Issue 43 May 2013

States of fragility

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3 From the editors 47 Networked governance in Ecuador’s border regions Lana Balyk and Jeff Pugh Fragile states 50 Refugees from Central American gangs 4 State fragility, refugee status and ‘survival Elizabeth G Kennedy migration’ 52 Data quality and information management in DRC Alexander Betts Janet Ousley and Lara Ho 7 How to engage constructively with fragile states 53 The curious case of North Korea Jon Bennett Courtland Robinson 10 Displaced populations and their effects on 55 Was establishing new institutions in Iraq to deal regional stability with displacement a good idea? Joe Landry Peter Van der Auweraert 12 Liberia: local politics, state building and 58 Displacement in a fragile Iraq reintegration of populations Ali A K Ali Jairo Munive 60 Psychiatric treatment with people displaced in or 14 Peace villages for repatriates to Burundi from fragile states Jean-Benoît Falisse and René Claude Niyonkuru Verity Buckley 17 Fragile states and protection under the 1969 63 State fragility, displacement and development African Refugee Convention interventions Tamara Wood Yonatan Araya 20 Fragile states, collective identities and forced migration General articles Kelly Staples 66 Crisis in Lebanon: camps for Syrian refugees? 22 Repeated displacement in eastern DRC Jeremy Loveless Fran Beytrison and Olivia Kalis 69 The arts in refugee camps: ten good reasons 24 ‘Everyone for themselves’ in DRC’s North Kivu Awet Andemicael Luisa Ryan and Dominic Keyzer 72 Trails of Tears: raising awareness of displacement 27 Can Refugee Cessation be seen as a proxy for the Ken Whalen end of state fragility? Georgia Cole 74 Harming asylum seekers’ chances through poor use of human rights treaties 29 The displaced claiming their rights in fragile states Stephen Meili Antonia Mulvey 76 Older people and displacement 32 The ‘phantom state’ of Haiti Piero Calvi-Parisetti Andreas E Feldmann 79 Poetry as women’s resistance to the 35 Post-disaster Haitian migration consequences of Bedouin displacement in Jordan Diana Thomaz Maira Seeley 37 Humanitarian responses in the protection gap 80 Emergency need for telecommunications support Aurélie Ponthieu and Katharine Derderian Marianne Donven and Mariko Hall 41 Flight, fragility and furthering stability in Yemen 81 Understanding refugees’ concepts of sexual and Erin Mooney gender-based violence 45 Surviving the odds: education, commerce and Carrie Hough development among displaced Somalis 84 The g7+ group Abdirashid Duale

Cover image Fragility: the state of being easily broken, damaged or destroyed. From Latin fragilis, formed from the root of frangere (“to break”). Fractured glass image over a photo of a family of Ivorian refugees walking along a forest track towards Zwedru, a town in south-eastern Liberia, following an eruption of violence in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011. In that year Côte d’Ivoire ranked 10th in the Failed States Index that measures the fragility of states worldwide. Ivorian refugees photo: UNHCR/G Gordon States of fragility 3

May 2013

Forced Migration Review From the editors (FMR) provides a forum for the regular exchange of practical experience, ragile states are risky environments. Many states fail in their information and ideas between Fresponsibilities to their citizens but those states which are researchers, refugees and internally fragile, failed or weak are particularly liable to render their citizens displaced people, and those who vulnerable. Failures of authority or legitimacy can lead to the work with them. It is published in emergence of significant organised violence; the impact of this can English, Arabic, Spanish and French then be compounded by the failure of the state to protect its citizens, by the Refugee Studies Centre of the especially minorities. Thus conflict as a cause of displacement often Oxford Department of International correlates with state fragility, whether as a symptom or a cause of Development, University of Oxford. fragility, and the ability of fragile states and their neighbours to deal with displacement has become a key indicator of failure or progress. Staff Marion Couldrey & This issue of FMR attempts to go behind the definitions, typologies Maurice Herson (Editors) and indicators to explore some of the concepts and realities. The Kelly Pitt (Funding & articles that follow also look at a variety of cases where displacement Promotion Assistant) and state fragility go together or where countries are emerging from Sharon Ellis (Assistant) conflict-related displacement and fragility. They also discuss some of the humanitarian and development responses. Forced Migration Review Refugee Studies Centre State fragility may play a significant role in forced migration relating Oxford Department of International to natural disasters or environmental crises, as failures in governance Development, University of Oxford, affect the vulnerabilities of populations and their ability to adapt and 3 Mansfield Road, be resilient. We will be following up on some of these issues in FMR Oxford OX1 3TB, UK 45, due out in December 2013, which will have ‘Crisis migration’ as its theme. [email protected] We would like to thank Alex Betts for his assistance as special Skype: fmreview advisor on this issue. We are also very grateful to the John D and Tel: +44 (0)1865 281700 Catherine T MacArthur Foundation, the Swiss Federal Department www.fmreview.org of Foreign Affairs and the UNDP Evaluation Office for their funding support for this issue. All our current institutional donors, including Disclaimer those who generously provide unearmarked funding for FMR, are Opinions in FMR do not necessarily listed on page 83. reflect the views of the Editors, the Refugee Studies Centre or the The full issue is online at www.fmreview.org/fragilestates in html, pdf University of Oxford. and audio formats. It will be available online and in print in English, French, Spanish and Arabic. Copyright Any FMR print or online material may FMR43 Listing (expanded contents listing for this issue) is available in be freely reproduced, provided that print, and online at www.fmreview.org/fragilestates/FMR43listing.pdf acknowledgement is given to ‘Forced Migration Review www.fmreview.org’. We encourage you to post online or reproduce FMR articles but please acknowledge the source and provide the original website link. The feature themes of our forthcoming issues are listed on page 83. See www.fmreview.org/forthcoming for full details, including calls for ISSN 1460-9819 articles and submission deadlines. Designed by To keep up to date on all FMR news and announcements, please sign Art24 www.art-24.co.uk up for our email alerts at www.fmreview.org/request/alerts or join us Printed by on Facebook or Twitter. Fine Print (Services) Ltd With our best wishes www.fineprint.co.uk Marion Couldrey and Maurice Herson to carry, Editors, Forced Migration Review lighter cheaper to read on mobile to post. New styleeasier FMR – devices and 4 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013 State fragility, refugee status and ‘survival migration’ Alexander Betts

State fragility poses a challenge to the refugee regime. Rather than just placing the emphasis on the need to protect people fleeing the acts of states against their own populations, it also demands the protection of people fleeing the omissions of states, whether due to states’ unwillingness or to their inability to provide for their citizens’ fundamental rights.

The designation of states as ‘fragile’ or rights deprivations resulting from the ‘failed’ is frequently criticised for lacking omissions of weak states that are unable or clarity, encompassing a disparate variety unwilling to ensure fundamental rights. of situations and being an over-used political label that measures states against Although the creators of the refugee regime a range of idealised Western standards of foresaw that the definition of a refugee governance.1 Nevertheless, we can use the would evolve over time – either through concept of state fragility to understand the jurisprudence of particular states or some important things about the changing supplementary agreements – there is still nature of displacement and the adequacy little legal precision over states’ obligations or inadequacy of existing international to people fleeing deprivations that fall protection responses when the assumed outside the conventional understanding relationship between state and citizen breaks of persecution. The 1969 OAU Refugee down and states are unable or unwilling Convention may be argued to cover aspects to provide for the rights of their citizens. of state fragility as a cause of cross-border displacement (under the heading of ‘events The international society of states drew seriously disturbing public order’2); its up the Refugee Convention in 1951 in the patchy use and weak jurisprudence, however, aftermath of the Second World War to address continue to make its application to fragile the reality that some states fail to provide states unreliable. Furthermore, although for the fundamental human rights of their complementary protection standards have citizens. Yet, since the creation of the refugee been developed through the application of regime in the 1950s, the circumstances that international human rights law to extend shape flight have changed. Although many international protection, jurisprudence is of the current academic and policy debates developing slowly and in a geographically focus on ‘new drivers of displacement’ (such uneven way. The result is that the protection as generalised violence, environmental of people fleeing deprivations that fall change and food insecurity), what ultimately outside the conventional understanding determines whether international protection of persecution is inconsistent and is needed is the quality of governance in conditioned by politics rather than law. the country of origin. In states with weak governance, the only available means to The consequence is that, today, many people acquire protection may be to leave the country. who are forced or who feel forced to cross international borders do not fit the categories From persecution to deprivation laid out in 1951. Many people fleeing human While there are now fewer repressive or rights deprivations in fragile or failed states authoritarian states than in the Cold War era, such as Zimbabwe, Somalia, the Democratic there has been an increase in the number Republic of Congo, Haiti, Afghanistan or of fragile states since the end of the Cold Libya look very much like refugees and yet War. This trend means fewer people are most fall outside the definition of a refugee, fleeing persecution resulting from the acts often being denied protection. They are not of states, while more are fleeing human fleeing state persecution, though many are States of fragility 5 FMR 43 May 2013

fleeing state incompetence. They are not exacerbate conflict or create opportunities, migrating for economic betterment, unless you for example for recruitment by armed call finding enough to eat an economic motive. groups. In the 1950s states’ motivation Yet the protection they occasionally receive for creating a refugee regime was not is patchy and inconsistent and unpredictable exclusively rights-focused. It was also based and at best terribly inadequate. They are on the recognition that a collective failure more likely to be rounded-up, detained to provide sanctuary to people whose own and deported than to receive protection. states were unwilling or unable to provide their most fundamental rights would have From an individual’s perspective, whether potentially destabilising effects. A similar one’s source of human rights deprivation logic applies to people fleeing serious rights comes from a persecuting state or another deprivations. Without coherent collective source makes no difference. If one cannot action, forced population movements – not survive or maintain the fundamental least from failed and fragile states – can have conditions of human dignity without leaving implications for regional security with the a country, then distinguishing between potential to create wider spill-over effects. persecution and other causes is meaningless. Survival migration The gaps in protection for people fleeing Beyond identifying people as refugees or failed and fragile states matter for human voluntary economic migrants, we lack the rights. To take one prominent example, large terminology to clearly identify people who numbers of Zimbabweans fled their country should have an entitlement not to be returned between 2000 and 2010 (with an estimated two to their country of origin on human rights million Zimbabweans entering South Africa grounds. People who are outside their country alone during that period). They were fleeing a of origin because of an existential threat desperate situation characterised by economic for which they have no access to a domestic and political collapse, in which there were remedy or resolution – whether as a result almost no viable livelihood opportunities of persecution, conflict or environmental to sustain even the most basic conditions of degradation, for example – might be referred life. Yet because only a tiny minority had to as ‘survival migrants’.3 What matters is faced individualised persecution on political not the particular cause of movement but grounds, the overwhelming majority have rather identifying a threshold of fundamental fallen outside the 1951 Convention’s definition rights which, when unavailable in a country of a refugee. Rather than receiving protection, of origin, requires that the international the majority have therefore received limited access to assistance in neighbouring countries; hundreds of thousands have been rounded up, detained and deported back to Zimbabwe.

These protection gaps also matter for international security. We know that there is a relationship between cross-border displacement and security, and that where international responses are inadequate, displacement can UNHCR/R Gangale A displaced child helps his family to rebuild a shelter made of cardboard on the outskirts of Bossaso, Somalia. 6 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

community allow people to cross an risk of persecution if they return but because international border and receive access to of weak governance in DRC. Yet elsewhere temporary or permanent sanctuary. The the response has been far more restrictive. difference in rights and entitlements available At the extreme, Angola has rounded up, to refugees compared with survival migrants detained and deported – often brutally fleeing serious deprivations is arbitrary. In – hundreds of thousands of Congolese. theory, all survival migrants have rights At the height of the crisis in Zimbabwe, under international human rights law. Yet, Botswana continued to deport Zimbabwean in contrast to refugees, the institutional migrants while South Africa at least mechanisms do not exist to ensure that instituted a belated temporary moratorium such rights are made available in practice. on the deportation of Zimbabweans. No international organisation has formal responsibility for protecting people with a In the absence of legal clarity, states have human rights-based entitlement not to be exercised significant discretion in their returned home if they fall outside the refugee responses. Meanwhile, international definition. The arbitrariness of distinguishing organisations’ roles have largely been between persecution and other serious determined by the willingness or otherwise human rights deprivations as a cause of of host governments to extend protection displacement is implicitly recognised in to populations fleeing forms of deprivation other areas of the practice of the international that are not defined as persecution. community. For example, since the late 1990s states have developed a normative and These inconsistencies highlight important institutional framework to protect internally gaps in the normative and institutional displaced persons (IDPs). In the case of framework that protects people fleeing fragile IDPs, rather than limiting the definition to and failed states. The challenge is to make those fleeing persecution, the international existing institutions work better rather than to community chose a more inclusive approach. create new ones. It needs to begin with better implementation of existing standards, which In some cases, the refugee regime has in turn requires better understanding of the ‘stretched’ to provide protection to survival local and national political incentives that migrants, and in other cases it has not. Despite shape implementation. However, there are host states having sometimes adopted, still normative gaps, for which some kind of signed and ratified broadly similar refugee authoritative set of guiding principles might norms, there is nevertheless significant help to consolidate understanding of what variation in what happens in practice. And existing human rights law standards imply for in spite of sometimes common underlying survival migrants who are at the margins of causes of population movements, the the refugee regime. At the moment, responses response of different host states to those to people fleeing serious human rights populations has varied radically. While all deprivations in fragile and failed states are of the responses have been imperfect from simply too arbitrary and too inconsistent. a human rights perspective, some have been far more imperfect than others. Alexander Betts [email protected] is University Lecturer in Refugee Studies and In Kenya, for example, all Somalis have been Forced Migration at the Refugee Studies Centre, recognised as though they were refugees, University of Oxford. www.rsc.ox.ac.uk

irrespective of the immediate cause of flight. 1. The Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index, for example, ranks This was even the case during much of the states according to a range of social, political and economic famine and drought of 2011. In Tanzania, there indicators. http://ffp.statesindex.org has been resistance by the government and 2. Article I.2 www.unhcr.org/45dc1a682.html UNHCR to invoke the cessation clause for 3. See Alexander Betts,Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement, Cornell University Press, 2013. Congolese from South Kivu, not because of the States of fragility 7 FMR 43 May 2013 How to engage constructively with fragile states Jon Bennett

Donors have allocated increasing resources in fragile states to the reform and/or rebuilding of the architecture of the state – such as justice systems, the police and army, and the management of ministries – in efforts to support stability. This has been important for all sectors of society, including displaced people.

Conflict invariably goes hand in hand with countries, focusing primarily on UNDP’s displacement. The protracted nature of contribution to enhancing governance in conflicts in countries such as Afghanistan, fragile settings.2 UNDP is one of the few the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan agencies with the capacity to operate ‘at means that conflict-induced IDP settlements scale’ across multiple programme areas, soon become semi-permanent and aid projects before, during and after the outbreak of correspondingly move away from immediate conflict and especially during transitions to relief towards basic service provision. Part of peacebuilding and post-conflict development. the ‘stabilisation’ and state-building agenda is the requirement that host governments The ten OECD Principles of Good International should take increasing responsibility for these Engagement in Fragile States and Situations and associated activities. Success in post- 1. Take context as the starting point. conflict state-building largely depends on re- establishing effective governance and security 2. Do no harm. structures. In the decade to 2010 the share of 3. Focus on state-building as the central objective. overseas development assistance (ODA) to fragile, conflict-afflicted countries doubled to 4. Prioritise prevention. US$50 billion and 39% of total available ODA. 5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives. At the same time there has been a growing 6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for interest in how best to evaluate and learn inclusive and stable societies. from experiences in conflict prevention and peace building, whether the intervention 7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts. is on conflict (with specific objectives towards increasing peace through direct 8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms intervention) or in conflict (conventional between international actors. sector-specific projects often ‘tweaked’ 9. Act fast … but stay engaged long enough to give to be conflict sensitive). Among the success a chance. techniques are thematic evaluations that 10. Avoid pockets of exclusion. attempt to capture common findings across geographically and historically diverse See www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/38368714.pdf for details. contexts. Evaluating aid in conflict settings has become something of a specialist skill, recognised by the recent publication of the Yet one of the inherent problems is that OECD/DAC guidance on the topic.1 Evaluators this builds an historical expectation that are aware of the challenges of the highly the organisation can and will respond complex non-linear pattern of social change positively to the many wide-ranging in conflict-affected countries which cannot requests for support it receives. be captured by simple cause-effect logic. Development activities alone cannot stop or A recent thematic evaluation examines the prevent violent conflict and the displacement performance of UNDP in 20 conflict-affected that goes along with it but benefits from a 8 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

cross-sectoral approach. In Sierra Leone, Returning refugees and IDPs frequently face following a brutal civil war from 1991 to problems over land and property ownership, 2002, the Lomé Peace Agreement provided particularly if they have been absent for a for the establishment of a Truth and long time. In this context, it may be important Reconciliation Commission. For those to rehabilitate the basic legal infrastructure returning from IDP settlements an approach and expand access to legal aid. Often the to community-based reconciliation included challenge in post-conflict contexts is to bridge investigations into human rights violations traditional dispute resolution and formal during the civil war and organising research justice systems while furthering transitional on traditional conflict resolution and justice. For this to work, it is essential to reconciliation processes among the various understand the political economy of a given ethnic groups. Likewise, in the aftermath country in conflict in order to approach legal of the 2006 crisis and ensuing displacement reform in a coherent fashion. For instance, in Timor-Leste, UNDP supported the judicial training that allows judges to make return of IDPs through three projects better judgments is not likely to have much involving dialogue between communities impact if there is no judicial independence, if and a government-run reconciliation corruption still dominates the legal system or process. Community mediators were if the police system has been destroyed or is trained by about 12 NGO partners. biased. Overcoming these problems is of key importance to enabling sustainable return. Public sector support UNDP often works in conflict settings In Puntland (Somalia), as a result of the through project support units, which are emergent formal legal system, customary generally embedded in the public sector structures – especially ‘elders’ groups’ – felt and operating parallel to it. While this threatened by the reduction in their authority method can enhance the pace and quality and influence. This led to an alarming of service delivery, it also runs the risk of increase in assassinations of judicial officials weakening institutions that countries must in 2009 and 2010, and has sparked a debate rely on in the long term. The international over how to make rule-of-law programming community as a whole has come under a more sensitive to conflict. By contrast, women lot of criticism for poorly coordinating the in the autonomous Somaliland region of embedded international experts assigned Somalia have increasingly turned to the to ministries. In South Sudan, for instance, UNDP-supported emergent formal structures there have been hundreds of foreign faces since they provide a forum for women’s ostensibly ‘advising’ the government but voices to be heard, whereas traditional and effectively running whole departments of customary mechanisms still exclude women. government. Even where national experts are employed, the wage and benefit incentives Notable successes in supporting used to attract talented staff for these opportunities for women to participate more posts often create major distortions in the fully in the emerging political and legal public service labour market. There is also landscape of post-conflict countries include often pressure to deliver services on the the expansion of female access to justice in ground while knowing that the expansion some countries, especially for survivors of of state capacities to deliver such services sexual and gender-based violence. Gender- themselves can take years. The dilemma based violence almost always increases is particularly acute in places such as the during civil war and generally among forced Democratic Republic of the Congo, where a migrants. Despite the disproportionate weak state government has not been able to impact of conflict on women, they are address many of the underlying causes of the often not included in decision-making continuing conflict and certainly not to deal and planning processes. There is still with the many IDPs generated by the conflict. little provision for women’s voices in the States of fragility 9 FMR 43 May 2013

The local community in El Srief area, North Darfur, welcomes the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) outreach activity organised in 2011 by UNAMID, with the support of UNDP, UNICEF, North Sudan DDR Commission and the local NGO Friends of Peace and Development Organization. UNAMID/Albert Gonzalez Farran

post-war macroeconomic frameworks that after the attention of the international determine how the economy grows, which community has moved elsewhere. sectors are prioritised for investments and what kinds of jobs and opportunities for Conflict analysis and change employment will be created and for whom. Anticipating conflict and helping to prevent it requires detailed and operational conflict The disarmament, demobilisation and analyses to be carried out at the country level. reintegration (DDR) of former combatants A conflict analysis sets the stage for a theory is a process that rarely works smoothly, of change. Once the problem is assessed and not least because it is a highly politicised the triggers of violence are known, a theory of arena that involves the wider community change suggests how an intervention in that as well as those who are demobilised. context will change the conflict. But this must Despite some innovative approaches, be preceded by a thorough understanding of there has been a tendency to concentrate context. The operational landscape in most on outputs – numbers demobilised and conflict-affected countries is characterised presented with reintegration packages – by new and fluid forms of internal conflict, rather than longer-term improvement in usually brought on by multiple ‘triggers’ and livelihoods. The problem is that once the exacerbated by the resulting displacement. highly complex technical (and inter-agency) aspects of the exercise are complete, partner The very nature of conflicts is that they agencies close their projects, donor funding are country-specific and there cannot be a drops and follow-up work is consigned formulaic response across the board. The to a relatively small coterie of agencies effectiveness of programming support (including UNDP) with reduced budgets. is always contingent upon events in the In some countries positive gains are then political and security realm, many of offset by the resumption of local conflicts, which are beyond external agency power to leading to secondary displacement. This influence. Where the semblance of political was the case for DDR programming during reconciliation has been scant and violence the period of the Comprehensive Peace ongoing (for example in southern Somalia), Agreement in Sudan, from early 2005 some interventions have had limited impact, until South Sudan seceded in July 2011. and progress has been frequently reversed The cumulative effect can be a return to due to the resumption of conflict and the arms and a resumption of displacement failure to resolve situations of displacement. 10 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

One clear conclusion is that in fragile published reports: ‘Evaluation of UNDP Support states there is no substitute for a strong to Conflict-Affected Countries in the Context and continuous field presence. Yet even of United Nations Peace Operations’ (UNDP allowing for the difficulties of recruiting Evaluation Office, September 2012) field staff for hostile environments, there is http://tinyurl.com/UNDP-eval-conflict-2013 and an alarming trend among some donors to ‘Aiding the Peace: a multi-donor evaluation of increase funding while reducing the number support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding of permanent staff on the ground. UNDP activities in southern Sudan 2005-2010’ has to some extent bucked the trend but (ITAD, December 2010). developing trust and demonstrating long- http://tinyurl.com/OECD-southsudan

term commitment cannot be held hostage to 1. ‘Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and ‘cost efficiency’ in countries where fragility is Fragility: Improving Learning for Results’, DAC Guidelines and defined precisely by transitory relationships. References Series, OECD Publishing (2012). http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264106802-en 2. Bennett, J et al, ‘Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict- Jon Bennett [email protected] was Affected Countries in the Context of United Nations Peace team leader and principal author of two recently Operations’, UNDP Evaluation Office, September 2012.

Displaced populations and their effects on regional stability Joe Landry A better understanding of state fragility – combined with improvements in policy and funding for displaced populations – is necessary to prevent the proliferation of further regional conflicts.

State fragility, conflict and violence were and consequences of state fragility is key central themes of the 2011 World Bank in preventing such undesirable outcomes. World Development Report, showing that Fragility-ranking indices and research on the connection between the prevention of the causes of civil war are tools that must intra-state conflict and broader international be promoted and utilised by policymakers, security is becoming ever more accepted.1 with the understanding that state fragility Academics are also paying a great deal of and state failure are useful concepts insofar attention to issues such as how to strengthen as they inform positive, preventative policy those states poised on the brink of failure and decisions and early intervention strategies. how to restore the functionality of those that have failed. Empirical studies highlight the Displaced populations also have an effect fact that conflicts in neighbouring states tend on the host countries in which they are to spread outwards. Less well understood forced to reside – usually neighbouring are the dynamic interdependencies found countries – where they can exacerbate between forced migration and state fragility. resource scarcity, leading to tensions and conflict. It has been demonstrated that one It is a fact that fragile and failed states of the primary risk factors for civil war is produce the majority of the world’s refugees, neighbouring states being engulfed in civil asylum seekers and IDPs. They are among conflict. The Political Instability Task Force the most at-risk people on the planet, and (PITF), for example, has narrowed its global are often subjected to intolerable living instability prediction model to four variables: conditions, human rights abuses and chronic regime type, infant mortality, state-led uncertainty regarding their future well-being. discrimination, and neighbouring states in A better understanding of both the causes conflict (also termed the ‘bad neighbours’ States of fragility 11 FMR 43 May 2013

variable).2 Their findings indicate that states refugees in neighbouring countries. This with four or more neighbouring conflicts does not account for unregistered persons, have a much higher chance of entering for which there are no accurate estimates. conflict themselves. While PITF’s measure A deeper understanding of the fragile of ‘bad neighbours‘ is a structural variable situation in Mali and the impact of conflict that does not change easily over time, other in neighbouring Libya might have provided research has illustrated that sudden large policymakers with practical options to prevent influxes of displaced populations can also the subsequent rebellion and thus better have a negative effect on state stability. protect the population of northern Mali. Hosting even ten thousand more refugees in a given year appears to have a significant These examples illustrate the policy effect on the chances of conflict erupting. implications for both the host country and the international community of An increased drain on state resources is one humanitarian donors and aid organisations. mechanism for this phenomenon. An example For the host country, support must be of such a situation is Syria, where by 2007 given to incoming refugees, claims must be approximately 1.2 million Iraqi refugees were processed quickly and assistance should be registered. This resulted in massive increases provided in finding gainful employment in the prices of everything from basic and somewhere permanent to live. On the foodstuffs to house rents. Water and electricity part of the international donors and NGOs, consumption ballooned. Skyrocketing funding these positive outcomes is critical. unemployment, crowded schools, overrun However, long-term sustainable solutions hospitals and degradation of basic social for displaced populations will only be service programmes were all symptoms of achieved through the exercise of political the influx of refugees. In turn, displeasure will and smart, evidence-based decision spread through both the host country and making. Without these, we will continue the refugee populations, leading to rising to see chain reactions of civil conflicts in tensions and outbreaks of violence. Pressure fragile states spreading to their neighbours. mounted on the Syrian government to quell the various crises but, with few resources The broader message is that the more fragile and mounting demands on basic services, not a state is, the more assistance the authorities much could be done. In retrospect, there is need in order to be able to predict and respond a strong case to be made that the discontent to such events through both political and created by this situation contributed to the macroeconomic reforms. In addition, global, later explosion of violence in Syria in 2012. regional and local conflict early-warning and response systems must incorporate Another mechanism through which state this knowledge into their framework of fragility may increase due to neighbouring indicators. Only through developing a conflict is through the mass proliferation more acute understanding of state fragility of small arms and other weapons, possibly and its relationship to displacement can along with the spread of radical ideologies. we better prevent and respond to crisis One recent example of such a situation is the events such as those displacing millions 2012 conflict in Mali, which was arguably of people around the world today. precipitated by the intervention of NATO forces in Libya, partially as a result of the Joe Landry [email protected] is a provision of weapons to rebel fighters doctoral student at The Norman Paterson School including Tuareg people. It is still too early of International Affairs at Carleton University, to determine the long-term effects of this Canada, and Assistant Editor, Canadian Foreign crisis on economic and social development Policy Journal. in Mali. At the time of writing there are 1. See article by Yonatan Araya in this issue pp63-5. over 200,000 IDPs in Mali and over 200,000 2. http://tinyurl.com/Systemicpeace-GlobalModel 12 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013 Liberia: local politics, state building and reintegration of populations Jairo Munive

Interventions aiming to assist IDPs and refugees returning home in fragile states would do well to take note of the local political and economic contexts in the aftermath of war, because these deeply affect the reintegration of war-affected populations.

