Munir Masood Marath

A Thesis Titled

Al-Qaida Apologists and the Agents: Narratives and Counter Narrative of Violence

Munir Masood Marath

Registration No. 02-GCU-PhD-PS-2011

Department of Political Science GC University Lahore

A Thesis Titled

Al-Qaida Apologists and the Agents : Narratives and Counter Narrative of Violence

Submitted to GC University Lahore in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in

Political Science

By Munir Masood Marath Registration No. 02-GCU-PhD-PS-2011

Department of Political Science GC University Lahore

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Dedicated to my Parents

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Acknowledgements

From the very outset of my academic career, the field of my keen interest has been political Islam. From this premise, I concentrated on Islamism and violence unleashed by different militant organizations in the name of Islamic ideology. Luckily, this study came out to be my hot pursuit. It provided me with the interest and aptitude needed to initiate advanced research with the aim to crystallize my academic ambitions.

Perhaps my efforts might not have been of much success, and I would have been lost in bewilderment, had I not been a Ravian whose exalted institution is indeed an embodiment of academic knowledge and experience. In this institution of high learning, I was exceptionally fortunate to have the guidance of Dr. Farhat Mehmood. I am also highly indebted to Dr. Khalid Butt, Chairman of the Department of Political Science for his invaluable cooperation during the course of this research.

It would be unjust on my part if I do not say a word of gratitude to my friend and colleague Asim Gulzar whose scholarly input not only enlightened me but also triggered in me a clear perception of the project I undertook for research. I must admit that it was my wife Beelam who has been source of encouragement throughout the course of this research. She has been careful reader of the draft and has contributed in a number of ways the completion of this work. My daughters Fatima Marath and Mahnoor Marath too, helped me simply by being there. Likewise, my brother Saleem Marath and my niece Maleeha Marath have also been source of continuous encouragement for me. I must mention Shakeel Raza as well who helped me in composing the draft. I have relied on Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall’s translation of the Quranic text. I am grateful to the publishers for making this piece of translation available.

Last but not the least, I am thankful to all of them, and to those as well whom I met just off and on in connection with my study, for being my well-wishers.

Munir Masood Marath

Abstract

The study aims to test the hypothesis that the conflict between the militants and the west being inherently ideological involves three parties which include, the militants, the apologists and those whom Al-Qaida label as agents of the west. The conflict has serious implications internalized to the Muslim societies in terms of even changing the boundaries of faith through the interplay of socio-political variables. Though, violence emerged in the Muslim societies in terms of a means of emancipation or identity when the state became irrelevant to deal with the conflict situation. The failure of state apparatus resulted in codification of violence at individual or group level and sometimes between the states as well. The grounds for codification were secured from juxtaposition of socio-political variables with the religious beliefs. Since, the paradigms of codification were largely provided by socio-political variables, thus, these variables continued to be relevant to the espousal of the codes of war by the militants. However, the militants have always looked towards religion to seek legitimacy to their acts of violence. The study exposing the fallacy of the narratives offered by the militants, the apologists and Al-Qaida labeled agents, offers a counter narrative to unmask their true facets. The counter narrative will reinterpret the primary sources, unravel the historical and socio-political constructs, unmask the heroes and enemies, challenge the theories and dichotomy of practices, re-establish the boundaries between heresy and faith and attempts to transform the current ideological discourse.

Contents

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1

1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY ...... 5 1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ...... 6 1.3 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS ...... 6 1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 7 1.5 RESEARCH SCHEME ...... 11 1.6 METHODOLOGY ...... 12 1. FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT ...... 14

1.1 IDEOLOGY...... 14 1.1.1 Religion ...... 14 1.1.2 Economics ...... 15 1.1.3 Sociology ...... 16 1.2 ORDERS AND THE STATE FORMATION ...... 16 1.2.1 Political Orders ...... 16 1.2.2 Social Order ...... 33 1.2.3 Religious Order ...... 36 2 HERESY OF IDEAS ...... 43

2.1 KEY TERMINOLOGY...... 43 2.1.1 Orthodoxy and Heresy (bida’ā) ...... 44 2.1.2 Apostasy (irti’dād) and Ex-communication (takfīr) ...... 44 2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ...... 45 2.3 PRINCIPLES OF KHURŪJ, IRTI’DĀD AND TAKFĪR ...... 47 2.3.1 Conditions for Khurūj ...... 47 2.3.2 Grounds to invoke Irti’dād and Takfīr ...... 52 3 POLEMICS REVISITED ...... 58

3.1 GENESIS OF THE POLEMICS ...... 58 3.1.1 Right to Prophetic Inheritance ...... 58 3.1.2 Belief in Imamate ...... 59 3.1.3 Right to Caliphate ...... 60 3.2 THEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF SECTARIAN DIVIDE: CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE ...... 63 3.3 POLITICAL VARIABLES VIS-À-VIS DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES ...... 65 3.3.1 Fatimid Caliphate ...... 65 3.3.2 Safāvīd Empire ...... 68 3.3.3 Rise of Wahābīsm...... 70 3.3.4 Iranian Revolution 1979 ...... 70 3.4 SECTARIAN RAPPROCHEMENT ...... 74 4 CODIFICATION OF VIOLENCE ...... 79

4.1 VIOLENCE AND IDENTITY CRISIS NEXUS ...... 80 4.2 GENESIS OF CODIFICATION OF VIOLENCE ...... 82 4.2.1 Linkage between Violence and Collaboration with the Colonialists ...... 82 4.2.2 Sectarian Violence due to Irrelevance of Ummah: ...... 89 4.2.3 Violence and Ideological Nostalgia ...... 97 xi

5 CODES OF WAR ...... 106

5.1 MILITANTS’ CODES OF WAR...... 106 5.1.1 Targeting those who Follow Democracy ...... 106 5.1.2 Fighting the Imperialists ...... 110 5.1.3 Eradicating Apostasy within the Muslim Societies ...... 117 5.1.4 Elimination of Heresies ...... 117 5.1.5 Violence against the Shiites ...... 119 5.1.6 Fighting against the ‘Nearer Enemy’ ...... 121 5.1.7 Attacks against the Local Supporters of the ‘Nearer Enemy’ ...... 127 5.1.8 Elimination of Distinction between the Military and Civilian Targets ...... 130 5.1.9 No Space for Peace Agreements with Non-believers ...... 132 5.1.10 Commission of Major Sins Warrants Takfīr ...... 134 5.1.11 Vengeance-based Violence ...... 134 5.2 CONTRADICTIONS AND GAPS ...... 134 6 FUEL OF FAITH: PAKISTAN- A CASE STUDY ...... 138

6.1 LOCALIZED IDEOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT ...... 138 6.1.1 Degeneration of the Muslims ...... 140 6.1.2 Boundaries of Faith ...... 141 6.1.3 Takfīr of the Shiites and Violence on Sectarian Grounds ...... 142 6.1.4 Suicide attacks against whom Qitāl is Warranted ...... 143 6.1.5 Khurūj against Unjust Muslim Rulers ...... 144 6.1.6 Democracy and Islam ...... 146 6.1.7 Permission of Muslim Rulers to Wage Jihad...... 147 6.2 MILITANT LANDSCAPE ...... 149 6.2.1 Localized Militant Environment ...... 149 6.2.2 Ideological Framework of the Terrorists ...... 155 6.2.3 Ideological Streams of the Terrorists ...... 157 6.2.4 Impact of Militants’ Ideological Streams ...... 160 7 KILLING FIELDS ...... 173

7.1 BIPOLAR BACKYARDS IN TERMS OF SECTARIAN SPLIT ...... 173 7.1.1 Sectarian vs Anti-Imperialist Themes ...... 173 7.1.2 Vulnerabilities of the Polemics ...... 177 7.2 STATE OPPRESSION BY THE TOTALITARIAN REGIMES ...... 179 7.2.1 Conceptual Framework ...... 179 7.2.2 Somalia ...... 180 7.2.3 Algeria ...... 184 7.2.4 Egypt ...... 186 7.3 UNHEALED WOUNDS IN THE MUSLIM LANDS: GAZA AND PALESTINE ...... 188 7.3.1 Militant Religious Nationalism ...... 189 7.3.2 Global Religious Militancy ...... 191 7.4 THEATERS OF INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION ...... 193 8 COUNTER NARRATIVE ...... 198

8.1 LIMITS OF FAITH ...... 198 8.2 GROUNDS OF TAKFĪR ...... 199 8.2.1 Khawārij ...... 200 8.2.2 Rawāfidh ...... 200 8.2.3 Jahāmiyyah ...... 202 8.2.4 Qarāmitah ...... 203 8.3 KHURŪJ ...... 208 xii

8.3.1 Imam Tahāwī ...... 208 8.3.2 Ibn Kathīr ...... 208 8.3.3 Ibn Taimmiyah ...... 209 8.3.4 Limitations of Obedience ...... 212 8.4 RELIGIOUS NECESSITY OF CALIPHATE ...... 213 8.5 PUBLIC CONSENT ...... 214 8.6 INSTRUMENTS OF POLITICAL DIVIDE ...... 216 8.7 CANDIDATURE ...... 216 8.8 FIXING THE POLEMICAL CONTEXT ...... 220 8.8.1 Days of the Prophet ...... 221 8.8.2 Financial Rights of Ahl-e-bayt during the Caliphate of Hazrat Abū Bakr ...... 222 8.8.3 Ali’s Willing Baya’ā to Hazrat Umar and Role in State Administration ...... 225 8.8.4 Relationship between the House of Uthmān and Ahl-e-bayt ...... 227 8.9 WAR ETHICS ...... 228 8.9.1 Suicide Killings ...... 229 8.9.2 Distinction between Combatants and Non-Combatants ...... 230 8.9.3 Violence against the Fellow Believers ...... 230 8.9.4 Violence against Non-Believers ...... 231 8.9.5 People of Covenant ...... 231 8.9.6 People of Guarantee ...... 231 8.9.7 Vengeance Driven Violence ...... 234 CONCLUSION ...... 236 9 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 241

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List of Tables

Table 6-1 Major Causes of Muslims’ Degeneration ...... 141 Table 6-2 Takfīr on the Basis of Bida’ā ...... 141 Table 6-3 Takfīr of the Shiites ...... 142 Table 6-4 Sectarian Violence ...... 143 Table 6-5 Permissibility of Suicide Attacks ...... 143 Table 6-6 Khurūj against Unjust Rulers ...... 144 Table 6-7 Permissibility of Suicide Attacks against the Supporters of the Non-Believers .... 145 Table 6-8 Khurūj to Demand enforcement of Shariah ...... 146 Table 6-9 Permissibility of Khurūj against Injustice of Muslim Rulers and Khurūj to Demand for the enforcement of Shariah: a Comparison ...... 146 Table 6-10 Democracy and Islam ...... 147 Table 6-11 Jihad without Rulers’ Permission ...... 147 Table 6-12 Academic Background ...... 150 Table 6-13 Religious Education ...... 150 Table 6-14 Secular Education ...... 151 Table 6-15 Age Group ...... 151 Table 6-16 Linkage with International Conflict ...... 152 Table 6-17 Sectarian Affiliations ...... 152 Table 6-18 Organizational Affiliations ...... 153 Table 6-19 Multiple Organizational Affiliations ...... 153 Table 6-21 Nature of Targets ...... 155 Table 6-20 Operational Patterns of Terrorist Organizations ...... 156 Table 6-22 Attacks on Western Targets (Region-wise Breakup) ...... 165 Table 6-23 Violence against Minorities ...... 167

List of Figures Figure 6-1 Inter-organization Movement ...... 154 Figure 6-2 Killings in Sectarian Violence in Pakistan (1989-2016) ...... 161 Figure 6-3 Shiites Causalities (2001-2016) ...... 161 Figure 6-4 Attacks on Sufi Shrines ...... 162 Figure 6-5 Suicide Attacks ...... 163 Figure 6-6 Attacks against Western Targets ...... 164 Figure 6-7 Attacks against Media ...... 166 Figure 6-8 Human Loss of LEAs ...... 169 Figure 6-9 Human Loss of Tribal Elders ...... 169 Figure 6-10 Terrorist Attacks on Party Leaders/ Workers, Candidates and Voters (Jan.1-May 15, 2013) ...... 170

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Transliteration Table (Arabic)

Letter Name Romanization Letter Name Romanization

ẓāʼ ẓ ظ ' hamzah ء

ʻayn ă ع alif A ا

ghayn gh غ bāʼ B ب

fāʼ f ف tāʼ T ت

qāf q ق thāʼ Th ث

kāf k ك jīm J ج

lām l ل ḥāʼ ḥ ح

mīm m م khāʼ Kh خ

nūn n ن dāl D د

hāʼ h ه dhāl Dh ذ

wāw w; ū و rāʼ R ر

yāʼ y; ī يzayn/zāy Z ز

alif maddah ā, ʼā آ sīn S س

tāʼ marbūṭa h; t ة shīn Sh ش h alif á ى ṣād ṣ ص maqṣūrah alif lām al ال ḍād ḍ ض

ṭāʼ ṭ ط

List of Abbreviations

AH Anno Hegirae, Year of the Hegira AMISOM African Union Mission to Somalia ANP Awami National Party AQAP al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula AQIM Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CJP Committee to Protect Journalists CNN Cable News Network DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine FATA Federally Administered Tribal Area FIG Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya FIS Islamic Salvation Front GIA al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha GMT Greenwich Mean Time GTD Global Terrorism Database ICU Ittihād al-mahākim al-islāmiyya IHK Indian Held Kashmir ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria JM Jaish-e- Muhammad JUI (F) Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazl) KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhwa LEA Law Enforcement Agency LEJ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam MIJ Movement of Islamic Jihad MOJWA Monotheism and Jihad Movement in West Africa NGO Non-Governmental Organization OBL Osama Bin Laden OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PLO Palestine Liberation Organization PML-Q Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e- Azam) PNC Palestine National Council SICC Supreme Islamic Courts Council SNM Somali National Movement SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front START Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism TFG Transitional Federal Government TNFJ Tehrīk Nifāz Fiqah Ja’afriā TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan WSLF Western Somali Liberation Front 1

1 Introduction

Lenses of religion and politics have produced a different but skeptical view of jihad. The recent scholarship links it to terrorism. The asymmetrical warfare waged against the power centers of nation states and their ideology expressed through democracy is the forte of those who are showcased as militants or labeled as Islamic terrorists. In this war, the definition of a Muslim and Islam is challenged alongside the obliteration of Muslim and western states. Non-Combatant Muslims as well as non-Muslims are wrapped into the fold of enemies and application of kinetic force is used as a strategy. One side employs beheadings and suicide bombings whereas the other utilizes Drones and Signature Strikes. The conflict however, transcends beyond tactics and spawns into the ideological frontiers. ‘Crusade’ and ‘Return of the Children of Ibn Qayyam’ speak of the narratives that resonate from both sides. Heroes are resurrected and battles redrawn across the globe. Return to past and shameful violence is a conspicuous element of this clash. In this backdrop, three mutually divergent narratives have been espoused by the parties to the conflict. The first narrative is based upon recasting multifarious local conflicts into a broader struggle between an ‘authentic Islam’ and the west specifically the US. This has ascribed the notion of jihad a mission and the strategy pronounced by Al-Qaida aimed at building a universal Islamic caliphate. As Bin Laden provided the front and finances to the organization, Al-Zawahiri fueled the ideological spirit. The latter’s views do not fully conform to any major recognized school of Islamic scholasticism. His ideas have been defined by the political developments in the Middle East and salafī school of thought and have been contextualized to support the new ideology. For instance, on the issues of suicide bombings and revolt against Muslim rulers, he differs from the traditional Wahābī standpoint as followed by Saudi sheikhs who consider the suicidal attacks impermissible in Islamic theological perspective. Killing of Muslims is now sanctioned by Al-Qaida by justifying collateral damage through redefining the concept of al-tatarrūs.

Moreover, it is argued that Al-Qaida’s ideology is rooted in Egyptian fundamentalist tradition of the 20th century. It shares its ideological contours with Ikhwān and its splinter groups like al-Jamāʻah al-Islāmīyah, Islamic jihad and Hamas. All cherish to vie for the establishment of Islamic political order through militaristic means vouchsafed in the name of jihad waged against the Western forces which Sayyed Qutb terms as ‘forces of jāhilliyah’. However, this philosophy of resistance to the Western forces underwent radical transformation under Al-Zawahiri after the demise of the Soviet Union. During the cold war, West could not make a united front at global level as it remained polarized between the Communist and the Capitalist blocs. Islamism also remained limited to a state-centered phenomenon as is evident from different movements in South East Asia, Middle East, South Asia and Africa. However, once the cold war was over and the US emerged as the sole superpower, the Western challenge became unified and global. In response to this global challenge, 2

philosophy of resistance too, got redefined under Al-Qaida on the premise of a common external enemy that was standing between the liberation of holy land of Palestine and powerless Muslims through its naked western support to Israel. It added a new perception in the Muslim Ummah across the Muslim Crescent that dictatorships especially in the Middle East follow the agenda of the west against the fellow believers. On this ground, the militants label these regimes as ‘agents of the west’.

In this conflict scenario, in order to legitimize violence, though we find with Al-Qaida ideologues frequent references to traditional scholars like the 13th century theologian Imam Ibn Taimmiyah yet they have been selective in his following. For instance, inspiration is drawn from Ibn Taimmiyah’s decree against Mongols whereby the obedience of those in authority was made conditional to their obedience to the God but at the same time they coined their own interpretations of Islam in terms of disregarding distinction between the combatants and non-combatants within the Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Given the militant character and conspicuous deviations from the authentic Islamic texts and practices of the salaf, this narrative fails to win approval of the Muslims at large. Al-Qaida’s ideology of khurūj against the Muslim rulers is inconsistent with the traditional theological Sunnite standpoint that does not approve of such actions against Muslim rulers except under specific conditions which are not present in Al-Qaida’s case. The militant narrative labels the Muslim rulers as ‘agents of the west’ and further alleges the ‘apologists’ to have perverted the ‘authentic Islam’. This narrative is based upon ideology which lacks in space for dialogue with those who happen to be on the other side of the fence. From this perspective, taking Al-Qaida in terms of an idea, this study seeks to examine the narratives of the militant outfits as well which claim to draw their ideological inspirations from Al-Qaida.

The second narrative revisits Islamic precepts through western democratic context instead of redefining Islam in its exclusive framework. Those who follow this narrative are marked as ‘apologists’. Some scholars like Maryam Jameelah term them as “West-worshippers” and argue that these are mediocre end products of their circumstances and have an overwhelming sense of inferiority. This narrative finds its common place with the apologists ranging from India to Sudan. For instance, early 20th century witnessed Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan vying for removing ideological fault- lines between the imperialist west and the Indian Muslims. He focused exclusively upon exploring common grounds between the two. He wrote bilingual commentary of Bible titled Tabyin-ul-Kalām wherein he attempted to discover common grounds between Christianity and Islam. He undertook to bring about reconciliation between the Christian British government and the Muslim subjects. Similarly, in Sudan, Mahmoud Muhammad Tāhā carried this apologist approach with him. He advocated democracy and opposed implementation of a version of Shariah. He was convinced of gender parity and equal status of Muslims and non-Muslims. He bifurcated between the Sunna and Shariah and viewed the post- Hijrā portion of the Quranic revelation in that-time contextual framework whereas in his opinion it was only the Makkan 3

portion of the Quranic revelations which provided guidelines for the modern age. This approach is in direct contrast to the majority opinion of Muslim ulema. This narrative ignores the basic tenets of the faith as agreed upon by the majority of ulema. It focused largely upon reconciling Muslim beliefs with the contemporary western values. It lost its credibility for ignoring the basic tenets of faith and also for not giving due importance to ideological differences between Islam and western ideology.

The third narrative refers to the dictatorial and westernized ruling elite in the Muslim lands. They are labeled as apostates for following anti-Islamic and imperialist agenda in the Muslim heartlands. The narrative of these agents is focused upon blatant use of force against the militant elements. They view in this coercive approach a panacea for this conflict situation. They attempt to draw legitimacy to their violence through their ideological reliance upon the apologists’ views. Nevertheless, this narrative for its sole reliance upon the use of force has also ended up in failure to settle this conflict. It leads to an argument that both Al-Qaida and those whom they label as ‘agents’ employ the same strategy and same levels of violence.

In this background where all the three available narratives have virtually failed to end violence, this study aims to offer a counter narrative. The identification of all the three afore-mentioned parties to the conflict leads to the argument that nature of conflict between them is essentially ideological with strong internal implications for the Muslim societies. The ardent quest for exposing these implications will lead to locate the trajectories of heresy which have virtually changed the boundaries of faith. As the fundamentals whereupon the boundaries of faith are ideally drawn have remained constant, therefore, this change in limits of faith is attributed to socio-political variables. These variables could prevail upon the constants through transgressing into the theological discourse developed over centuries. Though, initially, theologians championing the idealism of faith could resist the transgression of these variables yet in the subsequent course of history, they could not guard the immunity of religious ideals against the thrust of these variables which opened the venues of loose application of takfīr and khurūj. The classical theorists like Ibn Kathīr and Ibn Taimmiyah did not approve of khurūj against the rulers even if they do not fulfill the conditions ideally required for a Muslim ruler. They stressed upon the importance of jamāt and did not permit the believers to commit khurūj against the rulers unless they forego any fundamental of faith. Further, the classical theorists believe that takfīr is invoked only in case of refutation of the fundamentals of the faith. As against the classical theorists, the boundaries of faith squeezed with Ibn Abdul Wahāb who developed his theology in juxtaposition with his contemporary socio-political variables. He did not identify those who happened to practice the faith different from his own brand to be the Muslims at all. He did not even recognize the Islamic character of his contemporary Arab society rather he identified it with pre-Islamic jāhilliyah. Ibn Abdul Wahāb’s narrative found its subscription with Sayyed Maudūdī and Sayyed Qutb but with a certain level of mutual differences. The former did not approve of armed struggle against the forces of jāhilliyah whereas the latter retained 4

the option of armed resistance against these forces in final resort to be launched through his ‘vanguard’ of committed volunteers. Subsequently, the militants adopted this narrative to internalize their violence towards the Muslim societies.

