Geopolitics, Security
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4 • 2014 Geopolitics, Security current events at cejiss.org © cejiss 2014 cejiss acts as a forum for advanced exploration of international and security studies. It is the mission of cejiss to provide its readers with valuable resources regarding the current state of inter- national and European relations and security. To that end, cejiss pledges to publish articles of only the highest calibre and make them freely available to scholars and interested members of the public in both printed and electronic forms. editor in chief Mitchell Belfer pr & editorial support Daniela Zordová pr coordinator Zlata Kopřivová executive editor David Erkomaishvili associate editors Imad El-Anis, Jean Crombois, Bryan Groves, Jason Whiteley Yulia Zemlinskaya academic centre Nigorakhon Turakhanova (Head), Adisa Avdić (Review Editor) Gabriela Volfova (Fokus Editor), Bianca Bernathova (Researcher) Anja Grabovac (Research Manager) media centre Katerina Kjirovska (Head), Jay Nemec (Web Design and Support) Simona Bartovicova (Web Support) language editing Damien Galeone editorial board Benjamin R. Barber (Honorary Chair), Javaid Rehman, Ilan Danjoux Ibrahim A. El-Hussari, Efraim Inbar, Francesc Morata, Boris Popesko, Evan N. Resnick Cristian Nitoiu, Charles Robinson, Michal Romancov, Marat Terterov Yuliya Zabyelina, Natalia Piskunova, Gary M. Kelly, Kyle Atwell, Ladislav Cabada Harald Haelterman, Nik Hynek, Petr Just, Joachim Krause, David R. Marples Karel B. Müller, Suresh Nanwani, Tomas Pezl, Nicole Gallina, Nelli Babayan Benjamin R. Barber, Muhammad Atif Khan, Salvador Santino F. Regilme, Jr., Mils Hills Marek Neuman, Francesco Guimelli, Alica Kizekova, Adam Reichardt, Victor Sharduski Central European Journal of International & Security Studies C/o Metropolitan University Prague, Dubečská 900/10, 100 31, Prague, Czech Republic Tel.: +420 724 587 171, Fax: +420 274 817 190, [email protected] cejiss is published by Metropolitan University Prague Press issn: 1802-548x e-issn 1805-482x cejiss is not responsible for the contents of any external hyperlinks. The views expressed in this issue are solely those views of the respective authors and do not represent those of cejiss and its boards. Any part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, photocopying, recording, or otherwise on the condition providing proper attribution of the source in all copies. Printed in the eu Contents Volume 8, Issue 4, December 2014 Editor’s 6 Bahrain’s al Khalifa Dilemma Analysis Mitchell Belfer Research 14 Deterring Russia by US Followership? Articles Decomposing The Czech Participation in Afghanistan Nik Hynek 38 Rethinking US Policy Towards Iran’s Nuclear Programme Surulola James Eke 56 Looking for Insurgency in Cyberspace Jakub Drmola 78 Latvia and Money Laundering An Examination of Regulatory and Institutional Effectiveness in Combating Money Laundering Andrew Bowen and Mark Galeotti 99 Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring Reshaping Saudi Security Doctrine Yahya Al Zahrani 114 From the BSU to the BSEC Evaluating Interwar Geopolitical Fantasies Ostap Kushnir 137 Would External Intervention by Military Force to Pro- tect Civilians in Syria be Legally Justified? Richard Lappin 152 The Poverty of Statistics Military Power and Strategic Balance Jan Ludvík 168 Vindicating Neoclassical Geopolitics, Challenging Postmodernism A New Look at an Old Problem Nuno Morgado 205 Differentiating Arctic Provinces A Cluster Analysis of Geographic and Geopolitical Indicators Irina Valko 236 Shooting training of the CSI staff Hana Talandová and Milan Adámek Book Reviews 255 The Hybridity of Terrorism Reviewed by Michael Becker 257 Why Some Politicians Are More Dangerous than Others Reviewed by Katerina Kjirovska 259 Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War? Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond Reviewed by Katerina Krulisova 261 The Horn of Africa (Hot Spots in Global Politics) Reviewed by Kateřina Struhová 265 Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks Reviewed by Ahmet Gencturk Editor’s Policy Analysis Bahrain’s al Khalifa Dilemma Mitchell Belfer With the wider Middle East in a seemingly intractable crisis spiral, it is easy to lose track of specific national and historical contexts. Bahrain’s chapter in the now defunct Arab Spring has generally, but erroneously, been treated as a case of a pacifist opposition, composed of members of the Shia sect (majority) and a repressive Sunni government (minority). Not only does such loose demographic bookkeeping and simplistic cat- egorisations intellectually detract from truly understanding the internal dynamics of the country, it also eclipses the manner in which Bahrain’s government and civil society have adjusted themselves to the unfolding crisis