INVESTIGATING THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ISBN 978-974-7709-40-7

© IRASEC, 2007-03-14 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or means, without prior permission of the author or the publisher.

The opinions expressed in these papers are solely those of the author(s).

INVESTIGATING THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Proceedings of the Symposium organised by IRASEC at the Hotel Sofitel Silom (Bangkok) on January 2005, 6th and 7th

Scientific Coordinator : Arnaud Leveau

The Research Institute on Contemporay Southeast Asia (Irasec) based in Bangkok, Thailand, is a member of the network of research centres of the French Foreign Ministry. Irasec calls on specialists from all academic fields to study the important social, political, economic and environmental developments that affect, together or separately, the eleven countries of the region (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor Leste and Vietnam). Irasec’s research output consists on academic studies

The Irasec Occasional Paper collection can be downloaded free of charge on our website : www.irasec.com

IRASEC EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

• Jean BAFFIE, CNRS, IRSEA • Yves GOUDINEAU, EFEO, • Bénédicte BRAC de la PERRIERE, AFRASE CNRS, EHESS • Andrew HARDY, EFEO, Hanoi • Sophie BOISSEAU du ROCHER, • François LAGIRARDE, EFEO Centre Asie Bangkok • Jean-Raphaël CHAPONNIERE, • Christian LECHERVY, MAE CNRS, AFD • Arnaud LEVEAU, IRASEC • Gilles DELOUCHE, INALCO • LE Huu Khoa, Université de Lille • Jean-Luc DOMENACH, CERI, • Charles MAC DONALD, CNRS Réseau Asie • Rémi MADINIER, CNRS, EHESS • Evelyne DOURILLE-FEER, CEPII • Philippe PAPIN, EPHE • Stéphane DOVERT, Ambassade • François RAILLON, CNRS, de France à Rangoun EHESS • Frédéric DURAND, Université de • Jean-François SABOURET, CNRS, Toulouse Réseau Asie • Alain FOREST, Paris VII • Christian TAILLARD, CNRS • Guy FAURE, IRASEC LASEMA • Michel FOURNIE, INALCO • Hugues TERTRAIS, Université de • Charles GOLDBLUM, Ecole Paris VII d’architecture de Paris • Marie-Sybille de VIENNE, • Christopher GOSCHA, Université INALCO de Montréal

Table of Contents

Foreword ...... 7 List of Contributors ...... 8

The Papers The Ang-yi or Chinese Secret Societies of Thailand. Understanding a Total Social Phenomenon, by Jean Baffie (CNRS-University of Provence)...... 11 The Triads: Past and Present, by T. A. Bancroft, BSc (Hons), MSc ...... 31 Political influences of the Chinese communities in Thailand and Myanmar, by Ratanaporn Dhammakosol, Politic Counscellor ...... 47 Grey Side of Chinese Community in Indonesia, by Frans Hendra Winarta, S.H., M.H...... 61 Triad Involvement in the Sex Service Industry in Hong Kong and Its Impacts on Southeast Asia, by Dr CHU Yiu Kong, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, The University of Hong Kong...... 75 The Chinese diaspora and prostitution at the Thai-Malay frontier (Hat Yai, Sadao-Dannok, Betong and Sungai Kolok), by Dr. Emmanuel DIALMA, Jurist, AFESIP Campaign Director and Dr. Pierre LE ROUX, Ethnologist, AFESIP Research Unit Director ...... 91 Triads : From street level to transnational crime, by Peter Michael, Journalist ...... 115

Debates Notes on the Chinese communities in Burma and Thailand, by Guy Lubeigt (CNRS-PRODIG)...... 143 Notes on the foreign mafias in Thailand, by Jean Baffie (CRNS University of Provence)...... 151 Historical note on the Chinese communities in South-East Asia, by Alain Forest (University of Paris VII, CNRS) ...... 153 Links between Organized Crime and terrorist networks, by Philippe Migaux, Chief police superintendent, French Embassy in Malaysia ...... 157

General Bibliography ...... 163

5

Foreword

Among all the minorities in South East Asia, the Chinese Diaspora is by far the most influential. Its centuries-old presence, its demographic weight, the richness of its transnational network, its cultural, economical and political influence in some countries in the zone raise a series of question. The Diaspora role is essentially a political question. Who really are they ? Who is Chinese and how integrated in their host country could they be ? Does the multi dimensional influence of these groups pose a threat to the regional stability or is it a major advantage for the economic integration and the ASEAN’s relations with China and the Chinese world. The activity of the Diaspora and its integration in their host countries are two questions profoundly linked to the evolution and the change in China. With its opening up and its economic growth, China is once again, in a certain way, bringing up the question of the role and allegiance of its “expatriates”. In most south-east Asian countries, the members of the Chinese Diaspora have secured important position in the fields of administration, education and religion. Thanks to their capacity to work and to adapt as well as their frugality, their cultural influence continues to grow. Clans and factions form the essential structure of the ancient Chinese society. If Imperial China never developed a Civil Law, it’s probably because the ancient Chinese society never really saw the need for it. This structure of relations could also explain why the Chinese civilisation didn’t develop a real territorial reference. The Chinese Diaspora today covers different political and economical realities which could be conflicting. What primarily characterises the Diaspora is apparently its great capacity to organise itself in any economical, political, social or cultural

7 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES environment. The capacity if its economic and administrative elites had been the determining factor of their development. However, the existence of informal and trans-national networks can also help the development of criminal activities. The presence of mafia groups and gangs of Chinese origin and their collusion with the world of finance and politics are historical facts in the region and could represent today a real threat for its stability. These criminal networks tend to forge business link with their Japanese, Russian, Korea, Italian or South American counterparts and sometimes could interfere with the process of political decision making. The recent appearance of links between these mafia and the Islamic separatist movements in the Philippines, in Indonesia or in the South of Thailand is a new illustration if the threat these gangs could represent in a global level. The papers in this volume comprise contributions to the conference “investigating the grey area if the Chinese communities in South-East Asia” held in Bangkok on January 6th-7th 2005. For this symposium we had chosen to focus on the presentation on the shadow area of the Chinese Diaspora in South-East Asia.

List of Contributors : Jean Baffie is a sociologist and an historian. He published several papers on the Chinese communities in Thailand and South-East Asia. He is a member of the CNRS and teaches at the Institute of Research on South-East Asia (IRSEA) and at the House of Asia and Pacific. His paper explains very clearly the roots and the origins of the Ang-Yi (the Chinese secret societies in Thailand). He also offers a note on the foreign mafias operating in Thailand. Todd Bancroft has been employed by the Hong Kong Police for the past 14 years, where he has performed a wide range of duties relating to the investigation and prosecution of organized and serious crime. He is currently the officer in charge of Interpol Hong Kong’s Extradition Unit. He has a MSc on Forensic and Legal Psychology, University of Leicester.

8 FOREWORD

His presentation of the main honking based triads shows us how difficult the eradication of these gangs is difficult while some people in the authorities still believe that they are ‘patriots’ Ratanaporn Dhammakosol, counsellor to several political parties in Thailand illustrates the links between the Chinese communities in South- east Asia with China and focus on the political influences of these communities in Thailand as well as in Myanmar. Her lecture examines how of the Chinese government tries to use these communities to develop its own influence in the region. Frans Winarta is an eminent international lawyer. He is Founder of the Indonesian Anti Discrimination Movement (GANDI) and the Co- founder of International Chamber of Commerce of Indonesia. He is a Permanent Lecturer at the Law Faculty of the University of Pelita Harapan, Karawaci – Tangerang, since 1996 and Member of the Board the Human Rights Institute established by the Council of the International Bar Association. He describes the political influences of the Chinese communities in Indonesia and the recent improvement of this influence among the local business and political elite despites ancient segregation. Yiu Chu Kong received his PhD in Police Studies in the University of Exeter in the UK in 1997. He is currently an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology and a Fellow in the Centre for Criminology at the University of Hong Kong. He is also one of the founding members of the Asian Association of Police Studies (AAPS) and the Hong Kong Juvenile Delinquency Research Society (HKJDRS). He has been invited by various police forces in Asia and Europe to give guest lectures on Chinese organized crime and policing. Yiu Chu Kong writes a clear introduction on the current triad’s situation and use the field of prostitution as an example to show their participation in the business in Hongkong and it impacts in South-East Asia. He examines the networks establishing by the triads all over South-East Asia to recruit those implicated in this business and how the business is ruling. Pierre Leroux and Emmanuel Dialma, researcher at the AFESIP in Cambodia completed the presentation of professor Chu by focussing on the sex business at the border between Thailand and Malaysia and how

9 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES some Chinese roots gangs are taking benefit of this business in the kind of under law or no man’s land zone. Peter Michael, journalist specialized on organised crime, provided very informative elements on the triads and how they develop their business from the street level to the transnational crime. Guy Lubeight, a member of the IRASEC and researcher at Observatory on Illegal Migrations and Human Traffic in Southeast Asia writes a stylish board of the Chinese influence in Myanmar. Alain Forest, historian and professor at the University Paris VII makes a Historical memorandum on the Chinese communities in South- East Asia. Philippe Migaux is a Chef Police Superintendent at the French Embassy in Malaysia and is a well-known export on terrorism. His improvised paper explains the impossible relationship between terrorism and professional mafia gangs.

Bringing together specialists from different field (from history to sociology, politics and law, NGO and police) brought a real intellectual addition to this subject which can not be held by a single discipline.

Arnaud Leveau

10

The Ang-yi or Chinese Secret Societies of Thailand. Understanding a Total Social Phenomenon

Jean Baffie IRSEA CNRS-University of Provence Marseille, France

“Na thi dai mi chao chin apphayop na thi ni cha mi samakhom yu duai samoe.” M.R. Ayumongkol Sonakul, a newspaperman from royal ancestry translates this sentence as “They (the secret societies) existed everywhere there was a large Chinese community” (Sonakul 1985: 16; Leotphanitkun 2525: 1; 2528: 72).

The word ang-yi (อั้งย ) is quite familiar with the Thai people. However, all Thai dictionaries do not include it. One of the largest Thai- English dictionaries gives “Chinese secret society” and explains that it is a Chinese Teochiu word meaning “samakhom lap khong chao chin” (secret society of the Chinese). It also gives the two Chinese characters, which are written hóng zì, hóng being the red color and zì meaning “word, sprits, writings, style” (Iamworamate 2532: 1194; anonymous 1980: 148, 545).1 The classical Thai-English dictionary by So Sethaputra

1 We can find different translation. Prof. Subsaeng Phrombun, following a book on secret societies in Malaya, understands that ang-yi or hung-yi can be literally translated as “Hong, the just” and was the title of Ch’en Chin-nan, the founder of the first Triad (Phrombun 2525: 7). 11 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

(first published in 1965) gives more equivalents: “a Chinese secret society, a tong, a racket” (Sethaputra 1987: 2, 1036). We should already keep in mind that the newest Thai dictionary, published in 2004 gives an essentially juridical definition: an ang-yi is an unlawful organization (anonymous 2547: 962) with no mention of an ethnic group. That is exactly what says the 1962 Lao dictionary of the ministry of Education, which also includes ang-yi with different tones than the Thai word (anonymous 2505: 1081).

However, until the Fifth Reign of the Chakkri Dynasty Chinese secret societies were known as tua-hia (ตั้วเฮีย) also two Teochiu word meaning “big elder brother”. We don’t know why the word ang-yi came to be so widespread, but it seems that at first it was only the name of a particular Chinese secret society among many other.

The Triad-Century. The official history of the triads in Thailand (Second-sixth reigns of Rattanakosin: early 19th-early 20th centuries)

Most historians who wrote about ang-yi noted that Thai official records (archives) do not mention ang-yi before the first year of the third reign of the Bangkok dynasty. And concluded that ang-yi were created in Siam during the second reign (1809-1824). However, the chronicles of Ayutthaya mention at least one big scale revolt by Chinese in 1735, during the reign of King Borommakot (1733-1758). About 300 Chinese tried to take over the Royal Palace while the King was in his summer capital of Lopburi. They failed but the palace was badly damaged and forty Chinese leaders were executed (Anonymous 2507 : 595-6 ; Phonnarat 2515: 612; Cushman 2000: 427).

In the biography of king Rama III (1824-1851) written by king Rama V we find many reference to Chinese Secret Societies, called tua hia at that time (Chulachomklao chaoyua 2530: 82-84). In 1824, about 700 or 800 Teochiu Chinese constituted a secret society in Chanthaburi to oppose a Hokkien Chinese group. Fighting broke several times but the

12 THE ANG-YI province governor succeeded in seizing the leaders and sending them to jail. In 1842, in Nakhon Chaisi, this time, in the west of Bangkok, three ang-yi, each strong of about one thousand members, made some difficulties with the local authorities. The leaders were caught and sent to Bangkok, but their troops still robbed houses in the province. A large police operation was necessary to subdue them. In 1845, along the western seaboard, Chinese ang-yi indulged in piracy and robbed trader’s ships. Police forces were sent and many Chinese were put in jail. In 1847, fight arose in Samut Sakhon province, South-west of Bangkok, between ang-yi and Siamese troops because of some trafficking in illegal opium. Phraya Mahathep, one of the official sent by Bangkok to restore order was killed. More troops had to be sent.

Illustration 1: Ang-yi Chinese having been defeated in Bangkok at the end of the 19th century. (Source: Wanlayankun 2503 : 408)

Almost at the same time, according to the Royal chronicles, trouble burst at the east of Bangkok. On April 8, 1848 in Chachoengsao province, members of an ang-yi robbed a sugar factory and killed one of the owners, also a Chinese. They resisted the local authorities, killed the governor and took over the inner city on April 10. Two royal armies, one of them headed by famous general Chaophraya Bodindecha, and more than ten days were necessary to subdue the revolt. Thousands of

13 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Chinese were killed in Chachoengsao and neighboring Chonburi provinces by Thai and Lao troops sent by Bangkok and by ordinary villagers who joined the massacre (Thiphakorawong 1961: 126-130, etc.).

In 1867, one year before the end of the reign of King Rama IV, another major ang-yi riot occurred in Phuket, probably related more with the situation in English Malaya. Two ang-yi, the Ngi-hin and the Pun Thao Kong fought each other over a problem of water used to wash tin ore in the mines. Local Thai authorities sent nine ang-yi leaders to Bangkok where they were asked to declare on oath while drinking holy water that they would not cause any more trouble to the kingdom (Damrong 2545: 222-3).

Under the reign of King Rama V (1868-1910) a number of riots and internal wars by ang-yi burst from time to time. Very serious fights happened in Ranong and Phuket in 1876 (see infra at this page) and in Bangkok, in 1889. In 19-20 June 1889, in Bangkok Chinatown, workers belonging to a Teochiu ang-yi, the Tua Kongsi fought against Hokkien workers from another ang-yi, the Siw Li Kue. More than one thousand Chinese fought each other, twenty being killed and one hundred injured. The Thai army (infantrymen and sailors) had to step in to restore law and order. Eight hundred ang-yi men were arrested, and only ten killed and twenty injured by the Thai soldiers (Damrong 2545: 235-39).

From then the Thai government decided to implement a harsher policy and officially declared ang-yi illegal (Damrong 2545: 240).

Ang-yi as a first type of trade union.

According to Bevars D. Mabry, who wrote in 1979 a useful data paper (for Cornell University) on labor institutions in Thailand, explains that the Chinese immigrants in Thailand brought with them two types of organizations of some interest for his subject, the guilds and the secret societies (Mabry 1979: 37). He estimated that they existed in Siam since the seventeenth century. They were organized along speech groups and one of their functions was to gain control over certain occupations. 14 THE ANG-YI

Membership was a prerequisite for employment. Many societies existed in Bangkok and, as each of them wanted to enlarge their sphere of influence, conflicts and fights were frequent.

Ang-yi were not true labor organizations, but they controlled manpower, particularly in rice-mills and saw-mills, railroad works and provided support when strike broke. According to an Thai historian of the local workers movements, although they brought together only Chinese workers and were often manipulated by employers, the ang-yi helped giving a conscience to the workers and having them realize they had a very powerful weapon: the strike (Phiriyarangsan 2528: 57).

The revolts of the Chinese mining coolies in 1876 under ang-yi leadership in Ranong is well known to English-reading scholars thanks to the work Jennifer Cushman (Cushman 1991: 37-44). Oppressed by their Chinese boss, between 300 and 600 tin miners rose against the mine operators, but also the governor and other officials of Ranong. They succeeded in entering the city of Ranong and killed many local people and government officials. Workers in Phuket also attacked official institution in solidarity with miners in Ranong. The situation worsened and at a point 2,000 Chinese burnt and looted the city of Phuket. The governor met the leaders and promised that living conditions for workers would rapidly improved in Ranong and Phuket. However, only the coming of more regional troops could stop the last rioters.

Ang-yi as a welfare association

Chinese secret societies in Siam had a function of mutual aid between the members. When a member had to be defended in a law court, the ang-yi was ready to pay for that. If he had to go to jail, the ang- yi could look after him and be assured he was well treated. And if he died the ang-yi used to care about his corpse according to his will and believes (Loetphanitkun 2525: 5).

We know well enough only one leader of a secret society. In a footnote, Prince Damrong tells us that before he wrote about Chinese 15 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES secret societies he talked with phra Anuwat Rachaniyom (or Yi Ko Hong), who used to be hua-na tua-hia i.e. a leader of a secret society, the Hong Moen Thian Ti Hui หงเหมินเทียนต ีฮุย (Damrong 2504: 354; Sia Kwang 2546: 10). In two recent articles, Phanni Bualek and Suwanna Maprasoet, Yi Ko Hong’s granddaughter, wrote a very complete biography of this important Thai Chinese, also known through the name of Hong Techawanit (Bualek 2547; Maprasoet 2547). That very powerful Teochiu man, who used to run gambling dens in Bangkok, was one of twelve founders of the Pô Tek Tueng Foundation in 1910 with other prominent Chinese from the Lamsam and Wanglee families for instance (Anonymous 2513: 65). This welfare foundation, probably the oldest of Thailand, provides help to sick and wounded persons, both Thai and Chinese, and takes especially care of the uncollected corpses after traffic accidents.

Illustration 2: Yi Ko Hong or Hong Techawanit or Phraya Anuwat Rachaniyom, a famous leader of ang-yi. (Source: Anonymous 2513 [1970]: 65.)

16 THE ANG-YI

It founded a hospital in July 1938, in Bangkok Chinatown. In 1979, the king of Thailand officially inaugurated a 22-level new hospital. And in 1997, the Hua Chiao Hospital had 56 permanent physicians, 120 consultant physicians, 763 nurses and 638 other employees for 560 beds for patients (anonymous 2540: 20).

Ang-yi and religion

In a good book on Buddhism in China one can read that the existence of Secret Societies was due to the impact of Buddhism upon Chinese society (Ch’en 1972: 427). From the twelfth to the fourteenth century existed the White Lotus Society, founded by a Buddhist monk, but which accepted monks, laymen, and even women and children. The society was prohibited by decree several times in 1281, 1308,1322. The society was then involved in a number of revolts against the Mongol governments. The White Lotus Society is sometimes considered as an archetype of Chinese secret societies. Another story tells that five Taoist monks from the Hokkien province were at the origin of the first modern secret society when they swore an oath to devote their lives to overthrow the Manchu dynasty and restore the Ming dynasty (Sonakul 1985: 16).

As for the word ang-yi, now usually used in Thai for Chinese secret society, an author – who gives no reference – explains that the red color (ang) was the sign of a Chinese monk who had a large following and chose dubious means such as intimidation and racket fees to feed them (Sakthaisong n.d.: 17).

Ang-yi were hostile to the Christian religion. In Father Perbet’s necrology, a catholic missionary who spent forty years in Chachoengsao, an ang-yi stronghold, the writer mentioned “the systematic and intense opposition by the secret societies» that once besieged the missionary’s house (anonymous 1924: 78, 256).

17 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES Ang-yi as a political association

The first Chinese secret societies were set up with a political objective, to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. However, at the end of the 19th century South-east Asian secret societies had completely forgotten their original political purpose. But they still had constituted a potential political weapon and Sun Yat Sen was conscious of it.

It is well known that Secret societies had a role in the 1911 nationalist revolution in China. Dr. Sun Yat Sen himself became a member of a secret society, the Chee Kung Tong, when in Honolulu, on January 11, 1904 (Sia Kwang 2546: 7); his rank – a marshal or “Red Stick” – was quite high since he was only subordinate to the Chief (Tsai 1987: 15). Sun Yat Sen clearly intended to transform the secret society from a mere mutual-aid club (with some outlawed activities) into a truly revolutionary organization. The Chinese Secret societies may not have had enough time to become a revolutionary party but they played an important role as fundraiser for active groups in China (Tsai 1987: 18).

Dr. Sun Yat Sen paid not less than four trips to Siam. He first visited Siam in 1903, then in 1906 (or the end of 1905), and twice in 1908. When he came back at the beginning of 1906, he was already a secret society member (on 11 January 1904) and founded his own society, the T’ung Meng Hui (Thong Moeng Hui or ถงเหมิงฮุย) on 20 August 1905. He founded a local branch of the T’ung Meng Hui and pushed for the setting up of a library and a newspaper. The last time he stayed in Siam, in November-December 1908, Sun Yat Sen met famous Yi Ko Hong, leader of a powerful ang-yi, the Hong Moen Thian Ti Hui หงเหมินเทียนต ีฮุย.

In Siam, it seems that Chao Phraya Sisuriyawong, a member of the powerful Bunnag family, who acted as Regent of the kingdom for five years after King Rama IV’s death, tried to be particularly protective when dealing with the Chinese and their secret societies. It cannot be discarded that he may have thought they could be precious allies in case he decided to usurp the throne (see the rather suspicious reaction of the young king in Sitthisongkhram 2504: 594). The Regent gave them several privileges. They could be judge by Chinese courts speaking Chinese; 18 THE ANG-YI they had a special administration within the country with, for instance, district chief for Chinese (nai amphoe chin) beside ordinary district chiefs with powers over Thai people and other minorities. Also, in order to discourage Chinese to place themselves under the protection of European consulates, a position of “Chinese consul under Thai autho- rity” (konsun chin nai bangkhap Sayam) was created (Sitthisongkhram 2504: 587).

At the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, when ang-yi were most restless in Siam, Thai authorities apparently feared that they could become allied with English or French imperialist forces and provide a motivation for them to take over the country. Indeed, the chiefs of some ang-yi were subjects (or protégés) of European governments, French in particular (Sitthisongkhram 2504: 590- 591) but for some reasons no strong link was ever made more official. However, when the French gunboat forced the Chao Phraya River in 1893, some Thai officials really feared that the Chinese of Bangkok would be tempted to join the French against the Siamese.

In an interesting article on ang-yi and godfathers along the Eastern coast, Sisak Wanliphodom explains – and underlines – that learned people whose names he cannot mention here like to say that the founders of some very important families of this country have been pirates (chon salat) (Wanliphodom 2536: 92).

It is uneasy to say directly that some political parties come from ang-yi, however we know that, in recent history, many political parties tried to have special connections with provincial godfathers – in Chon Buri, Phetchaburi, Khon Kaen, for instance, and that some of these influential people (or members of their families) joined political parties, get elected and sometimes were promoted to ministerial jobs.

The ang-yi and the economy

Many observers agree that at the end of the 19th century Chinese Secret societies were very powerful in the economic field. Although 19 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES usually divided, they could unite to prevent the entry of an outsider into a trade, a craft or a line of business, a particular rice mill (Ingram 1971: 211). They were active in the coolie trade and provided many services to the Chinese coolies once in Siam, either legal or not.

Tax farmers wanted to be associated with a strong secret society to be able to get farms –especially profitable farms such as opium or alcohol farms – at low bids (Praphaphan 2524: 153, 242; Damrong 2504: 354-355). Then, when it was time to effectively collect the taxes in outlying zones such as tin mines or rubber or sugar estates, the protection of a rough tua-hia or ang-yi was a big help.

Another fundamental service needed by Overseas Chinese was the remittance of money back in their Chinese provinces. We know that at least some of the phoy kwan companies specializing in these transfers were headed by leaders of Ang-yi. The best example is again Phra Anuwat Rachaniyom, best known under the Chinese name of Yi Ko Hong or the Thai name of Hong Techawanit (Tantasuruek 2532: 66).

Opium, illegal alcohol, gambling, prostitution

These four activities provide entertainment for Chinese coolies (and traders,…), but are also very profitable economic sectors. Prostitution was made illegal in Thailand only in 1960. And opium den used to be frequent until a few decades. Many kinds of gambling – in Casino for instance – have also been made illegal but are still easy to find in Bangkok.

Oddly enough a dictionary chooses to give song (ซอง), now translated as brothel, as an equivalent of ang-yi (Manitcharoen 2514 : 1090). However, archival documents that mention almost only riots and other troubles to the public order by secret societies never directly refer to prostitution.

20 THE ANG-YI

Illustration 3: Ang-yi Chinese at the opium den. (Source: Wanlayankun 2503 : 374.)

In 1883 the now well-known Sarabanchi suanthi 2 khu ratsadon… samrap chaophanak-ngan krom praisani krungthepmahanakhon (Bangkok Postal Directory) was published. I counted 38 brothels (usually designated as a place which “liang khon ha ngoen”[shelters for people who are looking for money]) 2, almost all in small lanes (trok) of Chinatown. At the time, brothels were intimately associated with opium dens (then legal and taxed) and shops selling spirits. Two of the best-known lanes were Trok Tao and Trok Taeng.

The special tax on prostitutes under the reigns of Rama IV (1851- 1868) and Rama V (1868-1910) was called “Tax for the Improvement of the Roads” (phasi bamrung thanon). In fact, the tax was spent in the construction of canals as well as roads. Just as for most of the other taxes, the Thai government proposed bid invitations for each province or groups of provinces, and the person giving the highest bid was

2 Liang means “feed, raise, take care of”, khon means “people”, and ha ngoen can be translated by “looking for money”. It is evident that only the central part of Bangkok is covered. For example, the Phayanak area, later well known for its motels with prostitutes, has not been included. 21 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES appointed chao phasi bamrung muang. Dararat Mettarikanon found in the archives of the 5th reign of Bangkok the names of some of these farmers in Bangkok and Phuket with the sums they remitted to the Siamese state. It is highly probable that some of them – maybe all of them – were members or leaders of ang-yi.

Obviously, more research is necessary on this topic, particularly since, at least in China one of the most interesting characteristics of the secret societies is their treating men and women on an equal footing (Chesneaux 1975: 111).

Mauss and the ang-yi as total social fact or phenomenon.

When a diaspora takes form in a country, it badly need help, protection, financial channels to send money back home, entertainment, etc. but it is not sophisticated enough to have specialized institutions for each of these needs. Organized along speech-group lines, at least in Bangkok and Central Siam, the ang-yi were first global or total organizations, which could respond more or less to the new situation of Chinese abroad.

In his famous « Essai sur le don », Marcel Mauss explains that “in these « total social phenomenon » as we suggest to name them we encounter at the same time many types of institutions: religious, juridical and moral – and these ones related both to the political area and the family – economic – et that included production and consumption (…); and also aesthetic aspects…” (Mauss 1950 : 147). In the conclusion of his article, Mauss used the expression “total social fact” and “general social fact” because “they concern in some case the whole society with all these institutions and, in other cases, only a large number of these institutions” (Mauss 1950 : 274). I give as hypothesis that at the early stages of their development the ang-yi could be held as a good example of “total social phenomenon” or “total social fact”.

22 THE ANG-YI

We cannot understand a complex social phenomenon if we only consider its present stage. Historians of 19th century secret societies like to write that they had both good and bad points. But, as all the good points have given birth to legal and officially sanctioned institutions, associations, foundations, clubs or political organizations, were left only the outlawed activities which used to be just means to get money then diverted to many actions, many of them quite positive. But, at present, these traffics, or production of imitations, etc. have for only purpose to enhance the wealth of the leaders of the gangs or mafias. Professor Suesaeng Phrombun is right when he suggest to interview elder people of Chinese family name associations or staff attached to Chinese sanctuaries to learn more about ang-yi of the past (Phrombun 2525: 6).

What is left is a – of course illegal – mafia.

In 1897, when registration became necessary for all Chinese organizations, some secret societies preferred to go underground. It is hard to believe that ang-yi just disappeared in Siam during the reign of Rama the Sixth. What we can say, however, is that records no longer use the word but prefer other more neutral ones. William Skinner himself admitted that Chinese secret societies were revived in 1938-39 to oppose the influence of the Japanese (Skinner 1957: 265).

Chinese riots happened twice in Bangkok Chinatown since 1925, once in September 1945, the other in July 1974. In 1945, riots broke out when Chinese leaders celebrating the victory over the Japanese hoisted up the Chinese and European flags while forgetting to hoist up the Thai flag. Since Chinese in Bangkok had kept some weapons used against the Japanese, there were sequences of true urban guerrilla. At least seven Chinese were killed (Patthamasukhon 2517: 482-487; Skinner 1957: 279). More recently in July 1974, riots broke in Chinatown because of the violent arrest of a Chinese taxi driver by policemen. It resulted in 25 Chinese killed and about one hundred injured. The international situation was very different. Thailand was about to recognize Red China and put an end to official relations with Taiwan. In none of these cases official reports mentions the possibility of the presence of ang-yi people. 23 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

In an interesting article in Thai published in 1990 (and published again in 1993) respected scholar Sisak Wanliphodom suggested that the Chao Pho or godfathers of the Eastern coast of Thailand were the descendants of the ang-yi and the nakleng-to, a Thai tradition of “big boss” or kindhearted outlaws.

As many Chao Pho and local politicians are second-generation Chinese, whose fathers might have been ang-yi members, it could be concluded that old fashioned ang-yi have not completely disappeared but have flourished in some regions or have climbed the social ladder.

24 THE ANG-YI References

Note on the sources:

To my knowledge there is no English or French book, report, thesis or academic article on Chinese secret societies in Thailand. Of course, William Skinner’s book on “Chinese society in Thailand” gives much general information on the subject, and other English works deal with specific events, see for instance the secret society revolt of 1876 in Ranong, Southern Thailand in Family and State. The formation of a Sino- Thai Tin-mining dynasty, 1797-1932 by Jennifer Cushman (Cushman 1991). Many Thai language books and articles give some information on Chinese Secret Societies in Thailand, however there is two major references. “Ruang ang-yi”, a 33 page-long chapter in Nithan Boranakhadi, one of the best known publication in Thailand, first published in 1944 by Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, and an unpublished master degree thesis by Suppharat Loetphanitkun, who was later engaged as a teacher by Sukhothai Thammathirat university (see Loetphanitkun 2525, 2528). Among non academic works I founded two where ang-yi are covered with much detail: “Tua-hia” by Phoemsak Wanlayakun (1960: 373-476) that was first broadcasted in a local radio and a slim (112 p.) volume by Charoen Tanmahaphrom, in 1999, that covers several types of Chinese violent crimes and not just ang-yi (Tanmahaphrom 2503).

