UNIVERSITY COLLEGE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY THE EAGLE AND THE ALBATROSS AUSTRALIAN AERIAL MARITIME OPERATIONS 1921-1971 DAVID JOSEPH WILSON STUDENT NUMBER 9196522 A THESIS PREPARED IN REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 2003 1 hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no material previously published or written by another person, nor material which is a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgment is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom 1 have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. 1 also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression 'Is acknowledged. David Wilson September 2003 ABSTRACT The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) regarding the operation of aircraft from ships of the RAN and from RAAF shore bases. The effects of the separate intellectual development of maritime doctrine in the RAAF and RAN, and the efforts of the two Australian services to transfer theory into practice will be considered in the pre- (and post) World War II period, with due consideration of the experience of the services in both wars. The thesis will also discuss the problems that were faced by the RAAF and RAN to develop mutually acceptable operational procedures to enable the efficient use of aircraft in a maritime setting. The influence and effect on RAAF and RAN doctrine and equipment procurement, as a result of the special relationships that developed between the Air Force and Navy of Australia and Britain will be critically examined. A similar approach to the post war US/Australian relationship, and its effect on the Australian services, will also be critically examined. The thesis being propounded is that the development of a unique Australian maritime policy was retarded due to a combination of the relationship with Britain and the United States, lack of suitable equipment, lack of clear operational concepts in both the RAAF and RAN and the parochial attitude of the most senior commanders of both Services. The study has been based on Department of Navy, Department of Air and Department of Defence documents held in the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and Melbourne. In addition, relevant documents from the Admiralty and Air Ministry related to the development of naval aviation on RAN vessels during World War I, the attitude of the RAF toward the deployment of RAAF units to Singapore, and the negotiations that resulted in the procurement of HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne, have been perused. Wartime operational records of the RAAF have been examined to obtain data to enable a critical study to be made of the RAAF anti- submarine campaign, torpedo bomber operations and the maritime campaign undertaken from bases in North Western Area during World War II. The influence of the commander of the United States 5th Air Force has also been incorporated in the discussion. The research uncovered procedural and operational variations between the two Services, the diversion of key elements from Australian command and the priority given to the American line of advance that resulted in Australian operations being given a secondary, supportive, status. A conclusion reached as a result of this research has been that the development of a unique Australian maritime aerial capability was restricted by the requirement of Britain to deploy flying units to Singapore in 1940. Similarly, the pressure exerted on the RAN by the Admiralty to purchase the Light Fleet Carriers in the late 1940s was more in the interests of the RN and British foreign policy than that of the RAN. Overall, the relationship with the Britain and the United States masked the real weakness in Australia’s maritime operations and retarded its development. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work could not have been completed without the help and guidance of Professor Peter Dennis and Doctor John Reeves of the Department of History, University College, Australian Defence Force Academy. For there assistance in supplying information and details of available sources, I acknowledge the debt owed to: Captain (Ret) Noritaka Kitazawa, Military History Department, National Institute for Defence Studies, Tokyo, for his guidance on English language sources on Japanese naval operations during the Second World War; Theodore J. Williams, Emeritus Professor of Engineering and Director Emeritus, Purdure Laboratory for Applied Industrial Course, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, for access to his own records on the wartime operations of the USAAC 380th Bombardment Group from northern Australia; Ted Goodrich for putting me in contact with Professor Williams and other sources in the United States; David Swift. Gay Hogan, John Pepper, Megan Perry and John Fenton of the National Australian Archives staff in Canberra and Melbourne; the Staff of the Public Record Office, Kew, London and Mr Sebastian Cox of the Air Historical Branch (RAF). Ministry of Defence. Mr J.H. Taylor of Carrington New South Wales, for his personal reminiscences of 71 Squadron operations from Lowood Queensland and Coffs Harbour, New South Wales; Bob Nicholls for his guidance into Admiralty records in the Public Record Office, London; David Stevens and Joe Straczeck of RAN Historical Section, Department of Defence, for advice regarding appropriate naval records. For Section 22 memories I acknowledge Wing Commander Peter Smith (Ret), Harry Lainson, Dick Dakyne, Bob Nash, Ted Dellet, Lindsay Apted and Les Kingross. Mark Clayton and Bob Geale from the Naval Aviation Museum at Nowra assisted in obtaining data on FAA operations. Also to my good friends Mike and Wendy Byrne for their hospitality during a study trip to the United Kingdom. i INTRODUCTION Geography is, and always will be, an important consideration in the defence of Australia. Australia is an island continent, approximately the size of the continental United States of America or of Europe. Therefore the defence of Australia is intrinsically a matter of maritime defence. This study will attempt to analyse differing attitudes towards weapon systems development and operational employment in the broad spectrum of maritime operations - the defence of Australia’s maritime traffic and offensive action against enemy maritime forces and land forces dependant on that enemy maritime force. The centre of the argument will be a critical discussion of the crucial role played by both naval and land-based aerial forces in the defence of Australia. The focus of this thesis is on the development of air power doctrine and concepts of maritime aerial operations within the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). The assertions made by air power theorists and advocates such as Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard and William Mitchell are not directly applicable to the personal intellectual development of the RAAF and RAN officers who participated in the development of maritime air power in Australia. The effect of these international advocates was indirectly institutionalised as both Australian services were influenced by their respective ‘mother’ organisations, the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy (RN), for doctrinal and procedural guidance. Similarly, the approach taken to the naval concept of operations is not the Mahanian view of battlefleet command or the maritime logistical approach of Sir Julian Corbett, but rather a study limited to naval air power within the overall concept of unitary air power, whether sea or land based, commanded by naval or air force professionals, and ii the nexus between ground-based and ship-based aircraft, in a unique Australian context. This study is from the Australian perspective of a nation of a large, relatively isolated, geographic area that has traditionally looked to Europe for its intellectual and cultural inspiration. The main theme of this investigation is that although the maritime defence of Australia has always been, and remains, paramount, it has suffered due to the inability of the hierarchy of the RAN and the RAAF to translate the coherent Australian maritime policy that was developed during the period 1921-1975 into operational reality in the Australian region. This failure was arguably due to the overwhelming influence of the ‘mother‘ Services in the United Kingdom, and these attitudes affected operational thinking in Australia. However, to understand the relationship between the services, the global strategic influences that were current during the 50-year period of this study must be briefly outlined. Pre-federation colonial Australia was dependant on Great Britain for her defence, and contributed to British forces operating in the Sudan and as a participant in the system of empire-wide security in South Africa during the Boer War. Although colonies such as New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia constructed a limited naval defensive capability, the main defence against the possible incursions by enemy forces was the Royal Navy (RN) vessels of the Australian Squadron. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, raids by Russian navy units into Australian waters were identified as the most likely threat.1 By 1905 the increasing strength of the German navy and German imperialism had usurped the dominate position of Russia and France as potential enemies of the Empire. For the iii embryonic Australian nation this development, allied to the emergence of Japan as a major power after the decisive victory by Admiral Togo over the Imperial Russian Fleet during the Battle of Tsushima in May, was a matter for anxiety. Although Britain had signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 (and renewed the agreement in 1905), the Australian government did not trust Japanese motives.