AN EXCHANGE ON ISRAEL’S SECURITY DOCTRINE

Editor’s Note: In the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) appeared David Rodman’s article, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine: An Introductory Overview.” [http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/journal/2001/issue3/jv5n3a6.html]. In this exchange, Stuart Cohen raises additonal issues on this subject and the author, David Rodman, responds.

DAVID RODMAN’S “ISRAEL’S NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE”: SOME SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS By Stuart A. Cohen*

David Rodman’s “Israel’s National analytical structure that, in fact, is Security Doctrine: An Introductory insufficiently discreet to encompass the Overview” (MERIA Journal, Volume 5, multiplicity of themes that the article Number 3, September 2001) is an admirable discusses. exercise in condensation. Based on extensive At the heart of Rodman’s article lies a reading, not only does it present a succinct description and analysis of what he defines as overview of the major principles that have eight “basic security concepts” that have, in undergirded the history of Israel’s strategic his words, together “clearly driven Israeli behavior. It also presents an analytical thinking and conduct over the course of the synopsis of the major stages in that history. state’s existence.” These he lists “in no For all these reasons, it commands particular order” as: geography; manpower; attention and deserves a wide audience. quantity versus quality; offensive maneuver Precisely because of its many qualities, warfare; deterrence; conventional versus however, it also warrants review and unconventional threats; self-reliance; and suggestions for modification. The following great-power patronage. remarks are offered in that spirit. They do not This, surely, is too mixed a bag of seek to quibble with details of Rodman’s categories to be thus indiscriminately lumped analysis. Rather, they aim to present a together. somewhat different focus on some of its For one thing, the order of their major tenets. appearance, should be of importance – at the For purposes of presentation, I have very least, their ranking might provide an arranged my remarks under two headings: indication of the relative importance that the 1. Missed opportunities author considers to have been attached to each 2. Missing categories of these “concepts” at different points in time. It might also allow for an examination of the MISSED OPPORTUNITIES fluctuations in their degree of mutual Under this heading I list some of the issues reinforcement. As matters stand, Rodman’s that Rodman’s own analysis might have been higgeldy-piggeldy style precludes either issue expected to lead him to discuss, and that do from being explored. Take, for instance, the not seem to me to receive due attention in his first of his concepts, “geography” (for which, text. The reasons, I suggest, do not lie solely by the way, a better term – and one more in lack of space (although the need to keep the current in Israel’s own strategic parlance - is article concise is certainly apparent). Rather, “absence of strategic depth”).(1) As Rodman they seem to reflect a wish to sustain an himself points out, the salience of this Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 127 Stuart A. Cohen and David Rodman