The ideas of heresy metamorphosed into polemics that provided a trajectory for permanent fissures within the Muslim societies. In historical context, these cleavages emerged in the Muslims on the basis of doctrinal differences largely on three questions regarding ‘claim to prophetic inheritance’, ‘belief in imamate’ and ‘claim to the caliphate’. These dogmatic differences between the Shiites and the Sunnites set in physical and political conflict when juxtaposed with socio-political variables. In this backdrop, sectarian empires like Fatimid Caliphate and Safāvīd dynasty emerged which adopted sectarian violence in terms of a resource to the statehood. The emergence of these empires on the trajectories of polemics led to such historical presuppositions which could provide grounds for sectarian strife to flourish upon during the periods to come.

Though, sectarian polarization could not take place in the Islamic society until the emergence of the Safāvīd Empire in the 16th century. However, violence could not reach the masses until colonization took place in the Muslim lands. The colonial initiatives led to identity crises with the Muslim masses. This identity crisis that continued to exist even in the post-colonial Muslim societies in terms of colonial hangover led to codification of violence at the behest of religious ulema. This codification took place on the trajectories of ‘collaboration with the colonialists’, ‘irrelevance of Ummah to bridge the polemical divide’ and above all, ‘nostalgia for the caliphate’.

In the post-colonial context when the imperialists attempted to pursue their colonial designs through securing the collaboration of the Muslim rulers, triangular conflict involving the colonialists, the Islamists and the apologists got redesigned to accommodate a new target whom the militants label as apostate rulers in the Muslim lands. In this changed scenario, the militants developed their codes of war which include targeting the advocates of democracy, fighting the imperialists, fight against combatants and non-combatants alike, vengeance-based violence, and above all, cleansing the elements of apostasy in the Muslim societies. These apostate elements in the Muslim societies include the Shiites, other elements of heresies and local supporters of the west whom the militants label as ‘nearer enemies’. These codes of war reflect that implications of the conflict have been largely internalized to the Muslim societies. The empirical evidence gathered from Pakistan and elsewhere also confirms these codes of war with the militants.

Nevertheless, a study of the killing fields of Al-Qaida suggests that these flashpoints of violence may be examined in the context of bipolar backyards in terms of sectarian split, state oppression by totalitarian regimes, simmering wounds in the Muslim world, and above all, theaters of international aggression. In the first instance, sectarian split between the Shiite and the Sunnite is explored in Lebanon, Syria and 5

Iraq by developing two major arguments: one, despite sharing common anti- imperialist themes, the militants hardly compromise on their sectarian identities and, two, sectarian schisms are vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of the militants for securing political and strategic gains. In the second instance, the flashpoints of violence have been identified as products of state oppression by the totalitarian regimes. This state-oppression needs to be viewed in terms of a structural concept which has multiple manifestations. This oppression is commonly manifested in the form of economic exploitation, political marginalization and repression against a selective group. On these paradigms, Somalia, Algeria and Egypt are taken as test- cases where state oppression culminated into emergence of these states into militants’ killing fields. In third instance, Gaza and Palestine are identified to be the simmering wounds in the Muslim lands. They provide legitimacy to the violence of the militants in their bid to avenge these wounds. In the last instance, theaters of international aggression like Iraq provide space to the militants to assimilate their ideology of resistance to the west and their struggle for the liberation of Muslim Ummah.

In the last resort, the study offers a counter narrative to transform the contemporary ideological discourse by revisiting the primary sources and ultimately leads to refutation of the militants’ claim of following an authentic Islam. The counter narrative while examining two sets of sects in the course of Islamic history redraws the boundaries of faith and develops an argument that only refutation of any fundamental of faith as such invokes takfīr. The first set includes Khawārij and the Shiites who were not ex-communicated. Despite their multiple deviations from the path agreed upon by the majority of ulema, they did not happen to refute any fundamental principle of faith as such. The second set includes Jahāmiyyah and Qarāmitah who came up with categorical refutation of the basic tenets of faith and thus, takfīr was invoked against them by the ulema. The counter narrative also invalidates the khurūj against the Muslim rulers even if they do not fulfill the ideal Islamic conditions required for the rulers. Khurūj is only permissible when the ruler forego any basic tenet of faith. Further, the counter narrative seeks to suggest that democratic principles like public consent, instruments of political divide, candidature to the position of authority and territorial nationalism in terms of a means to revive the Ummah are theologically approved acts provided they do not believe in popular sovereignty. The counter narrative further revisits the primary sources and by ascertaining the historical evidence, exposes invalidity of grounds whereupon the polemics have been constructed. Furthermore, the counter narrative explores the ethics of war from the early period of Islamic history and challenges the militants’ codes of war and their tactics.

1.1 Objectives of the Study

The study aims to identify parties to the conflict between the militants and the west and inquire into the underlying themes of these actors. As themes of conflict happen to be ideological in character with more strong implications internal to the Muslim 6

societies, therefore, the study locates the trajectories of violence within the Muslim societies. The study examines the grounds upon which codification of violence could take place and suggests that violence could creep into the Muslim societies only when it was adopted by the state system. The study further identifies the codes of war adopted by the militants to achieve their goals in a broader global perspective. Finally, it leads to develop a counter narrative to the conflict through challenging the theological veracity of the militant narrative.

1.2 Significance of the Study

The significance of this study lies in its scope to examine the dynamics of the conflict that have culminated into change not only in the western perception of Islam but it has also challenged the definition of a Muslim even within the Muslim societies. In the given scenario, apart from the west, three parties to the conflict have emerged which include the militants, the apologists and the ruling elite in the Muslim states whom the militant label as ‘apostates’ for promoting western agenda against the fellow Muslims. The failure of the narratives developed by the parties to the conflict highlights the importance of this study even further. It aims to offer a counter-narrative that may lead to resolution of the conflict. In its bid to espouse a counter-narrative, the study attempts to locate the trajectories of heresy and invalidates the ideas of takfīr and khūrūj as held by the militants. The scientific significance of the study lies in the fact that it will extend theoretical value-addition to the existing knowledge base.

1.3 Research Hypothesis

The study seeks to test the hypothesis that conflict between the militants and the west is essentially ideological. It involves three parties which include, the militants, the apologists and those whom Al-Qaida labels as agents of the west. The conflict has serious implications internalized to the Muslim societies in terms of even changing the boundaries of faith through the interplay of socio-political variables. Though, violence emerged in the Muslim societies in terms of a means of emancipation or identity when the state became irrelevant to deal with the conflict situation yet the failure of state apparatus resulted in codification of violence at individual or group level and sometimes between the states as well. The grounds for codification were secured from juxtaposition of socio-political variables with the religious beliefs. As the paradigms of codification were largely provided by socio-political variables, therefore, these variables continued to be relevant to the espousal of the codes of war by the militants. Though the militants have always looked towards religion to seek legitimacy to their acts of violence yet their ideology stands in sharp contradiction to the precepts of faith and historical evidence. This contradiction requires that fallacy of the narrative offered by the militants, the apologists and Al-Qaida-labelled agents be exposed through a counter-narrative. This counter-narrative will attempt to transform the current ideological discourse through reinterpreting the primary sources, unraveling the historical and socio-political constructs, unmasking the heroes and 7

enemies, challenging the theories and dichotomy of practices and above all, re- establishing the boundaries between heresy and faith.

1.4 Literature Review

A lot has been written on the subject especially after 9/11. Most of the literature on this subject addresses the organizational structure of Al-Qaida and the US counterstrategy. However, western scholarship has not left the ideological perspective of militancy unattended. Research work do exist which claims to examine the ideological undercurrents of militancy. Richard Bonney (2007) has attempted to trace the genesis of jihad from the divine scripture and further examined it in the light of the traditions of the Prophet. He has made an attempt to explore different connotations of the subject in the framework developed by the classical jurists. He seeks to highlight the transformations in theory of jihad with the sectarian empires in the Muslim world. He argues that with the rise of these empires, jihad turned into an instrument of physical strength to the statehood. His discussion on jihad culminates into its revisions with the ideologues of contemporary militancy. Bonney deserves the credit for amassing wide range of material but most of the part has remained descriptive in his narrations and virtually failed to draw significant inferences therefrom.

Ideological framework of militancy gets further exposition with Jason Burke (2004) who argues that ‘Al-Qaida is more an idea than an organization’. By focusing on organizational structure of Al-Qaida, he made the point that Al-Qaida organization consisted of largely three elements: hardcore, members and ideology. He argues that Al-Qaida in terms of a formal organizational structure got incapacitated in the wake of US strikes in Afghanistan. However, its self-starting members are motivated by the organization’s ideology. They may not necessarily be linked through an organizational chain, yet they share the sources of ideological inspiration which they draw from the hardcore. Burke has remained focused chiefly upon organizational model of Al-Qaida and the strategies adopted by the subscribers of its ideology to achieve the goals of global jihad.

Actually, Burke’s examination of Al-Qaida seems to be inspired by Gunaratna’s (2002) modeling of the organization and his analysis of the organization’s strategies to achieve its goals. With him, we find a paradigm shift in the study of militancy- from formal organizational structure to a conglomeration of ‘Al-Qaida Core’, other related networks and individuals who are inspired by Al-Qaida’s ideology but operate in their independent capacities. In this framework, Gunaratna argued that the movement consisted of three parts: one, the core group founded by Bin Laden and Azzam and subsequently shattered by the US strikes; two, Al-Qaida-affiliates scattered in different parts of the world and three, ideologically inspired but independent cells struggling in pursuit of global jihad. He further argued that these 8

cells needed to be viewed in terms of product of international community’s efforts to counter militancy.

The issues like Palestine and the US military presence in the Arabian Peninsula have been providing context to the ideological orientations of militancy. Jacquard (2002), while tracing the roots of Islamic jihad to the Egyptian context, makes an inquiry into Islamic fundamentalism. He further includes Bin Laden into his inquiry and examines anthology of his life events from being a fighter in Afghanistan to a refugee in Sudan and again as an associate of Taliban. However, he does not limit himself to the biographical analysis of Bin Laden and also examines the major irritants of militancy.

In view of the frustration emerging out of non-resolution of these irritants, some like Atwan (2006) may warn the west that Muslims’ call to jihad may not be underestimated. They, being moved by historical loss of Ummah and confronted by humiliation at the hands of their contemporary adversaries, look towards jihad for their emancipation. This deprivation is not only felt by the down-trodden sections of the Muslims but also by the educated and financially well-off segments of the society. He further links the educated section of radicalized youth with innovative techniques of militancy. However, some like John L. Esposito (1992) may offer a soft reflection of political Islam vis-à-vis the west when he argues that most of the Islamic movements do not challenge the western interests. On this premise, he argues that major challenge to the west is not to counter political Islam per se rather to develop true understanding of the ground realities in the Muslim world. He further argues that the scope of cooperation between the Muslim states and the west is wider than resistance. Muslims have always been divided in themselves and thus, are not likely to make a unified front against the west. In his analysis of Islamic fundamentalism, he does not see any enemy in the ranks of the Muslims. He further argues that fundamentalists constitute a challenge for the current policies of the west and not for the western civilization as such. As, his study takes into account a milder aspect of Islamic fundamentalism, therefore, he is criticized for his failure to present the actual level of threat to the western world.

Nevertheless, the militants have always been keen to explore the grounds of legitimacy to their acts of violence. In this perspective, Maha Azzam (2003) seeks to explore the grounds of militants’ search for legitimacy to their violent acts. She argues that Bin Laden and his fellow militants may be inspired by Wahābī ideology yet they have never claimed to be Wahābī by themselves. By making reference to his Yemeni descent and his approval of suicide killings, Maha does not identify any ideological linkage between Bin Laden and Wahābī sheikhs. The sheikhs declare suicide killings to be contrary to the Islamic teachings in categorical terms. She attempts to examine the sources of motivation for Bin Laden to subscribe to Ibn Taimmiyah’s ideology. However, she leaves the question unanswered whether he, himself, was inspired by 9

this 13th century theologian or he borrowed the fascination for Ibn Taimmiyah’s ideas from his fellow Egyptian militants. She argues that Al-Qaida mat be viewed in terms of a movement instead of being merely a terrorist organization. It has provided militants from diverse backgrounds with a converging point to subscribe to the codes of war espoused by its ideologues. With a reference to Al-Zawahiri’s treatise Shifā Sūdūr al-Mŭminīn, she suggests that ideology of Al-Qaida originates from Al- Zawahiri whereas front and finances to the organization were provided by Bin Laden. She highlights the blueprints of Al-Zawahiri’s ideology including his doctrine of ‘nearer enemy’, his views of personal responsibility, and his twin ideas of ‘greater good’ and response to exceptional circumstances. These ideas lead Al-Qaida to claim a distinct ideological character in the array of militant organization.

As a matter of fact, the western narrative vis-à-vis militancy has failed to marginalize Al-Qaida leadership and curtail its ideological appeal despite the fact that Muslims, at large, do not approve of militants’ narrative. Sherifa Zahur (2008) exposes the weakness of the narratives espoused by the US and its allied Muslim rulers. She further argues that confused perception of the problem is major cause of the weakness of the US narrative on counter-terrorism. This weakness can only be removed through increased coordination with its Muslim allies’ perspective of their faith. Sherifa highlights the grounds that hinder the Muslims to own this counter narrative. She argues the Muslims in general feel constrained to follow this narrative because it challenges even the fundamentals of their faith. This confusion is a natural outcome of identifying militancy with Islam by the west.

However, there are others like Mozaffari (2007) who draw a line of distinction between Islam and Islamism as well. Mozaffari examines Islamism in terms of a totalitarian ideology. He further attempts to define this phenomenon with its sectarian connotations in terms of Sunnite, Shiite and Wahābī doctrines and also examines its national and global dimensions. He further argues that despite sectarian differences between different sets of the militants, all of them are united in their quest of the Islamic might. In pursuit of this broader objective, the militants retain the option of armed resistance against the counter forces.

In the same perspective, Haynes (2005) argues that violent streaks unleashed by Al- Qaida raise the questions regarding the ideological undercurrents of the organization. As violence is largely directed towards the Muslim societies, therefore, an insight into the transformations of the theory of jihad becomes even more imperative. Haynes argues that Al-Qaida’s failure to uproot the existing rulers in the Muslim world whom they label as apostates resulted into shifting of its violence to global framework. In this framework, Islamism happens to be an ideology which has potential to trigger global struggle against the west.

Islamism finds further exposition with Woltering (2002) who defines it in terms of a phenomenon which aims to revert to ‘authentic Islam’ by discrediting secularism and 10

democracy being colonial hangovers. It requires uprooting of the existing political systems and their replacement with the Islamic one governed by Shariah. He argues that those who become part of the existing political processes may not be taken as Islamists because they have virtually surrendered their desire to revive caliphate in favor of the existing systems. In pursuance of their vision to revive caliphate, the Islamists attempt to fascinate the Muslim masses through their welfare projects. However, the militants avoid to own the ‘Islamists’ uprising’ in the past largely because of their sectarian character. They discredit the 19th century Mahdi state in Sudan for its predominantly Sūfī character. Thus, the western scholars like Gilles Kepel consider Islamism to be a modern phenomenon which got popularity in 1960s when Muslim Brotherhood emerged to lead the fundamentalist projection of Islam. The educated youth in the Muslim world appears to be more receptive to the appeal of Islamism as compared to uneducated segments. Woltering further argues that Islamism is not Islamic because its subscribers are hardly thorough Muslims. Mostly, they belong to secular academic backgrounds and have moderate level of theological understandings. Though the Islamists may not be ideal Muslims yet being marginalized sections of their societies, they aspire to revert to ‘authentic Islam’ in terms of solution to their problems. The economic aggrandizement of the Muslims’ resources is still a resource to the perpetuation of this marginalization. Thus, Woltering views Islamism in terms of an ‘ideology of protest’ against the western imperialism.

In this conflict scenario, Sageman (2008) urges upon the need of understanding the underlying factors of radicalization for evolving a plausible counter terrorism strategy. He suggests that though the threat develops in hostile environments yet it gets exponential projection through internet. This projection results in “leaderless jihad” which has its own limitations in terms of limited public appeal of its intangible ideals. In view of this, he argues that leaderless jihad has its inbuilt limiting structure and thus, its threat is bound to fail provided it is avoided to be seen in terms of an ideological conflict. However, as Dasse and Kessler (2007) believe, developing a viable counterterrorism strategy demands management of the probabilities regarding risk assessment alongside the actual threat assessment. The probabilities emerge from realm of the unknown whereas certainties regarding actual threat assessment come out of realm of the known. Thus, devising a viable policy to counter militancy requires that realms of both known and unknown are taken into account.

So far as the implications of Bin Laden’s death on the dynamics of conflict are concerned, there exists consensus amongst the western scholarship and policy makers that by the time his death, he had been virtually reduced to be a figure head of Al- Qaida, therefore, his death is not likely to create any major difference in the conflict configurations. On the other hand, some analysts argue that he had already transformed Al-Qaida into an ideological movement, therefore, his death in terms of a martyr may mobilize the inspired followers even more vehemently. (Rollins 11

2011).Similarly, Liscia (2011) taking Al-Qaida in terms of an ideology develops an argument that capacity of Islamism to survive the death of Bin Laden should not be underestimated. Felbab-Brown (2011) argues that Al-Qaida had already been a loose conglomeration of networks driven by common ideology, therefore, death of Bin Laden may not be so important to incapacitate it. However, some like Maraia (2011) argue that Bin Laden’s death is more of a symbolic importance and would have little impact upon the actual operations. In the same stream, Jenkins (2016) argues that five years after Bin Laden’s death, the evidence exists that ‘high-value targeting’ may not eliminate ideologically inspired commitment of the militants.

Besides these works, an array of literature is available on militancy and counter- militancy strategies. As discussed above, the underlying ideological themes have also been under the focus of western scholarship. However, hardly any serious attempt has been made to challenge the philosophical standpoints of the militants through evolving a counter narrative. This study attempts to bridge this research gap by offering a counter narrative aimed at refutation of the ideological strands of the militants.

1.5 Research Scheme

After introducing the research blueprints, the first chapter aims to identify the paradigms that provide framework for the conflict from the trajectories of geography, ideas and the orders. The focus is limited to the Muslim world chiefly in the Middle East and South Asia. Ideology is further investigated in the spheres of religion, politics and social landscape. Actors involved in this process are identified and their standpoints are evaluated against the backdrop of the environment in which such developments have taken place. These actors have been grouped as ‘the militants’, ‘the apologists’ and ‘the agents’.

The second chapter will examine the implications of the conflict internalized towards the Muslim societies. While offering an explanation of the terminology associated with the issue, it explores the boundaries of faith. While examining the issue from the standpoint of the classical, modernist and the militant theorists, it analyzes the evolution of ideas towards heresy that ultimately culminate into the emergence of takfīr.

The third chapter will trace out the origins, revisions and mirroring of an old schism within the Muslims society and state in terms of Shiites and Sunnis. It will further test the sub-hypothesis that the conflict between the two sects have been partially political and partially religious. The role of state and the subjects will be mapped. This chapter will investigate the role played by polemics in legitimizing violence within and outside the boundaries of faith.

The fourth chapter while relying upon three interrelated paradigms namely ‘linkage between violence and anti-colonialism, ‘correlation between violence and nation state 12

system, and ‘irrelevance of Ummah’ will seek to suggest that the violence has been adopted at individual or group level as a means of emancipation and identity when the state apparatus became irrelevant to deal with the conflict situation or society failed to resolve the sectarian divide that resulted in the codification of violence at individual or group level or at times between states within folds of Islam.

The fifth chapter will determine the forms of violence adopted by the militants. A comparison with the codes of violence will be made to highlight the gap between the practices of the militants and their own codes of violence.

The sixth chapter will examine the profiles of the militant foot soldiers, handlers and the leaders from the standpoint of their backgrounds, socio-economic status, tribal customs and ethnic backgrounds. Field research from Pakistan will be undertaken as a case study. It will determine the reasons for appeal of militancy in terms of recruitment within their ranks. It will be argued that it is the religious dogma that provides stimuli in attracting the foot soldiers of Al Qaida.

The seventh chapter will identify killing fields of Al-Qaida and the factors that have contributed to the emergence of these flash points of violence from four paradigms: bipolar backyards in terms of sectarian split between Shiites’ and Sunnites’ like in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq; state oppression by the totalitarian regimes like in Somalia, Algeria and Egypt; unhealed wounds in Muslim lands like Gaza and Palestine and last but not the least theaters of international aggression like Iraq. It will be argued that all these factors provide suitable grounds for Al-Qaida to operate by assimilating their ideology with the resistance to the western ideology and a struggle for liberation of Ummah.

The last chapter aims to present a counter narrative by analyzing the ideologies of Al- Qaida, Al-Qaida-labeled Agents and the Apologists and will unmask their true facets. These narratives will be invalidated through generating epistemological and anecdotal evidence. The counter narrative will re-examine the primary sources, unravel the historical and socio-political constructs, unmask the heroes and enemies, challenge the theories and dichotomy of practices, re-establish the boundaries between heresy and faith and transform the ideological discourse.

1.6 Methodology

With no clear signs of when this clash will end, this research intends to explore the current landscape of its ideological frontiers and its masters who hold their destiny. It aims to unpack various narratives and counter narratives as espoused by western and modern scholarship in Muslim lands through a study of historical evolution of current Islamic labeled terrorism, its transformation and the current state. Codification of violence and the Codes of war will be studied and practices will be mapped and confirmed through empirical field research in Pakistan as a case study. This case study is important in terms of providing an insight into the narratives of three parties 13

to the conflict because Pakistan has been the frontline state to face backlash of militancy since the US strikes in Afghanistan in 1999. Al-Qaida affiliates unleashed violent strikes within Pakistan from their hideouts in Pakistan tribal areas and from across the western borders. The findings of this case study will be drawn through both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The killing fields and the fuel of faith will be investigated to link it with the boundaries of faith redrawn within the Muslim states and the society to challenge the scholarship and philosophy of Apologists, Al-Qaida labeled Agents. Epistemological and Anecdotal evidence will be generated to pronounce the invalidity of the prevalent streams and in order to suggest a new narrative.

