Inquisitive Semantics

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Inquisitive Semantics Inquisitive semantics Ivano Ciardelli Jeroen Groenendijk Floris Roelofsen November 24, 2017 About this document The current version of this book manuscript was created on November 24, 2017. Many of the papers referred to in the book can be accessed through: www.illc.uva.nl/inquisitivesemantics/papers Some computational tools that might help to become familiar with the frame- work presented in the book are available at: www.illc.uva.nl/inquisitivesemantics/resources The work presented here has been made possible through financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) and the European Research Council (ERC), which we gratefully acknowledge. 2 Contents 1 Introduction7 1.1 Motivation..............................8 1.2 Main aims and outline of the book................. 17 2 Basic notions 19 2.1 The standard picture......................... 19 2.2 Information states.......................... 21 2.3 Issues................................. 23 2.4 Propositions.............................. 26 2.5 Contexts................................ 35 2.6 Summary and pointers to possible refinements........... 42 2.7 Exercises............................... 44 3 Basic operations on propositions 47 3.1 Algebraic operations......................... 48 3.2 Projection operators......................... 56 3.3 Linguistic relevance.......................... 59 3.4 Exercises............................... 59 4 A first-order inquisitive semantics 61 4.1 Logical language and models.................... 61 4.2 Semantics............................... 62 4.3 Semantic categories and projection operators........... 65 4.4 Examples............................... 67 4.5 Informative content, truth, and support.............. 71 4.6 Syntactic properties of non-hybrid sentences............ 72 4.7 Sources of inquisitiveness...................... 73 4.8 Comparison with alternative semantics............... 74 4.9 Exercises............................... 75 3 4 Contents 5 Questions 77 5.1 Polar questions............................ 77 5.2 Alternative questions......................... 78 5.3 Open disjunctive questions..................... 79 5.4 Wh-questions............................. 80 5.5 Question coordination and conditionalization........... 84 5.6 Limitations and extensions..................... 87 5.7 Exercises............................... 90 6 Disjunction, clause typing, and intonation 93 6.1 List structures............................ 96 6.2 Logical forms............................. 99 6.3 Interpreting logical forms...................... 100 6.4 Unmarked cases............................ 104 6.5 Marked cases............................. 107 6.6 Exercises............................... 110 7 Conditionals 113 7.1 Evidence for truth-conditional effects................ 114 7.2 Conditionals in inquisitive semantics................ 118 7.3 Further benefits............................ 127 7.4 Summary............................... 136 7.5 Exercises............................... 137 8 Propositional attitudes 139 8.1 Propositional attitudes: the standard account........... 140 8.2 Inquisitive epistemic logic...................... 144 8.3 Beyond know and wonder ...................... 153 8.4 Pointers to further work....................... 154 8.5 Exercises............................... 155 9 Comparison with previous approaches to questions 157 9.1 Alternative semantics........................ 158 9.2 Partition semantics.......................... 166 9.3 Inquisitive indifference semantics.................. 172 9.4 Division of labor........................... 175 9.5 Exercises............................... 182 10 Conclusion 185 10.1 Overview of main concepts..................... 185 10.2 Mission accomplished?........................ 187 A Sources 189 Contents 5 B Pointers for further reading 190 Chapter 1 Introduction Inquisitive semantics is a new semantic framework mainly intended for the anal- ysis of linguistic information exchange. Information exchange can be seen as a process of raising and resolving issues. Inquisitive semantics provides a new formal notion of issues, which makes it possible to model various concepts that are crucial for the analysis of linguistic information exchange in a more refined and more principled way than has been possible in previous frameworks. In particular: 1. The semantic content of both declarative and interrogative sentences can be represented in an integrated way, capturing not only the informa- tion that such sentences convey but also the issues that they raise; 2. Similarly, conversational contexts can be modeled as encompassing not just the information that has been established in the conversation so far, but also the issues that have been brought up; 3. And finally, it becomes possible to formally represent a broader range of propositional attitudes that are relevant for information exchange: besides the familiar information-directed attitudes like knowing and be- lieving, issue-directed attitudes like wondering can be captured as well. This book provides a detailed exposition of the most basic features of inquis- itive semantics, and demonstrates some of the advantages that the framework has with respect to previously proposed ways of representing semantic content, conversational contexts, and propositional attitudes. This introductory chapter will proceed to argue in some detail why a frame- work like inquisitive semantics is needed for a satisfactory analysis of informa- tion exchange (Section 1.1), and will end with a global outline of the remaining chapters (Section 1.2). 7 8 Chapter 1. Introduction 1.1 Motivation The most basic question that needs to be addressed in more detail before we introduce the new formal notion of issues that forms the cornerstone of inquisi- tive semantics is why such a notion is needed at all for the analysis of linguistic information exchange. This will be done in Section 1.1.1. A second fundamental point that we want to make is that the analysis of linguistic information exchange does not just require a semantic theory of declar- atives and another semantic theory of interrogatives side by side, but rather an integrated theory of declaratives and interrogatives; neither sentence type can be fully understood in isolation. Reasons for this will be given in Section 1.1.2. Finally, a third important point is that a semantic theory of declaratives and interrogatives should not employ two different notions of semantic content, one for declaratives and one for interrogatives, but should rather be based on a single notion of semantic content that is general enough to capture both the information that sentences convey and the issues that they may raise. This point will be substantiated in Section 1.1.3. 1.1.1 Why do we need a formal notion of issues? There are several reasons why a formal notion of issues is needed for the analysis of linguistic information exchange, and each of these is related to one of the three aspects of information exchange listed above: some arise from the need for a suitable notion of semantic content, some from the need for a suitable model of conversational contexts, and yet others from the need for a sufficiently refined representation of the mental states of conversational participants. We will discuss each in turn. Reason 1: To represent the content of interrogative sentences The semantic content of a declarative sentence is standardly construed as a set of possible worlds, those worlds that are compatible with the information that the sentence conveys (as per the conventions of the language; additional information may be conveyed pragmatically when the sentence is uttered). This set of worlds is referred to as the proposition that the sentence expresses. This notion of semantic content works well for declarative sentences, whose main conversational role is indeed to provide information. For instance, the main communicative function of the declarative sentence in (1) below is to convey the information that Bill is coming. (1) Bill is coming. But information exchange typically does not just consist in a sequence of declar- 1.1. Motivation 9 ative sentences. An equally important role is played by interrogative sentences, whose main conversational role is to raise issues. Can the semantic content of an interrogative sentence be construed as a set of possible worlds as well? Consider the example in (2), a polar interrogative: (2) Is Bill coming? Frege(1918) famously proposed that the interrogative in (2) and the declarative in (1) can indeed be taken to have the same semantic content: \An interrogative sentence and an indicative one contain the same thought; but the indicative contains something else as well, namely, the assertion. The interrogative sentence contains something more too, namely a request. Therefore two things must be distinguished in an indicative sentence: the content, which it has in common with the corresponding sentence-question, and the assertion." (Frege, 1918, p.294)1 So the idea is that declaratives and interrogatives have the same semantic content|a proposition|but come with a different force|either assertion or request. This idea has been quite prominent in the literature, especially in speech act theory (Searle, 1969; Vanderveken, 1990).2 However, as noted by Frege himself, it is limited in scope. It may work for simple polar interrogatives, but not for many other kinds of interrogatives, like (3)-(4): (3) Is Bill coming, or Sue? (4) Who is coming? Moreover, as has been argued extensively in the more recent literature
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