“concept” has not been constant in Israeli selective. A taxonomy of Israel’s uses of strategic thought. In some periods, and force indeed reveals a remarkably wide against some classes of enemies, it was spectrum of force applications.(4) The thought to have dictated “offensive maneuver reasons are not difficult to discern. The vast warfare”; at other times, and against other majority of those who have formulated and foes, it was considered to mandate implemented Israel’s national security “deterrence” (on which more below). The task doctrine (there have been a couple of of the analyst is surely to account for these exceptions) have been pragmatists, above all fluctuations, and to construct some else.(5) Although they certainly favored framework for their interpretation. Sadly, certain forms and postures of strategic Rodman failed to take advantage of the conduct, very rarely did they allow those opportunity to show – however briefly – how preferences to automatically dictate their this might be done. behavior. Other missed opportunities – all the more Once again, by failing to recognize the frustrating because Rodman has clearly prevalence of the pragmatic strain in Israeli mastered the necessary data – seem to be the strategic thought and behavior Rodman has result of some conceptual confusion. Rodman missed an opportunity to explore its applies the generic term “concepts” to the consequences, positive and negative alike. eight security topics that he discusses. But These certainly deserve mention. Very this term is misleading, since it obscures the briefly, the most obvious advantage of the basic distinction between those categories in traditionally pragmatic Israeli mind-set on his list that have always been considered security affairs lies in the large measure of security “constraints” and those that are better flexibility that it has granted to the country’s defined as “responses”. Under the first rubric national security behavior. One of its most come the conditions arising from Israel’s blatant disadvantages, on the other hand, is smallness (in size, population, economic that it has dissuaded (perhaps even precluded) resources, etc.), conditions that the vast most attempts to formulate anything like a majority of Israel’s security community have coherent and cohensive national security always considered to be permanent operating doctrine that might be subjected to periodic factors, over which they can themselves wield and constitutionally authorized review. very little influence at all.(2) But these have Altogether, in fact, the formulation of Israeli to be analytically distinguished from other national security policies has tended to be a “concepts”, that encapsulate the strategic haphazard affair.(6) It has always owed more to solutions that the same community has the random predilections of individual political offered to the problems thus identified. The leaders and generals than to a systematic IDF’s traditional preference for military process of reasoned analysis. David Ben “preemption”, for “taking the fight to the Gurion did make some stabs at sketching a enemy’s territory”, and for “self-reliance”(for national security strategy which integrated instance) constitute deliberately chosen political and military elements (indeed, it was responses, selected from a wider range of he who introduced such concepts as possible options. Much the same is true of the “deterrence” and “lack of strategic depth” into political insistence on “great power the Israeli security lexicon). But the exercise patronage” and on swift results on the field of was never formalized. More important, no battle.(3) Thus to object to the use of the institutional framework was established in generic “concepts”, and to insist on a order to facilitate its repetition. Rodman fails to distinction between “constraints” and remind us of a fact that other observers have “responses”, is not merely to quibble over long considered to be critical: the absence of a semantic niceties. Only once we recognize truly powerful and well-entrenched national some of the “concepts” in Rodman’s list to be security council that might look beyond no more than preferred responses to perceived quotidian pressures and develop a coherent constraints can we appreciate why, in long-term strategy, based upon a detailed practice, their application has been fairly assessment and categorization of many of the 128 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) An Exchange on Israel’s Security Doctrine same notions that Rodman lists as “deterrence by punishment”. Many years ago, “concepts”.(7) the late Avner Yaniv sought to explore Israeli Undoubtedly the most serious casualty of applications of both of these forms, showing this situation has been the IDF. This is how their use has fluctuated over time.(8) More somewhat ironic, since it was the IDF which recently, Efraim Inbar and Shemuel Sandler for many years lead the opposition to the have suggested that Israeli “deterrence”, in both establishment of a national security council, its manifestations, has suffered erosion.(9) At and which has been largely responsible for the the very least, one would have wished for fact that the body that was eventually Rodman to refer to these studies, and then to established in 1999 has never exercised very suggest how their results they might be much real influence. Retrospect suggests this to synthesised with the other “concepts” in his have been a very short-sighted policy. Bereft of list, thus demonstrating their interaction. clear strategic guidelines, formally thrashed out Societal considerations constitute another, during the course of periodic dialogues and somewhat different, example of a missing between exponents of different points of view category. Certainly, Rodman is sensitive to the in both the civilian and military elites, Israel’s importance that these factors have always generals have, in intellectual terms, tended to played in Israeli security thought – as both live from hand to mouth. Instead of attempting “constraints” and “responses”. Yet, at no point to conceptualize the principles underlying their in his analysis does Rodman make explicit mission statements, they have invariably reference to what Michael Howard long ago resorted to variations on the shoulder- referred to as “the societal dimension” of shrugging theme of ein bereirah (“we have no strategy.(10) Instead, he largely restricts his choice”). Indeed, there is a strong case to be analysis of the influence exerted on Israel’s made for including that phrase in any check-list military doctrines by the size and composition of Israeli strategic concepts/principles – and not of her population to his sections on very far from the top of the pile at that. “manpower” and on “quantity versus quality”. This is a pity, because by thus seeming to MISSING CATEGORIES relegate societal factors to the status of a For all its comprehensiveness, Rodman’s dependent and subsidiary variable, he appears introductory survey is in some respects to overlook one of the most important curiously incomplete. It certainly touches the independent components of Israeli security main points, but sometimes does so in a thought, and one in which the extent of recent manner that hardly does justice to the richness change has been particularly marked. of their nuances. Again, the need to keep the In this respect, too, the obvious deserves article short must certainly bear some brief re-statement. Despite multiple signs that responsibility for this feature. But that the IDF is set on a course towards inevitable constraint seems also to have been professionalization,(11) the Force continues compounded by what seems to have been the to adhere to a system of military service rigidity of the author’s own framework of which still rests on the twin principles of analysis. universal conscription (for Jewish females as One example of the resultant failure to well as males) and of mandatory reserve duty. explore certain subjects in sufficient depth This militia framework does much to buttress (“missing categories”) is provided by the traditional image of the IDF as a “people’s Rodman’s analysis of deterrence. He is army”; it also helps to sustain the overall absolutely correct to identify this as a central character of Israeli-Jewish society as a concept in Israel’s military doctrine, and he “nation in arms”. However, and as observers does a fine job in providing examples of some have been pointing out for over a decade now, of its manifestations. Even so, the reader is left notwithstanding that surface impression of with a wish that the author had been a little apparent structural resilience and cultural more forthcoming. As we all know, continuity, domestic affinity with the IDF no “deterrence” is itself an umbrella term, that can longer constitutes so prominent a feature of be sub-divided into “deterrence by denial” and Israel’s strategic landscape.(12) Instead,

