DOCSLIB.ORG

The Main Political Parties in the Kurdish World

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Main Political Parties in the Kurdish World THE MAIN KURDISH POLITICAL PARTIES IN IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, AND TURKEY: A RESEARCH GUIDE By Rodi Hevian* Kurdistan is divided, and the Kurdish people are not united geographically. They are split among numerous political parties and institutions in several different countries. Various early attempts to build Kurdish national movements after 1918 failed. Modern Kurdish parties began to emerge after World War II. In the post-Cold War era, Kurdish movements have gained momentum politically, economically, socially, as well as at the regional and international levels. The current period may well be a particularly crucial one for Kurdish aspirations. This article offers an overview of Kurdish political parties and references the most significant literature and resources available on them. Map of Kurdistan according to Google INTRODUCTION Free Kurdistan Movement in 1923 in Diyarbekir; and Xoybun in 1927 in Lebanon. As Kurdistan is divided and the Kurdish The goal of these organizations was to lead people are not united geographically, they are Kurdish rebellions against the Ottoman split among numerous political parties and Empire and later, against Turkish state. Yet all institutions in several different countries. of these organizations failed to achieve their They follow different leaders in each region of goals and vanished from the public sphere in Kurdistan. After World War I, the Kurds the following years. created national organizations and institutions However, toward the end of the Second to further their cause. These included the World War, the first modern Kurdish political Society for the Rise of Kurdistan (Kurt Teali party was established. The Kurdistan Cemiyeti), established in 1918 in Istanbul; the Democratic Party in Iran (PDKI) was founded 94 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 2013) The Main Kurdish Political Parties in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey: A Research Guide in 1945 in Eastern Kurdistan, Iran, by Qazi Ottoman Empire, Kurdistan once again Muhammad. There, they declared the short- became subject to partition by the victors of lived Mahabad Republic of Kurdistan in the war. Kurdistan was divided among three January 1946. newly established nation states--Turkey, Iraq, The purpose of this article is to describe the and Syria. current landscape of the main Kurdish political parties in Iran, Turkey, Syria, and IRAN Iraq, including their leaders, political goals, their transformation, influence, and their The Democratic Party of Kurdistan in Iran significance for Kurdish society. It provides a (PDKI) brief history about the Kurds and Kurdistan and also includes international Kurdish The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan organizations. (PDKI), considered the “ultimate modern Kurdish political party,” was established on THE KURDS August 16, 1945, by Qazi Muhammad in Mahabad in eastern Kurdistan/Iran.5 Just a few The Kurds make up the largest nation in the months after its creation, on January 22, 1946, world without an independent state.1 They the PDKI established the “Republic of number over 30 million and are spread Kurdistan,” (also referred to by historians as throughout the Middle East, mainly the “Republic of Mahabad,” since Mahabad concentrated in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. was chosen as the capital) in a section of They “consider themselves… descendants of Iranian Kurdistan. the Medes and other Indo-European tribes With the northern part of Iran under Soviet who settled around the Zagros Mountains control just after the Second World War, range some 4,000 years ago.”2 Despite not Soviet support had been critical for the having a country of their own, the Kurds have establishment of the Kurdish republic. succeeded in maintaining their ethnic identity However, less than year later, an agreement over the years. between the Iranian central government and “The Kurdish world is diverse, and there the Soviet Union was signed, bringing the are no exact linguistic and religious criteria by republic’s short-lived independence to an end. which the Kurds can be defined. There are a On December 17, 1946, Iranian troops number of Kurdish dialects; there is no single launched a major military offensive into the religion that binds them; and they are spread region, effectively ending the republic’s short- out across many different countries.”3 This lived existence.6 division is the result of geographical factors. Following the republic’s collapse, many “Located at the crossroads of civilizations, PDKI leaders were imprisoned. Twenty were Kurdistan has been traversed by numerous executed, including Qazi Muhammad, PDKI invaders and occupying forces. Alexander the head and president of the republic. Great followed this path on his way to the “Thereafter, the PDKI went underground. In east, as did the Persians en route to the west.” the 1970s, under the direction of its new In later periods, “the Romans, the leader, respected Kurdish intellectual Dr. Byzantines, and the Sassanids all made Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, the party joined expeditions with the goal of dominating the the uprisings against the shah’s dictatorship. region. Century-long battles between the However, soon after Ayatollah Khomeini had Ottoman and Persian Empires all took place in seized power in 1979, Khomeini declared Kurdistan. This led to the division of the land what he termed a ‘holy war’ on the Kurds of of the Kurds in the first half of seventeenth Iran. This resulted in the deaths of over 10,000 century, following the 1639 treaty of Zuhab Kurds.” 