Land disputes among returning war- fact that ex-combatants and returning affected population groups endanger peace refugees belong to different ethnic groups, efforts in many fragile post-conflict settings. have different religions and supported rival During Liberia’s 15-year civil war, around factions during the war. one million people fled as IDPs or refugees, abandoning their houses and land. When When the disarmament process began, some of them returned to their properties a majority of ex-combatants opted for in the post-conflict reconstruction phase, permanent settlement in Ganta due to their many found them occupied by others. This perception of enhanced security and better generated rising tensions, land disputes livelihood possibilities in the city, as well as and a latent risk for outbreaks of violence. the existing social infrastructure. They used the first instalment of the Transitional Safety The civil wars in Liberia ran from 1989 to Net Allowance (paid as part of disarmament, 1996 and again from 1999 to 2003. Since 2003 demobilisation and resettlement – DDR – Liberia has been the target of international programmes to provide ex-combatants with efforts to build the capacity of the state and financial means during the period prior to to reintegrate war-affected populations. reintegration) to reduce their dependence Refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants – all of on former commanders and to start small whom are perceived as groups who are informal businesses. There was an interest disconnected from their communities of in taking over properties in the central origin and therefore in need of support – face parts of town because proximity to the similar challenges. The interventions that aim market area and the town’s main street were to promote their sustainable reintegration into considered to be of crucial importance to society are also strikingly similar. However, the success of the informal businesses. on the ground there might be opposing interests and even contradictory outcomes In 2004, under repatriation and reintegration between the reintegration of ex-fighters programmes for the many refugees and and the reintegration of forced migrants in IDPs, thousands returned from camps inside the context of state re-building. Therefore Liberia or from neighbouring Guinea to understanding local post-war politics is their abandoned homes in Ganta. UNHCR crucial to the success or failure of reintegration has undertaken extensive community- efforts of both ex-combatants and returnees. based reintegration projects throughout the areas of IDP return in Liberia and in Ganta city in northeastern Liberia is a main almost all cases refugees have also returned transit and commercial hub, attractive to to the same areas. There is therefore a traders and merchants, but the war altered strong degree of cohesion between the dual access to and control over land and in the processes of refugee and IDP reintegration. aftermath of war disputes have arisen between different groupings, in particular Local politics and the absence of the state between ex-combatants and returning When the war ended in 2003, local elders refugees. The dispute is exacerbated by the in Ganta and commanders from particular States of fragility 13 FMR 43 May 2013

militias appointed a Mayor and re-established the City Council, thus setting up the

political structure of civilian Munive Jairo authority in Ganta. Several commanders took control over the local government apparatus as de facto power holders locally and continued as patrons and protectors for former combatants, while the international community engaged in the process of constructing functional state institutions, mostly in the capital Monrovia.

While the successful reintegration of fighters is a precondition for fostering the security needed for the successful reintegration of returnees and stabilisation

of post-war countries Ex-combatants and their extended family build a house on squatter land in Central Ganta. and fragile states, in this case the international injection of cash to the Mayor had to retract and revoke all ex-combatants facilitated the creation of squatters’ rights granted, at least on paper. squatter communities on valuable urban However, in spite of their squatters’ rights land, and laid the ground for perpetuating being revoked, the ex-combatants were land disputes between returnees and ex- still squatting in central Ganta in 2010. combatants and their political patrons. So there are strong (if negative) linkages In the post-war nation-building process, land between the reintegration of returnees on disputes are one of the most significant issues the one hand, and the demobilisation and threatening national peace and security in reintegration of fighters on the other. the country. In 2006 a Land Commission was established by the president with the In several areas there are overlapping roles main task of investigating the various land and functions between local and national disputes causing continued ethnic tension. government in Liberia. One of these is the The Commission carried out consultations authority to lease out public land and grant and public hearings across the country ‘squatters’ rights’. It is generally agreed that with the intention of giving all parties an the local city administration can grant such opportunity to express their grievances and rights for land that is publicly owned. In concerns. Because of its economic importance, Ganta after 2003 the Mayor and the City Ganta was one of the most disputed areas. Council granted squatters’ rights to people settled on privately owned land. From 2003 For Ganta, the Commission’s recommendations to 2006 the central Liberian state was more led to the construction of new streets in or less completely absent in the locality and order to attract or create more avenues for intervened only sporadically in local affairs. businesses, since most of the disputes were It was not until 2008 – and after direct orders centred on the main street. However this did from the Minister of Internal Affairs – that not solve the problem, nor did a late 2008 14 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

follow-up Commission. To this day a series Advice for external agencies of land disputes has yet to be resolved. The findings above indicate a need for the international community to: The disputes and social struggle over land in post-conflict Liberia are not only about land ■■take note of local political and economic per se but about authority and legitimacy contexts when intervening to assist IDPs more generally. Returnees base their claims and refugees in fragile states to land and property on pre-war ownership and a right to return to the way things ‘used ■■translate and adapt international standards to be’ prior to the war. The ex-combatant and norms, such as the ones prescribed squatters ground their claims in their physical for the reintegration of ex-combatants and presence and de facto occupation of the forced migrants, to the particular contexts land, threats of violence and moral claims of emerging local political orders in fragile to the land as a ‘reward’ for heroism and states to secure real effects on the ground for defending it during the war. As things stand now, the return of refugees and IDPs ■■base reintegration programmes – for ex- and the reintegration of ex-combatants combatants and forced migrants alike – on appear to be mutually exclusive processes. evidence-based research on the actual The result is a profound reshaping of social, political and economic situation in the political and economic relations between aftermath of war in fragile states. local populations and a delay in processes of genuine reconciliation. The international Jairo Munive [email protected] is postdoctoral community has to date sought to stabilise researcher in the Peace, Risk and Violence unit the Liberian state centrally in Monrovia, at the Danish Institute for International Studies. only timidly addressing issues of, land www.diis.dk/sw152.asp access and political power at the local level.

Peace villages for repatriates to Burundi Jean-Benoît Falisse and René Claude Niyonkuru

Burundi’s peace villages, which are intended both as models for reintegration and as centres of economic development, have encountered a number of problems which are related to the country’s continued fragility as a state.

Specially constructed villages have been built occupying the offices of the administrative in Burundi since 2005 to welcome landless authorities, demanding a solution to their and ‘rootless’ repatriates returning from plight. Twa (the third official ethnic group in exile in Tanzania. Some had been refugees Burundi) with no land, internally displaced since 1972 and others since 1993. Although Tutsi and other categories of vulnerable most refugees were able to return to their people were also invited to move into the own land, some of them had nowhere to villages with the aim of reviving social go. Some of the ‘1972 Hutu repatriates’ diversity. This earned them the title of ‘peace had scarcely any remaining ties with their villages’. With the continuing influx of country of origin and no knowledge of refugees, there was an increasingly urgent their or their parents’ land in Burundi. need to find a permanent solution for the repatriates. UNHCR therefore cooperated Eventually this prompted the idea of building with the government to create a first villages to house those who had resorted to generation of 19 villages across the country States of fragility 15 FMR 43 May 2013

between 2004 and 2007, despite the fact that situation in which people found themselves the concept of a village is broadly unfamiliar before moving to a village, a move often in the Burundian landscape, where homes made on the promise of a decent life. are generally scattered over the hillsides. The Burundian Peace Villages built between An assessment of the first generation of 2004 and 2010 are also marked by their peace villages suggests that not only are the twofold objective of being not only places of buildings deteriorating but also the villages reintegration but also, in the official rhetoric, were failing to provide any way for their examples of development in one of the most inhabitants to reintegrate into the local socio- rural countries in the world. The housing economic environment. It was then decided scattered across Burundi’s hillsides is seen to construct a second generation of villages, as unconducive to the country’s economic no longer simply to provide accommodation development, insofar as it is easier to provide but also water and decent sanitary conditions basic social services to a more densely as well as means of subsistence, land suitable concentrated population. The rhetoric is, in for cultivation, and income-generating fact, quite similar to that used in the ujamaa activities for the inhabitants. Eight new villagisation programme in Tanzania and villages known as Integrated Rural Peace the imidugudu programme in Rwanda. Villages were built in the country’s southern provinces between 2007 and 2010. Fundamentally, the peace villages reintegration project is therefore incredibly Five or even, in some cases, ten years after the ambitious. To succeed in the long term, peace villages were built, their success can it effectively requires the state (and not be seen as at best partial. Reintegration is a international aid) to be able to provide its geographical rather than a social reality and inhabitants with an adequate level of basic the risk is that, in many places, the inhabitants social services and a degree of security – of the villages will be seen as second-class precisely two of the characteristics whose citizens for at least another generation. absence defines a fragile country. None of the villages seems to have driven reintegration to the extent that was promised. While security in the villages is not always Many villages are still dependent on food as good as it could be, it is less of a problem aid from the World Food Programme or the than the lack of basic social services tailored Ministry of National Solidarity, and economic to the specific needs of the inhabitants of activity appears to have started in scarcely the villages. A typical example is primary any of the villages. In practice, the villages education. As a result of their time in are not economically viable entities, they are Tanzania, most of the children in the villages prey to property speculation and there are have learned Swahili rather than Kirundi, tensions emerging with local communities. which is the national language of Burundi and Villages in areas of poor fertility are struggling the language of primary education. Unless to attract repatriates, who prefer to remain in they have the good fortune to benefit from UNHCR’s temporary accommodation centres. one of the projects organised by international aid organisations to provide educational The vicious circle of fragility? support, children in the villages therefore Whilst villagisation policies in the east and have little chance of succeeding in the central African region are memorable for the Burundian education system. On the other fact that they often involved coercion (as in hand, the state is not in a position to provide Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and in the same standard of basic social services for the 1990s in Burundi itself), these villages the surrounding areas as it is providing in the are, technically, home only to those who live villages – as is sometimes the case for water – there voluntarily. Their ‘voluntary’ nature and this results in community disputes, which remains questionable, however, given the can go as far as the sabotage of infrastructure. 16 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

The state’s lack of legitimacy can also be seen state itself struggles to clarify the status of in the peace villages in the limited capacity numerous areas of land. At a local level, the of local institutions to maintain peaceful authorities are routinely overwhelmed. community relations. Repatriates do, however, represent a source of development potential. If the fragility of the state is a significant Most of them, for example, speak Swahili obstacle to the success of reintegration and have some knowledge of English, which through the peace villages, the villages are important assets for a country that has themselves also bring with them the risk joined the East African Community despite of perpetuating that very fragility. They not sharing the region’s two linguae francae. threaten to delegitimise the state, which seems incapable of managing the situation. One cause of the fundamental fragility of At the same time, while the villages continue Burundi and other countries in the region to be places where second-class citizens is land. The villages – because they take dependent on humanitarian assistance live, up land and make land available to their they represent a source of frustration. The inhabitants for subsistence farming – add situation seems impossible to resolve, given a further layer of problems in a situation that the village ‘solution’ brings its own where there is a limited number of conflict problems, creating a vicious cycle of fragility. resolution mechanisms. Seventy per cent of the disputes brought before the local courts The villages are a thorny issue and it is too in Burundi concern land and the average size easy simply to dismiss outright all the efforts of plots has been reduced over successive that have been made to date. The reintegration generations to 0.3 hectare. Up to 18% of of over 5,000 rootless families who arrived the country’s land is thought to be subject almost in one go is a major challenge for any to dispute. In spite of its recent efforts, the country, and all the more so for Burundi, a fragile nation that is only just recovering from a bloody civil war. A case- by-case approach, based on reintegration family-

Jean-Benoît Falisse by-family, hillside- by-hillside, would seem less problematic but is a monumental task – even more so as another 35,200 Burundian citizens returned at the end of 2012 when Mtabila camp in Tanzania was closed. The mistake made with the villages as a solution for reintegration was perhaps a question of trying to think too big too quickly and of putting the cart before the horse. History seems to suggest that towns and villages do not drive economic development; Peace village at Nkurye, South Burundi, in November 2010. States of fragility 17 FMR 43 May 2013

rather it is economic development that drives eventually picks up and manages to transform the creation of towns and villages. the villages that are currently kept alive by aid into stable and sustainable communities where Building the capacity of the state – which is fundamental human rights are respected. a necessary part of lifting the country out of its fragility – requires the trust of its citizens Jean-Benoît Falisse is a doctoral researcher but unfortunately the peace villages story as at St Antony’s College, Oxford. it has been unfolding for about ten years now [email protected] continues to illustrate the system’s inability to René Claude Niyonkuru [email protected] is a win their trust and thus emerge from fragility. researcher on land policy and a Masters Student We do not have a miraculous solution for the at the Institute of Development Policy and villages except the hope that economic activity Management, University of Antwerp, Belgium.

Fragile states and protection under the 1969 African Refugee Convention Tamara Wood Current practice in African states highlights both the potential and the limitations of the 1969 African Refugee Convention in providing protection to persons displaced from fragile states.

In the most recent Failed States Index, 16 of Convention as they are unable to establish the 20 most fragile states in the world are either an individual risk of persecution in Africa.1 States such as Somalia, Sudan, or the requisite link between the risk and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and one of the five Convention reasons. Zimbabwe consistently top the list. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these states are also major In Africa, this gap in the protection of the 1951 sources of refugee flows on the African Convention might be expected to be filled by continent. The protracted civil war in its regional counterpart, the 1969 Organisation Somalia, for example, has resulted in the of African Unity Convention Governing the displacement of over a million people across Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa international borders, to neighbouring Kenya (1969 Convention), which expands refugee and further afield. In South Africa, over half protection to cover persons who are compelled of the more than 100,000 asylum applications to leave their homes “owing to external received each year are from Zimbabwe. aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order”.2 The legal status of individuals displaced The breadth of situations covered by the 1969 from fragile states is often ambiguous. Convention has led to extensive praise for Those who can establish a “well-founded the Convention and it is generally thought fear of persecution” for one of five reasons to provide legal protection to persons fleeing (race, religion, nationality, membership the very kinds of widespread, generalised of a particular social group or political and indiscriminate forms of harm that opinion) will be entitled to protection typically characterise conditions in fragile under the international 1951 Convention states. What is less well known is the Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees effect that the 1969 Convention has had on (1951 Convention). However, individuals African refugee protection in practice. fleeing the many other symptoms of state fragility, including poor governance, Protection for persons fleeing fragile states widespread insecurity, poverty and lack of Experience in refugee-hosting states such as basic services, will often fall outside the 1951 South Africa, Kenya and Uganda suggests 18 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

that, in certain circumstances, the 1969 In South Africa, applications for asylum Convention has played an important role in by persons from Zimbabwe are almost extending protection to persons displaced universally rejected. The view taken by from fragile states across international government, decision-makers and even borders. In Kenya, for example, persons many advocates is that most Zimbabweans fleeing continuing conflict and instability in crossing the border to South Africa, often central and southern Somalia are granted with the stated intention of accessing better refugee status on a prima facie basis under employment and education opportunities, the broader terms of the 1969 Convention. are ‘economic migrants’. According to the In 2011, when drought and famine forced South African Refugee Appeal Board, many more thousands of Somalis across despite ongoing and widespread deprivation the Kenyan border, this practice continued, of people’s basic socio-economic rights with both UNHCR and the Government in Zimbabwe the relative stability of law of Kenya recognising the interrelationship and order in the country means it falls between so-called ‘natural’ causes of outside the scope of the 1969 Convention. displacement, such as drought, and the broader Somali context, including conflict, Persons fleeing the new state of South Sudan insecurity and lack of effective government. also challenge the capacity of the 1969 Convention to protect persons fleeing non- The 1969 Convention has also played an conflict related symptoms of state fragility. important role in the protection of persons While significant parts of South Sudan fleeing conflict between army and rebel continue to be blighted by violence and groups in DRC, in particular in the eastern insecurity, across the border in north-western regions of North and South Kivu. In Uganda, Kenya, at Kakuma refugee camp, there is a persons displaced from these regions are widespread view that the majority of South granted refugee status under the 1969 Sudanese have come to Kenya primarily to Convention as a matter of course. In South access the education, health and food services Africa, a number of refugee status decision- that remain close to non-existent in their makers also recognise that the situation in home country. To date, the 1969 Convention eastern DRC amounts to “events seriously has not been applied to persons fleeing South disturbing public order” under the 1969 Sudan at all, and several UNHCR officials Convention. Even UNHCR, which has have expressed doubt about whether such sometimes been cautious in its application persons could really be considered refugees. of Africa’s expanded refugee protection regime, has suggested that persons from While the above examples do not provide eastern DRC are likely to meet the 1969 a comprehensive assessment of the Convention’s criteria for protection. implementation of the 1969 Convention or its role in protecting persons fleeing fragile In relation to displacement from fragile states across the whole of Africa, they are states such as Somalia and DRC, therefore, suggestive of both the potential and the the 1969 Convention has been instrumental limitations of the Convention in responding to in providing legal protection to persons who displacement from fragile states. In particular, may not otherwise qualify for it under the they suggest that states may be more willing 1951 Convention. In both cases, however, to apply the 1969 Convention to persons one of the defining features of state fragility in situations where the perceived cause of has been the presence of armed conflict. displacement is the existence of armed conflict The extension of protection to persons and a breakdown in law and order. Where fleeing the many other symptoms of state persons flee the many other symptoms of state fragility – including weak governance, fragility – including poor governance, food food insecurity and lack of basic services – insecurity and lack of access to basic services has not been so forthcoming. – such application is less straightforward. States of fragility 19 FMR 43 May 2013

“Events seriously disturbing public order” Against the legal and practical background One of the reasons for ambiguity in state of displacement from fragile African responses to the different aspects of state states, the concept of state fragility itself fragility is lack of clarity in the scope of might provide a useful reference point the 1969 Convention itself. Unlike the 1951 for distinguishing between those who are Convention, which has been the subject deserving of international protection under of extensive interrogation by scholars, the 1969 Convention and those who are practitioners and international institutions, not. Fragile states are by definition ones in analyses of the 1969 Convention are few which the government’s capacity to fulfill its and guidance on the scope of its terms basic duties towards its citizens – including is simply not available. Of particular the duty of protection – is compromised. relevance to displacement from fragile It is the citizen’s concomitant inability to states is the 1969 Convention’s extension of have those duties fulfilled that gives rise protection also to persons fleeing “events to his or her claim to the protection of seriously disturbing public order”. the international community. This idea is not a new one. The concept of ‘surrogate As the element of the 1969 Convention protection’ has been used to describe and to that most expands the scope of the term justify the international refugee protection ‘refugee’, this phrase is also the most regime almost since its inception. contested. It is generally accepted to cover human-caused events which undermine This is not to say that every person who leaves the existence of law and order, such as a fragile state is necessarily a refugee; for a conflict or generalised violence. What is less start, symptoms of state fragility frequently clear is whether it also extends to so-called have differential impacts on particular natural causes of displacement, such as individuals and communities within a state. drought, flood or earthquake, or to people Rather, it is to suggest that the characteristic fleeing deprivation of their human rights, inability of fragile states to protect their including socio-economic rights such as the citizens might provide a relevant and useful right to food, education and health care. framework for giving content to the otherwise seemingly boundless phrase, ”events seriously Regardless of the view one takes on these disturbing public order”. Put another way, questions, neat conceptual distinctions the incapacity of a state to fulfill its basic between ‘human’ and ‘natural’ causes of duties towards its citizens might be the displacement do not always reflect realities, determining factor in deciding whether or a as conditions in Somalia and South Sudan not a particular set of circumstances – whether well demonstrate. For example, while human or natural in cause – gives rise to other the 2011 Horn of Africa drought forced states’ international protection obligations. hundreds of thousands of Somalis across Where an individual’s home state is unable international borders in search of safety, to provide the most basic protections, a food and other assistance, the majority of legitimate claim to protection under the 1969 similarly drought-affected Kenyans stayed Convention Governing the Specific Aspects put, aided by the relatively higher levels of Refugee Problems in Africa may be made. of security and assistance in the country. Likewise, the distinction between ‘economic Tamara Wood [email protected] is migrants’ on the one hand and refugees a Nettheim Doctoral Teaching Fellow at the or ‘forced migrants’ on the other is blurry Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales. at best. People’s reasons for movement www.law.unsw.edu.au

are complex and often multifarious, 1. The Failed States Index is published each year by Fund for Peace not least in the case of fragile states. and is available at: http:/ffp.statesindex.org 2. http://tinyurl.com/AfrRefugeeConvention 20 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013 Fragile states, collective identities and forced migration Kelly Staples

There has been a worrying tendency for the international community to ignore questions of state capacity when enacting repatriations. Governance and the rule of law should be vital considerations in attempts to deal with forced migration in fragile states such as DRC.

States fail for a range of complex social, In addition, there is a strong international political and economic reasons. When they aversion to state failure and secession. do, it causes serious problems for those within their borders. Citizens suffer the In general terms, we have to presume that consequences of food and water insecurity, the borders that dissect the world today are economic decline, increased corruption, relatively stable, even when the national poor or non-existent public services and units they constitute are not. From a moral increased violation of a range of human point of view, we may expect statehood to rights. Additionally, state failure can lead be conditional on governmental legitimacy to governments deliberately pursuing and on the existence of domestic institutions exclusionary policies that allow peoples to in an attempt to be self-determining. gain public support. Practically speaking, Resident minorities however, states are UNHCR/F Noy become especially granted recognition vulnerable to human by other states rights violations, for political or while relationships diplomatic reasons, between ethnic or because they fear groups are often the implications stretched to breaking of state collapse point, with state and uncontained institutions becoming migration. At the fragmented along extreme, states such ethnic lines. as Somalia, that in recent years has not Especially in post- met the international colonial states legal criteria for it is often the statehood (which Congolese refugees build new shelters in Rwamwanja, Uganda, case that there following new waves of fighting in North Kivu in 2012. include ‘government’ is not a good ‘fit’ and ‘capacity to enter between state borders and the peoples they into relations with other states’1), are often still contain. Even so, there are good reasons recognised as states for, among other reasons, not to welcome the eventual collapse of the purposes of controlling migration. existing states and their rebuilding as new states. First, history teaches us that the This tends to mean that the favoured response drive to create mono-ethnic states has itself of the international community, including been a major cause of forced migrations. UNHCR, is the repatriation of refugees Second, the processes of state dissolution fleeing fragile states, with integration in and collapse are horrifically disruptive to the country of first asylum as the main individuals, both domestically and regionally. alternative. States have a long-standing Third, seceding states and the remaining mutual interest in repatriation, seen as a ‘rumps’ are likely to remain very fragile. vital component of the maintenance of order States of fragility 21 FMR 43 May 2013

and security. This interest has developed With the outbreak of war in Congo in 1996, alongside the development of international many Kinyarwanda speakers, both Congolese relations; certainty about which state has and Rwandan, were forced across the border responsibility for which citizens is now a into Rwanda, where significant numbers central tenet in international relations. What remain. Armed battles manipulating ethnic is needed, therefore, is a set of solutions tensions, as well as economic interests in that embody genuine commitments to the gaining control over land and precious natural strengthening of fragile states, as well as resources, have made eastern Congo one to the consideration, where appropriate, of the most deadly regions in the world.3 of regional and international solutions to the problems of forced migration. One of the favoured solutions of the international community in this case is State weakness and forced migration in DRC repatriation. However, a major obstacle in the The situation in the east of the Democratic way of the repatriation of Congolese refugees Republic of Congo (DRC) provides an from Rwanda is the suspicion that Rwanda illustration of the many obstacles to dealing will exploit the opportunity to ‘return’ non- with the closely linked issues of forced Congolese Kinyarwanda-speakers in an migration and state fragility. DRC is widely attempt to alter the ethnic composition of the acknowledged to be a failed state. In the 2012 region and gain access to precious land and Failed State Index, the country was in 2nd resources. Inter-group relations in eastern place. It was ranked 1st on the demographic DRC are so bad that many refugees fear pressures indicator, 3rd on refugees/IDPs, returning, and prefer to remain in refugee 4th on ‘uneven development’ and 2nd on camps in Rwanda, in spite of dire conditions. human rights.2 While there is a range of ways of measuring state fragility, or even failure, It is vitally important to avoid forced return, it is generally accepted that the absence of or the return of refugees to areas where law and order and weak central government their life or freedom are at risk. Questions undermine states’ abilities to respect their about the best way of ensuring voluntary basic functions and resist insurgencies and repatriation and effective citizenship are the rise of mercenary groups that challenge complicated by the extreme fragility of the the state’s monopoly of the use of force. Congolese state. Many would-be returnees recognise the special international status of Demographic pressures, uneven development formal citizenship, and seek comfort in the and conflict over resources, coupled with theoretical value of a Congolese state. There the inability of the country’s armed forces is an inescapable irony in this situation, given to halt violations by rebel groups in the that these are the same people who have been east, continue to trigger displacement. the most obvious victims of the state’s actual There are estimated to be around 476,000 failure. Ironically, in DRC as in many fragile refugees in neighbouring countries, and and failing states, effective access to the fruits around 1.57 million IDPs in DRC. of citizenship is either impossible or based on the same communal ties that aggravate Eastern DRC has also hosted many refugees. state weakness and forced migration. The arrival of waves of ‘Rwandophones’, speakers of Kinyarwanda (the official Kelly Staples [email protected] is Lecturer language of Rwanda), before, during and after in International Politics at the University of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 exacerbated Leicester.

the tensions that already existed between 1. The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Congolese Rwandophones and other ethnic 1933 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp groups in North and South Kivu Provinces, 2. http://ffp.statesindex.org where repeated waves of forced migrations 3. See FMR 33 ‘Past. Present. Future? Democratic Republic of from Rwanda have led to serious instability. Congo’ www.fmreview.org/DRCongo 22 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013 Repeated displacement in eastern DRC Fran Beytrison and Olivia Kalis

For the vast majority of those affected by conflict, displacement is often seen as the only option in an attempt to find safety. The provision of some basic assistance in places to which people flee makes this process slightly easier but in the absence of state-led protection multiple displacement has become a defining feature of the Kivu conflict. This has implications for both the humanitarian and the development response.

