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Security Guide for Cisco Unified Communications Manager, Release 12.5(1)

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Security Guide for Cisco Unified Communications Manager, Release 12.5(1) Security Guide for Cisco Unified Communications Manager, Release 12.5(1) First Published: 2019-01-23 Last Modified: 2021-08-09 Americas Headquarters Cisco Systems, Inc. 170 West Tasman Drive San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA http://www.cisco.com Tel: 408 526-4000 800 553-NETS (6387) Fax: 408 527-0883 THE SPECIFICATIONS AND INFORMATION REGARDING THE PRODUCTS IN THIS MANUAL ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. ALL STATEMENTS, INFORMATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS MANUAL ARE BELIEVED TO BE ACCURATE BUT ARE PRESENTED WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. USERS MUST TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR APPLICATION OF ANY PRODUCTS. THE SOFTWARE LICENSE AND LIMITED WARRANTY FOR THE ACCOMPANYING PRODUCT ARE SET FORTH IN THE INFORMATION PACKET THAT SHIPPED WITH THE PRODUCT AND ARE INCORPORATED HEREIN BY THIS REFERENCE. IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO LOCATE THE SOFTWARE LICENSE OR LIMITED WARRANTY, CONTACT YOUR CISCO REPRESENTATIVE FOR A COPY. The Cisco implementation of TCP header compression is an adaptation of a program developed by the University of California, Berkeley (UCB) as part of UCB's public domain version of the UNIX operating system. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1981, Regents of the University of California. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER WARRANTY HEREIN, ALL DOCUMENT FILES AND SOFTWARE OF THESE SUPPLIERS ARE PROVIDED “AS IS" WITH ALL FAULTS. CISCO AND THE ABOVE-NAMED SUPPLIERS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THOSE OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OR ARISING FROM A COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE, OR TRADE PRACTICE. IN NO EVENT SHALL CISCO OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY INDIRECT, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, LOST PROFITS OR LOSS OR DAMAGE TO DATA ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THIS MANUAL, EVEN IF CISCO OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. Any Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and phone numbers used in this document are not intended to be actual addresses and phone numbers. Any examples, command display output, network topology diagrams, and other figures included in the document are shown for illustrative purposes only. Any use of actual IP addresses or phone numbers in illustrative content is unintentional and coincidental. All printed copies and duplicate soft copies of this document are considered uncontrolled. See the current online version for the latest version. Cisco has more than 200 offices worldwide. Addresses and phone numbers are listed on the Cisco website at www.cisco.com/go/offices. Cisco and the Cisco logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Cisco and/or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. To view a list of Cisco trademarks, go to this URL: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/legal/trademarks.html. Third-party trademarks mentioned are the property of their respective owners. The use of the word partner does not imply a partnership relationship between Cisco and any other company. (1721R) © 2019 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. CONTENTS PREFACE Preface xvii Purpose xvii Audience xviii Organization xviii Related Documentation xx Conventions xx Obtain Documentation, Support, and Security Guidelines xx Cisco Product Security Overview xxi PART I Security Basics 23 CHAPTER 1 Security Overview 1 Terms and Acronyms 1 System Requirements 6 Features List 6 Security Icons 7 Interactions and Restrictions 8 Interactions 8 Restrictions 9 Authentication and Encryption 9 Barge and Encryption 10 Wideband Codecs and Encryption 10 Media Resources and Encryption 10 Phone Support and Encryption 11 Phone Support and Encrypted Setup Files 11 Security Icons and Encryption 11 Security Guide for Cisco Unified Communications Manager, Release 12.5(1) iii Contents Cluster and Device Security Modes 12 Digest Authentication and Encryption 12 Packet Capturing and Encryption 12 Best Practices 13 Device Resets, Server and Cluster Reboots, and Service Restarts 13 Reset Devices, Servers, Clusters, and Services 14 Media Encryption with Barge Setup 14 CTL Client, SSL, CAPF, and Security Token Installation 15 TLS and IPSec 15 Certificates 15 Phone Certificate Types 16 Server Certificate Types 18 Support for Certificates from External CAs 19 Authentication, Integrity, and Authorization 20 Image Authentication 20 Device Authentication 20 File Authentication 21 Signaling Authentication 21 Digest Authentication 21 Authorization 23 Encryption 24 Secure End Users Login Credentials 24 Signaling Encryption 24 Media Encryption 25 AES 