Nuclear Power: Is the Renaissance Real Or a Mirage? H-Holger Rogner & Alan Mcdonald International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 1

Nuclear Power: Is the Renaissance Real or a Mirage? H-Holger Rogner & Alan McDonald International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 1

Keywords: Nuclear power status and projections, nuclear power economics, manufacturing capacity

Summary In 2009, in the midst of the global financial and economic crises that began in 2008, and as the nuclear power industry posted its first two-year decline in installed capacity in history, the IAEA revised its projections for future nuclear power growth upwards. This paper summarizes the status of nuclear power in the world today and the status of all steps in the nuclear fuel cycle. It summarizes nuclear power’s prospects and important trends in key factors. It explains the reasons for optimism and rising expectations about nuclear power’s future, and it acknowledges that there is, nonetheless, much uncertainty.

Conflicting indicators For nuclear power, 2009 was a second straight paradoxical year. In 2008, pprojections of future growth were revised upwards even though installed nuclear capacity actually declined during the year and no new reactors were connected to the grid. It was the first year since 1955 without at least one new reactor coming on-line. There were, however, ten construction starts, the most since 1987. In 2009 installed nuclear capacity dropped yet again, the first two-year drop in nuclear power’s history, with three reactors being retired and only two new ones connected to the grid. But the IAEA’s projections for nuclear power growth were again revised upward, by about 8%, even as the world was still dealing with the financial and economic crises that started in late 2008. One reason for the higher projections was that construction starts on new reactors also increased. There were eleven new construction starts (see Figure 1), extending a continuous upward trend that started in 2003.

20 Constructionstarts

0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Figure 1: Construction starts of nuclear power plants by year. Source IAEA, 2010a.

1 IAEA, Wagramerstrass 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria. Tel +43-1-2600-22776; Email: [email protected]

Interest and expectations are high. Since 2004, some 60 countries currently without nuclear power have expressed an interest to the IAEA in exploring or starting nuclear programmes. Countries with phase-out policies have lifted or are considering a reversal of restrictive policies on the use of nuclear energy. But the rising interest must still be translating into new power plants. Reaching the IAEA’s high projection (presented below) would require bringing on-line an average of 22 new reactors each year through 2030. This is much higher than the average of three new reactors connected to the grid each year from 2000 through 2009, and one third higher even than the average of 16 new reactors each year during the 1970s. The reasons for the apparent paradoxes are several. First, the current financial and economic crises have not affected the longer term market fundamentals (or drivers of nuclear energy), most importantly growing energy demands due to population growth and economic development, an interest in stable and predictable generating costs, and concerns about energy security and environmental protection, especially climate change. Second, the financial and economic crises have had a more pronounced impact on projects with short lead times. The prospect of lower demand growth in the near term reduces the pressure for near term investment decisions, and the long lead times associated with nuclear projects allow for additional analysis and less rushed preparation. Put differently, the current crises hit most nuclear projects in the early planning stages, years before key financing decisions would have to be made. Hence only a few nuclear expansion plans have been postponed or cancelled, and the order pipelines remain filled. Third, investment costs for non- nuclear generation options have also increased, and the relative economics of electricity generation options have been realigned only marginally, if at all. This is not to say that the global financial and economic crises left the nuclear power business unscathed. It was cited as a contributing factor in near term delays or postponements affecting nuclear projects in some regions of the world. Vattenfall announced in June that it was putting decisions on nuclear new build in the UK on hold for 12–18 months, citing the economic recession and market situation. Financing uncertainty was cited in connection with the withdrawal of the utilities GDF SUEZ and RWE from the Belene project in Bulgaria. The Russian Federation announced that for the next several years, because of the financial crisis and lower projected electricity use, it would slow planned expansion from two reactors per year to one. Ontario, Canada, suspended a programme to build two replacement reactors at Darlington, partly because of uncertainty about the future of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL). The Canadian Government had reported it planned to seek buyers for AECL to reduce budget deficits. In the USA, Exelon deferred major pre-construction work on a proposed new nuclear power plant in Texas, citing uncertainties in the domestic economy. Of 17 combined license applications before the US NRC, 4 were put on hold in the course of 2009 at the request of the applicants. In South Africa, Eskom extended the schedule for its planned next reactor by two years to 2018. In contrast, China saw nine construction starts in 2009 after six construction starts in 2008. It appears that as utilities elsewhere dragged their feet in following through with nuclear plant and equipment orders, China seized the opportunity and moved ahead in the queue and negotiated attractive terms. As the year 2009 drew to a close, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced their signing of a contract to purchase four 1 400 MW(e) reactors from a South Korean consortium led by the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). About a dozen countries currently without nuclear power are continuing preparations to start their first nuclear power plants by the early 2020s while an even larger number are familiarizing themselves with the prerequisite nuclear infrastructure requirements. In short, while the prospects for nuclear power now are brighter than at the turn of the millennium, uncertainty remains about whether and when all the high ambitions will be realized.

Government policies and private sector risk perception remain decisive factors shaping the future of nuclear power.

Nuclear Power Plants in Operation and Under Construction As of 1 June 2010, there were 438 nuclear power reactors in operation worldwide, totalling 371.7 GW(e) of generating capacity (see Table 1). This is almost identical to the peak of 2007 due to closures of plants in Lithuania and Slovakia (integral parts of the EU accession agreements) as well as in Japan and France (after more than 30 years in service), no grid connections in 2008 and only little more than 1 GW(e) of new capacity additions in Japan and India. Since the turn of the millennium, the global nuclear generating capacity has grown on average by 0.5% per year compared with an overall global generating capacity expansion of almost 4% per year. The global fleet of nuclear power plants produced between 2 544 TWh and 2 661 TWh of electricity per year. The 2009 production of 2 558 TWh translates into a market share of 14 percent, i.e. every seventh kilowatt-hour produced in the world was generated by nuclear power. The market share has been declining slowly but consistently since the turn of the millennium as overall electricity generating capacity has grown faster than nuclear power and the temporary unavailability of several reactors, such as those at the 8.2 GW(e) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant in Japan, which was shut down in July 2007 after a major earthquake. After in-depth safety inspections and seismic upgrades, two of the seven were restarted and connected to the grid in 2009. Moreover, the past increase in availability factors, which helped keep the nuclear share relatively stable during the 1990s despite limited investment in new build, appears now to have plateaued (see Figures 2 and 3). The low hanging fruit of streamlined plant services and maintenance scheduling, improved plant operation and management, higher burn-up and shorter refueling down-times has been harvested, and further increases in load factors have become more difficult to achieve.

