The NIH Catalyst from the Deputy Director for Intramural Research

Fostering Communication and Collaboration The nihCatalyst A Publication for NIH Intramural Scientists National Institutes of Health a Office of the Director Volume 3, Issue 5 September-October 1995 Tenure Panel Intersecting Orbits: Gets First-Year NIH and NASA’s Joint Explorations Report Card by Celia Hooper by Rebecca Kolberg IH’s new Central Tenure Com- uter space may remain far Currently, two NIH labs —one at mittee recently completed its beyond NIH’s scientific reach NICHD and one at NEI—are weighing N first year of life—and the first O for quite some time, but some the potential applications of NASA- data on tenure decisions are in, along intramural researchers are taking advan- developed technologies in basic with mixed reactions from the scien- tage of the next best research. >• biomedical tists that the group evaluates and thing—a chance to | Not only do the two serves. explore the earth- projects tackle quite “We haven’t lived with the new | bound applications of 3 different scientific tenuring system long enough to see if technology designed problems, but they it produces a better product” than the for the final frontier. also diverge in the old system, says Mark Boguski, a NLM “The nice thing nature of the devices investigator recently tenured by the about working with being tested and in NIH is that the rest of the formality of their the scientific commu- arrangements with the nity looks to NIH for federal space agency. guidance, and if use- NICHD’s evaluation of ful results are reported NASA’s bioreactor for by NIH researchers, three-dimensional tis- the technology starts sue culture is a five- to spread,” says year, $4.8 million Stephen Davison, a interagency agree- biotech program man- ment. On the other ager with NASA’s NICHD's Joshua Zimmerberg, hand, NEI and NASA Microgravity Science foreground, and Leonid Margolis scientists' fledgling and Applications Divi- assemble a NASA bioreactor. collaboration to ex- in sion Washington. continued on page 18 . Central Tenure Committee (CTC). “The NIDCD Director James B. Snow Jr., real test will be not just whether the who was appointed NIH’s representa- system is fair at the front end but CONTENTS tive to NASA’s Life Sciences and Micro- whether at the back end it produces a 2 10-11 gravity Advisory Committee last spring, scientist with a better post-tenure track From the DDIR Commentary: record than before.” agrees that NIH and NASA make com- New Genetic Clues 4 To Hearing Impairment Actually, the idea for the committee patible partners in many areas of bio- Science Ethics Forum: was hatched for rather different rea- medical research. “Research on Earth New Intramural Panel 12-13 sons in the 1980s, under NIH Director could benefit from the application or Hot Methods Clinic: 5 More Than James Wyngaarden, says CTC’s execu- transfer of technologies specifically Research Grapevine & Just the FACS tive secretary, Richard G. Wyatt. The developed for space-related purposes, Interest Group Gazette goal of forming the new tenure com- in 14 and research space or space-like 6-7 mittee, according to Wyatt, was to Lab Behind the Leader environments could improve knowl- Klausner at NCI, bring the expertise of senior scientists edge of the normal function of human A Whale of a Job 22 into major decisions at NIH. As is the Awards biologic systems on Earth,” Snow told 8-9 case at universities, tenure at NIH this year’s American Institute of Aero- Scientific Cybernauts: 23 accords a scientist permanence and Speeding Up Searches nautics and Astronautics’ Life Sciences Cartoons independent responsibility for labora- and Space Medicine Conference in 24 continuecl on page 15 . Houston. Catalytic Reactions The NIH Catalyst From the Deputy Director for Intramural Research Safety and Security at NIH he recent contamination of a water cooler in vidual scientist if a few thousand counts of hydrogen-3, Building 37 with phosphorus-32 has raised phosphorus-32 (P-32), or carbon-14 are left contaminat- important issues about how we protect staff. T NIH ing a lab bench, or if a researcher wants to mouth-pipet Although we are a diverse community, spanning multi- Escherichia coli carrying a recombinant plasmid encod- ple campuses and a wide range of professions, we ing human cDNA sequences? First, such activities repre- share a desire to minimize threats to our safety and sent bad laboratory practice, which could lead to slop- security. The tough question is, how can we create a py handling of more hazardous materials or organisms. safe, secure work environment without destroying the Second, perception and acceptance of risk is very per- open intellectual atmosphere essential to biomedical sonal. Because we work in a crowded environment, research? one person’s carelessness invariably results in the expo- In my view, there are two general categories of safe- sure of others, and it is inappropriate for one