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Ethical Record The Proceedings of the South Place Ethical Society Vol. 109 No. 5 21.50 June 2004 The Fenner Brockway statue, Red Lion Square, Holborn, (adjacent to Conway Hall) on 22 May 2004, on the 50th Anniversary of Liberation, formerly the Movement for Colonial Freedom, founded by Fenner Brockway. (/ to r) Don Liversedge (SPES Hon Rep), Barbara Smoker (whose Guardian letter elicited the funds to repair the statue after the storm damage), Stan Newens (ex MEP), the statue;c sculptor Ian Walters, Jeremy Corbyn MP Tony Bent:. DURKHEIM: ACHIEVING MORAL CONSENSUS Tom Rabens 3 DR. YOUNUS SHAIKH FREE! IHEU 10 I. D. MACKILLOP (1939-2004.) Jennifer Jeynes 10 DO GIFTED CHILDREN NEED SPECIAL PROVISION? Lorraine Foreman-Peck 11 NEWS FROM THE AMERICAS Ellen Ramsay 15 SCIENCE IN THE CITY - WALK .Michael Howgate 16 VICTOR HUGO & SCIENCE Valerie M. Henderson 19 BOOK REVIEW: THE ROOTS OF HATE Gerald Vinten 21 VIEWPOINTS Dr John Edmondson, Randolph Atkins 22 ETHICAL SOCIETY EVENTS 24 SOUTH PLACE ETHICAL SOCIETY Conway Hall Humanist Centre 25 Red Lion Square, London WC I R 4RL. Tel: 020 7242 8034 Fax: 020 7242 8036 Website: www.ethicalsoc.org.uk [email protected] Officers Chairman of the GC: Terry Mullins. Hon. Representativeof the GC: Don Liversedge. Vice Chairman: John Rayner. Registrar: Edmund McArthur. Editor, Ethical Record: Norman Bacrac SPES Staff Administrative Secretag to the Society: Marina Ingham Tel: 020 7242 8034 Librarian/Progranune Coordinator: Jennifer Jeynes M.Sc. Tel: 020 7242 8037 Hall Manager: Peter Vlachos MA. For Hall bookings: Tel: 020 7242 8032 Caretakers: Eva Auhrechtova, Shaip Bullaku, David Wright Tel: 020 7242 8033 AdministrativelClerical Staff. Carina Kelsey, Victoria Le Fevre, Nanu Patel SPES TRIP: TO THETFORD FOR THOMAS PAINE DAY SATURDAY 3 JULY 2004 Readings & Floral Tribute laying at the TP Statue. Guided walk round Thetford highlighting Paine Associations. Thlk/debate at the Carnegie Room Leaving Red Lion Square promptly at 0930, returning approx. 2000h Tel. admin 020 7242 8034 to reserve seats (115) in A/c Luxury Coach 75th ANNIVERSARY OF CONWAY HALL * CELEBRATION * * * * * Thursday 23 September 2004 ALL MEMBERS WILL RECEIVE A PERSONAL INVITATION SOUTH PLACE ETHICAL SOCIETY Rea. Charity No. 251396 Founded in 1793, the Society is a progressive movement whose aims are: the study and dissemination of ethical principles based on humanism, thc cultivation of a rational and humane way of life, and the advancement of research and education in relevant fields. We invite to membership those who reject supernatural creeds and are in sympathy with our aims. At Conway Hall the programme includes Sunday lectures, discussions, evening courses and the renowned South Place Sunday Concerts of chamber music. The Society maintains a Humanist Reference Library. The Society's journal, Ethical Record, is issued tcn times a year. Funerals and Memorial meetings may be arranged. The annual subscription is 18 (112 if a full-time student, unwaged or over 65). Ethical Rmwrd, June, 2004 EMILE DURKHEIM: ACHIEVING MORAL CONSENSUS IN MODERN SOCIETY Lecture to the Ethical Society, 18 April 2004 Tom Rubens Emile Durkheim (1858--1917) is one of a number of distinguished French sociologists of the last 200 years; among others are Montesquieu. Comte and Tocqueville. This talk will consist of a--necessarily brief--exposition of his main ideas on the subject of moral consensus. In a short, final section of the talk, I will attempt some commentary, in connection with certain personal views I will advance on the recent and present state of British society ( as an example of the modern Western type of collectivity about which Durkheim wrote.) Also, exposition of Durkheim's view will be given in the past tense, whereas what I regard as incontrovertibly or arguably fact will be stated in the present tense. Societies: From Mechanical To Organic For Durkheim, the achievement of moral consensus was a key issue. Consensus is of course vital for all societies, but, as Durkheim argued, especially so in the modern Western context. This was the case because modern society had a form of solidarity which was organic, as distinct from mechanical. Organic solidarity was a kind which achieved unity and harmony through differentiation, diversity, and the extensive development of individuality. By contrast, mechanical solidarity rested not on difference but on resemblance: its unity depended on individuals closely resembling one another, and sharing, almost entirely, the same general outlook. (This distinction, incidentally, recalls Popper's between open and closed societies. It's worth noting that Durkheim's precedes Popper's.) Durkheim chose the term 'organic' with a biological analogy in mind. Organic social solidarity