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 129 Stuart A. Cohen and David Rodman military service, once a core component of overriding imperative to reduce Israel’s own Israel’s overall “civil religion”, is in many military casualties to a minimum.(15) The quarters now being marginalized. Likewise, same considerations, it ought to be noted, seem public esteem for the Force as a whole is also to constitute primary engines of change in steadily eroding. Once the darling of the two other spheres of military conduct: force press, the military is now the object of deployments (in particular, the relatively criticisms by an increasingly intrusive media, limited use of combat reservists in both the which delights in publishing sensationalist final stages of the Lebanon campaign and in the exposes of mismanagement, corruption and – first year of the ‘al-Aktza’ intifada) and force sometimes – sheer incompetence at every compositions (notably, the movement towards level of command. That process has been the incremental professionalization of the IDF paralleled by other manifestations of a and its modernization). It remains to be seen similarly unprecedented nature: the increasing precisely how these processes might in turn readiness of the law courts to intrude upon mandate re-adjustments to other elements of areas previously considered to be the Israel’s traditional military behavior. What is military’s exclusive preserve; a growing already apparent, however, is that the need to tolerance towards “conscientious objection” assess anew the precise calibration of the to military service (by both the right and the multiple components of the country’s national left of the political spectrum); friction security doctrine now constitutes one of Israel’s between senior military echelons and the primary strategic challenges. political elite; and – most dramatic of all – As Rodman points out in his concluding clear indications that society at large might no paragraphs, Israel’s national security doctrine is longer be prepared to sustain the risks and certainly experiencing a period of flux. Only in burdens which a state of war necessarily part, however, can that situation be attributed to entails.(13) the fundamental changes taking place in the Precisely why such phenomena might be overall geo-strategic situation (at both the occurring is a topic that occasions lively regional and global levels) and, perhaps no less debate.(14) In the present context, more drastically, in the technological-military important are their consequences. Rodman environment. Equally important are the himself provides a clue towards the very end of pressures exerted by domestic cultural changes his article, where he suggests that the term – whose roots lie deep in the transformations in “post-heroic” (which he cites Eliot Cohen as structure, composition and values now being applying to the contemporary phase of Israel’s experienced (at various paces and in different development in general) might now be ways) by individual segments of Israeli society. specifically applied to her national security Rodman is probably correct in concluding that doctrine. Unfortunately, however, he has not “If the past is any guide to the future… Israel’s taken this insight to its logical conclusion – and national security doctrine will contain solutions refrains from asking how it might have affected that prove up to the task of defending the and informed many of the “concepts” he has state’s survival.” But the growing prominence earlier itemized. of societal considerations as a factor of Take, for instance, the IDF’s recent apparent strategic-military importance requires policy- shifts to a preference for fire-power over makers and analysts to develop new conceptual maneuverability, and hence for stand-off frameworks that are appropriate to the task at weapons rather than for direct infantry action. hand. Useful though check-lists of the old To suggest that these shifts (that Rodman principles undoubtedly are, they cannot serve identifies in his discussion on “Offensive as substitutes for innovative modes of thought Maneuver Warfare”) have been almost entirely and behavior. influenced by technological developments is, surely, to tell only part of the story. Analysis *Prof. Stuart A. Cohen (Ph.D. Oxford indicates that they have equally (at least), been University) is the Dean of Students and a generated by societal pressures, of which Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan undoubtedly the most influential has been the University in addition to being a Senior 130 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) An Exchange on Israel’s Security Doctrine