researcher ty and security risks. First, there are risks such as fires to decide whether others should be exposed to ques- and chemical spills that pose an immediate danger to tionable material—no matter how small the risk. Finally, the health and well-being of NIH staff. There is little deliberate or careless violation of rules and regulations controversy about the importance of minimizing or regarding “low-level” risk subjects all of NIH to the pos- eliminating such risks. The second set of risks such as sibility of public censure and harsh regulatory sanctions recombinant DNA activities and exposure to low-level that could make it far more difficult to conduct our dai- radioactivity—risks that do not constitute an immediate ly work. threat to health or safety—is more problematic. The recent, apparently deliberate, P-32 contamina- In the first category, the danger of exposures to fire, tion of a water cooler and perhaps of a scientist’s food toxic chemicals, pathogenic organisms, and high-volt- or drink in Building 37 illustrates some of these points. age equipment is a fact of life in the modern laboratory. Although the exposures should not pose a health risk to Fortunately, scrupulous use of appropriate safety equip- any of the staff involved, the attendant negative publici- ment and precautions, proper training, and mainte- ty led to questions about our security and handling of nance of clear corridors can greatly reduce the chance radioisotopes and demonstrates the potential price of of lab accidents and facilitate emergency response problems in this arena. I cannot overemphasize the when accidents do occur. emotional distress experienced by the affected individu- A different sort of concern in the first category is the als, the exacerbation of mistrust within our local com- threat of criminal acts such as theft, personal assaults, munity, and the intensity of demands that NIH “do and violent action by malicious individuals or groups. something” to prevent such an event from recurring. Although rare, such events do occur at NIH. To guard Last year, NIH suggested to the Nuclear Regulatory against crime, NIH police patrol the campus and we all Commission (NRC) that security governing the storage take precautions such as locking unoccupied labs, limit- and use of certain radioisotopes, including P-32, be ing access to NIH buildings after normal working hours, relaxed to facilitate their use within labs. When the P-32 and controlling access to buildings that house nonhu- contamination occurred on June 28, NIH was undergo- man primates. Importantly, any steps to tighten security ing an NRC inspection to determine, at least in part, the are taken only after the risks are weighed against the effectiveness of our security arrangements for radioiso- possibility that tougher security measures will interfere topes and whether our request for less stringent restric- with normal research activities. Currently, there is no tions should be granted. Although our request was plan to lock all NIH buildings during working hours based in good faith on known risks, it did not take into because the need for such action has not been shown account the dramatic nature of any contamination with to outweigh the high cost of hiring enough security radioactive materials and the emotional reaction to such guards to provide “true” security and because it would contamination. I believe that our decision to withdraw significantly interfere with the normal flow of people that request, to strictly enforce current security regula- and research materials. Our best defense against crime tions, and to search scrupulously for other possible con- is for everyone to be vigilant, for example, by question- tamination—with only negative results so far—has been ing strangers about the nature of their business in NIH a reasonable response to the P-32 case. In fact, the NRC buildings and reporting suspicious or criminal activity to recently gave us high marks for the overall quality of police immediately. our radiation-safety program. The second category of potential risks at NIH Although we may wish to govern ourselves by safe includes factors that do not appear to pose an immedi- and appropriate research practices, the reality is that ate danger but that, over a period of time, may result in NIH is governed by oversight bodies such as the NRC, a statistically detectable hazard. In some cases, the the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and long-term health risks are unknown or indeterminable, the Environmental Protection Agency. One of my but a reasonable person might perceive such a risk, or responsibilities is to enforce safety regulations, but there might be public concern about the possibility of another is to explain to regulators the special circum- such risk. Activities that fall into this category are exper- stances that affect NIH research activities.

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