Falkland Islands Review Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors Chairman: The Rt Hon the Lord Franks, OM, GCMG, KCB, CBE Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty January 1983 LONDON HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE £6·10 net MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE The Rt. Hon. The Lord Franks, O M, G C M G, K C B, C B E (Chairman) The Rt. Hon. The Lord Barber, T D The Rt. Hon. The Lord Lever of Manchester The Rt. Hon. Sir Patrick Nairne, G C B, M C The Rt. Hon. Merlyn Rees, M P The Rt. Hon. The Lord Watkinson, C H TABLE OF CONTENTS Paragraphs Pages Introduction 1–14 1–3 Chapter 1 An Account of the Dispute from 1965 to 1979 15–70 4–20 The Starting Point of the Review 1965–1975 15–32 4–9 The involvement of the United Nations 17–18 4 Assessment of Argentine threat 19 5 Paragraphs Pages First diplomatic exchanges 20 5 ‘Operation Condor’ 21 5 The ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ 22–25 5–7 The Communications Agreements 26–28 7 Condominium 29–30 8 Increased Argentine pressure 31 8 Intelligence assessments 32 8–9 Increased Tension 1975–1977 33–66 9–19 Economic development 33 9 The Shackleton survey 34 9 Argentine action at the United Nations 35 9–10 10– Worsening diplomatic relations 36–39 11 Intelligence reports and assessments 40–41 11 11– RRS Shackleton 42 12 Mr Rowlands's talks in New York 43 12 12– Defence considerations 44–47 13 13– Resumption of negotiations 48–50 14 Further Argentine activity at the United Nations 51 14 14– Southern Thule 52–57 15 15– Announcement of resumption of negotiations 58 16 16– Mr Rowlands's visit to the Islands and Buenos Aires 59–60 17 Talks in Rome 61 17 17– Threat of Argentine military action 62–63 18 18– Consideration of counter-measures 64–66 19 Continuation of Negotiations to Spring 1979 67–69 19 19– Significant Themes of the Period 70 20 Chapter The Period of the Present Government, May 1979 to 19 20– 2 71–160 March 1982 47 Paragraphs Pages 20– Re-examination of the options 71–79 22 Mr Ridley's first visit to the Islands and Argentina 72 20 20– Lord Carrington's proposals 73–76 21 Assessment of Argentine threat 77 22 Exploratory talks 78–79 22 22– Leaseback 80–107 31 Mr Ridley's second visit to the Islands 81 23 Parliamentary reaction 82 23 Islander reaction 83 23 23– Opening of formal negotiations 84–87 24 24– Argentine views 88–89 25 25– Mr Ridley's office meeting on 30 June 1981 90–93 26 26– Intelligence assessment 94–95 27 Mr Ridley's report to Lord Carrington 96 27 27– Formal expression of Argentine views 97 28 28– Lord Carrington's decision 98–100 29 Lord Carrington's meeting with Dr Camilion in New York 101–103 29 29– The views of the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires 104 30 Dr Camilion's view of negotiations 105 30 30– Falkland Islands Elections 106–107 31 31– Contingency Planning and HMS Endurance 108–118 34 Civil contingency plans 108 31 31– Military contingency planning 109–113 33 33– HMS Endurance 114–118 34 34– Events leading up to the New York Talks 119–137 40 Paragraphs Pages 34– General Galtieri's accession 119–121 35 35– The situation at the beginning of the year 122–125 36 36– Further Argentine proposals 126–128 37 37– Argentine press comment 129–132 39 39– The New York talks 133–137 40 40– Aftermath of the New York Talks 138–160 47 40– Argentine action following the New York talks 138–141 42 Mr Enders's visit to Buenos Aires 142–144 42 42– A Uruguayan view 145 43 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's assessment of the 146–148 43 situation 43– Intelligence reports 149–151 45 The Prime Minister's reaction to the deteriorating 152–153 45 diplomatic situation 45– Diplomatic initiatives 154–157 47 Intelligence: mid-March 1982 158–159 47 Chapter 48– 3 19 March – 2 April 1982 161–259 72 48– The South Georgia Incident 161–192 55 Sr. Davidoff's contract and visit to South Georgia in 48– 161–165 December 1981 49 HMS Endurance's reception in Argentine ports 166 49 49– The landing on South Georgia on 19 March 1982 167–192 55 55– The Days Leading up to the Invasion 193–259 72 55– Thursday, 25 March 193–200 58 Paragraphs Pages 58– Friday, 26 March 201–206 59 59– Saturday, 27 March 207–208 60 60– Sunday, 28 March 209–212 61 61– Monday, 29 March 213–218 63 63– Tuesday, 30 March 219–228 66 66– Wednesday, 31 March 229–238 68 68– Thursday, 1 April 239–251 71 71– Friday, 2 April 252–259 72 Chapter 73– 4 The Government's Discharge of their Responsibilities 260–339 90 73– Could the Invasion on 2 April have been Foreseen? 261–266 74 74– How did the Dispute become Critical? 