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Schluss Mit Facebook: Fünf Whatsapp-Alternativen Im Überblick
https://futurezone.at/apps/schluss-mit-facebook-fuenf-whatsapp-alternativen-im-ueberblick/400529764 Apps 23.06.2019 Schluss mit Facebook: Fünf WhatsApp-Alternativen im Überblick Es gibt viele Gründe, WhatsApp abzulehen. Die richtige Messaging-Alternative zu finden, ist aber alles andere als leicht. Es gibt kaum eine App, die im Leben so vieler Menschen eine Rolle spielt wie Whatsapp. 2009 von Jan Koum und Brian Acton gegründet, entwickelte sich der Dienst rasant zu einer Konkurrenz für SMS und andere Messenger, die auf veraltete Protokolle setzten. Zu Beginn war die Anwendung nicht mehr als eine Art schwarzes Brett für Statusmeldungen. Nutzer konnten ihre Gedanken posten, Freunde hatten die Möglichkeit, diese Meldungen zu lesen. Mit der Zeit verwandelten die Entwickler ihre Erfindung in einen Kurznachrichtendienst. Die Vorteile von Whatsapp damals lagen auf der Hand: plattformübergreifende Kommunikation mit dem Smartphone und das auch noch kostenlos. Eine einfache Registrierung und der ebenfalls mögliche Austausch von Fotos und Videos taten das Übrige dazu. Seitdem ist viel Zeit vergangen und in der Welt von WhatsApp hat sich einiges getan. Nach der Übernahme durch Facebook für 19 Milliarden US-Dollar entstanden bei so manchem Nutzer Sorgenfalten. Der Umgang mit Nutzerdaten durch das soziale Netzwerk wurde schon damals kritisch beäugt. Befürchtungen, dass WhatsApp ein ähnliches Schicksal droht, waren alles andere als unbegründet. Zusicherungen, dass sich nichts verändert und die beiden Erfinder das Ruder in der Hand behalten würden, sollten besorgte Nutzer beruhigen. Auch die Implementierung von End-to-End-Verschlüsselung brachte etwas Ruhe. Mittlerweile sind die Gründer aus Unzufriedenheit nicht mehr bei Facebook am Werk, der Zuckerberg-Konzern hat mit der Verschmelzung seiner Plattformen begonnen und bald soll auch Werbung in der App erscheinen. -
Security Guide for Cisco Unified Communications Manager, Release 11.0(1) First Published: 2015-06-08
Security Guide for Cisco Unified Communications Manager, Release 11.0(1) First Published: 2015-06-08 Americas Headquarters Cisco Systems, Inc. 170 West Tasman Drive San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA http://www.cisco.com Tel: 408 526-4000 800 553-NETS (6387) Fax: 408 527-0883 THE SPECIFICATIONS AND INFORMATION REGARDING THE PRODUCTS IN THIS MANUAL ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. ALL STATEMENTS, INFORMATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS MANUAL ARE BELIEVED TO BE ACCURATE BUT ARE PRESENTED WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. USERS MUST TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR APPLICATION OF ANY PRODUCTS. THE SOFTWARE LICENSE AND LIMITED WARRANTY FOR THE ACCOMPANYING PRODUCT ARE SET FORTH IN THE INFORMATION PACKET THAT SHIPPED WITH THE PRODUCT AND ARE INCORPORATED HEREIN BY THIS REFERENCE. IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO LOCATE THE SOFTWARE LICENSE OR LIMITED WARRANTY, CONTACT YOUR CISCO REPRESENTATIVE FOR A COPY. The Cisco implementation of TCP header compression is an adaptation of a program developed by the University of California, Berkeley (UCB) as part of UCB's public domain version of the UNIX operating system. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1981, Regents of the University of California. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER WARRANTY HEREIN, ALL DOCUMENT FILES AND SOFTWARE OF THESE SUPPLIERS ARE PROVIDED “AS IS" WITH ALL FAULTS. CISCO AND THE ABOVE-NAMED SUPPLIERS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THOSE OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OR ARISING FROM A COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE, OR TRADE PRACTICE. IN NO EVENT SHALL CISCO OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY INDIRECT, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, LOST PROFITS OR LOSS OR DAMAGE TO DATA ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THIS MANUAL, EVEN IF CISCO OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. -
Communication and Security Survey Results from US, UK and German Business Leaders