Research Associate at the BESA Center. He 8. Avner Yaniv, “Deterrence and Defense in has been Visiting Scholar at Harvard Israeli Strategy” (Hebrew), Medinah, University's Center for Jewish Studies and Mimshal ve-Yahasim Beinle’umiyim, 24 Visiting Fellow at the University of Cape (summer 1985), pp. 27-62. Town. 9. Efraim Inbar and Shemuel Sandler, “Israel’s Deterrence Strategy Reconsidered”, Security Studies, 3 (winter 1993/4). NOTES 10. Michael Howard, “The Forgotten 1. See Aaron Yariv, “Strategic Depth – An Dimension of Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, 57/5 Israeli View” (Hebrew), Ma’archot [IDF (summer 1979), pp. 975-86 journal], 270-1 (October 1979), pp. 21-25. 11. Reuven Gal & Stuart A. Cohen, “Israel: 2. Israel Tal, National Security: The Israeli Still Waiting in the Wings,” The Postmodern Experience (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000). Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, 3. The distinction here outlined specific in edited by Charles Moskos, John Allen Ariel Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Williams & David R. Segal (New York: Military Doctrine (Tel-Aviv: Jaffee Center for OUP, 2000), pp. 224-241. Strategic Studies, 1989), a work that Rodman 12. Moshe Lissak & Dan Horowitz, Trouble does cite in other contexts. in Utopia: The Overburdened Polity of Israel 4. Stuart A. Cohen & Efraim Inbar, “A (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), 36-239. Taxonomy of Israel's Use of Force”, 13. Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on Comparative Strategy, 10/2 (April 1991): National Security 2001 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee 121-38. Center for Strategic Studies, memorandum 5. This, indeed, is one of the principle no. 60, August 2001), p. 38. conclusions to emerge from Efraim Inbar, 14. One school of thought stresses essentially Rabin and Israel’s National Security indigenous causes, such as Israeli society’s (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University “war weariness”, itself sometimes thought to Press, 1999). be engendered by the corrosive experience of 6. Yehuda Ben-Meir, Civil-Military Relations the IDF’s protracted occupation of the areas in Israel (New York: Columbia University conquered in 1967. Another paints a wider Press, 1995). canvass, depicting events in Israel as a local 7. The formation in Israel of an agency akin expression of currents affecting the tone of to the USA’s National Security Council was civil-military relations throughout the western advocated as long ago as 1974 by the Agranat democratic world. See: Gabriel Ben-Dor, Commission, that investigated Israel’s “Civil-Military Relations in Israel in the mid- military failures prior to the Yom Kippur War 1990’s,” Independence: The First Fifty Years, and during its early stages. Opposition on the edited by Anita Shapira (Hebrew; Jerusalem: part of the IDF and successive Ministers of Shazar Center, 1998), pp. 471-486. Defense obstructed this initiative until 1999. 15. S.A. Cohen, “Changing societal-military Even thereafter, resistance remained powerful relations in Israel: The operational enough to emasculate the skeleton body implications,” Contemporary Security Policy, which was then established. 21/3 (December 2000), pp. 116-138.

