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Understanding Iran's Assembly of Experts

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Understanding Iran's Assembly of Experts UnderstUnderstandinganding Iran’Iran’ss AssemblyAssembly ofof ExpertExpertss Policy Brief #1 November 2006 UnderstUnderstandinganding Iran’Iran’ss AssemblyAssembly ofof ExpertExpertss Contents Editorial Board Anoush Ehteshami - Safeguarding the Door of Power 3 Mahjoob Zweiri The Evolving Nature of Power in Iran - Election Facts and Figures 4 Contributors - The Constitutional Role of the Assembly 5 Rights and Limitations Ehsan Abdoh Iren Campari - Hashemi Rafsanjani and the Assembly of 6 Fouad Marei Experts Election Muhammad Saleh The Man of Power in Peril Afshin Shahi Arlene Taylor - Reformists and the Elections 7 Mahjoob Zweiri - Mesbah-Yazdi and Forthcoming Elections 8 The Man of Shadows Moves into the Open - Women and the Elections 9 - The Outcome 10 Possibilities and Different Scenarios Centre for Iranian Studies, Al Qasimi Building, Elvet Hill Road, Durham DH1 3TU, [email protected] SafeguardingSafeguarding thethe DoorDoor ofof PowerPower The Evolving Nature of Power in Iran Eighteen months after the election election, or more importantly what tional conservatives led by of President Mahmoud the outcome of this election will Rafsanjani, and neoconservatives Ahmadinejad, Iranians will once mean to Iran and Iranian politics? led by Mesbah-Yazdi. This conflict again go to the polls to vote, this The elections will have an indirect could eventually put an end to the time to elect the Assembly of impact on the President and the political future of Ahmadinejad, who Experts, which deals with monitoring Majlis (parliament), this will come enjoyed the support of Mesbah- the performance of the leader through the exisiting Supreme Yazdi in the last presidential elec- (Velay-e-Faqih). Iranians have to Leader, Ayatollah Khameini, or any tions in 2005. Undoubtedly, there is make the decision about which 86 one who succeeds him. The eight- the prospect of significant confronta- experts should do this job. Again the een months of Ahmadinejad's presi- tion within Iranian politics. This Guardian Council is fully prepared, dency has proved that the Supreme would be a real possibilty if the and the registered number of 496 Leader is not far away from influenc- Supreme Leader was to give his full candidates will have to face a written ing events within the country. Three support to Rafsanjani and his list, examination in order to ascertain the examples help to illustrate this point. which Rafsanjani needs to stop any adequency of their religious qualifi- Firstly, it was the Supreme Leader's attempt to question his authority as cations. Furthermore, if they pass decision to form a foreign policy long as he is alive. If this does not this examination, they will then also committee, following the perception happen this will mean the third face an interview process. Even of Ahmadinejad as a loose cannon defeat for Rafsanjani in less than 2 some previous members of the cur- in matters of foreign policy. years, which will further hamper his rent Assembly had to sit the written Secondly, on the economic front, the political career. exam, although it has been argued Supreme Leader also ordered the by some people, such as Majeed government to quickly deal with the Despite the power jostling between Ansari, that it is both illegal and inac- problem of inflation. Thirdly, the the Iranian political forces, the curate to do so. nature of the new Assembly of Experts will influence Iranian Those who succeed in the vet- domestic politics and foreign ting process will then qualify to policy. Therefore there will be stand for the elections. changes in long term policies, Moreover, those who are especially if the Ahamdinejad eventually elected will have an government keeps going in indirect impact on Iranian poli- the current direction which it tics, as the main job of the has chosen in regards to Assembly of Experts is to Iranian politics. There will monitor and assess the per- also be some changes on the formance and qualifications of foreign policy front, especially the leader for a term of eight if the neoconservative faction years. The reason why they will now Supreme Leader also urged the win a majority in the upcoming elec- enjoy an eight year term is due to government to sell shares of govern- tions. However, this will not be the fact that, in the future, the 5th mental companies to Iranian work- recognised in the short term, simply Expert elections will occur at the ers in order to distribute the wealth. because there will be an unseen same time as the 10th Majlis elec- Additionally, Ayatollah Khameini has conflict of interests which will slow tions. Therefore it has been also tried to control the foundations down any political decision-making assumed that this Assembly of (Bonyads), such as the Oppressed process. Experts will continue doing its job Foundation, the Fifteenth of without the need for new elections. Khordad Foundation and other simi- In summary, these elections add a Most importantly, as the soon to be lar organisations which legally are new chapter to the