For the sake of analysis, this study approaches the ulema belonging to three major sects namely Ahl-e-hadīth, Deobandīs and Barelvīs formally associated with the madrassa system or working beyond it. A sample survey has been conducted upon the clergy belonging to these sects through a questionnaire containing ten questions to test their intellectual response to the streams leading to militancy. Survey method was preferred to ensure anonymity of the respondents so that actual response is ensured. Size of the sample was one hundred from each sect. Probability-based survey sample has been developed whereby ulema have been included in sample frame through randomized selection process. Through stratified sampling techniques, selection of the ulema has been made by dividing them into sub-groups on the basis of sectarian affiliations. The sample has not been developed using cluster techniques as the nature of the questions was theological and were required to be answered in theological framework. In addition to sample survey, structured interviews have also been conducted so that detailed account of the ulema’s response in the context of jihad, takfīr and violence could be examined. The views expressed by the respondents may not reflect the collective standpoint of a particular sect rather these are views as nurtured and projected by semi-literate clergy who claim to follow a certain sect and thus, influence their audience and indoctrinate their own views in their minds. In addition, secondary data has also been examined to examine the dynamics of militancy especially in case of Pakistan. For this purpose data-base available with South Asia Terrorism Portal has been extensively utilized. 14

1. Framework for Conflict

This chapter identifies the paradigms that provide theoretical framework to examine the nature of conflict from the trajectories of geography, ideas and the orders. The focus is limited to the Muslim world chiefly in the Middle East and South Asia. Ideology is further investigated in the spheres of religion, politics, economics and social landscape. Actors involved in this process will be identified and their standpoints will be evaluated against the backdrop of the environment in which such developments have taken place. These actors have been grouped as the ‘fundamentalists’, the ‘apologists’ and the ‘agents’.

1.1 Ideology

Notwithstanding the definitional quagmire in which ideology has always been embroiled, in broader perspective it refers to set of ideas that orientate the thought process which culminates into a wide-ranging normative vision. This vision relates to essentially three inter-related spheres pertaining to religion, economics and sociology.

1.1.1 Religion

Religion, despite its antiquity has never escaped definitional predicament because of its plural spiritual manifestations which include ritual-performance by the adherents and acknowledgement of faith to be the source of ultimate knowledge which is channelized to the human beings. The approach of religion towards metaphysical phenomena determines its character in terms of either ‘divinity-based’ or ‘rationality- based’. The divine religions present practices and beliefs which are informed through some sort of divine communication with the humans. This communication may be revealed or inspired to disseminate the divine providence to address the questions that fall in the domain of metaphysics. The Abrahamic religions believe in the channelization of ultimate knowledge through what Thomas Aquinas terms as ‘direct revelation’ to the respective prophets. This direct revelation may be in terms of direct divine communication with its recipient as is the case with Quran or through divine inspiration that enables the recipient to conceive such ideas as God wills him to reduce to writing by illuminating his mind instead of direct communication. As against the theistic religions which recognize the existence of God1, though with different metaphysical attributes, the secularization of knowledge which does not acknowledge any metaphysical linkage demands definitional revisions to adjust secular ideas as ‘communism’, ‘nationalism’ or ‘democratic liberalism’ in terms of rationality- based religions. They hesitate to affirm the authenticity of knowledge which is beyond the grasp of human reason and thus, tend not to explore the realm of metaphysics in their quest of ultimate knowledge.

1For detailed discussion on the evolution of the idea of God, please see, Karen Armstrong, History of God (London: Vintage, 1999) 15

This taxonomy of ‘divinity-based’ and ‘rationality-based’ religions leads to difference between ideology and religion per se despite several similarities between the two. Both ideology and religion claim to order human conduct but still there exists distinction between the two in terms of scope. The scope of the ideology is usually limited to the temporal sphere whereas spiritual sphere is considered to be the exclusive domain of religion.2 However, this perspective that presupposes mutual exclusivity between the two is not supported by historical evidence. The medieval history of Europe as well as Muslim historical discourse suggests that religion has been a resource to the statehood especially in terms of defining its ideological character. Europe could not codify secularism until the period of Reformation. On the other hand, the Muslim societies have been harbinger of mutually inclusive bond between religion and ideology. Though secularism as an external factor could create ripples within the Muslim societies through generating gruesome debate regarding inter-relationship of the two phenomena, yet in broader perspective, it could not overwhelmed Islam in terms of an ‘ideology-producing force’.

1.1.2 Economics

An ideology also defines the socio-economic features of a society through evolving broader principles that determine the structure of the economies. After World War II, two major economic ideologies- Marxian Communism and Capitalism emerged to define the international conflict scenario through projecting their ideological webs to their respective spheres of influence. The Communist ideology provided for the common ownership of the means of production and aims at realization of classless society whereas the latter sanctions the private ownership of the means of production and emerged as global economic order through its projection by the transnational processes like globalization and imperialism.

Though, both of these economic ideologies could develop their appeal across the Muslim world yet could not disturb the ideological exclusivity of Islam even in economic sphere. Islamic ideology that aims to construct a welfare state discredits the visions of welfare state systems of both the Communists and the Capitalists. Communism developed on the basis of Marxian dialectical materialism which did not recognize but only the material aspect of life. The exclusive focus on material aspect earned the Communist ideology outright condemnation from the Muslim ideologues on the grounds that it could not achieve a sublime balance between the spirit and matter which had always been hallmark of Islamic ideology. Through their categorical condemnation of usury (ribā) which is cardinal constituent of the Capitalist economies, the advocates of Islamic ideology discredited Capitalism as well. Their condemnation of Capitalism and Communism further originates from the argument that as against Islamic vision of creating a balance, Communism underestimates individualism and overestimates collectivism and reverse is the case with Capitalism.

2 Ideology, Encyclopedia Britannica,http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/281943/ideology accessed on 29-11-2014 16

1.1.3 Sociology

Religious and sociological context is defined in terms of an approach to what one feels as supernatural3. The sociologists have been chiefly interested in examining the unifying effects of what they term as ‘civil religion’.4 In this purview, the functionalist theorists like Emile Durkheim identify religion as a tool of human socialization instead of human-God relations.5 In the same stream, others like August Comte believe in religion in terms of an evolutionary stage which with the march of history has become redundant. They believe that if in the advancement of history religion survived, it survived only as a religion of humanity, entirely secular in nature.6 As the terminologies like ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ occupy central place in the sociological explanations of the religion, therefore, the sociologists focus on defining these terms to find the universal values of all religions. They define the ‘sacred’ as something relating to supernatural phenomena which can be achieved through some rituals whereas ‘profane’ as something part of the ordinary life.7 Notwithstanding the academic value of these sociological studies, Islam as a religion retains its distinction for not bifurcating the life into spiritual and temporal spheres. Even ‘civil religion’ fell short of achieving its essence when tested in the Muslim lands. For instance, Akbar’s dīn-e-elāhī which aimed at unifying heterogeneous Indian society faced stiff resistance from ulema as well as the Muslim masses. Sheikh Ahmed of Sirhind, the revivalist of Islam in the 2nd millennium, publicly condemned this royal edict to be heretic in character and thus, did not let it secure public legitimacy. This encounter is taken to have marked the dawn of Islamism in the subcontinent.8 1.2 Orders and the State Formation These ideological spheres produce orders which provide grounds for the formation of the state and ideology. These ideological spheres also inform the constituents which define the dynamics of these orders. These orders include the following:

1.2.1 Political Orders

3 Ronald Johnstone, Religion and Society in Interaction: The Sociology of Religion, (Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc.,1975),20; also see, Paul B. Horton and Chester L. Hunt, Sociology,(Singapore: McGraw-Hill,1984),265; also see, Ian Robertson, Sociology, (New York: Worth Publishers Inc,1987),398 4 Robert N. Bellah, “American Civil Religion in 1970s”, in American Civil Religion , eds. R.E. Richev and D.G. Lones (New York: Harper & Row Publishers,1974)255-272 5 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (trans.) Carol Cosman, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); also see, Horton and Hunt, Sociology,267 6 Ibid.,266,267 7 Durkheim, Elementary Forms 8Husain Haqqani. “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups”, in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, eds. Hillel Fradkin et al. vol.1, (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2005), 12-26. For details see , S.M.Ikram, History of Muslim Civilizations in India and Pakistan (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture,1989),269-286 17

Political orders emerge from the respective ideologies which determine the character of the constituents of the political orders. These constituents determine the nature of political orders and keep their operation within the ideological framework. The constituents which define the nature of political order include sovereign authority, dynamics of conflict amongst the political orders and role of the actors involved. It is on these trajectories that following discussion will examine the dynamics of conflict in democratic and Islamic political orders.

Democracy in terms of political order has been selected for comparative analysis vis- à-vis Islamism because theoretical analysis between the two provides a framework for the conflict. Against democratic political order, Islamic political order will be examined from the perspectives of the fundamentalists and the apologists. In order to explain the fundamentalists’ perspective, three leading Muslim theorists namely Ibn Taimmiyah, Sayyed Maūdūdī and Sayyed Qutb will be discussed. The apologists’ perspective is based upon the ideas of Muhammad Abdūhū and Rashīd Ridā. The ideas of these theorists have been examined to ascertain their standpoints from the paradigms provided by the constituents of the political orders. The selection of these theorists from the array of Muslim scholarship has been made on the basis of the degree of their influence on the Muslim intellectual discourse.

1.2.1.1 Sovereign Authority The allocation of sovereign authority reflects the nature of a political order. It determines the relationship between the rulers and the ruled and also state and society. The following discussion will examine the nature of sovereign authority in western democracy vis-à-vis the Islamic political order chiefly in theoretical context and will also highlight the implications emerging from the allocation of sovereign authority in both orders.

1.2.1.1.1 Western Democracy Democracy as a socio-political ideal denotes that the will of people shall govern the operation of state institutions. As governance depends upon coercion to a certain degree, therefore, the theory of democratic governance itself gets caught up in paradoxes which need to be resolved to explain the genesis of democracy in terms of what Corcoran9terms as “new universal religion”. These paradoxes have two aspects: One, as the state authority implies the ‘right to rule’ and the natural instinct of man is freedom or ‘refusal to be ruled’, therefore, the resolution of this apparently zero-sum game requires us to look for alternatives10. The first alternative finds its philosophical basis with the anarchists’ presumption that as coercion, being anti-thesis to human freedom is inherently bad so it must be avoided even at the cost of the very existence of the political entity itself11. This alternative focusing on the elimination of coercion may not work as society requires coercion even to control the unauthorized coercion

9 P. Corcoran, “The Limits of Democratic Theory”, in Democratic Theory and Practice, ed. G. Duncan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 10Robert, A. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989) 11Ibid. 18

of one member of society against the other12. The second alternative which appears more plausible is to explore the ways and means to regulate the exercise of coercion instead of eliminating it altogether. The regulation of coercion requires the state to be democratic so that coercion may be exercised in the collective interest of the community and not otherwise.13

Two, the second paradox appears as a progeny of the first and finds its roots in the very chemistry of a democratic state which implies that all constituents have a share in sovereignty of the state which implies self-governance in terms of personal autonomy of the constituents14.Self-governance while living in a society demands that collective decisions be accepted by all constituents while maintaining their personal autonomy. The problem comes up that who will make collective decisions (govern) and who will follow the decisions (governed) as all constituents have an equal and inalienable right to govern15. This paradox was expressed by Rousseau in his Social Contract thus: “…find a form of association that defends and protects the person and goods of each associate with all the common force, and by means of which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before”.16However, this paradox remained unresolved even with Rousseau in the broader context of decision-making mechanism in the democratic frame-work as he suggested unanimity only to the extent of original contract, which provided for the creation of state and left the subsequent decision-making subordinate to the will of majority.17

However, the quest for alternatives to this paradox leads to following key questions: one, can anyone guarantee equal consideration of interests than his own and two, is there any better system other than democracy to make the decision-making more representative? John Locke viewed ‘equality’ in purview of right to natural freedom without one being subject to another and thus equality of rights and opportunities can be guaranteed if interests of each individual are given equal weight.18 As each individual can better define his own interests, therefore, equal consideration of interests is possible if one has the authority to interpret his own interests. This demands that each individual has access to the decision-making mechanism.19In a broader perspective, majority cannot be a judge of minority’s rights. As democracy, as explained by Rousseau above, rely on majority decision so what are the possibilities that any other system can make the decision-making more representative.

12Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, ed. C.V. Shields, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, [1861] 1958) 15John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 2nd ed., Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1689-90] 1970) 16Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy, ed. Roger D. Masters and Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin’s Press, [1762](1978) 17 Ibid. 18 Stanley I. Benn, “Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of Interests”, in, Equality, eds., R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman, (Nomos IX) (NewYork: Atherton Press, 1967): 61-78 19Dahl, Democracy 19

Evidence suggests that other systems rely on relatively smaller proportion of constituents than democracy for governance.20

However, to make democratic governance even more reflective of public aspirations two options may be suggested- structural and procedural. The former demands that democratic governance be devolved to local level which contributes to administrative efficiency as well as to the development of political faculties of the people. Though sometimes localities are dominated by few who suppress others, and central government may protect against this suppression, yet local rule is superior as it provides broader spectrum of political participation.21 The procedural option, as suggested by Schumpeter,22 takes democracy in terms of procedure to make political decisions by means of electoral process as a mechanism to register the public opinion. The democracy in terms of fair procedure provides for the best feasible course of decision-making. By making the general public, the ultimate authority to elect or reject any political party to assume power, it safeguards the interests of the minority against the possible tyrannical tendencies of the majority. Mill had the apprehensions that majority rule may prove violative of individual rights indispensable for the working of democracy.23 However, fairness of democracy as a procedure is conditional to the incorporation of following elements: public trust in the procedure, access to information for making informed decisions, active public participation in the decision-making as people can better safeguard their interests from being abused by the government if as J.S. Mill has suggested, they are themselves part of the decision- making process24,equality in terms of voting process to register their opinion25 and finally, neutrality on the part of state organs with regard to their relationship with the agents of public opinion formulation. This neutrality can be ensured if their role in terms of service-delivery reflects democratic spirit.

This critique leads us to the following broad conclusions:

One, democracy draws its genesis from the paradoxical relationship between the rulers and the ruled. There is inherent contradiction between use of coercive authority by the state and inalienable right to freedom of an individual. Whether this contradiction could be removed by assigning the right to exercise the coercive authority through democratic political authority was a practical question that even John Locke could not address. Actually, he could not come out of puzzle that who would rule and who would be ruled as all had equal and inalienable right to rule. This puzzle remained unresolved with Rousseau as well who could suggest agreement by consensus to the extent of original contract that provided for the creation of the state

20Ibid. 21Trevor Jones, Tim Newburn and David J. Smith, Democracy and Policing,(London: Policy Studies Institute,1994) 22 J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961) 23John S. Dryzek and Patrick Dunleavy, Theories of Democratic State, (Hampshire: Plagrave Macmillan), 2009 24Mill, Considerations 25Dahl, Democracy 20

and left further decision-making on the will of the majority. Thus, democracy in the context of popular sovereignty could not transcend from being the rule of the majority.

Two, the western scholarship could not discover any other system of governance more representative than democracy.

Three, the afore-mentioned structural and procedural measures to enhance the level of representation in democracy may not serve the purpose. Devolving the democratic governance to the local level will constitute nothing more but merely another tier that will again put minorities under the majority rule because the operational mechanism of the democracy will remain the same. Moreover, ensuring fair procedure in the process of registering public opinion will not help create a consensus government rather majority will continue to rule the minority.

The above conclusions lead us to argue that the Lockean social contract whereupon democratic ideals flourished in Western Europe was itself a progeny of rationalism which would not recognize any phenomenon but the one that could be experienced through human senses. Conversely speaking, as discussed earlier rationalism discarded everything that would fall in the ambit of metaphysics.26 Within the intellectual boundaries of rationalism, this social contract focused upon liberating individuals from the contemporary autocracies by transferring the sovereignty from a traditional monarch to the individuals themselves. Though by transferring the sovereign authority, Locke presumed that the individuals had been granted their inalienable right to self-rule, but this transfer of sovereignty happened to be nothing more than mere a redefinition of the context in which the autocracies were previously working. Monarchical autocracy gets converted into majoritarian autocracy. Thus, the new political order-democracy caught in a new paradox. As discussed earlier, Rousseau attempted to resolve this paradox by attributing the sovereign authority to General Will which was claimed to represent consensus opinion of the individuals but in actuality, it happened to be an abstract rather than a real phenomenon. Recognition of every individual’s inalienable right to rule and at the same time expecting the minority to be ruled by the majority created such a fundamental paradox that could not be resolved by remaining within the framework of western democracy.

1.2.1.1.2 Islamic Political Order Islamic Political order claims to resolve the paradox between the individual’s fundamental right to self-rule and the majority-rule by repositioning the sovereignty. It claims that this paradox can be resolved if the individuals agree to assign sovereign authority to a higher metaphysical phenomenon whom they render unqualified submission. The Islamic societies constitute an example where all believers render

26Shiites also agree to the view that rationality makes it difficult for the human beings to acknowledge the existence of God. See for example, Ruhullah Khomeini’s views on the subject, in, Shahrough Akhavi, “Islam, Politics and Society in the Thought of Ayatullah Khomeini, Ayatullah Taliqani and Ali Shariati,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol.24 No.4 (Oct.1988): 404-431 21

their unconditional submission to God. This unconditional submission to the sovereign authority of God is voluntary and it is fundamental constituent of their faith. Every Muslim is supposed to be ruled by the word of God and acts of the prophet (sw). In Quranic terminology, human beings are not the repository of authority but have been declared as vicegerents of God.27 Thus, in the decision-making process no specific group of the Muslims can claim ascendency over the other on grounds whatsoever except piety (taqwā). In other words, Islamic political order does not acknowledge anyone’s authority to rule but only in accordance with divine will. Quran says, “Whoso judgeth not by that which Allah hath revealed: such are disbelievers”. (Al-Maidah: 44) Moreover, it affirms the finality of the arbitrative authority of God and His Messenger in case of dispute amongst the believers. (Al- Maidah: 59) Furthermore, no individual can exercise legislative or executive authority in contravention of Quranic injunctions and Sunnah of the Prophet. It is evident from the following Quranic verse: “And it becometh not a believing man or a believing woman, when Allah and His messenger have decided an affair (for them), that they should (after that) claim any say in their affair; and whoso is rebellious to Allah and His messenger, he verily goeth astray in error manifest.” (Al-Ahzab: 36) However, in case the primary sources of Islamic law-divine scripture and traditions of the prophet are not categorically clear, human beings have the mandate to legislate and decide through ascertaining the real intent of Islam regarding a particular issue (ijtihād) and through exploiting the collective wisdom of the believers through consultation (shūrā). Despite being direct recipient of divine guidance, the Prophet was ordained to consult the believers on different issues. God has appreciated those who consult each other in settling their affairs. God says, “Now whatever ye have been given is but a passing comfort for the life of the world, and that which Allah hath is better and more lasting for those who believe and put their trust in their Lord. And those who shun the worst of sins and indecencies and, when they are wroth, forgive. And those who answer the call of their Lord and establish worship, and whose affairs are a matter of counsel, and who spend of what We have bestowed on them.” (Ash-Shūrā: 36-38) In the same pursuit, divine injunctions do not permit a Muslim ruler to act arbitrarily. Quran says, “It was by the mercy of Allah that thou wast lenient with them (O Muhammad), for if thou hadst been stern and fierce of heart they would have dispersed from round about thee. So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult with them upon the conduct of affairs. And when thou art resolved, then put thy trust in Allah. Lo! Allah loveth those who put their trust (in Him).” (Al-Imran: 159) In compliance of these divine injunctions, the Prophet acceded to the opinion of

27Quran reads, “And when thy Lord said unto the angels: Lo! I am about to place a viceroy in the earth, they said: Wilt thou place therein one who will do harm therein and will shed blood, while we, we hymn Thy praise and sanctify Thee? He said: Surely I know that which ye know not. (Al- Baqārāh). For Abduhū, the responsibility of human beings in the capacity of ‘viceroy of God on earth’ is to present Islam in terms of ‘culture-producing force’. See, Yvonne Haddad, “Muhammad Abduh: Pioneer of Islamic Reform,” in Pioneers of Islamic Revival, ed. Ali Rahnema (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1994) ,46 22

the companions even when it was against his own mind.28 Abu Hurayrah narrates that the prophet himself always attributed importance to shūrā (consultation) more than anyone else.29 However, it is argued that this consultation will not lead to majoritarian autocracy as is the problem with western democratic process rather the decision- making will be subordinate to overriding spirit of the faith. Islam does not permit any decision-making that is repugnant to the spirit of Islam and is not authenticated by Quran and Sunnah.30

Nevertheless, the western scholarship discredits Islamic shūrā for being not binding upon the rulers.31 Thus, labeling Islam as non-democratic, they tend to draw a parallel between Islam and the western Fascism.32 Moreover, they resolve to discover commonalities between the western Fascism and Islamism. German, Italian and the Russian transnational political aspiration are put in comparison with the Islamists’ desire to revert to early caliphate with the aim to revive world-wide caliphate.33 However, strict accountability during the early period of Islam refutes this notion. To quote one of many examples of such accountability, during the caliphate of Umar, a lady raised an objection on the caliph’s decision to fix the amount of mehr.34 The lady referred to the following Quranic verse which does not limit the amount of dower (mehr): “And if ye wish to exchange one wife for another and ye have given unto one of them a sum of money (however great), take nothing from it. Would ye take it by the way of calumny and open wrong?”(An-Nisā: 20) The caliph submitted to the divine verdict and instantly withdrew his decision. The fundamentalists as well as the apologists acknowledge the utility of consultation (shūrā) in terms of an essential check on the coercive authority of the rulers.35 However, categorical verdicts of God and His apostle enjoy overriding status vis-à-vis shūrā. For instance, Abu Bakr soon after assuming the caliphate declined the advice of leading companions of the Prophet

28In the battle of Uhud (3AH.), the prophet consulted his companions regarding the place where to face the enemy. The companions’ opinion was in favor of facing the enemy in open fields outside the city of Madina whereas the Prophet’s personal opinion was to face the enemy while remaining within the city. Despite this, he acceded to the opinion of the companions and faced the enemy outside the city though that resulted in loss to the Muslims. For details see, Ibn Ishāq and Ibn Hashām, Sīrat An-Nabī, (Urdu) vol.2 trans. Sayyed Yasīn Alī Hasnī Nizāmī Dehlvī, (Lahore: Idārā Islamiyyat, 1991), 82,83 29At-Tirmidhi, Sunan, jihad:34 30Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam: Selected Writings of Ibn Taimmiyah on Islamic Faith, Life and Society, comp. and trans., Abdul-Haqq Ansari, pp.508-510 Fatawa 28:386-7 31 Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashīd Ridā, (California: University of California Press,1966), 134 32Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 2006) 33Richard Schifter, “The Clash of Ideologies,”,Mediterranean Quarterly, (Summer 2004):12-23 34Mehr is a financial compensation which is given to the wife by the husband at the time of wedding. 35 Ibn Taimmiyah and Muhammad Abdu’hu, both appreciated the concept of Shūrā in terms of an instrument to ensure restrained use of political authority by the rulers. For Abdu’hū’s views, see, Kerr, Islamic Reform, 133, 134; also see, Haddad, Muhammad Abduh, 54. Though Rashīd Ridā being disciple of Abdu’hū belongs to the array of liberals but his approach seems to be confused regarding the powers of the caliph. On one hand like Abdu’hū, he argues in favor of granting constitutional status to the caliph whose powers are restrained by Quran, Sunnah and acts of the companions of the prophet but on the other hand he extends unlimited authority to the caliph by authorizing him to interpret the Shariah and thus, enforce his model of Shariah on the believers. See, Mahmoud Haddad, “Arab Religious Nationalism in Colonial Era: Re-reading Rashīd Ridā’s Ideas on the Caliphate,” Journal of American Oriental Society, vol.117, No.2 (Apr-June, 1997):253-277 23

including Umar not to dispatch expedition of Usāmā against the Romans. He turned down this advice on the grounds that he could not cancel the expedition which was dispatched by the Prophet himself.36 Thus, in actuality he did not act arbitrarily rather it was the Sunnah of the Prophet that prevailed upon the advice of the companions.