7 between the two fighting empires.”4 Following Based on reports published by Kurdish the First World War and the demise of sources close to the PDKI: Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 2013) 95 Rodi Hevian it is active among the Kurdish diaspora in Following Ayatollah Khomeini’s death North America, Europe, and Australia. in 1989, the Iranian regime, under then President Hashemi Rafsanjani, The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) expressed its readiness for negotiations with Ghassemlou in Austria. The PDKI The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is a delegation accepted. On July 13, 1989, splinter group of the PDKI and is led by in Vienna, Ghassemlou and his aides, Khalid Azizi. In 2006, at the PDKI’s 13th Abdullah Ghaderi-Azar--the PDKI convention, the dispute over choosing its next representative abroad--and Fadil Rasoul- leader led some senior members to leave the -the intermediary and an Iraqi Kurd-- party. Under Azizi’s leadership, they created were shot dead by Iranians at the the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). In negotiating table. 2012, “the PDKI and KDP met in Iraqi Kurdistan to discuss a possible According to Austrian MP of the Green reunification,”11 however, for the time being, Party Peter Pilz, “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, they function independently. The KDP is president of Iran from 2005-2013, had been based in Iraqi Kurdistan and has no real responsible for the gathering, had assisted in influence on the masses in Iranian Kurdistan. preparing the weapons, and had been a member of the execution team, which also Komala included Mohammed Jafar Sahraroudi, Hadji Moustafawi, and Amir Mansur Bozorgian.”8 “Komala, meaning ‘society’ in Kurdish, In 1992, “the Iranian regime targeted the was established in 1969 in Tehran as a Marxist PDKI’s new leader Dr. Sadegh Sharafkandi, in Kurdish movement. Led by Abdullah Berlin, Germany. Sharafkandi and three of his Mohtadi, it was mainly inspired by Mao’s friends were murdered by the Iranians and China and other socialist countries.”12 From their proxy Hizballah at the Mykonos Greek the beginning, it engaged in a clandestine restaurant in central Berlin.”9 campaign and became part of the ongoing The PDKI renounced its armed struggle in Kurdish struggle against the Iranian shah. the ensuing years and went underground once However, in 1983, it joined other leftist again. According to the PDKI’s party movements in Iran, and together they formed program, “the highest body of the PDKI is its the short-lived Communist Party of Iran. In Central Committee elected in the PDKI’s the following months, Komala left the Congress. The Central Committee also elects Communist Party and continued its struggle an executive body best known as the Political under its own name. Along with the Kurdistan Bureau, which also includes the general Democratic Party of Iran (PDKI), Komala secretary, who is elected by the Central became one of the two main Kurdish parties in Committee.” Iran fighting for Kurdish rights against the The PDKI leader, as of the writing of this Islamic Republic of Iran. article, is Mustafa Hijri.10 The PDKI, which “In the mid-1980s, Komala was active and has held 15 conventions, also endorses influential around Sanandaj, the capital city of democratic struggle in Iran, autonomy, and the the Iranian Kurdistan province, while the right to self-determination for the Kurds. In PDKI was more powerful around Mahabad, the past, especially during the Iran-Iraq War, it the former Kurdish republic in Iran.”13 was backed by the Iraqi government, and it However, internal fighting broke out between held a strong position on the ground in the the PDKI and Komala in the mid-1980s, Kurdish region. Since its decision to abandon leading to hundreds of deaths. armed struggle in the 1990s, it has become Not long after the 1989 murder of PDKI weak and disorganized. It has some influence, leader Ghassemlou in Vienna, one of although not strong, in Iranian Kurdistan, and Komala’s most prominent figures was killed in 96 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 2013) The Main Kurdish Political Parties in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey: A Research Guide Larnaca, Cyprus.14 In 1997, Komala joined the of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. “PJAK’s establishment of the Kurdistan National ultimate objective is to establish semi- Congress in Brussels with other Kurdish autonomous regional entities or Kurdish parties.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Turkey's Deep State