For most of the tens of thousands of Congolese settlements, IDPs subsequently became who have been displaced by violence since hosts themselves to IDPs arriving later. November 2012, it was not the first time, and almost certainly not the last, that they have Some community leaders have expressed had to flee their homes. Most were already concern over the presence of IDPs, claiming in IDP camps or hosted by family, friends they were responsible for food insecurity and and even strangers, and many of those who even for bringing instability and weapons are acting as host communities have already to the community. Whereas traditionally themselves fled their homes at some stage. in DRC IDPs have chosen to be hosted in communities rather than camps, recent years In eastern DRC, the majority of an estimated have seen a shift towards camp settlements 2.6 million IDPs have been in a state of for many reasons; among these are a simple protracted and multiple displacement for lack of safe places to flee to as insecurity many years.1 While some were displaced becomes more generalised and the de facto in the Masisi area in North Kivu as early as control of areas shifts from one armed 1993, mass movements started as a spill-over actor to another. However, even camps can from the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and be unsafe and may become places to flee the first Congo war in 1996. Today, almost from; the fighting in November 2012 saw a 20 years after people in the Kivus started to camp of over 50,000 people on the outskirts flee conflict, the numbers of IDPs are rising of Goma town empty within a few hours across the east of the country. And without as people fled in anticipation of attacks. the state’s ability to find or impose political solutions to address the causes of insecurity, The lack of basic security in places of refuge civilians continue to suffer violence and abuse frequently forces people to move again. This is by armed perpetrators. Meanwhile, assistance apparent in statements by affected populations needs to be delivered in a way that takes into themselves who recognise that while flight is account how multiple displacement during the only viable protection strategy available protracted conflict affects people’s resilience to them, it will not guarantee their safety. and their ability to protect themselves as In the absence of physical security or rule well as what particular vulnerabilities of law provided by the state, further strains and needs arise from this situation. on social cohesion stem from the broader instability that has seen communities resort Coping in the face of continued insecurity to using local defence militia which are A Norwegian Refugee Council assessment typically established along village – and found in one place that nearly 65% of therefore frequently ethnic – lines. respondents had been displaced two or more times in the last seven months and 37% at least Protecting and assisting where the state does not three times or more. Other data shows that The areas of the DRC affected by multiple displaced families can themselves become displacement are those where a chronic hosts; a 2008 UNICEF/CARE study found cases absence of state institutions and services where, having taken refuge in abandoned on the one hand and ongoing violence by States of fragility 23 FMR 43 May 2013

a multiplicity of actors on the other have to how this may be implemented and, at the coexisted for years. As a result, in DRC the political level, the New Deal for Engagement in provision of any sort of protection focuses Fragile States5 includes a focus on new ways to overwhelmingly on physical protection support, country-led and -owned transitions through MONUSCO peacekeepers, with based on one vision, one plan and inclusive limited thinking about alternatives or and participatory dialogue that bridges the complementary civilian action. This reflects the humanitarian/development divide. Yet there reality that the state is unable to provide this remains a gap in practical guidance protection, leaving the necessity for assistance – and no agreement amongst relevant actors – responses to the needs of IDPs also to external on how precisely such a duality of aid can actors. This is unlikely to change for some be achieved safely in contexts of chronic time. In such conditions, aid is provided by state fragility and insecurity. Existing humanitarian actors in a manner that fails to structures for coordination, funding and address the causes of people’s vulnerabilities. prioritisation of interventions do not lend themselves to supporting such an approach. International human rights law provides a framework on durable solutions from This, together with the fact that the Congolese the outset and highlights the importance state will not be able to play its part, leaves of engaging with longer-term dynamics of humanitarian actors confronted with a series resilience while responding to humanitarian of questions about the changing vulnerability ‘peaks’ in the case of prolonged insecurity such of people with each wave of displacement, as that in eastern DRC. The issue is the extent their mechanisms for coping with repeated to which the Congolese state is able to fulfill displacement and how assistance can help its obligations in this respect. DRC has ratified to build, or at least maintain, individual and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ community resilience in the face of repeated Rights (1981) which provides a comprehensive displacement. We need to be asking ourselves human rights framework applicable to how we can protect rights and provide aid situations of internal displacement.2 according to needs throughout the various stages of displacement, and in a way that While DRC is not a signatory to the recently- strengthens IDPs’ ability to cope with the ratified African Union Convention for the impact of displacement in the absence of state Protection and Assistance of Internally capacity. Similarly, development actors need Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala to adapt their interventions in a context of Convention)3, it is a signatory to the 2006 Great extreme fragility to better connect with life- Lakes Pact whose Protocol on the Protection saving interventions over the long term. and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons requires the state to integrate the Guiding Fran Beytrison [email protected] is Analyst Principles into domestic legislation. This for Central Africa for the Internal Displacement is intended to create a framework for state Monitoring Centre of the Norwegian Refugee structures and external actors alike to, among Council. www.internal-displacement.org other things, have greater respect for legally Olivia Kalis [email protected] is Protection and applicable principles on the part of the state Advocacy Adviser for the Norwegian Refugee – which in this case would, crucially, mean Council in the DRC. www.nrc.no

systematically promoting rule of law in the 1. By multiple displacement, we refer to a type of protracted or eastern provinces. It also provides a basis long-term displacement during which people are forced to move for a possible national IDP policy whose aim repeatedly from successive sites of refuge. would be to draw together all relevant actors – 2. http://tinyurl.com/AfricanCharter government, humanitarian and development. 3. http://tinyurl.com/Kampala-Convention-En 4. http://tinyurl.com/IASC-IDPs-Framework The IASC Framework for Durable Solutions 5. www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document For more information about g7plus, see back cover of this issue. for IDPs4 provides some technical advice as 24 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013 ‘Everyone for themselves’ in DRC’s North Kivu Luisa Ryan and Dominic Keyzer

While the international donor community has been trying to engage with DRC by partnering with the government to implement the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, communities in DRC, especially those displaced in war-affected areas, continue to have to look out for themselves.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) than with it. In communities unaffected will feature at the top of most lists for poor by recent conflict, health staff, teachers governance, political instability or insecurity, and members of the security forces are and at the bottom of those ranking social and unpaid. This obviously reduces the quality economic development, social service coverage of service, with the recipient population or transparent government. The distinction expected to cover the salaries for which the of ‘fragile state’ comes not only from hosting government is – on paper – responsible. one of the world’s deadliest conflicts and As the conflict in the Kivus continues, displaying relatively weakened state authority creating more IDPs, the humanitarian and but also from the impact that the combination development communities need to take of these two factors has on preventing the into account the underlying weakness of country from managing conflict, meeting the the Congolese state. Meeting the short-term resulting humanitarian needs and achieving needs of IDPs cannot eclipse the need to a sustainable development trajectory. strengthen the governance mechanisms that should be contributing to their long-term Communities across DRC experience frequent support, (re)integration and well-being. and extreme disruptions to their individual physical integrity, their family livelihoods In 2012 World Vision conducted field research and their social cohesion. In spite of this, in three sites in North Kivu, all of which host most communities display great resilience; in IDP camps.1 Unsurprisingly, the presence of North Kivu, this resilience has been tested by IDPs and their effect on host communities prolonged outbursts of conflict and several were frequently discussed by focus group waves of mass displacement. Mass population participants who included both the displaced movement affects government services, and locals. The main issues raised by IDPs including health, education and protection. included their inability to return home and Thus in North Kivu, the government has difficulties of integrating into their new extremely limited capacity to take care of communities. None of the participants was IDPs, resulting in local and international housed in official IDP camps. Many IDPs NGOs and UN agencies taking the bulk in the focus groups had been displaced for of the strain. While this may appear to many years but still identified themselves as be little different from how humanitarian displaced even when they have no intention operations are run in other disaster-affected of relocating again. Indeed, as we were countries, the Congolese government conducting this research at a time of further offers only limited provision of basic social displacement, many IDPs commented that services even when conditions are optimal. they are tired of moving, either lacking the will to move their families once again The emergency in the Kivus has now stretched or simply with nowhere else to go. over two decades and the government has demonstrated little will to change. Many Access to and use of land view the government as predatory and self- Thus land was also a key issue for IDPs. Their interested; indeed, aid organisations tend land in their home village had often been to operate around the government rather re-allocated to those with kinship ties to the States of fragility 25 FMR 43 May 2013

village elite, meaning they had nothing to The national armed forces themselves are return to, and – without traditional or kinship sometimes implicated in displacement, as ties to the ruling family of their new village – further evidence of the weak governance they did not qualify for a plot to farm where of the security sector institutions. they were. Although enforcing government policies securing land rights and access to With the presence of armed groups villagers justice would help, none of the participants feared forced recruitment and sexual and reported any contact with elected government other violence. Sexual and gender-based officials trying to resolve their displacement violence has been endemic in eastern Congo. or support their integration into a new When women are attacked, there is little community. Traditional leaders appeared recourse in a system where unpaid police to have control of land regulation and some and judiciary will find for the highest bidder. villagers reported their leaders selling their Participants reported not even attempting to farmland without consultation. This practice, get justice. This additional fear was preventing while linked to the immediate conflicts that some women from farming whatever land cause mass displacement of communities, is was still accessible. This affected the food and symptomatic of longer-term weak governance. money available to the family and is again the direct result of a fragile state unable to pay Land rights were a concern for all participants, the salary of its security forces and judiciary. and some of the challenges articulated related directly to the violent unrest. Being displaced When displaced families cannot farm, from their land removes communities from either because of insecurity in their home the traditional social and political structures locations or inability to access land in their that provide protection, and can place host communities, they begin to suffer additional strain on the security and justice from increased malnutrition and cannot services in their host communities. Some earn money. Without money, they cannot communities reported that the deployment pay for school or medical fees. When fewer of the national armed forces to North Kivu people can pay, the price may go up so that had resulted in the army taking over their teachers’ and health workers’ salaries can land. Rather than protecting the population, soldiers had commandeered farm plots and were working the fields themselves. Soldiers were preventing the population from accessing their own crops and were even selling produce back to the villagers. None of the participants reported any official intervention or advocacy on their behalf; indeed only one village had protested and was met with beatings by the soldiers. UNHCR/L Beck Congolese refugees return to DRC in March 2013 after fighting between rival M23 factions calms down. Years of experience have taught them to flee with as much as they can carry. 26 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

continue to be paid. When children are staff know that IDPs, especially recent forced from school because their parents arrivals, cannot afford fees and so do not cannot afford to pay, they may be easy allow them access. There is no functional targets for recruitment into armed groups. governance infrastructure for IDPs to While the immediate humanitarian needs appeal to when this occurs. Adding to of IDPs must be addressed, for aid to have a the difficulties arising from this aspect of lasting impact the ability and interest of the state fragility, the government had a very Congolese state to provide basic services to its limited response to the latest humanitarian citizens, including IDPs, must be increased. crisis, and even these distributions of Land inaccessibility, service provision and assistance were further limited by a lack of government fragility are interlinked. government access to vulnerable areas.

Hosted or hosting Conclusions Those not identifying themselves as displaced The latest waves of IDPs cannot be seen in said that hosting displaced people could isolation. Indeed, they join countless numbers be a major drain on communities which of their kin who have fled their villages only already have very little. Participants in this to be integrated, more or less, into existing research reported little to no contact with communities. But increased competition elected officials, and corrupt and ineffective for access to basic services, and aid directed traditional systems. As local service- solely to IDPs in very poor communities providers are rarely paid their government can then lead to intra-community tension. salaries, it is up to the communities to The local government seems incapable, provide for them by paying informal fees. and often unwilling, to lead and to provide Some participants described themselves as solutions. A comment often repeated by “orphaned” by the state, a heavy indictment focus group participants was “Chaqu’un in this kinship identity-orientated society. pour soi” (‘Everyone for themselves’). While some IDP camps are located alongside established communities, those in the camps Displaced populations highlight the can get access to high-quality services government’s inability to provide services through the international community and leadership but can also draw focus away that are not available to local villagers. from the underlying gaps in governance This great imbalance between what the when donors focus on emergency aid. Basic international community can provide to government services have been weak for a the displaced and what the government long time, deteriorating from a low starting service providers routinely offer causes point during the Mobutu regime. Political the local population to feel disadvantaged; capital has been exhausted by the conflict, some people reported pretending to be which means there is very little room left IDPs to access health and education. to focus on actual service delivery and improvements in governance. Due to ongoing Some IDPs hosted in communities rather than insecurity, instability and fragility, Congolese camps may receive preferential treatment citizens rarely look to their government from government services. For example, for help or leadership. The international participants from some villages indicated community’s interventions in North that IDPs received free medical treatment, Kivu must therefore take a two-pronged free education for the children or were approach: both addressing the shorter-term even housed in the community school. It humanitarian needs of displaced populations is not clear, however, whether the decision and improving governance mechanisms to provide IDPs with free care came from and accountability. The government and UN the service providers themselves or their Stabilisation strategies have attempted to international partners. Conversely, in other address these longer-term governance issues communities state health and education but have collectively failed to address the key States of fragility 27 FMR 43 May 2013

governance reforms necessary for successful responsibilities of fragile governments, stabilisation. Revisions of these strategies must effectively letting them off the hook. reflect the principles of the New Deal, or they Addressing the development needs of the will continue to have little impact on the long- people of North Kivu will require a great deal term situation of insecurity and displacement. of time, commitment and political capital. In the end, the Congolese state must show In a region where the population and will and build capacity not only to resolve international community both have very low and manage conflict amongst its population expectations of government officials, and and end the causes of displacement but the government itself makes little effort to also to consistently improve services change this, consecutive periods of internal and lead humanitarian interventions to forced migration can set back meaningful reinforce these services when needed. state-building. The Congolese government Luisa Ryan [email protected] is already demonstrates limited accountability to an independent consultant. Dominic Keyzer its people, and successive waves of displaced [email protected] was Advocacy people may have exacerbated this, as the Manager for World Vision DRC, Eastern Region. focus of both the population and international www.worldvision.org donors is on shorter-term humanitarian relief. 1. The aim of the study was to determine if a project called Community Voice and Action (CVA), successful in other African Continuing displacement can magnify countries, could also be applied in the Kivus. CVA works with the international community’s tendency communities and local service providers (health, education and to replicate, side-line or take over the protection) to jointly evaluate their social infrastructure and advocate to local government for improvement.

Can Refugee Cessation be seen as a proxy for the end of state fragility? Georgia Cole

The cessation of refugee status results from a judgment that a sufficient change has occurred in the refugees’ country of origin that they no longer require international protection. For individual refugees this may leave them in a precarious situation. For states hoping to dispel an image of being economically, politically or socially ‘fragile’, this judgment is clearly very helpful.

The voluntary repatriation of refugees to their himself of the protection of the country of country of origin is often interpreted by the his nationality’.1 A Cessation Clause is thus international community as signalling the understood as proof that profound, stable state’s ability to resume responsibility for its and durable changes have occurred since citizens. The formal invocation of a ‘ceased the time of the refugees’ departure such that circumstances’ Cessation Clause formalises the country of origin’s capacity to protect this interpretation in international law. its citizens’ rights is once again restored.

It amounts to legal recognition, determined A declaration of cessation is therefore of by Tripartite Agreements between countries immense symbolic importance for fragile of origin, countries of asylum and UNHCR, states. States recovering from conflict or that ‘fundamental changes’ have occurred civil strife can utilise the recognition of in the country of origin such that a refugee stability inherent within the invocation of a ‘can no longer … continue to refuse to avail Cessation Clause to buttress the claim, for 28 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

example, that displaced people no longer assessment of its resumed protective role have any continuing need for protection and capacity, using the Cessation Clause either inside, or outside, the country. as ‘evidence’ of this improvement. The President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, has The case of Rwandan refugees repeatedly asserted that “eventually no The 1994 genocide of Tutsi and moderate Rwandan shall be called a refugee since Hutu, and subsequent inter-communal and there is no longer any reason for this”. cross-border conflict, which purportedly reached its conclusion in 1998, resulted in Rwandans in exile thus seem convinced that over 3.2 million refugees fleeing the country. the Cessation Clause, rather than reflecting a desire on the part of the state to re-assimilate In several respects, Rwanda has remained Rwandan refugees, is being instrumentalised an extremely fragile state ever since, despite to bolster Rwanda’s international reputation. some remarkable improvements in basic As the Rwandan state’s economic, and thus political and economic indicators since political, stability rests to a large extent on 1994. The government nonetheless faces fluctuating relationships with increasingly continuing criticism over its increasingly disenchanted donor states – who have authoritarian style of governance, and provided between 50 and 75 per cent of concerns regularly focus on its restrictions Rwanda’s national budget through foreign aid on domestic freedom of speech and political over the last fifteen years – the Government association, its harassment and suppression of Rwanda’s portrayal of cessation as of opposition parties, and the military’s indicative of full international endorsement aggressive and exploitative conduct within of its behaviour is thus unsurprising. As a the Democratic Republic of Congo. result, Rwandan refugees have experienced increasing constraints to the international Nevertheless, the possibility of invoking recognition of their continuing protection a Cessation Clause for Rwandan refugees needs. This may result in them experiencing has been under intense discussion since further displacement, including back to 2000. By 2010 several countries had situations of potential persecution. decided, in conjunction with UNHCR and the Government of Rwanda, that the Despite the Government of Rwanda’s refugee status of all Rwandans should assertions to the contrary, many Rwandans be terminated by a generalised Cessation still face persecution and thus inevitably Clause. Following further debate between the will continue to resist repatriation to a state involved parties and a chorus of protesting that they do not trust to provide them with non-governmental organisations, it was protection. Greater efforts therefore need to decided that Cessation would be invoked in be made to prevent Cessation undermining June 2013. This would, however, only apply the rights and on-going protection needs to those Rwandan refugees who had fled of Rwandan refugees. Through effective between 1959 and 31st December 1998, as communication to clarify the exact details it was felt that the generalised conditions of the Cessation Clause, and the continuing of violence that had resulted in Rwandan accessibility of alternative durable solutions refugees fleeing the country up until 1999 no for those refugees who feel unable to return longer posed a threat to these individuals. to Rwanda, Cessation could be invoked while minimising the negative outcomes. These temporal limits have, however, been notably absent in the Government Georgia Cole [email protected] is of Rwanda’s statements concerning the studying for a DPhil at the University of Oxford.

Cessation Clause. The government has 1. UNHCR, ‘The Cessation Clauses: Guidelines on Their asserted that it must be conforming to certain Application’, 1999, www.refworld.org/docid/3c06138c4.html normative standards required for a positive States of fragility 29 FMR 43 May 2013 The displaced claiming their rights in fragile states Antonia Mulvey

To date, displaced persons in fragile and conflict-affected states have had little success in claiming their rights for housing, land and property violations. Creative legal thinking and strategic litigation has the potential to change this.

Although housing, land and property (HLP) the more practical challenges, cases are often violations are often triggers of conflict and not clear-cut, they are politically sensitive, there obstacles to peace, there is very limited is no legal precedent and it is difficult to predict jurisprudence dealing with HLP abuses, the outcome. This paints a bleak picture, so and perpetrators of crimes against land what can be done to change the situation? and home are rarely held accountable. Over the last decade the world has seen a steady It should be a priority of the international increase in the prosecution of international community to deal with these injustices criminal cases with the establishment of the and increase displaced people’s access to UN tribunals for the former Yugoslavia in justice. The presumption often held is that 1993 and for Rwanda in 1994, and cemented litigation can only be undertaken where there by the establishment of the International is a functioning judicial system and some Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002. While the extent semblance of the rule of law. Fragile states to which more recent international tribunals generally have neither and litigation in HLP have provided effective remedies for victims cases has therefore been presumed to be and their families is questionable, it cannot be impossible. That presumption is incorrect. denied that they have attempted to establish an Every day the law is being challenged and international forum for criminal accountability. creatively used by skilled lawyers around the globe. This is changing our ability to hold Taking a lead from the UN tribunals, some international and cross-border perpetrators domestic courts have held individuals accountable for their actions. International accountable for their crimes by way of law is being used creatively to protect the the concept of universal jurisdiction. This powerful, namely the state and transnational principle allows any state to bring to trial corporations, and now it must be used to persons accused of an international crime, protect the powerless, the displaced. However, regardless of the place where the crime was rarely does the legal action available for the committed, the nationality of the perpetrator well-placed become available for the displaced. or the nationality of the victim. Nonetheless, There are obstacles. Few international lawyers this positive progress in seeking international have any contact with displaced persons accountability has mainly ignored grave and it is also the case that humanitarians, violations of HLP rights. This is despite the fact who do have contact with displaced persons, that the ICC includes a number of international may perceive pursuing legal avenues for crimes that encompass HLP rights violations, accountability as a possible obstacle to their as do the jurisdiction and jurisprudence of the ability to provide assistance to those most in Tribunals of both Yugoslavia and Rwanda. need. A further fear is that the intervention of lawyers might make an already complex and In fragile states, access to redress within difficult situation worse. the country where the violations took place often appears impossible. In these situations, Development actors may have a different foreign courts can be an important adjunct to objection to the intervention of international everyone’s right of access to justice. Apart from lawyers in HLP cases. Their focus is to the legal challenges in litigating against human develop the institutional capabilities of a given rights violations in the international arena and state and related actors and to implement 30 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

longer-term institutional projects. These constraining the actions of mining companies, actors are working in tandem with the state they often go unobserved. and may be unwilling to contemplate cases against state actors and others associated One way to address such violations would with the state which could impede their be to target agribusinesses, mining and ability to undertake their development work. oil companies in their home countries. For Nevertheless, displaced people should be example, their contracts with the South given all their legal options and it is for them Sudanese government should be made to decide whether they wish to seek redress. public wherever possible, and they should be reminded of where they have signed up Where and how could perpetrators of HLP crimes to voluntary codes, such as the 2003 Equator be held accountable? Principles.1 Transnational corporations that There are creative ways in which legal action rely on their good name among consumers could be used to address injustice for displaced may be especially susceptible to the impact that persons in fragile states. These could range transnational litigation may have in the court of from the use of civil and administrative public opinion. Initial manoeuvres suggesting litigation in domestic courts and the use of that litigation is being planned may also be a regional courts such as the African Court way to impose accountability on regulators by of Human and People’s Rights to the use reminding them of the public’s expectations of criminal prosecution using universal that they will hold corporate entities to jurisdiction in foreign courts. In some fragile internationally accepted standards of conduct.2 states, there may be perpetrators who hold dual nationalities, including European The extent of rule of law in a fragile state is passports, and this could be a means to hold a key issue in determining which goals are them accountable in European jurisdictions. achievable through domestic litigation and in which cases international litigation should be State expropriations of land in South Sudan, undertaken. Weak rule of law in countries such Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of as DRC and South Sudan makes undertaking Congo (DRC) provide good examples of how domestic litigation risky but should not rule it international litigation might help locally out as a strategy. There are gains to be made displaced persons and victims of HLP abuses. by challenging the state and using its formal In each instance, the state has expropriated land institutions, even – or perhaps especially – and leased it to multinational corporations or where they are corrupt and underdeveloped. entities owned by other states such as China For example, could the state of South Sudan and Saudi Arabia. Land has been taken for be challenged domestically for its role in land resource extraction and agriculture without grabbing? local consultation or compensation. The result has been that the people living on the Equally, it might be possible to use regional appropriated land have been forcibly displaced. conventions to challenge European states or agents of the state who have expropriated land In all three countries, there has been little unlawfully in fragile states. The European regulation of the use of the land and minimal Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was return to the state in royalties and taxes, found to be applicable to actions taken by although there have usually been substantial British troops in Basra (Iraq), where the UK personal gains for state officials. Mining assumed the exercise of some of the public companies and other resource-extraction powers normally exercised by a sovereign enterprises are taking advantage of weak government. The ECHR may now apply governance to exploit the natural resources when agents of a member state are exercising without having to comply with the more authority and control within other territories rigorous regulation that comes with stronger where that same member state is exercising governance. Even where there are laws some public powers; for example, there may States of fragility 31 FMR 43 May 2013

be cases of land expropriation in Afghanistan breaches the rights of displaced persons under where the ruling would be applicable. the Geneva Conventions.

We can learn also from creative litigation and Strategic litigation is not just a tool of last judgments from other regional courts in non- resort and its audience often is not just a court. fragile states and should be inspired to create Litigating international humanitarian law new precedents in fragile states that will provide obligations not to maintain or support violations access to justice and protection to the displaced. of other states can be useful even where the In Botswana, the case of the San people, forced court determines it does not have jurisdiction to off their land and into resettlement camps, rule in a case; the litigation can bring important was taken successfully before both domestic facts to light, as in a case involving the health courts and the African Commission of Human impacts of the attack by UK and US forces on the and People’s Rights. Both courts found in Iraqi city of Fallujah in 2004. Through litigation, favour of the San and their judgments were documentation was obtained that enabled mutually reinforcing. In Panama, the case of people to receive appropriate medical attention, the displacement of tribal peoples resulting even though the case was ultimately dismissed. from construction of the Bayano Dam has been taken before the Inter-American Commission of The way forward? Human Rights. The ruling there will hopefully It is time that state actors, international provide the opportunity to articulate new organisations, transnational corporations and arguments regarding the property rights of non-state actors are sent a strong signal that displaced and indigenous peoples. impunity for crimes against land and home will no longer be tolerated and that they will be held The influence of external actors on fragile states accountable for their actions, even in fragile could also be addressed through litigation cases states. Innovative impact litigation can be used over donor accountability and aid effectiveness. to obtain redress for human rights violations The hugely expensive Pergau Dam in Malaysia, and in doing so help displaced persons return for example, was financed with British home or even prevent them being displaced in taxpayers’ money in order to secure a major the first place. Litigation can be used as a tool arms deal; a landmark judgment found British to protect, even where the rule of law is not aid for the dam unlawful. functioning. If a court is not available locally then efforts should be directed towards courts Third-party states could also be held abroad. The value of litigation is not (only) the accountable for violations of international chance of winning but in the litigation itself. law in fragile states. It can be argued that states which have both signed and ratified the Risk-free litigation does not exist but Geneva Conventions have a positive obligation international treaties give everyone whose to prevent the violation of international law. human rights have been violated the right to They also have a requirement (in the form of a fair trial and impartial court. That is a right a negative obligation) not to support ongoing that we must all defend. violations by another state. This obligation is reinforced in customary international Antonia Mulvey [email protected] law, as articulated in the ICRC guidelines on is Executive Director of Legal Action Worldwide humanitarian law (Rule 144), the International (LAW3) www.legalactionworldwide.org and is a Law Commission Articles on Third State Visiting Scholar at Columbia University Law School.

Responsibility (Articles 16 and 41) and decisions 1. www.equator-principles.com by the International Court of Justice. This would 2. See also ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework for Business lead us to conclude that strategic litigation and Human Rights http://tinyurl.com/UN-BusinessHRFramework could be conducted domestically in third states 3. LAW is a network of prominent human rights lawyers and to ensure that a state complies with its legal advisors providing innovative legal assistance to the least represented in fragile and conflict-affected states. obligations to take action against a state where it 32 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013 The ‘phantom state’ of Haiti Andreas E Feldmann

The fragile nature of the state had turned emigration into a major feature of Haitian life even before the earthquake displaced hundreds of thousands of people.