The most secure collaboration platform. Communication and Security Survey results from US, UK and German business leaders Communication and Security Survey | wire.com | February 2019 1 An introduction Every year we ask executives about key topics - this year we chose to focus on communication, security, privacy, and regulation as these have been hot topics in 2018. We asked more than 300 executives from US and Europe about their views on these topics. In addition, please find at the end of this presentation my personal predictions for 2019. We trust you will enjoy the report. Morten Brøgger · CEO Best regards, Morten Brøgger Chief Executive Officer at Wire Communication and Security Survey | wire.com | February 2019 2 Are we still secure? Many organizations have been a …. want their organization to be more proactive victim of a cyberattack and not a 81% in the ways it protects its sensitive information, single respondent disagreed that communication, and/or data. cybersecurity is a major challenge for businesses. Yet while the challenges posed by cybersecurity are understood …. believe security and compliance are key by businesses, some organizations 79% parameters when selecting cloud business aren’t doing enough to prepare. In crisis solutions. situations, in particular, businesses have gaps in their ability to communicate internally and externally in a safe and secure way. …. of organizations don’t have or are unsure if they 38% have, a plan in case of a security breach. …. of respondents said it would be useful to be 83% able to extend a company's secure communication infrastructure to business partners and customers Communication and Security Survey | wire.com | February 2019 3 Emails are popular, Email remains a popular communication to changes in instant messaging but are they tool yet business leaders spend too technology, an overwhelming number much of their time using it. -
Security Analysis of the Signal Protocol Student: Bc
ASSIGNMENT OF MASTER’S THESIS Title: Security Analysis of the Signal Protocol Student: Bc. Jan Rubín Supervisor: Ing. Josef Kokeš Study Programme: Informatics Study Branch: Computer Security Department: Department of Computer Systems Validity: Until the end of summer semester 2018/19 Instructions 1) Research the current instant messaging protocols, describe their properties, with a particular focus on security. 2) Describe the Signal protocol in detail, its usage, structure, and functionality. 3) Select parts of the protocol with a potential for security vulnerabilities. 4) Analyze these parts, particularly the adherence of their code to their documentation. 5) Discuss your findings. Formulate recommendations for the users. References Will be provided by the supervisor. prof. Ing. Róbert Lórencz, CSc. doc. RNDr. Ing. Marcel Jiřina, Ph.D. Head of Department Dean Prague January 27, 2018 Czech Technical University in Prague Faculty of Information Technology Department of Computer Systems Master’s thesis Security Analysis of the Signal Protocol Bc. Jan Rub´ın Supervisor: Ing. Josef Kokeˇs 1st May 2018 Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Ing. Josef Kokeˇs,for his guidance, engagement, extensive know- ledge, and willingness to meet at our countless consultations. I would also like to thank my brother, Tom´aˇsRub´ın,for proofreading my thesis. I cannot express enough gratitude towards my parents, Lenka and Jaroslav Rub´ınovi, who supported me both morally and financially through my whole studies. Last but not least, this thesis would not be possible without Anna who re- lentlessly supported me when I needed it most. Declaration I hereby declare that the presented thesis is my own work and that I have cited all sources of information in accordance with the Guideline for adhering to ethical principles when elaborating an academic final thesis. -
Best Apps for Secret Texting
Best Apps For Secret Texting Ceremonial and plumbeous Duncan tyre so venomous that Marc complexions his fauna. Unsteady Antoine cark academically and eruditely, she consummating her latching concoct adequately. Unwept Erik pickaxes some usneas and advising his wraith so diversely! Therefore not safe the best texting app which private message A secret debate on your smartphone makes texting faster and easier by. Please do for secret best apps for texting between the secret chat with friends! Here's a Secret or Hide Text Messages on Your Android. Cheating Apps To splash For On old Phone In 2021 Highster Mobile. Instead of unwanted messages in the pin that emphasizes data for best apps secret texting app does. So i somehow feel is the secret best apps texting apps for your mates can also send voice messaging focused on both download an invalid number. Viber