Anonymous 1924 “Nécrologie du reverend Père Perbet” Echos de l’Assomption 43: (June) pp. 78, 252-258 (in French and Thai). Anonymous 1980 Times Chinese-English Dictionary Hong Kong. Federal Publications. The Commercial Press, 546 p. Anonymous 1991 “Two charged over use of forged share certificates. Taiwanese, Thai suspected of ties with HK Triads” The Bangkok Post (30 March) p. 15. Anonymous 1997 “Crime: Police alert against HK gangsters. Triads might try to flee to Thailand” (AFP) The Bangkok Post (27 June) p. 3. Anonymous 2505 [1962] Atchanukrom phasa lao khong kasuang suksathikhan (Thai language dictionary of the ministry of Education) Vientiane. 1145 p. 25 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Anonymous 2507 [1964] Phraratcha pongsawadan krung Sayam (chak ton chabap khong britit miwsiam) (Royal chronicles of Siam, from a manuscript held at the British Museum) Bangkok. Kaona, 743 p. Anonymous 2513 [1970] Munlanithi Hua Khiao Po Tek Siao Tueng Chaeng kitchakan nai wara kroprop 60 pi (Hua Khiao Po Tek Tueng Foundation: the sixtieth anniversary) Bangkok, 298 p. Anonymous 2526a [1983] “Ang-yi ya tham wa mi di trong nai” (don’t ask if ang-yi are good things) Matuphum Raiwan (13 August) p. 11. Anonymous 2526b [1983] “Babuankan ang-yi” (the Ang-yi movement) Sakun Thai 29, 1485 (5 April) p. 51 and 29, 1486 (12 April) p. 49. Anonymous 2532 [1989] “Ang-yi” 191 Buanglang khao attayakam weekly features in July-August-September 1989, usually on page 59. Anonymous 2535 [1992] “Mangkon nua mankon” (a dragon above the dragons) Senthang mafia 1, 6 (15 May) pp. 11-28. Anonymous 2538 [1995] “Ang-yi phaendin yai” (The ang-yi of China) Matichon (5 March) p. 6. Anonymous 2540 [1997] Thi raluek wara khroprop 59 pi rongphayaban hua chiao munlanithi po tek tung (book published to commemorate the 59th anniversary of the Hua Chiao Hospital) Bangkok. 106 p. Anonymous 2547 [2004] Photchananukrom chabap Matichon/Matichon Dictionary of the Thai Language Bangkok. Matichon, 1061 p. Booth, Martin 1991 The Triads. The Chinese Criminal Fraternity. Grafton Books. Bualek, Phanni 2547 [2004] “Senthang chiwit phu nam chin sayam” (The life of a leader of the Siamese Chinese) in: Phimpraphai Phisanbut et al. Luk chin lan mon nai krung sayam (Sons of Chinese and grand-sons of Mons) Bangkok. Sarakadee, pp. 37-66. Ch’en, Kenneth 1972 Buddhism in China. A Historical Survey. Princeton. Princeton University Press, 560 p. Chesneaux, Jean 1975 “The Secret Societies” in : China Yesterday and Today edited by Molly Joel Coye and Jon Livingston New York. Bantam Books, pp. 110-112. Chonsaranon, Praphat 2544 [2001] “Lakhon thapat ‘ang-yi’” (about a play named “ang-yi”) Matichon (24 June) p. 14. Chulachomklao chaoyua (Prabat somdet phra) 2530 [1987] Phra thamma thetsana chaloem phrakiat phrabat somdet phra nang klao chao yu hua (on

26 THE ANG-YI

King Rama III) Bangkok. Published to commemorate the bicentennial of King Rama III’s birthday, 97 p. Cushman, Jennifer W. 1991 Family and State. The formation of a Sino-Thai Tin-mining dynasty, 1797-1932 Singapore. Oxford University Press, 172 p. Cushman, Richard D. (translator) 2000 The Royal Chronicles of Ayutthaya Bangkok. The Siam Society, 556 p. Damrong Rajanubhab (Prince) 2545 [2002]“Ruang ang-yi” (histories of ang-yi) Nithan Boranakhadi Bangkok. Dokya pp. 210-243. 1st edition: 1944. Damrong Rajanubhab (Prince) 2504 [1961]“Ruang ang-yi” (histories of ang-yi) Phraratcha phongsawadan krungrattanakosin ratchakan thi 5 (Royal chronicles for the fifth reign of Rattanakosin) Bangkok. Kurusapha, pp. 344-366. Domphananakhon, Wina 2536 [1993] “cho adit kammakon thai chak ang-yi-kuli chin su sahaphap raeng-ngan” (digging into the workers’ past: from ang-yi and Chinese coolies to trade unions) Matichon (22 October) special, p. 1. Ellithorpe, Harold 1974 “The Asian Mafia” The Asia Magazine (29 December) pp. 5-10. “Hong Samut S.B.S.” (pseud.) 2525 [1982] “Ruang ang-yi” (on the ang-yi) Senathipat 31, 1 (January-March) pp. 93-97. Iamworamate, Tianchai 2532 [1989] A new Thai-Englsih Dictionary Bangkok. Ruamsan. 1248 p. Ingram, James C. 1971 Economic Change in Thailand, 1850-1970 Stanford. Stanford University Press, 352 p. Jinakul, Surath 1995 “Beware of alien gangs” The Bangkok Post “Perspective” (19 February) p. 17. Jinakul, Surath 1999 “Invasion of the Triads” The Bangkok Post “Perspective” (7 November) p. 1. Lintner, Bertil 1998 “Organized crime: world wide web. The tangled trail of illicit Chinese migration” Far Eastern Economic Review (14 May) pp. 34-35. Loetphanitkun, Suppharat 2525 [1982] “Samakhom ang-yi nai prathet thai ph.s. 2367-2453” (Ang-yi in Thailand from 1824 to 1910) Paper for the First conference on the thesis of the faculty of History,20-21 March 1982, 56 p.

27 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Loetphanitkun, Suppharat 2528 [1985] “Samakhomlap ang-yi nai prathet thai ph.s. 2367-2453” (Ang-yi in Thailand from 1824 to 1910) Sinlapa- watthanatham 6, 4 (February) pp. 70-113. Manitcharoen, Manit 2514 [1971] Photchananukrom thai (Thai Dictionary) Bangkok. 4th edition, 1142 p. Maprasoet, Suwanna 2547 [2004] “Khwamlang nai ban Yi Ko Hong ) in: Phimpraphai Phisanbut et al. Luk chin lan mon nai krung sayam (Sons of Chinese and grand-sons of Mons) Bangkok. Sarakadee, pp. 67-104. Mauss, Marcel 1950 « Essai sur le don » in : Sociologie et anthropologie PUF. 1ère édition : 1923-24 . Mettarikanon, Dararat 2526 (1983) “sampheng : læng borikan thangphet thi samkhan nai samai rattanakosin ph.s. 2325-2453” [Sampheng: lieu important de prostitution entre 1782 et 1910] ekkasan phak wicha manutsayasat mahawitthayalai khonkæn 3:6 (octobre) pp. 37-49. Mettarikanon, Dararat 2527 (1984) “kotmai sopheni "ti thabian" khrang ræk nai prathet thai” [la première loi sur l'enregistrement des prostituées de Thaïlande] Sinlapawatthanatham 5:5 (mars) pp. 6-19. Patthamasukhon, Prasoet 2517 [1974] Ratthasapha thai nai rop si sip song pi (2475-2517) (Forty two years of Thai parliament: 1932-1974) Bangkok. Ch. Chumnum Chang, 1156 p. Phiriyarangsan, Sangsit 2529 [1986] Prawat kantosu khong kammakon thai (a history of the struggle of the Thai workers) Bangkok. CUSRI Publications, 239 p. Phonnarat (Somdet Phra) 2512 [1969 ] Phraratcha Phongsawadan Krung Si Ayutthaya (Royal Chronicles of Ayutthaya) Bangkok. Bannakhan, 656 p. Phisittaphanphon, Noraset (translator from Chinese, Taiwan) 2539 [1996] “Samakhom lap ang-yi nai Sayam” (Chinese secret societies in Siam) Sinlapa-watthanatham 17, 4 (February) pp. 198-199. Phrombun, Supsaeng 2525 [1982] Commentary of the paper by Suppharat Loetphanitkun on the Ang-yi in Thailand from 1824 to 1910, 9 p. Praphaphan, Yada 2524 [1981] Rabop chao phasi nai akon samai krungthep yuk ton (the tex farmer system in the early Bangkok period) Bangkok. Sansan, 307 p. Sakthaisong, Suriyan n.d. Chao Pho. Buanglang 9 aphimaha chao pho. (the background of 9 super godfathers) Bangkok. Matichon, 257 p.

28 THE ANG-YI

Sia Kwuang 2546 [2003] Kitchakam thang kanmuang khong chao chin phon thale nai prathet thai (kh.s. 1906-1939) (political activities of Overseas Chinese in Thailand between 1906 and 1939) Bangkok. Chinese Studies Center. Institute of Asian Studies. Chulalongkorn University, 89+105 p. (in Thai and Chinese) “Sichekchai” (pseud.) 2526 [1983] “Khao chu Sihiang mafia kham chat” (an international Mafioso called Sihiang) Matuphum Raiwan (14 February) p. 9. Sitthisongkhram, Natthawut 2504 [1961] Somdet chao phraya borommaha Si suriyawong mahaburut (Si Suriyawong, a famous personality) Bangkok. Thepphaisan, 825 p. Skinner, G. William 1957 Chinese society in Thailand. An analytical history Ithaca. Cornell University Press. Sonakul, Ayumongkol 1985 “The Secret Society” Bangkok World (16 September) pp. 16-17 (The article was first published in the late sixties by the Standard Bangkok Magazine). Songprasoet, Phuwadon 2521 [1978] “Thathi khong thai thi mi to kanliphai khaoma khong dr. Sun Yat Sen” (Attitudes of the Thai toward the coming as refugee of Dr. Sun Yat Sen) Chunlasan sangkhomsat lae manutsayasat 2, 2 (September-December) pp. 50-65. Tanmahaphram, Charoen 2542 [1999] Ang-yi muang Sayam (Ang-yi in Siam) Bangkok. Chattanphi, 112 p. Tantasuruk, Suchada 2532 [1989] Phoykwan kansongngoen klap prathet doi chao chin phon thale nai prathet thai (Phoy Kwan: sending money back by Overseas Chinese of Thailand) Bangkok. Chulalongkorn University, 184 p. Thipphakorawong Chaophraya 2504 [1961] Phraratchaphongsawadan krung Rattanakosin ratchakan thi 3 (Royal Chronicles of the Third Reign of Rattanakosin) Bangkok. Kurusapha, vol. 2, 192 p. Tsai, Shih-shan H. 1987 “The Revolution of 1911 and the Role of the Overseas Chinese” in : The 1911 Revolution. The Chinese in British and Dutch Southeast Asia Singapore. Heinemann Asia, pp. 7-19. Walliphodom, Si sak 2525 [1982] Commentary of the paper by Suppharat Loetphanitkun on the Ang-yi in Thailand from 1824 to 1910, 8 p. Wanlangkun, Phoemsak 2503 [1960] “Tua-hia” (Chinese secret societies) Muang thai nai adit (Thailand in the past) Bangkok. Watthanaphanit, pp. 373-476.

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Wanliphodom, Sisak 2536 [1993 ] “Khot ngao lao ko chao pho tawan ok” (the ancestors of the Eastern godfathers) in : Khon ‘Kao’ khayao banlang Po kotfathoe tawan ok (the fall of ‘Kao’ shakes Po’s throne) Bangkok. Khao Sot, pp. 87-98. (first published in Sinlapa-watthanatham 11, 8 June 2533 [1990])

30

The Triads: Past and Present

By T. A. Bancroft, BSc (Hons), MSc

Overview

In its most common form, the collective term triad refers to under- ground criminal fraternities. These fraternities are almost exclusively made up of Chinese membership, and although having originated in Mainland China, these societies have followed the migratory movements of the Chinese across the globe. Originally the triads were formed with political aims in mind, but over time they degenerated into criminal societies driven by greed. Today they are both opportunist and organized criminals whom mainly prey on their own ethnic communities, thriving on the proceeds of crimes such as drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal gambling, prostitution, counterfeiting the products of intellectual property, and other forms of racketeering. This paper will attempt to examine in brief the origin of the triads, and their progression to present-day criminal fraternities, particularly in Hong Kong. Attention will be paid to their modus-operandi and the true extent of their continuing threat to public security.

Origins of the Triads Given the mystery surrounding the triads, there exist numerous myths and opinions on their true origin. As stated in CHU (2001), one popular legend claims that the triads were formed by five monks from

31 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES the infamous Shaolin monastery in China, who were the only survivors when their temple was burned to the ground by the T’sing Emperor Kangxi (Hong Hei). Given the notariety of their fighting skills, it is claimed that Kangxi believed that the monks might rise against the T’sing and therefore he sought to anilhate them as a precautionary move against rebellion. Legend holds that the surviving monks spread across China and established five major lodges with the aim of overthrowing the T’sing. One of these lodges, located in Guangdong, known as the “Sam Hop Wooi” (United Three Society), became quite wealthy and powerful, and in the nineteenth century its influence began to spread around the world – including Hong Kong. A more plausible and universally accepted academic theory as laid out by LIU (2001) and Morgan (1960), is that an underground resistance was formed by Ming Dynasty (Han) loyalists in the 17th century, including some from the defunct Ming Imperial Army, to resist the foreign T’sing (Manchurians) rulers. The T’sing, at least initially, are referred to in literature as having been tyrants, who resorted to execution when dealing with dissidents, including Buddhist and Taoist priests, and as such the underground resistance received wide public support and grew in influence. The aim of the resistance was to oust the T’sing and restore the Ming. As a result of the Manchurian’s control and force in the north, many of the remaining Ming supporters fled to the coastal areas of the south of China. Many in fact sought refuge in Buddhist monasteries, namely in Kwangsi, Guangdong & Fukien, and it was therefore in the south that the resistance to the T’sing was most concentrated. With the reign of T’sing Emperor Kangxi, which didn’t end until 1723, Manchurian control of the south strengthened and eventually drove the resistance underground. It was at this time that the Manchus began referring to the resistance societies as the “Tin Dei Wooi” (Heaven and Earth Society). Such dominance by the Manchurians prompted the use of identifying passwords and signs to ensure the recognition and security of its members (Morgan, 1960), which were until recent times still common place in the triad societies we know today.

32 THE TRIADS: PAST AND PRESENT

It is claimed that this underground resistance was initially mostly passive, with a strong loyalty among its ranks, but later the movement is known to have became involved in various uprisings, including among others the Shantung Revolt in 1774, the Water Lily Uprising in 1797, and the Formosa Uprising in 1868 (LIU, 2001). When speaking of the origins of the triads, Morgan (1960) stated clearly that, “the (triad) society is not in itself a completely independent association conceived at any specific date or resulting from any one particular incident in Chinese history. Secret societies dedicated to the restoration or retention of Chinese rule over China had existed for hundreds of years…”. It is of interest to note that the Manchurians believed in Confucianism while the Han were predominantly Buddhists and Taoists. Many Buddhist and Taoist priests were killed by the Manchurians during their attempts to wipe out the underground resistance, and the public were often banned from worshipping in their temples. This lends to the theory that the Buddhist and Taoists sympathized with the resistance, and as such perhaps the Shaolin theory is not entirely mythical. It was the important Chinese historical figure Dr. SUN Yat-sen, a triad of senior standing (426 of the Kwok On Wui), who was behind the final push in the south to dispatch the Manchurians. Dr. SUN was the head of the then Republican political party, and had canvassed support not only within China, but in Chinese communities overseas in the United States, Japan and Hong Kong (Morgan, 1960). The ensuing rebellion of 1911 led to the proclaiming of a republic in 1912, and hence the triads finally achieved the political aim for which the secret societies had been originally formed. The assistance of the triads to the cause of the rebellion, and the Republican party, was recognized by the new government in China, which provided them with much power and influence – both in the public and private sectors. As Morgan (1960) states, this meant that it was often the case that anyone with ambition, either in business, the military, or the general civil service, usually joined the triad fraternity to ease their advancement up the ladder.

33 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Power corrupts, and after finally removing the T’sing, the resistance degenerated into criminal fraternities. For lack of better terminology, the resistance became guns for hire over the course of time, and hence the transformation from an underground resistance with political aims to a criminal brotherhood. Moreover, as one can see, this criminal brotherhood was also strongly woven into the prevailing society, its government, its military and even its private sector franchises. To this day, being a member of a triad society in Mainland China is not strictly a criminal offence. The laws there remain very ambiguous on this issue.

Hong Kong Although triads originated in Mainland China, as one author put it, Hong Kong is now the undisputed capital of triad operations. The literature available on the proliferation of the triads also frequently concentrates on Hong Kong, which was essentially the closest “port of call” for the resistance movement when being forced out by the Manchurians in the various rebellions in Mainland China. Waves of triads descended on Hong Kong from the mid-1800s until the establishment of the republic. Historical records maintained by the Hong Kong Government show that as early as 1842 British colonists had noted that these secret societies wielded significant power among the local population. These early triads gained control of local ethnic and labour associations, preying frequently on recent immigrants from the Mainland - who were as a group very vulnerable, as they were mostly ignored and unprotected by the colonial administration. The triads also engaged in extortion on an ever increasing scale, particularly in the coolie trade. Records also show that even in these early days the triads were found to have infiltrated the Police and various government departments in Hong Kong.

34 THE TRIADS: PAST AND PRESENT

In 1845 the first law outlawing triad membership was enacted, which boasted penalties of branding, three years of imprisonment and eventual deportation from the colony. (Morgan, 1960). Hong Kong was also used as a base for Dr. SUN Yat-sen’s Republican party, where they planned strategies and rallied support for the eventual overthrowing of the Manchurians, setting up the first locally headquartered Hong Kong triad society in the process – the Chung Wo Tong. The Chung Wo Tong was the foundation for what later became the powerful Wo group of societies (Wo Hop To, Wo Shing Yee, Wo Shing Wo etc). The triads grew in strength and number rapidly during the early years in Hong Kong, and as stated in Morgan’s (1960) account, between 1914 and 1939 the triads settled down and made the transformation into the criminal organizations they are now known to be. That is to say that they slowly began to lose their patriotic appeal and public support, as their true face became revealed. During this time many new societies developed and then fractioned, and by the early 1930s, eight basic groups controlled Hong Kong: the Wo, the Rung, the Tung, the Chuen, the Shing, the Fuk Yee Hing, the Yee On, and the Luen. They were very organized, loyal and disciplined, and had by that time split the colony up among their groups geographically, or to use the Americanism – they had established their respective “turfs”. Morgan (1960) states that pre-1941, the percentage of Triad membership in Hong Kong was, 8-9%, but due to further in-fighting, greed, and fractioning, the figure grew to an alarming 15% by 1958. Indeed the power of the triads, and their significance in numbers, led the Japanese to seek their collaboration during the invasion of Hong Kong in 1941. It is an accepted fact that the Wo group in particular did extend their influence in assisting the Japanese, including acting as informers concerning any anti-Japanese activities in the colony after the invasion. Succeeding the war, the triads continued to excel, and became even more engaged with crime, such as organized robberies, burglaries,

35 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES prostitution, and the operating of illegal divans for the ingestion of dangerous drugs – particularly Opium, and later Heroin. They also effectively extended their extortion activities to cover the transportation network, and the public markets (Booth, 1999). The Police were particularly unorganized at this stage, succeeding the war, and thus the triads had quite a free reign to run their illegal activities. This was bolstered by yet a further influx of triads from Mainland China when the communists gathered momentum against the nationalists (KMT), sending thousands of refugees fleeing southward into Hong Kong. As mentioned earlier, much of the military in the Mainland also held membership to a triad society, and it was during this push by the communists that the nationalists reached out to the societies for help in repelling them. In Guangdong, Lt. General Kot Siu Wong was tasked with this responsibility, which led to the establishment of a group of societies which became known as the 14 (sap-sei-wooi), and later the 14K (14 from their headquarters address in Po Wah Road in Guangdong, and K from Karat – a symbol of hardness). Many of this group later fled to Hong Kong when the communists swept to power, and to this day, 14K remains one of the strongest triad societies in Hong Kong and internationally. Their switch from being patriots to criminals was rapid. It is interesting to note here that when Mao Tse Tung’s communists were victorious in 1949, the triad nationalists were dispersed from China, not only to Hong Kong but around the world: Macau, Thailand, Burma, San Francisco, Vancouver, and Perth being good examples. In 1958, with approximately 300,000 members, Morgan (1960) estimated the overall revenue from triad activities to be approximately HKD$ 40 Million. That is a staggering amount for those times. The golden years for the triad societies began to come to an end however in the 1960s, as the public finally began to see these associations as nothing more than bands of criminals, and the Police finally started to take concrete proactive action to stem their control. Continuous raids and refining of the laws began to take effect, with the Police targeting the heads of the societies for arrest and deportation.

36 THE TRIADS: PAST AND PRESENT

There has been much speculation that the Police and Triads cooperated extensively in Hong Kong when it came to controlling social order during the 60s and early 70s. According to an account by Booth (1999), more than one third of the Hong Kong Police Force held affiliation with the triads during this time – although I would opine that this figure is inflated. In any event, conspiratorial behavior between the Police and the Triads was mostly eradicated by the late 70s, with the advent of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974 – an independent anti-corruption law enforcement body. This may have reduced the influence of the triads somewhat, however they were far from eradicated. In 1985 the Police were worried enough to re-establish a Triad and Crime Group, which was the forerunner of the Organized Crime and Triad Bureau, the current body investigating triad related crimes in Hong Kong today. According to Police figures, triad related crimes rose from 7000 in 1953, to 60,000 in 1993. By 1996, figures revealed that there were believed to be as many as 52,000 triad members in Hong Kong, in more than 50 gangs, with the Sun Yee On, the 14K, the Wo Shing Wo being the most prominent. The current characteristics and activities of the prominent societies can be summarised as follows:

The 14K: • formed after WWII and the Chinese Civil War by the nationalists fleeing the communist regime; • reportedly the largest society on an international basis, with approximately 20,000 members in Hong Kong; • has solid organization and management; • involved in many aspects of organized crime, and in Hong Kong they are particularly involved in night club and mini-bus extortion, counterfeit goods production and sales, and interfering in property sales (public queing incidents). They are also very active in the

37 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

casino industry in Macau, including protection, and loansharking activities.

The Sun Yee On: • the largest and most powerful group in Hong Kong, believed to have 25,000 members, and 56,000 members worldwide; • has sub-organizations in the USA – particularly the coastal cities of New York, Miami, Los Angeles and San Francisco; • originates from Chiu Chau and Hakka clans; • sophisticated criminals with expertise in drug trafficking, money laundering, computer software piracy, migrant smuggling, and credit card fraud; • very active in protection of entertainment premises in Tsim Sha Tsui area of Kowloon; • often act as hired guns to whoever can pay – sometimes other triad socities.

The Wo Shing Wo: • triad group with longest history in Hong Kong, with over 20,000 members; • Wo Hop To is a large division of the WO’s with significant illegal gambling operations in San Francisco; • mainly Cantonese speakers; • in Hong Kong the group is involved with illegal gambling, counterfeit activities, general extortion, cigarette smuggling, car theft, the protection racket in the decoration business, and drug trafficking.

During a recent interview concerning the current triad activities in Hong Kong, an officer from a Police anti-triad team expressed that the triads of today are still very active, but for the most part have become very fragmented over the years due to greed, and as a result of the Police

38 THE TRIADS: PAST AND PRESENT suppressing their activities. He went onto say that the days of oath taking ceremonies and swearing allegiances had all but disappeared, and instead those with money have become the defacto leaders. In simple terms, money attracts followers. Finally he added, that despite this fragmentation, the triads were still very much a force to be reckoned with, and that particularly during the recent economic crisis, a rise in recruitment was notable.

Recent Triad Activities of Interest It is quite clear that the triads of today are mainly economically driven, and if allowed, they will extend their hands into any enterprise with which they can make profit – be it legal or illegal. In turn, they will take all necessary steps to protect their enterprise, which at times has led to great strife and brutal killings. The film industry in Hong Kong is a good example of a profitable enterprise with which the triads have become increasingly involved. Given the high profits possible, the triads, which initially sought only small protection fees during location filming etc., became involved in both the production and distribution in the late 1980s. In order to maximize profits they have at times sought to cast Hong Kong’s biggest stars in their films, such as Andy LAU, Leslie CHEUNG, or CHOW Yun- fat. The appearance of such a start guaruntees a high return, but often the stars are unwilling to appear in such productions. This unwillingness has led in the past to criminal intimidation and assault on the film stars and/or their agents – who have been mostly unwilling to report the events to Police. In one such incident, the office of film and pop music star Andy LAU was criminally damaged and his manager threatened with a firearm, after he refused to accept a contract with one triad backed film company (Booth, 1999). In another incident, a producer from a triad backed firm, WONG Long-wai, was stabbed to death and then later killed in his hospital bed with a single gun shot to the head. This is allegedly to have been revenge by the Sun Yee On for WONG’s slapping the face of the late film and

39 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES pop star Anita MUI, when she refused to sing at a party that WONG was attending. It was only a few months later that the notorious Tiger of Wanchai (CHAN Yiu-hing), a senior Sun Yee On member, was shot and killed in his car, supposedly for the ordering the murder of WONG. As Booth (1999) points out, the criminal influence of the triads in the film industry has lessened, mostly due to the increased vigilance of the Police and unification of the industry against the criminal elements. It has by no means been eliminated however, with some of the largest film makers in Hong Kong today still having strong triad affiliations. This is a likely reason as to why the film industry in Hong Kong tends to glamorize the triad lifestyle through gangster inspired epics. Gambling is yet another sector with which the triads have brought much strife to in recent times. In Macau – in view of the then impending return of Macau to Chinese rule, a turf war erupted between the 14K and Wo On Lok in 1996, involving the jockeying for control of the casinos’ high roller VIP rooms. Control of the rooms, legitimately franchised from casino mogul Stanley HO, and their peripheral flesh trade and loansharking, are very profitable and can earn up to HK$ 250,000 a night (Booth, 1999). The ensuing fight for control resulted in more than a dozen people being killed, and scores being injured. It also resulted in a serious drop in tourism, and a period of instability for the small enclave. The self- proclaimed and alleged head of the 14K in Macau was eventually arrested in 1997, “Broken Tooth Kui”, and he is now serving a sentence of 15 years imprisonment (LIU, 2001). The involvement of the triads in illegal narcotic distribution and sales has too always been prevalent. In Hong Kong, the Police forced the closure of opium and heroin divans in the 70’s, which forced the drug market onto the streets (CHU, 2000). This lucrative market is most certainly controlled by local triad groups, who use their infrastructure and influence to facilitate distribution, and to reduce the risk of being cheated, robbed, or in fact arrested. The financial rewards in drug trafficking are hundred fold.

40 THE TRIADS: PAST AND PRESENT

Although the triad’s involvement in heroin trafficking has been established for years, it is only recently that they have become involved with the sales and distribution of psychotropic drugs, such as MDMA (Ecstacy) and Ketamine (Special K, or K-Jai). Since realizing the large demand for these drugs, and the large profits to be made, the triads have used their infrastructure and organizational skills to an alarming degree of efficiency. Sources from the Police indicate that the triads may even cooperate and sub-contract among each other so as to achieve the most efficient and profitable mode of distribution. As a result, the availability of these drugs on the streets has increased significantly, and prices have dropped. This is borne out by the seizures made by the Police as seen below. Seizure of Illicit Drugs (Weights in kilograms unless otherwise stated)

2004 * 2000 2001 2002 2003 (Jan-Sep)

Heroin 339.30 156.40 105.59 42.16 31.04

Ketamine 15.30 81.50 89.90 51.02 62.29 +110 tab +1,136 tab +534 tab +109 tab +5,093 tab

Ecstasy-type Tablets 378,621 170,243 48,840 142,912 204,599 +58.8 gm +0.032kg +0.05kg +31.17 kg +17.002 kg

Cannabis Herbal 226.70 2,103.90 665.91 233.03 130.85 Cannabis Resin 6.40 0.70 0.37 15.31 26.87

Methylamphetamine 87.60 63.10 71.56 38.64 24.56 +7,879 tab +49,208 tab +34,440 tab +1,465 tab +441 tab

Midazolam (Tab.) 43,374 53,192 31,274 39,331 40,864 +80 gm (mix) - +1.65 +31 gm +0.05 kg

Cocaine 9.40 29.70 8.30 6.63 45.65

Diazepam (Tab.) 30,286 121,126 174,528 29,856 22,059 Diazepam (kg) - +2 +0.172 +58 gm +114.44 kg

Nimetazepam (Tab.) 548 13,444 30,071 12,872 15,307

* All figures for 2004 are provisional figures only.

41 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Apart from these examples of the triads economically driven modus operandi, several recent events on the political map in Hong Kong have suggested that there is an unsavory relationship, albeit mostly unproven and very undefined, between some members of the Mainland Government and the triad bosses in Hong Kong. In particular, allegations this year stated that the triads have been involved in political intimidation, as part of an organized campaign to silence outspoken individuals in the media. In May the Director of the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, quoting a reliable source, claimed in the media that the Chinese Ministry of State and Security and local triads were behind the intimidation of outspoken radio hosts, namely Albert CHENG King-hon and Allen LEE Peng-fei. Albert CHENG was the influential host of the controversial Commercial Radio talk-show “Teacup in a Storm”, a phone-in style program which examined issues effecting Hong Kong citizens, and which often directed criticism openly at the Hong Kong Government or the Mainland authorities. CHENG left the program after stating that he felt “suffocated by political depression”. He was replaced by Allen LEE Peng-fei, who also left after little more than a week, stating that he could “no longer speak his mind freely”. LEE also resigned from his position on the National People’s Congress. Another outspoken talk-show host of the program “Close Encounters of Political Kind”, Raymond WONG Yuk-man, also left his show at this time. The exact details remain unclear, and the talk-show hosts have been reluctant to provide details of the intimidation to the authorities, but sources cultivated by the press indicate that a prominent entertainment industry businessman with extensive triad connections had made serious and credible threats against the hosts. The businessman had apparently been an envoy on behalf of the Mainland Government, which had been unhappy at the contents of the hosts’ programs. This was a blow to the freedom of speech in Hong Kong, and its fledgling attempts at democratization, but most interesting from the point of view of this paper, is the use once again of triads in a political

42 THE TRIADS: PAST AND PRESENT framework. Particularly in terms of a historical context, it raises the question of whether a relationship between the Mainland Government and the triads still exists? This is compounded even further if you view these developments in light of the shocking historical comments made in May of 1997 by the former Deputy Secretary General of Xinhua (China’s defacto embassy in Hong Kong prior to the handover), when he said that he had “befriended” Hong Kong’s triad bosses and had advised them that China would turn a blind eye to their illegal activities if they would promise to keep peace after the handover (Dannen, 1997). Still further, in 1984, just prior to reaching a handover agreement with Britain on the return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule, DENG Xiaoping hinted several times that “not all triads are bad, many of them were good, and many are patriots” (Booth, 1999). Earlier he had pointedly said that Hong Kong could rule itself as long as its administrators were Chinese patriots. Was there a connection?