A REPLY TO STUART COHEN By David Rodman**

I’d like to thank Stuart Cohen for his word on Israel’s national security doctrine stimulating critique of my article. Let me either descriptively or analytically. But, in my begin by saying that, with respect to his two own defense, it isn’t meant to be. The purpose broad charges, I freely acknowledge my guilt. of the article is simply to provide a thought- Unquestionably, the article is not the last provoking overview of that doctrine by

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 131 Stuart A. Cohen and David Rodman describing and assessing what I consider to be offers greater insight into the components of its bedrock components. Israel’s national security doctrine, as well as Furthermore, any framework for breaking into the links among them, than a strictly down an exceedingly complex whole into chronological approach. more manageable parts for purposes of With respect to Cohen’s comments about description and analysis is bound to terminology, he’s absolutely right— oversimplify that whole in one way or “constraints” and “responses” are more another. Any framework that Cohen might precise and evocative than “concepts,” which devise to replace mine could not escape this is admittedly somewhat vague. Still, his criticism, though I will certainly concede that, comments notwithstanding, I do feel that his because he is more of an expert on the subject quibble is largely about a semantic issue. In than I am, he may be able to come up with my discussions of geography, manpower, one that promises a more thorough and quantity versus quality, etc., I do indicate the compelling description and analysis of various “constraints” under which Israel has Israel’s national security doctrine. operated at different times, and I also point out its various “responses” at these times. MISSED OPPORTUNITIES Finally, before moving on to “Missing These introductory remarks aside, let me now Categories,” let me finish with a brief try to respond to Cohen’s specific substantive comment about “pragmatism” methodological and substantive criticisms, versus “strategic planning.” I certainly did not beginning with “Missed Opportunities.” For intend to suggest that Israel’s national starters, I’m not convinced that it’s really security doctrine has been anything other than possible to arrange the different components a set of pragmatic responses to the constraints of Israel’s national security doctrine in some under which the state has had to operate. I general order of importance. Taking the completely agree with Cohen on this issue. I state’s entire history into account, can it really disagree with him (and others), however, that be persuasively argued that territorial a lack of strategic planning has undoubtedly considerations have had more of an impact on harmed the state’s national security. First, as its national security doctrine than, say, I’m sure Cohen would agree, Israel has done a manpower or diplomatic considerations? To rather remarkable job of protecting its my mind, all of the components mentioned in national security over the last half century. my article have been vital to shaping that Not only has it grown from a weak and doctrine over the course of the state’s impoverished state into a strong and existence. prosperous one, but it has also transformed While it is true that some components have itself into a regional superpower and, by had a greater impact than others at discrete global standards, a medium power on par with points in time—for example, the rise of certain European states—all without the unconventional threats, particularly the one benefit of an integrated “grand strategy.” posed by weapons of mass destruction, has Second, while I surely do not want to leave become more acute over the past two the impression that strategic planning is a bad decades—it would be necessary to split up thing, it is not necessarily a recipe for success. Israel’s national security doctrine by historical Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are two periods to determine which components were cases in point. Both articulated coherent grand more important and which less important at strategies, yet both ended up in the dustbin of any given point in the state’s existence. history in a short span of time. True enough, Rather than a adopt a purely chronological Israel has made mistakes in the past; but approach, however, I chose a thematic one there’s no guarantee that it would be in a that not only separates out the different better place today if its national security components of the doctrine, but also assesses doctrine had been guided by an integrated them over time in terms of the conventional grand strategy instead of ad hoc solutions. versus unconventional warfare distinction. It’s my belief that this method of organization 132 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) An Exchange on Israel’s Security Doctrine