    #1.12 PERSPECTIVES Political analysis and commentary from Turkey FEATURE ARTICLES TURKEY’S DEEP STATE CULTURE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ECOLOGY AKP’s Cultural Policy: Syria: The Case of the Seasonal Agricultural Arts and Censorship “Arab Spring” Workers in Turkey Pelin Başaran Transforming into the Sidar Çınar Page 28 “Arab Revolution” Page 32 Cengiz Çandar Page 35 TURKEY REPRESENTATION Content Editor’s note 3 ■ Feature articles: Turkey’s Deep State Tracing the Deep State, Ayşegül Sabuktay 4 The Deep State: Forms of Domination, Informal Institutions and Democracy, Mehtap Söyler 8 Ergenekon as an Illusion of Democratization, Ahmet Şık 12 Democratization, revanchism, or..., Aydın Engin 16 The Near Future of Turkey on the Axis of the AKP-Gülen Movement, Ruşen Çakır 18 Counter-Guerilla Becoming the State, the State Becoming the Counter-Guerilla, Ertuğrul Mavioğlu 22 Is the Ergenekon Case an Opportunity or a Handicap? Ali Koç 25 The Dink Murder and State Lies, Nedim Şener 28 ■ Culture Freedom of Expression in the Arts and the Current State of Censorship in Turkey, Pelin Başaran 31 ■ Ecology Solar Energy in Turkey: Challenges and Expectations, Ateş Uğurel 33 A Brief Evaluation of Seasonal Agricultural Workers in Turkey, Sidar Çınar 35 ■ International Politics Syria: The Case of the “Arab Spring” Transforming into the “Arab Revolution”, Cengiz Çandar 38 Turkey/Iran: A Critical Move in the Historical Competition, Mete Çubukçu 41 ■ Democracy 4+4+4: Turning the Education System Upside Down, Aytuğ Şaşmaz 43 “Health Transformation Program” and the 2012 Turkey Health Panorama, Mustafa Sütlaş 46 How Multi-Faceted are the Problems of Freedom of Opinion and Expression in Turkey?, Şanar Yurdatapan 48 Crimes against Humanity and Persistent Resistance against Cruel Policies, Nimet Tanrıkulu 49 ■ News from hbs 53 Heinrich Böll Stiftung – Turkey Representation The Heinrich Böll Stiftung, associated with the German Green Party, is a legally autonomous and intellectually open political foundation.
    [Show full text]
  • Blood and Ballots the Effect of Violence on Voting Behavior in Iraq
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Göteborgs universitets publikationer - e-publicering och e-arkiv DEPTARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE BLOOD AND BALLOTS THE EFFECT OF VIOLENCE ON VOTING BEHAVIOR IN IRAQ Amer Naji Master’s Thesis: 30 higher education credits Programme: Master’s Programme in Political Science Date: Spring 2016 Supervisor: Andreas Bågenholm Words: 14391 Abstract Iraq is a very diverse country, both ethnically and religiously, and its political system is characterized by severe polarization along ethno-sectarian loyalties. Since 2003, the country suffered from persistent indiscriminating terrorism and communal violence. Previous literature has rarely connected violence to election in Iraq. I argue that violence is responsible for the increases of within group cohesion and distrust towards people from other groups, resulting in politicization of the ethno-sectarian identities i.e. making ethno-sectarian parties more preferable than secular ones. This study is based on a unique dataset that includes civil terror casualties one year before election, the results of the four general elections of January 30th, and December 15th, 2005, March 7th, 2010 and April 30th, 2014 as well as demographic and socioeconomic indicators on the provincial level. Employing panel data analysis, the results show that Iraqi people are sensitive to violence and it has a very negative effect on vote share of secular parties. Also, terrorism has different degrees of effect on different groups. The Sunni Arabs are the most sensitive group. They change their electoral preference in response to the level of violence. 2 Acknowledgement I would first like to thank my advisor Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • The Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Turkey
    http://assembly.coe.int Doc. 15272 21 April 2021 The functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey Report1 Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) Co-rapporteurs: Mr Thomas HAMMARBERG, Sweden, Socialists, Democrats and Greens Group, and Mr John HOWELL, United Kingdom, European Conservatives Group and Democratic Alliance Summary The Monitoring Committee is deeply concerned about recent developments in Turkey which have further undermined democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Procedures seeking to lift the parliamentary immunity of a third of the parliamentarians (overwhelmingly from opposition parties), the attempt to close the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and the continued crackdown on its members put political pluralism and the functioning of democratic institutions at risk. The presidential decision of 20 March 2021 to withdraw from the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (CETS No.210, the Istanbul Convention) to combat violence against women and domestic violence is a regrettable step backwards, made without any parliamentary debate, which raises the question of the modalities of denunciation of conventions in democratic societies. The committee also urges the immediate release of Selahattin Demirtaş and Osman Kavala following the final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. In order to reverse these worrying trends, the Turkish authorities should seize the opportunity of implementing the Human Rights Action Plan and revising the legislation on elections and political parties to take meaningful steps, put an end to the judicial harassment of opposition and dissenting voices, improve freedom of expression and media and restore the independence of the judiciary, in co-operation with the Council of Europe 1.