Threat to Public Security Succeeding the mid-90s, and particularly since the handover of Hong Kong to Chinese rule in 1997, the amount of triad related crime in the city seems to have dropped. Figures supplied by the Hong Kong Police, as listed below, show that as a proportion of overall crime, triad related offences have dropped to 2.6% by the first half of this year.

2004 * 2000 2001 2002 2003 (Jan-Jun)

Total Reported Crime 77,245 73,008 75,877 88,377 40,605 Triad-related Crime 2,477 2,455 2,604 2,471 1,061 % of Triad-related Crime 3.2% 3.4% 3.4% 2.8% 2.6% * Figures supplied by Hong Kong Police Force

43 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

The Hong Kong Police deserve much credit for this perceived drop in triad activity, as they have and continue to treat the fight against triads as an operational priority. From my own personal experience, having worked previously in the Organized Crime and Triad Bureau for three years, I am fully aware of the efforts required by officers in this field. Particularly as of late, anti-triad units have been regularly mounting intelligence-led operations targeting key triad personalities and activities, and attacking their sources of incomes. Officers believe that the success of these operations have contributed to the low level of triad- related cases being reported to police. As gleaned from recent media reports, the Hong Kong Police mounted two large-scale undercover operations, turning overt in 2004, which resulted in the successful neutralizing of a number of triad- controlled vice syndicates that were active in the Kowloon area, restraining a total of HK$45M in crime proceeds. The estimated monthly turnover of the syndicates was more than HK$12M. The Commissioner of the Hong Kong Police, Mr. LEE Ming-kwai, announced recently that the Police had adopted a series of measures to continue the fight against triads, including the: • Strengthening the Police intelligence network and enhancing cooperation amongst units at all levels; • Enhancing professionalism in the response to and investigation of triad-related incidents; • Continuation of strategic undercover operations; • Proactively targeting key triad personalities and activities; • Optimizing the use of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance in investigating triad related cases; • Continuation in exchanging intelligence with the Mainland and Macau authorities as well as overseas law enforcement agencies.

As one can see then, the Hong Kong Police do place great emphasis on the control of triad related crime, and in suppressing the fraternities

44 THE TRIADS: PAST AND PRESENT themselves. They have had successes, but nonetheless fragmentation the triads continue to persist as the main criminal opposition in Hong Kong.

Summary Historically the triads originated out of the perceived need of the Haan people to defy and overthrow Manchurian rule. Their role at that time was political, but in due course they were called to arms and were instrumental in several rebellions. Upon the eventual departure of the Manchurians and the establishment of a republic in 1912, the triad bodies quickly turned from political activists to criminal gangs. As political events unfolded in the Mainland, many of the triads fled to Hong Kong, appearing there as early as the mid-1800s. By the 1930’s eight main groups had formed within the territory, making up 8- 9% of the population. Government and Police corruption likely provided for a lucrative and easy time for the triads up until the advent of the anti-corruption Police in the mid-1970s. Today the triad societies are very much economically driven, and for that reason, have fragmented to a great extent. The three main societies existing today are the 14K, the Sun Yee On, and the Wo Shing Wo. Their illegal activities are extensive, including trafficking in dangerous drugs, general extortion, gambling, and prostitution to name but a few. The Hong Kong Police have continually increased their efforts and resources in the combat of the triads, with the amount of triad related crimes on the decline in past years. By the first half of this year, only 2.6% of all crimes reported in Hong Kong were triad affiliated.

45 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES Conclusion Despite continued Police action against the triads, and their slow erosion through fragmentation, they still continue to be a significant criminal element, both locally and internationally. Recent events in Hong Kong illustrate that they live on as a criminal fraternity, and yet incredibly there are those in authority who still believe that the triads are patriots. The population of triads in Hong Kong significantly outnumber the Police Force of 28,000 members. Should the fragmented groups ever be brought together under a centralized command, they would pose a very real threat to the order and stablity of Hong Kong. As remote as this possibility is, the Police need to continue in their attempts to further monitor and eradicate these criminal fraternities. This may become a more daunting task should the relationship between the Mainland authorities and the triads in Hong Kong deepen.

References

Morgan, W.P. (1960). Triad Societies in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Govern- ment Press. Booth, M. (1999). The Dragon Syndicates. London: Transworld Publishers. Liu, T.M. Benjamin (2001). The Hong Kong Triad Societies: Before and After the 1997 Change-over. Hong Kong: Net e-Publishing Ltd. Chu, Y.K. (2000). The Triads as Business. London: Routledge. Hong Kong Police Annual Review (2003). Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printers. Dannen, F. (1997). Partners in Crime. (On-line). http:www.copi.com/articles/triads.html

46

Political influences of the Chinese communities.

Ratanaporn Dhammakosol, Politic Counscellor

Overview With its 1.3 billion inhabitants and stable economic growth, China is becoming a very significant country. One might have heard of China being referred to as the Dragon, the Big Brother, or the World Market, the names reflecting on the country’s position. One thing is clear, though, even when considering the purchase of one item, the numbers become enormous when multiplied by 1.3 billion, which is why the name “China” works as an eye-opener. Not so long ago, when someone talked about communist and socialist countries, two names had to be taken into consideration: the Soviet Union and Mainland China. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, China’s assessment of the world situation appeared to place the country in an advantageous position. As the representative of Communism, the most powerful ideological survivor state which theoretically was to confront Capitalism, and with the Communist Party as the instrument of change, China was supposed to derive leverage from contradictions between the US, Japan and Europe. The differences with the neighboring countries and the military threat from the North receding, China’s external security environment has further stabilized and become relatively peaceful. This has provided China with an excellent opportunity to devote its attention to economic

47 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES issues, and the economic success alone would legitimize China’s policies of holding back political reforms in the name of “building socialist democratic politics with Chinese characteristics.” In the past, as a closed country, China’s policies were based on 6 political organizations: National People’s Congress (NPC), President, State Council, Central Military Commission, Supreme People’s Court and the Parliament, with NPC as the most significant Institution to appoint persons to the other five organizations. This has made China very successful in developing programs in any region of the country. Only in China the government can designate a group of people for any developing projects, such as the building of the biggest dam in the world, the Yangze Dam Building Project. How to move 60 million people along the river without an argument? It is only possible in China with the help of NPC. Moreover, China conducts economic reforms quietly. Since the year of the country’s opening, 1979, China has become the Big Brother of ASEAN countries without doubt again. In contacts with the South-East Asian neighboring countries, China behaves in a very friendly, humble and helpful way concerning economic and diplomatic approaches, with the exception of Taiwan and Hong Kong. China’s approach towards the countries of South-East Asia has been very soft and unthreatening, not asking very much of the region. It could be said that such actions use a combination of both bilateral and multilateral approaches. Even though, as a region, South- East Asia has tried to play the US and China against each other, China continues to keep a humble and kindly approach. In this regard, the United States policy in South-East Asia is too solely focused on the single issue of the war on terrorism, battling terrorism continuing to be its major concern. At the same time, the US economic, political and security interests in the region go well beyond the issue of terrorism, and American policies and programs must be formulated with these interests firmly in mind. The US bilateral treaties with Thailand and the Philippines are examples of hands-on commitment in this region.

48 POLITICAL INFLUENCES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

While the US does not seek to dominate the region, it would be basically against the US interests if any other nation, including China, were to do so. In this situation, the tools to promote the US interests include bilateral, multilateral, and regional approaches. In general, a win-win situation would be far more successful in South-East Asia than a confrontation or zero-sum approaches. Would you not agree?

Question : • If your country is the largest in the world, like China, how do you maintain your own characteristics of humble, gentle and unthreatening to your neighborhood or others? • How many Chinese in your own communities, could be accounted for or classified?

The Chinese Diaspora in South-East Asia

Overview There are more than 20 million Chinese in South-East Asia, most of them in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, Singapore and Myanmar, Philippines and Vietnam respectively. Originally from the Southern China they had come to trade and finally settled in South-East Asia over a period of thousand years. Now, the Chinese are a minority ethnic group in each of the SE Asian countries. Asian countries, except for Singapore, tend to see themselves as the Chinese people who settled in many countries outside China, without maintaining any links with their motherland. The Chinese migrants in South-East Asia have shown their economic strength and business prowess. More than that, they have contributed significantly to their host countries’ GDP. Out of the 50 top businessmen in South-East Asian countries, more than half are Chinese,

49 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES which made local politicians willing to have associations with them for political reasons. The Chinese migrants normally do not exert much political influence in their host countries, as they are usually a minority group. However, in the recent years, we have seen a growing acceptance of the Chinese into the higher political strata in the host countries, alongside the indigenous inhabitants. Some have been appointed important political functions, as in the case of the former Prime Minister Chuan Leek-Pai in Thailand. At a lower political level, the Chinese can influence government policies through domestic politicians, by financial support, lobbying, and donating for particular political parties. After the country had opened in 1979, China began to be seen by the rest of the world as a huge market and a place with high potential. Some may say that the Americans are bigger investors, but then the Chinese are more than the investment. Just think of the international network of the Chinese people around the world, China Towns and Chinese restaurants. This type of network has already been noticed as invaluable in various South-East Asian countries seeking to start business ties with the blooming Chinese market. Moreover, as the Chinese migrants settled into their respective host countries and communities, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, or many others, they brought with them their ways of life, tradition and culture, all of which could be easily found both down town and in numerous China Towns. How can you separate yourself out of the blood, genes and the DNA of the Chinese? Look at your eyes, your complexion, the shape of your nose or your face, you are definitely Asian, but you could be called Chinese as well. As part of global business, most of the Chinese are international investors. Since the 1980s, the Investment Fund raised approx. $ 400 M each year. And it became $ 2.3 billion in 1990s, and its investment funding abroad $ 37 - 40 billion in the year 2003. The Chinese Government policies have authorized more than 7,000 investment projects abroad in 160 countries, excluding all financial investment project.

50 POLITICAL INFLUENCES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Concerning projected investment, China set up an Economic Plan for Investment Abroad between 2001–2005. The goals of the plan are to expand 500 state companies by investing abroad, with 50 companies expected to be in the toplist of 500 best companies in the world regarding the highest income in the year 2015. More than 60% of the investment is located in the Asia –Pacific region, North America, Africa and Latin America respectively, with Hong Kong being the first choice and Thailand becoming the fifth focus point. As you can see the Chinese communities have influenced South- East Asian countries both in the spheres of politics and economy, on a macro and micro scale. Thailand is seen as a place of particular interest, as the fifth country on the list of investment location, which makes it a significant target for China. If you look at the map you can see that Thailand can easily become China’s hub for industrial investment in ASEAN countries, focused on Agro-Processing Industry with Infrastructure. In the year 2002-2003, UNTAD evaluated that China invested $ 214.7 M in electricity and electronics in 234 projects in Thailand, while the Thai government informed of 235 more Chinese projects at $ 263 M in the same area of investment.

Question : • Do you believe that China has already designated Thailand as its ASEAN hub for industrial investment? • Do you think “Politics” and “Economy” could be separated?

China and Thailand 3

Diplomatic Relations China and Thailand established diplomatic relations on July 1 1975. Since then both countries have developed their bilateral relations, as can

3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China. 51 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES be seen through frequent exchanges of high-level visits. In 1979, when China opened to other countries, the former Thai Prime Minister Gen. Chartchai Chunhawan went to China on an official visit and became closely related with the Chinese government. Since then several visits were paid by important politicians on both sides. The Thai leaders who have visited China over the recent years are as follow: Queen Sirikit, who represented the King in 2000; Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn in 1998; Princess Sirindhon, who visited China more than 20 times between 1981 – 2004; Princess Chulabhorn in 2001 – 2004; etc. Apart from the main members of the Royal Family China was also visited by Chairman of the Congress, Wanmuhamad Noor Matha in 1998, Prime Minister in 1999, and Prime Minister Thaksin in 2001. The Chinese leaders visited Thailand several times, just to mention Deputy Prime Minister Li Langing in 1998, President Jiang Zemin and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC Li Peng in 1999, Deputy Prime Minister Hu Jintao in 2000 and Prime Minister Zhu Rongji in 2001. Moreover, Deputy Prime Minister Li Langing paid an official visit to Thailand in January 2003, the same year Prime Minister Thaksin paid a working visit to China. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao came to Thailand to attend a special meeting on the issue of SARS held by the leaders of China and ASEAN countries. In 1981, a mechanism for consultations was established between the foreign ministries of the two countries. Apart from having its Embassy in Thailand, China has established its general consulates in Chiangmai and Thailand has established its general consulates in Guangzhou, Kunming, Shanghai and Hong Kong. Until now, the relations between the two countries have still been sustained and have been quite positive.

Economic Trade Relations & Technological Cooperation Two-way investment has been doing fine between both countries after the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the Chinese–Thai Trade has seen rapid development. In 1985, the Trade and Economic Joint Committee was set up, the shipping agreement and supplementary protocols were signed. These were followed by the Agreement on

52 POLITICAL INFLUENCES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Investment Promotion and Protection in 1985, Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Evading Tax Payment in 1986, MOU on Cooperation in Trade, Economy and Technology in 1997 and Agreement on Exchange of Chinese and Thai Currencies in 2001. The two countries have seen a steady growth of exchanges and cooperation in science, technology, culture, health, agriculture, education, sport, judicature and military technology. Let us mention only the Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, signed in 1978; the Extradition Treaty in 1993; MOU on Culture Cooperation in 1996; MOU on Strengthening Cooperation in Drug-Prohibition in 2000; and the Treaty on Assistance in Criminal Judicature in 2003. Moreover, the Chinese and Thai Armed Forces have long maintained friendly contacts including frequent exchanges of visits between the military leaders and cadet training courses between military academies. Each embassy also employs a military consul-general to promote close cooperation. On a par with official government relations, the Thai–Chinese Friendship Association was founded in 1976, followed by Sino–Thai Friendship in 1987. There are also 7 pairs of twin cities and provinces in China and Thailand, such Beijing – Bangkok, Shanghai – Chiangmai, Yuannan – Chiangrai, Henan – Chonburi, Kunming – Chiangmai, Yantai – Phuket and Nanning – KhonKaen.

Important Bilateral Documents In February 1999, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Thai Foreign Minister signed the joint Statement on the 21st Century Cooperation Program between the People’s Republic of China and the Kingdom of Thailand in Bangkok. Among the positive results, there have been several projects established in a number of ministries in both countries, such as, for instance, Agriculture and Cooperatives Ministry, or Ministry of Public Health. At the end of 2004, Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between two countries was, admitting products from both countries to their markets.

53 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

More cooperation followed from the Trade Exhibition organized by the Ministry of Commerce. Several trade fairs were conducted in a number of regions in China promoting Thai products, while Chinese products flooded Thailand offering the cheapest prices in the world, especially regarding electronics and electrical appliances.

Political Relations of Chinese in Thailand

CPC and CPT From the elderly Chinese migrants in Yaowarat, Sumpeng and other area of Bangkok and countryside of Thailand long life stories would be passed on to their kids telling them how they had worked hard to achieve wealth and capital for investment, which created the quest to spread or export the work ethic to their new country of residence. From generation to generation, the Chinese work ethic have become “The Old Wisdom” of China, representing in a positive way the teaching of Confucianism that accounts for the desire and willingness of the Chinese people to work hard. On the other hand, the negative stories of communism in Mainland China that separated those people from their Chinese families and forced them to become migrants in a number of Asian countries are still being told to their kids, days by day and year after year. The Communist Party of China, CPC, under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung became the part of political history influencing people’s opinions in negative and positive ways. Why are Mao Tse-Tung, and CPC seen in a negative and positive way in Thailand? People who are about 50 years old may still remember “The October 14th 1973 People’s Revolution” and “The October 6th 1976 People’s Revolution” in Thailand. These events involved Thai student union leaders and resulted in many students dying in the fights, with some imprisoned for 2-3 years and some hiding in the jungle between 1973–83 to avoid arrest. At that time the Soviet Union and China were

54 POLITICAL INFLUENCES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES spreading their political influence to Thai student unions and local communities, and as a result the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) turned against the Thai government in a violent power-struggle. In 1957, when Thai student leaders were arrested by Commander Salith Dhanarat, it was discovered that some had previously studied in the Soviet Union and some had visited China as young communist organizations members. CPC and CPT were named as political influences in the jungle area, the North, North-East and the South of Thailand. CPC and CPT had set up “Political courses for the youth” to study The White and Red Book: Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse- Tung. After the People’s Revolution in October 1973 and 1976, CPC and CPT became popular with the young people who were influenced by communism and socialism, in particular with Marxism and Mao’s Political Theory and Quotations respectively.

Student leaders and Ministers Hard as it may be to believe it, more than 60 % of the ministers in the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra could not be considered as original Thai or half-Chinese. Not only that, but some of them were imprisoned or stayed in the jungle as former student leaders before. For example: Deputy PM Pinij Jarusombat, Deputy PM Jaturon Chai-saeng, Dr. Pomint Lertsuriyadej (Minister of Energy), Dr. Surapong Suepvonglee (Minister of Information Technology), Dr. Somkid Jatusri- pitak (Minister of Finance), Mr. Sutham Saeng –Pratum (Deputy Minister of Interior) and Dr. Tosaporn Sererak (Secretary to Minister of Education). As a majority political party in the government, the key members of Thai Rak Thai Party were influenced by the Chinese Politics before, such as Dr. Punsak Winyarat, Chairman of the Advisory Board of Prime Minister Thaksin, Mr.Poomdham Vejayachai, Political Secretary to Prime Minister Thaksin, and others. Moreover, Mr.Suratien Jaktaranont, Chairman of S.C.Assett Company of PM Thaksin was a student leader who was influenced by the Chinese Political thought as well. These are

55 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES only some of the high-ranking officials in the Thai government, involved in decision-making and advising on national policies. Prime Minister Thaksin Chinawatra has designated Dep. PM Jaturon Chai-Saeng to handle all economic and political events, acting on his behalf in the South-East Asia region. Furthermore, the political team of the Thai government working closely with Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia and China consists of all the people who are mentioned above in this section. No matter what they do, the Chinese influence can be seen. With the approaching date of the election, February 6, 2005, on the Chinese New Year in Thailand, the first visit of the government party members will be paid to China Town: Yaowarat, Sumpeng and also to other Chinese communities: Sathorn and Silom. Within the Chinese communities there is a strong support for the government party, through the Chinese Families Association and Chinese–Thai Relations Association, including Sino-Thai Association as well. There are several “Chinese Family Name Associations in Thailand” who have donated funds to political parties, especially Thai Rak Thai.

Macro and Micro Chinese influences

Thailand People’s Popular Policies: the 3 Ps of Thai Rak Thai as the main party of the government are mainly based on people’s communities in the countryside and in cities. Regarding the way of thinking, planning and implementing ideas, it is sometimes hard to deny that many of the people involved have been influenced by “the Chinese style,” “Asian values,” “Oriental culture,” or “the Eastern way,” whichever term we use. If we talk about the “Macro scale” we may think about the countries, regions and continents located within the area of implementation. In this context, the macro scale may cope only with

56 POLITICAL INFLUENCES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Thailand and its neighboring countries, such as Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Malaysia. If we look inside people’s minds, we begin to know their way of thinking and working. Some may call this a “Micro scale” or perhaps an “Insider’s point of view.” The Chinese influences are inside – in the Chinese communities, in the Chinese people, in their blood, including tradition and culture that influenced the indigenous inhabitants of their host countries. As the Big Brother, China has historically played a major role in South-East Asia. The Chinese are very humble, gentle and kind in approaching their friends, such as Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, or Vietnam. Since it is large as it is, China has never really had any territorial intent regarding its South-East Asian neighbors. Unfortunately, some people may feel uncomfortable when dealing with China, because of the country’s sheer size, and because of its people and their unpredictability.

Myanmar Look at Myanmar today. With the country closed as usual, the military government of Myanmar is trying to implement democratic administration. Unfortunately, until Aung San Suu Kyi continues to remain under house arrest, it is not easy to the outsider to understand how Myanmar is supposed to become fully democratic. How many Chinese are in Myanmar? The approximate data says there may be 1.5 million Chinese people in Myanmar. If we included those who are Chinese by blood the numbers may be higher. Because Myanmar borders with the South of China, the Chinese migrants may move in more easily than in the case of other countries, especially when we talk about the Chinese soldier troops in the South of the country. Recently, the Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra visited Myanmar, meeting with Myanmar’s Prime Minister Soe Win, and noted that Myanmar would host the 2006 summit of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). At the meeting with all the ASEAN

57 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES leaders in Laos for the ASEAN summit 2004 it transpired that ASEAN leaders are worried that Myanmar’s lack of political reform will weaken the group’s credibility, especially if there is no progress before the 2006 summit. Remember that the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao went to Laos and attended the ASEAN summit as a close partner. While in Laos, Prime Minister Wen told the reporters “ASEAN and Chinese relations have now entered a new era of complete cooperation.” It means there are many things to consider, because China has started to expand its influence in the region of South-East Asia, aiming at creating the world’s largest trade area by 2010, and expanding the Chinese market onto 2 billion people. With China using its huge market as a bait to lure ASEAN countries away from US and Japan and intent on building closer relations with South-East Asian countries, there is a chance that Myanmar will become more open. Why would Myanmar need help from China? China has been dealing with ASEAN countries according to a group agreement, but on an individual level the ties with Myanmar through socialism and militarism have been more effective. Actually, the Chinese influence can already be seen inside and close to Myanmar: the Chinese migrants, Chinese goods and products on the market, soldier troops at the border, etc. Regarding bilateral relations, Myanmar is the world’s teak market - when China hosts the Olympics a lot of wood will be used. Moreover, China needs to expand its sea-link from the West of the country, which would be better through the Myanmar side.

Question: • Why has the Thai government decided on February 6th, 2005 as the new election’s day? • Which country could be more effective in Myanmar - the insider or the outsider, if we compare with the US and China?

58 POLITICAL INFLUENCES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES Conclusion As for a personal conclusion, I would feel very ashamed if I could not make it clear why I consider China to be more effective than the U.S. in South-East Asia, especially regarding the insider’s influence. Asian Values can be seen as one important point that makes China powerful in contrast with the Westernized style. We still keep talking and discussing about The East vs. The West, not only when joking in a group of friends, but, in fact, as a part of the life we are living. On a positive side, the Chinese people are very humble, kind in approach, and gentle to others. There are China Towns around the world with plenty of Chinese products surrounding you. By blood, you and me could not say we are free of the Chinese influence through family relations. Unfortunately, on a negative side, China is naturally a huge country, as the Dragon. When the Dragon moves it makes noise and its large size is seen as threatening. In the near future, when the biggest dam on the Yangze River is finished, as a consequence the market for agricultural products from China will increase. Finally, I myself was imprisoned as a student leader during the October 6th 1976 People’s Revolution in Thailand. From my own experience I can tell we studied The White Book and The Red Book of Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse–Tung of The Communist Party of China. They influenced me and my Thai friends a long time ago and this has made us realize that it would be impossible to separate ourselves from the Chinese blood. Political influence (in my understanding) has its base in creation and accumulation of wealth, which also depends largely on a desire to work hard. All these can be found in the Chinese ethics, culture and tradition, which are also a part of Asian Values.

59

Grey Side of Chinese Community in Indonesia

By Frans Hendra Winarta, S.H., M.H.4

Ethnic Chinese is considered one of so many minorities in Indonesia. The majority of Indonesians are Javanese and Sundanese making up to 50% of the total population of Indonesia which is about 220 million people. On the other hand, the fact shows the important role of the Chinese–Indonesians particularly in the economy and trade sector. Although the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia is the largest community among the other countries in South East Asia5 but they are still facing ongoing problem of discrimination and unclear identity. This is different from The Thai and Philippines experience in which the ethnic Chinese in those countries are well accepted and considered equal to the majority indigenous people. Despite their long presence in the country, some have been in Indonesia for generations and in a matter of hundred of years, yet they are still considered as foreigners. Recently, vice president Jusuf Kalla made a racial and discriminative remark on his affirmative action program to lift up the standard of living of indigenous people through loans provided for small and middle class indigenous businessmen. In an interview conducted by Sinar Harapan daily

4 Member of National Law Commission and Advocate in Jakarta, Indonesia. 5 Based on United Nations statistic the numbers of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in year 1999 is about 6,278,000. See: Leo Suryadinata, Nation ethnic Chinese: Indonesia Case, (Jakarta: Book LP3S Indonesia,2002),page 11. 61 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES newspaper date 12 October 2004 he stated: “Put up with the discrimination or get burned out of your homes.”

The affirmative action he proposed by lowering the interest rates on loans to 95% (by his own admission) of indigenous Indonesians businessmen is laudable, but by making such discriminative remarks is at the same time regrettable. It tarnishes the multitudinous of the program itself. Furthermore Kalla stated that its up to the ethnic Chinese whether they accept to be discrimininated or they choose to be looted of their properties like in the May riot 1998. It’s better to be discriminated rather than facing a situation where the pushcart small businessmen were chased and dragged out from their business place, usually on the trotoir, and every time it happened they always thought how and when to retaliate and who will be picked up as the victim of revenge which usually targeting Chinese properties and shops. It is shocking to learn the comment of a leader of Indonesia just one day prior to the inauguration day 20 October 2004. Although it is not a surprise that Kalla made such remarks because during the election campaign he reiterated time and again his stance to help the small and middle class businessmen at the expense of ethnic Chinese but such open and blunt statement made by the than vice president of Indonesia one day prior to his term of office is really a disgrace. And such remarks could ignite violence. One cannot elevate the standard of living of a group of people by sacrificing the other group in a society. The state must be protecting all citizens and groups of people equally without discrimination. Beside that, the May riot was instigated by the hawkish army faction who wants to maintain status quo owing to the fact that Soeharto is no longer popular in the country. This was reported by an independent fact finding (investigative) team appointed by the National Human Rights Commission in collaboration with a number of NGO’s. The team comprise of credible and trustworthy public figures, activists, lawyers, human rightists, ex bureaucrats and a number of the National Human Rights Commission members. The report of the team indicates that 1,200 urban poor became the victim of rioting and 80 women mostly ethnic Chinese were gang-raped at the time. For three days Jakarta were looted, shops and vehicles destroyed and burned down without any efforts to cope with by the security forces. The ordeal occurred by both

62 GREY SIDE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN INDONESIA commission and omission. Just a few hours before Soeharto landed in Jakarta from a Non Bloc meeting in Egypt, Jakarta was in control. Prior to the riot 15-17 May 2004, students of the University Of Trisakti demonstrated on the street and in their campus to demand Soeharto to step down. Three students of Trisakti University were shot dead and up to now the instigators and person behind the riot has not been found and brought to justice. Only a few law rank police officers were tried and sentenced to several years imprisonment. The notion that the May riot is a spontaneous act of the poor who envied the ethnic Chinese is again bogus and baseless. Kalla himself has prospered because his late father enjoyed the privilege of the so called PP 10 Year 1959 (Government Regulation No. 10 Year 1959 whereas the ethnic Chinese at that time was prevented from doing business in the ruler areas under the pretext that on the absence of the ethnic Chinese traders the indigenous people will survive in business. Kalla is one of a view indigenous Indonesians who took the advantage to explore his family business in South Sulawesi and became one of the richest indigenous Indonesians with a total wealth of no less than Rp. 122 billion.6 This privilege were changed during Soeharto era whereby Soeharto preferred his Indonesian-Chinese old friends and cronies to develop their business for the benefit of Soeharto and his family.

If we look back into the history of Indonesia discrimination against the ethnic Chinese was started during the Dutch colonial era, in which the colonial government applied a divide and rule principle (devide et impera) by segregating the population of Netherlands Indies into three categories (i) Europeans; (ii) Foreign Easterners such as ethnic Chinese, Indians and Arab and (iii) Indigenous people as provisioned in article 163 IS (Indische Staatsregeling Wet van 2 September 1854, Ned.S. 1854-2, S.1855-2 jo.1) or state regulation. The three groups were living segregately in a different atmosphere and standard of living, the indigenous people were the one lacking behind, economically as well as socially so to speak. By segregating into three groups in the community the Dutch ruler was able to maintain their presence for more than three

6 Article in Kompas daily newspaper, “From Bone to the State Palace”, 20 October 2004, p.43. 63 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES hundred years in Indonesia. The remnants of segregation are deep rooted in the Indonesian society up to now reflected in the law of civil registration in which the ethnic Chinese is considered foreign easterners. The government of Soekarno made a historical mistake, by signing a treaty with PRC (People’s Republic of China) on the dual citizenship of Indonesian-Chinese. The Indonesian-Chinese are automatically Indonesian citizen when Soekarno-Hatta declared the independence of Indonesia on 17 August 1945, but base on the ius sanguinus principle adopted by PRC overseas Chinese are citizens of PRC. This does not apply to Thai-Chinese, Malaysian-Chinese or Filipino-Chinese. By constitution the Indonesian-Chinese are automatically become citizens of the Republic of Indonesia. There is no reason why Indonesia signed a bilateral treaty with PRC to overcome the dual citizenship of Indonesian- Chinese. But this is a mistake which caused many problems in the future likewise the necessity for Indonesian-Chinese to obtain SBKRI (certificate of citizenship) for naturalization of foreign subject to become Indonesian citizen. Every single year the Indonesian-Chinese children and gangsters have to submit the SBKRI to their school and universities to proof they were Indonesian citizens. Also when they want to obtain IDs, driving license, passport, loan from the bank, land certificate and so forth they have to proof that they are Indonesian citizens. To obtain SBKRI one must spent around Rp. 5.000.000,- or around US $ 500.-. Although recently repealed by the government of Megawati Soekarnoputri but it is still required by schools, universities, banks, the immigration office, land office etc. It becomes a source of black mail for public servants and difficult to stop.