267–284 77 74– The positions of the parties to the dispute 268–271 75 Developments affecting the attitude of the Argentine 75– 272–283 Government 77 75– (i) Developments in Argentina 273–277 76 76– (ii) Developments in British policy 278–283 77 Did Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials pursue a 284 77 policy of their own? 77– How did the Present Government Handle the Dispute? 285–332 89 77– Continuity of policy and HMS Endurance 285–288 78 78– The decisions of September 1981 289–292 79 The view in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at the 293–294 80 beginning of the year Paragraphs Pages Contingency planning 295 80 Foreign and Commonwealth Office judgment of how the 80– 296 dispute would develop 81 81– The response to events following the New York talks 297–303 82 The Joint Intelligence Organisation 304 82 82– Earlier intelligence assessments 305 83 The assessment of July 1981 306 83 83– Review of the 1981 assessment 307–310 84 The intelligence agencies 311–314 84 Did the intelligence assessment machinery function 85– 315–320 effectively? 86 Impact of South Georgia incident 321–323 86 86– The possibility of earlier deterrent action 324–332 88 88– Final warnings to Argentina 333–334 89 Could the present Government have Prevented the 89– 335–339 Invasion of 2 April 1982? 90 Pages Annex Comments on some specific assertions 91–92 A. Annex Aspects of the Machinery of Government in Relation to the Falkland 93–95 B. Islands Annex Persons and Organisations from whom written submissions were 96–97 C. received Annex Replies received from newspaper editors 98 D. Annex Persons who gave oral evidence 99–100 E. Annex Extract from the Official Report, House of Commons, 2 December 101– F. 1980 105 Annex Map of the South Atlantic showing the Falkland Islands and the 106 G. Falkland Islands Dependencies Note: the estimated cost of preparing the report, including staff costs is £81,800. INTRODUCTION On 6 July 1982, in a Written Answer to a Parliamentary Question,(1)Official Report, House of Commons, 6 July 1982, Written Answers, Col. 51. the Prime Minister announced that, following consultation with the Leader of the Opposition and leaders of other Opposition parties, the Government had decided to appoint a committee of Privy Counsellors, under the chairmanship of Lord Franks, with the following terms of reference: “To review the way in which the responsibilities of Government in relation to the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies were discharged in the period leading up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982, taking account of all such factors in previous years as are relevant; and to report”. In answer to a separate Question on the same day,(2)Official Report, House of Commons, 6 July 1982, Written Answers, Col. 52. the Prime Minister announced the names of the other members of the Committee. 2. After a debate, the House of Commons resolved on 8 July to approve the Government's decision to set up a Falkland Islands review.(3)Official Report, House of Commons, 8 July 1982, Cols. 469–508. 3. We met for the first time on 26 July and held 42 meetings, on all but two occasions for the whole of the day. 4. In her opening speech in the debate on 8 July, the Prime Minister made it clear that the Committee should have access to all relevant papers and persons. All the Government Departments concerned provided us with papers relevant to our review. We subsequently asked for, and received, personal and formal written assurances from the Secretary of the Cabinet, the Permanent Under-Secretaries of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, and the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury that to the best of their knowledge and belief all the papers in their Departments relevant to our terms of reference had been brought to our attention. 5. We were provided with the following documents: i. folders of all the relevant papers that the Prime Minister personally saw from the time the present Government took office to 2 April 1982; ii. all relevant Cabinet and Cabinet Committee(4)Annex B contains a brief account of relevant aspects of the machinery of Government including the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee and the Joint Intelligence Organisation. papers and minutes of meetings from 1965 onwards; iii. detailed memoranda prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Research Department on the history of the dispute from 1965, various other papers and, for the period from the beginning of 1976 onwards, a comprehensive set of documents; iv.