90 45 2,700 Total nuclear TWhelectricitygeneration in 40 2,400 85 82.2 81.9 82.1 35 2,100 81.0 81.1 79.6 79.6 80.0 79.8 80 78.4 78.7 30 1,800

75.4 75.7 25 1,500 75 73.7 74.3 20 1,200 71.2 70.1 70.2 70.5 GWe 70 15 900 Percent 66.8 10 600 65 5 300

60 0 0

Incremental nuclear power capacity additions in capacitynuclear in additions powerIncremental -5 -300 55 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Figure 2: Development of the load factor of the global Figure 3: Annual incremental nuclear fleet of nuclear power plants. Source: IAEA, 2010a. capacity additions and nuclear electricity generation. Source: IAEA, 2010a. A total of 55 reactors were under construction on 1 June 2010, the largest number since 1992. Altogether, the plants under construction represent 50.9 GW(e) of nuclear generating capacity. More than half of the construction starts occurred since 2007 (see Figure 1). Note that most of the plants under construction are scheduled to be connected to the grid over the next 4 to 6 years and thus are not yet reflected in the incremental capacity additions of Figure 3. Current expansion, as well as near term and long term growth prospects, remain centred in Asia. Of the eleven construction starts in 2009, ten were in Asia. As shown in Table 1, 36 of the 55 reactors under construction are in Asia, as were 31 of the last 43 new reactors to have been connected to the

3 grid. China’s target is 40 GW(e) of nuclear power capacity in 2020, compared to 8.4 GW(e) today. Indeed without the expansion in Asia, total global nuclear generating capacity would have stagnated at the level of 1990s (see Figure 4). The recent trends of uprates and renewed or extended licenses for many operating reactors continued in 2009. In the USA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved eight more license renewals of 20 years (for a total licensed life of 60 years) bringing the total number of approved license renewals to 59. The UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate approved renewed periodic safety reviews for two reactors, allowing an additional ten years of operation. Spain’s Garona nuclear power plant was granted a four-year license extension, and operating licenses for Canada’s Bruce A and Bruce B nuclear power plants were renewed for an additional five years.

400 90 80 70 350 60 50 40 GW(e) 300 30 20 10 250 0 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Asia 200 GW(e) 150

100

0 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

North America Europe CIS Latin America Africa Asia

Figure 4: Global nuclear generating capacity in GW(e), 1960 – 2009. Source IAEA, 2010a. In Europe, nuclear power phase-out policies were moderated in several countries. Sweden will now allow its existing reactors to operate to the end of their economic lifetimes and to be replaced by new reactors once they are retired. Italy ended its ban on nuclear power and will now allow new construction. Belgium decided to postpone the first phase of its planned phase-out by ten years. Closure of its reactors had been scheduled to take place between 2015 and 2025. In Germany, following the change of Government, discussions started to postpone the phase-out. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are seriously considering adding new nuclear build to their existing fleets of nuclear power plants. Belarus and Poland have made decisions in principle in favour of introducing nuclear power, and Lithuania has made a comparable decision about replacing the now shutdown Ignalina nuclear power plant.

Economics Generally, existing operating nuclear power plants continue to be highly competitive and profitable. The low share of fuel costs in total generating costs makes them the lowest cost baseload electricity supply option in many markets. Uranium costs account for only about five percent of total generating costs and thus protect plant operators against resource price volatility. Recently the prices of energy resources, materials used in power plants and commodities have been high, but generating costs of nuclear power plants have been barely affected despite record-level uranium spot prices of $350/kgU in 2007 (compared with $20/kgU to $30/kgU during 2000 to 2003). On a levelized life cycle cost basis (LCOE), new nuclear build is generally competitive with other generating options. The ‘front-loaded’ cost structure of nuclear plants (i.e. the fact that they are

4 relatively expensive to build but inexpensive to operate) has always been an investment risk factor and a financial challenge, especially in liberalized electricity markets. Amortization periods of between 15 and 25 years, the bulkiness of the investment volume of a 1 000 MW(e) to 1 700 MW(e) nuclear project, and regulatory uncertainty are potential disadvantages to be weighed against a relatively low and predictable LCOE once the plant is completed and connected to the grid. The 2005 OECD report “Projected Costs of Generating Electricity” (NEA and IEA, 2005), prepared by a diverse group of experts from vendors, utilities, research organization and national and international governmental institutions, showed an investment cost range for nuclear power of $1 000 to $2 500 per kW(e), and nuclear power fared well compared to alternative generating options 2. However, investment costs for all power plants began to ascend steeply around 2006 and by 2008 had more than doubled, both for conventional coal technology and, especially, for nuclear power. This sharp increase coincided with the rapid increase in world market prices of energy and materials (e.g. cement and the full spectrum of metals). While the price increases for energy and materials were one element pushing investment costs higher, they alone do not explain the full investment cost increases. These are rather the result of a combination of several coinciding factors: (i) an above average demand for generating capacity in Asia, (ii) an ageing fleet of other kinds of power plants in North America and Europe that are competing for components and materials needed for refurbishments driven by environmental considerations and the need for efficiency improvements due to high fuel prices, and (iii) a global power equipment manufacturing industry with little spare capacity due to relatively little expansion for more than a decade. Globally only a few manufactures exist that are capable of producing heavy forging equipment such as reactor pressure vessels or steam generators. In 2008 lead times of 50 months and more had become common place. Backlogs started to accumulate with the license extension of existing reactors, which often require the replacement of steam generators and other heavy components. Rising interest in new nuclear build and the accompanying pre-orders further added to the backlog. Full order books allow manufactures to command higher margins and thus exert further upward pressures on prices. For new designs, or for construction in new environments, investment costs may include first-of-a- kind (FOAK) costs – either truly for the first construction of a design never built before (e.g. the EPR at Olkiluoto in Finland), construction in a region or country without nuclear power (e.g. UAE or Vietnam) or construction in countries where active nuclear power construction stopped decades ago (e.g. USA, Belgium, Switzerland or UK). FOAK costs include a particularly high share of contingency costs to cover unforeseen events given the lack of experience with the design, the environment or the country. They can add as much as 35% to overnight costs 3 (University Chicago,

2 The OECD study accounts for all generating options (coal, natural gas, nuclear and renewables) and considers electricity generating capacities in the pipeline or early planning stages using partly harmonized criteria (e.g., for load factors or discount rates); it otherwise reflects location specific data and circumstances (e.g., construction times or design specificity). Numerous national studies published before 2006 use similar investment cost ranges (MIT 2003; Tarjanne and Loustarinen 2003; French Energy Secretariat 2003; University of Chicago, 2004; CERI 2004; TVA 2004). Nuclear power plants completed in Asia between 2000 and 2007 reported investment costs between $1 800 to $2 400 per kW(e). 3 The term “overnight capital costs” (OC) generally includes costs for equipment, procurement and construction, plus owner’s and contingency costs, but excludes interest during construction (IDC), escalation due to increased costs for project specific material, components and labour, as well as general inflation. OC are the costs if the plant were built overnight. However, OC quotes for plants to be built, say, in 2015 often do include anticipated cost escalation and inflation. Extrapolations based on two-digit annual escalation rates as observed between 2005 and mid-2008 can quickly double or triple OC.