The fundamentalists consider the caliphate on the prophetic pattern as ideal Islamic form of government which was a practical reality during the early period of Islam.37 For Ibn Taimmiyah, political authority is religiously necessitated as enforcement of Quranic injunctions regarding enjoining good and forbidding evil (Al-Ara’af:157)38 warrants coercive authority which is neither an end in itself nor a means to achieve only temporal goals. The Prophet has been reported to have said, “Whenever three of you are travelling, let one of you be the amir”.39 Ibn Taimmiyah argues that if the Muslims have been commanded to appoint an amir even when they are in such a little number and doing some trivial job, how could the whole Ummah ignore to appoint a political leader in managing their collective affairs.40 He contends that though politics is subservient to religion yet both function in support to each other. Religion suffers in absence of power of the state (shawkah) required for the enforcement of religious tenets (iqāmat ad-dīn)41 whereas without a disciplined body of the laws, the state becomes a symbol of tyranny.42 As whole dīn is included in the body of worships (Ibādah), therefore, acquiring the political authority should be taken as a means to secure the divine pleasure. Thus, it becomes individual obligation of the believers to strive to install a political authority that would promote the cause of Islam.43 However, he reiterates that quest for political authority must not be coupled with material avarice rather the political authority should be strictly employed at the service of religion.44

Ibn Taimmiyah further argues that amongst religion and politics, the former has ascendency over the latter. This ascendency provides a common sphere for the political authority to be exercised through an office that is guardian of the faith. This office is called caliphate which demands religiously sanctioned submission from the believers. Quran says, “O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in authority”. (An-Nisā: 59) Abdullah b. Umar narrates that the Prophet said, “Every Muslim should listen (the authorities) and obey their commands

36Abi Ja’afar Muhammad Bin Jarir Tabrī, Tarikh al-Umam wal Muluk, Urdu. Trans.Tarikh-e-Tabrī, vol.2, Sayyed Muhammad Ibrahim Nadvi (Karachi: Dar-ul- Ashāt, 2003), 460. The Prophet had dispatched this expedition under the command of Usama in his last days. When the sad news of passing away of the Prophet reached Usama, he instantly returned to Madina. 37Islamic Caliphate is not a utopia rather a concrete reality. See, Nilufer Gole,“Snapshots of Islamic Modernities,” Daedalus,vol.129, No.1, Multiple Modernities (Winter, 2000):91-117 38Ibn Taimmiyah argues that enforcement of these Quranic injunctions invites divine blessings. See for example, At-Tirmidhi, Sunan, Ahkam:4; An-Nissai, Sunan,Zakah:77; Ahmed Musnad III:22; also see, Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 28:390-7, 503 39Abu Dawūd, Sunan, jihad:80 40Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 28:61-5, 502 41Ibid. Fatawa 28:390-7, 505-508 42 Richard Bonney, jihad: From Quran to Bin Laden,(New York: Plagrav Macmillan, 2007)119 43Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah expounds on Islam, Fatawa (10:1449-57),364 and Fatawa 28:61-5 44Ibid. Fatawa 28:390-7, 505 24

whether he likes it or not except if he is asked to do something sinful, in which case he is not to listen and obey”.45 Even in case of individual injustice, one does not get absolved from obedience of those in authority. Abu Hurayrah reported that the Prophet said, “You must listen and obey them in prosperity and in adversity, whether you like it or not, even when you are not given your due”.46 In another tradition, the Prophet advised a man from ansār to have patience even in case of injustice on the part of those in authority.47 Similarly in another hadīth the Prophet advised the believers to be patient in case of injustice on the part of the rulers and pray to God to grant them what is their due.48 Another hadīth suggests that revolt (khurūj) against even sinful rulers is not permissible provided they establish prayers.49The evidence generated from these prophetic traditions leads Ibn Taimmiyah to suggest that sanctity attached with obedience to those in authority is as overwhelming as observing the elements of the faith.50

As against Ibn Taimmiyah’s ideal state on the pattern of early Islamic caliphate (khilāfat-e-nabwiyyah), the fundamentalist perspective finds some radical revisions with Sayyed Maudūdī who labeled his polity51 as ‘theo-democracy’ which would be installed through western style of registering the public opinion by general voting but with limited public sovereignty. This theo-democractic state, in a bid to secure divine blessings52 through reviving the absolute sovereignty of God, marks a conspicuous shift from the secular statehood.53 He shares with Sayyed Qutb that it is only through acquiring the state authority that the usurpers of divine authority could be challenged.54 Thus, the dogma of Islamic state anticipates resistance from the forces of jāhilliyah55 not unlike the Prophet, himself who encountered similar reaction from

45Sahih Bukhari, jihad:108, Ahkām:4; Sahih Muslim, Imārah:34,38; Abu Dawūd, Sunan, jihad:87; At- Tirmidhi, Sunan, jihad:29, Adab:78; An-Nissai, Sunan, Bay’ah:34; Ibn Maja, Sunan, jihad:40; Ahmed, Musnad, II:17; see, Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah expounds on Islam, Fatawa 35:8-15 46Sahih Bukhari, Ahkām:43; Abu Dawūd, Sunan:5,Ilm:16, Adab:88; Ibn Maja, Sunan, Muqaddamah:6, Baya’ah:43 47Sahih Bukhari, Manaqib Al-Ansar:8; Sahih Muslim, Imarah:16,48; An-Nissai, Sunan, qudat:4; Ahmad Musnad, IV:351,352; see, Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 35:8-15 48 Sahih Bukhari, fitan:2, Musaqat:14,15, Khums:19, Jizyah:4, Manaqib:25, Manaqib Al-Ansar:8, Maghazi:56; Sahih Muslim, Zakah:132,139; At-Tirmidhi, Sunan, fitan:25; An-Nissai, Sunan, Qudat:4; In another hadīth, it has been reported by Ubadah b. Samit that they submitted to the Prophet that they would obey him in every condition, good or bad, even when they were not given their due.(Sahih Bukhari, Ahkam:43, Baya’ah:1-5,8; Ibn Maja, Sunan, jihad:41; Malik, Al-Mawatta, Baya’ah:1, jihad:5) See, Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 35:8-15 49Sahih Muslim, Imarah:36; An-Nissai Sunan, Baya’ah:26 50Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 35:8-15 51 Cited in Richard Bonney, jihad, 199 52 Abul al’a Maūdūdī, Tafheem ul Quran ( Towards understanding the Quran) vol. 1 (New Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami Publishers, 1998) 53 Charles, J. Smith, “ The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi”, in South Asian Politics and Religion, ed., Donald E. Smith, (Princeton:NJ, 1966)371-397 54Abul al’a Maūdūdī, Let us be Muslims, trans. Khurram Jan Murad, (Leicestar: Islamic Foundation, 1985) 55 Noor Muhammad, “ The Doctrine of jihad: An Introduction,” Journal of Law and Religion vol.3, No. 2 (1985):381-397 25

the pre-Islamic jāhilliyah order when he resolved to establish Islamic political order after migrating (hijrā) to Madina.56

For the apologists, modernity provides a bridge between Islamic and western democratic ideals.57 For instance, Muhammad Abdūhū (1849-1905) through rationalist interpretation of Islam advocates the British representative democracy and further seeks to draw parallels between ‘Shūrā and western democracy’ and ‘ijm’ā and public opinion’.58 As against traditional Sunnite standpoint on khurūj, he, being moved by the Westminster parliamentary democratic traditions, does not hesitate to recognize the popular mandate to impeach the head of the executive.59 Under the British influence, his approach gets liberal to such an extent that he declares even a non-Muslim rule on the Muslim lands as permissible provided it is in the public interest.60 Similarly, his disciple Rashīd Ridā inherited this inclination towards Westminster traditions from his mentor perhaps under the duress of British imperialism.61 He also followed Abdūhū to bring about rationalization between the Islamic law and the European civilization through an otherwise traditional instrument of ijtihād.62 Despite being identified as a link to the modernists’ chain in theological discourse owing to his liberal ideas, he happens to view linkage between religion and politics from a fundamentalist’s position. This is evident from his reference to the 11th century Shafi’ite jurist Al-Māwardī’s Ahkām al-Sultāniyāh63and his further reliance upon a tradition of the Prophet that whosoever dies without having a baya’ā dies the death of ignorance (jāhilliyah).64 Moreover, delineating upon the purpose of political authority, Ridā suggests that power is not to make one’s will prevail upon the subjects rather its real objective is to develop Shariah and its enforcement without repulsion from within the Islamic state and without.65

The fundamentalists tend not to validate the liberal’s version that Islam shares certain political norms like limited state authority, constitutionalism and separation of powers with western democracy.66 They argue that fundamental difference regarding the position of state authority between the two overshadows other similarities that are of

56Ibid. 57 For instance, Kurzman argues that Islamic teachings are unbiased towards democratic liberalism and if there is any dichotomy between the two, it can be removed by developing mutual understandings through dialogue. See, Charles Kurzman, “Liberal Islam: Prospects and Challenges,” MERIA Journal, September (1990) 58Roxanne L. Euben, “Premodern, Anti-modern or Post-modern? Islamic and Western Critique of Modernity,” The Review of Politics vol.59, No.3, Non-Western Political Thought, Summer(1997), 429- 459 59“Islam wa’n-Nasraniyya,”65 quoted in, M.H.Kerr, Islamic Reform,148,149 60Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt: A Biography of Muhammd Husayn Haykal,(Al-bany: University of New York Press, 1983),21 61“Islam wa’n-Nasraniyya,” 65 quoted in, Kerr, Islamic Reforms,148,149 62Haddad, Arab Religious Nationalism in Colonial Era,253-277 63Abu Al-Hassan al-Mawardi, Ahkam-us- Sultaniyyah, (Ordinances of the Government) http://www.kalamullah.com/ahkam-sultaniyyah.html, accessed on September 16, 2014 64Haddad, Arab Religious Nationalism in Colonial Era 65Ibid. 66Abdelwahab El-Affendi, “What is Liberal Islam? The Elusive Reformation,” Journal of Democracy, volume 14, No. 2 (April 2003):34-39 26

secondary nature. In this perspective, even those fundamentalists like Sayyed Maudūdī who avoids insisting upon the revival of caliphate on the model of early Islam yearn to defend the exclusivity of Islam for not documenting any specific form of government. However, in order to maintain its dynamism, Islam has only laid down its exclusive macro-principles of state governance. The micro-level governance has been left to the believers’ choice to adopt any form of political order which is otherwise not repugnant to the broader principles laid down by Quran and Sunnah.67

However, in the contemporary Muslim world, the ruling elite being largely concerned to perpetuate their rule follow the west to gain the support of the western powers. They follow only those western traits that help them prolong their rule. Monarchies in the Middle East may not prefer to follow western democratic ideals but these are accused of collaborating with the west against the fellow Muslims.

1.2.1.2 Dynamics of Conflict amongst Political Orders While quantifying the progression of history in terms of securing optimum liberty for an individual on the trajectory of Hegel’s dialectics, democratic liberalism is marked as culminating phase of universal history. Francis Fukuyama argues that democratic liberalism marks the final stage of history historical evolution as the process cannot explore a system better than democratic liberalism in guaranteeing the human rights. He declares this stage of historical process to be the “end of history”.68 He further seeks to draw a comparison between Islamism and democratic liberalism and argues that Islam in terms of a political ideology has hardly any appeal in the non-Muslim lands whereas democratic liberalism enjoys tremendous appeal within the Muslim lands as well.69

Nevertheless, the Islamists argue that Islam is neither a religion nor merely a culture rather a ‘culture producing force’70 having a universal appeal directed to audience from diverse backgrounds and thus, poses a conceptual threat to liberal democracies. This ‘culture producing force’ generates an appeal to Islamic fundamentalism.71 Islamists retain the right to declare something ‘Islamic’ or otherwise and thus, negate

67For detailed analysis of the broader principles of state governance as laid down by Islam see, Abul a’la Maūdūdī, “The Political Theory of Islam”, Contemporary Debates in Islam: An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought ed. Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof (New York: St. Martin Press,2000), 270,271 68The idea of Universal History may be viewed in terms of an intelligible scheme of development of not only human societies but human conscience as well. While St. Augustine, representing the theological standpoint, views history as ‘divine plan’ which begins with human origin and the Judgment Day marks its culmination, where as secular view of history finds its essence in the domain of scientific knowledge. It is in the realm of this secular view of history that German idealists of history like Kant, Hegel, and Marx take historical process as a finite process but their mutual distinctiveness lies in their expositions of their respective end-points of historical process. See, Fukuyama, The End of History. 69Fukuyama, The End of History 70W. Dietl, Holy War 13-47 (1984) quoted in, Noor Muhammad, 1985 71 Fukuyama, The End of History, 45,46 27

the exclusionary nature of the modernity thesis of the west72 that does not recognize modernity external to liberal democratic ideals. Islamists, reverting back to their past, explore their own parameters of modernity and suggest that Islamic fundamentalism constitutes a part of reconstructed definition of modernity. This reconstruction needs to be viewed not in terms of negation but in the context of pluralistic redefinition of the term.73Moreover, Muslims, in general, follow non-materialistic perspective coupled with divine promise for better prospects for acquiring political sovereignty.74 The modernity thesis developed on western secular grounds is taken to be external to Muslim heritage.75 Precisely, there is a general understanding with the Islamists that as Islam being complete code of life provides guidance about every sphere of human life, therefore, it is not permissible for a Muslim to look for the political systems external to Islam.76 The Islamists argue that if democracy is a gesture of public approval77 then it must honour the systems that enjoy public legitimacy even other than democracy but reality suggests otherwise. The fault lines between Islamism and liberal democracy become more pronounced if viewed in the context of globalization of democratic liberalism after the cold war when it embarked upon redesigning the world order especially on imperialistic patterns.

1.2.1.2.1 Conflict and its Resolution The cold war era witnessed democratic liberalism pitched against Communism. However, with the end of cold war, the triumphant United States could get a free chance to promote democratic ideals worldwide. Schumpeter argues that the capitalist societies are not imperialistic societies as such because they do not promote their worldview through use of force.78 However, realization in the Muslim circles is to the contrary. Muslims believe that the west is bent upon imposing its political ideology upon the countries especially the Muslim block without affording them an opportunity to discover a political system of their own choice. It is simply because the west considers Islamism as successor to the communist threat.79 Actually, the evidence that foreign aid to Germany and Japan after World War II helped promote democracies in these two countries have encouraged them to follow the same policy vis-à-vis those

72Abdel Salem Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ed., Islamic Fundamentalism,(Oxford: West View Press, 1996), 14 73For debates on Secularism, modernity and rationalism from western as well as Islamic perspectives see, Tamara Sonn, “Modernity, Islam and the West,” in Muslims and the West: Encounter and Dialogue, ed. Zafar Ishaq Ansari and John L. Esposito(Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 2002), 216-231 74Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “Islamism: a Designer Ideology for Resistance,”in Muslims and the West: Encounter and Dialogue, ed. Ansari and Esposito (Islamic Research Institute, 2002), 274-295 75Laith Kubba, “What is Liberal Islam? Faith and Democracy”, Journal of Democracy vol 14 No. 2 (April, 2003): 45-49 76“Khilafat: Aik Mukhtasar Guide”, (Urdu) Al-Muhajiroun, Pakistan. Al-Muhajiroun was originally established at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1983 by Sheikh Umar Bakri Muhammad Al-Halbi 77P. Hirst,”Representative Democracy and its Limits,” The Political Quarterly, 5 (1988):190-205 78Fukuyama, End of History, 260; also see, Schifter, The Clash of Ideologies, 2004 79Radwan A. Masmoudi, “What is Liberal Islam? The Silenced Majority,” Journal of Democracy vol 14 No 2 (April 2003):40-44 28

countries which are not democratic or where democratic norms are weaker.80 Muslims have been cautious of forcible democratization of the Muslim states so much so that they take it in terms of a part of revised imperialist policy of the west. Global Capitalist Theory provides a new perspective to examine revisions in the imperialistic patterns. This theory suggests that imperialism got transformed from being state- centered phenomenon into an instrument of transnational capitalist class. It explains the US military interventions in terms of support-mechanism for this capitalist class vis-à-vis the counter imperialist forces. The United States undertook a policy to impose democratic liberal norms upon the rest of world not only through the power of ideas rather through physical force as well. The ideological fault lines between Islamic and democratic political orders got transformed into physical conflict between the militants and the west. This conflict scenario is not limited to the external imperialist threat rather it embraces the elements internal to the Muslim societies. In addition to the conflict with the west for imposing its democratic ideas in Muslim lands, even internally, this conflict has created rifts in the Muslim societies leading to the emergence of following three mutually divergent narratives:

Firstly, the liberals yearn to harmonize Islam with western democratic values. Though they constitute a marginalized section of the reformers in terms of their appeal to the Muslim masses vis-à-vis the fundamentalists yet the support from the western imperial forces dispense with their initial frustrations to attract the Muslim masses as a whole. Aided by the imperial forces, they got elevated to central positions to influence the ruling elite. The nexus with the power centers helped them redefine the state systems in their liberal mold. These redesigned state systems when enforced with the imperial authority deprived the masses to follow the systems of their own choice. The compulsion to operate in a westernized state system and liberal interpretations of religious edicts provided the apologists to hold their sway into otherwise traditional Muslim societies. These apologists provided theological concessions to the westernized state system. In case of physical aggression by the imperialist powers into the Muslim territories, it is, of course, not possible for any believer to refute the ultimate evidence associated with the philosophy of jihad. However, to avoid direct confrontation in this conflict scenario, the liberals instead of approving or disapproving of jihad in categorical terms prefer to look for the alternatives by changing the perspective itself.81 They attempt to make the point that for the subdued Muslims, the way to survival lies not in confrontation but in reconciliation with the imperialist powers. In the wake of 1857 resistance against the British raj, the voice of apology for the Indian Muslims personified in Sir Sayyed

80S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, Democracy and Democratization in Developing Countries, Data for Decision Making Project, (Boston: Harvard School of Public Health, 1994; also see, Stephen Brown, “Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion:Lessons from Africa,” The European Journal of Development Research, vol.17, No.2 (June 2005):179–198 81Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan, Jihad Ka Qurani Falsafa (Urdu), in Mazameen-e- Sir Sayyed, comp. Muhammad Akram Chughtai, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2008), 113. Sir Sayyed views jihad as an instrument of resistance when the non-believers are bent upon obliterating the religion itself. He does permit to wage jihad to defend the territorial boundaries of a Muslim state. This view stands in direct confrontation with that of majority of ulema. 29

Ahmed Khan whose vision of the western civilization was that of a subdued person (maghlūb). Being overwhelmed by the militarily dominant civilization, he could not develop an objective vision.82 His fascination for the dominant western civilization led him to adopt rationalism on which western civilization was philosophically based. He introduced philosophic revisions in Islamic ideology and negated any phenomenon that fell beyond human reasoning and could not be proved on the touchstone of modern knowledge-base.83 As rationalism could not be assimilated by the Islamic ideology that recognized metaphysical phenomena in terms of ultimate source of truth, therefore, structural reforms in education process were introduced to serve the imperial interests by mollifying the local resistance through neutralizing the fault lines between the two diverse civilizations. On his return from England, Sir Sayyed reserved the post of the principal of his academic institutions exclusively for the British.84 Moreover, instead of promoting technical education aimed at industrial revolution on the model of the developed world, his reforms in curricula aimed at paving the grounds for the assimilation of the western value system by the Muslim civilization.85

In Egyptian context, Mufti Muhammad Abdūhū happened to follow this liberal approach. Though Sir Sayyed and Abdūhū belonged to different geographical environments yet both shared following contents of their apologies to the British imperialism: one, both of them preferred to explore grounds for reconciliation between the two civilizations through reforming the education system instead of direct confrontation; two, they accepted western rationalism as a source of ultimate knowledge and last but not the least, their religious approach could not earn recognition with general Muslim masses because of not being supported by any major school of Islamic scholarship. For instance, their reconciliatory approach towards imperialist challenge was taken to be violative of the divine scripture, prophetic traditions and acts of the salaf. One cannot find even an isolated instance where the believers have been ordained to observe restraint against foreign aggression. It is an agreed view of all the recognized schools of Muslims jurisprudence that jihad which is otherwise ford-e-kafāyā becomes ford-e-ayn86 for the Muslims whose territory has been invaded by any foreign power.