and blinds observers to the roles played by exogenous agitators, particularly post-revolutionary Iran. The 1979 revolution in Iran continues to profoundly impact Bahrain. From the attempted coup d’état by the Iranian proxy, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (iflb) in 1981, to the more recent usage of Hezbollah and its local allies, the Youth of 14 February (re: the Youth) and Sacred Defence Bahrain (SDB), it is clear that Iranian interests in Bahrain are persistent. And the actions of such terrorist groups is telling; demonstrations-cum-riots, car bombings, lynching and arson occur with frightening frequency and results. Against this backdrop, a political opposition group – the al Wefaq bloc – emerged to ostensibly represent the interests of Bahrain’s Shia community. There is growing concern, and evidence, that links the al Wefaq bloc to Iran and Iran to the violent groups operating in Bahrain. Al Wefaq’s spiritual leader, Issa Qassim, was a member of the inner circle of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Qom clique, and has retained his contacts throughout Khamenei’s reign. In fact, Iran’s Ayatollah has even bestowed the political-religious title ‘Ayatollah’ on Qassim since, according to Iran’s parliamentary declaration that Issa Qassim is to become the 6 Ayatollah of Bahrain on the construction of an Islamic Republic there. And there is a symbiotic relationship between Iranian and Bahraini terrorist groups. The iflb absorbed the al Haq movement, which was connected to al Sistani, who was instrumental in Hezbollah’s defeat of Amal in Lebanon, which deployed to Bahrain. After a decade – from Editor’s 1999 until 2009 – of Hezbollah having its numbers diminished due to Analysis successful counterterrorism efforts and a general national consensus that rejected political violence, the Youth of 14 February bear responsibility for the 2011 demonstrations turning violent. Since then, Hezbollah has increased its presence in Bahrain, prompting the government – and later the gcc – to ban both the political and military wings of the or- ganisation. The Youth are a key linkage between al Wefaq, Hezbollah and Iran. To compliment Issa Qassim’s relationship to the Ayatollah in Iran, al Wefaq chief, Ali Salman, is in frequent communication with Hezbollah’s commander Sayyad Hassan Nasrallah and are said to be directly coordinating their activities. It is important to note here that Hezbollah is not an autonomous organisation, its true leader is Ayatollah Khamenei. Finally, the goals of Iran’s and Bahrain’s radicalised groups are the same; forced regime change and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Bahrain under direction of Tehran and its two local agents, Ali Salman and Issa Qassim. It is no coincidence that powerful figures in Iran’s religious and political establishment have resurrected the claim that Bahrain is the 14th province of the former Persian Empire and should thus be returned to Iran. The al Khalifa Dilemma Such heightened pressures have resulted in the unfolding of an al Khal- ifa Dilemma where Bahrain’s political leadership attempts to counter the Iranian-al Wefaq nexus through reforms to the Kingdom. In their embryotic form, such reforms are meant to better reflect the legitimate demands of the Shia, Sunni, Christian, Jewish and expat communities but ends up focusing only on a singular energised, organised and vocal segment of society, fractions of fractions of the Shia community, since members of such fractions are comfortable deploying violence and Bahrain’s government is responsible for retaining order. In taking a wide reform programme and centring it on small fractions within one sect, Bahrain’s government may inadvertently be contributing to the further destabilising the country. Reform in this case may, in fact, be dangerous. 7 Consider the following logic. Firstly, internally – from within al Khalifas’ leadership circles – national identity (re: as Bahraini) is consid- erably more important than a sectarian identity (re: Sunni). As a result, the al Khalifas (rightly) view themselves as representative of the entire cejiss spectrum of Bahraini society. This view is shared among the majority 4/2014 of Bahrainis and sectarianism continues to be the hobby of a few, more fringe-located, groups and does not form majority opinion. However (secondly) externally – those located outside of political structures – some groups identify the al Khalifas through sectarian lenses. This is not due to the actions (or inactions) of the al Khalifas, but rather because such external groups’ ideology forces them not to consider the al Khalifas as legitimate leaders of Bahrain and categorise al Khalifa leadership as Sunni rather than Bahraini. It should be remembered that this form of sectarianism is not only to be found among smaller, spoiler