2004). FOAK costs are uncertain and prone to fast escalation, particularly since nuclear power’s capital intensiveness makes costs highly sensitive to delays in construction. For example, the overnight cost (OC) estimate for Olkiluto-3 in Finland, a FOAK third generation European Pressurized Reactor (EPR), has reportedly risen from €3.2 billion to more than €4 billion (at 2008 prices and exchange rates) due to construction delays caused by FOAK costs related to quality issues, design revisions, approvals, and logistic challenges not experienced for a long time. The resulting FOAK costs were further compounded by the 2007-2008 price escalation of raw materials, mainly copper, nickel and steel, and labour. This does not include the higher interest costs during construction (IDC) and power replacement costs caused by the completion delay. OC are lower for subsequent units, but some (decreasing) additional costs will persist until experience has been accumulated through the completion of several (about five to eight) essentially identical designs. Sharing existing sites and local infrastructure can considerably reduce OC (and IDC through generally shorter construction periods). For example, Progress Energy put the OC for a second AP-1000 at its Levy County site at $3 376 per kW(e), substantially lower than the first unit’s $5 144 per kW(e), with an average cost of $4 260 per kW(e) for both units. And the OC of the Russian Federation’s Kaliningrad-2 are $2 150 per kW(e), half the cost of Kaliningrad-1. The recent OECD report “Projected Costs of Generating Electricity” (NEA and IEA, 2010) presents nuclear OC between $1 560/kW(e) and $5 860/kW(e) – a much wider range than five years ago – which shows continued uncertainty about nuclear power OC. Altogether thirteen countries, all of which operate nuclear power plants, and two industrial associations contributed data for a total of twenty prospective nuclear projects (see Figure 5). At the lower end of the OC estimates are China, Japan, Korea and Russia, i.e. countries with ongoing construction experience. At the higher end, OC often reflect FOAK costs – either truly for the first construction of a design never built before (e.g., the EPR at Olkiluoto in Finland), construction in a region or country without nuclear power (e.g., UAE or Vietnam) or in countries where active nuclear power construction stopped decades ago (e.g., USA, Belgium, Switzerland or UK). However, what ultimately matters are not the investment costs but the LCOE over different generating options. As the OC of all electricity generating alternatives have increased substantially, and fossil fuel prices remain at elevated levels (except for domestic coal) compared to ten years ago, the LCOEs at a discount rate of 5% show nuclear power to be a competitive baseload electricity provider (see Figure 6). At a discount rate of 10% the situation is different. Nuclear power is competitive in some markets; in others it would only be competitive if there were a financial benefit attached to its low greenhouse gas emissions. The generating costs in Figure 6 cover a wide range reflecting different local conditions, e.g., the differences between regulated and liberalized markets and different assumptions about the future costs of fuel and other factors. The main parameters influencing total cost are: construction cost, financial factors (interest and discount rates, return on equity), fuel prices, decommissioning costs (and, in the case of nuclear power, also spent fuel management costs) as well as energy and environmental policies. The economics of nuclear relative to fossil-fuelled generation, particularly coal, improves with carbon pricing. No such pricing is included in the generating cost projections of Figure 6. To put the impact of carbon prices into perspective, consider that a price of $50/t of CO 2 would increase the cost of coal-fired electricity by $30 to $60 per MWh depending on the combustion technology and type of coal. For natural gas with a much lower carbon content per unit of fuel, the corresponding range is $8 to $15 per MWh.

6 000 300

5 000 250

200 4 000 150 3 000

US$/ MWh US$/ 100

2 000 50

1 000 0 Overnight investment costs $/kW(e) costs investment Overnight 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10%

0 Nuclear Coal Coal (CCS) Gas Wind Wind (onshore) (offshore)

Figure 5: Expected overnight cost of nuclear power Figure 6: Levelized costs of electricity of plants. Source: IEA/NEA, 2010. different generating options at 5% and 10% discount rates. Source: IEA/NEA 2010. Climate Change The Copenhagen Accord of December 2009 defined dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system as an increase in global temperature of more than 2 degrees Celsius. According to the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), avoiding such dangerous interference requires that global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions peak within 15 years and then, by 2050, fall by 50%-85% compared with 2000 levels. While efficiency improvements throughout the energy system, especially at the level of energy end-use, offer substantial GHG reduction potentials often at “negative” costs 4, nuclear power, together with hydropower, wind power and carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies, is one of the lowest supply-side emitters of GHGs in terms of grams of CO 2-eq per kWh generated on a life cycle basis (see Figure 7). Fossil electricity generation Non-fossil electricity generation (life cycle emissions) (life cycle emissions) 1 800 [8] 180 [4] 1 600 160 Standard deviation Median 1 400 [12] 140 Min - Max [10] 1 200 120 [sample size] /kWh / kWh / [8] eq eq - - 1 000 100 2 2 [16] [13] gCO gCO 800 80

600 60

[16] 400 40 [15] [8] [15] 200 20

0 0 lignite coal oil gas CCS hydronuclear wind solar bio- storage PV mass Figure 7: Life cycle GHG emissions of selected electricity generating technologies. Source Weisser, 2007.

4 Mitigation options with net negative costs (‘no regrets’ opportunities) are defined as those options whose benefits, such as reduced energy costs and reduced emissions of local and regional pollutants, equal or exceed their costs to society, excluding the benefits of avoided climate change.