Secondly, the Islamists have been at advantage to evoke the anti-imperialistic emotions amongst the masses by highlighting the multi-dimensional perception of the challenge of imperialism like territorial aggrandizement, threat to religious edifice, erosion of social values and above all, economic exploitation of the Muslims. As

82Syed Abu Al-Hassan Ali Nadvi, Muslim Mamalak me Islamiyyat aur Maghrabiyyat ki Kashmakash (Urdu.) Conflict of Islam and the West in Muslim Lands, (Karachi: Majlis Nashriāt-e-Islam),96 83Nadvi. Muslim Mamalik me,95 84Ibid. 101 85 Ibid. 103 86By fard-e-kafāyā, we mean that jihad is a collective responsibility which if performed by a group of believers compensates all others and if it is not performed by anyone, all are held responsible for this omission. By Fard-e- Ayn, we mean that jihad is an individual obligation just like other elements of Islam. 30

against the apologists, the Islamists instead of undertaking an ecumenical approach take refuge in the fundamentals of their faith in face of the challenges emerging from the western imperialism. The primary sources for the fundamentalists include the ‘divine scripture’, the prophetic traditions and the consensus opinion or acts (ijmă) of the companions of the Prophet. As a matter of fact, imperialism relies upon oppression of the marginalized sections of the society to perpetuate whereas Quran condemns oppression in whichever form it may be. It enjoins upon the believers to wage jihad against every form of oppression. It says, “How should ye not fight for the cause of Allah and of the feeble among men and of the women and the children who are crying: Our Lord! Bring us forth from out this town of which the people are oppressors! Oh, give us from thy presence some protecting friend! Oh, give us from Thy presence some defender! Those who believe do battle for the cause of Allah; and those who disbelieve do battle for the cause of idols. So fight the minions of the devil. Lo! the devil's strategy is ever weak.” (An-Nisā: 75, 76) Quran further says, “And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is all for Allah. But if they cease, then lo! Allah is Seer of what they do.” (Al-Anfal: 39) If the non-Muslims wage fight against the believers it becomes duty of the Muslims to pay them in the same coin. Quran says, “And wage war on all of the idolaters as they are waging war on all of you. And know that Allah is with those who keep their duty (unto Him)”. (At- Tawbah: 36) The above quoted Quranic verses suggest that if the Muslim territories are attacked by the non-believers, the only legitimate option the believers are left with is to resist them. The Prophet himself participated in many battles against the forces of unbelief (kufr). It is jihad that differentiates between a hypocrite (munāfiq) and a believer. The Prophet said, “Whoever dies neither having fought nor having made up his mind to do so, dies on a branch of hypocrisy”.87 The Prophet further cautioned the believers that if they give up jihad, they would be punished and would be replaced by another people. The companions of the Prophet followed him on the road to jihad. During the times of the first four pious caliphs, Muslim armies were dispatched to fight against the Romans as well as the Persians. This leads us to draw strong evidence in support of jihad against the exploitative imperial forces in the divine scripture, traditions of the Prophet and acts of the companions of the Prophet. This evidence renders jihad an instrument of resistance even against the contemporary imperialism on the one hand and strengthens the Muslims who struggle to protect and preserve their distinct identity and shield themselves behind their “sacred past” to avert their identity crises.88

For the fundamentalists, the ideological renaissance is measured against the corresponding level of the revival of political order based upon divine sovereignty. The quest for this ideological revival anticipates conflict with the competing forces of jāhilliyah. The forces include the imperialist powers who are bent upon exploitation of the Muslims’ resources, ‘the apologists’ who resolve to reconcile Islamic order

87 An-Nasai, jihad:3099 88Martin E. Marty and Scott R. Appleby, Fundamentalism Observed, (Chicago:University of Chicago, 1991) 31

with the western democratic ideals and ‘the agents’ who collaborate with the imperialists against the fellow Muslims in pursuance of the imperialist agenda. This plurality of targets has invited diverse response from the Islamists. In India, the religiously polarized society could not become politically diffused on the pattern of the European society that could acquire egalitarian character through diluting the distinction between the church and the state. Owing to the ideological biases in religiously heterogeneous society, the liberal-cum-apologist approach could not succeed to thwart the Muslims to revert to their pristine religious past to secure their separate religious identity through the instrument of jihad. The seeds of resistance were sown by Sayyed Ahmed Bareili (1786-1831) who waged jihad against Sikh rule under the banner of Mujahedeen Movement. He is considered to be a beacon light for the contemporary jihadis to draw an equation between the English colonialism and the policies of the United States.89 Similarly, Haji Shariatullah (1781-1840) initiated Frāizī Tehrīk in Bengal to eliminate heresies from the Muslim society. Muhammad b. Abdul Wahāb was a common source of inspiration for both of them. Their theory of resistance remained relevant mostly till 1857 when the Indian Muslims rose up against the British imperialism but were suppressed. Though in the 20th century, the British did not have to face any organized resistance from the Islamists yet the linkage of the Islamists with their Islamic past could not become weak. It is evident from tehrik-e-hijrat (Movement for Migration) of the Indian Muslims when the British disbanded the Ottoman caliphate in the 20th century on the pretext that India had become dar-ul-harab.

The ideological biases amongst different religious communities in Indian society continued to persist even during the post-independence period as partition of British India happened to be mere a redefinition of the context in which the communal forces had been previously working. The ideological hostility between the Hindus and the Muslims in United India transformed into enmity between the Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. In this context, Sayyed Maudūdī emerged to occupy a central place in the Islamists’ ranks who took Islam in terms of a counter-imperialist force. His anti-imperialist ideas found exposition in his criticism of the United Nations and other great powers for encouraging India to use naked force in Kashmir.90 Moreover, in face of imperialist Indian designs explicit from the statements of Indian leaders not lesser than the stature of Mr. Nehru, he urged the Muslim community to support the jihadi elements in Kashmir fighting against India.91 However, he happened to be utilitarian in approach when he rules out armed conflict with the counter- revolutionary forces within the country and emerged out more of a reformer than a revolutionary92 at least within Pakistan. In the war theatres outside Pakistan, he called

89Haqqani. The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups 90 Abul a’la Maūdūdī, Kashmir: A Call to the Conscience of Humanity, (Lahore: Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan, 1966) 91Ibid. 92 Revolutionaries follow different approach from the reformers in the sense that they view change as impossible in the existing phenomenon until and unless the power structure of the existing order is done away with altogether. For details see, Horton and Hunt, Sociology, 502-3 32

for armed struggle against the imperialist forces and used the Quranic terminology of Hezbollah (Party of God).93 Though Maudūdī was not a pluralist to believe in the co- existence of two or more belief systems dominating the power structure of a state but unlike Sayyed Qutb he ruled out the option of armed struggle at least within the Muslim states.

In Egypt, Islamic fundamentalism arose in a more virulent and organized form as compared to India. Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949) established Ikhwān Al-Muslimūn (Muslim Brotherhood) in 1928. This organization was to become mother of all Islamic revivalist movements in the times to come. He emphasized upon the need to wage jihad against the imperialist forces. He shared views on jihad with Sayyed Maudūdī who developed his anti-imperialist theory of jihad in Indian context.94 Another figure who influenced the Islamists’ ideology down to our days was Sayyed Qutb. He, in his book Muālim fil tarīq (Milestones) laid down the road map of Islamic revolution against the imperialist forces that he termed as forces of jāhilliyah. His ardent opposition to the apologists is evident when he argues that offering an apology to the western imperialists is akin to follow the traditions of jāhilliyah95because Islam, being inconsistent with the western value system, possesses its distinct way of life.96 Like Maudūdī, he uses the dogma of ideological renaissance in terms of rediscovering of the Islamic political order based upon divine sovereignty vis-à-vis other political orders97 to anticipate conflict with the forces of jāhilliyah order. For him, this revival is essential to revive the public appeal of the faith as people prefer to look towards living entities instead of mere abstractions.98 The revival of divine sovereignty is essential to uproot the existing ideologies which are bent upon exploitation of the mankind. As these ideologies possess tremendous material power base which the Muslims cannot compete, therefore, the only choice left with the Muslims is to rely upon the power of faith to stand in the face of these ideologies of oppression.99 This conflict will naturally invite resistance to the Muslims which can only be faced if jihad is taken in terms of a forceful tool to obliterate the oppressive political orders.100 This struggle will be launched by a resourceful Islamic movement (vanguard) through a gradual process. This process begins with an ideological struggle to expose the weakness of the system of jāhilliyah and then, in the final stage through the use of

93 Abul a’la Maūdūdī, jihad fi Sabillah( Jihad in Islam) trans. Khurshid Ahmed, ed. Huda Khattab (Birmingham: UK Islamic Mission Dawah Centre, 1995) 94 For details see, Hassan Al-Banna, Jihad 95Sayyed Qutb, Muālim fil tarīq (Milestones) (New York: Globosz Publishing) 96Sidahmed and Ehteshami, Islamic Fundamentalism,10 97 Ibrahim M. Abu- Rabi, Intellectual Resurgence in the Modern Arab World, (Albanay: State University of New York Press,1966)129 98Qutb, Muālim fil tarīq 99Ibid. 100 Sayyed Qutb while arguing against those who regard jihad as defensive war, raised very important question in Muālim fil tarīq when he said, “Can one say that if the pious caliphs had been satisfied that Roman and Persian empires were not going to attack the Arabian peninsula, they would not have striven to spread the message of Islam throughout the world. How could this message have spread when it faced with such material obstacles as political system of state, socio-economic system based on races and classes and behind all these, the military power”? 33

physical force, the jāhilliyah order will be overthrown and Islamic system will be installed.101 He distances himself from Maudūdī when he sanctions the use of force to face the resistance from the political order of jāhilliyah because as evident from history Islamic movement would not be able to achieve their goal only through preaching, devoid of physical force.102 He categorically sanctions khurūj against the Muslim rulers who are found in collaboration with the western imperialists.103

1.2.2 Social Order 1.2.2.1 Democratic Social Order The nature of social order also reflects the nature of ideology that generates it. In democratic social order ‘individual good’ occupies central place vis-à-vis the state formation. ‘Individual good’ is an end in itself to be achieved through state formation. A diffused political authority was visualized through separation of church from the state only to achieve this end by bringing discipline to the state’s role in individuals’ lives. Democratic liberalism approves of state’s interference in individuals’ lives only if it aims to promote ‘individual good’. Democratic liberalism generates social order that revolves around individualism and thus, relegates the society as a whole to a subordinate position only to secure individuals’ interests. It is in this context that J.S. Mill argues that as an individual is sovereign over his body and mind, therefore, the state interference in his life may run counter to his individual sovereignty. The state should only discipline activities which are ‘others-related’ and avoid infringing upon an individual’s liberty in one’s activities that are “self-related”. Actually, Mill’s theory of ‘human good’ needs to be examined in terms of an extension of Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian approach to politics that legitimizes the state interference in human lives provided it aims to secure ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. Though Mill did not subscribe to the utilitarians’ quantitative happiness of an individual yet he shared with them that it was individual good that provided space for the state interference in human lives. However, democratic liberalism that thrived upon free-market economy could not cater for all classes in a society in uniform manner. The dawn of industrialization ushered in an era of unprecedented rate of production but the system failed to ensure equitable utilization of the fruits of industrialization. This resulted in the emergence of a class of dispossessed on the one hand and also failed to control the competitive search for new markets that caused imperialism to emerge as an inevitable result. Thus, Capitalism could neither avoid exploitation of the ‘haves not’ within the capitalist societies nor the weaker nations too could not escape from its imperialistic designs.

1.2.2.2 Communist Social Order Against democratic liberalism, Communism denotes a political theory of method that provides for transition from Capitalism to Socialism through transfer of power to the

101 Ibid. 102Ibid; also see, Sayyed Qutb, “Jihad in the Cause of Allah,” in Contemporary Debates in Islam, ed. Moaddel and Talattof, 225-226 103 Bonney, Jihad, 215,216 34

proletariat class. This transfer of power takes place through revolutionary means.104 The proponents of Communism argue that the proletariats will emerge as a natural outcome of the class conflict between the ‘haves’ and ‘haves not’ within the capitalist framework the way the capitalists were supplanted by the preponderance of the feudal class. The rise of proletariats will lead to the abolition of the capitalist class that caused them to emerge the way the capitalists had uprooted the feudal class that created them. The communists claim to realize the salvation of humanity through achieving a classless society based upon collective ownership of the means of production though through a class-based revolutionary struggle.105 However, in practical terms, the process of Communism could not consummate classless society as the monopoly over the sovereign authority passed on to the proletariats empowering them to embark upon what Joad terms as “expropriation of the exploiters”.106 It proved counterproductive to the very raison d'être of this transition- from Capitalism to Communism as it, too, failed to eliminate the forces of class-based exploitation. It only resulted into the swap of actors of exploitation as previously the victims became the perpetrators of exploitation.

As said earlier, both systems could not avoid class-based exploitation and failed to create social cohesion as the society remained class-ridden. Actually, this exploitation in either case is closely linked with the problem of sovereign authority. In either case, sovereign authority has been a resource for its bearer to exploit the one who does not bear the crown of sovereignty. Democratic framework does not provide any safeguard against the exploitation of political minority at the hands of political majority. On the other hand, though the socialists claim to have collective control of the means of production as a whole, yet in practical terms, the sovereign authority is exercised by the communist leadership which creates a potential threat to those not subscribing to the communist ideology. As against both of these ideologies, Islam resolves to ensure human salvation by negating the human qualification to the sovereign authority. It seeks to ensure human salvation by bringing sovereignty into metaphysical domain in terms of an attribute exclusive to God. This metaphysical attribution of sovereignty provides a solution to the extreme positions taken by democratic liberalism and Communism and helps creating a sublime sort of balance between collectivism and individualism though with a marginalized tilt towards collectivism. Islam sanctifies the fundamental rights of an individual but at the same time, its inclination towards collectivism is reflected through the character of its rituals, its social welfare oriented economic program and above all, through jihad which is to be undertaken for the common good of the community.

The allocation of sovereignty to the transcendent metaphysical phenomenon broadens the ambit of the social order that transcends all territorial boundaries and aims to create a global ideological brotherhood. It overshadows the elusive notion of national

104C. E. M. Joad, Introduction to Modern Political Theory, (London: Oxford University, 1964), 88 105Ibid.90 106Ibid. 35

interest which is a pivot to modern secular statehood. Nevertheless, within the framework of Islam, the fundamentalists and the apologists differ upon the nature of the social order that Islam aims to establish.

The fundamentalists like Sayyed Maudūdī and Sayyed Qutb in response to western Imperialism that had been striking at the very roots of Muslims’ body politic in the last quarter of the 19th century,107 yearn to look towards Islam through the ideological lenses.108 They take Islam as an ideology that aims to restructure the global social order according to its own principles through its committed volunteers.109 Though, both of them seek to revitalize the intellectual and moral spirit of the community to transform the social order yet Sayyed Maudūdī opted for intellectual means like educational uplift through a countrywide network of schools110 whereas Sayyed Qutb opted to bring about this transformation even through militant struggle by a ‘vanguard’ of committed volunteers if required.111 Both of them happen to be exclusionists in terms of discrediting all socio-political orders other than Islam for being exploitative in spirit. They assert that all these exploitative systems must be replaced by the Islamic order to secure human salvation.112 They further argued that establishment of world state based upon divine sovereignty was the ultimate goal of Islam.113 This good would be achieved through jihad which is an instrument of social transformation. This social transformation aims at securing the sanctity of human life the way the Prophet (sw) secured it through jihad against the forces of jāhilliyah which had no reverence for human life.

The apologists’ narrative of the social order is inclusionary in nature vis-à-vis democratic social order. It aims to discover common grounds between the western and Islamic social orders to bring about reconciliation between the two. In Indian context, Sir Sayyed’s attempts to bring social transformation in Indian society were actually aimed at bridging the social gap between the British and the local population.114 He attempted to convince the Muslims that there was no harm in following the eating patterns of the British.115 One of his articles entitled Tarīqāh-i- Zindagī (The Way of Life) serves as a window to his recommended life pattern for the

107 Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order, 12 108In view of Sayyed Maūdūdī’s efforts to revive the ideological spirit of Islam, some regard ideological version of Islam as brain-child of Sayyed Maūdūdī; see for instance, S.V.R. Nasr, “Democracy and Islamic Revivalism,” Political Science Quarterly, vol.110, No.2 (Summer, 1995):261-285; also see, Qutb, Muālim 109 Maūdūdī, jihad fi Sabillah; also see, Qutb, Muālim 110 Jamat-e-Islami has established a department Islami Nizamat-e-Ta’leem which is monitoring a series of schools throughout the country. 111 Qutb, Muālim 112 C.J.Adams, “Mawdudi on the Necessity of Divine Government for the Elimination of Oppression and Injustice”, in Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan, 1857-1968, ed. A.Ahmed, and G.E. Grunebaum, (Wiesbaden:1970) 113Abul a’la Maūdūdī, “Nationalism and India” (Pathankot, 1947),10 quoted in ibid.92; also see, Qutb, Muālim 114Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan, Mazameen-e-Sir Sayyed, 154-157 and 417,418 115Sayyid Ahmed Khan, “Tariqah-i- Tanawul-i- Ta’am” (The Way to Eat a Meal) trans. Kamran Talattof, in Contemporary Debates in Islam, ed. Moaddel and Talattof,187,188 36

Muslims.116 Moreover, in order to remove the fault lines between the Christian British government and their Muslim subjects in India, Sir Sayyed wrote bilingual commentary of Bible titled Tabyin-ul-Kalām wherein he attempted to discover common grounds between Christianity and Islam.

This social transformation is secured through removing the religious barriers in temporal sphere. The debate regarding the scope of religion has created sharp cleavages between the fundamentalists and the apologists. The former views life as a compact whole indivisible in spiritual and temporal spheres whereas the latter tend to limit the scope of religion in temporal sphere of life. The apologists support the bifurcation of life into spiritual and temporal on the basis of modernity thesis by taking religion as anti-thesis to modernity117 whereas the fundamentalists subscribe to restructured description of modernity that is based upon linkage of future with the past. They take religion in terms of a culture-producing force that disciplines every aspect of the believers’ lives.118

1.2.3 Religious Order

Modernity thesis provides a paradigm to examine the approaches of the fundamentalists and the apologists. The apologists believe in exclusionary relationship between religion and modernity whereas the fundamentalists subscribe to reconstructed definition of modernity and approach religious dynamism not in terms of negation but in the context of pluralistic redefinition of the term. In this contextual framework, the following discussion will examine two inter-related philosophical paradigms namely ‘status of human reason vis-à-vis revelation in the realm of knowledge’ and ‘inter-relationship between religion and politics’. This discussion will lead to develop a case that as the apologists like Abdūhū and Rashīd Ridā exhausted their energies to reconcile Islam with the western intellectual and technological advancement as the symbol of western modernity, the fundamentalist Muslim scholars like Qutb, while rejecting the apologists’ approach, redefined their own parameters of modernity which view future strongly linked with the past.

1.2.3.1 Source of Religious and Socio-political Authority As discussed earlier, Islam like other divinity-based Abrahamic religions believe in channelization of divine knowledge to the respective prophets. This channelization of divine knowledge, in the terminology of religions is called ‘revelation’. Despite acknowledging the authenticity of revelation, the Muslim theorists differ upon the degree of authenticity of rationalism as a source of ultimate scholastic authority vis-à- vis revelation. The fundamentalists look solely towards revelation as a source of authority whereas the apologists identify rationalism as an important source to draw authority from.

116Ibid. 117Kubba, “What is Liberal Islam?”45-49 118Dietal, Holy War pp.13-47 quoted in Noor Muhammad, The Doctrine of Jihad 37

While identifying intellectual stagnation and internal strife in the body politic as the core causes leading to degeneration of the Islamic societies, Muhammad Abdūhū and Sir Sayyed focused upon reforming the education system by dispelling the prevalent impression that western material advancement was alien to Islam.119 Initially, they embarked upon reforming the education system in their respective colonized societies by emphasizing upon rational understanding of the religious scripture. In Egyptian society, Abdūhū resorted to this rational interpretation of the religious scripture120 through the pages of Urwāt-ul-Wuthqā (the Strongest Bond), a newspaper originally brought out by Afghani, his mentor in his mission of reformation of Muslim society.121 In his endeavors to establish a harmonious relationship between the scientific knowledge and religious dogma, he emphasized upon the significance of human reason as a source of knowledge to explore the ‘ultimate truths’ of life. He further stressed upon the Muslims that the secret of civilizational progress lies in following the pursuit of scientific advancement by recognizing the reason and the revelation as equally important sources of human knowledge.122 Reason being an attribute exclusive to human beings elevates them to ‘nobility’ by helping them to discover, to quote M. H. Kerr, “the principles of social morality” through discerning right from the wrong.123 Revelation being source of divine guidance addresses to metaphysical queries of human nature which fall beyond the limits of the reason. The reason has access only to the extent of material phenomena. As human reason depends upon empirical knowledge to explore the vast horizons of knowledge, therefore, the metaphysical phenomena which cannot be grasped through empiricism fall beyond its scope. In view of this, metaphysics becomes the exclusive sphere of faith to be explored through revelation.124 Furthermore, as revelation and reason, both are creatures of one Creator; therefore, any inherent incompatibility between the two is but unnatural. However, if any contradiction between the two surfaces, it may either be resolved through rational process or be referred to God on the presumption of human inability to discover the grounds of compatibility between the two.125 Therefore, as Roxanne Euben remarks, “the pursuit of unknowable is not only fruitless but transgressive of the precepts of faith as well”.126 In other words, reason should be cautiously exercised in the spheres of religion to ensure the promotion of faith rather than its degeneration.127 Similarly, in India, through his education reforms

119 The idea of inherent difference between Islamic and Western societies is the product of 18th century. See for example, Albert Hourani, “Islam and Philosophers of History,” Middle Eastern Studies (Apr.,1967) 120 Sarfraz Khan, Muslim Reformist Political Thought: Revivalists, Modernists and Free Will(London: Routledge Curzon, 2003),163 121 Yvonne Haddad, “Muhammad Abduh: Pioneer of Islamic Reform,” in Pioneers of Islamic Revival ed. Ali Rahnema,(London Zed Books Ltd,1994),32 122 Roxanne L. Euben, “Premodern, Anti-modern or Post-modern? Islamic and Western Critique of Modernity,”The Review of Politics vol.59, No.3, Non-Western Political Thought (Summer, 1997): 429- 459 123 Kerr, Islamic Reform, 107 124 Roxanne L. Euben, “Premodern, Anti-modern or Post-modern?” 125Ibid. 126Ibid. 127Ibid. 38

Sir Sayyed urged upon the Muslims to follow the rationalism-based western civilization. He categorically repudiated the metaphysical phenomena that fall beyond human reasoning and could not be proved on the touch-stone of modern knowledge- base.128 His attempts of rational interpretation of religious miracles earned him hostility of the Muslim fundamentalists in Indian society for whom the divine scripture instead of rationalism was a definitive proof to believe in these miracles.

