOARD FAILS TO CREATE THRID BRANCH OF US MILITARY, BOARD TO PLAY COORDINATION ROLE BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY 1917: IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVOY 1917: CREATION OF NATIONAL PETROLEUM WAR SERVICE COMMITTEE, USFA, AND ITS OIL DIVISION 1918: CREATION OF INTER-ALLIED PETROLEUM CONFERENCE JUDICIAL 1914: SUPREME COURT RULES PIPELINES ARE COMMON CARRIERS
284 The United States Investigative period: 1898-1905
TYPOLOGY OF ENERGY DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL TRANSITION POLICIES
DEFENSIVE 1898: $15,000 APPROPRIATION BY CONGRESS FOR OIL 1904: FIRST MAJOR SUBMARINE PURCHASE (L, F) BURNING EXPERIMENTS (L, T) 1905: FIRST DREADNAUGHT DESIGN (E, T) 1902: CREATION OF THE LIQUID FUEL BOARD (E, M) 1902: $20,000 APPROPRIATION BY CONGRESS FOR OIL BURNING EXPERIMENTS (L, T) 1904: NAVAL FUEL BOARD RECOMMENDS 1/3 OF TORPEDO BOATS BURN OIL (E, M) 1904: SCOUT CRUISERS TO BURN OIL, RETROFIT OF SMALL SHIPS (E, M) 1904: HOLLENSTEIN WATER TUBE BOILER TESTS (E, T) 1904: NAVAL FUEL BOARD OIL ENGINE TESTS ON INTREPID AND ALARM (E, T)
OFFENSIVE 1889: WORLD CRUISE OF THE DOLPHIN (COAL VESSEL) (E, M)
285 The United States Pre-War Transition period: 1906-1914
TYPOLOGY OF ENERGY DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL TRANSITION POLICIES
DEFENSIVE 1906: BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS ALLEGES STANDARD ILLEGAL 1908: SUB DOCTRINE OF COASTAL DEFENSE (E,M) ACTIVITY (E,M) 1910: FIRST PLANE TAKEOFF FROM SHIP (E,T) 1906: NAVY PLANS FOR DUAL FIRING SHIPS (E,M) 1910: NAVY BEGINS EXPANDING FUEL DEPOT CONSTRUCTION AT 1906 EARLY TALKS OF USE OF DOUBLE BOTTOMS (E,M) OUTLYING STRATEGIC BASES (E, M) 1906: FIRST BATTLESHIP CONVERTED TO BURN OIL (E,M) 1912: NAVAL AIR DOCTRINE OF MAINLY RECONNAISANCE) (E,M) 1907: SUBMARINE PERFORANCE TESTS AT NARRAGANSET BAY (E,T) 1912: EARLIEST DISCUSSION OF SHIPS AS AIRBASES, AIRCRAFT CARRIER 1907: COAL V. OIL EFFICIENCY TESTS (E,T) CONCEPT (E,T) 1907: TESTS ON 2-CYLINDER GAS ENGINES (E,T) 1913: NAVAL EXERCISES DISCOVER PLANES CAN SPOT SUBS (E,T) 1908: DUAL BURNING BATTLESHIPS UTAH AND FLORIDA (E,M) 1913: NAVAL OFFICER SENT TO EUROPE TO EXAMINE AIRCRAFT 1908: DIESEL GENERATORS TO CHARGE SUB BATTERIES (E,M) ADVANCES (E,T) 1908: ARMY/NAVY FLIGHT TESTS (E,T) 1909: MEYER DECLARES ALL BATTLESHIPS WILL BURN OIL (E,M) 1909: BUREAU OF NAVIGATION GIVEN AUTHORITY OVER OIL CONTRACTS, ETC (E,M) 1909: OIL BURNING DESTROYERS (E,M) 1909: NAVY SEEKS NEW GASOLINE MOTOR DESIGNS FROM PRIVATE SECTOR (E, F) 1910: NAVY SETS FUEL OIL STANDARDS (E,M) 1911: COMPETITIVE SHIP EFFICIENCY TESTS (E,M) 1911: DESIGNS COMPLETE FOR FIRST ALL OIL BURNING BATTLESHIPS (E,M) 1911: CONGRESS PASSESS APPROPRIATIONS FOR LAST COAL BURNING SHIPS (E,F) 1912: EARLY HIGH ALTITUDE TEST FLIGHTS (E,T) 1913: CALLS FOR NAVAL CONTROL OF NEEDED RESOURCES (E,M)
OFFENSIVE 1909: CONGRESS CREATES FIRST NAVAL OIL RESERVES (L,M) 1911: SUPREME COURT RULES TO BREAK UP STANDARD OIL UNITED STATES VS. STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY (J, F)
286
The United States Wartime Transition: 1914-1918