Viber is a messaging app with low cloak-and-dagger features like Secret Chats. Top 5 app to hide texts and calls on Android techlabuzzcom. CoverMe is by secret texting APP with marine grade encryption available since both Android and iOS devices With end-to-end encryption the text messages are highly secured so only nutrition and the person evil are communicating with can review what he sent totally safe from interception. OneOne is someone new app for Android and iOS that offers private and untraceable text messaging Photographer and entrepreneur Kevin Abosch is the wheat behind OneOne. Incognito mode allows you over be hidden on Confide so long can't we found by. 7 Secret Texting ideas alphabet code coding alphabet. -
Killer Apps: Vanishing Messages, Encrypted Communications, and Challenges to Freedom of Information Laws When Public Officials “Go Dark”
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET • VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2019 KILLER APPS: VANISHING MESSAGES, ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS, AND CHALLENGES TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAWS WHEN PUBLIC OFFICIALS “GO DARK” Dr. Daxton R. Stewart1 ABSTRACT Government officials such as White House staffers and the Missouri governor have been communicating among themselves and leaking to journalists using apps such as Signal and Confide, which allow users to encrypt messages or to make them vanish after they are received. By using these apps, government officials are "going dark" by avoiding detection of their communications in a way that undercuts freedom of information laws. This article explores the challenges presented by government employee use of encrypted and ephemeral messaging apps by examining three policy approaches: (1) banning use of the apps, (2) enhancing existing archiving and record-keeping practices, or (3) legislatively expanding quasi-government body definitions. Each of these approaches will be analyzed as potential ways to manage the threat presented by “killer apps” to open records laws. Keywords: government, encryption, messaging, freedom of information, record- keeping, communication, privacy 1 Ph.D., J.D., LL.M., Professor at Texas Christian University. JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET • VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2019 Killer Apps: Vanishing Messages, Encrypted Communications, and Challenges to Freedom of Information Laws when Public Officials “Go Dark” CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... -
Untraceable Links: Technology Tricks Used by Crooks to Cover Their Tracks
UNTRACEABLE LINKS: TECHNOLOGY TRICKS USED BY CROOKS TO COVER THEIR TRACKS New mobile apps, underground networks, and crypto-phones are appearing daily. More sophisticated technologies such as mesh networks allow mobile devices to use public Wi-Fi to communicate from one device to another without ever using the cellular network or the Internet. Anonymous and encrypted email services are under development to evade government surveillance. Learn how these new technology capabilities are making anonymous communication easier for fraudsters and helping them cover their tracks. You will learn how to: Define mesh networks. Explain the way underground networks can provide untraceable email. Identify encrypted email services and how they work. WALT MANNING, CFE President Investigations MD Green Cove Springs, FL Walt Manning is the president of Investigations MD, a consulting firm that conducts research related to future crimes while also helping investigators market and develop their businesses. He has 35 years of experience in the fields of criminal justice, investigations, digital forensics, and e-discovery. He retired with the rank of lieutenant after a 20-year career with the Dallas Police Department. Manning is a contributing author to the Fraud Examiners Manual, which is the official training manual of the ACFE, and has articles published in Fraud Magazine, Police Computer Review, The Police Chief, and Information Systems Security, which is a prestigious journal in the computer security field. “Association of Certified Fraud Examiners,” “Certified Fraud Examiner,” “CFE,” “ACFE,” and the ACFE Logo are trademarks owned by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc. The contents of this paper may not be transmitted, re-published, modified, reproduced, distributed, copied, or sold without the prior consent of the author. -