    [Show full text]
  • DELIVERED on 23RD SEPTEMBER Dear President Barzani
    THE LAST WRITTEN DRAFT – DELIVERED ON 23RD SEPTEMBER Dear President Barzani, I am writing on behalf of the United States to express our profound respect for you and for the people of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Together, over decades, we have forged a historic relationship, and it is our intention and commitment that this relationship continues to strengthen over the decades to come. Over the past three years, in particular, our strong partnership and your brave decisions to cooperate fully with the Iraqi Security Forces turned the tide against ISIS. We honor and we will never forget the sacrifice of the Peshmerga during our common struggle against terrorism. Before us at this moment is the question of a referendum on the future of the Kurdistan Region, scheduled to be held on September 25. We have expressed our concerns. These concerns include the ongoing campaign against ISIS, including upcoming operations in Hawija, the uncertain regional environment, and the need to focus intensively on stabilizing liberated areas to ensure ISIS can never return. Accordingly, we respectfully request that you accept an alternative, which we believe will better help achieve your objectives and ensure stability and peace in the wake of this necessary war against ISIS. This alternative proposal establishes a new and accelerated framework for negotiation with the central Government of Iraq led by Prime Minister Abadi. This accelerated framework for negotiation carries an open agenda and should last no longer than one year, with the possibility of renewal. Its objective is to resolve all issues outstanding between Baghdad and Erbil and the nature of the future relationship between the two.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction
    Notes Introduction 1. Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States (London, 1982), 5. 2. Ibid., 3. 3. Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain (London, 1977), 41–2. 4. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983), 15. 5. Ibid., 20. 6. Ibid. 7. Miroslav Hroch, ‘From National Movement to the Fully Formed Nation,’ New Left Review 198 (March/April 1993), 3–20. 8. Ibid., 6–7. 9. Ibid., 18. 10. Seton-Watson, Nations and States, 147–8. 11. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 127. 12. Ibid., 86. 13. Ibid., 102. 14. In the case of Iran, the Belgian constitution was the model for the Iranian constitution with two major adaptations to suit the country’s conditions. There were numerous references to religion and the importance of religious leaders. The constitution also made a point of recognizing the existence of the provincial councils. Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ, 1982), 90. 15. Peter Laslett, ‘Face-to-Face Society,’ in P. Laslett (ed.), Philosophy, Politics and Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), 157–84. 16. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 122. 17. Arjun Appadurai, ‘Introduction, Commodities and the Politics of Value,’ in A. Appadurai (ed.), The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspec- tive (Cambridge, 1986), 3–63. 18. Ibid., 9. 19. Luca Anderlini and Hamid Sabourian, ‘Some Notes on the Economics of Barter, Money and Credit,’ in Caroline Humphrey and Stephen Hugh- Jones (eds), Barter, Exchange and Value (Cambridge, 1992), 75–106. 20. Ibid., 89. 21. The principal issue in the rise of Kurdish national awareness is the erosion in the fabric of the Kurdish ‘face-to-face’ society.