The January 2010 earthquake dealt Haiti – an The root sources of Haiti’s dysfunctional already fragile state, which ordinary Haitians state can be traced back through a complex refer to as ‘the phantom state’ – a devastating historical process dating back to before even blow. Public buildings, power plants, the the 1804 revolution that made Haiti the first electricity grid, the sewer system, roads, slave colony to achieve independence. More telephone lines, water treatment works, recently the dysfunctional process of state hospitals and schools were either destroyed formation expressed itself in a chaotic pattern or severely damaged. of urbanisation. Newcomers to the capital, Port au Prince, were mostly poor peasants Haiti is one of the weakest states in the forced to leave their communities as a result world and registers the lowest human of the collapse of the agrarian economy, who development in the Western Hemisphere settled on unclaimed land around the city. and among the lowest in the world. The Huge, overcrowded slums characterised by Haitian state is unable to fulfill even the most sub-standard building conditions popped rudimentary functions of a modern state up around the city. Not surprisingly, the including the delivery of core public services earthquake disproportionately affected (security, health, housing sanitation, energy, these disadvantaged communities. The education), the development of essential vulnerability of Haiti’s population magnified infrastructure and the administration of the destruction of an earthquake of the rule of law. The state is unable to collect otherwise unremarkable power. taxes and lacks a working bureaucracy. Most of the population works in the One manifestation of the informal sector. The country also suffers relationship between state from severe environmental degradation fragility and displacement was and resource depletion associated with the total inability of the state vertiginous population growth. to react to the crisis and assist and protect its population after The iconic images of desperate Haitians the earthquake. The state was attempting to reach Florida in improvised incapable of organising search boats to escape the reign of terror that and rescue operations; without followed the overthrow of President Aristide clear leadership, survivors had in 1991 raised awareness of the plight of to fend for themselves. Lacking a Haitians. One million Haitians live in national army, Haiti did not have a the Dominican Republic and there are unified force with even moderate sizeable Haitian communities in Canada, technological capabilities, heavy the US, France and Latin America. While equipment and a clear chain of most are considered economic migrants, command capable of leading repression and human rights abuses the rescue effort. A frail health have resulted in significant migration system cracked after being flows. In addition, economic collapse inundated by thousands upon and a seemingly endless litany of natural thousands of victims seeking disasters have created existential threats urgent help. Many people who for the population, forcing thousands could have survived did not as to abandon their home communities. they did not receive medical Jeffrey ACT/Paul States of fragility 33 FMR 43 May 2013

assistance. The state was not even capable their families. The majority of children do of retrieving the bodies of victims, and not attend school because their families lack assistance began in earnest only with the the means to send them there. Camps are arrival of international help several days later. overcrowded, lack electricity and running water, and have awful sanitary conditions. How uprooting weakens the state In Golgotha, a typical camp, there was Uprooting of such proportions predictably one shower for every 1,200 people and one had a crippling effect on Haitian society working latrine for every 77 people. and on the state. In the capital alone a third of the population was rendered homeless. Security conditions inside the camps have While many sought shelter with relatives also allowed women and young girls to be and friends, many thousands of people systematically beaten and raped by armed spontaneously sought shelter in parks, men. Victims neither have access to medical squares, streets and open spaces. According treatment nor to accessible, effective judicial to the Haitian Camp Coordination and recourse, something that has fostered more Camp Management Cluster, at the peak attacks and perpetuated general conditions of of the crisis there were up to 1,555 camps impunity. Many camp residents have also been of diverse sizes and shapes holding 1.5 threatened with eviction, lured to abandon million internally displaced people. camps in exchange for meagre payments or violently evicted by armed thugs sent in by As of October 2012, almost three years after landowners eager to reclaim their property, the disaster, 496 camps remained open three quarters of camps and settlements and 358,000 people were still displaced. A having been set up on private land. fragile state has been incapable of fixing the problems. Most residents of the camps are In addition, the disaster and the ensuing without work and lack the means to support humanitarian crisis had a severe psychological

20-year-old Shirley [not real name] lost her mother and aunt in the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. With no place to go, she moved into one of the sprawling tent camps in the capital, Port-au-Prince. One night she came back to her tent to escape the rain. A man approached her and asked to go inside. She said he hit her and pushed her into the tent: “He threw me to the ground and raped me… The tents are not secure. Anyone with a razor or knife can cut the tent and come inside. There are no walls and no protection and before you know it someone is there in your tent.” 34 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

impact on a significant part of the also forced the Haitian authorities to develop population; many Haitians, in particular plans in a rush. The authorities opted for the children, are severely traumatised depopulating rather than revitalising urban from having experienced personal losses, areas, arguing that the emergency provided endured terrible injuries and suffered an opportunity for rural revitalisation the breakdown of their normal existence and industrial de-centralisation. In the after losing their homes and belongings. midst of the grave humanitarian crisis and Their predicament has been made worse mass displacement that the country was by the systematic human rights violations experiencing, no coherent plan emerged, and by the grim prospects for recovery. only piecemeal efforts that were clearly not good enough and paid scant attention to Massive displacement has further debilitated people’s needs and wishes. State fragility the Haitian state in several other ways. Most also undermined reconstruction efforts obviously, the humanitarian catastrophe because, in the absence of reliable local prompted the state to devote most of its state counterparts, programmes were limited material and human resources to almost exclusively channelled through addressing the immediate crisis, thus forcing non-governmental organisations which it to postpone dealing with other urgent often lacked the resources and expertise problems. More profoundly, displacement to carry out such challenging tasks. has had a negative impact on Haitian society by furthering marginality and promoting a The destruction and misery brought culture of dependency. In his report to the about by the earthquake, in particular the UN Human Rights Council, Michel Forst, uprooting of hundreds of thousands of the UN’s human rights expert in Haiti, people who continue to endure inhumane warned that: “Although the camps were conditions, is a chilling reminder of the an appropriate response to an emergency circular relationship between state fragility situation, one can only wonder whether and forced migration. State fragility creates they have now contributed to the emergence the conditions for uprooting, which in of a new kind of social organization that turn further undermines state capacity by might create more problems than it solves.” sapping the state’s few available resources. However resourceful the Haitian population Displacement and state building proves itself to be, its chances of finding Displacement creates formidable challenges lasting solutions to its problems are slim to state-building processes. In addition to against the backdrop of a ‘phantom state’. It distracting badly needed resources, massive is therefore critical that all actors involved, displacement often pushes peacebuilding whether in responses to displacement or in off the agenda as all efforts coalesce around promoting the development of the country, tackling acute humanitarian needs. Public work on ways to strengthen the capacity policies are often made in a haze and under and legitimacy of the Haitian state. great pressure in this context. The Haitian authorities have been obliged to channel Andreas E Feldmann [email protected] is resources to improving security in the camps Associate Professor at the Instituto de Ciencia and dealing with tensions created by violent Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. evictions. This meant reassigning police away from communities afflicted by acute The research was supported by International levels of violence. Uprooting also raised Development Research Centre, FONDECYT social tensions and resentment between the (1110565) and Millennium Nucleus for the Study displaced and pauperised urban dwellers of Stateness and Democracy in Latin America who were not directly affected by the disaster (100014). Dania Straughan provided research and therefore not eligible for special aid assistance. programmes. The critical housing situation States of fragility 35 FMR 43 May 2013 Post-disaster Haitian migration Diana Thomaz

Those who left Haiti in the chaotic aftermath of the 2010 earthquake did not generally find the same posture of solidarity and humanitarianism overseas that was apparent in the significant international assistance that followed the disaster.

Haiti has endured over two centuries of which was only aggravated by the natural complex political strife, successive coups disaster that, in that sense, acted as a d’état, authoritarian governments and trigger – and not as the main driver – for international interventions that have left it the displacement. with weak institutions, largely unresponsive to the needs of the population. Most Haitians Although the international legal definition have learned to depend on themselves and of refugees would not cover the post-disaster develop their own networks of support, Haitian migration, the Cartagena Declaration not only in the urban and rural areas of the on Refugees of 19841 had promoted an country but also across international borders, expansion of refugee protection in Latin as a way to circumvent the vulnerabilities America, recommending the inclusion of those of originating from a fragile state. who “have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened When the earthquake hit in January 2010 by generalized violence, foreign aggression, the capital Port-au-Prince’s infrastructure internal conflicts, massive violation of virtually collapsed and the international human rights or other circumstances which community responded with significant have seriously disturbed public order.” relief efforts and large donations aimed at reconstructing the country. Yet the thousands In spite of the non-binding nature of this who fled the country in search of safety document, many Latin American countries and survival at that time did not generally have applied this broad refugee definition find similar solidarity and humanitarian in their national legislation. Brazil was the response in potential countries of refuge. first country in the region to pass a specific law on refugees in 19772 and included in To take two examples, France and the US – it the Cartagena Declaration’s severe and two major donor countries that are deeply widespread violations of human rights as one connected to Haiti’s past and present – of the legitimate reasons for granting asylum. opted not to accept these forced migrants within their borders on the grounds that As Brazil was also one of the destinations they did not legally qualify as refugees for displaced Haitians after the earthquake, under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Both one might expect that its broad national of them took precautions to avoid the legislation on refuge could have assured possibility of a mass migration of Haitians Haitians protection and access to refugee to their territories; the US imposed a naval status. However, the National Committee blockade around its shores and France for Refugees (Comitê Nacional para closed the borders of French Guiana, Refugiados, CONARE) – the public body one of its overseas departments. designated to determine the granting of refugee status in Brazil – reached the Fragility as the main driver conclusion that the displaced Haitians The migration of these Haitians was mainly could not be granted asylum. The reasons generated by the fragility of the Haitian state for the denial stated that they could not and its consequent inability to secure its clearly demonstrate the existence of a citizens’ basic subsistence needs, a reality threat to their lives, security or freedom. 36 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

Although CONARE determined that Haitians devastated country, we should seek ways to could not be granted refugee status, it try to adjust the international community’s simultaneously considered that they required handling of those displaced from fragile states. some sort of special permit to stay in Brazil owing to the precarious situation they would One such way would be to stress the role face if returned to their home country. As a that these migrants might play when out consequence, some Haitians were granted of the country in improving the situation so-called ‘humanitarian visas’. Some actors, of their compatriots back home. In that including UNHCR, hailed this attitude as case they can, through the transnational exemplary, while others, mainly faith-based links they create, help ameliorate the organisations and human rights NGOs, situation in their country of origin. criticised it for being too timid, not amounting to the same protection as refugee status. This rationale seems particularly appropriate in the Haitian case as Haiti’s In January 2012, owing to an increase in the economy has been highly dependent number of Haitians arriving, the Brazilian on remittances for decades and in these authorities took the initiative to regularise circumstances would allow the displaced the situation of approximately four thousand to send remittances back to their families. Haitians who had already entered the country, while also introducing a quota An effective and low-cost strategy for helping system for new migrants from Haiti. As a to rebuild a fragile state devastated by a consequence, hundreds of these migrants natural disaster might consist in the adoption have found themselves stuck at the border. by receiving countries of a migration policy that recognises those migrants most in need What the Brazilian case serves to illustrate of protection and permits them to enter and is that, even in cases where a broad national be locally integrated. What the receiving and regional definition of the refugee countries would be doing is engaging in condition exists, obtaining effective protection a complementary assistance approach. or achieving durable solutions for those fleeing from fragile states is more difficult To this end, receiving countries might and dependent on political will than with either adopt broader interpretations of ‘traditional refugees’. As these migrants do their existing laws on refuge or allow not fit the globally recognised definition exceptions, creating special programmes of refugees, their claims for rights and or visas for those fleeing fragile states at protection are more easily subject to the particularly vulnerable moments. This is not receiving state’s sovereign power in deciding a normative solution but one that appeals who is granted asylum and who is not. to the practices of humanitarianism in a broad sense, an expanded humanitarianism A practical way forward not only committed to sending aid abroad Even though the post-disaster Haitian but also to allowing forced migrants in. migrants theoretically do have rights in a broad human rights and humanitarian Diana Thomaz [email protected] is a interpretation, they are not properly covered graduate student at Pontifícia Universidade by international frameworks for refugee Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

protection in practice. Cases of displacement 1. Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. Colloquium on the related to state fragility are not rare at International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico the present time. Given the significant and Panama, 1984, agreed upon in the Cold War context of authoritarian regimes and a proliferation of domestic political international mobilisation in the relief crises that created millions of refugees in the Latin American and reconstruction efforts following the region www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36ec.html earthquake in Haiti but the less generous 2. Law 9.474/97 of 22 July stance towards the Haitians who fled the States of fragility 37 FMR 43 May 2013 Humanitarian responses in the protection gap Aurélie Ponthieu and Katharine Derderian

Often a combination of factors pushes people to leave their country, and the voluntary character of their departure remains debatable, challenging humanitarians both to meet needs and to adapt to changing categories of forced displacement.

Today, the reality of forced displacement needs and vulnerabilities, if not the same is characterised by mixed flows, restrictive profile or reason for flight – confront a migration policies and increasing connections dire medical and humanitarian situation. between economic migration and political Among recent prominent examples are flight. As a result, assisting forcibly Zimbabweans crossing the border in large displaced populations already means numbers to South Africa (2007-13) and intervening in different type of settings: Haitians stranded in the Amazon region camps, detention centres, transit locations of Brazil (2011). These two groups reflect and urban environments, increasingly some classic economic migration patterns with challenges for human dignity and – the search for economic opportunity, a access to basic services. At the same time, high proportion of male migrants and/or new vulnerable groups are arriving at the the use of smuggling routes. Yet many of doors of Médecins Sans Frontières’ clinics, them point to reasons more complex than including victims of human trafficking, the simple will to improve their economic environmental disasters or food insecurity. situation. While some fled as refugees, the People’s main reason for flight is often difficult majority fled as a survival strategy from the to identify, yet remains key to the legal status consequences of state fragility, including they are deemed to have upon arrival. massive outbreaks of disease, natural disasters and extreme poverty. In these While legal categories are often inadequate in contexts, people’s vulnerability arguably the face of complex realities, vulnerabilities ended up equal to or greater than that of remain similar regardless of status. Neither refugees in the same country of destination. qualifying as refugees nor being voluntary economic migrants, many people on the move Haitians in Brazil face inadequate policies, lack of assistance Brazil has faced an irregular flow of and abuses of their human rights. In the Haitians, with 3,814 people officially countries of destination, their situation entering its Amazonian border with depends on fluctuating and politically Peru between 2010 and 2012. Most of motivated reception policies and the goodwill them had transited through Peru with of international or local organisations and the help of smugglers after travelling by NGOs to assist them. Often, lack of assistance plane to Panama or Ecuador. If Haitian or incoherent policies only aggravate emigration is hardly a new phenomenon humanitarian needs, leading to a very real – one out of six Haitians is estimated to ‘protection gap’ for the people involved live abroad – this was the first time Brazil and challenges for aid organisations and was confronted with this phenomenon. states. States facing such influxes must adapt migration and refugee policies coherently In 2011, MSF conducted a survey in the border to avoid increased vulnerability and to town of Tabatinga where most Haitians uphold people’s rights and human dignity. remained stranded. 40% of those surveyed came from regions of Haiti affected by the Recently, MSF has intervened in several January 2010 earthquake. Even though 84% situations where significant numbers of declared that unemployment was their main forced migrants – who share the same reason to migrate, the earthquake represented 38 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

the second motivation (56%). 69% said With no clear policy in force and despite they had been affected by the earthquake, the government decision not to count with 51% having lost their house and 33% Haitians as refugees, Haitians in Tabatinga members of their family. Insecurity was had no alternative other than the asylum also mentioned by 41% as a motivation to system to obtain temporary documentation leave. Even if Haitians would not qualify as and the right to work and to be able to prima facie refugees, many acknowledged the leave Tabatinga. With the asylum system humanitarian crisis in Haiti and the burden overwhelmed by new applications, delays in that forced returns would impose on the processing them and the extreme isolation of country in the context of the destruction and Tabatinga resulted in an alarming increase displacement caused by the earthquake. In in migrants’ vulnerability and humanitarian February 2010, OHCHR1 and UNHCR urged needs. Stranded for two to four months in countries to stop returning undocumented Tabatinga, Haitians remained unemployed, migrants to Haiti and to grant them incurring debt to pay for poor, unhygienic protection on humanitarian grounds, an housing. According to an MSF survey, a appeal that was renewed in 2011 and 2012. vast majority had only 1m² living space, slept on the floor, had limited access to Following the UN call in 2010 at the time potable water and sanitation and ate one of the earthquake for temporary protection meal a day provided by the local church. for Haitian migrants, Brazil regularised The federal government requested UNHCR some 300 Haitians present on its territory, not to assist Haitian migrants despite their offering them ‘humanitarian visas’. However, asylum seeker status while municipal the federal authorities failed to define authorities designated the ‘Haitian problem’ their policy framework as regards Haitian a federal issue. In this context of blatant migration, hampering timely responses to exclusion, MSF set up a short intervention new influxes of Haitians at Brazil’s borders. aimed at improving basic living conditions © Alessandra Vilas Boas

Stranded Haitians in the border town of Tabatinga, Brazil. States of fragility 39 FMR 43 May 2013

and advocated for the local authorities to effects pushed Zimbabweans ’underground’, grant access for Haitians to Brazilian basic where many lived in appalling conditions. services, resulting in complete registration This government policy, coupled with a lack of all migrants in the health care system. of legal status and a dysfunctional asylum procedure, hampered Zimbabweans from On 13 January 2012, the Brazilian government accessing health care and other assistance. adopted legislation regularising all Haitians present on its territory and allowing In April 2009, at the peak of electoral violence for family reunification. This decision in Zimbabwe, the South African Department ultimately facilitated legal immigration, of Home Affairs, under heavy pressure from with 100 visas per month being granted NGOs and human rights groups, offered at the Brazilian Embassy in Haiti. Zimbabweans a ‘special dispensation permit’ under the Immigration Act, a moratorium Zimbabweans in South Africa on deportations, a regularisation process In a similar case, some two million and a 90-day entry visa for passport Zimbabweans crossed the border to South holders. Although this new policy aimed Africa to flee the consequences of their to provide all Zimbabweans with a legal country’s political and economic crisis in status, acknowledging their protection the 2000s. While the region has long known needs and the unfairness of forced returns, different types of labour migration across and the special dispensation permit was never within borders, as well as refugee flows, the implemented. As a result, undocumented migration of Zimbabweans in the last decade Zimbabweans turned once again to the has been more complex. Food insecurity asylum system to get access to employment and the lack of access to basic services such and education. This strategy overburdened as health care have been important triggers the asylum system and South Africa became in the migration of Zimbabweans to South the country with the highest number of Africa. In 2009, Zimbabwe was the most pending asylum applications in the world. food aid-dependent country in the world, with seven million out of the population of The moratorium on deportations and nine million considered food insecure. 15% the complex documentation process for of the adult population was HIV-positive Zimbabweans ended in 2011, once again and 94% of the population unemployed. At exposing the vast majority of Zimbabweans the same time, the country faced Africa’s to arrest and deportation. Access to asylum worst cholera outbreak in over fifteen years procedures became ever more restrictive, in an epidemic that affected all provinces. with undocumented individuals of all Zimbabwe’s fragile public service systems nationalities systematically denied access into were simply unable to cope. People fled the country and turned away, forced to cross these desperate conditions, with no question clandestinely, so called ‘under the bridge’. that their motive was simply to survive. ‘Guma guma’ – criminal gangs present South Africa initially considered along the border – rob migrants of their Zimbabweans arriving at its border as belongings or sexually assault them; men are voluntary economic migrants. Many people often forced to rape women accompanying had crossed the border irregularly and them, or otherwise face rape themselves. remained undocumented due to the lack of From January 2010 to June 2011, MSF and access to legal migration channels, refugee the Thuthuzela Centre in Musina treated status or temporary protection measures. In 481 people who were raped or forced to mass deportations from January to June 2007 rape when crossing the Limpopo River the South African authorities repatriated a between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Most total of 102,413 undocumented migrants to victims also faced other types of violence Zimbabwe. The deportation policy and its including beating and abduction.2 40 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

Partial or temporary solutions conditions, during which people face health Several factors influenced the humanitarian risks such as interruption in HIV or TB needs of migrants in these contexts: access to treatment, or exposure to communicable a legal status, respect of human rights and the diseases. Today, South Africa faces new mixed responsiveness of the asylum or migration flows of vulnerable individuals, including regimes toward their specific situation. Each Somalis and Congolese from the war-torn MSF intervention was initially driven by the Kivus. Instead of revising its policies in lack of other responses to these migrants’ response to forced migration, South Africa needs. is closing its borders, restricting access to international protection, risking refoulement State immigration and asylum policies define and forcing people to enter by irregular and who is eligible to enter and remain on their dangerous means. territory but these policies are generally based on pre-existing, defined legal frameworks and New emerging concepts like ‘survival categories that risk being too rigid in today’s migration’3 have the merit of defining this world. Given the situation in some countries, category of forced migrants and challenging in fragile states such as Zimbabwe and Haiti, the adequacy of existing legal frameworks do populations have any other option than when, as in these cases, state fragility and migration? Sadly, the fear of ‘pull factors’ humanitarian needs create substantial may influence the provision of assistance migrations. and protection status more than the reality of people’s needs and vulnerability. MSF’s experiences in Brazil, South Africa and elsewhere point to the humanitarian After some time, Brazil and South Africa consequences of a protection gap. Ad hoc acknowledged the specificity of the causes and temporary state policies have proven of migration from Haiti and Zimbabwe and inadequate as answers to a continued and the need to adapt existing policies. In both durable phenomenon. There is now an urgent cases, the use of asylum channels alone failed need to develop coherent and needs-based to address needs fairly and effectively. While mechanisms to adapt asylum and migration these two countries granted permanent policies to displacement as one of the long-term residence or humanitarian visas to foreign consequences of state fragility. Otherwise, individuals in special circumstances, these some of the world’s most vulnerable people mechanisms led to politically oriented, ad hoc risk remaining caught up in a complex of state and thus temporary solutions. Even though fragility, restrictive policies and inadequate Brazil regularised several thousand Haitians assistance – with very real consequences for in January 2012, this did nothing to resolve their health and human dignity. the situation of hundreds of later arrivals who face the same substandard living conditions. Aurélie Ponthieu and Katharine Derderian With continuing difficulties in Haiti, the most are Humanitarian Advisors at Médecins Sans vulnerable of Haitian migrants are unlikely to Frontières. www.msf.org obtain visas in Haiti and will continue to arrive [email protected] in Brazil over various borders, yet face the same [email protected]

needs. 1. The UN Office of the High Commisssioner for Human Rights 2. See also ‘South Africa’s smugglers’ borderland’ by Tesfalem South Africa’s proposed special immigration Araia and Tamlyn Monson, FMR 33 status for Zimbabweans aimed at providing www.fmreview.org/en/FMRpdfs/FMR33/68-69.pdf stay and work permits failed to resolve the 3. Survival migration refers to “persons who are outside their country of origin because of an existential threat to which they situation, mainly due to unclear requirements have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution”. Betts, or applicants not having passports. Since the A ‘Survival Migration: a New Protection Framework’, Global Governance, Vol. 16, No. 3. end of this process, arrests, detention and http://journals.rienner.com/doi/pdf/10.5555/ggov.2010.16.3.361 deportations have resumed in substandard States of fragility 41 FMR 43 May 2013 Flight, fragility and furthering stability in Yemen Erin Mooney

The existence of a large number of refugees or internally displaced persons in a country is considered a primary indicator of instability.1 By this measure, and all others, Yemen is one of the world’s most fragile states. Less well understood is how this context affects the vulnerability of refugees, IDPs and migrants themselves and what can be done to strengthen protection for them.

“When disorder threatens, seek refuge in came here to run away from a war and now Yemen.” So counsels a hadith, or recounted we are caught up in someone else’s war.” saying of the prophet Mohammed. Since time immemorial, countless people have The political crisis of 2011 also caused a heeded this advice and come to Yemen worsening economic situation, resulting in search of safety from violence and in particular repercussions for refugees. instability. Although by far the poorest Many refugee women lost regular work as country in the region, Yemen is the only cleaners and domestic workers as well as ad state in the Arabian Peninsula that has hoc employment. Refugee men also lost job signed either the 1951 Convention or its 1967 opportunities, particularly in construction, Protocol, and continues to uphold its long- while those still working reported increased standing reputation as a place of refuge. mistreatment at work. More refugee children were compelled to work to help Since 1991, most refugees to Yemen were support their families. The combination fleeing the protracted conflict in Somalia; of of insecurity and economic difficulties in the 242,000 refugees registered in Yemen at the Yemen even led several hundred refugees end of March 2013, over 95% are Somalis, who to make the return journey to Somalia. are automatically recognised as prima facie refugees.2 The others originate from Ethiopia, The ‘Gate of Grief’ Iraq, Eritrea and other countries, including For the most part, however, people – an Syria, all of which also feature prominently unprecedented number, in fact – continue to in indexes of state fragility. As a sign of their come to Yemen in search of safety or economic desperation, refugees to Yemen therefore opportunities in Yemen, or on their way have fled one fragile state for another. further afield. In 2011, as famine ravaged the Horn of Africa while political crisis and Most refugees and asylum seekers arriving in violence engulfed Yemen, more than 103,000 Yemen were not aware of the deterioration in persons (double the figure for 2010) arrived the political, security and economic situation on Yemen’s shores. Then 2012 brought the in the country. Nor have they been immune largest recorded influx to Yemen yet (107,500 to its effects. Several hundred were uprooted persons). 2013 is set to see similar numbers, anew, this time within Yemen, and some possibly even surpassing previous records. were killed in the violent clashes that rocked Ethiopians seeking work in the Persian Gulf, the capital, Sana’a, in 2011. In addition, they rather than asylum in Yemen, comprise the have faced sporadic harassment, in particular vast majority (80%) of maritime arrivals. In after unfounded rumours in 2011 that the the first three months of 2013 alone, more government was recruiting refugees to help than 25,000 Ethiopians travelled to Yemen quell the anti-regime protests and in 2012 that by sea, either directly from Ethiopia or via “Somalis” were suspected to be behind some Djibouti – an average of 277 people a day. suicide bomb attacks on government officials. A Somali refugee woman who was arrested Most of this ‘mixed flow’ of regular and on her way home from work lamented: “We irregular migrants, refugees and asylum 42 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

seekers arrives via the Red Sea strait called displaced for the first time. Over the course bab el-mandeb in Arabic, meaning ‘the gate of 2012, most people uprooted by the unrest of grief’. The fact that these sea crossings managed to return, although they still need rely heavily on smugglers drives much of support to secure a durable solution. this migration into the shadows, beyond the reach of international or national monitoring Third, conflict in Abyan Governorate efforts; the insecurity in Yemen often also beginning in May 2011 displaced some 167,000 impedes humanitarian patrol teams from people across five southern governorates. reaching new arrivals before the smugglers. In June 2012, after the government declared Some who set out on this journey to Yemen it had rooted out anti-government armed do not survive it. Since 2008, well over 1,000 groups from Abyan, IDPs could begin people have not survived the hazards of to consider the possibility of returning. the crossing. For those who do make it to Initially, returns were tentative and Yemen, abuses are rampant and on the rise. limited due to the widespread presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance, Considering the fragile political and security general security concerns and extensive situation in Yemen, it may seem surprising damage to infrastructure. Yet, by the end of that so many people continue to make this April 2013, 95% of these IDPs had returned perilous journey. However, rather than and begun to rebuild their lives in Abyan. deterring migrants, it appears that the insecurity in Yemen has made it easier to A recent analysis by the government of factors enter Yemen as it has constrained national of instability in Yemen highlights that IDPs, and international efforts to monitor Yemen’s returnees and the communities hosting vast coastline and to curtail trafficking. them were among those most affected by

Canaries in the coal mine In addition to Yemen being a refugee- hosting state and a major transit hub for migrants, some half a million Yemenis have been internally displaced in recent years as a result of three distinct IDP crises.

First, since 2004, six successive wars in Sa’ada Governorate have created more than 356,000 IDPs. Although a February 2010 ceasefire remains in place, localised armed clashes in surrounding governorates caused new displacement in 2011 and 2012. Meanwhile, most IDPs thus far have been reluctant to return in the absence of a political solution to the conflict, guarantees of safety for all civilians, extensive de-mining, and reconstruction of heavily war-damaged personal property and public infrastructure.