The low GHG emissions per kWh of renewables and nuclear power are reflected in the overall GHG intensities of electricity generation in countries with a high share of any of these technologies in their generating mixes. Figure 8 contrasts the relative contributions of nuclear power, hydropower and other renewable technologies in 2006 with the average amount of CO 2 emitted per kWh. Countries with the lowest CO 2 intensity (less than 100 g CO 2/kWh, below 20% of the world average) generate around 80% or more of their electricity from hydropower (Norway and Brazil), nuclear power (France) or a combination of these two (Switzerland and Sweden). At the other extreme, countries with high CO 2 intensity (800 g CO 2/kWh and more) have none (Australia) or only limited (China and India) shares of these sources in their power generation mixes (IAEA, 2009a). Figure 9 takes a closer look at the GHG mitigation potentials of the principal low carbon power generation technologies assessed by the IPCC. The mitigation potentials of nuclear power and renewables are based on the assumption that they displace fossil based electricity generation. The figure shows the potential GHG emissions that can be avoided by 2030 by adopting the selected generation technologies. The width of each rectangle is the mitigation potential of that technology for the carbon cost range shown on the vertical axis. Each rectangle’s width is shown in the small box directly above it. Thus, nuclear power (the yellow rectangles) has a mitigation potential of 0.94 Gt CO 2-eq at negative carbon costs plus another 0.94 Gt CO 2-eq for carbon costs up to $20/t CO 2. The total for nuclear power is 1.88 Gt CO 2-eq, as shown on the horizontal axis. The figure indicates that nuclear power represents the largest mitigation potential at the lowest average cost in the energy supply sector, essentially electricity generation. Hydropower offers the second cheapest mitigation potential but its size is the lowest among the five options considered here. The mitigation potential offered by wind energy is spread across three cost ranges, yet more than one third of it can be utilized at negative cost. Bioenergy also has a significant total mitigation potential, but less than half of it could be harvested at costs below $20/t CO 2-eq by 2030.

Figure 8: CO 2 intensity and the shares of non-fossil sources in the electricity sector of selected countries. Source: IAEA, 2009a.

0.43 0.49 0.32 100 0.09 0.06 0.31 Total Mitigation Potential : 80 7.27 Gt CO 2-eq

1.88 0.87 0.94 0.94 1.22 1.88 60 Mitigation

. Potential in

-eq 0.19 0.19 0.08 Gt CO 2-eq . 2 0.01 40 0.54 0.49 0.23

US$/t CO US$/t 20 0.20 0.94 0.42 1.07 0.35 0 0.94 0.45 0.33 Negative 0.24 0.15 mitigation -20 costs 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0

Gt CO 2-eq. Nuclear Wind Bioenergy Geothermal CCS- Coal CCS- Gas Fuel switching & Hydro Solar (PV, CSP) plant efficiency Figure 9: Mitigation potential in 2030 of selected electricity generation technologies in different cost ranges. Source: Adapted from IPCC, 2007.

Projected growth for nuclear power Each year the IAEA updates its low and high projections for global growth in nuclear power. In 2009 and 2010, despite the financial and economic crises that started in late 2008, both the low and high projections were revised upwards compared with the 2008 projections. In the 2010 low projection, global nuclear power capacity reaches 546 GW(e) in 2030 (up from 473 GW(e) in 2008). In the updated high projection it reaches 803 GW(e) versus 748 GW(e) in the 2008 projection. Total global installed nuclear generating capacity was 369 GW(e) at the end of 2009. Since 2003 annual projections for 2030 have shown a general upward trend, and overall nuclear generating capacity projections increased by 41% (low) and 40% (high) over the period. This trend mirrors the rising interest in nuclear power with the largest step increases occurring during the last three years. The region with the largest increase is non-OECD Asia, essentially China and India, but also several newcomer countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Compared with 2009, nuclear power in this region would increase 11-fold in the high projection and more than seven-fold in the low projection (see Figure 10). In fact on a regional basis, projections show increases for all but one region in both the low and high projections. The exception is Europe where nuclear generating capacities in the low projection shrink to 105 GW(e) by 2030 – down from 135 GW(e) operating in 2009 – while the high projection foresees an expansion to 187 GW(e). The financial and economic crises that started in late 2008 affected the prospects of some nuclear power projects, but its impact was different in different parts of the world. The regional pattern of revisions in the projections reflects, in part, the varying impacts of the financial and economic crises in different regions. The general upward revision in both the low and high projections reflected expert judgment that the medium and long term factors driving rising expectations for nuclear power had not changed substantially. The performance and safety of nuclear power plants continued to be good. Concerns persisted about global warming, energy supply security, and high and volatile fossil

9 fuel prices. All credible studies still projected persistent energy demand growth in the medium and long term.

900

800

700

600 Middle East Non -OECD Asia 500 Pacific OECD CIS 400 Africa

GWe installed GWe 300 Latin America North America 200 Europe 100

0 2009 2020 2020 2030 2030 (LOW) (HIGH) (LOW) (HIGH)

Figure 10: Regional development of nuclear electricity generating capacities, IAEA LOW and HIGH projections to 2030. Source: IAEA, 2009b.

What had changed since the projections made in 2008 was that the commitments of governments, utilities and vendors to their announced plans, and the investments they were already making in those plans, were generally perceived as becoming firmer over time. That raised confidence. Another change was the Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA in August 2008. The Nuclear Suppliers Group subsequently exempted India from previous restrictions on nuclear trade, which should allow India to accelerate its planned expansion of nuclear power. Because of the retirement and decommissioning of aged plants, the projected expansion to 546 GW(e) by 2030, in the low projection, requires a cumulative addition of 375 GW(e) of nuclear generating capacity – 276 GW(e) for net growth and 99 GW(e) for replacement – over the next 20 years (Figure 11). In the high projection a total of 536 GW(e) would have to be constructed – 485 GW(e) in support of net growth and 51 GW(e) for the replacement of retired capacities (Figure 12). The high projection assumes not only a larger number of plant license extensions worldwide than in the low projection but also the reversal of nuclear phase-out policies currently in place in several European countries. The IAEA’s were not the only nuclear projections to have been revised in 2009. Updated projections were also published in 2009 by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the OECD International Energy Agency (IEA) and the World Nuclear Association (WNA). The EIA’s range of projections became slightly narrower, the WNA’s range became slightly broader, and the IEA’s range was shifted very slightly upwards (both the low and high values increased). Note that the projections are based on different sets of assumptions about the principal drivers of future electricity demand and supply, including demographics, economic development, energy policies, environmental policies, prices, etc. Figure 13 compares the ranges of the nuclear projections for 2030 from the EIA, IEA, IAEA, and WNA. Also included are the projections of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency’s 2008 World Nuclear Outlook.