The fundamentalists like Sayyed Qutb (1906-1966) redefined the contemporary Islamic ideology129 by challenging the apologists’ view that human reason enjoys equal standing vis-à-vis divine revelation as a source of knowledge. Though, Qutb recognizes human reason as a source of knowledge in the realm of physical and natural sciences yet he was convinced of its inability to access the metaphysical spheres of the universe which is exclusive domain of revelation. This inability relegates human reason to a position subordinate to revelation.130 It is empirical knowledge which determines the scope of rationalism. The empiricism can cover only the phenomena, material and tangible which may be experienced through human senses, meaning thereby, any phenomena which is not tangible and material do not fall within the ambit of empirical rationalism. Conversely speaking, if rationalism is accepted as source of knowledge, complete in itself, we will have to accept the negation of all intangible and metaphysical phenomena of the universe. It is in this context that Qutb believes that human reason unaided by divine guidance loses its direction and thus, invites the forces of jāhilliyah to challenge the divine authority- a highest metaphysical phenomenon. Consequently, rationalism by repudiating all metaphysical truths which constitute the basis of human morality exposes human nature to ‘moral sickness’.131 He further believed that as it is only Islam which addresses both the material and metaphysical aspects of the universe, therefore, it is in absolute harmony with human nature. As Islam stands for the salvation of mankind, therefore, the believers should explore western sources of knowledge with the pre- determined objective to ascertain the aberrations committed by the western society and to determine the mode to counter human misguidance created by this jāhilliyah order.132 Similarly, Sayyed Maudūdī exposed the fallacy of western rationalism and argued that religious edicts could not be compromised on the rationality-based utilitarian grounds. For instance, the criteria of harām and halāl cannot be relaxed to attract the non-believers into the ambit of Islam.133

1.2.3.2 Scope of Religion As discussed earlier, the apologists in their attempts to limit the role of the religion to the spiritual sphere get embroiled in confusion whereas the fundamentalists believe in

128Nadvi, Muslim Mumalik me Islamiyyat, 95,102 129 Gole, ”Snapshots of Islamic Modernities,”,91,117 130 Qutb, Muālim 131Euben, “Premodern, Anti-modern or Post-modern?,”429-459 132Sidhamed and Ehteshami, “Islamic Fundamentalism,”10 133 Maūdūdī, “Fallacy of Western Rationalism,”in Contemporary Debates in Islam, ed. Moaddel and Talattof (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006), 207-222 39

all-encompassing domain of the faith that does not bifurcate between the spiritual and temporal spheres of life. From the array of the apologists Abdūhū’s views reflect marked inconsistencies on the question of linkage between politics and religion. On the one hand, he appears to be convinced of inherent relationship between Islam and politics and on the other, he switches over to be the champion of secularism. For instance, he recognizes the Quranic laws as constitutive force behind the social order but at the same time he refuses to grant legislative role to the scripture.134 It is, perhaps, due to this inconsistency in approach that Mansoor Moaddel places this modernist scholar in the ranks of the secularists.135 On the other hand, Abdūhū regards religion and politics as if body and soul.136 In 1886, in a letter to Sheikh-ul- Islam in Constantinople, he argued that fidelity to Ottoman caliphate constituted the third pillar of the faith.137 He resolved to negate the claim that the Christianity stands in affirmation to secularism by pointing out that the Christian theology places ordinary things under subordination to the clergy.138 He further argued that western claim of championing the cause of secularism did not the counter argument that if the Queen of England and political leadership of France could claim to be the custodians of their respective churches, then why the Ottoman Caliph could not claim to be the spiritual head of the Muslims.139 Moreover, for Abdūhū, human beings are responsible for the creation of the Islamic civilization in the capacity of vicegerents of God on earth.140 He does not relegate religion to a subordinate position to reason and he acknowledges divine role in every sphere of human life.141In view of the foregoing we find ourselves in agreement with M.H.Kerr when he argues that he [Abdūhū] “hedged his espousal of secular notions and avoided a clear-cut rejection of orthodox conceptions with ambiguous results”.142

As against Abdūhū, Sayyed Qutb like Sayyed Maudūdī, representing the fundamentalists’ perspective, followed traditional view of Muslim theologians to explain the nature of relationship between religion and politics which suggests that life is a compact whole in the chemistry of Islam. He regarded sovereignty to be an exclusive privilege of God which is expressed through divine laws revealed to the Prophet. These laws are so comprehensive and all-encompassing that life becomes a compact whole, indivisible between the spiritual and temporal compartments and thus, Islam rules out any option of selective obedience on the part of believers. As modern world recognizes the phenomena of universe on the touchstone of reason through empirical rationalism, therefore, it refuses to identify anything

134 Kerr, Islamic Reform, 143 135Moaddel and Talattof,(eds.)Contemporary Debates in Islam, 3 136 Kerr, Islamic Reform,150 137Ibid. 148 138 Originally, Abdu’hu made this point in response to the argument of Farah Antun, the publisher of journal Al-Jamia, that inclusive relationship between Islam and politics has been a catalyst in bringing decline to Islamic civilization. See, Haddad, “ Muhammad Abduh: Pioneer of Islamic Reform,” 52,53 139Ibid. 55 140Ibid. 46 141 Kerr, Islamic Reform, 150 142Ibid.143 40

incomprehensible through empiricism including divine sovereignty rather recognizes popular sovereignty which amounts to usurpation of the sovereignty of God. The restoration of sovereignty to its real Owner is the basis of his theory of revolution against the modern secular world which he terms as jāhilliyah.143

Likewise, Sayyed Maudūdī’s anti-secular approach is explicit from his idea of theo- democratic state that provides that under the Divine sovereignty people will exercise limited popular sovereignty not as repository of power but as viceroys of God on earth.144 Some critics argue that as in Maudūdī’s theo-Democratic state authority to interpret the political ideology of Islam vests with the clergy, therefore, this theo- democracy would turn into “Modern Theocracy”.145 This hypothetical piece of argument can be easily discredited by making a reference to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan which was promulgated through consensus by all political parties including Jamat-e-Islami under the leadership of Sayyed Maudūdī himself. This constitution recognizes the sovereignty of God but does not provide for theocracy in Pakistan.

In addition, the following points highlight the extent of difference between the apologists and the fundamentalists regarding the scope of faith: One, the apologists believe that religion and politics constitute separate regions of human mind which may not be intermingled with each other. As a counter argument the fundamentalists make the point that religion for the Muslims is different from Sunday suit to be put on for worship and put off while in day to day life. In actuality, life is not divisible into spiritual and temporal compartments. Two, the apologists argue that by not appointing his political successor the Prophet affirmed the mutually exclusive relationship between politics and religion.146 The fundamentalists believe that though the Prophet did not appoint anyone as his political successor categorically but his directions to Abu Bakr for leading prayers are confirmatory of his will. Moreover, after such a clear indication, the need of formal announcement became redundant as the people would not have agreed upon anyone but Abu Bakr.147 Three, the apologists do not consider it imperative to revive the caliphate (khilāfat) on the pattern of pious caliphs (khilāfat-e-rāshidā) in modern times. The fundamentalists argue that it is obligatory upon every Muslim to make efforts to create a ‘nucleus for Muslims’ in the form of khilāfat because people do not attract towards an abstract theory which is devoid of practicing potential.148 Four, according to the apologists, though Islam was able to

143 Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986),45 144 B.P.Baura, Eminent Thinkers in India and Pakistan, (New Delhi: Lancer Books, 1991),95 145 Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan, (London: Printer, 1987),118 146Ali Abd al-Raziq, “The Problem of Caliphate,”in Contemporary Debates in Islam, ed. Moaddel and Talattof (New York: St. Martin Press, 2006), 95-100 147Sahih Muslim- Fazayl e Sahaba:1; also quoted in, Taimmiyah, Minhaj As-Sunnah,88; also see, Ibn Kathīr, Al-Badayah Wa Nahayah (Tarikh Ibn Kathīr) Urdu trans. Maulana Hafiz Muhammad Awais Sarwar,vol.15 (Karachi: Nafees Academy, 1989),20 148Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, Al-Faridah al-Gha’iba, (The Neglected Duty); also see, Qutb, Muālim fil tarīq 41

mitigate the differences between the politically fragmented Arabs149 but these differences did not vanish completely. They did not get united under the Prophet in terms of politics rather they assembled under the banner of the Prophet religiously as the Prophet did never interfere in the mechanics of governance of the society.150 The fundamentalists explore historical evidence contrary to this argument. They argue that the Prophet was not just a spiritual leader rather he was the ultimate leader in every aspect of the believers’ lives. His unqualified submission is the pre-requisite to enter into the fold of Islam.151 He exhibited in his life pattern a practical model for a true believer.152 In his personal conduct he set examples for the believers as a trader, commander of armies, in charge of foreign affairs of the state153. Prophethood was not limited to the spiritual sphere of life alone rather the Prophet controlled the forces of history as well by establishing an ideal Islamic state in Madina.154

In brief, the apologists view Islam in terms of anti-thesis to modernity and yearn to prefer the latter over the former155 whereas the fundamentalists being convinced of mutually inclusive relationship between religion and politics view Islam as a ‘culture producing force’ which disciplines every aspect of the life of a believer.156 They argue that Islam literally means submission to the will of God and as the will of God is all encompassing, therefore, the life is taken as a compact whole. In the terminology of Quran human beings are viceroys of God in this earth (Al-Baqarah: 30) and they have been entrusted to translate the will of God into practice. Moreover, Quran urges the believers to enter into the fold of Islam in toto meaning thereby that a believer is required to submit to the will of God in every sphere of his life. (Al-Baqarah: 208) Furthermore, emphasizing upon mutually inclusive relationship between politics and Islam the Prophet declared the whole earth as a mosque.157

To summarize, the following conclusions may be drawn: One, Islam unlike other religions is inherently non-secular. However, it would be oversimplification to assume that the debate regarding the character of Islam is confined only to the extent of academic squabbles. The revolutionary surge created by political Islam aims at reviving the socio-political order of the salaf. The militants, in the garb of struggle for establishing khilāfat on prophetic model, seek to ascribe theological legitimacy to their acts of violence against the west. Two, the genesis of this inquiry in forming the

149“And hold fast, all of you together, to the cable of Allah, and do not separate. And remember Allah's favor unto you: How ye were enemies and He made friendship between your hearts so that ye became as brothers by His grace; and (how) ye were upon the brink of an abyss of fire, and He did save you from it. Thus Allah maketh clear His revelations unto you, that haply ye may be guided”. (Al- Imran:103) 150al-Raziq, ““The Problem of Caliphate,” 95-110 151“Whoso obeyeth the messenger hath obeyed Allah, and whoso turneth away: We have not sent thee as a warder over them”. (An-Nisa:80) 152“Verily in the messenger of Allah ye have a good example for him who looketh unto Allah and the Last Day, and remembereth Allah much”. (Al-Ahzab:21) 153The Prophet wrote letters to other heads of the states. 154 Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, “The Spirit of Muslim Culture,”Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam 155 Kubba, “What is Liberal Islam?”45-49 156W. Dietal, Holy War, 13-47 quoted in Noor Muhammad, “The Doctrine of Jihad,” 381-397 157 Tirmidhi-Salat; Nissai- Ghusal 42

framework of the conflict has established that ideology is the realm of the conflict with three strands of actors who have been the principal architects behind this construction. The first group identified can be labeled as ‘the fundamentalists’ who cherish to revive the faith by reverting to the early period of Islam. The second group is ‘the apologists’ who cherish to harmonize the Islamic principles with the western democratic ideals. Third group is ‘the agents’ who are accused of collaborating with the western powers against the fellow Muslims.

2 Heresy of Ideas

Once it is established that the nature of conflict between the extremists and the west is essentially ideological, its manifestations have largely been internalized towards the Muslim societies. The current chapter will focus on this context to determine the foundations of this development. While explaining the key terminology associated with the issue regarding concepts of takfīr (ex-communication), bida’ā (heresy) and irti’dād (apostasy), this study will explore the boundaries of faith to locate trajectories of heresy nurtured on these ideas by the extremists. It will also be argued that the boundaries of faith have been deliberately changed owing to interplay of socio- political variables. This study will examine the issue from the perspectives of the classical and the modernist theorists and the militants and will analyze the evolution of ideas towards heresy that ultimately culminate into the emergence of takfīr.

2.1 Key Terminology Religion may be defined in terms of a voluntary approach to what one feels as supernatural.1 Thus, a religion2 cannot be exclusive to the idea of God or at least, a supernatural phenomenon to which it directs the unqualified submission of its adherents. In other words, belief in or about such supernatural phenomenon and the religion itself are mutually inclusive to each other. As religion demands its adherents to have a view regarding a supernatural phenomenon in terms of a point of total submission, theology defines the process to reach that point. However, the evidence suggests that this point of submission as required by religion can also be reached external to a theological discourse. For instance, the Arabs prior to the advent of Islam had no theological discourse to follow to render their submission to God as required by Islam. Nevertheless, they could enter the fold of Islam without any previous theological channel.3 As have been said earlier, though theology was not inclusive to Islam as such rather it emerged out of historical progression in terms of an external process that would define the issues and provide for the methodologies to address them.4 Moreover, theology as an instrument of acquiring a belief depends upon a validation process whereby a theologian validates his conclusions to draw authenticity whereas he being himself subject to limitations because of finite being cannot reach the infinite and thus, cannot draw conclusions about God who is infinite in nature (al- Awwal, al-Ākhir). Theology being a finite process cannot explore the infinite divine domain, therefore, it becomes subservient to revelation as an ultimate source of knowledge to explore those phenomena that are part of divine infinity. In other words, a creed (aqīdah) that is an outcome of a particular religious belief may not necessarily

1Johnstone, Religion and Society in Interaction, 20; also see, Horton and Hunt, Sociology, 265, also see Ian Robertson, Sociology, 398 2Here the term ‘religion’ has been used in terms of ‘divinity-based religion’. 3Sherman A Jackson’s introductory note to Abu Hamid Al-Ghazalī, Faysal al-Tafriqā Baynā al-Islam wa al-Zandaqā (On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam),trans. Sherman A. Jackson(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005),3-32 4Ibid. 44

be owing to theology rather it may develop directly on the basis of knowledge received through revelation.5

2.1.1 Orthodoxy and Heresy (bida’ā)

In literal sense, bida’ā (heresy) means innovations. It includes the ideas or acts that are not actually part of the original body of a religion as informed by primary religious scriptures and those early followers of the faith whose acts have the sanctity for being true reflections of the spirit of the faith. In the contextual framework of classical Islam, heresy was not identified with apostasy rather a fine line could never be removed between formal and material forms of heresy. The former being the outcome of deliberate insistence on error and the latter being the product of unintended mistakes.6 However, labeling of any act in terms of bida’ā or otherwise requires a great deal of intellectual ordeal. Whether a theological framework is pre- requisite for exercising such ordeal or otherwise is a question that requires to be explored in detail.

Given the subordinate status of theology vis-à-vis revelation as a source of knowledge, it happened to be handicapped to draw such conclusions through its validation process that could culminate into the advent of orthodoxy in Islam. Thus, the terminology ‘orthodox’ remained alien to Islam in the sense it was relevant to the Christianity where some formal authority could determine some acts to be ‘orthodox’ or heretic. In Islam, there was no such formal authority to categorize some act as orthodox or heretic except some schools of Muslim jurisprudence which had their respective position on different aspects of the religious jurisprudence.7 However, some may argue that an informal authority had existed in the Islamic context that could dispense with a formal authority to determine the veracity of some acts. This informal authority could be informed by collective opinion by some schools of thought within the Muslim clergy.8 However, the fact remains that biases associated with this informal authority could not avoid but to inform interpretations of different acts. This is by no means to suggest that existence of formal authority to determine orthodoxy can close the doors for heresy rather it is argued that formally authorizing someone to categorize different acts in terms of orthodox or heretic, will limit the scope of dynamic interpretations as difference with such formal authority’s opinion will attract the label of heresy by default.

2.1.2 Apostasy (irti’dād) and Ex-communication (takfīr)

Apostasy may be defined in terms of reverting of a Muslim to unbelief. It has been defined by the Quran in the following words: “And whoso opposeth the messenger after the guidance (of Allah) hath been manifested unto him, and followeth other than

5Ibid. 6Ibid. 7W. M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, (Edinburgh:University Press, Edinburgh,1985), 19 8Jackson’s introductory note to Al-Ghazalī, Faysal, 3-32 45

the believer's way, We appoint for him that unto which he himself hath turned, and expose him unto hell - a hapless journey's end.” (An-Nisā: 115) However, what constitutes an apostasy and what does it imply are the issues that warrant detailed expositions. Takfīr means to label someone an unbeliever who is otherwise a believer on the basis of any of his act or belief. It has strong implications for both upon whom it is exercised and upon the one who exercise it as well. If exercised justifiably it renders upon whom it is exercised liable to the punishment specified for an apostate and its unjustified exercise places the one who exercises it outside the pale of Islam. Abdullah Ibn Umar narrated that the Prophet said, “If a man declares his brother to be a kāfir, it will apply to one of them”.9

2.2 Conceptual Framework The following discussion will develop a theoretical framework to identify the principles of khurūj, apostasy and takfīr from the classical, modernist and the militant perspectives.

The classical narrative will be explored largely from the theological standpoints of Ibn Taimmiyah and Ibn Kathīr. The rationale to select these jurists from an array of medieval theologians arises from the following considerations: One, theological authenticity and their intellectual contribution to the theological knowledge base in the period of medieval Islam is undisputedly acknowledged. As far as Ibn Taimmiyah is concerned, Islamic legal structure owes a lot for its evolution to this 13th century Hanbal’ite theologian who challenged the finality of all the four schools of Sunnite Muslim jurisprudence and claimed the authority of mujtāhid for himself. He revolted against the idea of the blind following (taqlīd) of the recognized schools of jurisprudence. The degenerated conditions of the Muslims in the backdrop of the extinction of the Abbasid caliphate provided legitimacy to his ideas. Needless to say that his opposition to taqlīd left everlasting imprints on the subsequent Islamic thinkers and opened the doors of dynamism for the Muslim thought through ijtihād. Similarly, Ibn Kathīr is recognized as an authentic historian as well as commentator on the Quran. He has the credit to trace the origins of the sects in Islamic history and to clarify their religious status in the light of historical evidence.10 Two, both theorists are a source of reference for the contemporary militants in their search for theological legitimacy to their acts of violence within the Muslim societies and without.11 The militants make reference to Ibn Taimmiyah’s decree that permitted revolt (khurūj)

9Sahih Bukhari; Sahih Muslim 10 His luminous works include among others Al-Badayah wa Nahayah (History of Ibn Kathīr), Tafseer Ibn Kathīr (exegisis of the Quran) and Ghazwāt-ur-Rasul (Battles of the Prophet) which are reference books for the generations to come. These works are also an important addition to the knowledge base and authentic sources of research into the Muslims’ history. 11 For instance, during the year 2003, Bin Laden quoted Ibn Taimmiyah more than once to seek grounds of justification in their conflict with the west. 46

against the Mongol rulers to seek grounds to justify their khurūj against the contemporary Muslim rulers.12

For the modernist perspective, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahāb, Sayyed Qutb and Sayyed Maudūdī have been selected. The rationale behind their selection to represent modernists’ perspective on heresy of ideas in this study is based upon their contribution in terms of influencing the Muslim thought in their respective time frames and contexts which is acknowledged across the globe and has not been eclipsed so far. They still constitute a source of inspiration for the subsequent generations of the Islamists.13 Ibn Abdul Wahāb was the intellectual spirit behind the revolution in Arabia during the 18th century that brought the house of Saud to power. He rose to eliminate the signs of the days of pre-Islamic jāhilliyah (ignorance) from the contemporary Arab society. He identified taqlīd (blind following) as the root cause of the degeneration of the Arabian society. He embarked upon bringing a change in the society by eliminating those elements that have caused the jāhilliyah of pre-Islamic era to creep into the society of his times. His efforts culminated into a political revolution that awarded political authority to the house of Saud and his so- called Wahābī ideology became dominant in religious terms.14 Though, he belonged to 18th century yet this study examines his ideas in the modernist perspective because his philosophy is still a strong source of inspiration for the militants. He is considered to be a bridge between the classical and modernist perspectives on fundamentalist version of Islam. Likewise, Sayyed Qutb enjoys central place in the 20th century fundamentalist Egyptian tradition and is considered to be the pioneer of takfīr-wal- hijrā in the contemporary age.15 Being a point of convergence for Ibn Taimmiyah’s concept of jihad against the invalid Muslim rulers and Ibn Abdul Wahāb’s idea of modern jāhilliyah, he becomes the most potent figure to influence the contemporary extremist thought. He did not rule out the option of military jihad against the rulers in the Muslim lands on the grounds that they were supporting the forces of jāhilliyah bent upon obliterating the Islamic ideology and identity from the Muslim lands. So far as Sayyed Maudūdī is concerned, his political theories of Islam influenced almost every Islamic resistance movement in the world. For instance, Hassan Al-Banna, the founder of Egyptian Ikhwān and Sayyed Qutb shared many ideological aspects with Maudūdī but the latter did not support the option of military jihad for uprooting the

12Abu Salam Al-Faraj who was alleged to have killed Anwar Sadat argued that he got him killed in line with the fatawa issued by Ibn Taimmiyah against the Mongol rulers. 13 Militant Ideology Atlas suggests that by 2006, Ibn Abdul Wahab had been quoted by the Al-Qaida leadership for 09 times; Sayyed Qutb for 10 times and Sayyed Maūdūdī for 04 times. See, William McCants and Jarret Brachman, Militant Ideology Atlas: Executive Report 2006 (West Point, New York: Combating Terrorism Centre, 2006), 13-15 14 His luminous works include (Ten Nullifiers of Islam), (Aspects of the Days of Ignorance) and Kitāb al-Tauheed (Book of Tauheed). These works are relevant to our study in the sense that they uncover his views regarding the boundaries of faith as such. 15 His book Ma’alim fil tariq (Milestones) uncovers the dynamics of modern jihadi ideology. His other intellectual contribution is in the form of commentary on the Quran titled Fi Dhalal al-Quran (In the Shadow of Quran). 47

Muslim rulers even though they were invalid. He joined the political process in Pakistan to bring about a change in the political system.16

The militant perspective will be based largely on the ideas of Al-Qaida ideologues. This perspective will further get further exposition from the militants’ violence against those accused of undermining the purity of faith by introducing bida’ā in the faith. Al-Qaida ideologues include Azzam, Bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri, Al-Maqdisi and Al-Zarqawi. Azzam was the first to use the term Al-Qaida al-Sulbah denoting a precept or a base for a vanguard of the committed volunteers to continue their jihad even after the withdrawal of soviets from Afghanistan. He focused largely on jihad against the external enemy. After Azzam, Al-Qaida ideologues chiefly Bin Laden, Al- Zawahiri and Al-Zarqawi unleashed violence inside the Muslim societies to purge them of the elements of apostasy. Currently, ISIS follows the same ideology to internalize their violence to the Muslim world.