TYPOLOGY OF ENERGY DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL TRANSITION POLICIES DEFENSIVE 1914: NAVY BEGINS EXAMINING OKLAHOMA PIPELINE 1914: NAVY LAUNCHES FIRST ALL OIL BATTLESHIP USS NEVADA (E,M) OWNERSHIP/OPERATION (E,F) 1914: FIRST NAVY DESIGNED AIRPLANE (E,T) 1914: NAVY CALLS FOR $5,000,000 IN AIR POWER INVESTMENT (E,F) 1915: NAVY CALLS FOR 1000 TON FLEET SUBMARINE (E,M) 1914: NAVY CALLS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF FLEET SUBMARINES (E,M) 1916: FIRST ALL OIL BATTLESHIP JOINS FLEET USS NEVADA (E,M) 1914: CREATION OF US AERONAUTICS BASE IN PENSACOLA (E,T) 1918: CONSTRUCTION OF SCOTTISH PIPELINE WITH BRITAIN (E,F) 1914: SUPREME COURT RULES PIPELINES ARE COMMON CARRIERS (J,E) 1918: CREATION OF INTER-ALLIED PETROLEUM CONFERENCE (E, M) 1915: CONGRESS PASSES LARGES NAVAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL IN HISTORY (L,F) 1915: CREATION OF LONG TERM 5 YEAR NAVAL FUNDING BILLS CONCEPT (L,M) 1915: RECRUITMENT OF THOMAS EDISON AND CREATION OF NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD (E,T) 1916: APPROPRIATIONS FOR NCB SCIENTISTS (E,M) 1916: NAVAL COMPLAINTS ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL EROSION OF NAVAL RESERVE RIGHTS (E,M) 1916: CREATION OF COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (E,M) 1916: CREATED COMMITTEE FOR INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS (E,M) 1916: CATAPULT AIRCRAFT LAUNCHING EXPERIEMNTS (E,T) 1917: $67 MILLION APPROPRIATED FOR AVIATION (L,F) 1917: CREATION OF NATIONAL PETROLEUM WAR SERVICE COMMITTEE, USFA, AND ITS OIL DIVISION (E,P) 1917: DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF LIBERTY ENGINE (E,T)
OFFENSIVE 1917: AIRCRAFT BOARD FAILS TO CREATE THRID BRANCH OF US 1917: IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVOY MILITARY (E,M)
287
Great Britain Investigative Period: 1898-1905 POLICY FINANCIAL/MONETARY/ECONOMIC MILITARY/POLITICAL TECHNOLOGICAL/ CLASSIFICATION RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
LEGISLATIVE 1904: OIL MINES ACT OF BARBADOS, 1902: BRITAIN BUILDS ITS FURIST SUBMARINE, STIPULATES THAT OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE THE H-1, HOLLAND TYPE VESSEL COLONY WOULD ACT WITH BRITISH NAVAL 1903: BRITAIN OBTAINS 8 MORE HOLLAND TYPE INTERESTS IN MIND SUBMARINES
EXECUTIVE 1903: FISHER MEETS WILLIAM D'ARCY, AND IS 1904: BRITAIN ADOPTS OIL AS AN AUXILLIARY 1898: FISHER SUPPORTS EARLY TESTS ON OIL SHOWN THE MAPS OF THE D'ARCY PERSIAN OIL FUEL ON ALL NAVAL VESSELS, ALL SHIPS TO BE AS CONTROLLER OF NAVY 1898-1901 CONCESSION DUAL-BURNING 1901: PRELIMINARY LIQUID FUEL 1904: PRETYMAN COMMITTEE AND COLONIAL 1905: PRETYMAN, SELBORNE, AND REDWOOD, EXPERIMENTAL PLANT BUILT AT OFFICE DEVELOP POLICIES THAT ENCOURAGE WORK TO KEEP PERSIAN CONCESSION IN DAVENPORT HEAVY OIL FUEL PRODUCTION IN THE EMPIRE BRITISH HANDS THROUGH DEAL WITH BURMAH 1902: ADMIRALTY FUEL EXPERIMENT 1905: PRETYMAN COMMITTEE, ADMIRALTY, AND OIL STATION ESTABLISHED AT HASLAR INDIAN GOVERNMENT, AGREE TO EXCLUDE 1904: BRITISH ACHIEVE OIL ATOMIZATION STANDARD OIL SUBSIDIARY (ASIATIC OIL) OUT WITHOUT COMPRESSED AIR, CONSIDERED OF INDIA STATE SECRET, GRANTED SECRET PATENT 1905: ADMIRALTY SIGNS FIRST LONG TERM OIL CONTRACT WITH BURMAH OIL, INCLUDES CLAUSE THAT ADMIRALTY MUST APPROVE ANY CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP
JUDICIAL
288