    [Show full text]
  • Istanbul Technical University Graduate School of Arts
    ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES TRANSFORMATIONS OF KURDISH MUSIC IN SYRIA: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS M.A. THESIS Hussain HAJJ Department of Musicology and Music Theory Musicology M.A. Programme JUNE 2018 ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES TRANSFORMATIONS OF KURDISH MUSIC IN SYRIA: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS M.A. THESIS Hussain HAJJ (404141007) Department of Musicology and Music Theory Musicology Programme Thesis Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. F. Belma KURTİŞOĞLU JUNE 2018 İSTANBUL TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ SURİYE’DE KÜRT MÜZİĞİNİN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ: SOSYAL VE POLİTİK ETKENLER YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ Hussain HAJJ (404141007) Müzikoloji ve Müzik Teorisi Anabilim Dalı Müzikoloji Yüksek Lisans Programı Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. F. Belma KURTİŞOĞLU HAZİRAN 2018 Date of Submission : 7 May 2018 Date of Defense : 4 June 2018 v vi To the memory of my father, to my dear mother and Neslihan Güngör; thanks for always being there for me. vii viii FOREWORD When I started studying Musicology, a musician friend from Syrian Kurds told me that I am leaving my seat as an active musician and starting a life of academic researches, and that he will make music and I will research the music he makes. It was really an interesting statement to me; it made me think of two things, the first one is the intention behind this statement, while the second was the attitude of Kurds, especially Kurd musicians, towards researchers and researching. As for the first thing, I felt that there was a problem, maybe a social or psychological, of the Kurdish people in general, and the musicians in particular.
    [Show full text]
  • Interpreting the PKK's Signals in Europe
    PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume II, Issue 11 Interpreting the PKK’s Signals in Europe By Vera Eccarius-Kelly ince the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) unexpectedly abducted three German hikers near Mt. Ararat in Turkey on 8 July 2008, and then released them on 20 July, intelligence sources in Europe have in- tensified their surveillance of PKK operatives among members of the particularly numerous Kurdish S Diaspora in Germany.[1] According to German newspaper reports, the PKK demanded that in ex- change for the release of the hikers “Berlin stop its hostile politics towards the Kurds and the PKK in Ger- many”.[2] While the exact purpose of the abduction requires further analysis, it is clear that it was the armed branch of the PKK, known as the People’s Defense Forces (HPG), that kidnapped the German hikers at their Mt. Ararat encampment at 10,500 feet in the evening hours—only to release them unharmed some two weeks later.[3] Questions Related to an Abduction Several questions preoccupy security analysts in relation to this abduction. How should this event be inter- preted in Europe, and particularly in Germany? What signals did the PKK send? And, most importantly, is the PKK entering a renewed phase of high intensity activism and terrorism in Europe? This essay aims to provide a brief analysis of the often confusing and contradictory messages sent by European Kurdish circles.[4] Despite convoluted interpretations of Kurdish demands that are linked to a lack of unity among the many Kurdish organizations in Europe, it is possible to disentangle the underlying messages.
    [Show full text]
  • View/Print Page As PDF
    MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds In the Regional Power Struggle, has Erbil Decided to Join the Sunni Bloc? by Frzand Sherko Jan 29, 2016 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Frzand Sherko Frzand Sherko is an Iraq based strategic scholar and political analyst specializing in the intelligence and security affairs of the Kurdistan region of Iraq, greater Iraq, and the wider Islamic Middle East. Articles & Testimony he security of the Kurdistan Region-Iraq (KRI) depends more on agreements between Erbil and Kurdistan’s T neighbors than the KRI’s own security and intelligence capabilities. Whenever the regional powers surrounding the KRI have suspected that their interests are at risk, they have not hesitated to put the KRI’s security and stability in jeopardy to secure their interests. However, these regional power’s interests, increasingly at odds with one another, have begun to exacerbate the KRI’s security and internal political challenges. Since 1992, the KRI has worked to maintain a strategic relationship with Iran. When Iraqi Kurdistan’s civil war began in late 1993, Iran played a significant role, initially by directing the Islamic Movement in Kurdistan and later through its support of both sides in the conflict – the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Iran maintained its dual support until 1996, when it leveraged its relations to encourage both parties to maintain a political balance. Such an arrangement created stability, allowing Tehran to benefit from its economic ties with both parties and to avoid any possible threats the conflict could pose to Iranian national security.
    [Show full text]
  • Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey's
    Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy Ayşegül Aydin Cem Emrence turkey project policy paper Number 10 • December 2016 policy paper Number 10, December 2016 About CUSE The Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings fosters high-level U.S.-Europe- an dialogue on the changes in Europe and the global challenges that affect transatlantic relations. As an integral part of the Foreign Policy Studies Program, the Center offers independent research and recommendations for U.S. and European officials and policymakers, and it convenes seminars and public forums on policy-relevant issues. CUSE’s research program focuses on the transforma- tion of the European Union (EU); strategies for engaging the countries and regions beyond the frontiers of the EU including the Balkans, Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine; and broader European security issues such as the future of NATO and forging common strategies on energy security. The Center also houses specific programs on France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey. About the Turkey Project Given Turkey’s geopolitical, historical and cultural significance, and the high stakes posed by the foreign policy and domestic issues it faces, Brookings launched the Turkey Project in 2004 to foster informed public consideration, high‐level private debate, and policy recommendations focusing on developments in Turkey. In this context, Brookings has collaborated with the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) to institute a U.S.-Turkey Forum at Brookings. The Forum organizes events in the form of conferences, sem- inars and workshops to discuss topics of relevance to U.S.-Turkish and transatlantic relations.