150 200 140 180 130 120 160 110 IAEA LOW projection IAEA HIGH projection 140 100 90 120 80 100 70 GWe GWe 60 80 50 60 40 30 40 20 20 10 0 0 NAM LAM Europe CIS Africa MEA P-OECD NO Asia NAM LAM Europe CIS Africa MEA P-OECD NO Asia New construction 19.5 7.7 40.0 51.0 4.3 6.7 41.7 104.8 New construction 57.2 19.7 88.6 55.7 13.5 12.7 53.7 183.5 Retirements Retirements 4.4 0.3 70.1 20.1 0 0.0 2 2.3 4.4 0.3 36.3 8.9 0 0.0 1.099 0.5 Figure 11: Cumulative capacity additions and Figure 12: Cumulative capacity additions and retirements by region, LOW projection, 2010-2030 5. retirements by region, HIGH projection, 2010- Source: IAEA, 2009b. 2030. Source: IAEA, 2009b.

WNA NEA IAEA IEA EIA 2009

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900

GWe Figure 13: Comparison of nuclear power projections by the EIA, IEA, IAEA, NEA and WNA. Sources: NEA, 2008; IEA, 2009; WNA, 2009; IAEA, 2009b; EIA, 2009.

Uranium availability Between 2003 and 2007 rising uranium prices triggered a significant increase in investment in uranium exploration and mine development. The stepped-up exploration activities worldwide resulted in new discoveries and re-evaluation of known deposits. As a result, identified resources recoverable at less than $130/kgU grew by more than 40% from the amount estimated in 2001, to a current total estimate of 5.404 Mt U (see Figure 14). There are an additional 0.902 Mt U of identified conventional resources recoverable at costs between $130/kg U and $260/kg U (NEA, 2010). Uranium production in 2008 covered only about 68% of the world’s reactor requirements of 64 360 tU. The remainder was covered by five secondary sources: stockpiles of natural uranium,

5 NA = North America, LA = Latin America, EU = Europe, CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States, MEA = Middle East, P-OECD = Pacific OECD countries, NO Asia = Non-OECD Asia

11 stockpiles of enriched uranium, reprocessed uranium from spent fuel, mixed oxide (MOX) fuel with uranium-235 partially replaced by plutonium-239 from reprocessed spent fuel, and re-enrichment of depleted uranium tails (depleted uranium contains less than 0.7% uranium-235). At the estimated 2009 rate of consumption, the projected lifetime of the 6.306 Mt U of identified conventional resources recoverable at less than $260/kg U is almost 100 years. This compares favourably to reserves of 30–50 years for other commodities (e.g., copper, zinc, oil and natural gas). With reprocessing and recycling, more years of power could be extracted the same amount of uranium, and the projected lifetime of current identified conventional resources recoverable at less than $130/kg U would rise to several thousand years. In short, uranium resources are plentiful and pose no constraint on future nuclear power development (NEA, 2010).

India Mongolia Uzbekistan Jordan China 1.3% 0.8% Total Identified Resources: 6.306 Mt U 1.8% 1.8% 2.7% Ukraine 7.0 3.5% Australia 26.6% 6.0 Others 5.0 5.2% Niger 4.4% 4.0 Brazil 4.4% 3.0 MilliontU Namibia 2.0 4.5%

1.0 South Africa Kazakhstan 4.7% 13.2% 0.0 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 United States 7.5% Russia Canada 9.0% 8.6% Figure 14: Development of Identified Uranium Resources at less than $130/kgU production costs (less than $260/kgU for 2009), 1991-2009, and geographical distribution in 2009. Source: NEA, 2010.

Technology The majority of nuclear power plants operating around the world were designed in the late 1960s and 1970s and are no longer offered commercially today. Reactor designs increased gradually in size, taking advantage of economies of scale to be competitive. Many of the earliest reactors, which started commercial operation in the 1950s, were 50 MW(e) or smaller. The current fleet ranges from less than 100 MW(e) up to 1500 MW(e). The average size of reactors in operation today is 850 MW(e). Although the industry has historically and overwhelmingly pursued greater economies of scale, modest deployment of small (less than 300 MW(e)) and medium sized (between 300 MW(e) and 700 MW(e)) reactors continues. Small and medium sized reactors (SMRs) enable incremental capacity expansion, reduce economic risk exposure, especially at times of uncertain electricity demand prospects, and lower finance barriers. SMRs are being developed for: (a) use in small grids with limited interconnections, typically found in developing countries, (b) as a power or multipurpose energy source for isolated areas and (c) as less ‘bulky’, less risky investments in liberalized markets. Reactor technologies available for use today are evolutionary improvements of previous designs and generally take into account the following design characteristics:

• a sixty-year service life, • simplified maintenance — on-line or during outages, • easier and quicker construction, • inclusion of safety and reliability considerations at the earliest stages of design, • modern technologies in digital control and the human-machine interface, • safety system design guided by risk assessment, • simplicity, by reducing the number of rotating components, • increased reliance on passive systems (gravity, natural circulation, accumulated pressure, etc.), • additional severe accident mitigating equipment, and • complete and standardized designs with pre-licensing. Close to a dozen reactor designs are currently offered by the major nuclear power plant vendors worldwide. These so-called ‘generation III’ and ‘generation III+’ designs are expected to provide the majority of new nuclear build for the coming two decades. These include: • The ABWR (Advanced Boiling Water Reactor) is the only one of the leading designs already operating. Four are operating in Japan and another three units are under construction in Taiwan and Japan. The four operating units have outputs in the 1 300 MW(e) range, but versions up to 1 500 MW(e) are offered. The basic design was developed jointly by General Electric (GE), Toshiba and Hitachi. The ABWR design is currently licensed in the United States, Japan and Taiwan, China. • The AP-1000 is an advanced pressurized water reactor (PWR) with a capacity of 1 100 MW(e) to 1 200 MW(e) designed by Westinghouse. Construction of the first AP- 1000s started in 2009 at Sanmen in China. The design has also been associated with the majority of projects under consideration in the USA and is being considered in the UK and other markets. • The ESBWR (Enhanced Simplified BWR) is an evolutionary development of the ABWR concept by GE-Hitachi. To date, no orders have been placed for this 1 600 MW(e) design, but the design has been tentatively earmarked for some potential new plants in the USA. • The EPR (Evolutionary PWR) is a joint development by AREVA of France and Siemens of Germany designed to comply with stringent safety requirements laid down in the “European Utility Requirements” as well as with similar requirements issued by the US Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). Unit sizes will vary from 1 600 MW(e) to 1 700 MW(e). The first such units are now under construction in Finland, France and China, although the former has experienced significant ‘first-of-a-kind’ related delays. Several projects in early planning stages in the USA and the UK are considering the EPR design. • The APWR (Advanced PWR) has been developed for the Japanese market by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI). The design of the 1 530 MW(e) plant is an evolutionary improvement on currently operating designs. The construction of two units at Tsuruga is expected to start in the near future. MHI is also offering a version of the APWR in the US market, and has been selected for one potential project. • The VVER-1200 (also known as AES-2006) has been designed by a group of Russian institutions including the Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute, Rosenergoatom, Atomstroyexport and others (now all part of Atomenergoprom — a holding company for all of Russia’s civil nuclear industry). It is the most advanced PWR of the VVER series with a