Second, violence associated with political unrest in the country in 2011 caused internal displacement, particularly in and around the capital, Sana’a. Those uprooted by the violence include refugees, IDPs who previously had fled the conflict in Sa’ada, and civilians Nasser UNHCR/Yasser States of fragility 43 FMR 43 May 2013

the nationwide political crisis of 2011 and affected by instability in Yemen are heard made more vulnerable by the humanitarian and taken into account will be critical to the crisis. Finding durable solutions to internal inclusiveness and legitimacy of the process. displacement in Yemen is critically important not only for IDPs themselves but also for Feasibility amidst fragility? promoting stability in the country as a As Yemen seeks to advance down the path whole. Indeed, in Yemen, as elsewhere, IDPs from fragility to stability, the Government of can be considered the proverbial ‘canaries Yemen’s Transitional Program for Stabilization in the coal mine’ – their conditions and and Development, 2012-2014 (TPSD) defines prospects are key barometers of whether four top priorities and urgent actions for peace will take root and development will promoting stability in Yemen: (i) finalising occur, or whether conflicts will re-emerge the peaceful transfer of power; (ii) restoring and another spiral of violence will ensue.3 political and security stability; (iii) meeting urgent humanitarian needs; and (iv) achieving Key to the transitional process and thus economic stability. Among the urgent actions future stability of Yemen is the National to be taken towards achieving security, Dialogue Conference, which began in March stability and enhancing the rule of law is 2013 and will run for six months. In addition to “[r]eview and further develop national to revising the Constitution, the agreed legislation pertaining to addressing issues aims of the process include taking “the of vulnerable groups such as women, IDPs, necessary legal and other means to enhance asylum seekers, and refugees in addition to the protection of vulnerable groups and their issues relating to trafficking and migration rights.” The extent to which the voices and management.” Stability also requires “urgent views of IDPs as being among the people most action” to “meet urgent humanitarian

Migrants arriving on the coast of Yemen from the Horn of Africa. 44 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

needs”, including by assisting IDPs and the government in this endeavour. The other vulnerable groups and compensating policy has now been finalised through a individuals for private property damaged broad-based consultative process and it during conflict. To promote economic is to be hoped it will be adopted by the growth, reduce unemployment and alleviate government without delay in 2013. When poverty, the TPSD includes a medium- it does so, Yemen will be among the still term economic recovery programme, relatively few albeit growing number of which recognises the need to expand social countries in the world to adopt a national protection including through specific IDP policy. Doing so is a key benchmark of provisions “to deal with crisis issues national responsibility for addressing internal such as providing shelter to IDPs.” displacement, with the emphasis being not only on adoption but implementation.4 International support for these and other stabilisation efforts is essential. For refugees, In conclusion, in addition to general UNHCR is working with the transitional instability, the current situation in Yemen government to develop national refugee engenders specific fragilities for refugees, legislation and to strengthen the national asylum seekers, migrants and IDPs. Yet asylum system. Mixed migration flows from the case of Yemen also shows that even in the Horn of Africa to Yemen, by contrast, the most fragile of states it is possible to must be recognised as an issue affecting not undertake national and international efforts only Yemen but the region as a whole. To this towards enhancing protection for these end, the Government of Yemen is playing groups, and that doing so is an imperative in a leadership role and taking the initiative order to promote national stability. Stability is to convene, with support from UNHCR closely linked to effective governance, which and IOM, a regional conference in Yemen in turn can be gauged by how well a society in 2013 to develop a strategy for managing protects its most vulnerable. Efforts currently the flow of mixed migrants and combatting underway in Yemen by the transitional smuggling and trafficking in the region. government to strengthen its national asylum system, address mixed migration The IDP situation, meanwhile, has begun (including efforts to tackle smuggling and to see positive developments, most notably trafficking) and resolve internal displacement the recent mass IDP returns to Abyan. all are important steps in this direction. The challenge now is to support the sustainability of returns, in particular Erin Mooney [email protected] served as through reconstruction of infrastructure Senior Protection Officer with UNHCR in Yemen ensuring access to basic services, rebuilding from December 2011 to June 2013.

livelihoods and re-establishing governance 1. The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses and the rule of law. Meanwhile, greater for Security, Governance and Development, Clingendael Institute national and international attention for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (January 2005), available at: http://tinyurl.com/stabilityClingendael and resources also must be devoted to The Failed States Index, 2012, Fund for Peace, available at: facilitating similar progress towards durable http://ffp.statesindex.org/indicators. solutions for the protracted and larger IDP 2. For all figures cited, see http://tinyurl.com/YemenUNHCR situation from the conflict in Sa’ada. 3. William O’Neill, ‘Internal Displacement and Peace building: Institutional Responses,’ Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 28, Issue 1. 4. See Erin Mooney, ‘National Responsibility and Internal Indeed, the breakthrough towards durable Displacement: A Framework for Action,’ Forced Migration Review solutions for IDPs from the Abyan conflict supplement October 2005 gave new impetus to efforts to address and www.fmreview.org/en/FMRpdfs/FMR24/IDP%20Supplement/05.pdf and Elizabeth Ferris, Erin Mooney and Chareen Stark, From resolve internal displacement throughout Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Yemen. In November 2012, the Prime Displacement Minister commissioned the development of http://tinyurl.com/Brookings-responsibility2011 a national IDP policy. UNHCR is supporting States of fragility 45 FMR 43 May 2013 Surviving the odds: education, commerce and development among displaced Somalis Abdirashid Duale

Private entrepreneurship and the disapora play important roles in supporting displaced people in fragile ungoverned situations. They are also valuable in helping those situations emerge from fragility.

The Somali territories are beginning to the mass movement of millions of people. emerge from arguably the most difficult Amid the unrest of the 1980s my family was period in their history. For two decades among the hundreds of thousands who fled large areas of the region have struggled to Ethiopia leaving everything behind. Over in the absence of any recognisable state time, we began using our existing network infrastructure, and periodic droughts like of contacts to offer much-needed money the one of 2011 have left millions facing transfer and other services to refugees. food and water shortages. But another story has also emerged, one of resilience and There are many examples of this kind in resourcefulness in the face of these hardships. today’s displaced communities. Time and Remittances from the Somali diaspora have again, refugees and IDPs have proved that helped to sustain an economy that in many they do not simply have to be passive actors sectors, such as livestock, construction waiting for aid. Business people arriving and telecoms, is surprisingly buoyant. in the camps often begin trading again; in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya’s North Encouraging as these developments are, there Eastern Province there are blacksmiths, is still some way to go. The UN estimates tailors, fruit vendors and many others that there are currently 1.4 million internally earning a living despite the challenges. In displaced people (IDPs) across the Somali some of the more stable and prosperous territories and hundreds of thousands of regions within the Somali territories, many Somali refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia and IDPs have successfully integrated with beyond. As conditions for more established host communities by becoming part of the communities begin to improve, the fear is that productive economy. Now that the political these vulnerable groups could be left behind. and security situation is improving elsewhere, better coordination of aid efforts along with Barring inevitable cases of tension and stronger governance and a more active resentment, resident communities have business environment should help displaced generally received these displaced groups people in those regions as well. These with compassion and helped them to settle. advances constitute the principal difference Such charity is deeply ingrained in Somali between past and present in terms of the culture and crosses regional and other status and prospects of the mobile population. divides. Smoothing the integration of IDPs is vital for a sustainable solution to the Aid agencies have in some cases implemented problem, and reinforcing common culture and programmes that are specifically aimed values is an important part of that process. at rehabilitating and integrating IDPs – employing vulnerable people and training The story of my family and the business them to tackle community needs such as we established, Dahabshiil, is closely rebuilding roads, collecting refuse and associated with the story of migration in the improving irrigation systems. Other initiatives Somali territories and with the growth of have involved allocations of livestock, offering the remittance industry that accompanied a source of income as well as food to the 46 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

recipients, some of whom have gone on to of capital inflows in those days were invested. make successful applications for micro-grants, A trade-based system of remittance transfer, enabling them to start small businesses. Other known as franco valuta, bypassed strict schemes have focused entirely on training foreign exchange controls and allowed for and vocational courses. In many efforts of imports of raw materials that fed industrial these kinds, Dahabshiil has partnered with growth. Later on, the civil war prompted a and supported NGOs and UN agencies by much larger and more far-flung migration acting as a bank and a conduit for remittances, involving a fuller cross-section of Somali and in some cases – particularly in health society. Remittances for family support began and education – directly funding projects. to overtake those for commercial objectives and were soon far greater than development Perhaps the most powerful way to improve and humanitarian aid combined. The recent the situation of displaced people is through improvement in the business climate has education. It is very often the poorest in meant that the proportion of funding being society who are the most vulnerable to used for investment is once again on the rise. displacement and, once displaced, their chances of achieving a basic level of Remittance income has been crucial to literacy and numeracy are diminished sustaining consumption and thus maintaining even further. Projects like that of the Africa the conditions in which the economy Educational Trust (AET), which schooled can grow, creating opportunities for the women and children IDPs in 16 camps, aim poorest to earn a living. As the remittance to break this cycle. In Dadaab, a Canadian- industry has expanded it has assimilated Kenyan partnership is opening an onsite the latest information and communication campus of Kenyatta University, making technology (ICT). The East African mobile it the first higher education institution to banking revolution is well documented, and serve a refugee camp. The project aims to in the current environment the volume of bridge the gap between the outside world remittances transferred to a particular region and the inhabitants of the world’s largest now depends in large part on the quality refugee settlement, and to prepare them of telecommunications there. Fortuitously, for returning to their places of origin. the Somali telecoms sector underwent a spectacular boom in the years following Better connected students, both at Dadaab the collapse of central government, when and in educational initiatives within the a newly competitive marketplace (aided Somali territories, have been able to draw considerably, it must be said, by the lack of on help from relatives abroad; support for regulation in the absence of a functioning education has been one of the principal state) allowed for the proliferation of ways in which the diaspora has played what are now some of the cheapest and a role in wider developmental efforts most reliable mobile services in Africa. beyond straight commerce. Somalis of the diaspora feel a strong connection to their The number of mobile subscriptions in the homeland and are driven by this and Somali Somali territories is now in the millions. custom to send remittances back to family Landline connections, by comparison, members who find themselves displaced. are relatively few. Internet access is also spreading. Abandoning copper wire and Remittances moving straight into mobile and wireless We have witnessed at close quarters how the is one of the best-known examples of the evolution of remittance patterns has mirrored developing-world phenomenon of ‘leapfrog’ the various phases of migration the region has technology, by which obsolete phases seen over the years. Early Somali migrants of industrial development are bypassed working in the Gulf were often comparatively altogether. While there clearly remains a well connected and educated, and the majority pressing need for stronger formal institutions States of fragility 47 FMR 43 May 2013

and governance, these advances seem bound Somali society one of the most globally- to set the development of our financial minded in Africa. The steady inflow of infrastructure on a different trajectory. financial and human capital has been hugely Realising the growing synergies between significant to private sector development. the two sectors, many money transfer The rehabilitation of Mogadishu – with a operators in the Horn of Africa have, like diaspora-funded construction boom, a rash us, made strategic acquisitions in the ICT of new start-ups and the introduction of industries, enabling them to expand services wireless internet by young entrepreneurs to those people who have traditionally arriving from Europe and the US – is perhaps lacked access to financial services but the best current example of this. Until that who now own or share a mobile phone. recovery was underway there was a fear that the next generation of Somalis abroad There are many different shades of would forget their roots but migrants are displacement within the Somali territories now returning and are bringing their and different groups have distinct needs children with them, reinforcing a growing and priorities. With stability now returning sense of renewed hope and confidence. across the region, collaborative efforts should There are many challenges still to face be redoubled to boost literacy, training and but if we can maintain the advantage, the employment, and to give not just IDPs but last two years may well be remembered poor communities in general the tools they as the moment the tide finally turned. will need to contribute to the recovery. Abdirashid Duale is CEO of Dahabshiil. By working with NGOs and local government, www.dahabshiil.com He is rated as one of diaspora groups can play an important part the 50 most influential Africans by the Africa in that process. The sheer size and spread Report. For more information please contact of its diaspora have made modern-day [email protected]

Networked governance in Ecuador’s border regions Lana Balyk and Jeff Pugh

In order to improve security for both Colombian forced migrants and Ecuadorians in the communities where they live, an approach that takes advantage of governance networks can allow residents to negotiate access to resources and rights that they otherwise would not be able to enjoy. It can also improve relations between the two groups.

Ecuador’s population of some 135,000 and by international refugee law. Many have Colombian forced migrants who have fled encountered a hostile reception in their new their country of origin since 2000 makes it country; even local officials charged with the the largest recipient of refugees and asylum protection of law, order and human rights seekers in Latin America. In the cities, the sometimes mirror discriminatory attitudes and state is strong and has the resources to behaviour toward Colombians. A UN official protect these people. In the border areas, in Esmeraldas province, in Ecuador’s coastal however, the state presence is very weak. region near the Colombian border, explained the political calculation that local officials Despite Ecuador’s progressive Constitution, in the provinces often have to make: “When which guarantees foreigners the same basic the revenue for a local government does not rights as Ecuadorians, many Colombians add up to the projected levels, naturally they face difficulties in practice in accessing the are not going to be able to adequately serve rights guaranteed them by the Constitution the needs of the entire population, so they 48 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

prioritise those who are going to give votes and already been in Quito for nine political support – meaning Ecuadorians.” years, and upon his arrival she initially assisted him and his Undocumented migrants’ lack of legal family with food, shelter and,

documentation reduces their ability to get even more importantly, good UNHCR/S Aguilar assistance either from the state or from other advice. He immediately met with potential allies. In fact, while the greatest UNHCR to request asylum, and fears of Colombians with documentation is he and his family were granted being harmed by illegal armed groups and refugee status. Over the coming not having sufficient economic resources, months he networked with new undocumented migrants’ fears were directed friends and other refugees, and more toward the state, with deportation and heard about various organisations incarceration being their biggest worries. that assist refugees. From these he received food and assistance The role of networks with living costs. Eduardo Since the government acts both as enforcer worked in various odd jobs of immigration and deportation laws and that he discovered through as the protector of rights and source of his networks. In early 2011 he dispute resolution, migrants frequently and his family were selected feel afraid to seek help from the state. In for resettlement to Canada. response to such practical gaps in the security protection guaranteed by the Constitution By contrast Maria arrived in Quito with and Ecuadorian legislation, many Colombian her husband and three children in 2011 not forced migrants in Ecuador have turned to knowing anyone there, and they have not informal contacts and non-state actors for encountered any helpful networks. They help in accessing protection, negotiating are fearful to make any contacts, and they resources and resolving conflicts with each avoid leaving home because of continued other and with Ecuadorians. The networks threats from Colombian FARC members of personal contacts that forced migrants tap who attacked them shortly after their into can be key to their survival and success arrival in Quito and continue to pursue when they are fearful or do not know how to them. Maria is clearly traumatised by the access rights and resources from the state. encounter and does not trust anyone in their host community, especially not other Since local power brokers and NGOs gain Colombians, as she cannot be sure if they are authority by organising and representing friendly or not. Maria is concerned for her migrants’ interests to the state while providing family’s survival; their search for peace and resources and protection for migrants, their stability is an even more distant aspiration. connections to government and international actors form a governance network that is If organisations that work in cooperation with often more responsive and accessible to non- (or sometimes in place of) the state as part citizens than government agencies alone. The of a governance network play a key role in ability to leverage the full spectrum of non- providing human security and building peace state, informal and state resources available in migrant-receiving communities, what types through the migrant-related governance of interventions have been most successful? networks in Ecuador often represents a key And how can the state, the UN system and factor in Colombians’ success in Ecuador, as the NGO sector incorporate these lessons into illustrated by two contrasting experiences. their programme strategies? The experience of Ecuador shows that cooperative working Eduardo arrived in Quito in 2009 with his relationships among NGOs, UN agencies and two daughters after his wife was a casualty state institutions that deal with migrant-related of the conflict in Colombia. His sister had issues can provide informal or unofficial States of fragility 49 FMR 43 May 2013

working relationships between Ministry officials, UNHCR officers and NGOs that accompanied and ensured the accountability of the process. These NGOs continue to advocate for greater refugee protection and to provide legal assistance to forced migrants going into status determination hearings.

NGO and international actors can complement the state by providing spaces for common action across nationality lines, reducing power inequalities and fear. Network building through personal relationships is important in the Latin American context. Of those Colombians who reported having no interaction at all with Ecuadorians in a survey by CEMPROC, an Ecuadorian NGO, more than two thirds reported having a negative perception of Ecuadorians, and none reported a positive perception. In contrast, more than half of those Colombians A Colombian refugee in northern Ecuador shows his new refugee visa. who had meaningful interaction with In the province of Sucumbios, mobile government registration teams (part of the Enhanced Registration initiative) are completing in a Ecuadorians (through family, in the workplace single day an asylum process that used to take months. or at school) reported having positive perceptions of their citizen counterparts. channels to access basic rights and economic resources for migrants who may not directly If governments, UN agencies and NGOs be able to access them from the state. These actively seek to strengthen governance governance networks also have the potential to networks and carry out adequate public open up institutional spaces to foster tolerance campaigns of diffusion and awareness between Ecuadorians and Colombians. raising, it could lead to more experiences like Eduardo’s and fewer like Maria’s, which Negotiating rights and recognition would increase human security for everyone The Enhanced Registration initiative, a joint in fragile migrant-receiving regions. programme of the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Relations and UNHCR, carried out Lana Balyk [email protected] was a mobile registration throughout the border research associate at the Center for Mediation, provinces in 2009 and 2010, streamlining the Peace, and Resolution of Conflict – International lengthy refugee status determination process (CEMPROC). Jeff Pugh [email protected] and bringing it closer to where many forced is Assistant Professor of Political Science at migrants actually live. This resulted in a Providence College in Rhode Island and Executive doubling of the number of registered refugees Director of CEMPROC. www.cemproc.org with legal documentation in one year. The Enhanced Registration has been praised This article is based on a survey of Colombians internationally as an example of governance living in Quito that was carried out in 2009 networks producing concrete benefits for and 2010 by an NGO based in Ecuador, with forced migrants while also strengthening the the assistance of Emily Ginsberg and Maribel capacity of the state. In addition to increasing Melo. Names have been changed for protection the number of permanent government refugee purposes. A longer version is online at registration offices in the border provinces, www.cemproc.org/CWPSPughBalyk.pdf the initiative also forged close and productive 50 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013 Refugees from Central American gangs Elizabeth G Kennedy

El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are among the world’s most fragile nations, yet they are largely ignored by refugee agencies who underestimate transnational criminal organisations’ abuses and powers of control, while overestimating national governments’ ability and willingness to protect their citizens.

Despite the steady stream of thousands of gang members who often spoke limited fleeing into neighbouring nations, UNHCR’s Spanish and possessed limited skills arrived 2011 data show no internal displacement in in unstable countries barely recovered from the Central American region and only a few the civil wars of the 1970s and 80s. Crime, thousand refugees. Courts in the United States, drug sale and use, and violence increased where most seek asylum, rely on outdated, quickly, and the street gangs spread inaccurate or politically motivated reports their network throughout the region. that document greater ability or willingness of the state to protect its citizens than exists. Today, all three nations are severely challenged 74,449 people from El Salvador, Guatemala by these transnational criminal organisations and Honduras have applied for asylum in (TCOs), which wield considerably more arms, the US since 2007 but only 2,250 applications money and power than each nation’s military. were granted. Furthermore, the US deported Estimates of government officials who are also between 22,000 and 41,000 migrants from on TCOs’ payrolls in these three countries are each of these three nations in 2012 alone. between 40 and 70%. Whole municipalities – and pockets of the federal governments – are Recognition of the Central American crisis controlled by TCOs who mete out education could impose fewer burdens on receiving and justice through bribery, bullets, forced nations like Mexico and the US. Overloaded recruitment of children as young as nine, rape immigration courts spend countless hours and torture. The state, compromised as it is on their cases and then their appeals, with corruption and outnumbered in arms hundreds of new detention centres have as it is by the TCOs, is critically limited in its been opened to house them while they await ability to protect citizens from TCO terror. their verdict1 and millions of dollars are spent on their deportation. Alternatively, if TCOs seek to instil fear of serious and the crisis were acknowledged, resettlement harmful persecution in order to achieve their programmes could be offered to those in desired control. Individuals who express need and receiving nations could plan for fear of such persecution are highly likely refugees’ arrival, introduction into society to be well-founded in doing so, especially and productive citizenship, as was done in because the state’s ability or willingness the 1980s. More importantly, recognising to protect is severely compromised. institutional factors in the region that Surprisingly then, Central Americans are contribute to state fragility would strengthen forcibly repatriated to their countries where Central American asylum applications. they face TCO persecution – a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. In 1996, the US began deporting both citizens and residents who were born elsewhere and To correct current failures and recognise that convicted of a crime, many of whom had people are being returned to persecution, joined gangs in the US’s roughest urban four facts must be acknowledged: neighbourhoods; from 2000 to 2004 alone, more than 20,000 of these were repatriated Fragility can lead to state inability or to Central American nations. This influx unwillingness to protect:2 Using arms States of fragility 51 FMR 43 May 2013

and money, TCOs may exert significant in all three nations. Most children regularly control over such governments through see murder being committed, some have lost threats and bribery, with the effect that a their parents to gang violence and some no government may be unable to protect its longer attend school because gangs actively citizens because of comparatively limited recruit from school grounds. Former child resources; where a government is able, it soldiers in other contexts, forced to join may be unwilling because of widespread national and guerilla armies, have been corruption. Nonetheless, asylum courts have recognised as a particular social group; been generally remiss in not acknowledging forced conscription into transnational gangs TCOs as non-state actors capable of inflicting is no different. Those who flee to avoid actions rising to the level of persecution. conscription into gangs exercise a political Greater weight must be given to the opinion and would be likely to face immediate persecution that non-state actors like TCOs persecution if they were returned. Returned inflict, especially in fragile states, where they or not, their family may face reprisals. may with impunity wield significantly greater ability and willingness to punish and protect Temporary protection status can be used to than the state itself. Some TCOs operate uphold non-refoulement principles when throughout these nations and the region, persecution for reasons of accepted grounds meaning that internal flight alternatives cannot be established: Asylum courts have rarely exist, even though courts sometimes repeatedly found that fear of generalised wrongly speculate or assume otherwise. violence does not meet the standard of persecution or return to torture, even though Persons fleeing crises that have not received such violence may have targeted detrimental international recognition have a right to effects on certain groups, especially children have their asylum cases taken seriously: whose entire courses of life are likely to The flight abroad of citizens of these nations shift. TCOs target returnees because of their may be the best indicator of the extreme perceived increase in wealth or knowledge of risks or persecution they have encountered, gang operations in the US and Mexico. The despite lack of international recognition of effect is that those repatriated are not safe the crises they face. Such large-scale flight and frequently find themselves persecuted may also be considered to be an indicator by state and non-state actors. The US has of state fragility. Yet the refugee regime created Temporary Protection Status for instead punishes them and allows courts Central Americans fleeing natural disasters to deem them simply economic migrants like earthquakes, floods and hurricanes in the in denying their asylum claims. Cases of past two decades but the more pressing issue applicants from as yet unrecognised crisis they face may in fact be targeted violence at situations should be considered just as gangs’ and governments’ hands upon return. seriously as those with a large humanitarian presence or recognised instability.

Children targeted by TCOs are at risk because of their membership of a ‘particular social group’ or their political opinion:3

TCOs in Central America specifically prey UNHCR/M Echandi on children to join their ranks or be killed if they refuse, facilitated by the fact that some 100,000 youth in the region are already gang members. The median age of gang members is just 19. In only the first three months of 2012, 920 children were killed in Honduras and girls as young as nine were gang-raped Honduran family driven out of Honduras by gang persecution, applying for refugee status in the southern Mexican city of Tapachula. 52 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

Unacknowledged fragile states like El Elizabeth G Kennedy [email protected] is a Salvador, Guatemala or Honduras highlight doctoral candidate at San Diego State University at best the lag in response time in refugee and University of California, Santa Barbara and and humanitarian circles and at worst the directs the Youth Empowerment Program in two US geopolitical influences determining who is detention shelters for unaccompanied minors.

allowed to flee and to where. TCOs specifically 1. http://tinyurl.com/USimmigration-detention choose weakened national bases where 2. Importantly for this region, legal definitions of ‘persecution’ and they can exert greater control. Arguably ‘refugee’ are expanded and already recognise this point in the 1984 nations which contribute to situations Cartagena Declaration, 1994 San Jose Declaration, and 2004 Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action. creating flight – for example through large 3. The act of refusing to join a gang, despite mounting pressure, is consumer demand for drugs – should be at the very least neutrality and often a radical act of support responsible for receiving the fleeing citizens. for peace.

Data quality and information management in DRC Janet Ousley and Lara Ho

Forced migration creates special challenges at the time these surveys were key to bringing to collecting data and monitoring responses in attention to the conflict’s devastating impact, fragile states where infrastructure and systems they were also demanding in terms of the time, are weak or non-existent. These states often lack logistics and the technical and financial resources the statistics registries needed to measure the required to conduct them. Nevertheless, the basic demographic information that is essential to mortality surveys did little to directly reinforce the planning when emergencies happen. As key building Congolese state’s ability to measure mortality. blocks in the process of state reconstruction, valid demographic data are required to conduct robust As a result, since 2008, IRC has been helping the needs assessments and to measure and demonstrate Congolese state improve its ability to collect valid progress. When migration takes place, whether demographic information and to measure and forced or otherwise, the poor data from weak state respond to displacement and emergencies. IRC is also systems can become almost unusable, necessitating supporting community-based solutions to strengthen the need for costly external assessments. data quality. Yet, as conflict again erupted in North Kivu in early 2012, many of the Community Health In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Workers included in the data-strengthening project data problems resulting from poor state information were displaced themselves or had the cell phones management have been a persistent issue for years. they used to send data stolen or lost. Months of lost The last nationwide population census in the country data show the weakness of even innovative solutions took place in 1984, before the major conflicts of to improving data collection in fragile states. the 1990s and 2000s, and today’s population figures are often calculated by multiplying this 1984 If states are to escape fragility through the baseline by a 3% growth rate regardless of changes establishment of functional institutions capable in fertility, mortality (conflict-related and otherwise) or of delivering services, good quality data and displacement, resulting in sometimes wildly inaccurate monitoring can help measure changes that result population estimates, and making it extremely from displacement and are therefore important difficult to prepare for or respond to the actual parts of the process. needs of both displaced and stable populations. Janet Ousley [email protected] is a private In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the consultant and was Research, Monitoring and International Rescue Committee (IRC) conducted Evaluation Advisor with the International Rescue a series of nationwide mortality surveys to better Committee (IRC). Lara Ho [email protected] is understand the impact of the wars, which was Health Technical Advisor in the IRC. www.rescue.org at that point grossly underestimated.1 Though 1. www.rescue.org/special-reports/congo-forgotten-crisis States of fragility 53 FMR 43 May 2013 The curious case of North Korea Courtland Robinson

Displacement and distress migration within and outside North Korea may be an indicator of state fragility but a reduction in numbers should not necessarily be read as a sign of improving conditions there. In fact, increased movements might be considered as positive, if they are accompanied by increased protection for refugees, survivors of trafficking, stateless children and other vulnerable populations.