Security Guide for Cisco Unified Communications Manager, Release 12.5(1)SU2
Security Guide for Cisco Unified Communications Manager, Release 12.5(1)SU2 First Published: 2020-02-03 Last Modified: 2021-09-27 Americas Headquarters Cisco Systems, Inc. 170 West Tasman Drive San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA http://www.cisco.com Tel: 408 526-4000 800 553-NETS (6387) Fax: 408 527-0883 THE SPECIFICATIONS AND INFORMATION REGARDING THE PRODUCTS IN THIS MANUAL ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. ALL STATEMENTS, INFORMATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS MANUAL ARE BELIEVED TO BE ACCURATE BUT ARE PRESENTED WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. USERS MUST TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR APPLICATION OF ANY PRODUCTS. THE SOFTWARE LICENSE AND LIMITED WARRANTY FOR THE ACCOMPANYING PRODUCT ARE SET FORTH IN THE INFORMATION PACKET THAT SHIPPED WITH THE PRODUCT AND ARE INCORPORATED HEREIN BY THIS REFERENCE. IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO LOCATE THE SOFTWARE LICENSE OR LIMITED WARRANTY, CONTACT YOUR CISCO REPRESENTATIVE FOR A COPY. The Cisco implementation of TCP header compression is an adaptation of a program developed by the University of California, Berkeley (UCB) as part of UCB's public domain version of the UNIX operating system. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1981, Regents of the University of California. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER WARRANTY HEREIN, ALL DOCUMENT FILES AND SOFTWARE OF THESE SUPPLIERS ARE PROVIDED “AS IS" WITH ALL FAULTS. CISCO AND THE ABOVE-NAMED SUPPLIERS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THOSE OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OR ARISING FROM A COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE, OR TRADE PRACTICE. IN NO EVENT SHALL CISCO OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY INDIRECT, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, LOST PROFITS OR LOSS OR DAMAGE TO DATA ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THIS MANUAL, EVEN IF CISCO OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. -
Wire Security Whitepaper
Wire Security Whitepaper Wire Swiss GmbH∗ March 3, 2016 Contents 1 Introduction 2 2 Application layer 2 3 Registration 2 3.1 User Registration . .3 3.1.1 Registration by e-mail . .3 3.1.2 Registration by phone . .3 3.1.3 Passwords . .4 3.1.4 Further data . .4 3.2 Client registration . .4 3.2.1 Further data . .5 3.2.2 Metadata . .6 3.2.3 Notifications . .6 3.3 Push token registration . .6 4 Authentication 6 4.1 Tokens . .6 4.2 Login . .7 4.2.1 Password login . .8 4.2.2 SMS login . .8 4.3 Password Reset . .8 5 Messaging 8 5.1 End-to-end encryption . .9 5.1.1 Prekeys . .9 5.2 Message exchange and client discovery . .9 5.3 Assets . 10 5.4 Notifications . 11 6 Calling 12 6.1 Call signaling . 12 ∗[email protected] 1 6.2 Media transport . 12 6.3 Encryption . 12 6.4 WebRTC . 13 A Cookie and access token format 13 1 Introduction Wire runs on Android and iOS devices, on Windows and OS X as well as on the Web in browsers. Registered users engage in conversations whose contents are synchronized across all devices of a user. This document provides an overview on the cryptographic protocols and security aspects implemented to protect the privacy of users. 2 Application layer Wire clients interact with backend servers over HTTPS connections supporting the following TLS parameters: TLS versions • TLSv1.0 • TLSv1.1 • TLSv1.2 The server indicates the order preference of cipher suites and communicates HTTP Strict Transport Security [2] to all clients. -
Multi-Device Secure Instant Messaging
SoK: Multi-Device Secure Instant Messaging Antonio Dimeo, Felix Gohla, Daniel Goßen, Niko Lockenvitz {antonio.dimeo, felix.gohla, daniel.gossen, niko.lockenvitz}@student.hpi.de Hasso Plattner Institute, University of Potsdam April 17, 2021 Abstract The secure multi-device instant messaging ecosystem is diverse, varied, and under- represented in academia. We create a systematization of knowledge which focuses on the challenges of multi-device messaging in a secure context and give an overview of the current situation in the multi-device setting. For that, we analyze messenger documentation, white papers, and research that deals with multi-device messaging. This includes a detailed description of different patterns for data transfer between devices as well as device management, i.e. how clients are cryptographically linked or unlinked to or from an account and how the initial setup can be implemented. We then evaluate different instant messengers with regard to relevant criteria, e.g. whether they achieve specific security, usability, and privacy goals. In the end, we outline interesting areas for future research. Contents 1 Introduction3 1.1 Group Messaging vs. Multi-Device Messaging............... 