Great Britain Pre-War Transition Period: 1906-1914 POLICY CLASSIFICATION FINANCIAL/MONETARY/ECONOMIC MILITARY/POLITICAL TECHNOLOGICAL/ RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
LEGISLATIVE
EXECUTIVE 1907: ADMIRATLY REJECTS AN OFFER FROM 1908: CREATION OF THE IMPERIAL DEFENSE 1911: BRITISH NAVY BEGINS USING INTERNAL THE WRIGHT BROTHERS FOR THEIR SUB-COMMITTEE ON AERIAL NAVIGATION COMBUSTION ENGINES AND TURBINE ENGNES PATENTS ON AIRPLANES 1910: DESTROYERS BURNING ONLY OIL IN DESTROYERS 1910-1911: ADMIRALTY PURCHASES ITS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED, ALL BATTLESHIPS 1911: CREATION OF THE NAVAL FLYING FIRST EXPERIMENTAL AIRPLANES FROM DUAL-FIRING USING OIL AS ADJUNCT SCHOOL MCCLEAN AND ALSO FROM SHORT 1911: BRITAIN BY 1911 OWNS MORE 1912: CHURCHILL CREATES THE ROYAL BROTHERS SUBMARINES THAN ANY OTHER NAVY COMMISSION ON FUEL AND ENGINES 1912-1913: BRITISH NAVY MORE THAN 1911: ADMIRALTY CREATES PAKENHAM 1912: AIR COMMITTEE (SUB COMMITTEE OF DOUBLES ITS EXPENDITURE ON COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE TRANSITIONING COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENSE) CREATED AERONAUTICS ALL BRITISH SHIPS TO BURNING ONLY OIL 1912: AIR COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS 1913: A.P.O.C.'S ABADAN REFINERY BEGINS 1912: PAKENHAM COMMITTEE FAILS TO CREATION OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS FUEL OIL PRODUCTION RECOMMEND TRANSITIONING ALL SHIPS TO 1913: CHURCHILL EXPLAINS HIS POSITION OIL BURNING ON OIL TO PARLIAMENT, CALLS FOR DIRECT 1913: CHURCHILL TASKS THE NAVAL WAR STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE OIL STAFF TO PRODUCE A REPORT ON THE PRODUCTION, AND REFINERY BUSINESS, FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING OIL STATE TO CREATE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY
JUDICIAL
289
Great Britain Wartime Transition: 1914-1918 POLICY CLASSIFICATION FINANCIAL/MONETARY/ECONOMIC MILITARY/POLITICAL TECHNOLOGICAL/ RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
LEGISLATIVE 1918: PASSAGE OF THE 1918 PETROLEUM PRODUCTION ACT
EXECUTIVE 1914: BRITAIN OBTAINS CONTROLLING 1914: R-CLASS BATTLESHIPS CONVERTED TO 1917: CABINET CALLS FOR INCREASED USE SHARES IN ITS FIRST NATIONAL OIL BURN ONLY OIL OF DOUBLE BOTTOM SHIPS FOR CARRYING COMPANY 1916: SYKES PICOT AGREEMENT BETWEEN OIL 1917: BY 1917 BRITAIN 22,000 AIRPLANES BRITAIN AND FRANCE (DIVIDING UP BETWEEN THE ARMY AND NAVY FORMER OTTOMAN TERRITORIES) 1916: BALFOUR DESCRIBES CONTROL OF MESOPOTAMIAN OIL RESERVES AS FIRST CLASS WAR AIM 1917: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM 1917: CREATION OF MINERAL AND OIL PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT, THE POOL BOARD, THE PETROL CONTROL DEPARTMENT 1918: SLADE MEMO REACHES CABINET WITH ADMIRALTY APPROVAL 1918: CREATION OF THE INTER-ALLIED PETROLEUM CONFERENCE JUDICIAL
290 Great Britain Investigative Period: 1898-1905
TYPOLOGY OF ENERGY DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL TRANSITION POLICIES