The diplomatic relation between PRC and Indonesia was at the lowest level after the abortive communist coup d’etat in 1965. PRC was accused behind the coup d’etat under the pretext that a batch of arms was stranded in Hongkong ready for dispatch to Indonesia connected with the abortive coup d’etat. The government of Soeharto then cut the diplomatic relation with PRC. But in 1991 the diplomatic relation was resumed following the end of the cold war. The peak of the warm relation between PRC-Indonesia was during the term of office of president Megawati Soekarnoputri who extended the close relation of PRC-Indonesia in the 1960s under President Soekarno spearheading the

64 GREY SIDE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN INDONESIA alliance of non-bloc countries. Indonesia has currently a surplus trade around US $ 100.00 million with PRC as a result of the reestablishment of diplomatic relation.7

When Soekarno stepped down from office after the abortive Communist coup d’etat in 1965 replaced by the New Order regime under the leadership of Soeharto the improvement initiated by the administration of Soekarno against the ethnic Chinese was crushed by the New Order regime. Albeit legally recognized as Indonesian citizens after the independence of Indonesia 17 August 1945, whereas all individuals ex the Netherlands-Indies subject were considered citizens of the Republic of Indonesia, the New Order regime has discriminated the ethnic Chinese through laws, government regulations, presidential decrees, ministerial regulations, and cabinet circulars. There are about 64 regulations and laws, which are considered discriminative against Chinese culture, names, language, worshiping, characters, schools, publishing, media and so forth.8 This policy is carried out under the assumption that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and in Southeast Asia are prone to be communist or sympathize the communist. This is of course a false statement as an excuse to corner the minority Chinese resulted into huge political pressures to the Indonesian-Chinese Community and instigates the introduction of discriminative laws and regulations after the abortive coup d’etat in 1965. There are around 64

7 The data is compiled from a report published by the Indonesian trade attaché in Beijing, China, in November 2004. It is reported that export from Indonesia in January-September 2004 reached US $ 5,34 billion (an increase of 26.78 %) compared to 2003, whilst import to Indonesia reached US $ 4,4 billion (an increase of 37.77 %). As such Indonesia has a surplus of US $ 937.69 million against PRC with a total trade volume between the two countries of US $ 9.74 billion, Sinar Harapan daily newspaper, “Balance of Trade of Indonesia reached a surplus of US $ 937.69 Against PRC”.19 November 2004, p.3. 8 In its policy implementation, the New Order regime was not always consistent. It is true that the educational system and the regulation to change Chinese names is for the purpose of integration however discrimination was applied. Even the identity card of the ethnic Chinese has special code. The economic group classification was based on ethnicity. See: Leo Suryadinata, ibid, page 62.

65 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES laws and regulations discriminating the ethnic Chinese although some have been repealed by president Habibie, president Abdurrahman Wahid and president Megawati Soekarnoputri. Most of them changed their Chinese names and did not acknowledge as Chinese origin for many reasons. President Megawati Soekarnoputri indicated that there are 18 million Indonesian-Chinese in Indonesia during the campaign in the last election but did not indicate where she got the figure from. The UN research in 1999 indicated that there are 6,278,000 ethnic Chinese in Indonesia is probably not accurate because of the political pressures during the New Order era they do not admit of being ethnic Chinese siphoning from the pressures, especially those who converted to Islam or having mixed marriage with indigenous people (spouses). Laws and regulations, which are discriminating the ethnic Chinese, are among others: 1 - Government Regulation No. 10/Year 1959 on foreign small businessmen and retailers in region of level I and level III and prefectures, which prevent the ethnic Chinese to do business in the regions. 2 - Cabinet Presidium Decree No. 127/U/Kep/12/1966 on regulation to change name of Indonesian citizens with Chinese names. 3 - Decree of The People’s Consultative Assembly No. XXVII/MPRS /1966 on religion, education and culture, which prohibits Chinese Tao Worshiping in public, Chinese education and characters. 4 - Cabinet Presidium Instruction No. 49/U/8/1967 on the utilization of Chinese language in Mass Media. 5 - Regulation from the Minister of Justice No. JB 3/4/12 year 1978 on certificate of citizenship (SBKRI), applied to ethnic Chinese.

The above laws and regulations can be considered as a state sponsored discrimination carried out against its own citizens. The implication of such policy is tremendous as if anything with regard to Chinese culture, religion, worshipping, and customs is bad and should be prohibited. This is why the integration of the ethnic Chinese is considerably slow compared with other Southeast Asian countries like Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. Almost every decade since Indonesia declared its independence in 1945 the ethnic Chinese become the target of rioting, looting, anger and hatred of the other ethnic groups.

66 GREY SIDE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN INDONESIA

The Indonesian-Chinese were shunned from politics unlike during Soekarno administration they were allowed to join political parties and some were active as members of parliament and some become ministers in the cabinet.9 The creation of a couple hundreds of Indonesian–Chinese conglomerates by Soeharto resulted into anti Chinese sentiment among indigenous Indonesians. They were considered as the cause of poverty. 10 The segregation policy by the New Order regime is against the conception of a modern nation introduced and adopted by the founding fathers of the Republic of Indonesia. 11

It is true that during the New Order regime the Chinese- Indonesians enjoyed the privilege to become an economic power. This is supported by the policy of Soeharto to encourage for economic growth and dragged the Indonesian-Chinese only to trade and economy.12 Besides the Indonesian-Chinese, similar to their equal in Southeast Asia, are gifted businessmen and therefore play an important role in the

9 During the liberal democracy until 1965, Indonesia had 7 (seven) ministers from Chinese origin in the cabinets. During revolution, Mr. Tan Po Goan and Siauw Giok Tjhan as State Minister in children affairs. In the cabinet of Ali Arifin, Dr. Ong Eng Die as Finance Minister and Dr. Lie Kiat Teng alias Mohamad Ali as Health Minister. In the last cabinet under Soekarno, there were 3(three) ministers of ethnic Chinese which is Mr. Oei Tjoe Tat. Tan Kiem Liong alias Mohamad Hasan as Minister of Income, finance and supervision also Ir. David Cheng as Minister of Construction. See: Dana K. Anwari S.b., Endangered Chinese Lobby in Indonesia? The emerging of the Indigenous, Including ethnics Chinese (PT. Orayta),page 86. 10 According to Charles A. Coppel in his book entitled “Indonesian Chinese in crisis” describes that the Indonesian ethnic Tionghoa (Chinese) are always in dilemma as to what to do in politics. If they are deeply involved in a political party that is opposed to the government, then they are labeled as subversives. However if they support the government in power, society will regard them as opportunists seeking only profit support the government therefrom. See : Bambang Setiawan, “Cloud over Chinese New Year”, Kompas 12 February 2002. 11 As quoted from Ernest Renan: “Nation state is a group of people who want to live together because they experienced the same situations and conditions, currently and in the future have the same faith, therefore they decided to live in unity in the future. 12 Leo Suryadinata, op cit., page 59. 67 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES business sector, they also considered education as paramount to create high quality human resources. Not surprisingly, they were well educated compared to other groups in the community.13 Consequently although the ethnic Chinese are advance in business and economy they are not involved in the government or military.

On the pretext of economic growth and prosperity, the New Order regime opened the door for the private sector, especially the Chinese- Indonesian businessmen, to develop their enterprises. This has resulted into corruption, collusion and nepotism (namely KKN) in the bureaucracy from the highest-level officers to the lowest rank and file. For thirty two years of term of office Soeharto created hundreds of conglomerates most of them ethnic Chinese. This becomes a myth that 90% of the Indonesian economy is dominated by the Chinese- Indonesians as a result of unscrupulous business practices or KKN.14 Of course this is bogus as state enterprises and multinational companies are controlling oil, gas, consumer products, plantation, finance, banking, mining, communication, and public transportation businesses.

During this era Cukongism 15 were introduced among the bureau- crats and businessmen. The Chinese-Indonesians are the active partners

13 Adam Schwarz, A nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search For Stability, (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1999), page 106. 14 It is true that the conglomerates are rich and wealthy and they are around two- three hundred people. But the population of the Indonesian-Chinese in Indone- sia is between 6-8 million. Because of that the indigenous Indonesian perceived that all Indonesian-Chinese are rich because most of the conglomerates are Chinese. Beside that there is a myth established that the Indonesian-Chinese dominate the Indonesian economy. Dr B.J. Habibie on March 1998 when he was vice president was interviewed by Nihon Keizai Shimbun stated that 3% of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia dominate 90% of the Indonesian economy. But in fact state enterprises and multinationals are predominantly control the economy of Indonesia. 15 Cukong (old spelling tjukong) is a Chinese Hokkien dialect for “master”. However, in Indonesia, the term is used to refer to a Chinese businessman who collaborates with a member of the Indonesian power elite, usually a military man. Cukong provides skills in running the business and sometimes capital 68 GREY SIDE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN INDONESIA in business. They were favored by the power holders and also by the foreign partners due to their experience and superiority in business.16 It is no secret that Soeharto beside recruiting technocrats also embraced his ethnic Chinese friends, and business partners such as Lim Sioe Liong alias Sudono Salim, The Kim Seng alias Mohamad “Bob” Hasan, Yantje Liem and others to obtain wealth for his personal gain by providing all kinds of facilities and monopoly in various sector of business such as cloves, flour, cement, logging and so forth. Ironically Soeharto, on the pretext of a racist attitude relocate gambling centers, bars, nightclubs and massage parlors in China town or areas where most Indonesian- Chinese businessmen operate. Outside those areas permits of such business were closed.

Those conglomerates, dubbed as cronies of Soeharto, were competing one to another to expand their businesses. They were guilty of deceiving the people through mark-up of their assets, shares, and property of their companies in order to obtain loans from domestic and international banks or financial institutions. The land appropriated for office buildings, industrial estates, shopping malls, luxurious real estates and golf courses were carried out through military might against the poor people and peasants. Again this is done through collusion with the

while the Indonesian power elite and various facilities to the cukong. The rise of the cukong system is complex . It is a product of historical and structural development in Indonesia as well as a conscious of the Indonesian political elite in managing Indonesia society. During the colonial era, there was an absence of a strong indigenous middle class and the ethnic Chinese, especially those in Java, served as the middlemen between the Dutch and the indigenous population. The role of the Chinese as members of the entrepreneurial class continued even after independence. As a middle class ethnic Chinese succeeded in a accumulating wealth and experience in the modern economic sector. See: Leo Suryadinata. The Culture of the Chinese Minority in Indonesia, (Singapore: Times Books International, 1997), page 33. 16 The collaboration between Chinese businessmen and indigenous power holders has created resentment among some pribumi Indonesians, particularly among the less successful businessmen. This group supported by Islamic groups and the opponents of the Suharto administration, staged a well-known anti cukong campaign in 1971. See: Leo Suryadinata, ibid., page 34. 69 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES bureaucracy to smoothen their business. Such practice creates an image that corruption and bribery is the culture of ethnic Chinese.

The collaboration of the conglomerates and politicians to gain political support and favorable economic policy made the situation worst. Some politicians paved the way for the conglomerates to expand their businesses and strengthen their position, whilst the profit gained was utilized to stretch their political influence. Such relation is popularly identified as client-patronage relation (politico-business).17 This kind of transaction becomes obvious during election days by donating funds to certain political parties hoping they will be able to obtain concessions and privileges in business.

The creation of conglomerates as cronies by Soeharto and gambling places run by the Indonesian-Chinese gave a bad impression as if all ethnic Chinese are greedy, immoral and gain wealth from criminal acts and damaging for Indonesia.18

A few years prior to the monetary crisis many suggested dissatis- faction against the economic policy introduced by Soeharto which is designed for the benefit of the family of Soeharto and his cronies. This is used by provocateurs to instigate hatred against ethnic Chinese. The tip of the iceberg was the broke-out of the May riot 13-15 May 1998 which caused huge damage and suffering to the Indonesian people 19, particu-

17 Yoshihara Kunio elaborated in his book “The Rise Of Ersatz Capitalism In South-East Asia”. This phenomenon has occurred in many countries in South- east Asia, especially in Indonesia. The cronies enjoyed the protection and facilities from the government and in return, they pay tribute to them. This relationship is described as a form of politico-business collaboration in the national capitalis system. See: Luky Djani, cs., Module Observation of campaign Fund, (Jakarta:Indonesia Corruption Watch and Transparency International Indonesia), pages 8-10. 18 Benny G. Setiono, Chinese in the Political Stream, (Jakarta: Ekasa, 2002), pages 992-994. 19 The total expected loss was at least 2.5 trillion Rupiah or equivalent to US$238 million. Thirteen public markets, 2,479 shop-houses, 40 shopping malls, 1,604 shops, 45 service stations, 387 office buildings, 9 gas stations, 70 GREY SIDE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN INDONESIA larly against ethnic Chinese. This is a shock to most Indonesian-Chinese that they always become the target of any violence due to the frustration among the indigenous people, which cautioned them that they have been sidelined, their rights as citizens being reduced, and a constant scapegoat as well as target of extortion by the power holders of the New Order regime. The riot proves the truce that the ethnic Chinese has been prepared to be the scapegoat of violence and bumper of the New Order regime.20

The 21st May marked the end of the New Order Era when Soeharto stepped down from office due to heavy pressures by the students and his own cabinet ministers. Indonesia then entered a democratic reformation era. In this era the above system must be eliminated. The ethnic Chinese gained a better place and acknowledgement in the Republic of Indonesia. We can see among others Kwik Kian Gie was appointed as Coordinating Minister of Economy and Industry during the term of office of President Abdurrahman Wahid and later on as Chairman of The National Development Board during President Megawati Soekarnoputri.

On top of that the right to assemble and participate in politics are widely open for the ethnic Chinese marked by the founding of political parties and NGOs, such as Chinese Reformation Party (Parti), Integrated Indonesia Party and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia Party (PBI), National Solidarity (SNB), Indonesian Anti Discrimination Movement (GANDI), Indonesian-Chinese Social and Cultural Institute (PSSTI) and Indonesian-Chinese Association (INTI). The new government has also repealed discriminative policies against ethnic Chinese, among others through Presidential Decree No. 56 Year 1996 on certificate of citizenship (SBKRI), Presidential Instruction No. 26 Year 1998 on the elimination of the term indigenous and non indigenous people, Presidential Instruction

8 busses and other public transportation, 1,119 cars, 821 motorcycles, and 1,026 houses were destroyed, looted, and burned during the riot. See: Damar Harsanto, “May Riots Still Burns into Victim’s Minds” in the Jakarta Post, May 14, 2002. 20 Benny G. Setiono, op.cit., page 1062-1063. 71 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

No. 4 Year 1999 on the education and usage of the Chinese language, Presidential Decree No. 6 Year 2000 on the revocation of Presidential Instruction No. 14 Year 1967 on Chinese religion, believe and customs and Presidential Decree No. 19 Year 2002 on the decision to determine Lunar New Year as a national holiday. However the reform government did not differ much from the New Order government. Corruption was rampant. Human Rights are not respected. A number of discriminative regulations were maintained. Articles 26 of the 1945 Constitution were amended but maintain the term “indigenous Indonesian”.21

Looking into those facts it is expected that the new government under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono respects democracy and human rights. All forms of discrimination should be eliminated whether based on religion, race, ethnicity, color, socio-economy, culture, gender or otherwise. Every group in the community has the right to prosper and live decently according to their merits. A system of meritocracy should be introduced to prevent bad past experience. Segregation policy during the New Order era has caused social envy, upheavals, and violence.

The new policy must be balanced by providing the ethnic Chinese the opportunity to join the military, bureaucracy, police force, the judiciary, parliament, politics, and so forth. The legal system must be unified and do not segregate the society on basis of racial or ethnic background. In short pluralism must be acknowledged as a fact of life rather than an object of politics to maintain power.

On the other hand, the ethnic Chinese must be willing to enter other professions and not confined in the business and trade sector only. They must enter the bureaucracy, military, police force, the judiciary, become prosecutors, lawyers, politicians, member of parliament and so forth. This is to neutralize the paradigm that they are economic animals, greedy, selfish, self-oriented, and unpatriotic.

21 Article 26 Paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution states that: “the Indonesian citizens are the native Indonesian people and people from other nations legislated by laws as Indonesian citizen”. 72 GREY SIDE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN INDONESIA

It is high time for the new government under president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to declare that the Indonesian-Chinese is an integral part of the nation and practice unity in diversity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) in a state based on law (rechtsstaat). As such all forms of discrimination should be shunned. The state must guarantee equality before the law and equal opportunity for all citizens without exception.

“I would like to clarify that the creation of 200 – 300 conglo- merates mostly ethnic Chinese – Indonesians by President Soeharto during the rule of the New Order from 1966 up to 1998 have resulted into social envy and disparity. They are very close to the power holder and enjoy privileges during Soeharto terms of office. Their main business are mostly in the areas of cooking oil, instant noodle, wheat, car manufacturing, banking, financing, industry, plantation, chemical, soft drinks, consumer products and so forth. One of the new emerging business tycoon is Tommy Winata with his Artha Graha Group of companies running entertainment businesses such as karaoke, massage parlour, pubs, restaurants, banking, shopping mall, real estate and so forth. He is very close to the military and run the military business with a turn over of 5 billion US dollar per annum. Although the new government of Indonesia under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono planned to take over the military business but this has not materialize due to the resistance from the army generals (58 active generals). It was rumored that Tommy has relation with Triad but there is no evidence on such pretext. The Chinese – Indonesians are accused as perverters of the law due to their involvement in illegal gambling, karaoke, massage parlour, prostitution etc in the dense Chinese areas (China Town). This is because the permits for such business are issued in those areas by the regional governments in many provinces particularly in urban areas. Again this is considered by most indigenous Indonesians, who are Moslems, as the symbol of the grey side of the Chinese Community.

73 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

In the past during the colonial time the Chinese were known as loan sharks and collaborators of the Dutch colonial. After independence things are not better because Soeharto abuse them as the financial supporters (donators) of the autho- ritarian regime. And because of their role in the economy they were blamed as the source of economic and social disparity. Unlike the small group of Chinese conglomerates the majority ethnic Chinese – Indonesians have contributed a great deal to the development of the country. They are professional medical doctors, lawyers, accountants, journalists, managers, directors, businessman and bankers. In fact the Indonesian language as we know today was established by the Chinese – Indonesians journalists during colonial time. They speak the language at home unlike the indigenous people who speak their own dialect at home. But this was not acknowledge in the history of Indonesia. The role of the Chinese – Indonesians as tax collectors is another grey side of the Chinese Community. But most of all the discrimination in regulations and laws is the most critical point of discrimination by the state against its own citizens. This is another gross violation of human rights committed by the state against individuals and should be corrected by the new government of Indonesia. “Reformasi” is the key word to improve the situation.”

The story about gambling in Jakarta was organized by governor Ali Sadikin during the 70s and 80s and is no longer exist. The money was used for building infra structure such as roads, bus stations, schools, traditional market, youth center, construction, sanitary, health, hospital, medication and so forth. It was legally organized at that time but now is illegal by operated undercover in yachts or vessels from Jakarta to Singapore v.v.

74

Triad Involvement in the Sex Service Industry in Hong Kong and Its Impacts on Southeast Asia

Dr CHU Yiu Kong Assistant Professor Department of Sociology The University of Hong Kong

1. Hong Kong Triads Triad societies appeared in Hong Kong even before the Chinese ceded it to be a British colony in 1842. Although the triads in Hong Kong had some indirect links with those in China, the take-off of Hong Kong triads was a direct response to the conflicts between different migratory dialect groups for job opportunities in the labour market by the turn of the 20th century. According to the record of the Hong Kong police, there were more than 300 triad societies in the region. Most of them were established between 1914 and 1939. Nowadays, there are around 50 triad societies still existing in Hong Kong, about 15 of which regularly come to police attention. The most active triad societies are Sun Yee On, 14K- Hau, 14K-Tak, 14-Ngai, Wo Shing Wo, Wo Hop To, Wo On Lok (Shui Fong) and Luen Ying Sh’e. Sun Yee On was believed to be the most powerful triad society in Hong Kong in the 1990s. In these few years the Hong Kong Police have paid more attention to the Wo Shing Wo triad society. Hong Kong triads do not possess a central organisation with a Godfather at the top directing their local and overseas branches to

75 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES organise a variety of criminal activities. They are loose cartels consisting of a number of independent societies which adopt a similar organisa- tional structure and ritual to bind their members together. Although various societies are symbolically under the same roof of the triad family, they are decentralised to a certain extent in that no one single central body unites different societies and gives universal commands. The traditional rank system has largely reduced to mainly three ranks, i.e. 426 Red Pole, 49 ordinary member, and Blue Lantern. The simplified initiation ceremony and the method of ‘handing the blue lantern’ based on oral agreement are widely practised to recruit new members. A well-organised triad society may have a central committee at the top to co-ordinate many autonomous gangs under its name. The Chair- man, Treasurer, and other committee members are elected by various area bosses who physically control a particular territory with their own followers. A fragmented triad society such as the 14K has no central committee, but consists of various independent gangs headed by different area bosses, and they only co-operate on an ad hoc basis. Therefore, triads are neither a highly centralised nor a totally disorga- nised organisation. They are not single big pyramid with a Godfather at the top controlling the whole organisation, but have many small hierarchical pyramids led by area bosses at the district level. There is no doubt that triads are a menace in Hong Kong, thriving on public fear through their mystery and intimidation. In reality, not all organised crime is the work of triads. According to the Hong Kong Police, the total number of reported crime was 88,377 in 2003, but only 2,471 (2.8%) triad-related crime cases were recorded (see Appendix 1). Although triads are known to have long been involved in illegal businesses, the illegal market is not monopolised by triads with a godfather-like figure at the top to control his members for the production of illegal goods and services. For instance, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the triads are dominant in the businesses of smuggling, counterfeiting, swindles, organised illegal immigration, and money laundering. Illegal operations can be headed or run by persons without a triad background.

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Triad participation in illegal businesses varies from one to another, or even within the same business. Even if triad members are involved in a specific illegal operation, it is not a society' business. Instead, it is strictly a private investment. Profits will remain in the hands of the individual members and do not channel up to the triad hierarchy. Moreover, triad members are free to seek business partners from their own circle, other societies, or the people who are not triads. Nowadays, Hong Kong triads have become adept to adjust themselves in a changing environment. In this paper the sex service industry is used as an example to show the roles of the triads in the illegal market.

2. The Sex Service Industry in Hong Kong Prostitution is normally undertaken by a female who earns money by having sex with anyone who will pay for it. Although no specific laws have made prostitution illegal in Hong Kong, virtually every activity connected with it is regarded as an offence. These offences include soliciting in a public place for immoral purposes, trafficking in women, harbouring or exercising control over a woman for the purposes of prostitution, causing prostitution, and keeping a vice establishment or permitting or suffering premises or vessels that one owns or rents to be used for prostitution. Nevertheless, commercial sex is prevalent in Hong Kong and it can cater for almost every need. Female sex workers in Hong Kong can be grouped into six major categories including callgirls, massage girls, PR girls, one-woman brothel sex workers, street sex workers and cyber café girls. They work in different vice establishments. In Hong Kong there are a large number of ‘villas’. They are small hotels that rent rooms by the hour. No sex workers stay in the premises. When a customer needs a girl, the keeper will call an agent. The agent will escort a girl to the hotel to provide sex service. The service normally lasts for 45 minutes and it will cost the customer from HK$300 to 400. There are unlicensed massage parlours. In the cubicle the massage girl can provide sex services from masturbation to sexual intercourse. The cost may range from HK$500 to 1,000. Some night clubs, dance halls and karaoke lounges allow the customer to ‘buy out’ their PR girls for the

77 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES evening in a hotel. The cost is relatively high from HK$1,000 to 1,500 (Vagg 1991 and Police Interview, 8 October 2004). Although public brothels do not exist in Hong Kong, there are a number of so-called ‘one-woman brothels’. They are actually small residential flats, each with a single female both living and working in it. According to law, at least two females must be working as sex workers in an apartment before it can be classified as a vice establishment. Thus, lone sex workers who sell their bodies for sex in the one-woman brothel are technically committing no offence. The one-woman brothel sex workers solicit their business by advertising in newspapers and magazines. Also, they will show some symbols at the nearby like installing a coloured light bulb at the top of the doors and mark a symbol at the door bells to act as a hint to their potential customers. The charge is varied by the appearance of the sex worker and where the brothel is located. It may range from HK$150 to 800 (Vagg 1991; Ma 1998 and Police Interview, 8 October 2004). Street sex workers will solicit their customers on the street. After agreeing on the price, they will take their customers in a nearby guest house to provide sex services. Normally street sex workers are relatively old, above 35 years old, and are less attractive than the sex workers in other vice establishments. The cost is between HK$100 and 300. (Ma 1998 and Police Interview, 8 October 2004). In the 1990s the cyber café started to become popular in Hong Kong. In the last five years, some indecent cyber cafes were opened. They mainly provided young local girls as Internet Instructors. The customer can enjoy hand gratification by touching the young girl’ body. In some cases the customer can ‘buy out’ the girls for sex services in a nearby hotel.

3. Triads and the Supply of Sex Workers As a number of vice establishments exist in Hong Kong, there is a constant demand for sex workers. It would be a lucrative business if somebody could systematically recruit and arrange for girls to work in vice establishments. Triads, with the real capacity and reputation for violence, have been dominant in the business of supplying sex workers.

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Nevertheless, their roles in the business may vary in different periods of the Hong Kong prostitution history. In the 1960s and 1970s the most common method used by triads was to cajole selected girls for prostitution. The youths who specialised in this job were locally known as Koo Yae Chai (professional boyfriends). According to Chang (1989), all professional boyfriends are triad members. The reason is that if they had no back-up from their triad brothers, their cajoling projects might not be successful. Even if they can cajole a girl, it was hard for them to sell her to a vice establishment without triad arrangement. In addition, their girls would be easily hijacked by other gangs if they were not triad members. When a victim was trapped, she would be ‘sealed’ - having sex with her ‘boyfriend’. At an appropriate time the victim would be confronted with a deliberately devised situation whereby her ‘boyfriend’ found himself in need of help to pay off heavy and pressing debts, usually said to be connected with triad- backed gambling or triad loan-sharking operations. The young victim would then be cajoled into prostitution to earn money to enable her boyfriend to pay off his debts. When she agreed, she was traded to a call girl centre. The ‘boyfriend’ quickly disappeared with his profit, leading the victim to repay the purchase price to the call girl centre by way of their income from prostitution. Since the 1980s, it has become common for triads to recruit girls as their members and then wait for the opportunity to convince them to become sex workers. According to a study of young sex workers in Hong Kong, the majority of the girls in the sample (50 cases) admitted that before entering into prostitution they had followed a ‘Big Brother’ or formally joined the triad society. Some of the girls joined the triad when they were only nine to twelve years of age. They believed that their Big Brothers would offer them protection and their triad status would earn them respect from their peers. Since many Hong Kong girls now see prostitution as a rational alternative to their educational abilities and future prospects in manual, clerical and retail jobs, young girls are now relatively easily recruited to be sex workers by triads (Tang and Lam 1986).

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In the 1990s, the prostitution scene has changed. The flow of overseas sex workers from the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan and recently China, has provided vice establishment operators with more channels from which to obtain girls. Although triads still play a significant role in the recruitment of sex workers, they are losing their competitive edge in running the business because violence is now relatively seldom used to recruit girls into prostitution. More non-triad people are able to be involved in the business. Since Mainland Chinese sex workers (locally known as Northern Girls) are both cheaper and better in quality, they have become the mainstream sex workers in Hong Kong (see Appendix 2). The usual practice now is that Mainland Chinese gangsters (locally known as Chicken Head) look for girls in China and then arrange them to come to Hong Kong legally or illegally. Upon arrival, Hong Kong syndicates will take over. After one or two day orientation, syndicate members will arrange these girls to work in vice establishments.

4. Triads, Ownership and Protection Services As the persons providing the finances often use two or three middlemen to hide their role, it is difficult to prove the ownership of a vice establishment. The actual managers may not even know who the owners are. Even if these establishments are constantly raided by the police, only the front men appear in court with one or two of the sex workers. In Hong Kong, vice establishments, such as villas, licensed massage parlours, low-class nightclubs and dance halls, indecent cyber café, and karaoke lounges with the company of young girls, are basically legal public entertainment services and they are registered as companies, although their premises may provide facilities for sex workers and their customers to meet each other. Thus, the background owners of a vice establishment can be any business entrepreneur who has the connection with triads to obtain girls and back-up staff for the business. In some cases owners of vice establishments are retired law enforcers or people whose family members are law enforcers. Even if the vice establishments are owned by triad members, it is strictly a private business and the profits will not channel up to their societies. In order to

80 TRIAD INVOLVEMENT IN HONG KONG’S SEX INDUSTRY minimise risks, it is common for triad members from different societies to group together to invest in vice establishments. Although triads are not likely to monopolise the prostitution market, it is quite clear that they are dominant in providing protection services to vice establishments. Most vice establishments are registered as legitimate companies and the operators, at least in theory, commit no offences and can resort to law if they are victimised by criminals. In reality, nevertheless, vice establishments are actively supporting the prostitution business in their premises. In order to conceal their illegal practices, operators may hesitate to report to the police when they have troubles. In addition, their customers can come from any walk of life (including the underworld) and their businesses usually involve a large cash flow. These factors further make their businesses vulnerable to dishonest customers, extortionists and robbers. Security is one of the main problems in running vice establishments. In Hong Kong it is quite common for vice establishment owners to buy protection from triads. When a new vice establishment is about to open, the operator contacts the boss of the most influential triad group in the area for protection. The triad boss will answer calls if the premises are visited by dishonest customers or harassed by other gangs. In this case, the operator uses the ‘reputation’ of the triad boss to deter troublemakers and other extortionists. If operators themselves are triad members or connected with a particular triad group, they often employ their members to be bouncers. However, if the premises are located in an area with no connection to his triad, it is common for the owner to pay protection fees to local triads.

5. Triads, Callgirl Services and the Horseman System In the 1970s callgirl centres were popular in Hong Kong to provide sex services. A callgirl centre could be located in any residential flat in the urban area. The manager kept a group of sex workers in the apart- ment. When villa keepers called for girls, he arranges for his followers to escort the girl to the villa to serve the customer. These centres were normally run by triad officials. Their back-up staff and escort agents

81 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES were also members of the same triad group. The main reason for the triad monopoly of callgirl centres at that time may be that most of their girls were forced to work as sex workers. Consequently, it was tempting for them to run away or report it to the police. Without a strong triad back-up, it was difficult for the manager to control these girls. Since the 1980s, the organisational structure of callgirl centres has become flexible. The boss now tends to franchise the operation to their horsemen (escort agents). Every horseman is given a girl. The duty of the horseman is to look for customers for his girl, escort her to the villa to serve the customer and protect her if she gets trouble from the police, customers or criminals. His salary is based on commission. In 1992, it was reported that a horseman was given an average of HK$50 per customer. One horseman said that every day he started to work at 2:00 p.m. He had a list of 50 to 60 villas. He reported to keepers that his sex worker was available. In order to get more business for his sex worker, he would go to introduce himself and leave his business card when a new villa opened. Although forced prostitution is now not too common, triads are still influential in the field. Compared with other vice establishments which simply provide meeting points or facilities to their customers and sex workers, callgirl service operators supply sex workers directly. The operator and horseman can easily be charged with living off sex workers or other offences. In addition, centre managers usually give loans to the girls or their overseas agents and deduct the debt against their future income. If the operator and horseman are not stronger than their sex workers, it is hard to ensure that the latter will work according to contract because it cannot be enforced effectively in a legal way. More importantly, sex workers are vulnerable to customers and robbers. If the operator and horseman have no triad back-up, they may find it difficult to protect their sex workers.