256 Encryption Support for TLS and SIP SRTP 26 AES 256 and SHA-2 Support in TLS 27 AES 256 Support in SRTP SIP Call Signaling 27 Cisco Unified Communications Manager Requirements 28 Interactions and Restrictions 28 AES 80-Bit Authentication Support 29 Self-encrypting drive 29 Configuration File Encryption 30 Encrypted iX Channel 30 Security Guide for Cisco Unified Communications Manager, Release 12.5(1) iv Contents Encryption Modes 31 Non-Encrypted Modes 31 NMAP Scan Operation 32 Set Up Authentication and Encryption 32 Cipher Management 35 Recommended Ciphers 36 Configure Cipher String 37 Cipher Limitations 39 Cipher Restrictions 49 Where to Find More Information 49 CHAPTER 2 Hypertext Transfer Protocol Over Secure Sockets Layer (HTTPS) 51 HTTPS 51 HTTPS for Cisco Unified IP Phone Services 53 Cisco Unified IP Phones that Support HTTPS 53 Features That Support HTTPS 53 Cisco Unified IP Phone Services Settings 53 Enterprise Parameter Settings for HTTPS Support 56 Save Certificate to Trusted Folder Using Internet Explorer 8 56 Copy Internet Explorer 8 Certificate to File 57 First-Time Authentication for Firefox with HTTPS 58 Save Certificate to Trusted Folder Using Firefox 3.x 58 Copy Firefox 3.x Certificate to File 59 First-Time Authentication for Safari with HTTPS 60 Save Certificate to Trusted Folder Using Safari 4.x 60 Copy Safari 4.x Certificate to File 61 Where to Find More Information About HTTPS Setup 62 CHAPTER 3 Default Security Setup 63 Default Security Features 63 Trust Verification Service 64 TVS Description 64 Initial Trust List 64 Security Guide for Cisco Unified Communications Manager, Release 12.5(1) v Contents Initial Trust List Files 65 ITL File Contents 65 ITL and CTL File Interaction 66 Certificate Management Changes for ITLRecovery Certificate 66 ITLRecovery Certificate 66 Interactions and Restrictions 67 Update ITL File for Cisco Unified IP Phones 67 Autoregistration 68 Obtain ITL File Status 68 Obtain Cisco Unified IP Phone Support List 68 ECDSA Support for Common Criteria for Certified Solutions 69 Certificate Manager ECDSA Support 69 SIP ECDSA Support 69 CAPF ECDSA Support 70 Entropy 71 HTTPS Support for Configuration Download 71 CTI Manager Support 72 Certificate Regeneration 72 Regenerate CAPF Certificate 72 Regenerate TVS Certificate 73 Regenerate TFTP Certificate 73 Regenerate ITLRecovery Certificate 74 Tomcat Certificate Regeneration 75 System Back-Up Procedure After TFTP Certificate Regeneration 76 Refresh Upgrade From Cisco Unified Communications Manager Release 7.x to Release 8.6 Or Later 76 Roll Back Cluster to a Pre-8.0 Release 77 Switch Back to Release 8.6 or Later After Revert 78 Migrate IP Phones Between Clusters with Cisco Unified Communications Manager and ITL Files 79 Bulk Certificate Export 80 Generate Self-Signed Certificate 81 Self-signed Certificate Fields 81 Generate Certificate Signing Request 83 Certificate Signing Request Fields 84 Security Guide for Cisco Unified Communications Manager, Release 12.5(1) vi Contents Interactions and Restrictions 85 Reset CTL Localkey 86 View the Validity Period of ITLRecovery Certificate 86 Contact Search Authentication Task Flow 87 Confirm Phone Support for Contact Search Authentication 87 Enable Contact Search Authentication 88 Configure Secure Directory Server for Contact Search 88 CHAPTER 4 Cisco CTL Client Setup 89 About Cisco CTL Setup 89 Addition of Second SAST Role in the CTL File for Recovery 91 SIP OAuth Configuration Through CLI 91 Activate Cisco CTL Provider Service 92 Cisco CAPF Service Activation 93 Set up Secure Ports 93 Set Up Cisco CTL Client 94 SAST Roles of CTL File 96 Migrate Phones from One Cluster to Another Cluster 97 Migration from eToken-based CTL File to Tokenless CTL File 98 Update CTL File 98 Update Cisco Unified Communications Manager Security Mode 99 Cisco CTL File Details 100 Verify Cisco Unified Communications Manager Security Mode 101 Set Up Smart Card Service to Started or Automatic 101 Verify or Uninstall Cisco CTL Client 102 CHAPTER 5 TLS Setup 103 TLS Overview 103 TLS Prerequisites 103 TLS Configuration Task Flow 104 Set Minimum TLS Version 105 Set TLS Ciphers 105 Configure TLS in a SIP Trunk Security Profile 105 Security Guide for Cisco Unified Communications Manager, Release 12.5(1) vii Contents Add Secure Profile to a SIP Trunk 106 Configure TLS in a Phone Security Profile 106 Add Secure Phone Profile to a Phone 107 Add Secure Phone Profile to a Universal Device Template 108 TLS Interactions and Restrictions 108 TLS Interactions 109 TLS Restrictions 109 PART II Certificates 115 CHAPTER 6 Certificate Overview 117 Certificates Overview 117 Third-Party CA-Signed Certificates 118 Certificate Signing Request Key Usage Extensions 119 Server Certificate Types 120 Administration Tasks for Certificates 121 Show Certificates 121 Download Certificates 121 Install Intermediate Certificates 121 Delete a Trust Certificate 122 Regenerate a Certificate 123 Certificate Names and Descriptions 124 Regenerate Keys for OAuth
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