DEFENSIVE 1898: FISHER SUPPORTS EARLY TESTS ON OIL AS CONTROLLER OF 1902: BRITAIN BUILDS ITS FURIST SUBMARINE, THE H-1, HOLLAND NAVY 1898-1901 (E,T) TYPE VESSEL (L, M) 1901: PRELIMINARY LIQUID FUEL EXPERIMENTAL PLANT BUILT AT 1903: BRITAIN OBTAINS 8 MORE HOLLAND TYPE SUBMARINES (L,M) DAVENPORT (E,T) 1904: PRETYMAN COMMITTEE AND COLONIAL OFFICE DEVELOP 1902: ADMIRALTY FUEL EXPERIMENT STATION ESTABLISHED AT POLICIES THAT ENCOURAGE HEAVY OIL FUEL PRODUCTION IN THE HASLAR (E,T) EMPIRE 1904: BRITISH ACHIEVE OIL ATOMIZATION WITHOUT COMPRESSED 1905: PRETYMAN COMMITTEE, ADMIRALTY, AND INDIAN AIR, CONSIDERED STATE SECRET, GRANTED SECRET PATENT (E,T) GOVERNMENT, AGREE TO EXCLUDE STANDARD OIL SUBSIDIARY 1904: BRITAIN ADOPTS OIL AS AN AUXILLIARY FUEL ON ALL NAVAL (ASIATIC OIL) OUT OF INDIA (E, F) VESSELS, ALL SHIPS TO BE DUAL-BURNING (E, M) 1905: PRETYMAN, SELBORNE, AND REDWOOD, WORK TO KEEP PERSIAN CONCESSION IN BRITISH HANDS WITH HELP OF BURMAH OIL (E,M)
OFFENSIVE 1903: FISHER MEETS WILLIAM D'ARCY, AND IS SHOWN THE MAPS OF THE D'ARCY PERSIAN OIL CONCESSION (E,F) 1904: OIL MINES ACT OF BARBADOS, STIPULATES THAT OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE COLONY WOULD ACT WITH BRITISH NAVAL INTERESTS IN MIND (L,F) 1905: ADMIRALTY SIGNS FIRST LONG TERM OIL CONTRACT WITH BURMAH OIL, INCLUDES CLAUSE THAT ADMIRALTY MUST APPROVE ANY CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP (E,F)
291
Great Britain Pre-War Transition Period: 1906-1913
TYPOLOGY OF ENERGY DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL TRANSITION POLICIES DEFENSIVE 1907: ADMIRATLY REJECTS AN OFFER FROM THE WRIGHT 1911: BRITAIN BY 1911 OWNS MORE SUBMARINES THAN ANY OTHER BROTHERS FOR THEIR PATENTS ON AIRPLANES (E,F) NAVY (E, M) 1908: CREATION OF THE IMPERIAL DEFENSE SUB-COMMITTEE 1912-1913: BRITISH NAVY MORE THAN DOUBLES ITS EXPENDITURE ON ON AERIAL NAVIGATION (E,M) AERONAUTICS (E,F) 1910: DESTROYERS BURNING ONLY OIL FIRMLY ESTABLISHED, ALL BATTLESHIPS (E,M) 1910-1911: ADMIRALTY PURCHASES ITS FIRST EXPERIMENTAL AIRPLANES FROM MCCLEAN AND ALSO FROM SHORT BROTHERS (E,F) 1911: CREATION OF THE NAVAL FLYING SCHOOL (E,T) 1912: PAKENHAM COMMITTEE FAILS TO RECOMMEND TRANSITIONING ALL SHIPS TO OIL BURNING (E,M) 1912: CHURCHILL CREATES THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON FUEL AND ENGINES (E,T) 1912: AIR COMMITTEE (SUB COMMITTEE OF COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENSE) CREATED (E,T)
OFFENSIVE 1912: AIR COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS CREATION OF THE ROYAL 1913: A.P.O.C.'S ABADAN REFINERY BEGINS FUEL OIL PRODUCTION FLYING CORPS (E,T) (E,F) 1913: CHURCHILL EXPLAINS HIS POSITION ON OIL TO PARLIAMENT, CALLS FOR DIRECT STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE OIL PRODUCTION, AND REFINERY BUSINESS, STATE TO CREATE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY
292
Great Britain Wartime Transition Period 1914:1918 TYPOLOGY OF ENERGY DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL TRANSITION POLICIES
DEFENSIVE 1914: R-CLASS BATTLESHIPS CONVERTED TO BURN ONLY OIL (E,M) 1916: SYKES PICOT AGREEMENT BETWEEN BRITAIN AND 1917: BY 1917 BRITAIN 22,000 AIRPLANES BETWEEN THE ARMY AND FRANCE (DIVIDING UP FORMER OTTOMAN TERRITORIES) (E,M) NAVY (E,F) 1917: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM (E,M) 1917: CABINET CALLS FOR INCREASED USE OF DOUBLE BOTTOM SHIPS 1918: CREATION OF THE INTER-ALLIED PETROLEUM FOR CARRYING OIL (E,T) CONFERENCE (E,M)