6. The New Trend: The One-station Operation In May 2002 the Hong Kong Police launched Operation Firelily that mobilised more than 900 officers to raid 77 vice establishments connected

82 TRIAD INVOLVEMENT IN HONG KONG’S SEX INDUSTRY with a large prostitution syndicate in the Mongkok area. They arrested 213 people. Among them were 18 suspected core members of the syndicate, including eight directors, a shareholder, four photographers and another four employees of a pornographic publication and several internet companies. The syndicate has purchased a total 24 premises for the operation of vice activities in Mongkok. They controlled the full operation of the business from recruiting sex workers in Mainland China, promoting their services in magazines and on the internet, managing the villas and employing horsemen to escort the sex workers to the villas. That was the largest prostitution ring in Hong Kong with a monthly turnover amounting to HK$10 million. The syndicate worked with its Mainland partners who periodically recruited women from different provinces into Hong Kong for prostitu- tion. After the selection of the women, they were smuggled into Hong Kong by land and seas routes. The syndicate could also provide fake and genuine travel documents for the women. After arriving in Hong Kong, the women were housed in quarters where they received training before being sent to work. The syndicate arranged photographers to take pictures of the women, which would be printed in pornographic maga- zines, newspapers and on websites together with the personal details of the women and what services they could provide. A sex worker would be assigned to an escort agency (the horseman). The agent would look for customers for the girl and escort her to the syndicate operated villas to provide sex services (South China Morning Post 8 May 2002). The service cost the customer HK$420. The syndicate organiser would take HK$170, the sex worker would receive HK$100, the villa would get HK$90, the horseman would obtain HK$50 and finally the keeper would be offered HK$10. The sex worker normally had to service up to 100 clients to pay back the smuggling fee or the cost of their travel documents before being paid for their sex service. Although the syndicate leader had 14K triad background, there was no evidence to support that the whole production line was controlled by the 14 triad society. In fact, this was a private investment. The main organiser employed core members to assist him in running the business and contracted out specific tasks to persons or smaller teams through his personal networks. Those who contributed their brains, capital, skills or

83 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES labour in the operation would receive appropriate rewards. If his core members or contracted labourers were triad members, they did not necessarily come from the same triad society.

7. The Impacts on Southeast Asia Although there are still some Hong Kong women going to Japan to become sex workers, Hong Kong is mainly a destination point for prostitution. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Southeast Asian girls such as Thai, Filipino and Malaysian Chinese were major overseas sex workers in Hong Kong. In the last ten years, Mainland Chinese women have been gradually taking over local commercial market and they have become the major target of law enforcement agencies. For instance, in 2002 the total number of sex workers arrested by Hong Kong law enforcement agencies was 8,970. Among 8,970 sex workers, there were 8,455 Mainland Chinese, 284 Thai, 78 Vietnamese, 3 Filipino, 1 Macanese and 3 Indonesian (see Appendix 2). In September 2004 the Hong Kong Police launched an anti-vice operation. Thirty-six sex workers were arrested. Most sex workers were from Mainland China and others were from Thailand, Philippine, Malaysia, Japan, Korea, Mongolia and India This reflects the extensive networks of human smuggling across the region. Prostitution rings in Hong Kong rely on their counterparts in Southeast Asia countries to find and select women. These women are then brought to Hong Kong via illegitimate pathways, tourist visas, chop-head visas, bogus marriage or fake visas. The methods that these girls are recruited differ. Indeed, there have been some cases that girls are abducted in rural areas and forced into prostitution in Hong Kong. For instance, some women originally leave the country for positions other than prostitution. They soon realize the fact when they arrive in Hong Kong. They have no choice but become sex workers to repay the travelling and other fees of being brought to Hong Kong. In most cases the women know that they will become sex workers and they see this as a method to earn quick cash. However, they are not fully aware of the working conditions they would encounter in Hong Kong. For example, they may be required to entertain 15 or even more customers every day.

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Chinese prostitution has become a global phenomenon. Mainland Chinese girls not only come to Hong Kong to be sex workers, they are also smuggled to other Southeast Asian countries for prostitution such as Macau, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines and Burma. In May 2003, for instance, the Malaysia Police raided 1,740 nightspots in the major cities and towns as part of a cleanup campaign. In every one of the raids, they found Chinese women outnumbering Malaysians and other nationalities working in the clubs. Most of these clubs were thinly disguised fronts for brothels (Asia Times 16 July 2003). In Singapore prostitution is legal in several red-light districts where Indonesian, Malaysian, Thai, Indian and Chinese women ply their business in brothels, karaoke lounges and massage parlours. It was reported that China has become the biggest source of new sex workers in the last few years (Reuters 12 October 2004). Mahatdhanobal (1998) describes how the gangs moved Chinese women from China to Thailand for prostitution. First, the gangs used either an intermediary known by the women or a gang member contacted the woman directly. Second, they convinced the woman to leave her home. Third, they led her across the border. Fourth, the woman was swapped between the Chinese, Burmese and Thai gangs. Finally, the woman was handed over to a person in Thailand before being taken to the sex establishment. Therefore, the gangs had clear procedures for deceiving and transporting the women. He also observes that the gangs had a strong network of people. At each of the different points along the routes used to transport women, the gangs had connections with people of various nationalities. When the women arrived in Thailand, the network was evident from the way they were delivered to the sex establishments. Though illegal, the gangs’ activities were very systematic, organized and well-coordinated. Further, they were coordinated horizontally, not vertically, i.e. not conducting their activities as a single organization (cited from Chantavanich 2003). It is true that triad societies are found in Southeast Asian countries. For instance, triads have long been existing in the Chinese community in Malaysia and Singapore. It is said that 14K and Wo Shing Wo are active in Philippine. Recently Sun Yee On and 14K have been identified by the Vietnamese Police. It is also reported that triads are taking root in

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Cambodia. Nevertheless, there is no evidence to support that triad societies in Southeast Asian countries are under a single giant triad organisation. It is definitely not the case that triads in Southeast Asian countries are controlled by the Hong Kong triads. In fact triads in all over the world including Hong Kong are independent gangs although they are symbolically under the same roof the triad family. It is quite clear that Chinese criminals in China and different parts of Southeast Asia countries collaborate to bring a large number of Chinese women to the destination country for prostitution. It should be noted that these syndicate members are not necessarily triads and usually nothing to do with Hong Kong triads. They connect each other to run this cross-border crime projects based on their personal, family, kinship and regional relationships. Traditionally any overseas Chinese found committing a crime, whether it be drug smuggling or petty theft, is usually automatically labelled a triad member by the police of the country involved. In reality, not all Chinese crime is committed by triads. International Chinese organised crime such as smuggling of sex workers is committed by different ethnic Chinese crime groups. Apart from Hong Kong Chinese, Singapore Chinese, Malaysia Chinese, Thai Chinese, Vietnamese Chinese, Indonesia Chinese and recently Mainland Chinese are also involved in this international organised crime. Even if the smuggling of sex workers is organised by Hong Kong Chinese, in many cases, they are not triads. In the operation of international organised crime, there is no gang boundary. A group of people, whether they are triads or not, can team up to organise the business if they possess the required resources.

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Appendix 1: Triad-related Crime Cases from 1993 to 2003

Total Reported Triad-related Year Percentage Crime Cases Crime Cases 1993 82,564 3,487 4.22 % 1994 87,804 3,746 4.27 % 1995 91,886 3,959 4.31 % 1996 79,050 3,126 3.95 % 1997 67,367 2,599 3.86 % 1998 71,962 2,623 3.64 % 1999 76,771 2,872 3.74 % 2000 77,245 2,477 3.20 % 2001 73,008 2,455 3.40 %

2002 75,877 2,604 3.40 %

2003 88,377 2,471 2.80 % Source: Interview with an anti-triad police officer in Hong Kong on 8 October 2004.

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Appendix 2: Sex Workers Arrested in Hong Kong from 2001 to 2003

Origins2001 2002 2003 (up to 3Q) Mainland China 4,504 8,455 7,070 Thai 436 284 113 Hong Kong 54 97 93 Viet 81 78 15 Filipino 30 3 8 Uzbek 10 19 1 Macanese 7 1 2 Indonesian 1 3 1 Russian 5 12 0 Mongolian 11 2 4 Indian 1 12 2 Korean 2 0 2 Columbian 0 0 2 American 0 1 0 Brazilian 0 1 0 Cambodian 0 1 0 Spanish 0 1 1 Source: Interview with an immigration officer in Hong Kong on 25 October 2004.

88 TRIAD INVOLVEMENT IN HONG KONG’S SEX INDUSTRY References

Chang, S. (1989) A True Story of Triad Societies in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Cosmos. [In Chinese] Chantavanich, S. (2003) Recent Research on Human Trafficking in Mainland Southeast Asia. Available at: http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue3/article_307.html Chau, K.C.K. (2000) Policing Prostitution in Hong Kong: An Exploratory Study in Mongkok District. Unpublished M.Soc.Sc. in Criminology Dissertation. Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong Chu, Y.K. (2002) Global Triads: Myth or Reality? In Berdal, M.R, and Serrano, M. (ed.) Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business As Usual. Chapter 13, pp.183-193. Boulder Colo. and London: Lynne Rienner. Chu, Y.K. (2000) The Triads As Business. London and New York: Routledge. Emerton, R. (2001) Trafficking of Women into Hong Kong for the Purpose of Prostitution: Preliminary Research Findings. Hong Kong: Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. Liu, T.M.B. (2001) Hong Kong Triad Societies Before and After 1997 Change- over. Hong Kong: Net e-Pub. Kuppusamy, B. (2003) Malaysia’s Hot New Import: Chinese Sex Slaves. Asia Times, 16 July. Law, L. (2000) Sex Work in Southeast Asia: The Place of Desire in a Time of AIDS. London and New York: Routledge. Lo, C. (2002) Police Arrest 213 in Anti-vice Blitz. South China Morning Post, 8 May. Ma, T.M.W. (1998) The Milieu of Prostitutes in One Woman Brothel in Hong Kong. Unpublished M.Soc.Sc. in Criminology Dissertation. Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong. Mahatdhanobol, V. (1998) Chinese Women in the Thai Sex Trade. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University. Pearson, V. and Yu, R.Y.M. (1995) Business and Pleasure: Aspects of the Commercial Sex Industry. In Leung, B.K.P. and Pearson, V. (eds.) Women in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.

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Tang, A.Y.M. and Lam, M.P. (1986) Teenage Prostitution in Hong Kong: A Survey and Review of Fifty Cases. Hong Kong: Centre for Hong Kong Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Vagg, J. (1991) Vice. In Traver, H. and Vagg, J. (eds) Crime and Justice in Hong Kong. Chapter 5, pp. 57-69. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Whitehead, K. and Vittachi, N. (1997) After Suzie: Sex in South China. Hong Kong: Chameleon Book. Wong, F. (2004) Prostitution Wave Hits ‘Squeaky Clean’ Singapore. Reuters, 12 October.

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The Chinese diaspora and prostitution At the Thai-Malay frontier (Hat Yai, Sadao-Dannok, Betong and Sungai Kolok)

by Dr. Emmanuel DIALMA, Jurist, AFESIP Campaign Director Dr. Pierre LE ROUX, Ethnologist, AFESIP Research Unit Director

Summary

This article seeks to portray a realistic picture of the current situation af the Chinese diaspora in this frontier region and perhaps defend the reputation of this community, the members of which are often systematically accused of being implicated in the flesh trade, in their capacity as the main people concerned as well as participants, for if some members of the Chinese community are indeed involved in prostitution and flesh trade, all are not necessarily concerned and there are reasons why the Chinese community is concerned by the sector of prostitution in one way or the other.

Chinese diaspora in Thailand, “condemned” to the “grey areas” ?

This article seeks to establish that there is a “historical” link between the Chinese diaspora in Thailand and what can be called “grey areas”. Not that the Chinese community particularly chose to flourish in

91 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES these zones but history (Thai ultra nationalism at times anti- Chinese, particularly between 1920 and 1930) as well as the singular method of operating in networks that structured their work (cultivation and selling of rubber) or their identity ( including religious identity) forced them to do so. The « grey » colour of the Chinese community’s area of work in Southern Thailand is therefore not a choice but an obligation for them to find a foothold in a field of activity that did not yet exist and where by definition there was neither much competition nor many regulations: for example the flesh trade, to avoid the possible consequences of Anti- Chinese nationalism (carrying out humanitarian work), to facilitate their integration and to preserve their cultural and religious identity. This is how historically Chinese immigants in Thailand have specialised in:

- businesses not held in very high esteem by the other minorities in the South (rubber cultivation, sex industry for example). Their techniques and singular networks were far more effective (in purely economic terms) than those of their rivals from other minorities. - In “public service” for the local population, particularly through charity houses that were also structured in networks. The arrival of the Chinese migrants was to be overseen by triads but they fell into decline and at the same time the shan tang (philanthropic institutions) made their appearance.

These fundamental structures of the Chinese diaspora in Southern Thailand serve today as the backdrop to the flesh trade that flourishes along the border with Malaysia. The point of contact between the zones of Buddhist and those of Muslim civilisation in Asia, the growing sex industry, a prominent grey area, is also organised and managed by the Chinese,Thai, or Malay diasporas. Forming a chain of brothels along the Thai- Muslim border, paradoxically, the development of this industry is proportionate to Malaysia’s austere attitude towards sex, on the other side of the border.

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Grey areas, Chinese and minorities: preliminary elements of definition “Grey areas”, “Chinese”, “minorities”: the notions and categories used here need preliminary definitions so as to avoid any amalgamation or confusion. A rapid presentation of the Chinese in Thailand can be made.

Grey area In this article, by “grey areas” are meant hidden aspects of social life, parallel activities, that are underground as they are forbidden or not yet regulated (thereby taking advantage of what is called a “legal void”); examples-trafficking of any kind (we are particularly concerned here by trafficking of humans for sexual exploitation and prostitution) . Let us recall that the legal definition of “trafficking” is “illegal trade”.

“Chinese”, “Jawi”, “Thai”, “Malay” “Chinese”: This term is used to refer to the minority of Chinese origin in Thailand (therefore Thais of Chinese origin). Similarly and in keeping with a widespread habit of the Thais themselves, the word “Jawi” refers to the Muslim Malay minority in Southern Thailand) ; whereas “Thai” will be synonymous with “Buddhist” here and the term “Malay” will be reserved for Muslim citizens of Malaysia.

Minorities : relativity and the numerical strength of the diaspora Relativity and variability of being a minority: everything depends on the place and the moment. The Jawis are a minority, but in Yala and other Southern provinces, the Chinese constitute a minority when compared to the Jawis who in their turn are a minority in Thailand, probably even when compared to the total Sino- Thai population. The majority of the population in the Betong district (province of Yala) is Jawi. However, the city of Betong itself and some of the neighbouring cantons are almost exclusively populated by the Chinese (coming originally from Malaysia when rubber cultivation started) The Chinese in Thailand are essentially Teochiu: in 1955, the Teochiu represented 56% of the Chinese in Thailand, the Hakka 16 % in the same period, originating from Fujian just like the Hokkien, the second largest Chinese group in Thailand in terms of numerical strength.

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However, there are more Hokkien in the south. The Teochiu are predominant particularly for historical reasons: after the defeat of Siam by Burma in 1767, its grandeur was restored by Thaksin, son of a Teochiu tax collector adopted by a Siamese family, who then ascended the throne thus giving a decisive impetus to the immigration of the Teochiu group, coming from the north of the Guandong province, in China (Chaozhou region). Another remarkable example is the existence at Pattani of the cult of Chao Mae Lim Khao Niao, a young woman in all probability Teo chiu, who committed suicide in the 17th century to honour the memory of her ancestors, refusing to accept the conversion to Islam of her elder brother, Lim Tho Khiam, an engineer who had brought and offered to the Pattani Sultanate the technique of smelting metals for melting marine canons to which Pattani later owed its glory. (P. Le Roux, 1998, p.142 sq.). 25 to 30 million Chinese live overseas (hua ch’iao) and can be found all over the world. However, 80% of them live in Southeast Asia, outside Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. Their per capita GDP is between US $ 10,000 and 20,000 (500 according to classical accounting and 2900 in terms of “purchasing power parity”), according to Pierre Trolliet (1999b, p. 51). Predominantly Teochiu, the Chinese in Thailand are also primarily city dwellers and traders: more than 50 % of the city dwellers of Thailand are of Chinese descent. 70 % of the Hua Ch’iao are to be found in Bangkok and in the Central plain. 60 % of them are engaged in trade. As Bernard Formoso (2000) points out, the Chinese community is the biggest cultural and religious minority of Thailand. In 1974, although they represented only 8 to 15 % of the population, the Chinese in Thailand accounted for 90 % of the commercial and industrial investment of the country and held 50 % of the financial and banking assets.

Huge Compatibility between business and the Chinese

It seems that there is a huge compatibilty between “economic success” and the Chinese diaspora, particularly in the view and the collective consciousness of Thai’s and even all Asians. Apart from being

94 THE CHINESE DIASPORA AND PROSTITUTION culturally (Confucianist individualism) and religiously predisposed, which we will not elaborate upon here, it appears that the Chinese “economic success” is due to cultural and historical circumstances (Jean Baffie, 1992, 1994). The Chinese population in Southern Thailand is primarily made up of traders, a profession which by definition leaves the door open for “grey areas”. Let us illustrate this state of things by presenting two institutions that are predominantly Chinese, commercial and linked to the grey areas : the “taokhae” and the “shan tang”.

The taokhae, a typical institution of the diaspora The taokhae is an economic institution in Southeast Asia who controls economic production upstream through usury and keeping a hold on the client. He is a kind of trader-entrepreneur- risk taker, who is generally and historically Chinese. Today this notion has a broad connotation: entrepreneur, rich and boss… Consequently the word refers to the “manager, proprietor” of a business, legal or otherwise. The Sino-Thai diaspora exerts a great influence in the country and is very powerful (despite the efforts of the Siamese to divert their wealth towards an « indigenous » bourgeoisie) and is far better accepted than in other countries. The Chinese slip through the mesh of the nationalist net and are more easily accepted than the other communities particularly thanks to their singular structures, the shan tang, which are institutions whose activities are humanitarian, religious, economic and directed at preserving their cultural identity. By doing this, these institutions and their singular way of functioning ensure that the Chinese community retains its dominant position in the sectors of trade, finance and industry

“Success” of the Chinese in Thailand in general: example of the “charity houses” If the Chinese integration in Thailand has been relatively well accepted (Jean Baffie, 1999), it is due to a series of factors – their renunciation of politics (at least within the formal local political system) as well as their involvement in local public service particularly through charity houses. Why the sector of charity-welfare-philanthropy? Because, since the triads became non grata during the Chinese emigration, it was a

95 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES sector that was still almost “virgin”. Moreover, the Chinese did not project themselves as political competitors of the Thais, which contributed greatly to their integration in Thailand. We will note however a marked tendency amongst the rich Chinese taokhae to turn to politics, for example, the case of the Yaha district in the Yala province, an important Muslim centre for rubber cultivation. (Le Roux et al., 1991). Thus, the Teochiu diaspora developed an original strategy in order to facitilate their integration and to sidestep Thai nationalism that was sometimes anti-Chinese. They established « charity houses », shan tang in Mandarin, hsiang t’üng in Teochiu and muni thi in Thai (B. Formoso, 2003, p. 833 sq.). Thailand had adopted a more or less anti-Chinese policy between 1930 and 1950 (1938-1958: a succession of Siamese nationalist governments; 1955: implementation of highly restrictive immigration quotas) and the Chinese has to avoid the consequences. The shan tang, or the charity houses were the privileged institutions for facilitating Chinese integration and they carried out economic, social and humanitarian activities. These charity houses thus reflect the territorial and economic expansion of the Chinese in Thailand. They represent elements of the cultural identity of the Teochiu group (Teochiu cults transposed overseas) as well as of their socio-political integration in Thailand, particularly through philanthropic work: - ambulances; - rescue teams; - occasionally hospitals... which help the population in the event of a catastrophe or an accident; - providing free care and bare necessities to the poor; - interring in their cemeteries people who died without any kith or kin. These widely publicised activities, an ostensible proof of their civic sense, were and continue to be huge factors that contributed to their integration (their popularity amongst the Thais). These institutions are often run by Teochiu businessmen who have proved their mettle in the private sector (for ex: Têk K’a [De jiao], at the head of charitable institu- tions in Thailand, a movement that is established in Malaysia as well as in Hong Kong, Singapore, Laos, Taiwan, United States and the People’s Republic of China more recently; those in Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia have integrated emblematic figures of Lao Tseu, Confucius,

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Buddha and Jesus, into their cults and pantheons…thus functioning in a syncretic mode) This religious syncretism is also one of the key factors that contibuted to Chinese integration in Thailand..

Growth in the economic power of the Chinese community in the 60’s The economic clout of the hua ch’iao grew from 1960 due to many reasons: - the ostracism practised against the Chinese slackened in the 60’s ; - a series of favorable factors: American aid, correlated growth in export oriented agriculture and industry culminating in a high growth rate (around 8 % per year). Due to their dominant position in the sectors of trade, finance and industry, the Chinese like the Sino- Thais benefited from this growth to a larger extent than other groups in the Thai nation (consequently a small percentage of the hua ch’iao became very rich). The shan tang are a means of garnering symbolic capital, a proof of respectability. But they can also for this very reason serve as a screen for activities that are less laudable including money laundering.

The success of the chinese when compared to other ethnic groups: example of the Betong triangle 22

The link between the Chinese communities and the grey areas can only be understood by studying their economic success which is neces- sarily relative. We wish to illustrate this fact by taking the example of the “Betong triangle”, where the hua ch’iao diaspora stands out clearly from the other communities particularly Thai and Jawi. After the presentation of the “Betong triangle”, we will compare the success of the Chinese community with the other communities, which it particularly owes to a singular method of functioning. Then the information presented will be completed and reinforced by the example of the Yaha district.

22 Pierre Le Roux et al., 1991 97 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Preliminary presentation of Betong The Betong district is remotest area in the whole Yala province (the only enclosed province in Southern Thailand, with no access to the sea, hence its nickname: “Betong triangle”). The majority of the population in the district is Jawi. However, the city of Betong itself and the few surrounding cantons are almost exclusively inhabited by the Chinese (coming from Malaysia when rubber cultivation started) This Chinese municipal enclave or the “Betong triangle” is an exception in Southern Thailand mainly inhabited by the Jawis, who are themselves one of the biggest minorities of the country: nearly 2 million Muslims of whom 75 % are concentrated in the South alone and 99% are Sunnis. Hence, in the Betong canton, the proportion of the communities (48.9% Jawis, 35.7% Chinese and 15.3% Thais: synonym of “Buddhists” here) is very different from the usual Southern norm: respectively 75 % Jawis, 5% Chinese and 20% Thais in the Pattani province. Betong city subsists mainly on trade (98 % of the frontier trade concerns latex the cost price of which follows the variations of the Singapore market and is relayed daily in Chinese by Singapore radio) and on tourism (1,000 visitors per day in 1990, coming mainly from Malaysia and Singapore: a tourism that is essentially linked to sex and Betong is a kind of a specialised centre). The Chinese are dominant here to a large extent: in terms of numerical strength, economically and even politically. The economic might of the Betong triangle makles it possible for them to do so. On the other hand and on another note, Betong was till 1989 the fiefdom of the small Malay Communist Party, the MRP, a group that was considered illegal in Thailand and in Malaysia… However, as pointed out by Jean Baffie (2001, p. 131), the Thai Communist Party, whose leaders were Chinese from Thailand, launched its guerilla in the North and Northeastern regions where the Chinese community was smaller but the people, who were abandoned and disinherited, were more hostile towards the capital. The development of cassiterite (tin) mines having caused a veritable rush towards this grey gold on the Eastern coast of Malaysia and Thailand was initially due to the Chinese pioneers, who lived in very miserable conditions (malaria, massacres, slavery, etc.). The Chinese developed economic enclaves with their particular networks and techniques. The still virgin soil of the Betong region offered them the possibility of 98 THE CHINESE DIASPORA AND PROSTITUTION settling down and cultivating the land as they wished. Thus, “foreigners” in huge numbers succeeded in acquiring property rights that were almost identical to those of the Thais.

Commercial superiority of the Chinese in Betong The difference in the way the Chinese and Jawi plantations functioned can be explained by taking into account a series of factors: - the existence, in the Chinese plantations, of structures that are very different from the other agricultural farms, with land being relatively abundant when compared to the family work force that was relatively limited (often reduced to just the couple). Therefore, a greater capacity for capitalisation ensued in order to improve productivity of work, that is to say the “virtuous circle” of accumulation: creating paths that were rapid and could be used in any weather for having access to plots under rubber cultivation ; investing in means of transport that were adapted ( all terrain bikes) ; constructing trellises along contour lines and the steps between the rows of trees… - the determination to not partition the land when it came to inheritances so as to ensure that there was a sufficient area for some children to earn an adequate revenue without depending on another activity left to others; tendency to complete secondary and particularly higher studies so as to provide other children the opportunity of finding employment outside, “arranged marriages” which made it possible to consolidate or bring together plantations through alliances. - the desire of the Chinese immigrants to be self sufficient and avoid resorting to share cropping unlike the Jawis where community interest and social equilibrium take precedence. Economic solida- rity which guarantees social equilibrium has a greater importance in the Jawi village which functions as a fraternal social unit where acquiring prestige by ostentatious expenses is widespread. - Economic singularity of the Chinese which is reinforced by their minority status as well as by the intelligent management of distri- bution circuits which go beyond a local perspective of economic phenomena, but weakened by the social rejection of which they are consenting victims in their capacity as the inevitable money 99 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

lenders, pawn brokers or mortgage bankers (a very important role as Muslims cannot practise usury, for them Time belongs only to God and a mere mortal cannot take advantage of it…). Thus some Chinese proprietors turn their backs on production to resort exclu- sively to money lending.

The example of the Yaha district Having arrived about thirty years ago at the very moment when rubber was poised for growth with the development of the l’ORRAF (Office of the Rubber Replanting Aid Fund ), the Chinese initially played the role of the rubber leaf pickers and later the Muslim traders opened their shops, hubs of their own growing network of pickers. Progressively, the Chinese wriggled out of the intermediate levels of the economic distribution chain and concentrated only on the higher echelons which were not characterised by high profit margins but proved to be lucrative in the long term within a network system of more complex and vast exchanges : - holding the client captive, a practise by which the planter is held hostage as his land is mortgaged or he is obliged to sell his entire production to a single buyer ; - plotting, to destroy potential rivals who were financially less competitive and then restoring the balance by creating a situation of oligopsony at the local or national level ; - creating interest groups, to bypass the existing distribution network and have a direct access to international trade. In 1989, the five biggest Chinese taokhae of Yaha dealing with the highest volumes of latex got together to set up a factory for drying and packing, against 22 Jawi rivals; they currently dominate the local market by selling more than half the latex; - investing, in the transformation of rubber for example, as in Tanoh Meroh (amphoe Betong) where 40 % of the factory capital comes from the People’s Republic of China which in return has the priority for purchasing, proof of the economic solidarity that surpasses the local, even national situation (the taokhae in Yaha leave the intermediate and lower echelons to the Muslims thus avoiding tensions but at the same time they control the various stages of distribution). 100 THE CHINESE DIASPORA AND PROSTITUTION

So, what explains the Chinese superiority in purely conomic terms? The Chinese village appears to be more like a commercial interest group organised around an economic hierarchy (employees or propreitors, pickers, factories…..) having its own networks. In a certain way, it is a state within the State or an enlarged social space dominating the contacts with other spheres of action of the Thai and Malay social spaces, whereas the Jawi village is a social community that functions in the interest of all and which gives importance to priorities that are not always compatible with pure economic growth.

Networks and grey areas, necessarily arcane in the chinese immigration in Thailand

Taking into account the preceeding elements, it is clear that the strong link between the Chinese community of Thailand and the grey areas has been forged as much by the history of the immigration of the hua ch’iao in Thailand as by their cultural mysteries. Condemned to a discreet and efficient method of functioning “in networks”, the Chinese have thus been, historically and culturally, for religious reasons as well as for those that are linked to their identity, “condemned” to settle in grey areas, highly promising for their influence as well as economic success.

System of functioning in networks In Chinese numerology as in Southeast Asia and in Buddhism, the number 5 is the symbol of the centre, the quintessence of everything: there are four charitable associations grouped around a centre (for example for the charity houses there is one shan tang which has a special status: Po Têk Hsiang Tüng, which has a symbolical and hierarchical predominance, is managed and founded by some of the biggest bankers in the country; between 1983 and 1993 it collected 28 billion dollars and its fortune is estimated at 110 billion dollars. In its system of collecting funds and subsidies, the contribution of funds is hence a way of verifying the allegiance of the “vassals” that is to say, of the other associations). It is a unit with a global network and the main factor is the

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Teochiu identity of the majority of the founders and leaders of these institutions. Catastrophes and festivals are thus the occasion for these Chinese charitable/ religious and commercial institutions to: - ensure the movement of labour - exchange information and experience ; - give substance to the Chinese community. Similarly as far as rubber cultivation is concerned, the Chinese success can be attributed to the method of operating “in networks”, an intelligent management of the distribution circuits that surpass a local perspective of the phenomena.