previous Iranian elected Assembly of Experts will tax exempt and out of the control of understanding of democracy and enjoy a longer eight year term, the the President and the Majlis. In elections, and with power being cen- Iranian political forces are pushing these elections, Khamenei himself is tral to the elections, one faction is hard to win more seats in the trying to limit any movement from therefore pitted against the other. It Assembly in the knowledge that they those who call themselves the third might be understood as being will then be able to significantly movement, supported by Mesbah- improper, but this is religious affect the Iranian polical scene. Yazdi, as they will be a threat to his democracy according to Iranian pol- authority. It also appears that there itics! There is a question about what this is real competition between tradi- Centre for Iranian Studies, Al Qasimi Building, Elvet Hill Road, Durham DH1 3TU, [email protected] 3 FactFactss && FiguresFigures In these elections, eighty six seats will be elected from thirty electoral constituencies. The distribution of these candidates will be according to the following map and table: Centre for Iranian Studies, Al Qasimi Building, Elvet Hill Road, Durham DH1 3TU, [email protected] 4 AA constitutionalconstitutional rolerole ofof thethe AssemblyAssembly Rights and Limitations The unexpected victory of Mahmoud As demonstrated, the Assembly of the Supreme Leader indirectly Ahmadinejad in the recent presiden- Experts acts as a representative appoints the members of the tial election surprised, if not gal- body to democratize the role of the Assembly of Experts through the vanised, many internal and external Supreme Leader, the most powerful Guardian Council. Consequently observers of the Iranian political figure in Iranian politics. one could argue that, as the scene. Ahmadinejad's hardline rhet- Consequently, the Islamic Republic Assembly of Experts are subject to oric, fundamentalist religious senti- often identifies the Assembly of approval by the Guardian Council, ments, militant approach to the state Experts as "the source of legitima- which itself is subject to the of Israel, and alleged nuclear ambi- cy". However, in spite of the appar- Supreme Leader, there is very little tions has increasingly placed Iran at ent democratic role of the Assembly space left for political maneuvering. the centre of international attention. of Experts, the same constitution It also raises the important question The outcome of the previous elec- also provides additional clauses about just who will supervise the tion, and the radical shift of power which clearly undermine the demo- conduct of the Supreme Leader him- from one side of the political spec- cratic nature of the Assembly of self. trum to another, should provide us Experts. By examining the constitu- with enough reasons to recognise tional role of the Supreme Leader, Having reviewed the selective per- the importance of Iranian elections the democratic deficit of the formance of the Guardian Council and their wider repercussions. Assembly of Experts becomes during previous elections, it seems Baring in mind the political potential apparent. plausible to expect minimal room for of the Iranian elections, we thus a fair competition which would ade- have significant reason to analyse One article in particular can be iden- quately represent those from differ- the forthcoming election vigilantly. tified within the constitution which ent sides of the political spectrum in This article will briefly examine articulately outlines the political Iran. whether the election set to take jurisdiction of the Supreme Leader. place on the 15th December 2006 There are 11 sections in Article 110 The Guardian Council was widely will, constitutionally speaking, have which give the Supreme Leader the criticised for its act of political the capacity to reshape the political overarching authority over other favouritism and selectivism during milieu in Iran. components of the system, including the presidential election of 2005. the legislature, judiciary and the Out of 1014 people who registered Before engaging ourselves in analy- executive. The Islamic Republic for the presidential candidacy, only a sis and speculation regarding the attempts to justify such monopolisa- small number of candidates were outcome of the election, it is essen- tion of power by referring to the role selected to participate in the elec- tial to examine the constitutional role of the Assembly of Experts, which is tion. Unsurprisingly, most of those of the Assembly, and also its legal elected and responsible for the disqualified by the Guardian Council jurisdiction within the political frame- selection of the Supreme Leader. were either independent, or work of Iran. Clearly, the legal Therefore, they are implications of belonged to the reformist parties. authority of the Assembly of Experts, indirect democracy taking place Subsequently, due to the constitu- and its constitutional rights and limi- through the Assembly of Experts to tional limitation of the Assembly of tations, can help us speculate as to elect the Supreme Leader.
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