OFFENSIVE 1918: PASSAGE OF THE 1918 PETROLEUM PRODUCTION ACT (L,F) 1914: BRITAIN OBTAINS CONTROLLING SHARES IN ITS FIRST 1918: SLADE MEMO REACHES CABINET WITH ADMIRALTY APPROVAL NATIONAL OIL COMPANY (E, F) (E,M) 1916: BALFOUR DESCRIBES CONTROL OF MESOPOTAMIAN OIL RESERVES AS FIRST CLASS WAR AIM (E,T)
American Energy Transition Timeline
YEAR THE UNITED STATES 1889 CONSTRUCTION OF THE ABCD SHIPS (COAL BURNING), 1889 DOLPHIN'S WORLD WIDE CRUISE WITHOUT INCIDENT 1898 $15,000 CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION TO NAVY FOR EXPLORATORY RESEARCH ON OIL POWERED VESSELS 1899 12 MILLION BARREL/YEAR CONSUMPTION 1902 WILLIAM H. MOODY, NAVAL SECRETARY, OIL AS BEST MEANS FOR NAVAL PROPULSION 1902 CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION OF $20,000 FOR OIL EXPERIMENTS 1902 CREATION OF THE LIQUID FUEL BOARD (EXAMINE COAL V. OIL) 1904 HOLLENSTEIN WATER TUBE BOILER TESTS BY LIQUID FUEL BOARD 293 1904 LIQUID FUEL BOARD RECOMMENDS 1/3 TORPEDO BOATS AND DESTROYERS SHOULD BE FITTED WITH OIL BURNING ENGINES 1904 NAVAL FUEL BOARD PLANS FOR EXPERIMENTAL ENGINES ON INTREPID, ALARM 1904 PLANS FOR OIL BURNING SCOUT CRUISERS, RETROFITTING SMALLER SHIPS TO BURN OIL 1904 COMPLETION OF 12 EARLY SUBMARINE CRAFT FOR US NAVY, 10 BY HOLLAND, AND 2 BY ELECTRIC BOAT COMPANY 1905 FIRST 'DREADNOUGHT' CLASS SHIPS DESIGNED BY US, SOUTH CAROLINA CLASS 1906 USS WYOMING ADAPTED TO BURN OIL FUEL, TO LEARN HOW OIL WOULD IMPACT SHIP DESIGN 1906 EARLY NAVAL DISCUSSION ABOUT DOUBLE-BOTTOM SHIPS 1906 BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS ALLEGES MONOPOLIZATION, CORRUPTION, PRICE CUTTING, AND BRIEBERY BY STANDARD OIL 1906 ATTORNEY GENERAL BRINGS SUIT AGAINST STANDARD OIL 1906 NAVAL PLANS FOR DUAL-FIRING SHIPS 1907 NARRAGANSETT BAY SUBMARINE PERFORMANCE TESTS 1907 EFFICIENCY TESTS OF RAW COAL V. BRIQUETTED COAL 1907 EARLY TESTING AND ACQUISITION OF 2-CYLINDER GASOLINE MOTORS FOR SMALL CRAFT 1908 JOINT ARMY/NAVY FLIGHT TESTS…FIRST MANNED FLIGHT TEST OF A WRIGHT MODEL PLANE BY US MILITARY 1908 BATTLESHIPS UTAH AND FLORIDA, TO BURN BOTH COAL AND OIL 1908 US NAVY DESCIBES SUBMARINES AS PURELY DEFENSIVE WEAPONS, COASTAL AND HARBOR DEFENSE 1908 USE OF TURBO DIESEL GENERATORS ON DESTROYERS AS SUBMARINE TENDERS TO CHARGE SUBMARINE BATTERIES 1909 GEORGE VON LENGERKE MEYER STATES ALL BATTLESHIPS FROM HERE ON OUT WILL BE OIL BURNING… 1909 BUREAU OF NAVIGATION PLACED IN CHARGE OF OIL CONTRACTS AND PURCHASES, DEPOT CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE 1909 WYOMING, AND ARKANSAS BUILT AS DUAL FIRING, BUT PLANS LAID DOWN FOR 5 OIL BURNING DESTROYERS 1909 NAVY SEEKS NEW GASOLINE MOTOR DESIGNS FROM PRIVATE SECTOR COMPANIES 1910 NAVY ADOPTS SPECIFIC FUEL OIL STANDARDS (NOT READILY AVAILABLE ON MARKET) 1910 NAVAL COMPARATIVE TESTS OF RECIPROCATING V. TURBINE ENGINES 1910 NAVY BEGINS EXPANDING FUEL DEPOT CONSTRUCTION AT OUTLYING STRATEGIC BASES 1910 NAVAL TESTING ON DUAL FIRED BATTLESHIPS DELEWARE AND NORTH DAKOTA 1910 EUGENE ELY SUCCEEDS IN TAKING OFF IN A PLANE FROM THE USS BIRMINGHAM (AIRCRAFT CARRIER PROOF OF CONCEPT) 1911 NAVY IMPLEMENTS COMPETITIVE TESTING FOR FUEL EFFICIENCY AMONG SHIPS/CREWS (INTERNAL FUEL EFFICIENCEY TESTS) 1911 USS DELEWARE SAILS FROM US TO ENGLAND AND BACK WITHOUT TAKING ON ANY EXTRA FUEL (OIL AS ADJUNCT TO COAL) 1911 APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE NEW YORK AND TEXAS PASS CONGRESS, (THE LAST COAL BURNING BATTLESHIPS) 1911 NAVY COMPLETES DESIGN OF FIRST ALL OIL BURNING BATTLESHIPS, NEVADA AND OKLAHOMA 1911 INCREASED USE OF INTERNAL COMBUSTION GASOLINE ENGINES IN SMALL CRAFT (REPLACING HEAVY FUEL OIL) 1911 SUPREME COURT RULES TO BREAK UP STANDARD OIL UNITED STATES VS. STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY 1912 NAVAL SECRETARY MEYER CALLS FOR MORE OIL TRANSPORT VESSELS 1912 NAVAL FUEL OIL CONSUMPTION AT 16 MILLION GALLONS (380,952 BARRELS) 1912 EARLIEST NAVAL AIRPOWER DOCTRINE ARTICULATED (RECONNAISANCE AND SOME LIMITED ATTACK EFFORTS) 1912 NAVAL CONSIDERATION OF SHIPS AS MOBILE AIR BASES (AIRCRAFT CARRIER), CATAPULTS FOR LAUNCHING AIRCRAFT, 1912 EARLY HIGH ALTITUDE FLIGHT TESTS, 3,000 FEET 1913 JOSEPHUS DANIELS CALLS FOR AUTARKY/CONTROL BY NAVY OF NEEDED RESOURCES, INCLUDING OIL 1913 START OF COOPERATION BETWEEN NAVY AND LANGLEY AERODYNAMIC LAB, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICS 1913 FLEET EXERCISES USING PLANES TO SPOT SUBMARINES 1913 NAVAL OFFICER SENT TO EUROPE TO EXAMINE AIRCRAFT ADVANCES 1913 NAVY REQUESTS ASSURANCES FROM DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR TO CONFIRM ADEQUATE OIL SUPPLY 1914 DANIELS EXPLICITLY DESCIBES THE PASSING OF COAL AND THE BENEFITS OF OIL 1914 NAVY BEGINS TO EXAMINE FEASIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTING A STATE OWNED PIPELINE FROM OLAHOMA TO GULF OF MEXICO 1914 SUPREME COURT RULES THAT PIPELINES ARE COMMON CARRIERS, US VS. OHIO OIL CO. 1914 NAVY CALLS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF 4 FLEET SUBMARINES 1914 NAVY RECOMMENDS $5,000,000 APPROPRIATION FOR 'PROPER AIR SERVICE' 1914 LAUNCH OF FIRST ALL OIL POWERED DREADNAUGHT CLASS SHIP… USS NEVADA 1914 CREATION OF THE US AERONAUTICS BASE IN PENSACOLA FLORIDA 1915 NAVY DESIGNS AND BUILDS ITS FIRST AIRPLANE, (INDEPENDENT OF PRIVATE INTERESTS) 1915 NAVY CALLS FOR FIRST 1000 TON DISPLACEMENT FLEET SUBMARINE 1915 CONGRESS PASSES LARGEST NAVAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL IN HISTORY
294 1915 DEVELOPMENT OF THE LONG TERM FUNDING PLANS FOR NAVY (5 YEAR BUILDING PLANS) 1915 NAVY RECRUITS THOMAS EDISON TO HELP LEAD THE NEWLY CREATED 'NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD' (HARNESS INNOVATIVE TALENT) 1916 NAVY COMPLAINS THAT CONGRESS IS ACTING AGAINST ITS INTERESTS AND ITS LEGAL RIGHTS OVER NAVAL OIL RESERVE LAND 1916 CONGRESS APPROPRIATES $25,000 TO PAY CIVILIAN SCIENTISTS INVOLVED WITH NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD 1916 $1.5 MILLION APPROPRIATED FOR EXPERIMANTAL LABORATORY FOR USE BY NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD 1916 CREATION OF THE COMMITTEES FOR INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS (240 NATION-WIDE MEMBERS OF NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD) 1916 CREATION OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (LATER TO BECOME THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD) 1916 CONTINUED CATAPULT AIRCRAFT LAUNCHING EXPERIMENTS ON NORTH CAROLINA, WEST VIRGINIA, AND WASHINGTON 1916 USS NEVADA JOINS FLEET SERVICE AS FIRST ALL OIL BATTLESHIP IN US NAVY 1917 LAST PRE-WAR AMERICAN APPROPRIATIONS BILL FOR NAVAL CONSTRUCTION, 3 