Grey areas: not a choice but a necessity From 1850 to 1950, the millions of Chinese migrating towards the Nan Yang (Southern seas) fled from the endemic poverty in their country of origin particularly in the coastal provinces of Guandong, Fujian and Hainan (in 1947: 8.5 million Chinese in the region with a third in Siam). An Eldorado, but in a favorable context where Thailand (particularly its rulers) looked benevolently upon the arrival of the coolies for the economic development of the country, till the Second World war (huge contingents were exploited by some of their compatriots to whom they were endebted for paying their journey) Till 1920, two thirds of the Chinese immigrants were young men, living in solitude (they had left their wives and children behind in their country) : therefore they easily fell prey to gambling, alcohol and opium… Choice ground for the “grey areas”… At first, secret socities having international branches linked the country to the Southern seas to protect their members according to a system of patronage: according to John Mac Carthy, (1902, p. 3) all the Chinese in Thailand were members of a triad at the end of the 19th century). However, these secret socities clashed amongst themselves and they fell into decline at the beginning of the 20th century under the pressure of the local authorities; and at the same time, Bangkok witnessed the birth of associations based on a dialect (such as associations of those who spoke Haïnanais in 1900, Hakka in 1909 and Teochiu in 1918). This time, acting in accordance with the law they created social or cultural institutions which however were restricted

102 THE CHINESE DIASPORA AND PROSTITUTION exclusively to their members and then appeared the shan tang whose philanthropic action was directed towards the general public, including the local Thai population. After 1918, the network of Chinese associations witnessed an unprecedented growth as the Chinese minority became wealthy and also due to a harsh filtering process (as a result of which only a majority of prosperous Chinese stayed on). Moreover it coincided with the entry into the business world of children of immigrants who were born in Siam and so better integrated. Paradoxically, Thai ulranationalism, which became more strident between 1920 and 1930 with strong overtones of anti-Chinese sentiments, had a structuring effect. Particularly by inciting the wealthier businessmen to give ostentatious proof of their integration (which resulted, in a certain reproduction of the integration strategy used by the internal immigrants who had made a fortune in the wealthy Chinese trading centres at the end of the 19th century). Thus the plan of action of these founders of charity houses consisted of taking the place of the local authorities in the event of individual accidents and catastrophes, burying the dead, offering bare necessities to the poor as well as financing the infrastructure in abandoned rural zones (as in China). At the same time, these associations became the main religious hua ch’iao center of Thailand (spiritual as well as temporal power?), just like in Malaysia. The Chinese minorities of Thailand and Malaysia could thus link their networks independent of the Thai- Malay border for legal as well as illegal trade. The dominance of the Teochiu in the philanthropic associations of Thailand resulted in an unparalleled structure of cooperation which has no equivalent in Pre-communist China and in other countries where the hua ch’iao are established.

Flesh trade, prominent “grey area”

Sex tourism and sex industry in Thaïland : clichés and taboos

Clichés: Patpong and other Pattayas As is well known, tourism is an important component of the Thai economy. And in this sector, contrary to the cultural and political stand

103 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES of the kingdom which simply displays its tolerance, which according to some observers ought to be criticised, sex tourism occupies quite an important place, once again despite the reservations of the government.. In the eyes of most foreigners in Thailand particularly Westerners, many places are considered, rightly or wrongly, shady or “red light” areas: the very famous but tiny streets of Patpong, Soi Cow Boy, Soi Nana in Khrung Thep Maha Nakhon (Bangkok), in the capital, seaside resorts such as Pattaya at Chon Buri or the paradisiacal islands of Koh Samui ou Koh Phuket… This is very simply due to a lack of visibility in the media, a certain lack of knowledge on the part of Westerners, and in particular journa- lists, regarding the reality of the places where prostitution is practised in Thailand. They focus attention on the eternal Patpongs and other Pattayas that are like the trees that hide the forest. In fact, serious reporting on the frontier region between Thailand and Malaysia is rare if not entirely absent. It is true that these highly touristic places are well known abroad for prostitution. But it is less well known in the West that prostitution exists elsewhere in Thailand on a far larger scale, but in places that are visited almost exclusively by a wealthy Asian clientele, both local (Thais, Sino-Thais) and international (Japanese, South Koreans, inhabitants of Hong Kong, Taiwanese, Malaysians and Singaporeans). For proof, it is enough to visit the Chinese district of Bangkok, teeming with specialised places, and to pass a few nights in hotels of good or less good quality that cater to a local clientele: They systematically offer company for the night often at far lower rates than in the famous spots known to the Westerners. Equally convincing is a visit to ancient Chinese settlements in Thailand and to the cities of Ranong (where most of the prostitutes of môn origin, come from Burma, and not having papers are victims of the trade) and Takuapa (where the oldest statues of Hindu Gods in the whole of Southeast Asia were found) and finally and above all to Hat Yai.

The Thailand-Malaysia border: the biggest sex spot of the country This second largest Thai city, Hat Yai, the economic capital of the South if not of the entire kingdom, is in fact famous for being a “Chinese” 104 THE CHINESE DIASPORA AND PROSTITUTION city, such is the extent to which the biggest ethnic minority of the country is dominant here in terms of sheer numerical strength. Hat Yai and its region are probably the biggest prostitutional “spot” of Thailand, far ahead of the places Westerners prefer to visit. Apart from this long established fact (since a few decades now), it is important to note a more and more marked Asian trend in Thai tourism: for example, in Phuket, according to the statistics of the Thai Ministry of Tourism, the number of visitors coming from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia or Singapore, is rising to equal if not overtake the number of Western visitors. However, the average duration of an Asian tourist’s visit is shorter than that of Western tourists. Three parameters, economic as well as cultural, play an important role in attracting this clientele to red light areas that are different from those that the Westerners visit: 1 - the physical appearance of the young women generally corresponds better to “Asian” tastes. Clients of Eastern origin generally prefer young women with delicate if possible fair skin, devoid of tatoos or piercings, with generous curves whereas Westerners generally do not object to darker skinned women who are very slim and whose bodies are decorated with tatoos and metal rings. 2 - The right environment: The Chinese and the Sino-Thai just like the Malays and the Japanese generally prefer to mingle amongst their kind when they go out, in places that cater to their tastes. They prefer to avoid the presence of Westerners who have very different tastes as far as food habits are concerned. Apart from the language, the young women who specialise in the Chinese or Asian clientele do not have the same behaviour, gestures, way of speaking, dressing, eating and dealing with their clients as those who operate in the areas that are popular with the Westerners. 3 - The rates: despite having financial means that are as consequent if not higher than those of the Westerners, Asian sex tourists and the local brothel goers who are capable of spending far more than a Westerner should the occasion arise, prefer the company of young women whose rates are lower than those of the young women who cater to the Westerners: whereas the amount a Westerner would spend for “a short time” in Patong (Phuket) or in Patpong (Bangkok) could be between 1000 to 2000 bahts and above, the rate of a young

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woman working in Visu Kasat (Bangkok), in Saphan Kwai (Bangkok), in Hat Yai (Songkhla), in Sungai Kolok (Narathiwat), in Betong (Yala) or in Dannok (Sadao-Songkhla) is not generally higher than 500 bahts. Besides this tendency is theoretical to the extent that once the client is reassured about the rates being charged in the area, he could very well be systematically spending much more. All this is mostly hearsay therefore rumoured. As for the realities, they are all a little similar, everywhere.

Prostitutes, seasonal and mobile It must be noted that some of the young women working in Thailand in the milieu of prostitution as “freelancers” go from one place to another and are therefore highly mobile, with elaborate strategies and a very precise schedule. Thus, they can go from Bangkok or Pattaya during the rainy season to the South (which lasts 8 months in some places like Hat Yai, Dannok or Sungai Kolok) to Phuket, and Krabi, then when the rains arrive in the Phuket island, they go over to Koh Samui on the other coast where it is not yet raining before going down if necessary towards the frontier cities: Dannok, Betong and Sungai Kolok, that are far less popular as the clientele, mainly Muslim is said to be less interesting for the young women and certainly far less generous to them. However, this clientele is more regular and each prostitute has more clients which guarantees her more regular returns which makes up for the lower rates. It is not so in places like Patong, Krabi or Pattaya where there is stiff competition amongst the prostitutes and the number of clients is uncertain and very irregular acording to the season. As far as the mobility of the young women who take to prostitution in the above mentioned places is concerned, it must be pointed out that most of them come from North Thailand (Chiang Mai, Chiang rai), and particularly from North-east Thailand, the Isan region(Lao), which is immense and the most thickly populated region but also the poorest. Added to this, are the strategies and the local cultural habits that facilitate prostitution and perpetuate it through successive generations (on this topic refer to P. Le Roux and E. Dialma, 2004). Prostitutes coming from the Southern region (Chumphon, Nakhon Sri Thammarat, Phang Nga, Krabi, etc.) are a recent phenomenon which started only a few years ago( particularly since the 1997 crash). 106 THE CHINESE DIASPORA AND PROSTITUTION

The excellent quality of the Thai road network and its extraordinary round-the-clock interregional bus services at very reasonable tarifs, ensures this mobility of the young women for whom it is an important element of their strategy. The sites that attract them, apart from some of the spots mentioned above that are conventionnaly reserved for the Westerners such as Pattaya and Patong Beach, are essentially the old Chinese settlements. That is to say, places where the economy is developed, and even prosperous, and where there are enough hotels, coffee shops, and karaokés to guarantee a steady influx of clients and therefore prospects of earnings. But this promiscuity in places that appear restrained on the surface and that are not well known or listed by the concerned organisations and this specialised work of mobile women who are easy victims of the flesh trade, give rise to supplementary risk factors as far as the transmission of AIDS-HIV or Hepatitis C is concerned and pose further danagers for these young women as shown by the example of Cambodia (P. Legros et al., 2004 ; P. Gazin et al., 2004).

the “taokhae”, gold, gambling, drugs and debt : basic and mysterious institutions of sex trade

The taokhae and loyalty developping tactics We have already seen that in Thailand the major part of the economy is in the hands of the Chinese, the Sino-Thai or Thai of Chinese origin (for a realistic typology of the components of the Chinese diaspora in Thailand, refer to B. Formoso, 2000). It is important for these young women to feel relatively secure, hence the importance of networks, either informal ones where the young women mingle with relatives, friends, cousins, or formal ones like those of the taokhae or the Chinese proprietors whose family and economic networks have a far reach nationally and internationally, making it possible to contact the young women in their native villages thereby reassuring them. This structured organisation that the prostitutes are offered plays a very important role in developing their loyalty. Most of them prefer to remain where they first arrived as they know their boss,

107 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES their place of work, even though it is deplorable and the health and social conditions are unbearable. They are scared of the unknown and most of them are incredibly ignorant of the mysteries and structures of their prostitutional milieu as well as the “tricks” used by their bosses and pimps to guarantee their loyalty. In order to do this, apart from passive pleasing tactics and the semblance of security, the Chinese boss can also keep these young women who work in his establishment captive by using more aggressive methods such as liberally supplying drugs, particularly till very recently, metamphetamines or ya baa (70 to 100 bahts for a pill) and currently ice or ya ice (500 bahts for less than 1 gram) as well as by pushing them into debt: all the brothels, all the karaokés, etc. are surrounded by expensive restaurants (where the girls and women take a break from their milieu even to the extent of spending a large part of their earnings), and stores where clothes, frills, furbelows and other fancy stuff are sold, which despite being expensive are very much in demand amongst the prostitutes who are permanently seeking their identity. Finally, there are the jewellery shops that entice these ladies as well as their clients, but specially these women to literally cover themselves in gold for which there is a a real craze amongst the young Thai women for cultural reasons.

The taokhae and the retention of “his” money This gold, as well as the earnings of the prostitutes, very often comes back to the proprietor of the establishment in which the girls work, through gambling, mainly card games that are theoretically banned in Thailand but are excessively indulged in, particularly in the red light areas, as they are often a means by which the proprietors and pimps retain and literally hold captive the young women who take to gambling. There are many of them. Sometimes they lose all their earnings, past as well as future to the extent of selling themselves into slavery for a theoretical period ranging from a few weeks to a few years. This is not rare. Debt and debt recovery are some of the most effective coercive means used by Chinese bosses to retain their prostitutes; all the more as the girls who are often illiterate or not very educated, trust their “boss” to keep an account of their borrowings and their earnings. It is rare that women keep their own accounts in order to verify if the 108 THE CHINESE DIASPORA AND PROSTITUTION earnings credited every month or twice every quarter by the proprietor correspond really to the services they have rendered.

A “sexual” frontier between thailand and malaysia

A frontier of brothels In the Southern region, apart from Hat Yai, there is this line of frontier “sex” cities, Sungai Kolok, Betong and Dannok, from the Western coast to the Eastern one. These are three important transit points for entering and leaving Malaysia. In fact, they are three brothels rather than three cities since the major part of the economy here revolves around prostitution. This reality is only a result of circumstances probably since prostitution exists here on such a large scale for one single reason: the prohibition and moral ban on any kind of licentiousness in the puritanical but highly hypocritical society of Malaysia, which is totally responsible for the situation as it is at the origin of this huge influx of Muslim clients who obviously wish to escape from the restrictions that stifle their day to day existence, particularly in the fundamentalist states of the Malay Federation: Kelantan and Trengganu. The most ancient site is probably that of Betong, as the Chinese settled here very early at the time of the tin mines in the 19th century and then from the time of the rubber cultivation at the beginning of the 20th century. Betong, a colony populated by workers from China, at the invitation of the English and the Siamese, has always been and will continue to be an important port of entry for clandestine immigrants. The Betong region is also well known for having been for decades during the 20th century the fiefdom of a Pro–communist guerilla, particularly during the Vietnam war. However, Betong is not the most important port of access to Malaysia. The road between Yala and Betong with many bends in the high mountains, along with the threat of the Communist guerilla that was virulent between 1970 and 1980, is probably the cause. Today, with access routes that are easier, broader, more comfortable and safe, Sungai Kolok and particularly Sadao-Dannok, which can be

109 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES considered as gateways, are visited far more often by all those who enter and leave Malaysia. To sum it up, people go to Betong just to have fun and get back to their homes, both from Thailand as well as from Malaysia. The city of Hat Yai was considered to be the most important centre of prostitution on the Southern frontier till early 2000. Muslim Malay clients and the Chinese from Malaysia used to go there for the weekend.

Thus, there was a huge concentration of prostitutes within Hat Yai itself, as well as to a lesser extent in the city of Sonkhla which is a famous nearby seaside resort. The large number of hotels in these cities particularly in Hat Yai is proof of this. It must be pointed out that in Thailand, hotel generally means brothel. Propositions are made to the client at the lobby or the elevator itself: “Do you want a masseuse? A girl for a night?”. And should he prefer, there are many young ladies waiting

110 THE CHINESE DIASPORA AND PROSTITUTION for him in the coffee shops or the karaokés attached to these hotels. The client is spoiled for choice. He has only to pick the girl and the time, there is almost round-the-clock service.

The paradox of the flesh trade: forbidden here, flourishing there

Malay strictness and Thai laxism But since early 2000, for reasons that are probably linked to the internal policy of Malaysia, the site of Sadao-Dannok (Dannok literally means frontier), 15 km from the city of Sadao, in the no man’s land between Thailand and Malaysia, a veritable satellite city has mush- roomed within the space of a few years, made up mainly of brothels, hotel brothels, karoké brothels, restaurant brothels and jewelery shops. This strange city grows a little more each night, as it is highly patronised by the Malay muslims far more than the Chinese of Malaysia (who prefer Betong or Hat Yai where they are more comfortable), since this site makes it possible for the Malays who live on the coasts right up to the island of Penang and even beyond, to have fun as they can make a day trip, thereby avoiding the awkward questions of their spouses on their return. This way they can have access to the artificial paradise that Malaysia refuses them. Thus the fundamentalism and the severity of Malaysians and Islam nourish the chain of frontier sex cities. The Chinese and people of Chinese origin are only taking advantage of this enormous constant demand. One of the reasons why the clients prefer to make a trip is that they can drink alcohol without fear at the frontier on the Thai side, and they can get into brawls all night if they wish without fear of the Malay religious police, that obliges them within a few minutes to go to the numerous clandestine brothels at Butterworth, Penang, or Kuala Lumpur… At Dannok, Sungai Kolok, Betong, Hat Yai, they can take the time to enjoy life as they wish. Finally the rates in Malaysia in the clandestine brothels are highly discouraging for the Malay clients: at around

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100 ringgits (1000 bahts) for a sexual service, 350 ringgits (3500 bahts) for a night, it is expensive. At the frontier, the rates are 300, 400 or 500 bahts for a sexual service, and maximum 1000 bahts for the night. The hotels of reasonablly good quality, are clean with hot water, TV and cable and cost around 500 bahts per night which is quite affordable. When the clients cannot afford the price of a hotel room as well as of the sexual service he requires, the prostitute at the frontier at Dannok for example, lets him use her sordid little room which is more like a slum than a guest room, at no extra cost so as to finish the transaction. The huge majority of the owners of these establishments of the frontier zone are Chinese or of Chinese origin. And if it is true that they are pragmatic, rather than really evil, and fully take advantage of this manna from the Muslim Malays, they in their turn operate without any respect for public morals, serving solely their own financial interests, thus placing themselves in a vast shady zone with which they are associated in the popular imagery but from which they can easily extricate themselves by changing their field of work. Two factors can greatly help them do so: proposing laws that are adequate in a sector that proves to be a legal abyss, a zone where there are almost no laws, as AFESIP does in Cambodia for example (refer to Aarti Kapoor, 2004); and induce Malaysia to reduce its hypocrisy. For the responsibility of this critical situation does not lie solely with Thailand or even just with the Chinese diaspora in Thailand, but is to be borne equally by the self proclaimed prudish and licentious Malaysia that is pushed to vice by the very severity of its austere and extreme religious moral keepers.

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Bibliography

BAFFIE Jean, 1992, « Croyances et pratiques “religieuses” des Chinois de Thaïlande » Géographie et culture, 4 (hiver), p. 91-112. BAFFIE Jean, 1994, « From Rags to Riches : discussing achievements of some Chinese families in Thailand », p. 281-296 in Amara Pongsapich et al. (Eds) : Entrepreneurship and Socio-Economic Transformation in Thailand and Southeast Asia, Bangkok, CUSRI-ORSTOM,. BAFFIE Jean, 1999, « Les Chinois de Thaïlande, le cas d’une minorité dominante » Historiens et Géographes, 368 (nov-déc.), p. 207-225. BAFFIE Jean, 2001, « La politique en Thaïlande depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale », p. 83-142 in Stéphane Dovert (Ed.) : Thaïlande contemporaine, Bangkok/Paris IRASEC/L’Harmattan. DENG XIAONAN & LAMOUROUX Christian, 2004, « Les “règles familiales des ancêtres”. Autorité impériale et gouvernement dans la Chine médiévale », Annales HSS, 3, mai-juin, p. 491-518. GAZIN Pierre, PLARD-RODRIGO Christine, UONG CHHENG, DE GREEF Stéphane, RHIS Bernard & LEGROS Pierre, 2004, « Femmes prostituées à Phnom Penh (Cambodge) : comportements et évolution entre 2000 et 2004 », 6 p. (submitted to Médecine tropicale (Med Trop), 2004). FORMOSO Bernard, 2000, « Identités en regard. Destin chinois en milieu bouddhiste thaï », Paris, CNRS Editions & Ed. de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme (« Chemins de l’ethnologie ») ; 288 p., cartes, 6 pl. photo. FORMOSO Bernard, 2003, « Marchands et philanthropes, les associations de bienfaisance chinoises en Thaïlande », Annales HSS, 4, juillet-aout, Paris, EHESS & Armand Colin, p. 833-855. KAPOOR Aarti, 2004, AFESIP Model Law on Suppression of Human Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation, Phnom Penh, AFESIP International Research Unit and Legal Department (“Documents”), 43 p., mimeographed (PDF format, to be downloaded at www.afesip.org). LEGROS Pierre, SOMALY MAM & GAZIN Pierre, 2004 « Prostitution et infection par le VIH au Cambodge », Médecine tropicale (Med Trop), 64 : 20.

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LE ROUX Pierre, 1998b, « Bedé kaba’ ou les derniers canons de Patani. Une coutume commémorative des Jawi (Malais de Thaïlande du Sud) », Bulletin de l’Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient, 85, p. 125-162. LE ROUX Pierre & DIALMA Emmanuel, 2004 « Le trafic des femmes et des enfants à fin d’exploitation sexuelle vu comme phénomène social total en Asie du Sud-Est et la nécessité d’établir, dans l’étude et l’action, une osmose interdisciplinaire et inter-institutionnelle: une approche régionale et interdisciplinaire du trafic humain à but d’exploitation sexuelle en Asie du Sud-Est », Editorial du mois de septembre du Réseau Asie : réseau des chercheurs, universitaires et experts français et francophones sur l’Asie (www.reseau-asie.com), online paper, September, 2004 (13 photographs by Stéphane DE GREEF & Peter LIVERMORE). Editorial, Website of Réseau-Asie (www.reseau- asie.com). [Professional Network of French-speaking scholar in social and natural sciences in Asia]. LE ROUX Pierre, BESSON Igor & IVANOFF Jacques, 1991 « Les seigneurs de Bétong. Aspect agraire et économique d’une minorité chinoise », p. 39-64 in P. Le Roux et J. Ivanoff, Identités Sud. Regard sur trois minorités de Thaïlande, Patani/Paris, Prince of Songkla University/CNRS (ECASE UPR 298), 100 p. MAC CARTHY John, 1902, Surveying and exploring in Siam, Londres, John Murray. SWINGLE Joseph & Aarti KAPOOR, 2004, A Response to Steinfatt’s estimates of the prostitute population in Cambodia (2002-2003), Phnom Penh, AFESIP International Research Unit (“Documents”), 23 p., mimeogr. (PDF format, to be downloaded at www.afesip.org). TROLLIET Pierre, 1999a « Les minorités nationales en Chine », p. 33-49 in Jean-Pierre Larivière (dir.) : La Chine et les Chinois de la diaspora, Paris, CNED-SEDES. TROLLIET Pierre, 1999b « Un monde chinois », p. 51-78 in Jean-Pierre Larivière (dir.) : La Chine et les Chinois de la diaspora, Paris, CNED- SEDES.

114

Triads : From street level to transnational crime

By Peter Michael

From the neon-lit streets in the heart of triad territory in Hong Kong and China’s ganglands dominating the sex, extortion and drug trade; to counterfeiting luxury goods straight off the shelves of the Parisian fashion houses of Louis Vuitton, Pierre Cardin and Chanel; right down to hired assassins, the illegal shark fin trade and clandestine metham- phetamine factories on the tropical island paradise of Fiji, they are everywhere. They run casino loansharking and operate multi-billion dollar blackmarket horse-racing and illegal soccer betting rackets across Asia. They are key players in the global business of people smuggling and money laundering with secret underground routes criss-crossing China, Eastern Europe and the Middle East into the popular destinations of the EU, UK and the US. They have been identified meddling in the blackmarket arms trade and financing terror and piracy networks with links to the Stalinist state of North Korea, the outlawed terrorist organisations of Al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiah. And, of course, it is important not to forget their core business which is shipping tonnes of highly-addictive illicit party drugs such as ice, ecstasy and speed – as well as the more hard-core crack, mandrax and heroin - into dance clubs and drug dens across the world in capital cities like Sydney, Toronto, New York and Durban. But the face of the modern triad is changing.

115 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

This paper will cover some of the latest trends, activities and personalities of one of the most powerful and ruthless criminal networks on the planet, known as the Triad or “black society”. Based on personal investigations, observations and interviews with senior organised crime and anti-triad experts, intelligence operatives and underworld sources, this document draws on a number of my news articles written over the past two years while working as the senior investigative reporter for Hong Kong’s leading English daily the South China Morning Post. These reports also include rare insight into the machinations of the changing face of triads through off-the-record conversations with several high-ranking triad officials. This access was granted only after a series of meetings in the lobby of a five star hotel – and later in such venues as a karaoke bar and corporate boardroom – and always on the proviso of unnamed sources. Such encounters reinforced the low-profile image that the triad bosses – or dragonheads – are seeking to encourage and foster. Many of the major triad organisations – including 14K, Sun Yee On and Wo Shing Wo – started investing in property and a wide-ranging portfolio of legitimate businesses as a means of creating an impenetrable money trail in the early 1980s. And while the footsoldiers and sergeants-at-arms are more easily distinguishable on the streets of Mong Kok, Yau Ma Tei and Tsim Sha Tsui for their died blonde/red hair, flashy jewellery, aggressive posturing and hotted-up cars, this is not the case with the leaders and decision makers of the modern triad. Most of the crime lords seek a low profile and claim to be “simply businessmen”. They present themselves as urbane, multi-lingual, sociable and well-travelled individuals. But behind this facade these are ruthless and dangerous men capable of mobilising large groups of committed and willing street thugs and smaller cadres of well-trained and blooded assassins. Offers to join them on their personal luxury yacht for a cruise around Hong Kong harbour or on a Ferrari club “cannonball rally” run up to the 2004 Shanghai Grand Prix were politely declined for obvious reasons.

116 TRIADS: FROM STREET LEVEL TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

Certainly it is true that the lines of triad allegiance are blurred. The long-harboured hatred and enmity between various triad factions is no longer so distinct. These days it is money and connections that talk. And, in some cases, this power and influence can be traced to the very top of China’s political elite. Prior to the handover of the former British colony to China in 1997, a confidential police report suggested membership of the four main triads – Sun Yee On, Wo Shing Wo, 14K and Wo Hop Wo – boasted numbers of more than 30,000 each. The tally, the document asserts, excludes those of the fringes who have not undergone the initiation rites. This means that about three of every 100 residents aged over 15 are sworn members of the underworld. The top-secret report also claimed Chinese law enforcers had struck a deal with the triad bosses to ensure a smooth transition of law and order in the handover process. At a reception for a delegation of Hong Kong business figures on June 22, 1984, the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping told his guests: “Hong Kong black societies are very powerful. They are even more powerful than their counterparts elsewhere. Of course, not all black societies are dark. There are many good guys among them.” My intention with this paper today is to provide a snapshot of the modern triad as evidenced in news events and police and intelligence operations that have surfaced on the public radar over the past two years. In keeping with the tempo of the rapidly evolving criminal diaspora of the modern triad, I would like to present the information (with minor style changes) as I originally wrote it - be it as a news article or colour feature - and including direct quotes from sources of the time. As mentioned earlier, we will start on the streets of Hong Kong, move across the border to Macau and mainland China, before, much like the ever-reaching tentacles of the criminal underworld, expanding to cover the transnational activities of triad organisations. To finish I will offer some profiles of several triad bosses, dragon- heads, red pole fighters, and other business-minded triad figures who have been caught and convicted and are currently serving time in prisons around the world.

117 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES Sex and the city

Hong Kong is the heartland of the triad. Behind the space-age façade of gleaming skyrises, bustling harbour and the urban canyons of Asia’s World City, it is easy to find the shopfront of the modern-day gangsters. Emerge from the underground subway station onto the seedy streets of Mong Kong and you enter the twilight zone of triad territory. Here within a matter of a couple of hundred metres you can find the recruiting stations, training ground and economic pipeline of triad business. Housed in major shopping blocks and now, after an ongoing police crackdown, less visibly in the upper floors of office buildings, is room after room of hardcore pornography. Touts and junior triad associates stand on street corners and in the rooms directing customers to the best bargains.

Everywhere you look, hard-core sex fills these rooms - thousands of pirated discs emblazoned with lurid images of naked men and women engaged in various sex acts. Most cost an average of $20 or six for $100. Some of the titles are equally eye-catching: Three For All, Lewd Conduct, Taste Of Love. Overhead a widescreen plasma television offers a sample of the wares. The volume is turned up loud, deafeningly so. The entire room reverberates to the sound of moaning, groaning and grunting. It's hard to imagine that anyone making that much noise is enjoying themselves. Next door it is the same. And the next one. The entire floor of these Mongkok buildings are dedicated to the sale of illegal pornography. Drifting through the rooms are dozens of mostly young men. Peak business is after work or at weekends, say the touts. Men stand in the doorway of each unit, offering to strike a deal. “You buy six and I will give you one for free,” says one tout. “But don't tell my boss. It is our secret.” "This is the shopfront of organised crime in the city," says Mongkok's assistant district commander (crime), Superintendent Dave Grant, an anti-triad veteran.

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The open sale of hard-core pornography had been a problem for more than 10 years but it was still "totally unacceptable", he says. "We know blackmail is out there, prostitution is out there, drugs are out there, but this thing (the issue of hardcore pornography) has been sitting there all this time as a mountain," said Superintendent Grant. Triads make $1.7 million a day out of hard-core pornography in the "most visible and tangible evidence" of organised crime activity in the city, investigations have revealed. The $6 billion-a-year industry is "highly lucrative" for the 14K and Wo Shing Wo triads, according to police. And it is being used to fund large-scale drug production and trafficking, people smuggling, prostitution and extortion rackets. Based on the latest official figures, this multi-billion dollar industry equates to about 17,000 customers a day each paying the going rate - about $100 for six discs - for pirated hard-core films in Mongkok's black market. Police have launched a "zero-tolerance crackdown" in the problem areas of shopping centres such as the Sino Centre, Ho King Commercial Centre and Sim City. More than 90 outlets have been raided on numerous occasions, with police having to weld doors shut to stop gangsters breaking into shops to reclaim seized goods. Police have arrested 123 people and seized 1.3 million discs since the start of 2004. But syndicate chiefs continue to elude capture through the use of "ghosts" or the names of drug addicts on leases. "Police have written to those purported landlords of the outlets concerned but to date less than 10 have come forward seeking to repossess their units," an official statement said. "This indicates ownership of many units is bogus." Police, legislators and justice department officials are pushing for laws to plug loopholes that allow triads to operate so freely. It is an offence to sell such material but sentences are usually a fine or short jail term. "This is the most visible and tangible evidence of organised criminal activity on the streets of Hong Kong," Superintendent Grant said.

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"And we cannot let that amount of organised crime and that amount of money flow freely to the triads. It is a mountain of a problem but we are determined to eradicate it." Another highly lucrative industry the triads dominate in Hong Kong is the sex trade and they are using increasingly sophisticated measures to make money out of the world’s oldest profession. Using the emerging phenomenon of “cyber-brothels”, they have even started advertising online prostitution services in English in an attempt to attract expatriate and foreign clients. Senior police sources say the move could be an attempt to market Hong Kong as a cheap destination for sex tourists. Several sex websites have been translated into English and offer thousands of women from Hong Kong, the mainland, Korea, Britain, and France for and average hourly rate of $350. One website operator, who refused to be identified, said triad bosses had turned to cyber-brothels for easy profits. He said the women paid a fee of several hundred dollars each to register with the website. They were then photographed and graded on their appearance, attitude, experience and services offered. Each link included a detailed map of how to find a prostitute’s apartment. “We only just started offering the service in English about three weeks ago,” said the operator. “This was more for the convenience of expats and overseas tourists… we did not want to be seen to be discri- minating.” He said he believed the cyber-brothels were operating in a “grey area of the law” but they were more of a service to help sex workers find customers. It is not illegal for a sole prostitute to work in an apartment, but it is illegal to run a brothel or live off the earnings of a prostitute. The organisers of the online brothels offer many girls – but all operate out of their own apartments. The chief weapon against the trend is to check whether the women breach their tenancy agreements. The operations director of Mongkok police district, Chief Inspector Cheung Kim-Kwong, confirmed that the sex trade appeared to be moving away from the traditional brothel scenario.