power output of about 1 100 to 1 200 MW(e). Three VVER-1200 units are presently under construction in Russia. The latest VVER-1000 designs have also been exported to several countries, including China and India. • The ACR-1000 (Advanced CANDU) is the latest pressurized heavy water moderated reactor (PHWR) design of the Canadian crown corporation Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL). AECL’s reactor technology, known as CANDU, differs from other designs in that it uses natural uranium, thus avoiding the need for uranium enrichment. The ACR, however, will use slightly enriched fuel, the first CANDU design to do so. The ACR-1000 is an evolutionary 1 200 MW(e) PHWR building on AECL’s flagship CANDU 6 design. Preliminary orders for two ACRs by the Canadian Province of Ontario have been suspended over concerns about pricing and the future of AECL. • The APR-1400 is the latest Korean PWR design led by Doosan Heavy Industries (DHI). The APR-1400 is an evolutionary further development which has its origins in the second generation CE System 80+ model of Combustion Engineering, now part of Westinghouse. Two of these 1 400 MW(e) plants are under construction at the Republic of Korea’s Shin- Kori site. In late 2009 a consortium led by the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) won a contract to build four APR-1400s in the United Arab Emirates. The contract also foresees plant operation being carried out over the 60 year plant lifetime by Korea Hydro and Nuclear Corporation (KHNP). • In addition to the designs listed above, there are further designs under development that could become commercially available around 2020-2025. Efforts are particularly targeted at the development of smaller designs suitable for markets with smaller grid sizes or markets where smaller capacity increments would minimize financial risk. In the fastest growing markets for nuclear new build, China and India, two designs dominate: • The CPR-1000 is currently the main design being built in China, with 14 units now under construction. The design is a further development of French pressurized water reactor technology transferred to China under a 1992 agreement with then Framatome (now AREVA). Technology transfer and a high localization factor have been the cornerstones of China’s nuclear power development strategy. Another major technology transfer agreement with Westinghouse provides for the construction of four AP-1000s; two units are already under construction. Subsequent AP-1000s are expected to be largely built by domestic component suppliers. • India’s PHWR designs are based on an early CANDU design exported from Canada in the 1960s. The latest unit now has a capacity of 540 MW(e), up from the 220 MW(e) of earlier plants. The 2008 US-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement and the subsequent lifting of the ban on nuclear technology exports by the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group ended India’s 30-year-old isolation from access to imported nuclear technology. It is expected that India will soon play an important role in the nuclear technology market. Two VVER-1000s from Russia are already under construction at Kudankukam, and several more are in a planning stage.

Conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication Total global conversion capacity is about 76 000 tonnes of natural uranium per year for uranium hexafluoride (UF 6) and 4 500 t U per year for uranium dioxide (UO 2). Current demand for UF 6

14 conversion is about 62 000 t U per year. In 2009, AREVA started construction on its new COMURHEX II conversion facilities to replace the older facilities at Malvési and Pierrelatte, France. COMURHEX II’s design capacities for uranium tetrafluoride (UF 4) and UF 6 conversion are 15 000 t U each per year by 2012. In 2008, Cameco Corporation and Kazatomprom announced the establishment of a joint venture to develop a 12 000 tonne UF 6 conversion facility in Kazakhstan (IAEA, 2010b). Total global enrichment capacity is currently about 60 million separative work units (SWUs) per year compared to a total demand of approximately 45 million SWUs per year. Three new commercial scale enrichment facilities are under construction, Georges Besse II in France and, in the USA, the American Centrifuge Plant (ACP) and the National Enrichment Facility (NEF). All use centrifuge enrichment. Georges Besse II and ACP are intended to allow the retirement of existing gas diffusion enrichment plants. At Georges Besse II rotation of the first centrifuge cascade took place in December 2009. At NEF the first centrifuge was installed in September 2009. For the ACP, there is still some doubt about the readiness of the technology. The US NRC began formal reviews for two additional facilities, AREVA’s proposed Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility in Idaho and Global Laser Enrichment’s proposed laser enrichment facility in North Carolina (IAEA, 2010b). Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) expects to begin commercial operation of improved centrifuge cascades at Rokkasho-mura around 2011 and expand capacity from 150 000 SWUs today to 1.5 million SWUs by 2020. Current enrichment capacity in China, using Russian centrifuges, is 1.3 million SWUs, and Russia and China recently agreed to add 0.5 million SWUs. Limited enrichment facilities for domestic needs exist in Argentina, Brazil, India and Pakistan. Ukraine joined Armenia, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation as members of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC). The IUEC was established in 2007 in Angarsk, Russian Federation, following calls by the IAEA’s Director General and the Russian President to work towards multinational control of enrichment and create a network of international centres, under IAEA control, for nuclear fuel cycle services including enrichment. Total global fuel fabrication capacity is currently about 13 000 tonnes of uranium (t U) per year (enriched uranium) for light water reactor (LWR) fuel and about 4000 t U per year (natural uranium) for PHWR fuel. Total demand is about 10 400 t U per year. Some expansion of current facilities is under way, for example in China, Republic of Korea and USA. The current fabrication capacity for MOX fuel is around 250 tonnes of heavy metal (t HM), mainly located in France, India and UK with some smaller facilities in Japan and Russian Federation. Additional MOX fuel fabrication capacity is under construction in the USA (to use surplus weapon-grade plutonium). Genkai-3 in Japan started operating with MOX fuel in November, making it the first Japanese reactor to use MOX fuel. Worldwide, 31 thermal reactors currently use MOX fuel (IAEA, 2010b).