MISSING CATEGORES by being able to impose unacceptable costs Before I respond to Cohen’s comments on through a retaliatory strike. missing components of Israel’s national I would argue that Efraim Inbar and security doctrine, I want to mention briefly Shmuel Sandler are correct in asserting that one that both of us overlooked, as it arguably Israel’s deterrent posture in both areas has should have been incorporated into my article. declined over time insofar as low-intensity That is, Israel’s policies vis-à-vis non-Arab conflict is concerned. As a result of the Oslo states and dissident ethnic/religious groups in peace process, after all, Israel permitted what the Middle East. With respect to the former, has now mutated into a terrorist army to be Israel has adopted what has come to be created and encamped on its eastern and known as its “periphery” policy. It has, in southern borders, losing its previous ability to other words, aligned with non-Arab states, deny this territory to its Palestinian enemy. such as Turkey and Iran, at different times in Moreover, the application of heavy retaliatory its history, based on common national blows has not had the same “sobering” effect security interests. Israel’s past strategic on terrorist groups in the past decade that it relationship with the Shah’s Iran and its had in previous decades. On the other hand, in current relationship with Turkey are well the realms of full-scale warfare and weapons known, and need no elaboration here.(1) of mass destruction warfare, I’m not Suffice it to say that both relationships have convinced that Israeli deterrence by denial or brought strategic benefits to Israel and its deterrence by punishment has actually eroded partners. of late. No Arab army has initiated a full-scale With respect to the latter, which has seen war against the IDF since 1973. And no Arab Israel provide assistance over the years to state has dared to attack Israel with weapons groups as varied as the Kurds of Iraq, the of mass destruction. Even though Iraq Africans of Sudan, and the Christians of launched ballistic missiles at Israel in the Lebanon, the results have been far less 1991 Gulf War, it refrained from arming these encouraging. Indeed, one respected scholar missiles with non-conventional warheads. has unambiguously asserted that Israeli Finally, I’ll wind up my reply to Cohen “intervention” in intra-Arab affairs has never with a few words about the impact of societal enhanced the state’s national security. In the changes on Israel’s national security doctrine, case of Lebanon, he continues, it actually a subject of special interest to him. I agree harmed national security to a significant with Cohen that society constitutes an extent.(2) Perhaps this line of reasoning important variable; however, I made only explains Israel’s reticence of late in fleeting and hesitant references to this supporting such ethnic/religious groups. variable because, in my opinion, it’s too early Regarding the concept of deterrence, I to make any definitive statements about its chose to look at it in terms of the common long-term impact on Israel’s national security Israeli distinction between general and doctrine. For most of the state’s history, specific, because I thought that this frame of society has been a constant—the Israeli public reference would resonate with the article’s has essentially made whatever sacrifices the audience. Given that the concept of deterrence state has asked of it. To be sure, rumblings of covers a very broad spectrum of conduct, one dissent began to be heard in the wake of the can also, of course, examine Israeli behavior 1973 War, and these voices picked up in light of the more academic ideas of strength during the 1982 Lebanon War. “deterrence by denial”—that is, the ability to Nevertheless, only in the last decade have the stop an opponent from initiating an action that trends that Cohen cogently outlines—the it would otherwise undertake by defensive increased distance between society and the measures—and “deterrence by IDF, the decreased willingness of influential punishment”—that is, the ability to prevent an segments of the population to serve in the opponent from initiating an action that it military, the IDF’s changed force structure, would otherwise undertake not by being able and so on—become very noticeable. to defend against the action itself, but rather Moreover, some (if not all) of these trends

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 133 Stuart A. Cohen and David Rodman may be reversed by the events of the current Israeli-Palestinian low-intensity conflict, which has clearly opened the eyes of even the most dovish members of Israeli society. Therefore, even though I largely endorse, for the moment, Cohen’s view of the evolving impact of societal changes on Israel’s national security doctrine, I still think that caution is indicated in drawing conclusions in this area. The future may well hold some surprises.

**David Rodman has taught courses at the University of Michigan and written articles for The Journal of Strategic Studies, Diplomacy and Statecraft, SAIS Review, the Journal of intelligence and Counterintelligence, and Israel Studies.

NOTES 1. For a thorough review of the Israeli-Iranian relationship see Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel’s Role in the Iran-Contra Affair (New York: The Free Press, 1988). For an equally thorough review of the Israeli-Turkish relationship see Efraim Inbar, The Israeli-Turkish Entente (London: King’s College London, 2001). 2. Zeev Maoz, “Israeli Intervention in Intra- Arab Affairs,” in Abraham Ben-Zvi and Aharon Klieman, Global Politics: Essays in Honour of David Vital (London: Frank Cass, 2001).

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