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“This is an emerging phenomenon,” Chief Inspector Cheung Kim- Kwong said. “We cannot see why they would want to promote Hong Kong as a sex tourist destination … but it is a concern.” “We fear society is facing the problem where the prostitutes are moving into family environments to exploit the legal loophole of one- prostitute apartments.” Shoni, a 23-year-old prostitute working for the syndicates, says has sex with an average of seven men a day. “Some are nicer then others,” says the woman, who greets customers at the door of her tiny apartment wearing only a skimpy bikini. Shoni – not her real name – and the two girls next door on the same floor and the three on the floor below are the face of Hong Kong’s emerging cyber-brothel industry. Operating out of one-prostitute apartments, Shoni and hundreds like her are working for triad societies exploiting a legal loophole allowing operators to run an online brothel. She relies almost solely on the business generated by her appearance on a sex website. Charging a negotiable rate of about $400 for an hour, she offers massages, sex, “anything you want”. She keeps some of the money, but the rest goes to “them” – she refuses to say who her partners are or how much they get. Based on her hourly rate and an average of seven men a day – except on Sundays – Shoni makes more than $2,000 a day. Shoni agreed to be photographed but not identified. “They will get very angry.” Subsequent police investigations have found clear and direct links to triad societies.

'Drug supermarkets' above the law

Triads are using dance and karaoke venues, many of which operate outside the law, to distribute illicit drugs such as ketamine - and police feel powerless to stop them, one of my investigations early last year revealed. Powerful triad bosses are operating a series of nightclub and karaoke bars like "drug supermarkets" - often beyond the reach of the 121 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES law - where the widespread availability of the party drug ketamine is exposing Hong Kong youth to the risk of becoming a "lost generation", authorities confirm. Ketamine, also known as "Special K", is flooding across the border from the mainland in huge quantities and is being openly sold in bars and nightclubs across Hong Kong, the investigation revealed. Police say they are powerless to close down the venues - with some attracting crowds of up to 1,200 party-goers a night - or even to prevent them operating beyond the law without valid liquor or Place of Public Entertainment (PPE) licences. Senior police, triad experts, social researchers and young people have voiced growing concern over the alarming trend of the booming "Special K" phenomenon in Hong Kong. Ketamine comes in pill, powder or capsule form and is a tranquilliser used by vets to perform operations on animals. When taken by humans it can produce anything from numbness to a paralysing out-of-body experience. As part of the investigation, I visited several establishments in Tsim Sha Tsui and Mongkok to explore the scale of the drug problem and witnessed dealers selling packets of drugs and party-goers snorting white powder off the backs of their hands. Assistant Commissioner of Police Mike Dowie, said he had ordered a crackdown on the burgeoning ketamine trade. "The problem of psychotropic use of drugs by youngsters remains very high on the list of priorities of police concerns," he said. "The abuse and availability of ketamine in entertainment premises is now a major problem in Kowloon West. "And the amount of ketamine flooding on to the market is the focus of our efforts." He said police intelligence suggested a mixture of triad groups - including 14K and Sun Yee On - were "heavily engaged" in the sale of psychotropic drugs in entertainment centres. "Our concern is those clubs who have fallen foul of the law, who have lost their licences but who continue to operate unregulated, and seemingly beyond the reach of the law," he added. Another highly-ranking police source said many officers felt a huge sense of frustration because the triad-owned bars were operating like

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"drug supermarkets" and they were unable to close them down without the support of other government authorities. Owners of Club 348 in Nathan Road, Mongkok, one of the biggest nightclubs in Hong Kong and the target of an ongoing series of raids by police, welcomed the police crackdown yesterday. "We welcome them to work with us to clean up not only our club, but to also clean up drugs all over Hong Kong," said managing director Manuel Sequeira. "In the past we have been the subject of drug raids by the police and they have helped us clean up the place... the drug scene has been reduced phenomenally. "In no way does our club approve of the taking of drugs or participate in any selling of drugs." Mr Sequeira, who regularly packs in up to 600 party-goers on weekends, said he intended to stay within the law "as best as we can" and work with the police. He said he was unaware of any triad involvement in his club. Nowhere else in the world is ketamine, or 'Special K', used at such a high level, studies suggest. According to preliminary findings of the research, a staggering 95 % of party-drug users in Hong Kong reported using ketamine, compared with 82 % who take Ecstasy and 80 % who smoke marijuana. At least 11 deaths have been linked to ketamine in Hong Kong, according to a police report. Experts believe the animal tranquilliser has soared in popularity in Hong Kong simply because the drug is so readily available across the border. China has five factories licensed to make and export ketamine - for medical use. Police sources say wholesale powdered ketamine is obtained relatively easily from legitimate manufacturers, but instead of ending up at veterinary clinics, they end up on Hong Kong streets. "Our intelligence points to mainland as the main source of ketamine," said Detective Senior Inspector Paul Lewis, of the Narcotics Bureau. The youngest offender involved in a trafficking case in the city was a 13-year-old, police said.

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Criminologist Chu Yiu-kong, author of Triads as Business, said triads had taken over the ketamine trade because its profitability. "If you look at the triads, there are not so many businesses left that they can do, protection rackets and smuggling have slowed down and CD piracy has slowed down. Now they have found the sale of ketamine is very profitable and that is why they are drawn to it," he said.

Cross-border cousins

Triads are increasingly turning to cross-border activities to cash in on the demand for sex, drugs and contraband. Hong Kong’s three most powerful triads - Wo Shing Wo, 14K and Sun Yee On - are known to have forged alliances with prominent gangs in Macau and on the mainland. They are sharing skills, expertise and cash in return for a mutual flow of high-quality drugs, sex workers and counterfeit goods, senior police and analysts said. The comments followed a massive anti-triad crackdown, a seven-day operation involving unprecedented co-operation between law enforcement bodies in Macau, Guangdong and Hong Kong, in September last year. In Hong Kong alone, more than 1,500 suspected triad members or associates were arrested in 2,000 raids involving 6,000 officers. Officers said the joint operation, code-named Sun Rise, was a major success and had severely dented the financial pipeline that funds the criminal activities of triads. Chief Superintendent Stephen Fung Kin-man of the Organised Crime and Triad Bureau said cross-border co-operation was crucial to curbing many serious crimes involving triads. “Because of the close proximity of the three places, we have identified that some Hong Kong triads are operating in these other regions,” Mr Fung said. Intelligence-sharing between law enforcement agencies was opening up new leads for investigators trying to combat triad societies. He said triads were involved in protection rackets, vice activities, illegal gambling and bookmaking, dangerous drugs, pornographic and pirated optical discs, counterfeiting, contraband cigarettes and selling 124 TRIADS: FROM STREET LEVEL TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIME illegal, unmarked oil. Two key factors contributing to the increasing underworld trade are the emerging middle class on the mainland and the recently introduced individual travel permit system into Hong Kong. Mr Fung said police had observed a significant boom in the cross- border trafficking of sex workers. Some syndicates were recruiting people to work as prostitutes on the mainland and arranging their transfer to Hong Kong. Triads were also using on-line brothels to attract customers. They were leasing flats as reception centres where customers could choose girls from a selection of photos, he said, while the girls waited in another apartment. Chu Yiu-kong, a criminologist at the University of Hong Kong, said it was not unusual to find the underworld branching out in such a way. “Triads are not the only businesses turning to China. But from their point of view it is where they can get everything they want - drugs, girls, these sorts of things,” Dr Chu said. “It is a massive market and a resource-rich area ... and people in China, too, want what they are offering.” But despite the massive dragnet no crime lords, or “dragonheads” - triad office bearers - were among the 1,569 people arrested, said Chief Superintendent Stephen Fung Kin-man of Hong Kong's Organised Crime and Triad Bureau. Mr Fung said the focus of the operation was to hit the triads' income. “Different tactics might have to be used in tackling the triad problem in Hong Kong and it all depends on our focus,” he said. “Our main focus was to attack their financial source and through this joint operation we wanted to deliver a strong signal to the triad and criminal fraternity. “At the end of it I think we have achieved our aims and the operation is considered to be very successful.” Backed by intelligence co-operation from Macau and Guangdong, officers raided more than 2,000 locations including discos, games centres, massage establishments and flats. They smashed 23 vice establishments, 18 gambling and six drug- smoking dens, and nine pirated disc centres, leading to the arrests of 802 men and 767 women.

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According to Mr Fung, triad societies in Hong Kong had evolved over the years into very loosely connected gangs. “They are not very organised - they don’t have central control - very much like gangsters.”

Cashing on the chinese love of gambling

Triads dominate the underworld betting syndicates in Asia and are estimated to be taking more than $80 billion annually in horse racing alone. Illegal soccer gambling, too, is huge business for the triads. When Chelsea and Liverpool met for the showdown for a Champions League place on the last day of the 2004 English Premier League season, police swooped on a underground syndicate believed to be controlled by the Wo Hop To triad society arresting 16 suspects and seized $9 million which had been wagered on the game. Triads also offer loans to gambling-mad punters in Hong Kong and in the casinos in Macau – on exorbitant interest rates – and with ruthless and often deadly repercussions for those who are unable to pay up. Hong Kong police are calling for legislation to tackle loansharks to be fast-tracked following the death of a 23-year-old gambler who plunged 15 floors while trying to escape from two Macau casino debt collectors. The Law Reform Commission recommended that the government make harassment tactics used by debt collectors a criminal offence as part of a series of legal changes. The proposal is still under review. Ho Kin-wah, 23, died of multiple injuries after falling from the balcony of a Choi Wan Estate building in Wong Tai Sin. Ho was seen fighting and arguing with the two loansharks moments before he plunged from the high-rise. However, the case has not been listed as a murder investigation. The death was not suspicious, a police spokeswoman said. “No sign of other injuries or a defensive wound indicating a struggle with others was revealed in the post-mortem examination,” she said. Law Reform Commission chairman Stuart Stoker yesterday said the proposal to regulate the debt collection industry followed a public outcry over “a growing and real” problem. 126 TRIADS: FROM STREET LEVEL TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

“This is something that is likely to get worse before it gets better,” he said. The incident involving Ho was the latest in a string of recent deaths linked to gambling and loanshark-related debt with four cases on one Saturday alone. Police are searching for the two Macau casino loansharks who accompanied Ho back to Hong Kong to try to get his $100,000 gambling debt from family members. Ho’s father, 50, told police the two men came to his Tse Wan Shan home on Sunday morning with his son and demanded $100,000. He refused and they left. The two men later took his son to the flat of another relative in Choi Wan Estate in Ngau Chi Wan in an attempt to extort the money. At about 11am, a resident in the apartment block reported hearing an argument and the sound of people running. The resident then said she heard a “big bang” and saw a man lying in a pool of blood in the courtyard below. The two other men escaped via the lift. In separate incidents, a man, 35, also of Choi Wan Estate in Ngau Chi Wan, was found hanged in his home by his younger sister after borrowing from a loanshark and incurring deepening gambling debts. A man, 40, was also found dead by his younger sister in Tseung Kwan O after inhaling charcoal smoke. His family told police they had already paid debt collectors $100,000 of the man’s gambling debt but still owed a further $100,000. Another man, 28, was found dead by staff in a Western District hotel, also after inhaling charcoal smoke. He was found with a suicide note saying he had taken his life over a debt-related problem from gambling. Police broke up one such loansharking syndicate run by members of three triad societies. It allegedly preyed on businessmen and charged annual interest rates of up to 430 per cent. Police said the gang was formed by members of three triad societies - Wo On Lok, 14K and Sun Yee On - and was also linked to loanshark syndicates in Macau. Acting Chief Superintendent Lo Mung-hung, of the Organised Crime and Triad Bureau, said the syndicate targeted businessmen from small

127 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES and medium-sized firms, especially those in the manufacturing sector. “It is possible that members from the syndicate might have links with people from the manufacturing industry,” he said. Initial investigations revealed more than 200 debtors borrowed money from the syndicate and at least half of them were owners of small and medium enterprises. “The loans involved ranged from tens of thousands of dollars to $1 million. The total amount of loans reached $8 million a year and we estimated that their annual income was about $34 million,” Mr Lo said. He added the syndicate, which had been in operation for about two years, lent money to debtors at interest rates of up to 430 per cent a year. The highest legal rate is 60 per cent a year.

Not the real thing

One field the triads are increasingly branching out into is counterfeiting. Exposing the tip of the iceberg, thirteen Hong Kong tourists were detained in Paris in January 2003 as part of a crackdown on a growing number of “tour group smugglers” buying up luxury goods in the French capital. The Hong Kong tour group was detained at Charles de Gaulle airport at the start of a 20-day tour of Europe. They apparently aroused suspicions among officers who believed they were operating as part of an organised syndicate buying luxury brands for gangs making fake goods. One of the travellers – who returned to Hong Kong after the detention – admitted paying just $2,000 to join the tour in return for buying luxury brand goods on behalf of a “trading company” sending goods to Japan. Although such schemes are in a grey area of the law, importing goods for the purpose of resale without declaring so and paying a duty constitutes smuggling in most countries. The 10 women and 3 men, aged between 30 and 45, were travelling with empty suitcases and had 60 credit cards between them. None of the group was charged with any offence. Global investigation agency Maxima Group, which specialises in brand protection for some of the world’s top fashion houses, said the 128 TRIADS: FROM STREET LEVEL TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIME phenomenon of “tour group smugglers” travelling out of Hong Kong has boomed in the past four years. “Demand is outstripping supply,” said operations director Lindsay Hudson, speaking from London. “It is very difficult to get hold of the latest imported styles from Europe, and they sell for three times the price on the streets of Hong Kong,” she said. “Some women would kill for the latest Birkin or Kelly handbag, and they will pay enormous amounts to get them. “There are also the counterfeiting gangs, many based in southern China, who are becoming increasingly sophisticated in copying these luxury products. But first they need the genuine article to copy.” The French luxury goods industry is renowned as the toughest in the world and is enforcing heavy fines as part of a crackdown to protect their brands against smugglers and counterfeiters. A spokesman for the Colbert Committee, which represents the interests of France’s leading fashion and luxury-goods houses, said they were “deeply concerned” by the black-market trade of luxury items. “Sometimes this kind of parallel traffic is organised,” said spokesman Nicolas Prelot. He said his members regularly confronted “tour groups” which were buying luxury brands such as Chanel, Hermes, Louis Vuitton, and Christian Dior in bulk. “Usually our members confront the buyers who are not buying for themselves but are buying in bulk to be sold back in Asia.” Hong Kong-based brand protection expert Tony Gurka, of Commercial Trademark Services, said “tour group smugglers” were a modern, sophisticated version of an old racket. “It is a very lucrative trade, and these sorts of groups could be doing as many as three trips a month,” he said. “Everything is pre-sold to retail outlets, they are only interested in genuine merchandise, they are usually surveillance-aware, and only shop in crowded places at peak times.” French anti-counterfeiting legislation was introduced in 1994, putting it in the same category as drugs and arms trafficking. The triads have also been found to be using counterfeiting to fund other activities.

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A counterfeiting racket operating through several front companies in Hong Kong and Asia is being investigated for allegedly funding Islamic terrorist organisations, a security expert revealed. David Fernyhough, head of Hong Kong-based risk management company Hill and Associates, said a probe into the leader of a regional organised crime syndicate had uncovered a complex web of counter- feiting, arms dealing, people smuggling, drug running and links to terrorist groups across Southeast Asia and the Middle East. He said the terror groups included Al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiah. Mr Fernyhough released the details yesterday to coincide with the visit of the FBI director Robert Mueller and said the investigation demonstrated the extent of the links between counterfeit- ing and terrorism. “We are investigating a major smuggling kingpin who is running a syndicate with operations in six countries, involving 50 individuals, four key players, using 70 front companies in multiple jurisdictions,” Mr Fernyhough said. “This syndicate is operating in the counterfeiting market, making enormous amounts of money which is being used to supply, fund and resource terror groups.” He said counterfeit products being smuggled out of China and the Philippines and through Hong Kong included cigarettes, designer wear, car parts and fake pharmaceutical goods. Mr Fernyhough, a former counter-terrorism agent with the Hong Kong government, said the finding of his firm’s private investigation had been referred to police and intelligence officials in several countries throughout Asia. “This clearly demonstrates the frightening extent to which terror groups are turning to the counterfeiting business to make their money and fund their campaigns,” he said. “There is no quick fix but it is a monumental problem that needs to be immediately addressed.”

Washing the money

Hong Kong police are also investigating potential terrorist and drug-trafficking links to an underground banking network after helping

130 TRIADS: FROM STREET LEVEL TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIME to smash a suspected $120 million international money-laundering racket operating out of the United Kingdom. Nine premises, including residential units and commercial locations, were raided across Hong Kong in June last year as part of a synchro- nised operation also involving police in Britain, America and Dubai. No arrests were made in Hong Kong, but documents were seized for further investigation, a police spokeswoman said. “The Narcotics Bureau was requested by its counterparts in the UK early last year to assist in the investigation of a suspected money- laundering case which occurred in the UK,” she said. “Initial inquiries showed that some bank accounts and companies in Hong Kong are involved in the case.” Narcotics Bureau Chief Superintendent Kenny Ip Lau-chuen said the ongoing investigation was exploring the links to the underground hawala banking system. The ancient system of underground or remittance banking has come under heavy scrutiny after it was revealed al-Qaeda terrorists relied heavily on the hawala network to transfer funds. Mr Ip said: “We are still investigating how the criminals made the money. But we do know there was a lot of money coming in from UK and some of that money was then being sent back across the world to all sorts of destinations.” Mr Ip said he was unable to reveal if the multimillion-dollar money trail was related to a terror network or drug traffickers. He said further raids in Hong Kong and abroad were expected. Detective Chief Inspector Paul Owen, of the Telford, Shropshire, branch of the British National Crime Squad in the English Midlands, said: “We believe that large sums of cash, in some cases tens of thousands of pounds, were paid into banks here and then transferred to Hong Kong. “It is still too early to give exact figures about the total sum of money involved, but our investigations would suggest that in excess of $120 million was processed.” Mr Owen said the suspected laundering operation might have been active for several years. It is believed that the alleged smuggling ring, thought to be centred on the West Midlands, saw large amounts of cash transferred abroad, mainly to Hong Kong and Dubai but also to at least 10 other unnamed countries.

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“Money laundering is the centre of organised crime. If we stamp on the people committing money laundering we will have a knock-on effect and a direct impact on organised crime,” Mr Owen said.

Spreading the tentacles

One very interesting case to surface last year was an investigation into the cold-blooded assassination of four men in Fiji. Like the layers of an onion skin, the deeper a international team of investigators including Interpol, Australian, Malaysian, Fijian and Hong Kong dug, the more it revealed about triad activities on a transnational scale.

Hong Kong triad link suspected in gangland-style shark fin murders Police investigating the execution-style killings of two Hong Kong businessmen in Fiji believe the men were victims of a gangland dispute over the billion-dollar-a-year shark fin trade between the city and the South Pacific. Four men were found murdered - all shot through the head from close range - at the Live Fish Export Fiji factory about 10km outside Suva on Friday afternoon. The victims were general manager Kwok Kaa-kee, 36, and business- man Chong Ho-kin, 23, both from Hong Kong; business partner Wu Guiuiu, 19, from the mainland; and security guard Rupeni Talakuli, 26, a Fijian. Hong Kong police and Interpol are helping with the investigation into what has been described as “a Chinese mafia or triad-related killing”. “It was a gruesome scene,” police spokesman Mesake Koroi said. “The bodies have not yet been moved from the factory ... there was a lot of blood.” He said it appeared the assassin used a pillow to muffle the sound of gunshots and all of the victims had been shot through the head from close range. “This was not random. This was a very clinical killing. The killer or killers placed a pillow over their face and, using a gun or spear gun, shot them all in the head,” Mr Koroi said. He rejected earlier reports that the victims were tortured before they were murdered. “There have been

132 TRIADS: FROM STREET LEVEL TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIME some reports of a struggle, and that the victims were locked in a freezer and tortured, but we do not believe this.” Mr Koroi said no murder weapon was found at the scene. The results of postmortem examinations are expected today. Two Chinese nationals, one believed to be from Taiwan and the other from Hong Kong, have been held for questioning in relation to the murder inquiry. Major crime detectives yesterday said the investigation centred on the highly lucrative shark fin industry operating out of the Fijian capital. They were interviewing key members of the trading community, most of whom are from Hong Kong and the mainland. “There are indications there has been some form of rivalry between these two Hong Kong businessmen and other shark fin producers over the price they have been paying for shark fin,” Mr Koroi said. “We are trying to work out how much of the gangland-style slayings are related to the Chinese mafia or Hong Kong triads. That is why we have asked Interpol and Hong Kong police to help.” Two of the shooting victims were linked to the owner of the popular Phoenix Chinese restaurant in central Suva. The restaurant owner, who refused to give his name, yesterday told the Sunday Morning Post he was the father of the 19-year-old victim. He said he believed the murder was a “revenge killing”. He said no money was taken, indicating the motive was “cold- blooded murder”. “It [the killing] was because of business disputes with other Chinese people.” But he refused to elaborate on the nature of the dispute, saying he feared for his own life and the safety of his family and children. According to police, both Hong Kong victims had been due to fly home today to discuss “business opportunities in the South Pacific” with other partners. The men had only been in Fiji for two weeks trying to start up the fledgling fish factory operation. Trade in shark fins is a lucrative business. In Hong Kong, the world capital of shark fin cuisine, retail prices generally range from $300 a kilogram to $4,400, depending on the variety, while a bowl of shark fin soup can sell for up to $700.

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HK pair shot dead in Fiji are linked to money laundering Two Hong Kong men shot dead in Fiji in a gangland dispute surrounding the lucrative shark-fin trade have been linked to a series of shadowy money-laundering transactions in the South Pacific, according to police sources. Detectives investigating the killings have uncovered a series of large cash transactions and a paid shipment order to export two tonnes of shark fin to Hong Kong in connection with the two dead men. Hong Kong police and Interpol are assisting with the investigation into what has been described as “a Chinese mafia or triad-related killing”. Fijian authorities have detained two men, a Taiwanese and a mainland resident, and a manhunt is under way in the rugged interior for another mainland man. All three suspects are believed to be hired assassins. Four men were murdered in the dispute - general manager Kwok Kaa-kee, 36, and businessman Chong Ho-kin, 23, both from Hong Kong; business partner Wu Guiuiu, 19, from the mainland; and security guard Rupeni Talakuli, 26. All were shot through the head at the Live Fish Export Fiji factory about 10km outside Suva on August 22. The two Hong Kong men had been in Fiji for only two weeks and were trying to start up the fledgling fish factory operation. Senior police sources yesterday revealed the murdered men sparked a bitter gangland dispute when they attempted to undercut competitors. “We have been told they tried to revolutionise the whole export business in Fiji,” the source said. “Most of the other traders, mostly Hong Kong and Chinese busi- nessmen, are only paying about US$2 per kilogram for shark fin. But these guys were offering as much as US$6 per kilo ... we understand some of the Asian business people did not like this very much.” Postmortem examinations have revealed that the victims were killed with a .38 calibre semi-automatic pistol at point-blank range. In each case, an assassin used a pillow to muffle the sound of the gunshot. One of the Hong Kong men suffered a deep gash to the throat, in addition to being shot.

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The police source said the general manager was shot in the head, but the killers also symbolically burned a pile of local currency around his head. “We interpret this as being some symbolic ritual to show he was murdered because of the money,” the source said

Ice – and the big thaw

A sophisticated international drug syndicate financed out of Hong Kong - and linked to a $4.38 billion Ice haul - has been smashed after simultaneous raids in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Fiji. Four Hong Kong syndicate members in Fiji, two in Malaysia and one in North Point, Hong Kong, were among 14 people arrested in what investigators describe as one of the world's biggest drug busts last June. More than 60 officers from Hong Kong, Fiji, Australia and New Zealand raided an industrial estate and three homes in the Fijian capital of Suva, uncovering the largest crystal methamphetamine factory found in the southern hemisphere. Seven people, including four Hong Kong Chinese, were arrested and the factory had enough chemicals to produce 1,000kg of the popular party drug Ice in less than a fortnight. The drug would have had a street value of $4.38 billion. In Hong Kong, Narcotics Bureau officers raided several addresses, arresting one man and seizing $30 million in a suitcase - as well as jewellery and valuables. At the same time in Malaysia, six syndicate members were arrested, including two Hong Kong Chinese - a man and a woman. Chief Superintendent Kenny Ip Lau-chuen, head of the Hong Kong Narcotics Bureau, last night said the raids were the result of a 14-month covert investigation, dubbed Operation Outrigger. Mr Ip said the cartel was also involved in trafficking heroin, Ecstasy and cannabis in Australia, Asia and Europe. Fijian Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes said the drugs were destined for Asia, Europe, the US, Australia and New Zealand. “This [was] the largest clandestine laboratory ever discovered and disrupted in the southern hemisphere. [It] is a frightening example of 135 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES transnational organised crime elements using Fiji as a staging ground,” Mr Hughes said. Officers found drugs “bubbling away” in a warehouse stacked with drums of chemicals. An Asian expatriate is believed to have rented the warehouse. It was backed by “a cartel with Hong Kong and Malaysian connections ... the thing is being financed from Hong Kong”, Fijian police spokesman Mesake Koroi said. Tony O'Connor, Fiji’s director-general of customs, said the seven men arrested were expected to appear in court in Suva tomorrow. The factory could also have had a devastating environmental impact - for every 1kg of drugs made, 6kg of toxic waste was produced.

Don't send me to HK, begs “dead man walking”

Police say triad boss wanted over killings and car bombings faces certain death at hands of rivals A triad boss arrested in Malaysia is fighting moves to have him extradited to Hong Kong to face murder charges, because he is a “dead man walking” if he comes back, according to police. Chan Yiu-hong, also known as Kai Hong, fled Hong Kong more than 10 years ago after rival gangsters put out a contract on his life during a turf war in Wan Chai in the early 1990s. Chan has been lobbying Malaysian authorities to keep him in the country to avoid being returned to face “certain death”, Organised Crime and Triad Bureau (OCTB) sources have revealed. Justice and law-enforcement authorities are negotiating over the case. Chan is wanted in Hong Kong and Macau by police investigating a series of killings and car bombings. Malaysia has announced it plans to detain Chan - brother of the late “Tiger of Wan Chai”, Andely Chan Yiu-hing - for at least three years under the Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act following his arrest three months ago. Malaysian police suspect Chan is a ringleader of an international crime syndicate found operating an illicit

136 TRIADS: FROM STREET LEVEL TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIME drug factory in Fiji capable of producing billions of dollars worth of the party drug Ice. “Chan is desperate not to come back to face trial in Hong Kong ... if he does he is a dead man walking,” a senior OCTB officer said. “He has a contract out on his head and faces certain death if he ever sets foot in Hong Kong again. “He was involved in a particularly bloody power struggle between triads, and after he escaped he was told never to come back.” The Sun Yee On triad boss fled to Malaysia more than a decade ago, establishing himself in drug trafficking, gaming, prostitution and extortion rackets. He eluded the authorities by travelling on passports from the Republic of Nauru and from Gambia, sources said. According to the New Straits Times, Chan had a reputation in Kuala Lumpur as a big spender, blowing more than HK$100,000 in a night out on the town. Many of his friends were unaware of his underworld role, believing him to be a property speculator with a penchant for expensive watches and luxury cars, the paper said. Others knew him as a goldsmith, dealing in high-end ornaments and gemstones. Chief Superintendent Kenny Ip Lau-chuen, head of the Hong Kong Narcotics Bureau, told the Sunday Morning Post the raids that nabbed Chan and 13 other syndicate members in four countries were the result of a 14-month covert investigation, dubbed Operation Outrigger. He said the cartel was involved with heroin, Ecstasy and cannabis in Australia, Asia and Europe. Chan shot to prominence in Hong Kong's criminal fraternity when the murder of his brother - a 426 Red Pole officer [a rank for triad fighters] known as the “Tiger of Wan Chai” - left a power vacuum. His brother died on November 21, 1993, when three gunmen in motorcycle helmets opened fire as he left Macau's New World Emperor Hotel at 3.10am, hitting him in the head and chest. The 32-year-old was apparently killed in revenge for ordering the killing of 14K-affiliated film producer Wong Long-wai. Police believe Wong was shot dead for slapping the late Canto-pop songstress Anita

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Mui Yim-fong after she refused to sing during a celebration at a karaoke bar. Chan’s brother is believed to have infuriated rival triads by refusing to pay “compensation” for Wong’s death and by falsely bragging about being the hitman. The turf war between the Sun Yee On, Wo Hop To and Wunan gangs that followed his killing led to a bloody chopping in Lockhart Road, Wan Chai, which left six triad members in hospital. Following the chopping, the younger Chan fled to escape police and rival triads.

Fatman – China/India/ – Dea

China’s transnational criminal underworld has been served a strong warning with the arrests of four “untouchables” and the dismantling of one of the world's biggest drug smuggling rings, says a senior US agent. The latest intelligence showed the business of a number of interna- tional drug traffickers had suffered heavily as a result of raids by the first joint Sino-US drug taskforce on May 16, the Beijing-based officer said. He said simultaneous raids in Fujian, Yunnan, Guangdong and Hong Kong aimed at the highly organised crime ring known as the 125 group had sent shockwaves through the underworld, both in China and overseas. Crime bosses who previously thought themselves beyond the reach of international law were now scaling back smuggling operations in the region, he said. The raids resulted in the indictment of 25 people by Manhattan federal court. They are accused of smuggling more than 680kg of heroin out of the Golden Triangle, through China into the US since 2000. Among those arrested was the group's alleged leader, Wong Kin- cheung, also known as the Fatman. Wong, 56, a Hong Kong citizen, and his three partners, referred to as “the untouchables” because mainland authorities believed they would never be caught, are in detention awaiting trial on drug trafficking charges in Fuzhou. Under mainland law, they face the death penalty. 138 TRIADS: FROM STREET LEVEL TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

Three Hong Kong-based members of the 125 group were also arrested and are facing extradition to the US on charges of conspiring to commit an offence relating to dangerous drugs. Mak Kam-fai, 43, Tsui Yan-ko, 48, and Too Ka-keung, 35, are due to face committal proceedings on July 14. “It sends out a very strong message. A very powerful warning,” said the agent. “We were very fortunate in that we were able to pick up all the major players very quickly.” Agents in Canada, India and the US also led simultaneous drug raids. The agent said it was the first time Chinese drug lords had been found to be operating in India. “The case has resulted in the removal of a major threat. But it has also exposed how Chinese drug traffickers are looking to shift their operations away from the stringent law detection in this region and into the less traditional drug producing areas,” he said. “It shows [drug traffickers] are branching out, taking opportunities, and this is some- thing we must be aware of.”