    [Show full text]
  • PUBLISHER S Iranian Opposition to the Shah
    HAH S Guide Iranian Opposition to the Shah Advisor: Wolfgang H. Behn Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin RANIAN OPPOSITION TO THE I AIDC PUBLISHERP U R L 1 5H E R S S BRILLB RI LL WolfgangWolfgang H.H. Behn,Behn, StaatsbibliothekStaatsbibliothek Preussischer Preussischer Kulturbesitz,Kulturbesitz, BerlinBerlin GuideGuide to the microform collection collection IDC numbersnumbers NE-1550NE-1550 - NE-1578 NE-1578 MU IDCIDC PUBLISHERSPUBLISHERS 1988 The Iranian opposition to the Shah The overthrow of the Shah came as a great surprise, even to many Iranists, in spite of the fact that the revolution had been in the air in Tehran long before this was realized in the West. More enigmatic than the Islamic revolution itself were the aims of its supporters, although most of the opposition groups had explicitly stated their objectives in their publications long before the revolution. But the tightening censorship in Iran had forced the whole spectrum of the opposition to publish abroad. The evasive nature of dissident literature makes bibliographical control, and acquisition in general, extremely difficult. In the case of the Iranian revolution we are fortunate that "W.H. Behn has taken on the formidable task of listing (in his bibliographies) every publication of an anti-Pahlavi nature in Persian, or in other languages about Iran, published outside Iran between 1962 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. The measure of his success is that he has amassed a total of some 800 books and pamphlets... [The ] work... will be an indispensable tool for anyone studying the recent history of Iran and the sources of the opposition to the Shah that led to the revolution of 1979" (Prof.
    [Show full text]
  • Protesting As a Terrorist Offense RIGHTS the Arbitrary Use of Terrorism Laws to Prosecute and Incarcerate Demonstrators in Turkey WATCH
    Turkey HUMAN Protesting as a Terrorist Offense RIGHTS The Arbitrary Use of Terrorism Laws to Prosecute and Incarcerate Demonstrators in Turkey WATCH Protesting as a Terrorist Offense The Arbitrary Use of Terrorism Laws to Prosecute and Incarcerate Demonstrators in Turkey Copyright © 2010 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-708-6 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org November 2010 1-56432-708-6 Protesting as a Terrorist Offense The Arbitrary Use of Terrorism Laws to Prosecute and Incarcerate Demonstrators in Turkey I. Summary ......................................................................................................................... 1 Key Recommendations ..........................................................................................................6 Methodology ........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • BEFORE the IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL the Hague
    BEFORE THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL The Hague The Netherlands The Islamic Republic of Iran, Claimant, v. Claim No . A/30 United States of America, Full Tribunal Respondent. STATEMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES Sean D . Murphy Agent of the United States Counsel: Michael J . Matheson Jeffrey D . Kovar BEFORE THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL The Hague The Netherlands The Islamic Republic of Iran, Claimant, v. Claim No . A/30 United States of America, Full Tribunal Respondent. STATEMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES On August 12, 1996, the Islamic Republic of Iran filed a Statement of Claim (Doc . 1) in a new interpretive dispute against the United States, Case No . A/30, alleging that the United States has violated its commitments under the Algiers Accords by interfering in Iran's internal affairs and implementing economic sanctions against Iran . Pursuant to the Tribunal's Order of August 21, 1996 (Doc . 3), and subsequent extension orders (Docs. 5, 9, and 12), the United States submits this Statement of 1 Defense. 1 In the event the Tribunal permits Iran to file further written statements or other materials in this case (Rules of Procedure, Art . 22-23), the United States requests that the Tribunal accord it the right to respond thereto . - 2 ­ I . INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY The Government of Iran, which has a long record of using terrorism and lethal force as an instrument of state policy, is seeking a ruling from the Tribunal that the United States has violated the Algiers Accords by intervening in Iran's internal affairs and enacting economic sanctions against it .
    [Show full text]