worked in the way an animal body does: different organs perform different functions to maintain an overall, co-ordinated metabolism. He added that mechanical solidarity was characteristic of what sociologists call archaic societies--those without writing--while organic solidarity, as said, characterised modern Western society. Historically, the mechanical came first, and the organic arose with the disintegration of the former. However, in all societies, the organic no less than the mechanical, there existed a collective consciousness of some kind. While there was a contrast in the degree to which the collective outlook influenced that of the individual in mechanical and organic societies, nevertheless the person in the organic context was, in considerable measure, tied to the social whole. Though, in mechanical solidarity, the collective mind filled the major part of the individual's perspective, whereas in organic solidarity it occupied much less space. still the person in the organic context was required to adhere to a number of collective norms, albeit far fewer than in the mechanical context. This was the case in spite of the differentiation between individuals which Durkheim saw as the defining feature of organic solidarity; and despite the fact that, under organic conditions, the individual was to a large extent free to believe, desire and act according to his / her own preferences. For Durkheim, the individual was always inseparable from the group; s/he was in fact born of society, and not society of individuals. By this, Durkheim meant that society formed the single individual, and was not formed by single individuals. The social whole was always greater than its parts, with a character distinct from Ethical Record, June, 2004 3 the characters of its individual members. Accordingly, the whole explained the parts, and not the converse. Social facts were accounted for by other social facts, and not by facts of individual pyschology. In order to understand the status of the individual in society, one had to examine the collectivity which made that status possible. (This subordination of part to whole echoes Hegel's social philosophy.) To illustrate his thesis, Durkheim pointed out that, in modern society, differentiation between individuals goes hand in hand with an extensive division of labour. He argued that such diversity was partly the result of the division of labour, but mainly the cause of it, since the whole idea of extensive division of work would have been inconceivable in a society which did not already possess a highly developed sense of individuality, and was not, therefore, already organic in character. Hence the emergence of a widespread variegation of labour reflected an already-existing organic solidarity, though dne that would develop further. Hence also, the division of labour extended differentiation but did not create it. In order to comprehend the role that contracts play in modern society, we had to understand that contractual practice between individuals or small groups was itself made possible by the overall structure of their society. This was a structure shaped by a collective consciousness which had a particular sense of right and wrong, justice and injustice, and which had formulated a legal system sanctioning contracts. The collective consciousness was, again, of the organic type, allowing individuals to do things, such as drawing up contracts, which they would not have been allowed to do had the collectivity been mechanical. Thus the practice of particular individuals was enabled by conditions which the individuals themselves did not create. (All this runs counter to some traditional liberal schools of social thought, especially those connected with social-contract theory.) Anomie - Lack Of Cohesion Thus for Durkheim there were three main points to note about modern organic society:- 1) It was highly differentiated; a fact which was its defining feature. 2) This differentiation was nevertheless the expression of a collective outlook which sanctioned individuality. 3) Because the collective outlook was the condition for individualism, the latter could never be absolute, if society was to hold together. The collectivity placed necessary limits on the sphere of individual conduct; it imposed responsibilities and prohibitions, in addition to granting extensive freedoms. Further, it transmitted a moral and cultural heritage which occupied a significant part of the individual mentality, no matter how distinctive the latter might be. Organic society, then, tempered individualism by possessing a number of beliefs, feelings and values which were common to all its members. Or--at least-- such was the case when society was in a healthy condition, with a balanced relationship between the individual and the