Back end of the fuel cycle The total amount of spent fuel that has been discharged globally is approximately 320 000 tonnes of heavy metal (t HM). Of this amount, about 95 000 t HM have already been reprocessed, and about 310 000 t HM are stored in spent fuel storage pools at reactors or in away-from-reactor (AFR) storage facilities. AFR storage facilities are being regularly expanded both by adding modules to existing dry storage facilities and by building new facilities. Total global reprocessing capacity is about 5 000 t HM per year. Completion of the new Rokkasho reprocessing plant in Japan was postponed until 2010. The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) selected Östhammar as the site for a final spent fuel geological repository in June 2009, following a nearly 20-year process that

15 narrowed the list of voluntary applicant sites to two in 2002. Subsequent site investigations concluded that the bedrock in Östhammar was more stable with less water than that in Oskarshamn, the other potential site. SKB plans to apply for a construction license in 2010 with site works scheduled to start in 2013, and disposal operations are to commence in 2023 (IAEA, 2010b). Site investigations for repositories at Olkiluoto in Finland and in the Bure region in France continued on schedule with operation targeted for 2020 and 2025 respectively. In the USA, the Government decided to terminate its development of a permanent repository for high level waste at Yucca Mountain, while continuing the licensing process. It plans to establish a commission to evaluate alternatives. In the UK a voluntary siting process has been initiated. Two boroughs in the neighbourhood of Sellafield have expressed an interest. In 2009, completion of the decommissioning of the Rancho Seco nuclear power reactor in California, USA, brought the number of power reactors worldwide that had been fully dismantled to 15. Fifty-one shutdown reactors were in the process of being dismantled, 48 were being kept in a safe enclosure mode, 3 were entombed, and, for 6 more, decommissioning strategies had not yet been specified (IAEA, 2010b).

Nuclear component manufacturing capacity Reactor pressure vessels, vessel heads, steam generators, steam turbines, reactor coolant pumps and other components must be manufactured to very high standards to ensure safety. The most demanding items are the pressure vessels, which require high capacity presses for producing heavy forgings. Reactor vendors and utilities alike prefer large forgings to be integral, as single components. While it is possible to use split forgings that are welded together, these welds then need routine inspections throughout the life of the plant. For very large generation III+ reactors, production of the pressure vessel requires, or is best undertaken by, forging presses of about 14 000- 15 000 tonnes capacity which accept hot steel ingots of 500-600 tonnes. Such presses are not common and do not have high throughput — about four pressure vessels per year appears to be common at present. Westinghouse is constrained as of early 2009 in that the AP1000 pressure vessel closure head and three complex steam generator parts can only be made by Japan Steel Works (WNA, 2009). Doubts have been expressed about the global nuclear industry’s capability to meet a rapidly growing demand like the one underlying the IAEA high projection. Two decades of low orders and rather bleak prospects for nuclear energy led to a stepwise downsizing of global manufacturing capacity. Japan Steel Works (JSW) is considered by many in the industry as the leader in ultra-heavy forgings. JSW has a series of hydraulic forging presses ranging from 3 000 to 14 000 t, the latter able to take 600 t steel ingots, as well as a 12 000 t pipe-forming press. Currently, JSW can only produce some four reactor pressure vessels and associated components per year, but capacity expansions are under way to triple this output to twelve by 2012. In recent years, many other companies established such capacities in preparation for meeting the rising expectations for nuclear power. The Japanese company Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) has the capacity to produce vessels for two-, three- and four-loop pressurized water reactors (PWRs), including the 1 538 MW(e) APWR at its Futami plant in Kobe. Recent plant upgrading is expected to enable the handling of even larger components. In total, MHI is to invest ¥40–50 billion ($380–470 million) in its facilities at Kobe and Takasago and to hire 1 000 more employees for its nuclear division by 2013. More recently, MHI announced a ¥15 billion ($138 million) investment to

16 double, by 2011, its capacity to make nuclear reactor pressure vessels and other large nuclear components. The Russian company, OMZ Izhora, also announced the doubling of its capacity, providing large forgings for Russian reactors to be built domestically and internationally. Another Russian company in the heavy equipment manufacturing branch, ZiO-Podolsk, is increasing its capacity in order to be able to produce four nuclear equipment sets per year. This company will complete the reactor pressure vessel for the BN-800 fast reactor at Beloyarsk by early 2010 and will also produce steam generators for several new nuclear power plants in the Russian Federation. Doosan Heavy Industries in the Republic of Korea has established itself as an important competitor in this market. The company plans to increase casting and forging capacities, including through the acquisition of a 17 000 t forging press, by investing 405 billion won ($395 million) by 2011. Castings production will increase by almost 50% to 300 000 t, while forging capacity will be almost doubled to 190 000 t/year. China’s heavy manufacturing plants such as the Dongfang Boiler Group, Dongfang Heavy Machinery Company, Shanghai Electric Group and Harbin Boiler Works can make about seven sets of pressure vessels and steam generators per year, a doubling from 2007. However, this is projected to rise to 20 sets per year by 2015. In June 2009, Dongfang Heavy Machinery Company delivered the first Chinese-made reactor pressure vessel for a 1 000 MWe CPR-1000 reactor (Ling Ao Phase II). In southern Asia, India’s Larsen and Toubro are increasing their scope in this area to satisfy both domestic and international demand. Bharat Heavy Electricals (BHEL) has set up a joint venture with Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL to supply turbines for nuclear plants of 700 MW(e), 1 000 MW(e) and 1 600 MW(e) and to seek overseas partners to provide technology for this enterprise. In July it announced that it was close to finalizing a European partner to take 30-35% of this joint venture. Following the 2008 removal of trade restrictions, Indian companies led by Reliance Power (RPower), NPCIL and BHEL plan to invest over $50 billion in the next five years to expand their manufacturing base in the nuclear energy sector. BHEL in 2008 set up a joint venture with Heavy Engineering Corp (HEC) for making castings and forgings for nuclear power plants, based on upgrading HEC’s plant. BHEL has plans of setting up a greenfield manufacturing base for nuclear forgings and is exploring joint ventures in forgings with UK-based Sheffield Forgemasters International Ltd. and Japan’s Kobe. In western Europe, the nuclear industry is already enlarging its production capacity to match the upcoming market. To take part in the United Kingdom’s new nuclear programme, Sheffield Forgemasters is considering expanding its heavy forging capacity with a 15 000 t press that would allow the production of large reactor pressure vessels, including Areva’s 1 650 MW European Pressurized Reactor, currently the largest on the market. Meanwhile, Areva is also increasing its large forging capacity at Le Creusot in Burgundy, France. The global nuclear supply chain has been positioning itself to meet even the most ambitious nuclear expansion programmes. With firm orders filling the order books — rather than uncommitted plans or vague proposals — the additional investments in manufacturing capacities needed to balance demand will undoubtedly be forthcoming. There may be some bottlenecks at the early stages, but the market will react and adjust itself to bring forward the required material, staff, components and services. Since the process of planning, environmental impact assessments, licensing, site preparation, etc. for a new nuclear power plant takes years, this will give sufficient time for manufacturers to establish the required capacities.