4 1.2 Methodology.................................. 4 2 Multi-Device Messaging7 2.1 Context...................................... 7 2.2 Transferring Data Between Different Devices of One User........ 7 2.2.1 Storing Data on a Server........................ 8 2.2.2 Using Messages to Exchange Data.................. 9 2.3 Transferring Data to a Different User..................... 11 2.3.1 Without End-to-end Encryption................... 11 2.3.2 End-to-end Encryption With Shared Group Key.......... 13 2.3.3 End-to-end Encryption Per Recipient............... -
A Comparison of Chat Applications in Terms of Security and Privacy
See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334537058 A Comparison of Chat Applications in Terms of Security and Privacy Conference Paper · July 2019 CITATION READS 1 1,071 3 authors: Johnny Botha Carien van 't Wout Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, South Africa Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, South Africa 8 PUBLICATIONS 19 CITATIONS 9 PUBLICATIONS 1 CITATION SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE Louise Leenen University of the Western Cape 57 PUBLICATIONS 302 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects: Network Threats View project Ant Colony Induced Decision Trees for Intrusion Detection View project All content following this page was uploaded by Johnny Botha on 18 July 2019. The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. A Comparison of Chat Applications in Terms of Security and Privacy J. Botha1, C. Van ‘t Wout1, L. Leenen2 1Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), Pretoria, South Africa 2 University of the Western Cape [email protected] 1 [email protected] 2 [email protected] Abstract: Mobile messaging or chat Applications (Apps) have gained increasing popularity over the past decade. Large amounts of data are being transmitted over the internet when people make use of these Apps. Metadata and personal information are being collected and stored every day while consumers are seeking protection against surveillance as well as against attacks from hackers. There are countless Apps available but some are leading the way in popularity, platform availability and features. WhatsApp, one of the leading Apps, revealed in 2016 that it had more than one billion users. -
Forensic Investigations of Popular Ephemeral Messaging Applications on Android and Ios Platforms
International Journal on Advances in Security, vol 13 no 1 & 2, year 2020, http://www.iariajournals.org/security/ 41 Forensic Investigations of Popular Ephemeral Messaging Applications on Android and iOS Platforms M A Hannan Bin Azhar, Rhys Cox and Aimee Chamberlain School of Engineering, Technology and Design Canterbury Christ Church University Canterbury, United Kingdom e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; Abstract—Ephemeral messaging applications are growing It is not just criminals using EMAs. Mobile phones are an increasingly popular on the digital mobile market. However, essential part of modern-day life. According to the Global they are not always used with good intentions. Criminals may System for Mobile Communications [6], there were five see a gateway into private communication with each other billion mobile users in the world by the second quarter of through this transient application data. This could negatively 2017, with a prediction that another 620 million people will impact criminal court cases for evidence, or civil matters. To become mobile phone users by 2020, together that would find out if messages from such applications can indeed be account for almost three quarters of the world population. Due recovered or not, a forensic examination of the device would be to the increasing popularity in mobile phones, there is required by the law enforcement authority. This paper reports naturally an increasing concern over mobile security and how mobile forensic investigations of ephemeral data from a wide range of applications using both proprietary and freeware safe communication between individuals or groups is.