2.3 Principles of Khurūj, Irti’dād and Takfīr

As all the three concepts including bida’ā, irti’dād and takfīr are mutually inter- related, therefore, they need to be focused in conjunction with each other. Bida’ā has the potential to become basis for irti’dād which may attract takfīr. As these concepts are bound together in a cause and effect relationship; therefore, their isolated analysis becomes virtually impossible. In view of this, the following discussion will develop an integrated perspective on the basis of the concepts espoused by the classical and the modernist theorists.

2.3.1 Conditions for Khurūj 2.3.1.1 Classical Perspective

On the significance of collective identity (jamāt), the traditional Sunnite scholarship renders it a religious duty for the believers to remain part of the jamāt of the believers. Ibn Kathīr also subscribed to this standpoint. He highlighted the importance attached with the obedience to the rulers. Following the standpoint of the salaf, he opposed the kharij’ites for their khurūj against Ali. He strongly disapproved of violence on their part for having least regard for the sanctity of human life. He did not permit khurūj against the rulers even if they were imperfect and invalid and did not fulfill the criteria of an ideal Muslim ruler.

In the same vein, Ibn Taimmiyah too, quoted many prophetic traditions that make individual interests subordinate to the collective interests of the believers’ community. For him, a believer was religiously obliged to render obedience to the rulers even in case of individual injustice against him on the part of the rulers. He further declared

16 His important works include among others Khilafat-o-Malukia, (Khilafat and Kingship), his commentary of Quran in Urdu language titled, Tafheem al-Quran (Understanding the Quran), Islamic Law and Constitution and Islami Riasat (Islamic State).

the importance of obedience to those in authority equal in importance to the elements of faith. Given the paramount importance associated with obedience to ulil amr, he argued that even an invalid ruler continued to have right to command obedience from the believers provided he did not forego any fundamental of the faith.

Thus, the classical perspective on the question of khurūj leads us to draw two broader conclusions regarding the conditions of khurūj: One, the believers are not permitted to commit khurūj against the rulers unless they forgo any fundamental of the faith. Two, the classical jurists like Ibn Taimmiyah and Ibn Kathīr did not permit khurūj even against those rulers who had lesser degree of legitimacy which denotes that even though reluctantly, they accepted the transition of caliphate into monarchy.

2.3.1.2 Modernists’ Perspective As discussed elsewhere, Ibn Abdul Wahāb (1703-1792)17 who flourished in the 18th century Arabia was an ideological spirit behind the Saudi revolution subsequent to a religo-political arrangement between Muhammad b. Saud and Ibn Abdul Wahāb. The former was to assume the political authority whereas the latter was to provide the ideological spirit to the post-revolution state. Initially, this power sharing arrangement between Ibn Abdul Wahāb and the house of Saud configured the state of Diriyah where Muhammad bin Saud had already some political influence on tribal basis. However, Ibn Abdul Wahāb’s puritanical thoughts proved to be catalyst in the rapid expansion of Saud’s political authority in conjunction with his own religious ideas. Initially he distanced himself from Ibn Taimmiyah’s theory of right to rebel against the rulers, not following Shariah but later on, the Wahābī movement got attracted towards his philosophy when they felt need to overthrow their rulers labeling them as unbelievers.18 Ibn Taimmiyah limited the rights to rebel only against the rulers and that too, who acted against the fundamental principles of Islam whereas Ibn Abdul Wahāb further expanded the scope of khurūj beyond the rulers and included different segments of society in its ambit. He categorized those Muslims who he believed to be practicing Islam in any way different from his brand of the faith as a distinct category which he declined to acknowledge as Muslims in the first place and equated them to the followers of pre-Islamic jāhilliyah against whom jihad was waged.

Ibn Taimmiyah’s narrative of jihad against the Muslim rulers got intellectual support from a new generation of Muslim theorists after Ibn Abdul Wahāb, of course, with certain modifications. Sayyed Maudūdī and Sayyed Qutb happened to be the chief stalwarts of this class of theorists. The jāhilliyah thesis which originated from Ibn

17 Though originally belonging to Hanbali’ite school of Islamic scholasticism, he eschewed the following of all major school of Muslim jurisprudence and he developed his own salafi approach to Islam. This shift in approach that culminated into doing away with the following (taqleed) of the existing scholarship owes a lot to Muhammad Hayya Al-Sindi, one of the teachers of Ibn Abd al Wahab whose profound influence resulted into his denunciation of the commentaries of the four Sunni Imams. See, John Voll, “Muhammad Hayya Al-Sindi and Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahab: An Analysis of an Intellectual Group in Eighteenth-Century Madina” in, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, vol.38. No.1 (1975) 18 Natana DeLong Bas, “Wahabi Islam. From Revival and Reform to Global jihad” (New York:2004)p.256 quoted in Richard Bonney, Jihad, 121 49

Abdul Wahāb was subscribed by many other scholars as well. Sayyed Abul Hassan Ali Nadvi and Sayyed Maudūdī in India also argued that the Muslims were still living in jāhilliyah.19 In this purview, the dynamics of revolution as developed by Sayyed Maudūdī were shared by Sayyed Qutb in terms of labeling the modern western civilization as jāhilliyah and further drawing parallel between the pre-Islamic jāhilliyah and the modern civilization. However, Sayyed Maudūdī preferred to participate in political process to bring about change in the society instead of uprooting the existing political order through military jihad. He outlined his scheme of revolution on the basis of the Quranic injunction which regards the enjoining of good and forbidding of evil as the very raison’d'etre of the Muslim community.20 Though Maudūdī was not a pluralist and did not believe in the co-existence of two or more belief systems dominating the power structure of a state but unlike Sayyed Qutb he ruled out the option of armed struggle at least within the Muslim state on the basis of six major arguments: one, in case of an armed struggle, the anti-revolutionary forces may get control of the armed forces and in this case armed clash would naturally have catastrophic effect on the revolutionary movement. Two, even if the revolutionary forces get hold of the state machinery they would hardly be able to Islamize the society as the institutions of society would not be yet prepared for moral transformation that Islam demands and if un-Islamic legacy continues to persist even under the Islamic power structure it may disillusion the masses from Islam itself. Three, armed revolution would open gateway for a series of revolutions and counter revolutions to destabilize the society. Four, to undertake an armed revolutionary struggle one will have to organize the movement in the style of secret organizations. As those who operate such organizations, as the type of work necessitates, they themselves turn out to be intolerant and by the time such struggle stands victorious they become even greater tyrants than the existing ones. Five, these organizations resort to violence and other immoral means to achieve their ends which Islam does not permit, thus it becomes virtually impossible for one to imagine that after assuming power they will be running the state according to the principles of Islam. Finally, revolution brought about by physical force requires perpetual use of physical force for its stability. Resultantly, one type of despotism is replaced by another.21 Thus, Sayyed Maudūdī, in his endeavors to materialize the Islamic revolution joined the political process22 in Pakistan and ruled out armed conflict with the counter revolutionary forces within the country and happened to be a reformer more than a revolutionary23 at least within Pakistan. Moreover, he sought to revitalize the intellectual and moral spirit of the community to materialize the Islamic revolution. Following his vision of intellectual revolution Jamat-e-Islami is still making efforts for the educational uplift.

19Noor Muhammad, The Doctrine of Jihad 20 Shahrough Akhavi, Islam, Politics and Society 21Abul a’la Maūdūdī, Interview with The Muslim (Newspaper, Feb. 1967) in London vol.6. 22 Jamat e Islami has been participating actively in Pakistani Politics and has been part of coalitions in Pakistani politics as well. 23 Revolutionaries follow different approach from the reformers in the sense that they view change as impossible in the existing phenomenon until and unless the power structure of the existing order is done away with altogether. For details see, Horton and Hunt, Sociology, 502-3 50

Following the same narrative as espoused by Ibn Taimmiyah and further projected by Ibn Abdul Wahāb, Sayyed Qutb’s approach to jihad reflected partial subscription of Sayyed Maudūdī. He followed Maudūdī’s labeling of modern civilization as jāhilliyah society whom he considered to be the enemy of Islam. On this premise, he developed his two-dimensional theory of jihad. He happened to be the foremost to localize the conflict at the center of the Muslim society by developing a concept of ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemy. Ibn Abdul Wahāb created spaces when he relegated a segment of society to pre-Islamic times. Sayyed Qutb filled these spaces by developing this approach and prioritized jihad within the Muslim societies over jihad against external (western) elements.24 For him, jihad was a gradual process that initially targeted the elements of jāhilliyah order and ultimately after exhausting all peaceful means assumed the shape of armed struggle to uproot the existing system of jāhilliyah.25 He happened to be part of the philosophic stream followed by Maudūdī but adopted separate course by retaining the option of military jihad against the forces of jāhilliyah once the alternate peaceful means failed to achieve the objective.

Moreover, as both of them belonged to diverse physical contexts, therefore, the impact of the surrounding political milieu might be a defining factor for their difference of approach to jihad. Maudūdī developed his ideas in the context of United India where the Muslims constituted the largest minority in the world whereas Sayyed Qutb assimilated the jihadist struggle in an otherwise Muslim country. Therefore, the militant struggle could find their separate targets with both of them. Maudūdī focused his jihad largely on the external front against the imperialist threats whereas Qutb in addition to the external enemy pronounced takfīr to what he termed as the ‘apostate rulers’ in the Muslim lands. He pronounced takfīr to these rulers by accusing them of following the western agenda in the Muslim lands and thus, supporting the infidels against the fellow believers. His narrative of applying takfīr to the local Muslim rulers happened to bring jihad to the home front and provided future direction to the evolution of militants’ codes of war.

In brief, the above discussion leads to the following inferences from the modernists’ perspective: one, all the three theorists aimed to change the political order based upon what they term as jāhilliyah of the modern times. Two, Ibn Abdul Wahāb and Qutb supported uprooting this jāhilliyah order through the instrument of military revolution whereas Maudūdī preferred to change the existing order by becoming part of it. Three, Ibn Abdul Wahāb extended the scope of the right to khurūj which Ibn Taimmiyah granted to the believers to be exercised against those rulers who forgo any fundamental of the faith to different segments of the society who do not follow his brand of Islam. Four, Sayyed Qutb gave direction to the jihadis by localizing the jihad

24Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Ideology,” in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology (vol.1) ed. Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, Eric Brown, “” (ed.) vol. 1(Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute Washington, D.C.,2005),56-67 25Qutb, Muālim fil tarīq

against the Muslim rulers whom he terms as ‘near enemies’ because of their following what he terms as the forces of modern jāhilliyah

2.3.1.3 Militant Perspective On the conditions of khurūj, the Egyptian narrative as espoused by Sayyed Qutb could not find way with the jihadis until Azzam was their ideologue. He believed in traditional Sunnite standpoint that did not sanction khurūj even against these Muslim rulers who did not come up to the ideal criteria for a Muslim ruler. However, the conditions of khurūj changed after him when Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri became the chief ideologues of Al-Qaida. They profusely relied on Sayyed Qutb to develop their codes of war. A radical shift in the theory of jihad became obvious when Al-Qaida brought the violence to the home front against the ‘nearer enemy’. On the question of khurūj, the militant perspective is based upon the following points:

One, Al-Qaida leadership’s belief in jihad in terms of an instrument to revive the caliphate culminated into refutation of any political order other than the caliphate. They believed every system except caliphate to be heretical and deserved to be uprooted. Two, the militant narrative acknowledges the legitimacy of khurūj against the rulers for their collaboration with the infidels against the fellow Muslims.26 It is to be noted that for Al-Zawahiri, enforcement of Shariah by the rulers does not insulate them against khurūj as long as they continue to pursue the western agenda. The militants proclaim takfīr against the Saudi rulers despite that they enforce Shariah simply on the charges of being part of the US scheme of the Middle East, commitment to the crusaders as reflected through their putting the sanctuaries of Islam under their occupation and also for their supporting the communists against the believers in Southern Yemen.27 Al-Qaida believes that supporting the infidels against the believers will constitute unbelief and makes the believers religiously obliged to commit khurūj.28 Al-Zawahiri views the Arab spring in terms of khurūj against the rulers who had virtually joined the infidels’ ranks.29 In the same vein, Al-Maqdisi justifies khurūj against the Muslim rulers who become tool of exploitation of the Muslims’ resources by the non-believers. Three, Bin Laden directed his field formations to target the ‘distant enemy’ in the first place even though he had firm belief in religious obligation of khurūj against the ‘nearer enemy’. However, Al- Zawahiri, Al-Maqdisi and Al-Zarqawi believed in violence against the ‘nearer enemy’

26Osama Bin Laden’s second letter to the Muslims of Iraq (18-10-2003) , in Al Qaida in its Own Words, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh, ed. Gilles Kepel & Jean-Pierre Milelli (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009) 68; also see, Interview of OBL with Hamid Mir published in Daily Pakistan, Islamabad (urdu) 18th March 1997, in FBIS Report - Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994- January 2004, 44,45 27Osama Bin Laden, Interview by Peter Arnett and Peter Bergen, CNN, May 12, 1997, in A-Qaida in its Own Words ed. Kepel & Milelli, 51,52; also see,Osama Bin Laden, Interview with Robert Fisk, Independent London, July 10, 1996,14, in, FBIS Report 28Anwar al-Awlaki, “The New Mardin Declaration: An Attempt at Justifying the New World Order”, in Al-Qaida in Arabian Peninsula, (Al- Malahem Media) Inspire, Issue 2, Fall 1431/2010 29Don Rassler, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Liam Collins, Muhammad al-Obaidi, Nelly Lahoud, Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined, No. SOCOM-2012-0000013 (Combating Terrorism Centre, May 03, 2012) 52

in the foremost. Four, though the militants claim to follow Ibn Taimmiyah’s narrative of khurūj against the Muslim rulers yet in their khurūj even against the ‘apologists’, they appear to be closer to Ibn Abdul Wahāb. Finally, it is argued that prevailing of Egyptian militant traditions upon Al-Qaida leadership transformed the ideological orientations of the organization from following the traditional Sunnite narrative of Azzam to Al-Zawahiri’s reactionary ideology developed under the influence of iconic figures of Egyptian militancy like Sayyed Qutb and Al-Faraj.

2.3.2 Grounds to invoke Irti’dād and Takfīr

Whether the commission of bida’ā invokes takfīr or otherwise is the crucial question which has been addressed by the Muslim scholarship from classical to modernists in their respective frameworks. The issue also carries in itself colossal implications for the collective identity of the believers as well. It could develop intra-sect divide within the Hanfites when the followers of Deoband school of thought started accusing Barelvis, a co-Hanfite sect of contaminating the purity of faith through introducing innovations into its practice. Against them, the Barelvi ulema condemn them for being violent and label them as takfīrī.30 In addition to intra-sect divisions, the question of introducing bida’ā into the faith has created inter-sect splits as well. Ahl-e-hadīth sect which claims to revive the purity of faith, charges the Barelvis of polytheism (shirk) for introducing such practices in the chemistry of faith which had never been part of its original body. On the other hand, the Barelvis charge them of being violent and takfīrī. As the question of bida’ā has the potential to provide premise for pronouncing takfīr to each other, therefore, it has the chances of being exploited to unleash inter- sect violence in the Muslim societies. In the following lines, this question has been discussed from three broader perspectives:

2.3.2.1 Classical Perspective The classical theorists including Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Kathīr and Al-Ghazālī decline to accept that all sorts of heresies invoke takfīr.31 It is rather refutation of the fundamentals of faith that lead to unbelief. This limited scope of takfīr is evident from the Muslim history where certain sects like Jahāmiyyah and Qarāmitah were condemned to be unbelievers whereas, sects like khawārij and the Shiites were not labeled as such. Despite fighting against the Khawārij, the companions of the Prophet showed restraint to pronounce takfīr to them. Similarly, in case of Rawāfidh, despite conspicuous differences with the Sunnites, the classical Sunnite scholarship, in a large part, has avoided to ex-communicating them in their collective capacity. Thus, despite introducing radical revisions into the practice of faith, the khawārij and the Shiites were not condemned to be non-believers. On the other hand, Jahāmiyyah and Qarāmitah were charged of committing unbelief simply for foregoing the

30 Ahmed Yar Khan Naeemi, Ja’a-ul-Ha,q(Lahore: Naeemi Kutb Khana, 2011),7-13 31Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 3:345-55; also see, Sherman A. Jackson’s introductory note to Al-Ghazalī, Faysal, 3-32. He argues that labelling of takfīr depends upon the scope of criteria that determines orthodoxy. 53

fundamentals of the faith. Khawārij and the Shiites happened not to forego any fundamental of faith whereas, Jahāmiyyah and Qarāmitah disputed about the fundamental principles. Jhamiyyah questioned the attributes of Allah whereas the Qarāmitah recognized the prophethood of Zoroaster and preferred to follow the Persian philosophers instead of Islam. Even in case of refutation of the fundamental principles of faith, the mitigating criteria exempt those whose refutation flows from ignorance or mistake.32

2.3.2.2 Modernist Perspective As against the classical perspective, the boundaries of faith squeezed with the modernists like Ibn Abdul Wahāb who developed their theology in juxtaposition with their contemporary socio-political constructs. Theology, now, appeared to be serving the politics and vice versa. To nurture his ideas, Ibn Abdul Wahāb adopted a paradigm that was based on the grounds that the contemporary Arabian society reflected the traits of pre-Islamic ignorance which needed to be purified from all the innovations that had become part of it. He stressed to revert back to the salaf to rejuvenate the orthodox spirit of Islam. He had the understanding that this objective could only be achieved if the politics and religion could work in a mutually supportive framework. In this context, while delineating upon different aspects of jāhilliyah which had become part of the Arabian society he developed his theory of takfīr and thus, changed the religo-political dynamics of the Arabian society. In the following lines we will focus upon the aspects of the Arabian societies on the basis of which he developed his grounds of takfīr.

One, he argued that the contemporary Arabian society had lost the spirit of faith which was infused by the Prophet. This decline of religious spirit is reflected through involvement of the people in polytheism (shirk). Two, the Arabs reverting to pre- Islamic jāhilliyah had again started believing in intercession between themselves and Allah to secure divine closeness which was strictly forbidden by Allah in these words, “And those who take associates apart from Him, (say): “Surely pure religion is for Allah only. And those who choose protecting friends beside Him (say): We worship them only that they may bring us near unto Allah. Lo! Allah will judge between them concerning that wherein they differ. Lo! Allah guideth not him who is a liar, an ingrate.” (Az-Zumar: 3) For their elimination of distinction between the belief and unbelief, these polytheist Arabs became legitimate target of military jihad. The Quran says, “And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is all for Allah. But if they cease, then lo! Allah is Seer of what they do.” (Al-Anfaal: 39) Three, sectarian fragmentation in the Arab society was also reflection of jāhilliyah which Quran did not approve of. (Ar-Rum: 32; As-Shūrā: 13; Al-Ana’am:159; Al-Imran: 103,105) Four, in spite of categorical prophetic transmissions, they did not render obedience to those in authority amongst them. Five, like those in pre-Islamic jāhilliyah, they believe in blind following (taqlīd) which is strongly disapproved by Islam. (Az- Zukhruf: 23; Luqman: 21; As-Saba: 46) Six, they consider the opinion of majority and

32Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 3:345-55 54

of the powerful segments of society as proof of being right. Seven, they followed blindly their wicked scholars which was against the spirit of Islam. (At-Tawbah: 34; Al-Maidah: 77) Eight, they preferred speculation over revelation. Nine, they resorted to magic which was prohibited in Islam. (Al-Baqarah: 101,102) Ten, they immersed in materialism and perceived Allah’s blessings in terms of material advancement. (As- Saba: 35)33

On the premise of these aspects of ignorance, he developed following ten nullifiers of faith: one, to commit shirk; two, to have belief that someone has the right to intercession with God; three, to have doubts in the unbelief of the polytheists; four, to have conviction that a source of guidance other than what the Prophet brought is more complete; five, to hate something brought by the Prophet; six, to make a mockery of some beliefs of the faith; seven, to get involved in magic spells; eight, to support the unbelievers against the believers; nine, to believe that someone is exempted from following the Shariah of the Prophet and lastly, neither to learn what constitutes the divine faith nor to make endeavors to implement it in one’s life.34

In view of the above, the following points come to surface: First, he follows the puritanical line of the Muslim theology initiated by Ibn Taimmiyah.35 It appears that the Wahābī movement of the 18th century draws inspiration from Ibn Taimmiyah in many aspects.36 However, as have been said earlier, he does not limit his concept of khurūj to the rulers who forego any basic ingredient of faith like Ibn Taimmiyah but extends it to the societal level as well. Second, he provides a basic premise to subsequent generations of the Islamists like Qutb and Maudūdī who developed their ideas by drawing parallel between the modern civilization and pre-Islamic jāhilliyah of the Arabian society. Three, Qutb and the contemporary extremists’ concept of ‘near enemy’ also appears to have been derived from Ibn Abdul Wahāb’s ten nullifiers wherein he has pronounced takfīr to those who support non-believers against the believers. It is on this basis that the contemporary extremists direct their resistance to the Muslim rulers whom they consider to be supportive arms of the west.