BATTLESHIPS, 3 CRUISERS, 15 DESTROYERS, 18 SUBS 1917 $63,000,000 APPROPRIATED FOR AVIATION IN THIS YEAR 1917 DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF THE 'LIBERTY ENGINE' 1917 AIRCRAFT BOARD FAILS TO RECOMMEND A THIRD BRANCH OF MILITARY FOR 'AIR SERVICE' 1917 AIRCRAFT BOARD CREATED TO COORDINATE BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY AIR ACTIVITIES 1917 BOTH ARMY AND NAVY WILL OPERATE SEPARATE AIR WINGS OF THEIR SERVICES 1917 IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVOY SYSTEM TO COMBAT U-BOAT WARFARE CREATION OF THE NATIONAL PETROELUM WAR SERVICE COMMITTEE, UNITED STATES FUEL ADMINISTRATION, OIL DIVISION WITHIN 1917 USFA 1918 NAVY FUEL OIL CONSUMPTION AT 189,000,000 (4.5 MILLION BARRELS), GASOLINE CONSUMPTION 11.5 MILLION GALLONS 1918 NAVY DECLARES THAT NO NATION CAN MAINTAIN FORCES IN THE FIELD WITHOUT CONTROL OF ADEQUATE OIL SUPPLIES 1918 NAVY REQUISITIONS 6 COMMERCIAL OIL TANKERS 1918 US AND BRITAIN BUILD OIL PIPELINE ACROSS SCOTLAND 1918 CREATION OF THE INTER-ALLIED PETROLEUM CONFERENCE 1918 AT WAR'S END US NAVY HAS OVER 2100 PLANES, 695 SEAPLANES, 1,170 FLYING BOATS,(5,965 total navy planes) 241 LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT
British Energy Transition Timeline
YEAR GREAT BRITAIN 1865 SELWYN AND RICHARDSON CONVINCE ADMIRALTY TO CONDUCT EARLY TESTS ON OIL BURNING TECHNOLOGY 1898 FISHER SUPPORTS EARLY TESTS ON OIL AS CONTROLLER OF NAVY 1898-1901 1899 JACK FISHER MEETS MARCUS SAMUEL FOR THE FIRST TIME 1901 WILLIAM D'ARCY OBTAINS REMARKABLE PERSIAN OIL CONCESSION 1901 PRELIMINARY LIQUID FUEL EXPERIMENTAL PLANT BUILT AT DAVENPORT 1902 ADMIRALTY FUEL EXPERIMENT STATION ESTABLISHED AT HASLAR 1902 JAMES MELROSE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF MACHINERY FOR ROYAL NAVY CONVINCED BY TESTS OF THE CAPABILITY OF OIL FUEL 1902 BRITAIN BUILDS ITS FURIST SUBMARINE, THE H-1, HOLLAND TYPE VESSEL 1903 FISHER MEETS WILLIAM D'ARCY, AND IS SHOWN THE MAPS OF THE D'ARCY PERSIAN OIL CONCESSION 1903 BRITAIN OBTAINS 8 MORE HOLLAND TYPE SUBMARINES 1904 FISHER MADE FIRST SEA LORD 1904 BRITISH ACHIEVE OIL ATOMIZATION WITHOUT COMPRESSED AIR, CONSIDERED STATE SECRET, GRANTED SECRET PATENT 1904 BRITAIN ADOPTS OIL AS AN AUXILLIARY FUEL ON ALL NAVAL VESSELS, ALL SHIPS TO BE DUAL-BURNING 1904 PRETYMAN COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED, PURPOSE TO EXAMINE THE SUPPLY PROBLEM 1904 PRETYMAN COMMITTEE AND COLONIAL OFFICE DEVELOP POLICIES THAT ENCOURAGE HEAVY OIL FUEL PRODUCTION IN THE EMPIRE 1904 OIL MINES ACT OF BARBADOS, STIPULATES THAT OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE COLONY WOULD ACT WITH BRITISH NAVAL INTERESTS IN MIND 1905 PRETYMAN COMMITTEE, ADMIRALTY, AND INDIAN GOVERNMENT, AGREE TO EXCLUDE STANDARD OIL SUBSIDIARY (ASIATIC OIL) OUT OF INDIA ADMIRALTY SIGNS FIRST LONG TERM OIL CONTRACT WITH BURMAH OIL, INCLUDES CLAUSE THAT ADMIRALTY MUST APPROVE ANY CHANGE IN 1905 OWNERSHIP 1905 PRETYMAN, SELBORNE, AND REDWOOD, WORK TO KEEP PERSIAN CONCESSION IN BRITISH HANDS THROUGH DEAL WITH BURMAH OIL 1907 FISHER MEETS WINSTON CHURCHILL 1907 ADMIRATLY REJECTS AN OFFER FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS FOR THEIR PATENTS ON AIRPLANES 1908 FIRST OIL GUSHERS RUPTURE IN D'ARCY PERSIAN CONCESSION AT MAIDAN-I-NAFTUN 1908 CREATION OF THE IMPERIAL DEFENSE SUB-COMMITTEE ON AERIAL NAVIGATION 295 1909 ANGLO PERSIAN OIL COMPANY INCPORPORATED 1910 DESTROYERS BURNING ONLY OIL FIRMLY ESTABLISHED, ALL BATTLESHIPS DUAL-FIRING USING OIL AS ADJUNCT 1910 BRITISH SUPPORT FOR EXPERIMENTAL AIRPLANE RESEARCH LAGS BEHIND THE US, AND FRANCE. 