Human resource development An important challenge for the nuclear power industry, government authorities, research and development organizations, and educational institutions is ensuring that there is a sufficient and skilled workforce for all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle . Estimates of the human resource (HR) requirements associated with any of the nuclear growth projections cited above are not readily available, and data are scarce on the number of people today with the various skills needed in the nuclear industry and on the number in relevant education and training programmes. With increased interest in nuclear power, concerns have been expressed about possible shortages of people with the skills needed by the nuclear power industry, although it has also been recognized that the situation varies across countries according to the strength of their nuclear power programmes. Concerns about possible shortages have prompted initiatives by government and industry to attract students and expand education and training in nuclear related fields. Where data are available, these initiatives appear to be successful. For example, Électricité de France (EDF) recruited four times as many professionals in 2008 as it had in 2006, and it expects to maintain this higher level of recruitment for several more years, supported partly by an internal ‘skills renewal’ project. Areva hired 12 000 engineers in 2008 and plans to recruit an additional 40 000 in the next four years. Both companies will benefit from a presidentially initiated French Committee to Coordinate Training in Nuclear Science and Technology (C2FSTN), established in 2008. In the USA, nuclear engineering enrolment has increased by 46% in the past five years, assisted by Government funding and annual surveys of human resource needs that have increased the visibility of nuclear careers. China is developing a five-year plan to recruit 20 000 new engineers for its nuclear power programme by 2020, and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India is expanding its existing recruitment programmes to more than double its workforce of engineers by 2017. If the higher projections for nuclear power described above are realized, these efforts will have to be successful and replicated several times over. That challenge will be significant. The IAEA high projection, for example, would require bringing on-line an average of 22 new reactors each year through 2030. This is much higher than the average of 3 new reactors connected to the grid each year from 2000 through 2009, and one third higher even than the average of 16 new reactors each year during the 1970s. Still, even in the high projection, nuclear power capacity grows just 0.5% faster than overall electricity generation capacity. This means that human resource needs for nuclear power would be growing only slightly faster than human resource needs for electricity generation from coal, natural gas and renewables. The challenge faced by nuclear power is not exceptional (IAEA, 2010b).

Conclusions Nuclear power is back on the agenda of many countries, essentially for three reasons: long-term predictable and stable generating costs, energy security, and climate change mitigation benefits. Its economic competitiveness depends on local conditions including available alternatives, market structures and government policy. Nuclear power is not the ‘silver bullet’ to solve all the energy challenges before us. Deployment of nuclear energy should be preceded by comparative analyses of all available options. It also requires a strong and long-term commitment of governmental institutions and utilities as well as public acceptance. Good governance, transparency and stakeholder involvement in the decision process are therefore key for a decision to invest in the nuclear option.

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Table A-1. Nuclear Power Reactors in Operation and Under Construction in the World (as of 1 June 2010)a Nuclear Total Operating Reactors in Reactors under Electricity Experience through Operation Construction Supplied in 2009 COUNTRY 2009 No of Total No of Total % of TWh Years Months Units MW(e) Units MW(e) Total A rgentina 2 935 1 692 7.6 7.0 62 7 Armenia 1 375 2.3 45.0 35 8 Belgium 7 5 902 45.0 51.7 233 7 Brazil 2 1 884 1 1 245 12.2 2.9 37 3 B ulgaria 2 1 906 2 1 906 14.2 35.9 147 3 Canada 18 12 569 85.3 14.8 582 2 China 11 8 438 23 23 620 65.7 1.9 99 3 Czech Republic 6 3 678 25.7 33.8 110 10 F inland 4 2 696 1 1 600 22.6 32.9 123 4 France 58 63 130 1 1 600 391.8 75.2 1 700 2 Germany 17 20 480 127.7 26.1 751 5 Hungary 4 1 889 14.3 43.0 98 2 I ndia 19 4 189 4 2 506 14.8 2.2 318 5 Iran , I slamic Republic of 1 915 Japan 54 46 823 1 1 325 263.1 29.2 1 440 8 Korea , R epublic of 20 17 705 6 6 520 141.1 34.8 339 7 M exico 2 1 300 10.1 4.8 35 11 Netherlands 1 487 4.0 3.7 65 0 Pakistan 2 425 1 300 2.6 2.7 47 10 R omania 2 1 300 10.8 20.6 15 11 Russian Federation 32 22 693 9 7 131 152.8 17.8 994 7 Slovakia 4 1 762 2 782 13.1 53.5 132 7 Slovenia 1 666 5.5 37.8 28 3 S outh Africa 2 1 800 11.6 4.8 50 3 Spain 8 7 450 50.6 17.5 269 6 Sweden 10 9 036 50.0 37.4 372 6 Switzerland 5 3 238 26.3 39.5 173 10 Ukraine 15 13 107 2 1900 78.0 48.6 368 6 United Kingdom 19 10 137 62.9 17.9 1 457 8 United States of America 104 100 747 1 1 165 796.9 20.2 3 499 11 Total b, c 438 371 727 55 50 929 2 558.1 NA 13 913 0 a Data are from the Agency’s Power Reactor Information System ( http://www.iaea.org/pris ) b Note: The total includes the following data from Lithuania and Taiwan, China: Lithuania: 10.0 TWh of nuclear electricity generation, 76.2% of the total electricity generated; Taiwan, China: 6 units, 4980 MW in operation; 2 units, 2600 MW under construction; 39.9 TWh of nuclear electricity generation, 20.7% of the total electricity generated. 170 years, 1 month of total operating experience at the end of 2009 c The total operating experience includes also shutdown plants in Italy (81 years), Kazakhstan (25 years, 10 months) and Lithuania (43 years, 6 months).