In 2011 the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index While census data and official documents ranked the Democratic People’s Republic of from the DPRK suggest limited movement Korea (DPRK or North Korea) 22nd out of internationally and internally, the unofficial 177 countries, giving it a score of 95.5 out picture is one of a great deal more mobility, of a maximally worst score of 120. This was most of it without authorisation. A study actually an improvement over the DPRK’s in 1998-99 that included nearly 3,000 North previous rankings; indeed, it was the first Korean refugees and migrants in China time the country had dropped out of the suggested a net migration rate of 18.7%, top twenty since the index was begun in with much of the internal movement 2005. This was not due to enhanced state characterised as ‘distress migration’. The legitimacy, an indicator on which North Korea study retrospectively covered a four-year scored a 9.9 out of 10 (worst in the world), period including 1996-97, when the DPRK nor a better human rights record (9.5 out of experienced a severe famine with significant 10). The ‘improvements’ were noted in the malnutrition, a rise in infectious disease indicators of ‘refugees and IDPs’ and ‘human and a dramatic spike in mortality among flight’, where North Korea was grouped all age groups. In the study, more than 30% among states with ‘moderate’ records. of respondents said their main reason for moving out of the household was to “search Though both North Korean refugees and for food”. Large numbers of children displaced IDPs are quite challenging to count, it is by the famine and economic hardship were not numbers alone that should be used to placed in so-called ‘9/27 centres’ (named after convey improvement or decline in their the date of their establishment by government situation, as opposed to the fragility of the decree to aid those “wandering for food”). North Korean state. The unique physical and political geography of North Korea is This displacement occurred within the shaped within by a regime bent on checking territory of a state that has displayed a long- internal and external migration, as it is shaped standing disregard for human rights and externally by China to the north, that seeks the international relief agencies currently to suppress cross-border movement and deny involved had no clear mandate (or means) refugee protection to those who flee, and by to address such concerns. Natural disaster South Korea to the south, whose cautious seems to be the only form of displacement commitments stem in equal parts from a that may be discussed openly. desire to help its suffering kin to the north and a fear of a dangerous, destabilising exodus. International migration The result is a curious case where the ordinary While migration of Koreans into north- measures of increased internal or external east China dates back to at least the 1880s, exodus are no longer reliable as indicators of the more recent surge in cross-border greater fragility or propensity to fail. In North movements began in the mid-1990s but Korea, when seeking to interpret the meaning did not peak until 1998. Since then, North of displacement, the problem of absence Koreans have been crossing into China, does not mean the absence of problem. seeking to escape food shortages, economic 54 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

hardship and state repression in their own arrivals of North Koreans into China to a country. Most of these North Koreans trickle for several months in 2012. North have left without documentation or travel Korean entries into South Korea totalled authorisation. Given their undocumented only 1,500 in 2012, down from 2,700 in 2011. status and the repressive nature of the DPRK, Since movements to South Korea began in these North Koreans have been labelled as earnest in 2002, about 24,500 North Koreans refugees and asylum seekers by those who have settled in the South. It would be a sign seek their protection. Conversely, they are of improving North-South relations and called illegal migrants by both the Chinese – with the exception of a massive exodus and the North Korean governments. in the context of war, natural disaster or regime collapse – might be a possible sign of From 1999 to 2008, we worked with local improved conditions inside North Korea if and international partners to monitor there were an increase in the outflow of North movements of North Koreans crossing into Koreans to South Korea and other countries. China. Key trends over the years included an obvious seasonal spike in arrivals during Conclusions and recommendations the winter months when food and fuel The declining numbers of North Korean were scarce in North Korea and security refugees, migrants and asylum seekers in might have been relatively more relaxed China cannot be interpreted as a sign of on both sides of the border, and an overall improving conditions in the DPRK but, at (nearly ten-fold) decline in the number of best, as evidence of constrained migration arrivals over the period from 1998 to 2008. options and, at worst, as a cynical effort by both states to suppress the right to leave one’s It is fairly clear that there was a dramatic country and to seek and enjoy asylum in decline in the North Korean population in another. The growing proportion of women north-east China, from around 75,000 refugees among the remaining North Koreans and and migrants in 1998 to around 10,000 by the growing number of children born to 2009. Reasons for the declining refugee these women and their Chinese husbands population have little to do with improved or partners point to a need to broaden circumstances in North Korea. More than a the protection focus for displaced North decade after the famine, hardships continue Koreans to include measures to protect for the North Korean people in the form against human trafficking and promote of continued human rights abuse, chronic durable solutions for stateless children. food insecurity, a moribund economy and periodic natural disasters. The declining UNHCR has declared all North Koreans in refugee population has instead much China to be ‘persons of concern’, although more to do with tightened border security, China does not recognise North Koreans’ increased migration to South Korea and claims to asylum as valid. Indeed, in March other countries, and a growing knowledge 2012, a Chinese official reiterated that that there are clear limits to protection and “these North Koreans are not refugees but livelihood opportunities in China. China rather they have entered China illegally is signatory to the 1951 Convention but has for economic reasons… China is opposed introduced no implementing legislation to the attempt to turn the issue into a nor do its policies acknowledge North political and international subject.” Koreans as entitled to refugee protection under either national or international law. North Korea might be encouraged to initiate something like an Orderly Departure Program In the leadership transition following the (ODP), similar to the multilateral programme death of Kim Jung-il in December 2011, begun in Vietnam in 1979 to permit safe and tightened security on both sides of the orderly exodus of populations seeking to border contributed to reducing cross-border leave. It would be in North Korea’s interests States of fragility 55 FMR 43 May 2013

to permit households with motives of family shelter, asylum, family formation, family reunification, labour and economic betterment, reunification, labour/livelihood and more. or simply survival, to leave without risk of The problem is that the discussion of this penalty to themselves or their family members migration – and the policy/programme left behind. options that either are or should be available – has been dominated almost exclusively by the A practical, and perhaps even productive, question whether they are or are not refugees. approach to North Korean migration must begin by framing an understanding of Courtland Robinson [email protected] population mobility within and outside the is a core faculty member at the Center for country as something more than a simple Refugee and Disaster Response, Johns threat to stability. The migration of North Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Koreans in the last two decades has always www.jhsph.edu encompassed a mix of motives: food, health,

Was establishing new institutions in Iraq to deal with displacement a good idea? Peter Van der Auweraert

The humanitarian, developmental and political consequences of decades of mass forced migration are part of the legacy that the current political leaders of Iraq need to address. For this they need the right institutions if they are to be successful in guiding their country towards a more peaceful and stable future.

Iraq has had a long and painful history of country, mostly to neighbouring states. forced migration. In the past decade alone, This third wave subsided alongside the it has been the scene of at least four distinct diminishing threat of an all-out civil war waves of displacement and return. The in Iraq but even today members of Iraq’s first wave occurred shortly after the Ba’ath small minorities reportedly continue to party’s fall from power with the return of an feel the urge to leave a country where they estimated 500,000 Iraqis in the period between feel less and less at home. Currently the March 2003 and December 2005. While this Syrian conflict is pushing Iraqi refugees return movement was, in essence, a largely to return to Iraq where they often have positive ‘regime-change dividend’, it did few or no assets left and thus, in essence, create a set of challenges that Iraq continues to become displaced in their own country. struggle with today. The second wave of the post-Saddam Hussein population movement Taken together, these large-scale population was mostly made up of those who feared that movements posed, and continue to pose, their real or perceived association with his considerable strains on Iraqi state institutions regime would cause them harm and those responsible for the provision of basic services who were forced to flee by the returnees such as health, education, water, sanitation and, in some cases, their armed backers. and electricity. They also raised a set of particular issues that, at the time, existing The largest displacement crisis, however, institutions and legal and policy frameworks occurred between February 2006 and late were not well equipped to deal with. These 2007 when out-of-control sectarian violence included, for example, the widespread caused 1.6 million Iraqis to become internally occupation of public buildings and land, displaced and a similar number to flee the largely by those with nowhere else to go; the 56 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

emergence of a large number of land and often ill-thought-out interventions of the property conflicts related to displacement Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that and return; and the need to integrate new cost the Iraqi state its monopoly on the populations in both national and local use of violence further contributed to a development plans and policies to upgrade context where even ordinary governance and to expand Iraq’s insufficient housing was becoming a massive challenge, let stock. Critically, these new demands came alone dealing with the fall-out of multiple, at a moment in Iraq’s history when decades ongoing waves of displacement and return. of neglect, mis-management, sanctions and conflict had turned its state institutions from New state institutions being a model for quality and effectiveness in It is against this background of prevailing the Middle East to being deeply flawed and state fragility that the CPA decided to structurally deficient. This decline commenced establish two new institutions to deal with in the 1980s as a direct consequence of mass displacement and its consequences. the Iran-Iraq war and became further Both institutions were endorsed and further pronounced in the 1990s following Iraq’s developed by subsequent Iraqi governments. invasion of Kuwait, the ensuing imposition In Iraq there is now a dedicated Ministry of of international sanctions and Saddam Displacement and Migration (MoDM) with Hussein’s continued diversion of state funds. a broad mandate to deal with all matters pertaining to Iraqi refugees and IDPs and The initial period following the US-led to develop and implement appropriate invasion of the country in 2003 further policies to assist the affected persons. accelerated the decline, with waves of unchecked looting that gutted much of the The second new institution was the national already decaying physical infrastructure of Property Claims Commission (PCC) to resolve public administration, the flight of the Ba’ath claims from displaced Iraqis whose properties Party cadres that created a leadership vacuum had been seized or confiscated under the in many institutions and the departure from Ba’ath party regime. Both institutions have Iraq of many professionals in the period developed a sizeable presence across the between 2005 and 2007. The sweeping and country and are now an established part of the institutional landscape in Iraq. The MoDM’s principal roles include the national registration of IDPs and the provision of assistance and cash grants UNHCR/H Caux to displaced and returning families, most recently to Iraqi refugees forced to return to Iraq by the violence in Syria. To date, the PCC has resolved well over half of the 160,000 claims it has received, although with resolution rates strongly differing around the country.

Throughout their existence, both of these institutions have been subject to considerable criticism inside and outside Iraq, usually focusing on shortcomings in effectiveness, A young IDP feeds his pigeons in Resafa district of Baghdad. “I don’t go to school and there is no job for me here.” States of fragility 57 FMR 43 May 2013

efficiency and, ultimately, sensitivity and protocols or focal points for collaboration responsiveness towards the needs of the between new and existing institutions further displaced and returnee populations alike. complicated the integration of the MoDM It is clear with hindsight that some at least and the PCC into the ordinary Iraqi state of the complaints of beneficiaries and apparatus. Finally, the fact that decision- decision-makers were directly connected makers had under-estimated the extent to the newness of both institutions. to which pre-existing state institutions would also have to deal with displacement The initial real and perceived failures to and its consequences, and hence at least deliver were largely due to the time and initially failed to provide those institutions energy that both institutions needed to spend with additional resources for this purpose, on becoming fully operational. Inevitably for further contributed to their reluctance to institutions that try to establish themselves engage with the issue of displacement and, in the midst of political instability and by extension, the MoMD and the PCC. turmoil, significant staff resources were initially allocated to internal administrative To what extent the Iraqi response to issues, like securing office space, hiring and displacement and return would have been training staff, developing standard operating different if the CPA and the subsequent rules and procedures and, indeed, simply Iraqi governments had not chosen to create figuring out how best to operationalise new institutions is of course speculation. the mandates they had received. From the The experience of the MoDM and the outside these efforts often remained invisible, PCC is, however, useful also beyond Iraq and soon incomprehension and frustration in that it can provide policymakers with about the lack of progress started to mount valuable lessons about the advantages and amongst beneficiaries and politicians disadvantages that come with addressing alike. Already struggling under unrealistic large-scale forced migration and its aftermath expectations, the PCC, for example, suffered through new rather than existing institutions. a serious legitimacy crisis a few years It brings home the point that attempting into its existence. Eventually, this led to to bypass fragility and governance issues an amendment to the law which in reality in existing state agencies through the changed little but caused the institution to establishment of new ones invariably also lose further time and energy adapting internal entails costs and downsides. As much as practices to the new legal framework. possible, both the benefits and the costs that can come from investing in new Another element that very much hindered institutions need to be weighed up before both institutions in their first years of implementation and integrated in decision- existence was the reaction from other making about the best way forward. much longer-established governmental agencies and authorities that the MoDM and An additional notoriously complex issue especially the PCC needed to rely on for their is sustainability and whether a new work. Concerned about the national and institution dedicated to displacement is international resources and attention these likely to remain alive until it has effectively new institutions were getting, and convinced completed its work for all those affected by that those resources would have been better displacement. In Iraq the jury is still out. spent on reinforcing existing institutions to do the same work, they tended at best to be Peter Van der Auweraert is Head of the reluctant to cooperate and at worst to behave Land, Property and Reparations Division in in a downright obstructionist manner. A the International Organization for Migration. lack of understanding about what the MoDM [email protected] and the PCC were supposed to achieve www.iom.int and the mundane absence of specific rules, 58 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013 Displacement in a fragile Iraq Ali A K Ali

The post-Saddam Iraqi state enjoys only limited support from the population, excludes significant sections of its people from power, suppresses the opposition and does not protect citizens from arbitrary arrests, and corruption is rampant. There is a direct relationship between these failures and displacement in Iraq.

It was no surprise that the ‘new’ Iraqi state Palestinians was an example of a fragile that emerged from the wreckage after the state attempting to show its strength by invasion of 2003 was fragile, with serious targetting a group that could not fight back. implications for human security and displacement which are still felt today by Fragile states are more prone to the fracturing Iraqi society. Obvious drivers of displacement effects of the privatisation of violence in Iraq are the threats to life and health which and these have serious repercussions for come from general insecurity, arbitrary human security and displacement. With detention and poor service provision. Life the fragmentation of the instruments of becomes unbearably difficult and dangerous coercion the state lost both physical control in such environments, resulting in decisions over territory and the allegiance of the to leave. Less obvious a driver of displacement population.1 Paramilitary groups flourished in are actions intended to strengthen the state the absence of legitimate state authority and a but which target vulnerable groups in disintegrative cycle set in, further weakening society in such a way that those targetted the state in relation to private military experience a process of increasing constraint groups. Some of these groups infiltrated state upon their daily lives and sometimes institutions and aspired to seize control of threats to their physical safety. These the state. Their activities transformed the pressures forced many Iraqis to migrate. spaces in people’s daily lives in threatening ways, prompting decisions to leave. Early victims of such predatory actions were those perceived – rightly or wrongly – to be For example, members of the Mehdi Army associated with the old order. Some Iraqis militia infiltrated the newly formed Iraqi with ID cards identifying them as residents police. The militia forced many Baghdadis of sites of resistance to the new order were from their residences with the threat of punished. An Iraqi student I interviewed violence, it housed families displaced by said that students in his school had their opposing militias in the forcibly vacated grades docked because their family names homes, it attacked grocers and bakers in order identified them as originating from such to force target populations to flee to other areas. The effects of a fragile state exercising neighbourhoods – so that militia members collective punishment threatened the could pillage homes and re-populate areas educational and livelihood opportunities with people loyal to them. These were of specific sections of Iraqi youth. manifestations of the fragility of the state in Iraqis’ daily lives. They threatened human Palestinian refugees who had been living in security and prompted displacement. Iraq for decades had their residency revoked and were re-categorised as foreigners. The There are further effects of these dynamics idea was spread that Palestinian refugees with significance for displacement. Migration were responsible for terrorism against the affects the context in which future migration Iraqi people and attacks on Palestinians decisions are made.2 When members of increased, compelling many of them to kinship and other networks leave, this leave Iraq. The campaign against the depletes the psychological and social States of fragility 59 FMR 43 May 2013

resources of those left behind. The depletion Too many governments perceive – or of kinship networks contributes to the process rather present – refugees as threats to their of displacement as it reduces the support and sovereignty. These governments should coping capabilities available to those who remember that fragile states will almost remain. In a society in which the integrity of certainly produce refugees and IDPs and that the family unit is so highly valued, those who states do not exist in a vacuum. The weakest are left behind are in turn then more likely of states can survive with the support of the to migrate. Many Iraqis who had not initially international community and strong states decided to leave were soon compelled to do can crumble if the international community so in order to rejoin other family members. invites destructive processes.4 Governments The burden of living in isolation from them should avoid imposing destructive processes in a failing state was too high a price to pay. on states if they wish to reduce the production of refugees which they uniformly seem to fear. The Mandaeans – an ancient monotheistic sect – found that they could no longer practise Ali A K Ali [email protected] is a Post-doctoral in public the distinctive rituals essential Research Officer in the Department for to their identity as a community for fear of International Development at the London School being shot at. Their priests were attacked, of Economics. His PhD research was supported as were members of their community more by the British Institute for the Study of Iraq and generally. The fragile Iraqi state failed to the AHRC.

protect them. Some believed it was unwilling 1. See also Mary Kaldor New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a to do so because they were not Muslims. Global Era, Cambridge: Polity Press 2012. The scattering of Iraq’s Mandaeans across 2. See also Douglas Massey ‘Social Structure, Household Strategies, the world has intensified since 2003; their and the Cumulative Causation of Migration’ Population Index Vol 56, No 1 (Spring, 1990) www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/3644186 faith forbids them from marrying and 3. See Ali A K Ali ‘Displacement and statecraft in Iraq: Recent procreating outside their community and trends, older roots’, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi thus displacement and dispersal represent an Studies Vol 5, No 2, 2011 http://tinyurl.com/AliAKAli-IJCIS2011 existential threat to this ancient community.3 4. See also Zolberg et al Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World, New York: OUP 1989. A Mandaean priest performs a baptism. Ali 60 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013 Psychiatric treatment with people displaced in or from fragile states Verity Buckley

A fragile state is not an ideal environment for any professional to work within – psychiatric, medical or otherwise. Psychiatrists working to assess psychological distress and mental health in fragile states, or with refugees from fragile states, need to adopt flexible approaches.

The instability and uncertainty usually is unknown whether the same success rates found in fragile states create a breeding can be repeated elsewhere. In spite of this, ground for psychological problems and short-term interventions may be the best way mental health issues, as well as risk of forward as they will empower the individual physical harm. Individuals that live in such and give them tools to help themselves environments are more likely to experience if psychiatrists are no longer present. trauma on a scale not otherwise known by the rest of the world. When deciding how Many attempts have been made to design best to adjust practice and treatment when psychiatric assessment questionnaires and working with those from fragile states, the scales that are sensitive to different cultures psychiatric community must be able to and that include colloquial terminology examine many aspects of the environment and phrasing. Unfortunately, when a team surrounding that particular social group. is dispatched in an emergency situation, the likelihood of obtaining an already The circumstances under which the validated set of assessment tools is low. psychiatrist is operating may well dictate what This is a considerable barrier for psychiatric work can be delivered. Teams of researchers professionals to overcome. Bringing an and psychiatrists often descend to determine additional person into the assessment or the levels of psychological distress and look at treatment stages to act as translator may mental health issues and can be faced with a cause confidentiality issues but alternative range of restrictions including general health options are limited. The use of local treatment limitations, inability to adopt a bilingual professionals and volunteers may multidisciplinary approach and reduced help psychiatrists assess which diagnostic access to psychotropic medication and other tools will be efficient, and they may even drugs. Traditional methodologies therefore be involved in the treatment process. need to be adjusted in this environment, first of all by taking into consideration which Every psychiatrist must be able to provide treatment plans can realistically be considered. care that is free from discrimination of any kind; the psychiatric community Within refugee camps or safety zones with may, however, hold preconceptions about basic living conditions and little apparent certain social groups. It has been noted, governance or control, violence can occur for example, that the role of women during without warning, services may be attacked times of conflict has been described almost or cut off from outside assistance, political exclusively in relation to victim status. and economic disruption may occur and Although women are at a higher risk of governmental policy could change at any time. being the targets of persecution and acts Although short-term and intensive cognitive of violence, the psychiatrist could be at behavioural therapy sessions – usually used risk of viewing all female patients as once the immediate distress of the patient victims, and not, as was the case during has been alleviated – have been successful the 1994 Rwandan genocide for example, within Western and refugee populations, it as perpetrators, instigators or bystanders. States of fragility 61 FMR 43 May 2013

Cultural interpretation and understanding could be left with limited or a complete Psychiatrists may not be able to view such lack of professional psychiatric support. vulnerable groups outside their own, traditional and often Western points of view. Rather than simply delivering treatment, The structure of family units, gender roles the psychiatric community should look at and class systems differ with every culture, alternative approaches. While current research and are also more likely to be going through is calling for more long-term treatment a state of flux within fragile states. All these approaches in these settings, it perhaps should factors may lead psychiatrists to misinterpret not be delivered by international psychiatrists; symptoms or make incorrect assumptions local NGOs and professionals could instead be regarding their causes. Traditional treatment trained in psychological care. This way, when methods should be adapted; for example, external organisations leave, treatment and children and adolescents may not benefit psychiatric care can continue where needed. from therapy designed for their age groups as they face living situations that are drastically Working with people displaced from different from those of Western children and fragile states children living in stable environments. Although many of the above factors are still relevant issues for psychiatrists operating People in fragile states may have their own, outside a fragile state, new obstacles arise often supernatural, explanations for common when those who are displaced seek refuge and symptoms. These may be similar to those psychiatric treatment in a different country. experienced by Western civilian populations (e.g. headaches, chest pain or disturbed Having experienced maybe long and often sleep patterns) but are instead associated dangerous journeys to a place of refuge, with illnesses not formally recognised by individuals are then likely to enter the psychiatric professionals. Patients should asylum process where they face further not be discouraged from using more holistic anxiety and uncertainty regarding their and local traditional methods if they so future. The psychiatrist who treats patients wish, as long as they do not clash with the at this stage faces many practical issues treatment provided by the psychiatrist; this even before assessment can begin. Medical will help preserve their identity and cultural histories may either be inaccessible or non- attachments as well as boosting morale. existent. There are likely to be social barriers between the psychiatrist and the patient, Psychiatrists may also have to refer back even more so than if the psychiatrist were to basic psychological theories such as operating within the fragile state itself. The Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs which requires psychiatrist is less likely to speak the language that, before the psychiatrist begins to treat of the patient, and may have a limited problems such as depression, anxiety and understanding about – and no easy way to possible post-traumatic stress disorder, find out about – the history and culture of they must first be able to ensure that the the fragile state from which the patient has patient’s basic needs are being met.1 fled. This will cause difficulty when trying to build a picture of the patient’s history and The psychiatric community must be past experiences, as well as when analysing sensitive to the difficult working conditions; symptoms and making formal diagnoses. traditional ways of operating and conducting treatment may not be efficient. Emphasis This period of uncertainty for the patient should be placed on multidisciplinary may coincide with difficulty in meeting approaches even although achieving basic physical needs that are higher up in this within fragmented societies will be Maslow’s Hierarchy and thus are still a difficult. Following up on patients could priority. The patient may also be experiencing be rendered impossible, and individuals psychological disturbances as a result of 62 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

external events which the psychiatrist has Not every psychiatrist will have the social little awareness of or understanding about, or practical tools readily available to deal and that may not be easily addressed in the with such problems; they should instead course of treatment that is delivered. For be encouraged to signpost the patient example, some asylum seekers and refugees to partnering organisations and service are uncertain about the fate of their loved providers such as social services, community ones, and may fear that harm or injury has centres and help groups. What the wider befallen their family in their home country. psychiatric community can provide, however, They may have pressure on them to provide is basic training and skills that can be used for those that have been left behind, and may when assessing and treating individuals be unaware of current events in the country from backgrounds such as these. People that they came from. The fact that they have coming from fragile states are more likely no control over their return to their home to have experienced or witnessed an act of country, whether it is wanted or not, can violence or traumatic event. Patients may be make the person feel as though they are in a reluctant to divulge information regarding state of limbo, with no control over their fate. events such as these; therefore extensive notes formed by other professionals as part The psychiatrist may not be given a definite of a multidisciplinary and collaborative period of time to work with their patients, approach could be extremely useful. and instead may have to adopt more intensive treatment models. Although it Conclusion is difficult to prepare for such changes, Whatever the context, the decision over better communication across multiple whether to address short-term or long- disciplines and organisations handling each term needs of those from or displaced case could reduce the risk of increasing within fragile states may prove the most psychological distress in the future. If a difficult for the individual psychiatrist. psychiatrist working with a refugee during While organisations both within low- to the asylum process, for example, is able middle-income countries and developed to build up an extensive medical history Western contexts roll out psychological of the patient, as well as making a formal care on a mass scale, a more structured diagnosis and treatment plan, and if the and tailored approach is essential when patient’s application is successful, these working with patients from fragile states. notes could be passed on to the appropriate authorities such as general and mental Amidst the instability there is a great health service providers, as well as local opportunity for the wider international housing authorities or social services. psychiatric community to learn and grow. Western-based psychiatric research is Once the displaced individual has found very limited in its scope and may only a stable form of refuge and has begun be applicable to those living within the resettlement, psychiatric care can move into contexts from which theories were derived. a different stage. Problems that affect the By working with individuals outside these general population will now begin to affect contexts, psychiatrists are able to develop the displaced individual. These will be on a view on how robust these theories top of other problems such as integration into really are and whether or not they can society, learning a new language, dealing be generalised to other communities. with past traumatic events, uncertainty about the safety of loved ones back home and Knowledge is being gained about folk regaining a social status similar to that they illnesses, differences in symptomatology, achieved in their home country; all of these treatment methods and the effects that culture issues have been found to cause additional has on the way psychiatric illness is perceived. psychological distress in refugee populations. This knowledge is allowing the field of States of fragility 63 FMR 43 May 2013

psychiatry to become more relevant and and be enabled to provide assistance to reliable; it is also highlighting the malleability those affected by the realities of living in of current models and commonly held beliefs or coming from fragile states in conflict. about the nature of the human psyche. By taking on a more collaborative approach, the Verity Buckley [email protected] is a international psychiatric community will PhD student at King’s College, London.

be able to take these developments further 1. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maslow’s_hierarchy_of_needs State fragility, displacement and development interventions Yonatan Araya The development approach to displacement brings advantages not only in addressing the needs of refugees, IDPs and host communities but also in helping societies tackle the underlying aspects of fragility that may have caused the displacement.