1910-1911 ADMIRALTY PURCHASES ITS FIRST EXPERIMENTAL AIRPLANES FROM MCCLEAN AND ALSO FROM SHORT BROTHERS 1911 BRITAIN BY 1911 OWNS MORE SUBMARINES THAN ANY OTHER NAVY 1911 BRITISH NAVY BEGINS USING INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES AND TURBINE ENGNES IN DESTROYERS 1911 WINSTON CHURCHILL MADE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY 1911 56 DESTROYERS, 74 SUBMARINES BURNING ONLY OIL IN BRITISH NAVY 1911 ADMIRALTY CREATES PAKENHAM COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE TRANSITIONING ALL BRITISH SHIPS TO BURNING ONLY OIL 1911 CREATION OF THE NAVAL FLYING SCHOOL 1912 PAKENHAM COMMITTEE FAILS TO RECOMMEND TRANSITIONING ALL SHIPS TO OIL BURNING 1912 CHURCHILL CREATES THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON FUEL AND ENGINES 1912 AIR COMMITTEE (SUB COMMITTEE OF COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENSE) CREATED 1912 AIR COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS CREATION OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS 1912-1913 BRITISH NAVY MORE THAN DOUBLES ITS EXPENDITURE ON AERONAUTICS 1913 A.P.O.C.'S ABADAN REFINERY BEGINS FUEL OIL PRODUCTION 1913 CHURCHILL CALLS FOR DIRECT STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE OIL PRODUCTION, AND REFINERY BUSINESS, STATE TO CREATE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY 1913 JACK FISHER DESCRIBES THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SUBMARINES AND OIL ENGINES 1913 BRITAIN HAS BUILT A 2-1 MARGIN OVER GERMAN IN SUBMARINES FOR ITS NAVY 1913 CHURCHILL TASKS THE NAVAL WAR STAFF TO PRODUCE A REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING OIL 1914 BRITAIN OBTAINS CONTROLLING SHARES IN ITS FIRST NATIONAL OIL COMPANY 1914 R-CLASS BATTLESHIPS CONVERTED TO BURN ONLY OIL 1916 SYKES PICOT AGREEMENT BETWEEN BRITAIN AND FRANCE (DIVIDING UP FORMER OTTOMAN TERRITORIES) 1916 BALFOUR DESCRIBES CONTROL OF MESOPOTAMIAN OIL RESERVES AS FIRST CLASS WAR AIM 1917 BRITISH OIL RESERVES ONLY AT 60% OF PREFERRED LEVELS 1917 CABINET CALLS FOR INCREASED USE OF DOUBLE BOTTOM SHIPS FOR CARRYING OIL 1917 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM 1917 CREATION OF MINERAL AND OIL PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT, THE POOL BOARD, THE PETROL CONTROL DEPARTMENT 1917 CREATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXECUTIVE 1917 BRITISH (NAMELY JELLICOE) ADMIT THAT THE GERMANS CONTROL THE SKIES, AND BELOW WATER IN NORTH SEA AND EVEN EASTERN ATLANTIC) 1917 BY 1917 BRITAIN 22,000 AIRPLANES BETWEEN THE ARMY AND NAVY 1917 70% OF ALL BRITISH OIL IMPORTS FOR NAVAL USE, BRITISH OIL IMPORTS DOUBLED SINCE 1914 1918 SLADE MEMO REACHES CABINET WITH ADMIRALTY APPROVAL 1918 CREATION OF THE INTER-ALLIED PETROLEUM CONFERENCE 1918 PASSAGE OF THE 1918 PETROLEUM PRODUCTION ACT
Matrix and Timeline Legend Investigative Era Pre-War Transition Wartime Transition Color Code YELLOW GREEN TURQUOISE
296
297