Triad’s $8m casino scam is exposed in Australian court

A Hong Kong triad boss and heroin baron has been exposed as the mastermind of a card-dealing scam that fleeced Australia’s biggest casino out of more than HK$8 million. However, gangster Tong Ko-kon - jailed in Australia in 2001 for his part in a heroin ring - escaped further punishment as the croupier he recruited refused to give evidence against him. The failure to convince Tiffany Moss, a dealer at the Crown Casino in Melbourne, to testify against Tong at her Australian fraud trial last February has demonstrated the power the gangster apparently still wields from inside his maximum-security prison cell. Moss, 32, was sentenced to 15 months’ jail on February 5 for her role in one of the most complex scams in the casino industry. But police were unable to convict Tong, a female accomplice and another man who acted as the middleman between the croupier and Tong because of a lack of evidence, despite extensive video and audio surveillance. 139 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

A spokeswoman for the Australian Crime Commission yesterday was unable to expand on the investigation into Tong’s powerful Luen Ying She triad society. She was also unable to comment on the hunt for Tong's wife, Jenny Tsui Shuk-fan, a former Miss Hong Kong contestant, who is believed to be hiding in the special administrative region. Hong Kong police are investigating transactions of millions of dollars through Hong Kong banks allegedly linked to her. Tong’s role as the mastermind of the “very sophisticated” card shuffling scam was exposed during last week’s trial. The court heard Tong hatched the plan to turn the odds in his favour during his heady days as a high-roller, when he gambled A$360 million (HK$1.8 billion) in a two-year gambling spree on the baccarat tables of the Mahogany Room in the Crown Casino. Tong and his wife lived in the casino where they were feted with A$2.5 million worth of free food, flights, accommodation and gambling chips between August 1997 and July 1999. For her part, croupier Moss was paid A$20,000 to flash cards as she shuffled the deck at her baccarat table on July 26, 1998. Tong went on to win A$1.4 million, while other gamblers won A$400,000 by copying his bets. Moss’ irregular shuffles were captured by security cameras and the scheme was uncovered. However, the card-dealing scam was just a sideline to the billion- dollar drug-dealing and money-laundering business Tong ran from his suite at the casino. Just as casino staff picked up the baccarat scam, Tong was the subject of a major international narcotics sting involving Hong Kong and Australian agencies. In police surveillance tapes and videos between April and August 1999, Tong brazenly told of his plans to become Melbourne’s biggest heroin wholesaler. He was arrested in August 1999 after police found 6.8kg of heroin worth $28 million in the boot of his car. Tong was jailed for 16 years.

140

Debates

Notes on the Chinese communities in Burma and Thaïland

By Guy Lubeigt (CNRS-PRODIG) Member of the IRASEC Observatory on Illegal Migrations and Human Traffic in Southeast Asia

Concerning these communities I would like to make two compa- rative remarks : one concerns Thaïland and the other concerns Burma.

1 ) When we speak about the Chinese in this country there is a sort of taboo. As people in general do not like too much to speak about the Chinese during conversations with strangers some subjects concerning that community are never mentionned or are systematically concealed. The reason for such a discreet attitude is obvious. For most of the foreigners the inhabitants of Thailand are “Thaïs”, and there are but few mentions of the Chinese as a distinct group of population or inhabitants of the kingdom. To be fair the other ethnic groups composing the population are also ignored. In the north nearly one million of hill tribes people (Akha, Karen, Lishu, Hmong, Miao, etc) are often denied the Thaï nationality. Nevertheless one can safely assume that a large portion -if not the majority- of the so-called “thaï”population is unmistakably either ethnically purely chinese or mixed blood, with the exception of the eastern part of the country (Isan) where physical Khmer characters are dominant. Thaïs of chinese ancestry are so well integrated into the society, sometimes for generations, that they identify themselves as “Thaïs.” Naturally by underlying this wellknown facts I do not wish to make any sort of unpleasant racist remark about the Sino- Thaïs, I only try to describe a situation that anybody familiar with continental indochina can witness in Thaîland. Many books deal with the

143 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES historical presence and integration of the chinese in the kingdom of Thaïland. As they are of easy access in the libraries and bookshops anybody can find references on that abundant and well documented literature.23

When we live here, we can see that the Chinese presence is conspicuous. We don’t need to go far : let’s start with the Chinese cimetary which is right in front of the entrance of this venue (Sofitel Hotel), and right in the middle of the business center of Bangkok (the quadrilater defined by the roads Sathorn, Charoen Krung, Si Phraya and Rama IV). The capital of Thailand itself is by no mean a “Thaï” town : it can be characterized as a Chinese town. Not because of its urban landscape, which tends to globalisation (skyscrapers are everywhere in asian metropolis), but because it is mainly inhabited by ethnically chinese people. Bangkok was already described as such at the beginning of last century.24 Not solely because of the existence of a famous “Chinatown” in the historical center of the city. Other countries also, western included, have their ‘Chinatown.’

In Bangkok a very large number of shops, in every quarter of the city (and not only in Chinatown) can be attributed to chinese families. They display outside, above their door, small red stickers wishing luck to the owners, and inside the shop red painted altars (which can be installed on the floor level or fixed on the upper part of the wall) devoted to the worship of the ancestors of the shopkeepers. Meanwhile tall buildings bordering the avenues have their names inscribed in huge chinese characters which are fluorescent at night. During the annual celebrations of the Chinese New Year, Bangkok nearly seems to be a dead city : for about one week most of the government administration, shops, offices, trading and financial houses and banks are closed. Members of the chinese community, whether or not Thaïs by nationality, follow the tradition, participate actively to the festivities (Dragon dances,

23 Among the latest publications on the subject we can refer to the book of Arnaud Leveau : Le destin des fils du Dragon. L’influence de la communauté chinoise au Viêt Nam et en Thaïlande. Irasec-L’harmattan, Paris 2003, 287 p. 24 Lunet de Lajonquière, Le Siam et les siamois, 1904. White Orchid Press, Bangkok (Reprint 1986), p.8. 144 NOTES ON THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN BURMA AND THAILAND homages to ancestors, traditional cakes) and indulge in or outbound travels often to pay a visit to their elders or relatives left in China.

According to the statistics the size of that community appears modest when compared to the overall population of the country (66 millions). I don’t remember the actual figures,25 but in the sixties the percentage of chinese immigrants among the “Thaï” population was officially 8,5 %. It represented already the greatest concentration of ethnic chinese outside China. Since then one can can be sure that most of these immigrants have quietly acquired the Thaï nationality. They are so well integrated within the “Thaï” community as to dominate all the sectors of activities of the nation.26 Therefore we are not speaking about a small minority. I do believe that actually the bulk of the Thaïland’s population is mainly composed of ethnic chinese, whether old or recent immigrants, and sino-thais.

Another taboo in this country is not to mention clearly that there is a link between the thaï politics and the ethnic origin of the politicians who dominate the political scene. For instance it reminds me what happen when Prime Minister Banharn raise to power. For some reasons journalists enquired about its origins. They found that Banharn was born in China and came in Siam with his father –a chinese immigrant- when he was 8 years old. According to thaï law, as he was born in China, he should not have been entitled to become Prime Minister. Everybody in the political circle knew that Banharn had relatives in China and paid some visits to them after the establishment of diplomatic relations between this country and Thaïland (1975). The question was of importance and the newspapers made their front pages on the subject for a few days. Finally a birth certificate of Banharn was produced showing that he was born in Siam, in Suphanburi (an ancient town

25 Between 8 and 16 % (Leveau, 2003 : 1). This uncertainty concerning the real size of that community could allows us, within the frame of the present workshop, to consider it as a “grey community.” 26 On this topic the publications of Chris Baker and Paisuk Phongpaichit are deeply informative. Their latest book is a biography of the actual Prime Minister Thaksin. 145 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES situated in the central plain) which was described as the craddle of his family. Some claimed that the certificate produced was a forgery. Luckily no experts were called to check the authenticity of the document and the matter was quickly laid to rest. Banharn became Prime Minister. He was followed in that position by other Prime Ministers : Chavalit, Chuan and by the actual Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. All of them of Chinese ancestry like their predecessors Kriangsak and Chartchai, or the latest dictators Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapat. With such a background needless to say that a majority of the “Thaïs” politicians, bankers and high profile businessmen are of chinese ancestry.

So many “thaïs” people, whether powerful or modest, have Chinese ancestors in Thailand that, naturally, it is difficult for them to accuse their concurrents or partners to be not real “Thaïs,” especially when they, their own father or their spouse originated from China. Even if the migration of these ancestors took place a long time ago. Thus, when the matter of ethnic origin arise it is quickly buried because the whole society, or nearly all the society (the powerful, the businessmen, the banking, the big families, the monks) is concerned.

2 ) You mentioned yesterday that “when the Chinese move, they move with a lot of noise.” For Thailand we don’t see such a move because the Chinese are well integrated and the newcomers are quickly assimilated into the “Thaï.” After a few years they have their ways to acquire the Thaï citizenship and a thaï identity card. In Burma the current situation is different.

Until the annexion of the kingdom of Ava by the British on the first january 1886, the Burmese were mostly among themselves. Relations between Burmese kingdoms and China have been attested for over 1200 years, however, through the ages it seems that the chinese presence and influence have been kept at bay by the burmese community. During the second half of the 18th century the armies of the Burmese rulers were still strong enough to repulse three chinese invasions. Since the middle age period trading relations, especially with the caravans plying

146 NOTES ON THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN BURMA AND THAILAND between the highlands of Yunnan and the valley of the Irrawaddy, never ceased among the two neighbours who knew each other well. Burmese and Chinese even consider to be related by a sort of family link, called paukpaw. By the middle of the 19th century, although there was a chinese merchant settlement and a temple in the capital of Amarapura, few Chinese migrate to Burma and the size of their community remained it seems unsignificant.

The situation in central Burma changed with the colonial period (1886-1948), because the British, in need of clerks and manpower to administer their new colony, encouraged both chinese and mostly indian labourers to come to Burma. After independance the burmese nationalist feelings were running high and one of the first move of the newly founded Union of Burma was to check the nationality of its citizens. Most of the Chinese and Indians living in the country were recent migrants associated with the colonial power. Within a few years they were sent back to their respective countries. In 1952-1954 the Kouomintang invasion of the Shan States by the chinese nationalist troops increase the resentment of the Burmese against the chinese foreigners. By the end of the sixties and through the seventies each plane leaving Burma was carrying several chinese families hoping for a better future for their children in a western country.

Up to 1988 the burmese troops had a hard time in the Shan State, fighting this time against the Communist rebels of the BCP (Burma Communist Party) trained and equipped by the Chinese Communist Party. Finally a serie of violent battles between the burmese army and the rebels took place in the northern Shan State (Sisiwan) and the communists rebels were wiped out. Meanwhile the burmese socialist regime of General Ne Win, shaked by Union wide popular demonstrations, collapsed. It was replaced, on september 18 th, by a junta promissing to hold free and fair elections and to undertake a new policy founded on a liberal market economy. Unfortunately the true colour of the new military dictatorship was shown the next day : several hundred (possibly 3000) demonstrators claiming for the establishment of democracy were gunned down by the soldiers in Rangoon...That is the

147 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES reason why, by the end of 1988 nobody in the free world wanted to help the Burmese generals.

Meanwhile the Chinese were closely monitering the evolution of the burmese political scene. They probably compared the then situation in Beijing with what had taken place in Rangoon. In June 1989 it is known that the Burmese ambassador was received by the Chinese officials, three days before the Tien An Men’s massacre perpetuated on the chinese students. The radical burmese example could have inspired the Chinese to eliminate their student power. Consequently the relationships with Burma, strained for decades by the chinese support to the BCP troops, were overhauled. Close relations with the Burmese military leaders were reestablished.

Since then China has supported Burma with arms, loans, grants, technicians, engineers (building of bridges, factories, railways) in all its endeavours. Countless missions by chinese delegations, especially in the economic field, came to visit Burma and signed multiple trade agreements with the Military. Naturally these friendly relationships between the two regimes have changed the way the Burmese were looking at the Chinese. They are not anymore perceived as a threat to the Union. New border checkpoints have been opened and border trade initiated in 1988-89 have developped may folds. The road between Mong La and Tachileck has been upgraded (with chinese money, mechanical equipment, engineers and workers) and, through the Eastern Shan State and its capital Kengtung, the Thaï border can presently be reached by 20 tons trucks within five hours. Following the trade development the Chinese migrants (workers, traders, drivers and gamblers), clearly encouraged by the burmese military policy, have been pouring into Burma and began to settle down in the Shan State and Mandalay.

This is the reason why, for six or seven years, I’ve been witnessing, especially in Mandalay (historical capital of the Burmese kingdom) and Rangoon, the results of this new chinese migration, especially in the urban architecture. In the seventies Mandalay (founded by King Mindon in 1853) was a traditional asian town, with small wooden buildings in the popular quarters and brick houses, not very high though, in the

148 NOTES ON THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN BURMA AND THAILAND wealthier ones. The recent massive arrival of Chinese migrants has completely modified the picture. This movement has generated a deep change in the urban architecture and the landscape of Mandalay. Numerous new buildings have been constructed and keep popping up everywhere. The main feature is that the town starts to rise up. Huge constructions can be seen everywhere, the same type of buildings that you can see in China. These are concrete big blocks of over ten floors. Like in China they are usually of dark grey colour and the buildings differ slightly from one another.

Simple enquiries reveal that the owners of these blocks are Chinese. In some quarters chinese families (officially identified as “Shan nationals”) have bought plots of land and constructed spacious villas such as those build in the wellknown VIP quarter contiguous to the road to Maymyo-Lashio-Chinese border. The movement of construction and transfer of landownership is so strong that it has now spread to the all town. To accomodate this urban change, part of the Burmese population, which was living traditionally in the central part of Mandalay (around the Zegyo market), have been encouraged to sale its land to the Chinese and move away. New settlements have been created by the authorities on the eastern side of the old agglomeration. They are now constituted into two townships called “Mandalay New Town.” The change is of importance for the old inhabitants of Mandalay : the Burmese citizens found themselves to live now on the outskirts of Mandalay. They migrate to the outskirts of the city while they are replaced in the center by wealthy Chinese merchants. The more the Chinese settle in the central part the more the Burmese, who are offered attractive prices (for burmese standard) to sale their landholdings, move to the outskirts. 27

I can give an example of this movement. In the south of the old palace, near a new market (Yadapon Zay) a very wealthy Chinese, recently arrived from Yunnan, has bought a piece of land to settle down.

27 The same phenomenon has been observed in Chiang Mai, Thailand. See Lubeigt : “Traditional and recent aspects of the urban development of Chiang Maï” (117-134) in Cultural Identity and Urban Change in Southeast Asia : Interpretative Essays. Deakin University Press, 1994 , 252 pages. 149 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

This person has been powerful enough to have some buildings demolished to build his own villa. The villa is surrounded by a lawn turned into botanical garden and protected by walls. Some coconut trees have been planted in the garden to show that the owner is somehow an ecologist.The house is fully equipped with modern and luxuous apparatus in each room (kitchen, fitness room, three salons for receptions and so on). During my visit, made with the approval of the landlady, I was very surprised by the fantastic luxury : marble flooring on the ground floor, golden teak upstairs, huge chinese vases for decoration and so on. To say the least the contrast was big between the traditional Mandalay where Burmeses used to live in tiny houses, and the sudden irruption of such wealthy Chinese gentleman who had so much money that he could build this marvellous dwelling. Here we rejoin the topic of our meeting and the question of the so-called “laundering” (just business as usual for the chinese living in these areas) should be raised.

Thus, the Chinese migration in Burma is going on strongly and very fast. However the urbanization of Mandalay is but the first stage of the movement. The urban lansdscape is also quickly changing in Rangoon where Chinese buildings, banks, businesses, restaurants, and even Chinese dentists are also thriving in Pansodan Street. It appears that for the Chinese Burma plays presently wittingly the role of a “Far South.” The study of their influence on the country and its inhabitants is therefore fundamental to understand the prospects of the Union of Burma in Southeast Asia.

150

Notes on the foreign mafias in Thailand

By Jean Baffie, CNRS, Director of the Research Institute on Southeast Asia (IRSEA), University of Provence, Marseille, France.

I will be very brief. I found yesterday night newspaper clippings in a Thai-language economic weekly magazine … and it illustrates very well that Thai people and some newspapers try to minimise, lessen the importance of the Chinese mafia. The title in Thai is “mafia tang prathet tem mueang” and you can translate as “Foreign mafias fill the city or the country” because mueang is both the city and the country. And this is an official report from, I think, the Security Unit. And it lists 22 mafias or gangs, the Thai term kaeng is taken from the English term “gang”. And the first one is not the Chinese, it’s the German mafia, the German, well it’s written gang mafia … so it’s German mafia. The second one is the Russian one, the third is Korean, the fourth is Philippino, the fifth is, well, this is strange – Austrian, the sixth is Pakistani, the seventh is Burmese, the eighth is the English mafia, the ninth is Holland – Dutch, the tenth is Danish, Denmark, the eleventh is South African, the twelfth is Nigerian, the thirteenth is Chinese. It’s written mafia… Then you find Indian, Nepali, Malaysian, Senegalese, Kuwaitian, Libyan, Uzbek, Liberian, and the 22nd Sri-Lankan. Well, you can see that, there is another sentence following, I cannot find it, but well, dangerous gangs or mafias are said to be mafias from South Asia, that is to say, Pakistani, Indian, then Russian and Chinese. But I found many newspaper clippings, the

151 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES other one is in English and is from The Bangkok Post published in 1996 and it’s about Indian or South Asian gangs, but the title is foreign gangs, and you guess you will find an article on all the foreign gangs in Thailand, but it’s only about South Asian gangs. And those who have been in Thailand for some time know that from time to time the press, TV and people talk about the most dangerous foreign gangs of the moment and it’s very rarely about Chinese gangs. A few years ago we could think that the most dangerous gang leader in Pattaya was a German one and almost at the same time in Bangkok we could realise that it was an Indian one. So it’s just to show you that it’s a very important meeting because we certainly know that Chinese Triads and mafias are very powerful and serious ones but maybe others think differently.

152

Historical memorandum on the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia

By Alain Forest Professor at the Paris VII University

As an introduction to the second day, Alain Forest warns against the unfair association that can be made between the Chinese presence on the one hand, and illegal or underground activities on the other.

That all the Chinese more or less belong to mafias is an old cliché, arising particularly from the existence of an organization (sometimes under colonial impulsion as in French Indochina) of congregations generally based on the origin of Chinese immigrants; a cliché that is obviously reinforced by the very real existence and activities of secret societies.

We must not forget, however, that Chinese immigration in Southeast Asia is a very old phenomenon- attested as early as the late 13th century at Angkor, by Tcheou Ta Kouan. And that it has prevailed from that time in the whole of Southeast Asia. In itself, such immigration was apparently not illegal. Also, we hardly find any trace of massive extermination attacks on the Chinese quarters by the local population, the great exterminations recorded by history are those by the Spanish in Manila, and the Dutch in Batavia, both fearing the dynamism and the arrival of new immigrants as well as a threat to their political and economic power. On the contrary, the Chinese were well received by the

153 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES local authorities who thus maintained an economic duality that they found entirely profitable: for the people of the country, agriculture and administration; for the Chinese – and other foreigners –, business, the profits from which they shared with the local chief who consequently gained considerable more income and hence power.

As suggested above, for a long time, the Chinese were not the only foreign traders in the Southeast Asian countries. The business initiative was shared mostly with Muslim traders from Indian Ocean countries and with European traders, until the Dutch gained control of the islands, for one thing, and the power of the English and French grew in India, for another. This led to the eviction – rapid, from the late 17th century – of the Muslim traders. Hence the Chinese were more or less the only ones to "monopolize" business activities. In reality, they mainly operated low- profit business lines – even in Batavia where the Dutch let them operate not very profitable business lines for the Westerners, such as the Batavia- Tonkin line… The Chinese specialized in business in Southeast Asia, not because of an atavistic inclination for all sorts of trafficking– as western clichés lead one to believe – but rather because of local chiefs’ interests for commercial operations as also the lack of interest on the part of Westerners for low-profit businesses (in this case, the western powers found it more interesting to tax the Chinese traders…).

Let us not forget that, in parallel, there were major immigration movements of Chinese agriculturists – who, for example, developed river-bank cultivation along the Mekong or pepper cultivation in the Kampot-Hatien region …

As the immigrants were essentially men at a time when, despite their hopes, it was difficult to find ways and means to return to their own country, there was a lot of inter-marriage. It was essentially under the impulsion of the Westerners that the Chinese presence would be made instrumental, by the clear differentiation (in the form of census, of grouping into congregations, special taxes or even via a massive immigration of labor for plantations) between natives and Chinese, which allowed to put the Chinese into non-native categories, that is, “temporary", “profiteers” and " potential danger ".

154 HISTORICAL MEMORANDUM

For an analysis of the mafia and underworld systems to be truly relevant, it must avoid repeating clichés that evoke fantasy and coercion techniques through discrimination28.

28 - General studies on the Chinese in Southeast Asia: V. Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, London, Oxford University Press, 1965; G.W. Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand. An Analytical History, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1957; W.E. Wilmott, The Chinese in Cambodia, Vancouver, University of British Columbia, 1967. 155

Links between Organized Crime and terrorist networks

by Philippe Migaux Chief police superintendent, French Embassy in Malaysia

I would like to tell you a word about what I think of the links between Organized Crime and terrorist networks. Because a lot of people pretend there are strong links between Organised Crime and terrorist networks, which is absolutely wrong. Both are professional, but they have not the same goals. Terrorist organizations can receive the help of petty delinquent groups, but not share their activities with organized criminal networks.

First idea, for discussing about that, we have to come back to some definitions of the problem. Even for words as simple as terrorism or crime, definitions are not very clear.

What is terrorism? It’s a strategy and it’s a method.

First, terrorism is a strategy : If you are a state and want to fight against an other state, you make war. If you are an organization that has the support of part of the population and the control of part of the territory, you can practise guerrilla. If you are just a group that has no support of the population and no territory control , you only do terrorism.

157 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Secondly, terrorism is a method. A sure way to threaten population for pushing the authorities to negotiate. It is true that terrorism was used, by organised criminal organizations or by guerrilla movements, but at very specific moments.

Remember what happened in Colombia in 1986. At this moment, a treaty of extradition was negotiated between the USA and Colombia, aiming particularly the drug leaders of the Cali Cartel. But these people were in connection with the most important guerrilla group, called the “Columbian Revolutionary Armed Forces” (CRAF), that was paid for protecting the cocaine laboratories. The leaders of the Cali Cartel tried to negotiate with the government for preventing the final signature of the Extradition treaty, they even proposed to reimburse themselves the amount of the Columbian international debt. Of course, authorities refused. So the Cali cartel adopted a last strategy to force the government to negotiate. They used the CRAF militants to launch terrorist actions. At first, a mass slaughter operation, with hiding a bomb in a plane of Avianca Airlines, that killed more than 130 passengers and crew members. Then a more targeted action, with the assault of the Court of Justice in Bogota and the assassination of more than 30 judges, most of them working on drug cases. But it was a failure and the treaty was adopted by the parliament.

Remember what happened in Italy in 1991. After operation “Mano Pulite” (clean hands) in 1993, when hundreds of Cosa Nostra members were arrested by the security forces. To assassinate Italian judges, as it had been commited in the past years, was no longer enough to stop the judicial investigations. So Toto RINA, the leader of Cosa Nostra, ordered to launch spectacular operations in the main towns of Italy. Rome and Florence were targeted. But it had for main result to strengthen the support of the population in favour of the struggle against the Organized Crime. And Toto RINA was finally arrested some months later, isolated in his Sicilian hideout.

What do these two examples prove? It shows that the use of terrorist methods by Organized Crime is a demonstration of deep weakness. Organized Crime is part of the society. It doesn’t want to

158 LINKS BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST NETWORKS change it, it wants to grow up inside. And to integrate its illegal revenues inside the legal economic system. So, its main interest is a quiet domestic situation, where it can slowly corrupt and infiltrate the levels of power. That’s not the choice of terrorist movements that want to create chaos inside a country, because they want to create a new society.

Second idea, I would like to explain you how Jihadi groups use criminal methods to finance their actions. The international Jihad began really with the war in Afganistan against the soviet invaders. Around thirty thousand volunteers came from all the Muslim world to help the struggle of the Afghan mujahiddeen. Most of them didn’t fight directly, but all had the feeling to belong to a new Muslim Army, whose aim was to reconquer the lands of the Umma, the Muslim community. They really believed that the victory in Aghanistan was not the result of the help of the United States, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, but was obtained because it was the will of God. So, with the help of God, they would be able in the future to free any Muslim countries ruled by the unfaithfull people

Since the beginning of the 1990’s, jihadi networks used three different ways for financing their terrorist activities.

The first one was the misappropriation of the funds given by the Wahhabi NGOs. These NGOs played an important role during the Afghanistan war. After 1989, they found new lands of jihad for spreading their ideology.

A lot of Wahhabi NGOs coming from the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, went to work in Bosnia in 1993. The two most important of them were Al Haramein and the International Islamic Relief organization (IIRO). Of course they had real charity activities for the Muslims. Most of their money were used for building mosque and Coranic schools, for supplying food to civilian populations, for giving direct medical assistance to people that were hurt by the war, for managing refugee camps… But they dindn’t work only for humanitarian goals. They also had direct links with terrorist activities. They provided weapons, explosives and ammunitions. They recruited, as local members

159 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES of staff, foreigner volunteers belonging to radical Muslim groups. They provided them NGO’s identity cards, they autorized them to drive NGO’s cars for their clandestine needs. In Bosnia were seized many boxes, officially carrying First Aid, but hiding in fact grenades or AK47.

And the activities of IIRO in Philippines must not be forgotten. Its local representative was the Saudi National Jamel KHALIFA. He was not only an Afghan veteran, he was the own brother in law of Oussama BEN LADEN. He played an important role for the creation of Abou Sayyaf Group, then for the settlement of a Jammah Islammiyah training camp (Hudaybiah camp) in Mindanao.

The same situation happened in Chechenya,. The Wahhabi mujahideen, leaded by the Checheni Chamil BASSAIEV and the Saudi Ibn Khattab, received an important financial help from the Saudi NGOs.

That is the reason why, under international pressure, Saudi authorities decided to better control the activities of their NGOs. On June 2, 2004, Saudi Arabia announced the dissolution of the NGO Al Haramein, whose activities were given to a government organization, the Civil Council for the Help and Charity Works Abroad. t But the other ones stay very active : I.I.R.O. is today a real holding that controls investment companies, companies marketing pharmaceutical products and many other activities. The organization created a financial foundation, SANABELL AL KHAIR, located in Jeddah, to manage its funds and to secure stable incomes. It is active in over 80 countries with a budget exceeding 500 millions dollars. Generally speaking, its funds pass through AL RAJHI, the Saudi bank with an Islamic status. But anyway, contrarily to what happens with organized crime, there is no money laundering with the NGO’s. It is white money given by rich donators of the Middle east. It is a legal money whose a part disappear for an illegal use.

The second way how Jihadi groups finance their activities was provided directly by Al Qaida. But only for the main operations. For the bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi and DaarEs Salam in August 1998, for the four suicide attacks of 9/11 in the US. Al Qaida even

160 LINKS BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST NETWORKS provided at least 35.000 $ to Jammah Islammiyah for the Bali bombings in October 2003.

Sometimes, Al Qaida used the banking system, sometimes it used the “Alhawa” financial system which is more difficult to trace, but in most of cases human couriers brought discretely the money in cash.

But thirdly, in most of cases, local Jihadi groups searched to obtain themselves the money. And how do their self-finance their activities? By the use of criminal ways.

What are the main criminal methods of the Jihadi groups? Burglaries, fake documents trafficking, robberies - including in some cases bank robberies -. But since the end of the 90s the most important work is credit card trafficking. Because with the credit card trafficking you can earn quickly a lot of money. One of the specialities of the European cells was to rent expensive cars in rental cars companies such Avis, and to keep them for selling them to criminal gangs for the third of the value.

Contrarily to what is often written, jihadi networks don’t sell drugs for one reason. They could earn a lot of money but they risk to lose the discipline of their members. Specially in Europe where a lot of jihadi militants are former petty delinquents and, for a part, former drug addicts

In Islam, to commit crime is forbidden. So Jihadi militants refer to a special Fatwa (Islamic judgement) that is called the Ghanima (the “legal exception”). It authorises to commit illegal actions, that’s to say criminal actions, if it’s committed against the non-Muslims for the benefit of the Jihadi cause. In South East Asia, specially in Indonesia, it is called “Fa’i”.

One of the masterminds of Bali bombings, Iman SAMUDRA – sentenced to death - wrote recently a book. There is a complete chapter about the use of criminal means for finding logistical supports. For preparing its main terrorist attacks, JI had to complete the financing with criminal operations. example if you remember what happened in the

161 THE GREY AREAS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES main Jammah Islammiya actions you remember that at each time they need money and this money was found by criminal operation. For Bali bombings, a jewellery was robbed, for Mariott Hotel bombing a bank was attacked in Semarang… They were not isolated case. The local Jihadi group in Malaysia, the Kampulan Militant Malaysia, was dismantled in June 2001 because its members robbed two banks and a jewellery. During the robbery of the jewellery, two of the attackers were shot down and the third one was arrested. He quickly confessed to be a KMM member.

Question

Is there any connection between the Chinese gangs and some terrorist group?

There is no direct connection. But in Thailand , Jihadi networks had a specific interest about one specific criminal activity. Since 1998, 80 % of the fake French or Belgian travel documents used by the Al Qaida networks in Europe were made in Thailand. Why were they using French documents? Because most of Al Qaida militants in Europe were Algerian, or Moroccan, or Tunisian and they spoke French. So they wanted to use French or Belgium identities for travelling abroad

But investigations proved that, in Thailand, there was no Jihadi network, specialised in Fake documents trafficking. The fake documents are made by specialists, mainly Iranians or Pakistanis. These people sell to everybody, including some people from north African countries who were in the past involved in Jihadi activities and fled to Thailand for seeking an asylum. These men are the contacts of the European Al Qaida groups. And the Al Qaida groups orders them fake documents in large quantities. If they need 100 fake documents for their own militants, they are going to buy 1000 and they will sell the other 900 to illegal immigrants in Europe.

162

General Bibliography

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Other books in English published by Irasec

A Roof Over Every Head - Singapore’s Housing Policy between State Monopoly and Privatisation, by Wong Tai-Chee & Xavier Guillot, Irasec-Sampark, 2005, ISBN 81-7768-009-9.

Aceh - History Unfinished, by Jean-Claude Pomonti & Voja Miladinovic, Irasec-Aux Lieux d’Etre, 2005, ISBN 2-916063-01-3.

East Timor - A Country at the Crossroads of Asia and the Pacific - A Geo-historical Atlas, by Frederic Durand, Irasec-Silkworm Books, 2006, ISBN 974-9575-98-9.

Laos - From Buffer State to Crossroads?, by Vatthana Pholsena & Ruth Banomyong, Mekong Press, 2006, 974-94805-0-3.

The Muslims of Thailand, by Michel Gilquin, Irasec-Silkworm Books, 2005, ISBN 974-9575-85-7.

Yaa Baa - Production, Traffic and Consumption of Methamphetamine in Mainland Southeast Asia, by Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy & Joel Meissonnier, 2004, ISBN 9971-69-278-3.

Sudestasia, the Irasec's newsletter in English, can be dowloaded from our website: http://www.irasec.com/en/documents.php

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