The absence of capable and legitimate most vulnerable to violence and instability. institutions in a country exposes citizens to In fragile situations, however, the state is human rights abuses, criminal violence and not the only actor; in some cases it may not persecution, all of which are recognised, even be the most powerful actor. Although explicitly or implicitly, both as direct causes some elements of fragility emanate from the of displacement and as signs of fragility.1 state, others are deeply rooted in societal The combination of exposure to internal dynamics — the way individuals and and external stresses and the strength of groups interact, including the relationships a country’s ‘immune system’ (the social between groups in society and the state. capability for coping with stress embodied Therefore, fragility should not be viewed in legitimate institutions) will determine as only a problem of state capacity. how fragile the country is. The stresses could be either security-related – legacies The areas hosting the displaced are often of violence and trauma, external invasion, affected by conflict and displacement, and external support for domestic rebels, cross- host communities and areas often do not border conflict spillovers, transnational have the institutional capacity to deliver terrorism and international criminal or manage the delivery of the necessary networks; or justice-related – human rights protection and assistance to the displaced. abuses, real or perceived discrimination, and For instance, in Mogadishu, Somalia, the ethnic, religious or regional competition; or failure of state institutions to work with economic in nature – youth unemployment, the various national and international corruption, rapid urbanisation, price shocks actors that are providing assistance to IDPs and climate change. Some of these stresses has led to IDP camps being controlled by (such as youth unemployment, price shocks, ‘gatekeepers’ connected to local powerbrokers poorly managed natural resource wealth who regularly demand as ‘rent’ a portion and corruption) could indirectly lead to of the international aid the IDPs receive. people becoming refugees or IDPs. Conflict and fragility also hinder the pursuit The existence of such stresses alone does of durable solutions for displaced populations. not lead to violence or conflict. Countries Fragility undermines durable solutions, or regions with the weakest institutions are in particular voluntary repatriation, in the least able to withstand and respond to various ways. First, the fragility of areas internal and external stresses and are the of origin, the main cause of displacement 64 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013

in the first place, makes the whole idea of What determines the impact of the presence return unattractive to the displaced and to of displaced people is how displacement is the institutions providing assistance. Even if managed to mitigate the negative impacts the areas of return are considered to be safe and build on the positive impacts. and free of conflict or violence, the absence of capable and legitimate institutions still These dimensions of the fragility- makes it harder for the returnees to be self- displacement nexus underscore the strong dependent. If the institutions in the areas need for better synergies between efforts to which people may return fail to properly to address fragility and the international manage land and property disputes, the responses to forced migration. To break cycles returnees will find it difficult to restore their of insecurity and to reduce the risk of their livelihoods or find shelter. And the absence of recurrence, national reformers and their strong and capable institutions that address international partners should build legitimate issues of discrimination and marginalisation institutions that can provide sustained levels prevents the returnees from effectively of citizen security, justice and jobs. The pursuing income-generating activities and process of building institutions is commonly getting access to the services they need. subject to setbacks, and in any case building institutions is a slow process. Even the fastest- How does displacement affect state fragility? transforming countries have taken between Neglected or poorly managed displacement, 15 and 30 years to raise their institutional particularly protracted displacement, can performance from that of a fragile state to exacerbate situations of conflict and fragility. that of a state with functioning institutions. Cross-border conflict spillovers – with accompanying refugee flows – are among The difficulty and the slow pace of the security-related stress factors that lead transforming institutions mean that there to fragility. The influx of refugees into the is a need to restore local confidence in Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire, as it collective action before embarking on a wider then was) after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda institutional transformation. Confidence is often cited as one of the factors that has building is essential because low trust means contributed to the conflict there. The influx that stakeholders who need to contribute of displaced persons often overwhelms the political, financial or technical support institutional capacity of host communities. will not collaborate until they believe that In addition to putting a strain on weak a positive outcome is possible. Confidence institutions, displacement can cause or building includes signalling a real break exacerbate difficult relations between the with the past – for example, ending political displaced and the host communities. or economic exclusion of marginalised groups, corruption or human rights abuses, It should be noted, however, that the presence all of which are causes of displacement. of refugees and IDPs does not necessarily Just as violence begets violence, so efforts to lead to negative outcomes; it could also build confidence and transform institutions lead to positive outcomes. For instance, the typically follow a positive spiral. In this presence of Rwandan refugees in Tanzania regard, carefully tailored development has led to increased demand for agricultural interventions addressing displacement have products produced by Tanzanian farmers. been useful. For instance, the provision Anecdotal evidence suggests that, on average, of housing services to Rwandan IDPs and farmers doubled the size of their cultivated cash transfer payments for IDPs in Timor- land and their production of bananas and Leste have been used to signify the state’s beans during the period 1993-96. In Kenya, concern for the victims of violence or those the presence of a large number of refugees previously excluded from state services. in the Dadaab area has increased economic Such interventions foster the participation opportunities for the local communities. of excluded groups or areas in economic States of fragility 65 FMR 43 May 2013

and political decision-making, enabling deliver citizen security, justice and jobs in them to benefit from development assistance areas affected by displacement. If designed and signaling a real break with the past. and implemented properly, development interventions designed to improve the A development approach to displacement livelihoods of the displaced and the host The international response to displacement communities could contribute to building has predominantly been humanitarian in institutions by addressing for example nature. Humanitarian interventions, while discriminatory laws that restrict the right extremely useful in saving lives during to work and the freedom of movement of emergencies, are not tailored to the needs the displaced. Similarly, efforts to restore of the majority of the world’s refugees and land, housing and property that belonged IDPs, who are in protracted displacement to the displaced are useful in building situations which have moved beyond the institutions delivering justice. Efforts initial emergency phase but for whom to improve service delivery invariably solutions do not exist in the foreseeable future. contribute to improving the institutions that Too often, international attention begins to deliver citizen security and rule of law. fade after the initial emergency phase, and long-term support becomes less predictable as Efforts to address marginalisation and displacement situations become protracted. human rights abuses will not only improve In these situations, the challenge is often the lives of refugees and IDPs but also developmental rather than humanitarian contribute to addressing fragility by building in nature. The development challenges of confidence. Taking a development approach protracted displacement situations include the to displacement will improve the lives of the re-establishment of livelihoods, the equitable displaced and host communities and facilitate delivery of services and accountable and the pursuit of durable solutions. It will also responsive governance, which is critical to allow societies to mitigate the negative ensuring that issues affecting the displaced impacts of displacement and capitalise on the are resolved in ways that are viewed as positive impacts. The utility of a development legitimate both by the displaced and by host approach to forced displacement goes beyond communities. In situations of return, the addressing the needs of the displaced. It is also restoration of land, housing and property is useful in addressing conflict and fragility by also a major challenge that requires immediate contributing to efforts to build the institutions attention if the return of the displaced is to that provide citizen security, justice and jobs lead to a durable solution to displacement. and by building confidence. The focus on building institutions will also contribute to By creating better synergies between efforts preventing future incidences of displacement. to address fragility and efforts to address Yonatan Araya [email protected] is a displacement, the development approach is Consultant in the World Bank. Views expressed better suited to addressing the spillover effects in this article are the author’s and do not – including refugee flows – from neighbouring necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank. countries’ conflicts, one of the external stress www.worldbank.org factors overwhelming weak institutions. A development approach to displacement means The discussion on fragility is informed by two contributing to building institutions that help recent World Bank publications on the topic: The mitigate the stresses caused by large-scale World Development Report: Conflict, Security displacement and is useful in building on or and Development (2011) and Societal Dynamics taking advantage of the positive impacts. and Fragility (2013). 1. For example in the African Union Convention for the Protection Compared to humanitarian interventions, and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific the development approach to displacement Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, and the 1984 Cartagena is better suited to building institutions that Declaration on Refugees. 66 General articles FMR 43 May 2013 Crisis in Lebanon: camps for Syrian refugees? Jeremy Loveless

Lebanon has absorbed the enormous Syrian influx but at a high cost ot both refugees and Lebanese populations. Current humanitarian programmes can no longer cope and new approaches are needed.

At the end of April 2013, according to frequently no windows, doors or sanitary UNHCR data, there were 445,000 Syrian facilities. In many of these areas temperatures refugees in Lebanon, including both those fall well below freezing in the winter. Some who are registered and those waiting aid agencies are running programmes to to be registered. There are also many seal these dwellings by covering windows, thousands of refugees who have not tried fixing doors, etc. This takes time and to register. Government of Lebanon and is expensive, as each building must be UN projections estimate that there will be identified and renovated individually. one million Syrian refugees in Lebanon by the end of 2013. Lebanon’s population There are very few opportunities for is approximately 4.2 million. Based on the employment, so many refugees resort to official numbers alone, Syrian refugees make desperate measures to cover their costs. up 10% of the population already and by These include prostitution, early marriage, the end of the year this will rise to 20%. begging and working for exploitative wages. The World Food Programme is implementing The Government of Lebanon has, in many a large-scale food voucher programme and respects, pursued an admirable policy. other organisations are providing household Borders have remained open. Refugees items and cash support. Some agencies have been allowed to settle where they like manage work creation and training schemes. and they are allowed to work. Camps have However, even before the crisis, employment been prohibited and refugees have settled in the refugee-hosting areas was hard to within communities. The approach has been applauded by the international community.

However, it comes at a cost. Refugees are concentrated in some of the poorest parts of the country. Sudden expansion of the labour pool has pushed down wages for Lebanese and Syrians alike. Education and health services that were inadequate before are now further stretched. All available housing is full or over-full and refugees are setting up unsanitary shanty settlements. There is a perception that international assistance is going only to refugees. Tension between refugees and Lebanese communities is rising.

On arrival in Lebanon most refugees rent private dwellings (paid from their savings or, for the lucky few, by relatives or charities). Thousands live in unfinished buildings. These buildings accord minimum protection against the elements: a roof and walls but Tents in the grounds of a mosque provide shelter for Syrian refugee families in Lebanon. General articles 67 FMR 43 May 2013

come by. Now business opportunities have Camps: forbidden but inevitable decreased and the number of residents has It is important to state that none of the increased massively; in some areas it is policymakers in Lebanon favours camps estimated that there are more refugees than as a first or even a second resort. The residents. With the best will (and practice) government has forbidden camps, a policy in the world, it is inconceivable that income- strongly supported by UNHCR. All agree generation programmes will help more that, given the choice, it is better for refugees than a tiny proportion of the refugees. to be integrated within communities.

Many people’s savings are exhausted. They One of the most compelling arguments move onto the streets in the towns or into against camps is that they take away refugees’ the shanty settlements that are springing opportunity to manage their own lives. up all over the Beka’a Valley and the north. However, it is inconceivable that enough jobs UNHCR has estimated that there are 240 could be generated to provide sustainable informal settlements in the Beka’a alone, livelihoods for a meaningful proportion of the ranging in size from less than 10 tents to more refugee population and in these circumstances than 100. The settlements receive little aid refugees have little opportunity to control (because of lack of capacity rather than lack their lives. Inevitably refugees will be of will). They are unsanitary. With summer dependent on some form of welfare support approaching (and temperatures possibly for the duration of their stay in Lebanon. nearing 40˚C) health problems are inevitable There is little social connection between the and there is a real danger of epidemic disease. shanty settlements and local communities.

If the system is unable to cope with the The fact is that camps – in some guise or other current refugee in-flows, what will happen – are inevitable. This has been recognised by if the feared and much talked-about some government ministers, who have made “mass influx” occurs? This is a scenario in public personal pronouncements to that effect. which hundreds of thousands of people Camps can accommodate large numbers arrive in Lebanon over the course of a few of people and can be constructed relatively days. Such a scenario quickly once land has been identified. This is entirely plausible. It last point is important as Lebanon is a small could occur if fighting country and there is not much vacant land. in Damascus intensifies, Land-owners must agree to lease their land forcing whole sectors of and communities have opinions about the the city to evacuate, or if establishment of camps in their vicinity. Jordan were to close its borders, reducing people’s There is also the issue of cost. We often hear options for escape. that it is more expensive to accommodate refugees in camps than in the community but The current approach – the current approach is expensive. The direct renovating individual costs of rent, food, heating, health care and shelters, subsidising all the other essential living expenses must be households’ expenditure, covered. It is extremely expensive to provide etc – would not be able to health care to such a dispersed population. respond quickly enough to Then there are the costs to refugees’ dignity this scenario, even if there and safety that come from the coping were the capacity (which strategies that they cannot avoid. Finally (and there is not). We must very significantly) there are the costs to the consider alternative options host communities – lost income due to lower and at this point it is hard wages, more competition for jobs and the UNHCR/S Malkawi to avoid the idea of camps. deterioration of services due to over-demand. 68 General articles FMR 43 May 2013

Actually the aid community, and the refugees, the central level, and it is easy to see why have no choice in the matter. De facto camps many Lebanese fear for their country. are springing up all over the country (the shanty settlements mentioned above). These The severity and urgency of the situation are expanding in size and number. We will must be recognised. Lebanese ministers need see more aid going to these settlements, as to take tough decisions (among other things, informal settlements have been prioritised about camps) and re-organise the priorities in government and UN planning. But it within their ministries. The refugee crisis will be impossible to intervene in so many cuts across political blocs and politicians small settlements, spread over such a of all persuasions have to recognise this. large area. Aid agencies will focus on the largest settlements and those with the most At the practical level, ministries, UN extreme needs, drawing people to these agencies and NGOs could all be more settlements. This is a reality that we need to efficient and pragmatic. They must work address systematically; it will not go away. together towards an agreed (but flexible) set of objectives. They must be creative, A shift in government policy to allow a continually looking for ways to address certain number of properly planned camps is problems as they emerge and change. essential. This will enable aid organisations and municipalities to plan and construct There is an enormous need for funds. camps properly, avoiding the chaotic The Government of Lebanon and the UN expansion that we are currently seeing. It is estimate costs of the existing operation also crucial that aid is shared across refugee (even without a sudden influx) as over one and host populations. This is only fair; needs billion dollars up to the end of 2013. It is within Lebanese communities are similar to highly unlikely that anything close to the those faced by refugees. If carefully targeted, it amount that is needed will be forthcoming. will also reduce local inter-communal tension. Overt recognition of this fact and careful targeting of funds could at least address the The camps issue has polarised debate within most severe needs and reduce tension within Lebanon and outside. But it is not an either/or communities. Recent government and UN situation. In order to address such enormous plans emphasise the need to help host as well needs we need to combine approaches. This as refugee communities; this policy needs entails continuing with the existing approach to be endorsed and funded by donors. but enhancing it with camps and other alternatives. With existing options saturated, The crisis in Lebanon cannot be solved with more refugees arriving, and tensions within humanitarian assistance. But flexible and communities growing, we must be creative. well-targeted aid can reduce the impact of the political crisis. The government and aid What next? agencies must respond to the ever-changing Lebanon is inextricably caught up in environment with carefully considered Syrian affairs. The country is not merely policy shifts of the sort suggested here. mopping up the mess caused by the war in Syria but it is also moving rapidly into Jeremy Loveless [email protected] its own internal crisis. Unless we see is a freelance consultant who worked as an decisive action by Lebanese politicians and advisor to the UK’s Department for International international donors it is hard to see how Development (DFID) and the Lebanese we can avoid this. The population figures government between November 2012 and May quoted above speak for themselves. Add to 2013. The views expressed in this article are this the shelling of northern Lebanon from entirely his own and do not necessarily reflect within Syria, the proxy war intermittently those either of DFID or of the Government of waged in Tripoli and political paralysis at Lebanon. General articles 69 FMR 43 May 2013 The arts in refugee camps: ten good reasons Awet Andemicael

Refugees’ involvement in artistic activity – music, theatre, poetry, painting, etc – often plays a powerful positive role in their ability to survive physically and even emotionally and spiritually.

Clearly, artistic activity is neither a solution confront difficult memories and sometimes for every problem, nor can it provide quick to find an escape from burdens. fixes. Some artistic endeavours require equipment and training that are difficult 3. Involvement in artistic activity can help to obtain in camps, although many artistic reinforce your sense of power and agency. activities require little more than time and This is especially so when you initiate or the inspiration. But even if you are not a lead it yourselves. Moreover, the element trained or professional artist, if you live of play that the arts engage can contribute in a refugee camp there are many good to the overall flourishing of adults and reasons to get involved in the arts, whether children alike, affirming the possibility of music, poetry, dance, painting, drawing joy even within the context of camp life, and or any other creative activity. Here are ten undermining your acceptance of poverty, reasons why I believe refugees in camps forced migration and injustice as normative. should participate in artistic activity. 4. Artistic activity can connect you with 1. Artistic activity helps you use your time your spiritual community. Taking part in creatively and productively. One resource religious observance and rituals can be an many refugees in camps have in abundance important part of your spiritual life, and is time. When opportunities for employment the artistic components of such rituals – are limited, artistic activity is one way to use religious songs, poetic prayers, spiritual time productively and creatively, focusing dances, decorated religious implements, energy and talent toward meaningful ends. etc – play a key role in engaging the In addition, celebrating festivals – such as senses in worship and contemplation. World Refugee Day or religious and secular Celebrating religious festivals with creative holidays – with artistic presentations can expression and festive processions can keep you engaged in the cycles of time from which you can be easily disconnected in camp life.

2. Artistic activity can help you UNHCR/G Brust cope with the psychological and emotional stresses of living in a refugee camp. Given the prevalence of trauma among refugees in camps, coping and healing mechanisms are a major priority for refugees’ individual and communal well- being. Although artistic activity cannot substitute for psychiatric therapy and care, participating in such activity – whether private or public, formal or informal – can help provide a means to express both painful and pleasant emotions, to A trio of Iraqi refugee musicians who met in Damascus after fleeing the violence in Iraq released their first album in 2011; profits will help compatriots in exile who are in financial need. Transitions comprises 15 tracks put together by (from left to right) Abdel Mounem Ahmad on the qanun, Fadi Fares Aziz on the ney and Salim Salem on the oud. 70 General articles FMR 43 May 2013

help connect you to the religious tradition of the host community, and learning about of which you are part and the religious their artistic activities and cultural life, community you may have left behind. may contribute to building bridges. Such personal and cultural interactions may 5. Artistic activity can help you preserve play a role in engendering mutual respect, your traditional culture while away from challenging stereotypes held by both sides, your native land. Singing traditional songs, and fostering cooperative ventures. making traditional handicrafts and using traditional languages to compose poetry and 8. Artistic activity can help children learn. other literature can help preserve your cultural The use of songs, pictures and other artistic practices. It can also help you pass on your devices may help children learn their cultural heritage to your children or other lessons more effectively, by enabling them children in the camp, even if they have never to use their imaginations and their senses seen or no longer remember their homeland. more completely than is possible with less creative learning methods. It is also easier 6. Artistic activity can help you create a to learn and remember information when sense of community with other refugees. it is presented in the form of poems and While over-emphasising differences songs. Participatory practices, such as acting between groups in a refugee camp may out sketches and dramas, can help students cause strife and division, artistic activity experience their lessons more vividly and can provide opportunities to share engage them as active agents in their own your culture with others in gestures of learning. Since artistic and creative learning friendship. Participating in cultural and is fun, it can hold children’s attention for artistic activities from other cultures can longer periods of time than other types of help you learn about your neighbours in educational activities. In addition, children the camp, and help you appreciate their whose lives have been interrupted by the contributions to the life of the camp. traumas of forced migration may have developed special learning challenges which In addition, artistic activity can help need addressing, for which the arts are well- community members discuss difficult, suited as educational and therapeutic tools. awkward or taboo subjects. Rather than tell people what to do and what not to 9. Artistic activity can help adults learn and do, one can, for example, put on a drama develop behaviours that foster physical, showing a certain harmful practice and its psycho-social and community health effects on the people involved. This may and well-being. Learning is not limited to invite conversation about the issue, giving academic subjects, nor is education only community members the freedom to discuss for children. For many of the same reasons the issue indirectly through the drama. that artistic activity can provide effective Once the silence around the issue has been ways for children to learn, the arts present broken, then the issue may be addressed many opportunities for adult education and more directly. Artists can use stories, songs, development. Refugees can share important dances, visual arts and other means to information about social or health concerns bring up sensitive issues and open them up effectively through the arts (music, street for public consideration and discussion. drama, poetry, posters, etc). Especially in refugee communities in which literacy levels 7. Artistic activity could help create are low, other means of communicating bridges between refugee and host information may be more effective than communities. Relations between refugee pamphlets and other text-based methods. and host communities are complex and often tense. Sharing your cultural and Arts can be especially helpful in addressing traditional artistic practices with members concerns that would ordinarily seem impolite Congolese refugee with a drum in Kiziba refugee camp, Rwanda. Many refugees in African refugee camps make their own instruments out of whatever materials they can scavenge. UNHCR/T Maurer 72 General articles FMR 43 May 2013

or embarrassing to discuss in public. Issues activity – such as self-discipline, creativity such as ethnic conflict, domestic abuse or and patience – may serve you well once you high-risk sexual behaviour can be examined leave the camp and begin building a new life. through street drama, for example, with less risk of putting people on the defensive. The guidelines of many international NGOs Community discussion may lead to the point to the arts as a potential and desirable development of new social norms and vehicle for promoting humanitarian goals the promotion of more socially-beneficial essential for humans to flourish. Artistic and behaviours. Because songs, poems and cultural expression is even a right protected visual images remain in the memory, the by the Universal Declaration of Human dissemination and this new social norm Rights and the Convention on the Rights of may remain longer in people’s memory if the Child. With the freedom to enjoy this reinforced through artistic means. The longer right, and so many reasons to exercise it, and more deeply you remember, the more the benefits of artistic activity and creative likely your individual behaviour and collective expression are within your grasp, even in social standards will change accordingly, the limited context of a refugee camp. enabling you to experience a positive transformation in your habits and attitudes. Awet Andemicael [email protected] is a musician and writer, pursuing a doctoral 10. Artistic activity may help you prepare degree in theology at Yale University. Her for life beyond the camp. Even if you do research on the role of artistic activities in the not end up working as a professional in lives of people living in refugee camps was the literary, visual or performing arts, the published by UNHCR and is available online at skills you learn from engaging in artistic www.unhcr.org/4def858a9.html Trails of Tears: raising awareness of displacement Ken Whalen Trails of Tears have arisen to draw attention and give legitimacy to multiple movements for fairness and justice, hoping to create a community of support strong enough to rectify a past injustice or prevent a future one.

Twenty-five years ago, the federal government of Tears – nevertheless has transcended the of the United States agreed to establish historical event and its American landscape the Trail of Tears National Historic Trail by becoming a metaphor used by local which commemorates the forced migration and international news media and NGOs of thousands of Native Americans from to represent contemporary instances of the south-eastern US to ‘Indian Territory’ displacement. The representation of this west of the Mississippi River during the difficult heritage has the potential to influence early part of the nineteenth century. The people to reflect on their own sense of place Trail also promotes public awareness of and on their relationship with the past, both the broader history of American Indian of which can foster concern for those in dispossession and displacement carried out other regions of the world on the verge of by the US government and large numbers suffering the same plight in the present. of Euro-American settlers moving west. Several countries are beginning to assume The trail, which links over 1,300 kilometres the moral obligation to uncover and preserve of concrete and asphalt roadways, follows the landscapes of forced migration, which they land route taken by most Cherokee Indians envisage as gestures of reconciliation, venues who suffered the migration. The name – Trail of learning and sanctums of remembrance. General articles 73 FMR 43 May 2013

Some have nominated landscapes for signatures of the Trail of Tears have arisen to designation as UNESCO World Heritage Sites, draw attention and give legitimacy to multiple following UNESCO’s recent acknowledgement movements for fairness and justice in the US of the relevance of preserving historical and around the world, all hoping to create landscapes of displacement. In 2010, a community of support strong enough to UNESCO assigned World Heritage Site rectify a past or prevent a future injustice. status to Australia’s archipelago of convict prisons because they represent a moment Ken Whalen [email protected] is a in human history that silenced tens of Lecturer in the Faculty of Arts and Social thousands of men, women and children. Sciences at Universiti Brunei Darussalam. And the African Slave Route heritage has More about the Trail of Tears National Historic become a focus of historical preservation for Trail can be found at www.nps.gov/trte/index.htm countries such as Senegal, Kenya and Malawi, which have nominated various landscapes of displacement for World Heritage status, including auction houses, stockades, ports, passages and plantations built between the 16th and 19th centuries to serve mainly the Atlantic slave trade.

Of the 53,112 kilometres of National Historic Trails in the US, over 7,000 are now

dedicated to dispossession Whalen Ken and displacement, reminders of the often violent relationship between Euro-American settlers and Native Americans. Today, the country is home to over two million Native Americans, only a remnant of the population when the first Europeans arrived.

Needless to say, preserving landscapes of difficult heritage is no panacea for preventing forced displacement. And it is no easy matter to rename and recategorise a public space – nor to darken a family’s sense of place by signalling a history of atrocity outside their front door. Nevertheless, the steel trail markers which Ken Whalen Ken are the most prominent 74 General articles FMR 43 May 2013 Harming asylum seekers’ chances through poor use of human rights treaties Stephen Meili

Over the past decade, UK courts and administrative tribunals have become increasingly comfortable relying on international human rights treaties in cases where non-citizens claim asylum or other means of protection from persecution. However, this trend does not mean that these treaties have always been deployed by refugee lawyers in ways which benefit their clients.

One could argue that the UK is experiencing As a result, it has become commonplace for a golden age of human rights jurisprudence UK lawyers to cite the ECHR in UK domestic on refugee matters. Ever since the European courts. According to two barristers: “The Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) ECHR … is just a part of your day-to-day became part of British domestic law in 2000 vocabulary. It is directly applicable in almost through the Human Rights Act (HRA), all of the work that you do” and “When I judges have become increasing receptive started [in the early 1990s] …[e]verything toward human-rights-based arguments was the Refugee Convention. [The] European asserted by lawyers for refugees. Previously, Convention was virtually never raised…” lawyers representing refugees in UK domestic courts rarely invoked human rights Lawyers sometimes invoke other human treaties other than the 1951 Convention rights treaties as well, especially the Relating to the Status of Refugees. As one Convention on the Rights of the Child, which barrister told me, doing so would incur has effectively now been incorporated into the judge’s scorn: “If you had gone to an British law. immigration tribunal pre-2000 and tried to bring up the ECHR, they’d have looked Nevertheless, when I asked lawyers about at you like you were wasting their time.” situations where invoking human rights treaties in domestic courts might be When the HRA was passed, refugee lawyers detrimental to the interests of individual litigating in domestic courts suddenly claimants, nearly all of them came up with at had options beyond the 1951 Convention least one example: and no longer needed to demonstrate that their clients would face persecution When the judge is opposed to, or sceptical “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, about, human rights law: There is not political opinion or membership of a much a lawyer can do in this situation, particular social group”. For example, given that it may be difficult to raise a ECHR Article 3 prevents countries from human rights argument on appeal if returning refugees to home countries it has not been raised (and rejected) at where they risk torture or inhuman or an earlier stage of the proceedings. degrading treatment or punishment, regardless of the reason or whether they When the treaty argument complicates have been personally targeted. And Article 8 matters: Several lawyers noted that prevents public authorities from interfering judges, particularly at the first tier of the with an individual’s right to family life, immigration tribunal, like to keep things which has enabled many non-citizens to simple. One barrister said: “It could be remain in the UK even when they cannot distracting. If you can get what you need from meet the 1951 Convention requirement incorporated treaties or domestic law, then of a well-founded fear of persecution.1 you may just overcomplicate and confuse, General articles 75 FMR 43 May 2013

particularly in the tribunal … by referring the positive impact of human rights to treaties that they don’t know about.” treaties in UK jurisprudence. The first is by appealing to the increasingly internationalist When lawyers assert human rights perspective of many judges, particular in arguments indiscriminately: In the process, the higher courts. Lawyers feel that many they obscure their strongest points and judges see themselves operating on a global damage their credibility with the court. stage where their decisions are scrutinised “People feel they have to throw everything in. by courts, lawyers and academics around ... I’ve sat at the back of the court lots of times the world. If this is true then refugee lawyers and watched judges say ‘What does this add to would perhaps be wise to consciously appeal your argument?’ Why be put in that position?” to the judge’s desire to be at the forefront of – or at least in line with – global legal When the judge sees human rights-based developments. arguments as a sign of desperation: “I think the sense is, if you’ve got a proper A second strategy was explained by some legal argument you don’t need to use the lawyers as “going on and on about it long Human Rights Act outside of [when it’s] enough [until] eventually things begin to strictly [a matter of] torture… You are only change. The change you see in the courts using it because you are desperate and is slow... We’ve been banging on about the therefore you must have a weak case.” rights of the child for decades. It’s really only in the last few years that it has made a real The common risk in all of these situations difference.” is that they can result in bad law. Indeed, several lawyers emphasised the A desperate and ill-prepared lawyer who value of continuing to assert human rights- includes a specious or unnecessary treaty- based arguments in a creative, but not based argument may create legal precedent desperate, way until a judge in a higher court which adversely affects not only the current accepts them. client but also other claimants in the future. This risk is likely to escalate soon, given In the end, most lawyers see the future role the consensus view among refugee lawyers of human rights treaties in refugee practice that cuts to legal aid in the UK will drive either as a constant struggle against the some of the best lawyers from refugee law tightening up of the rules somewhere else practice, leaving it wide open for less skilled every time an advance is made, or as a matter practitioners. In addition, several lawyers of recognising that the struggle over a broad expressed a fear that those who remain will interpretation of human rights treaties and adopt an assembly-line or factory mentality their applicability to individual cases will to their work. This approach is likely to not be won overnight: “You win these battles result in one of two outcomes for human slowly, with incremental development. rights arguments: some lawyers not familiar And eventually you find that the world with such arguments will omit them, even has moved on, and the things that were though they might have assisted their clients, controversial ten years ago actually come to and other lawyers will include them in all be the standard.” of their arguments with little thought as to whether they really apply to the facts or In conclusion, human rights treaties have might instead alienate a particular judge. been increasingly accepted by UK tribunals and courts over the past decade. While this While recognising the risks of making is undoubtedly good news for human rights human rights-based arguments under these advocates, it is tempered by the consensus conditions, lawyers identified two principal among refugee lawyers that treaty-based ways of maintaining and even expanding arguments sometimes can hurt asylum 76 General articles FMR 43 May 2013

claimants and the overall cause of the lawyers who litigate asylum and complementary diffusion of human rights law. These lawyers protection cases before the Asylum and stress the importance of carefully crafting Immigration Tribunal and higher courts. It is such arguments rather than adopting part of a larger empirical project analysing the a one-size-fits-all approach. The wiser impact of human rights treaties on refugee practice, they assert, takes into account the jurisprudence and practice in Australia, Canada, presiding judge, the strength (and number) New Zealand, the UK and the US. The author of other available arguments, and the gratefully acknowledges the National Science extent to which courts in other jurisdictions Foundation and the Robina Foundation for have adopted the proposed argument. providing funding.

1. Refugee lawyers also frequently utilise Articles 15 and 23 of Stephen Meili [email protected] is on the faculty the 2004 E.U. Qualification Directive, which offer protection at the University of Minnesota Law School. from “serious harm” and require member states to ensure the maintenance of family life, respectively. This article is based on interviews with 42 UK

Older people and displacement Piero Calvi-Parisetti

At all phases of the displacement cycle – flight, displacement and return – older people are exposed to specific challenges and risks which are not sufficiently taken into account.

As the world population is ageing at an further exacerbate invisibility, and often unprecedented rate and displacement is on exclusion, during displacement. the rise, increasing numbers of older people are forced from their homes. Whether they At the onset of a crisis, older people are remain in their own country or cross an often left behind when the rest of their international border, they face a range of community is displaced. One major reason specific and very significant risks. The fact is the physical incapacity of many older that it is virtually impossible to say how persons to move, whether real or perceived many is a manifestation of the first of such by their family. Also, older people may have risks – invisibility. Often already marginalised personal reasons for remaining at home. They before a crisis, older people are often not may feel particularly tied to their home and factored into assessments of need and fall lands, or they may have resisted pre-emptive between the cracks of registration systems. disaster evacuations and thus experienced Of the 50 countries reviewed by the Internal and managed similar situations before – that Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) is, ‘ridden out’ previous disasters. Moreover, for its 2011 global IDP survey, only 11 had the prospect of starting again elsewhere may up-to-date sex- and age-disaggregated data; be too overwhelming for an older person. in only six of the 50 countries did national Lastly, the older person or the family may policies make specific reference to older decide that it is important for someone to people; and only three of these six had remain at home to secure their assets. gathered any information on older people. Older people who stay behind may be subject Failure to understand the socio-cultural to violence, intimidation or secondary impacts dimensions of the definition of ‘older of natural hazards, such as aftershocks or person’ (which in many countries does rising flood waters. In Darfur, for example, not only depend on physical age) and the older people who did not leave were terrorised fact that older persons have quite different and then killed by Janjaweed militia; and levels of vulnerability and capacity may during the 2008 crisis in Georgia, militias General articles 77 FMR 43 May 2013 UNHCR/P Taggart UNHCR/P Taggart

Mania, 70, with her daughter and four grandchildren in the Zugdidi Hospital Collective Centre for IDPs in Zugdidi, Georgia. All four children, their mother and their grandmother sleep in this one small room. looted the houses and tried to extort the health of the general population can money from older people who had been left be devastating, an almost exclusive focus behind, beating up some of them severely. on communicable diseases misses the fact Furthermore, those who do not leave their that much excess morbidity and mortality area of origin often lose assistance and among older people result from exacerbation support mechanisms they rely on. In the wake of existing non-infectious conditions such of Hurricane Katrina in the US, for example, as hypertension, diabetes and cancer. older people who were unable to leave residential homes were exposed to grave risk Similarly, access to adequate food is often a as their carers left New Orleans, abandoning major problem for older displaced people. The them to their fate. Seventy per cent of those way humanitarian operations are generally who died as a result of the disaster were over organised, focusing on bulk distribution of 70 years old. undifferentiated dry rations, may suit the needs of aid organisations better than the Support in displacement needs of the population, particularly those During displacement itself, the support that with special needs. Older people often have older people receive from governments and problems with the way the food rations are international or national organisations can distributed as much as with the nature of the be minimal or non-existent as it is frequently food itself. In a nutrition survey undertaken by merged into programmes targeting displaced HelpAge in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya in people as one homogeneous group. This 2011, more than 500 older persons were found results in assistance programmes which to be in need of nutritional support. This need are not adapted for and/or are inaccessible was attributed to exclusion from or lack of to older people. For instance, while the access to the general food distribution, low known consequences of displacement on diversity in their diet and infrequent meals. 78 General articles FMR 43 May 2013

Contrary to common belief, often older them. These challenges are especially difficult people in displacement cannot count on for older people who are without family a safety network, as they find themselves support or who are caring for dependent marginalised – and at times excluded – children whom they are reluctant to take by their own families and communities away from where they can receive services. in a situation of competition for scarce resources. Following the devastating 2010 The prospect of having to build or reconstruct floods in Pakistan, for example, and in stark housing can also be a great obstacle to older contrast with the prevailing religious and people’s return after displacement. Many cultural values, older people were simply older people, especially the very oldest, are abandoned. Pakistan’s Ministry of Social physically unable to rebuild their houses. Welfare estimated the numbers of older Furthermore, access to land for return is people living without family support at often fraught with complex land tenure and as much as 10% of the older population. ownership issues. Population growth in many developing countries is placing ever- Displacement often brings about devastating greater pressure on good land and priority loss of social status for older people as will most likely be given to younger people, well, with the huge contribution they even when many older persons are capable normally make to society being ignored. and willing to resume agricultural activities. This is particularly apparent in the case of their support role vis-à-vis children being As the ageing dimension of displacement replaced by some of the very practices of the becomes ever more relevant, development humanitarian community. Older persons and humanitarian agencies, local and national in the developing world tend to work into governments and human rights organisations their late seventies, whether in formal or need to pay much greater attention to the informal employment. As with younger needs and rights of older persons at all generations, the lack of employment brought stages of the displacement cycle. Every effort about through displacement can be extremely should be made to ensure that vulnerable demoralising. In an extreme example, in Lira older people are identified and that all actors district of northern Uganda, in the absence with protection responsibilities have the of an alternative strategy to support older capacity to fulfil these responsibilities. people’s needs, the local government declared Fridays begging days for older persons living Piero Calvi-Parisetti [email protected] is in IDP camps. Yet older people do really a university lecturer and policy adviser with suffer from the transition from a rural to an HelpAge International. www.helpage.org urban environment that is often associated See also the 2011 report online at with displacement. Many of the skills they http://tinyurl.com/HAI-NeglectedGeneration have may not appear relevant in the new published by HelpAge situation, and aid agencies rarely consider International and them as part of programme planning for IDMC entitled livelihood work – a form of age-related The neglected discrimination, even if unintentional. generation: The impact of Return displacement on Many older persons are among the most older people. See willing to return home to their places of also FMR 14 (2002) origin because of their strong historical ties on ‘Older displaced to their land. Yet, regardless of whether they people: at the back are particularly vulnerable, older people may of the queue?’ require assistance to be able to get back home online at or to carry return packages or assets with www.fmreview.org/older-displaced-people General articles 79 FMR 43 May 2013 Poetry as women’s resistance to the consequences of Bedouin displacement in Jordan Maira Seeley

Despite the significant displacement that Jordanian Bedouin families have undergone in recent generations, Bedouin women are able to mitigate some of the consequences of that displacement through the opportunities and influence they have gained as Nabati poets.

Bedouin populations in the Middle East as economic contributors and their influence have experienced significant displacement in their own household’s economic decisions through loss of assets or of access to assets, has consequently been reduced. Political leading to a loss of livelihood during the activity is also difficult for Bedouin women past six decades. Bedouin in rural Aqaba and due to restrictions on their public movement Ma’an governorates in southern Jordan have and interaction with unrelated men. been prevented from following migratory routes because of a reinforced border with The traditional art form of Nabati poetry Saudi Arabia and government initiatives (al-sha’r al-Nabati), a genre of oral poetry that sought to induce Bedouin settlement. composed throughout the Arabian Peninsula Very few Jordanian Bedouin today rely by both men and women, has proved to be on herding for subsistence, and most an acceptable means of resistance. Nabati families’ survival depends on male wage poetry creates an avenue of resistance in labour (for example in the tourist industry), several ways: by increasing women’s spatial military pensions and state benefits. and geographic mobility, by providing opportunities to voice political and social This displacement from a migratory lifestyle criticism, and by allowing some women to has significantly affected Bedouin women’s establish careers as poets and thus garner social and family roles. The transition to respect, influence and financial benefits. sedentary life and greater geographic and spatial proximity to non-relatives has required Unlike many rural Bedouin women, a female women to take measures to avoid contact poet (shā’irah) may travel many driving with unrelated males. In the densely settled hours from home to participate in a poetry contexts into which Bedouin have been evening (umsiyyah) or contest (mahrajān), displaced, this has serious consequences for accompanied by her husband or another women’s mobility, restricting their ability to trusted individual. This contrasts strongly contribute economically to their families and with the restrictions on many non-poet limiting their participation in public activities Bedouin women’s movement which prevent and decision making. Women’s labour was them from appearing even in the village formerly critical to family survival in a outside their home. A female poet, however, herding context, as women were responsible can recite her work before an audience of as for caring for animals, milking and processing many as 500 men without attracting criticism dairy products, as well as for the care, mobility of her morals. The most successful female and erection of tents. Women’s activities also poets may even, if they have the resources, occupied a larger spatial range in herding travel abroad to participate in international contexts, with fewer restrictions on movement. poetry events such as the Emirati televised competition ‘Shā’r al-Million’ (‘Millions’ Poet’). Because most families no longer depend on During and after such events women poets domestic animals and the vast majority of may converse and eat with unrelated men wage earners in Bedouin households today and in the context of a poetry evening this are male, women have been largely sidelined does not usually generate social disapproval. 80 General articles FMR 43 May 2013

Nabati poetry events also enable such official participation in politics but they displaced Bedouin women to participate supported her political action through a in public political and social debate. Much widely disseminated and controversial of the poetry women compose addresses poem criticising political figures. Renown contentious issues such as political as an accomplished poet is also a means corruption and perceived disloyalty, the for women to establish a position of social Arab Spring movements and the nature of prestige as contributors to family honour and being Jordanians. Bedouin women’s limited reputation and as savvy intellectuals who opportunities for higher education often may join in men’s political discussions. bar them from political leadership but not from composing influential poetry. One Maira Seeley [email protected] is female poet’s family strongly opposed her a student at the University of Oxford.

Emergency need for telecommunications support Marianne Donven and Mariko Hall

Of the biggest emergencies needing emergency Yida is susceptible to conflict and violence; in telecommunications support through the cluster March 2013 security incidents caused over 300 system at the moment, two stand out. The first children to be displaced from the camp there. is Mali, where the lack of infrastructure in the areas where the humanitarian operations are Services provided by the ETC response solution enable taking place is stark, and where humanitarian coordination and communication both locally and agencies do not have a long history which internationally for responders. The ETC response would have allowed time solution consists of technologies and opportunity to build up from ‘emergency.lu’, Ericsson their own communications Response and the World Food infrastructure. The other, Programme. ‘emergency.lu’ is South Sudan, by contrast, has a satellite-based mobile had a humanitarian presence telecommunication service, for decades. Yet the physical developed by a public-private environment is difficult and the partnership between the areas of need and operations Luxembourg government and change so frequently private companies which was set that there is constant up after the Haiti earthquake.1 demand for emergency The Haiti experience of course infrastructure to be set up. challenged the international

UNHCR/K Mahoney humanitarian community both to Both countries have thus take advantage of the been sites for the deployment of the ‘Emergency possibilities of increasingly available and common Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) response solution’ communications technologies and networks, and to to provide internet connectivity and voice telephony ensure that it has access to the technological services to the relief community. In fact the first infrastructure enabling it to do so. deployment of the ETC response solution was in Marianne Donven [email protected] Bentiu, South Sudan, in January 2012. Since then, heads the Humanitarian Aid Desk at the over 3,000 humanitarian workers across the country Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Directorate have used its services. A recent deployment has for Development Cooperation. Mariko Hall been to Yida in South Sudan where the population [email protected] is Communication Analyst has swelled from 20,000 to over 70,000 with with WFP’s IT Emergency Preparedness and the great majority of the inhabitants now being Response branch. See also article refugees. Located close to the border with Sudan, www.fmreview.org/preventing/donven-hall 1. www.emergency.lu/ General articles 81 FMR 43 May 2013 Understanding refugees’ concepts of sexual and gender-based violence Carrie Hough

Sexual and gender-based violence prevention campaigns that incorporate culturally sensitive understanding will stand a better chance of breaking down barriers to accessing services.

The number of refugees in Kenya has grown were less familiar with the area and had from approximately 12,000 registered established fewer support mechanisms. refugees in 1988 to 616,555 in 2012, the great majority originating from neighbouring Most survivors interviewed had not sought countries in the Horn of Africa. Expecting a medical treatment after being attacked. The safe haven in their country of asylum, many majority of women interviewed did not have instead found themselves vulnerable speak English or the official local language, to an array of new risks in the refugee Kiswahili, and explained that stigma left context, including the very real threat of them wary of asking another member sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). of the community to interpret. Women repeatedly highlighted the negative social In 2011 the international NGO RefugePoint consequences if a woman is known to have conducted a study among some randomly been raped, including being labelled a sex selected male and female refugees living in worker, presumed to be infected with HIV/ Nairobi to explore refugee understandings AIDS, and being considered unsuitable for and attitudes towards behaviour that is marriage. Acknowledging an incident of termed ‘SGBV’ by humanitarian actors. SGBV is considered shameful and several survivors described wearing the niqab (face- UNHCR defines SGBV as “violence that veil) so that they could not be identified and is directed against a person on the basis ridiculed. The taboo on openly discussing of gender or sex. It includes acts that anything related to sexual relations also inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or inhibits some women from seeking help. suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty.”1 Direct translations of SGBV terminology This study explored how such official do not necessarily exist within the lexicons definitions translate into local cultures of refugee communities. If there are no which contain their own ideas about equivalent words to describe a particular gender norms and acceptable behaviour. form of SGBV, to what extent can it be conceptualised by the community to exist The study documented that single refugee as a violation? women between the ages of 20 and 35 years are particularly vulnerable to SGBV. Consent was revealed to be a key concept Without a traditional male protector and which defied any clear-cut direct translation. provider, the limited livelihood options Sexual passivity (Oromo male: “Some will not available to refugee women heighten their resist you in everything that you do, which risk of experiencing SGBV. Many who means they have consented”), modest refusal report incidents are employed as domestic of sex to appear ‘proper’ (Oromo male: “Men workers or street-sellers and are assaulted think she is just cheap if she says okay at a during their work or in the evening when glance.... she will never say yes, so I need to returning home. SGBV incidents were more use some force... because this is normal”), prevalent during the first two years in and especially marital partnership (Somali Nairobi when asylum seekers and refugees female: ”There is nothing like being forced – 82 General articles FMR 43 May 2013

it’s just part of an agreement between wife for sexual violence survivors, despite and husband”) were all denoted as markers confidence among humanitarian actors in of consent among these communities. Nairobi that this issue has been appropriately addressed in community education The assumption of a wife’s consent within campaigns. This may be an indication that marriage has implications for the reporting the concepts and language of campaigns of physical and sexual violence by a spouse. have not been as effective as hoped for. This was found to be widely occurring but largely surrounded by silence, as it is not Police and health clinic staff should also regarded as violations. The findings suggest be aware of the fear of speaking out that that the normalised nature of such violence refugee women experience and ensure combined with cultural expectations of that refugee women seeking care are wifely obedience and loyalty to husbands asked direct questions and given time to also contribute to low reporting rates disclose their experiences. The availability (Oromo female: “Beating is something of trusted and well-trained translators that has come from our ancestors... it is at both police stations and health clinics normal for a husband to beat his wife”). is critical. Police officers, clinicians and Intimate partner violence may even be translators need to be aware that people in viewed positively by the victim – for these communities may not be comfortable some women, being beaten is perceived as using explicit terms to communicate their evidence of a husband’s love for his wife. experience and should pay attention to the nuances of a patient’s narrative. Ensuring Although refusal of a spouse’s sexual that police stations and health clinics advances is permissible in theory, emotional provide safe spaces to report incidents, that pressure and cultural norms appear to translators are trained in confidentiality, undermine an individual’s ability to refuse and that the communities are well informed in practice. Marriage is commonly equated are also critical to improving reporting with life-long sexual consent among rates. These lessons can also be applied in these communities, the wife’s will being many Western societies, where incidents considered as indistinguishable from that of SGBV continue to be under-reported. of her husband’s, suggesting that local conceptions of SGBV do not generally The study documented a high prevalence include the possibility of a husband as and ongoing tolerance for SGBV within perpetrator. This raises the question of how the Horn of Africa refugee communities in consistent translations of terms such as ‘rape’ Nairobi. Given the varying understandings are between cultures where a husband is of SGBV within the refugee communities, considered to have almost unlimited sexual great care should be taken by humanitarian entitlement to his wife, and the meanings actors when designing and facilitating intended by outsider humanitarian actors. information and prevention campaigns on this topic. It should not be assumed that By gaining a sense of culturally normalised humanitarian language around SGBV can behaviour, service providers can better translate directly into local languages and understand low reporting and care- cultural belief systems; and the use of jargon seeking habits among refugee SGBV and foreign terminology should be avoided. survivors. They can then in turn create more culturally sensitive interventions RefugePoint has shared the findings of which stand a better chance of achieving this research with a wide network of improved primary prevention. humanitarian actors and organisations, and has incorporated them into the design Among refugees, there is a lack of of recent SGBV and reproductive health information on the benefits of health services community campaigns. By engaging the General articles 83 FMR 43 May 2013

communities (including religious leaders RefugePoint. www.refugepoint.org This article and other community opinion leaders) is based on a longer report entitled ‘A man who in the implementation of behavioural does not beat his wife is not a man’: Risk factors change campaigns and in the participatory and cultural conceptions of sexual and gender production of communication materials, based violence among Horn of Africa refugees in humanitarian actors can help ensure that Nairobi, available at language, images and themes are clearly http://tinyurl.com/RefugePoint-sgbv2012 understood and have cultural resonance. 1. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Against Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons. Carrie Hough [email protected] is Guidelines for Prevention and Response, available at: a Researcher and Protection Officer with www.refworld.org/docid/3edcd0661.html

Forthcoming issues of FMR

Feature themes in 2013 Proposed feature1987-2012 themes in 2014-15 FMR 25th Anniversary collection

FMR 25th Anniversary cover images – captions, credits and links

From left to right

Detention and deportation (FMR 44) • Afghanistan Top row: 1987-2012 1. Cover image of first issue of Anniversary Network newsletter, published Refugee November Participation 1987. www.fmreview.org/RPN/01 collection 2. Refugees from 13. Internally displaced Congolese women wait during a food Kosovo. distribution in Kibati, just outside the eastern provincial 1999. www.fmreview.org/kosovo UNHCR/Le Moyne. FMR 5, August Due out September 2013. capital of Goma, DRC. IRIN/Les Neuhaus. FMR special

3. Kabul, Afghanistan. Shawn Baldwin. FMR 21, issue, December 2008. 2004. www.fmreview.org/return-reintegration www.fmreview.org/GuidingPrinciples10 • Dayton+20/The Balkans September 4. Forced repatriation in December 2006 of 14. From the cover of thousands of 27, January 2007. FMRwww.fmreview.org/sexualviolence 27. Rwandan refugees from Per-Anders Pettersson. FMR Kagera river crossing. UNHCR/R Chalasani. hundreds FMR 35, ofJuly Tanzania at the 15. Satellite image taken in 2006 of Details at www.fmreview.org/detention 2010. www.fmreview.org/disability in North Darfur showing 75% destruction since earlier village of 5. Sabine Larribeau receives a Brighter Futures image taken in March 2003. DigitalGlobe Inc. Shangil FMR Tobay38,

recognition of October 2011. ‘advocating for www.fmreview.org/technology while working with Just Award in a young refugee’s rights’ Fourth row: 40, August 2012. for Kids Law. Simona Aru. FMR • Environmental migrationwww.fmreview.org/young-and-out-of-place 16. Eldoret IDP camp, Kenya, January 2008. Pedram Yazdi. Second row: FMR GP10 special issue, December 2008. www.fmreview.org/GuidingPrinciples10 6. Local transport for 17. Heal Africa Transit Centre for Cambodia. WFP/Jim the Holmes. UN World FMR Food 18, Programme in violence. IRIN/Aubrey Graham, FMR 36, November 2010. www.fmreview.org/logistics women affected by September 2003. www.fmreview.org/DRCongo sexual 7. Painting by Sri Lankan child from 18. Demobilisation ceremony, transit camp near Rumbek, the Indian Ocean tsunami. FMR special issue, July 2005. Batticaloa district, after southern Sudan. UNICEF/Stevie Mann. FMR 21, Crisis migration (FMR 45) www.fmreview.org/tsunami

September 2004. www.fmreview.org/return-reintegration • Faith-based humanitarianism8. IDPs in Burma. Free 19. FMR’s Creative Commons licence includes three www.fmreview.org/non-stateBurma Ranger s. FMR 30, conditions: Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivatives. 9. April 2008. Two friends See www.fmreview.org/copyright for meet again a repatriation programme.in YUNHCR/Cambio, Hamm. April 2007. You can follow FMR on South more information. Intended for Sudan, following Facebook and Twitter Due out December 2013. use in FMR 28, July 20. After confirmation of www.fmreview.org/capacitybuilding 2007. Bangladesh can now their citizenship, Biharis in 10. Spanish coastguard intercepts a traditional fishing boat after have decades of hope of leading a normal life laden with migrants off 32, April 2009. www.fmreview.org/statelessness exclusion. UNHCR/G M B Akash. FMR • Transitional justiceCanaries. UNHCR/A Rodríguez. the island FMR of 32, April 2009. Tenerife in the Bottom row: www.fmreview.org/statelessness 21. Sudanese refugee woman from Call for articles online at www.fmreview.org/crisis Third row: back to her tent Darfur carries firewood 11. Gulu Disabled Persons Union, northern Uganda. Christine UNHCR/J Clark. FMRin Oure 29, Cassoni December camp 2007. in eastern Chad. M Carlson, Advocacy Project Peace Fellow. FMR 35, July www.fmreview.org/humanitarianreform 20 10. www.fmreview.org/disability 22. Elia Kidibu, a 1972 12. The FMR website in its four Burundian refugee, sorting through photos as he packs his belongings for Arabic, Spanish and French. mainSome languages issues and – articlesEnglish, Burundi in November 2008. UNHCR/B Bannon. FMR 33, Issue 33 Submission deadline for articles is 2nd September. • Transitional solutionsha repatriation to September 2009 ve also been Sept published in other languages, such as ember 2009. www.fmreview.org/protracted Russian, Hebrew, Burmese, Tamil, Bahasa Indonesia, 23. Sinhala, Portuguese Mugunga IDP camp outside Goma, DRC. Norwegian www and Korean. Refugee Council/Truls Brekke. FMR 36, November 2010. Protracted displacement .fmreview.org/issues/additional-languages www Increasingly, displa .fmreview.org/DRCongo c even decades. We edassess peop thele re impact of this on people’s main displaced for years, lives and our societies. And we explore the ‘solutions’ – 24. Haiti Adolescent Girls Network. Nadia Todres. FMR 40, political, humanitarian and personal. August 2012. www.fmreview.org/young-and-out-of-place 25. FMR 1987-2012: 25 years 25th Anniversary issue See www.fmreview.org/forthcomingresearch and learning of sharing information,

mini spotlight on Sri Plus: -feature on Collective centresLanka and articles on: FOR FRE Darfur, Colombia, E DISTRIBUTION ONLY smuggling climate change in South Africa, agreement peace med talks, See www.fmreview.org/25th-anniversary for more information. iation.

Thank you to all FMR's donors in 2012-2013 FMR International Advisors FMR is wholly dependent on external funding to cover Advisors serve in an individual capacity and do not all of the project’s costs, including staffing. We are necessarily represent their institutions. deeply appreciative to all of the following donors both for their financial support and their enthusiastic collaboration. Lina Abirafeh Rachel Hastie UN Rapid Response Team Oxfam GB Arcus Foundation • AusAID • Brookings-LSE Project Guido Ambroso Lucy Kiama on Internal Displacement • Dahabshiil • Danish UNHCR Refugee Consortium Refugee Council • DHL • Feinstein International Diana Avila of Kenya Centre, Tufts University • Generalitat Valenciana/ Diálogo Sudamericano Consellería de Educación • Haiti Adolescent Girls Khalid Koser Network/IPPF-WHR • IOM • International Rescue Nina M Birkeland Geneva Centre for Security Committee • Invisible Children • Lex Justi • Norwegian Refugee Policy Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs • John D and Council Amelia Kyazze Catherine T MacArthur Foundation • Mohammed Dawn Chatty British Red Cross Abu-Risha • Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs • Refugee Studies Centre Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Erin Mooney Mark Cutts Monitoring Centre • Oxfam • Refugees International OCHA ProCap • Save the Children • Swiss Federal Department of Kathrine Starup Foreign Affairs • UNDP Evaluation Office • UNICEF • Eva Espinar Danish Refugee Council UNHCR • UNOCHA• University of Queensland • US University of Alicante Dept of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh Richard Williams Migration • Women’s Refugee Commission Refugee Studies Centre Independent consultant “We, the member countries of the g7+, believe fragile states are characterized and classified through the lens of the developed rather than through the eyes of the developing.”

Eighteen countries recognised as fragile states a group and to meet with the international and clustering around the high end of the community about the members’ needs and Failed States Index convene under the name circumstances. Their stance is that they g7+, with the motto ‘Goodbye conflict, welcome should take leadership and express a strong, development’. They all struggle with poverty, long-term vision to assist their development instability and the threat of violent conflict, and partners, the donors, in designing their in most cases with extensive displacement assistance to fragile states. The ‘New Deal for now or in the recent past. Few of them have engagement in fragile states’ has become the been expected to meet any of the Millennium framework for this engagement.2 Development Goals.1 Effective assistance to fragile states to support g7+ is a “country-owned and country-led them to become less fragile should lead to mechanism to monitor, report and draw opportunities to reduce internal displacement, attention to the particular challenges faced by allow refugees to return and settle issues of fragile states”. The group made a collective rights, in a virtuous circle hopefully breaking approach to the international community on the cycle of displacement as cause and the sidelines of the OECD’s fourth High-level symptom of fragility. Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011 and has since both continued to meet as www.g7plus.org

1. A World Bank analysis published in April 2013 indicates, however, that 20 fragile and conflict-affected countries are meeting one or more MDG targets. They are Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kiribati, Liberia, Libya, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Sudan, Syria, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, and West Bank and Gaza. http://tinyurl.com/FragileStates-MDGprogress 2. http://tinyurl.com/NewDeal4peace