The puritanical narrative of Ibn Abdul Wahāb got further exposition with Sayyed Qutb who too, drew a parallel between the jāhilliyah represented by modern civilization and the pre-Islamic jāhilliyah. He aimed to eliminate the modern form of polytheism which has ended up in enslavement of one human being to the other through jihad. He declared jihad to be an instrument of revolution which will culminate into creation of a purely Islamic society. This society would be based upon recognition of divine sovereignty and would thus, be harbinger of liberty for the

33Ibn Abdula Wahab’s account of the days of ignorance is very detailed; however, we have identified ten aspects which are more relevant to this study. See, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab, Masa’ail Al- Jahilliyah (Aspects of the Days of Ignorance) trans. Isma’eel Alarcon. (Al-Ibaana Publishers) 34 Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab, Sharah Nawaqidh Al-Islam (Explanation of the Nullifiers of Islam) 35 Ibn Taimmiyah, Letter Seven: The letter to Sarjawaz, the King of Cyprus, trans. Abdul Haqq, Abdul Khaliq, Nov.7, 2012 36Voll,“Muhammad Hayya Al-Sindi and Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahab” 55

individuals from the slavery of each other.37 He realized that deification of human legislation was the modern form of polytheism which needed to be eradicated in the new society. In this society, authority of Law-giving would rest with God as obedience to man-made laws was tantamount to worshipping the architects of those laws who represented the forces of modern jāhilliyah. This modern jāhilliyah was bent upon exploitation of mankind under the umbrella of either Capitalism or Socialism.38 It was but natural that when Muslims would embark upon the road to revolt against these oppressive ideologies which were backed by such a powerful material base, they would have to face heavy resistance. Thus, in the opinion of Qutb jihad would not be taken as defensive but a forceful tool to obliterate the oppressive political orders that represented modern jāhilliyah.39 This struggle aimed at the liberation of humanity would be undertaken by an organized and resourceful Islamic Movement (vanguard) through a gradual process. This struggle would begin with an ideological struggle to expose the weakness of the system of jāhilliyah and then in the final stage through the use of physical force the jāhilliyah order would be overthrown and Islamic system would be installed.40 While relying upon the theoretical paradigm of takfīr-wal-hijrā, he derived his concept of ‘nearer enemy’. By applying the label of ‘nearer enemy’ he extended his takfīr to the so-called Muslim rulers of Egypt who were taken as agents of the west. By declaring the Egyptian rulers as ‘nearer enemy’ and thus, declaring them to be kafir he directed his revolution towards two fronts- the Egyptian rulers as well as their western imperialist masters.41

In short, the following points arises from the study of Sayyed Qutb: One, he developed his theory of revolt against the forces of imperialism within Egypt and without by drawing parallel between the contemporary jāhilliyah order and the pre- Islamic jāhilliyah; two, his takfīr was directed against the contemporary Muslim rulers whom he called ‘nearer enemies’ for their collaboration with the west. Three, takfīr of the Muslim rulers gave his theory of jihad a direction to uproot what he termed as ‘modern jāhilliyah’. Four, by labeling the contemporary Muslim rulers as unbelievers he joined Ibn Abdul Wahāb in rejection of Muslim theology that developed over centuries and disapproved of khurūj against the Muslim rulers even if they were invalid.

2.3.2.3 Militant Perspective Azzam’s militant struggle remained focused largely against the foreign aggression instead of fighting against the Muslim rulers by pronouncing takfīr to them. He relied

37Qutb, Muālim fil tarīq 38Ibid. 39 Sayyed Qutb while arguing against those who regard jihad as defensive war, raised very important question in Muālim fil tarīq when he says, “Can one say that if the pious caliphs had been satisfied that Roman and Persian empires were not going to attack the Arabian peninsula, they would not have striven to spread the message of Islam throughout the world. How could this message have spread when it faced with such material obstacles as political system of state, socio-economic system based on races and classes and behind all these, the military power? 40Qutb, Muālim fil tarīq 41Bonney, Jihad, 215,216 56

chiefly on the traditional Sunnite standpoint which, as said earlier, did not make allowance for khurūj even against imperfect rulers. Nevertheless, the subsequent militant ideologues chose Ibn Abdul Wahāb and Sayyed Qutb for reliance to develop their reactionary ideology which pronounced takfīr to the Muslim rulers to justify khurūj against them. Bin Laden’s emphasis upon his fellow militants to focus on the ‘distant enemy’ in the first place was merely to avoid distortion of the organization’s image within the Muslim societies otherwise he happened to widen the scope of his takfīr even to the secular political parties in the Muslim areas. He viewed democracy in terms of bida’ā in the domain of faith which have substituted the divine sovereignty to popular sovereignty. Thus, those who were part of this bida’ā came within the scope of takfīr.42 Besides, while condemning the majority-worship under democracy, Al-Zawahiri’s takfīr included in its ambit, the Muslims in their personal capacity who happened to follow a system supportive of the west.43 Similarly, for Al- Maqdisi, participating in democratic process, supporting (mawālāt) the infidels44 and rendering voluntary submission to the non-believers would lead to takfīr.45 Likewise, besides sharing the grounds of takfīr with the fellow militant ideologues, Al- Maqdisi’s theory of takfīr reflected radical revisions in the classical narrative regarding the Shiites. The classical theorists despite their strong disapproval of the bida’ā committed by the Shiites avoided to proclaim takfīr to them at least in collective terms whereas Al-Maqdisi’s takfīr was categorical about them. Following the same line, Al-Zarqawi categorically pronounced takfīr to the Shiites, those who follow democracy which had assumed the shape of a religion and the followers of secularism.46

In short, the militant perspective on the boundaries of faith leads us to make the following points: One, takfīr has undergone evolution within the militant perspective as well. For instance, no evidence is available to argue that Azzam pronounced takfīr to the rulers in the Muslim world. However, with the advent of Egyptian traditions of jihad within Al-Qaida at the leadership level under Al-Zawahiri, takfīr became the defining feature of the codes of war with the extremists. Two, even within the ranks of Al-Qaida leadership that believe in pronouncing takfīr to the Muslims, differences in approach can be identified regarding the primacy extended to takfīr. For instance, Al-Maqdisi, Al-Zawahiri and Al-Zarqawi are unanimous to fight out the so called elements of kufr within the Muslims as a means to get strength to affectively resist the forces of unbelief whereas Bin Laden moved by pragmatism appears to have advised the fellow extremists to focus on the distant enemy. Moreover evidence is also available that the lower formations of Al-Qaida are in favor of observing restraints in

42OBL’s second letter to the Muslims of Iraq dated 18th October, 2003, in Al Qaida in its Own Words ed. Kepel & Milelli, 67,68 43-al-Zawahiri, Shifa Sudur al-Momineen, quoted in, Maha Azzam, “Al-Qaida: the misunderstood Wahabi connection and the ideology of violence, ” in, Briefing Paper No. 1, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Middle East Programme (2003) 44Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, This is Our Aqeedah 2nd edition, (At-Tibyan Publications) 45Ibid. 65 46Fradkin et al, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, (ed.) vol.1 (Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2005 57

violence within the Muslim societies rather jihad should be directed towards the forces of unbelief in the foremost.47 Three, Al-Qaida leadership and their offshoots like AQAP, TTP, Al-Qaida affiliates in Far East and Africa redefine the boundaries of faith by extending label of takfīr to those who support the forces of unbelief against the believers, follow the democratic ideals, the Shiites and above all, to those who follow the western cultural traits. Last but not the least, though Al-Qaida theorists claim not to follow Khawārij in terms of declaring the commission of sin as apostasy yet in practical terms they ex-communicate those who commit sins like involvement in ribā-based banking and following the cultural traits of the west.

In view of the foregoing, the following broader conclusions may be drawn:

Firstly, though the fundamentals of Islam have remained constant but the boundaries of the faith have changed owing to interplay of multiple socio-political variables. For instance, initially during the period of salaf, takfīr could only be pronounced against those who forego a fundamental principle of Islam whereas the innovations of secondary nature were not to constitute a basis for takfīr. However, the contemporary militant perspective suggests that boundaries of faith have been redefined on the basis of contemporary ideological conflict model in such a way that ex-communication now includes following any political system other than khilāfat, the Shiites for their alleged support to the imperialist powers, following the western cultural traits and participating in interest-based financial enterprises.

Secondly, the theological definition of the boundaries of faith is not independent of the socio-political constructs of the respective theologians whose development of ideas is strongly linked with the pre-supposition of the historical process. These pre- suppositions make the objectivity of the definition of the boundaries of faith a far cry and thus, lead to theological extremism. These pre-suppositions make the theologians to believe in the finality of their interpretations of religious ideas to such an extent that difference of opinion to such human theological interpretations are taken in terms of refuting the validity of the revelation itself. Thus, the extremist theologians developed a tendency to attribute the label of kufr to those having divergent view from their own.

Thirdly, though in theoretical terms the above-discussed three perspectives are unanimous that committing a major sin does not put a believer outside the pale of Islam yet in practical terms the militants extends the label of takfīr to those who commit major sins like involvement in interest-based business enterprises and following the cultural norms of the western society

47Rassler et al, Letters from Abbottabad,No. SOCOM-2012-0000018 58

3 Polemics Revisited

The dimensions of ideological foundations traced the ideas of heresy which metamorphosed into polemics or sectarian cleavages within the fold of Islam. This important trajectory generated a permanent fissure within the ideological framework and legitimized violence within and outside the boundaries of faith. This chapter will investigate the role played by polemics in legitimizing violence within and outside the boundaries of faith. 3.1 Genesis of the Polemics The following discussion while focusing upon three inter-related questions regarding ‘the right to prophetic inheritance’, ‘belief in Imamate’ and ‘claim to caliphate’ seeks to suggest that these three issues form the basis of schism within the Ummah and thus, culminate into the definition of polemics. These polemics have been influencing the political configuration in the Muslim societies throughout the course of political history of the Muslims. This polemical divide crept into the body politic of Islam not long after the Prophet passed away. Even this sectarian split that was to become a permanent feature of the Muslim lands in the ages to come was anticipated by the Prophet himself. He said: “The Jews divided into seventy-one sects (firqah), all of which will go to hell except one; the Christians will divide into seventy-two sects, all of which will go to hell except one; this Ummah will divide into seventy-three sects, all of which will go to hell except one”. These sectarian fault lines that plagued the Muslim societies were between those who held Ali to be the legitimate religious and political heir of the Prophet and those who believed that the first three caliphs were equally eligible for the office of the caliphate and thus, they were legitimately elected to the office through consensus amongst the companions of the Prophet (ijmă-e- Ummah).

3.1.1 Right to Prophetic Inheritance

The Shiites argue that Ali being the son-in-law of the prophet was heir of the Prophet and thus, they refute the traditional Sunnite view that none has the right to claim whatever the Prophet left behind (tarkā). They draw their argument from the following Quranic verses: “And Solomon was David's heir.” (An-Namal: 27) Quran further reads as under: "And Verily! I fear my relatives after me, since my wife is barren. So give me from Yourself an heir; "Who shall inherit me, and inherit (also) the posterity of Ya'qub (Jacob) (inheritance of the religious knowledge and Prophethood, not the wealth, etc.). And make him, my Lord, one with whom You are Well-pleased!.” (Maryam: 5, 6)

On the other hand Sunnite believe as Ibn Kathīr has reported on the authority of Abu Haurayrah that none has the right to claim to inherit what the Prophet left as whatever he left comes within the definition of māl-e-Sadqā.1As a counter-argument to Shiite

1Ibid., 385 59

claim, Ibn Kathīr argues that Shiite inferences drawn from the Quranic verses regarding the succession of Prophet Salman to prophet Dawūd are without any valid reasoning as Salman was successor to Dawūd not in the matters of property rather in the matters of divinely combined prophet hood and political authority and further in the matters of adjudication amongst the Children of Israel (Banī Israel).2 He further explains that prophet Dawūd had about one hundred sons and if the question of inheritance of property would have been involved, then being equal in entitlement, all of them would have been mentioned as successors whereas divine selection fell only upon prophet Salman to succeed with regard to Prophethood coupled with political authority.3 Similarly, prophet Zakariyā’s prayer for successor- prophet Yahyā was not driven by his desire to have successor for material property as being a prophet he was not concerned about material belongings rather he prayed for a son who would succeed him in Prophethood and in reforming Banī Israel.4 This is explicitly clear from the following Quranic verses: “Kaf. Ha. Ya. A'in. Sad. A mention of the mercy of thy Lord unto His servant Zachariah. When he cried unto his Lord a cry in secret, Saying: My Lord! Lo! the bones of me wax feeble and my head is shining with grey hair, and I have never been unblest in prayer to Thee, my Lord. Lo! I fear my kinsfolk after me, since my wife is barren. Oh, give me from Thy presence a successor Who shall inherit of me and inherit (also) of the house of Jacob. And make him, my Lord, acceptable (unto Thee)”. (Maryam: 1-6)

3.1.2 Belief in Imamate

Imamate is a core element in almost every sub-sect of the Shiites and provides a pivot to the Shiite model of state governance. The twelver Shiites (athnā-e-ashriyyā) believe in twelve Imams whereas the Ismailites believe in living Imam. This institution is an instrument of ‘collective action’ that guarantees human salvation through the enforcement of Imam’s justice.5 Moreover, the Shiites believe that socio- political order and the Muslim unity cannot be achieved without this institution. They subscribe to the following statement of Hazrat Fatima al-Zahara: “the imamate exists for the sake of preserving order among the Muslims and replacing their disunity with unity.”6 Thus, imamate is needed to protect the fundamentals of the faith and to revive its glory.7 Ibn Mutahir8 delineating upon the Shiite standpoint regarding the question of imamate argues that belief in imamate constitutes an element of faith. He draws this inference from a hadīth of the Prophet which reads as under: “He who dies without recognizing Imam of his times dies the death of jāhilliyah”.

2Ibid., 392,393 3Ibid. 4Prophet Zakariyah was a carpenter by profession and had negligible earnings. See, Ibid. 5Akhavi, “Islam, Politics and Society” 6Moaddel and Talattof, Contemporary Debates in Islam 7 Imam Ruhullah Khomeini, “The Pillars of an Islamic State”, in Contemporary Debates in Islam , ed. Moaddel and Talattof, 247-250) 8He was a distinguished student of Nizam ul Mulk Tūsi and is a recognized scholar of Shiite Islam 60

On the other hand, the Sunnites argue that since the religion has been completed in all its dimensions and the divine guidance has reached its culmination through the Prophet, therefore, the believers have no need of further guidance through the institution of Imamate. The believers are required only to follow whatever has been reached down to them through the Prophet. Ibn Taimmiyah, representing the classical Sunnite view, is not inclined to recognize the authenticity of the above-quoted hadīth because of weakness in narration-linkage. He argues that the actual wording of authentic hadīth is as follow: “he who dies in such a condition that he is without bay’ā, he dies the death of jāhilliyah”.9 He further argues that as the religion has been completed and the guidance has reached its culmination, therefore, the believers have no need for Imamate for further guidance.10

3.1.3 Right to Caliphate

So far as the question of the right to caliphate is concerned, the Shiites believe that having close blood relationship with the Prophet, Ali had the legitimate right to the office of caliphate after the Prophet. They further believe that the Prophet appointed Ali as his successor on ghadīr khumm when he said, “Ali is the lord of those whose lord I am”. The Shiites further argue that while proceeding to Tabuk expedition, the Prophet appointed Ali as his deputy in Madina stating “you are to me as Harūn was to Musā”. The purpose of these narrations on the part of the Shiites is to establish that primacy of Ali’s right to caliphate was confirmed by no other than the Prophet himself. So far as the Sunnite standpoint regarding these narrations is concerned, the hadīth of ghadir has been noted by many distinguished Sunnite scholars as well but with difference of interpretation of the term ma’wlā. For them, this term refers to a person with whom closeness exists whereas Shiites interpret it in terms of imam.11 The Shiites believe that the Prophet appointed Ali as his deputy in Madina while leaving for Tabuk expedition. They refer to a hadīth of the Prophet that Ali had same relation with him what Harūn had with Musa.12Regarding the Shiite belief about the appointment of Ali as deputy by the Prophet while leaving for Tabuk expedition, Ibn Taimmiyah does not recognize any plausible evidence that support Shiite viewpoint.13 The Sunnite argue that the prophet Harūn passed away prior to Mūsa, therefore, the question of his succession does not arise.14 Besides this, Tabrī has recorded Friday

9 Sahih Muslim, Kitab al-Ammara-wajub Mulazimah Jamat al-Muslimeen -1801 quoted in, Ibn Taimmiyah, Al-Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah, Urdu trans. Professor Ghulam Ahmed Hariri, (Aqeedah Library, 2010) 10Ibn Taimmiyah, Al-Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah 11Bonney, Jihad,493 12 For hadīth reference, see, Muhammad Bin Saad, Tabqāt Ibn Saad, Urdu trans. Abdullah Al-Amadi, (Karachi: Nafees Academy) vol.2, 154 13Ibn Taimmiyah, Al-Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah, 82,88 14Quoted in Bonney, Jihad, 494, see, footnotes to chapter 9. There are still others like Rawinda who hold the belief that the Prophet nominated Abbas as his successor whereas Imamia holds the similar view in favor of Ali. Rawinda further holds that the nomination of Abbas as successor was prophetic 61

sermon delivered by Ali after the martyrdom of Uthmān, the third pious caliph wherein he recognized popular prerogative for the election of the caliph. He declined to assume the office of caliphate without popular consent.15 This account nullifies the Shiite claim that instead of a popular prerogative to be decided by consensus, the caliphate was the exclusive right of Ali on the basis of close blood relationship with the Prophet. However, as Ibn Hazam16 has argued that the Sunnite standpoint on the question of prophetic nomination of the successor is divided. Some argue that the appointment of Abu Bakr as leader of the prayer by the Prophet during his illness was a reference to his nomination as the successor of the Prophet. For instance, Ibn Sa’ad has quoted Ali to have said that as the Prophet chose Abu Bakr as imam of the spiritual domain by appointing him as leader of the prayers during his illness, therefore, the companions agreed for his being head of the temporal sphere as well.17 However, some argue that appointment of Abu Bakr as imam of the prayers refers to his high standing amongst the companions but does not reflect prophetic intentions to nominate him as his successor.18 Nevertheless, the dominant view of the Sunnite scholarship is that though the Prophet did not appoint anyone his successor yet he expressed his intentions in favor of Abu Bakr through different means. For instance, the Prophet has been reported to have advised a woman to seek guidance, if required, from Abu Bakr in his absence.19 The Prophet did not appoint anyone his successor deliberately.20 Moreover, evidence suggests that by following the prophetic traditions, no one from the early caliphs nominated their respective successors. Abu Bakr’s recommendation of Umar as his successor should not be taken in terms of nomination because it was subject to the approval of the believers at large. Sunnite view in this regard is that Khalifah can nominate his successor if he is satisfied about his qualifications as a caliph and further, that he is satisfied that public will also accept him as caliph. However, the caliph can leave the election of his successor to ahl-al- hill- wal-aqad (those who lose and bind).21 For instance, Umar said that if he did not appoint his successor it would be on the model of the Prophet who had not appointed his successor as well and left the decision on the collective will of those who lose and bind (ahl-al- hill- wal-aqad). He conveyed his will to Ibn Abbas that he had not appointed his successor by

decision but the ummah did not agree to it through consensus and thus, committed apostasy. See, Qazi Abu Yali quoted in, Ibn Taimmiyah, Al-Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah, 82 15Tabrī, Tarikh al-Umam wal Muluk, vol.3, 432 16Ibn Hazam, Al-Fisal fil milal wa nahal quoted in Ibn Taimmiyah, Al-Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah 17Ibn Sa’ad quoted in Hafiz Jalaluddin Abdur Rehman Bin Abu Bakr Al- Sayyuti, Tarikh al-Khulafa, Urdu trans. Iqbal uddin Ahmed (Karachi: Nafees Academy, 1983) 24 18Ibn Hazam, Al-Fisal fil milal wa nahal quoted in Ibn Taimmiyah, Al-Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah 19Sahih Bukhari- Kitab Al Ahkam :93; Sahih Muslim Fazail-e-Sahaba:44) quoted in, Ibn Kathīr, Al- Bidayah, vol. 15, 20 20Bazaz has quoted in his Musnad a hadīth on the authority of Abu Yaqzan which reads as follow: ‘Once people asked the Prophet the reason for not appointing an Amir after him. The Prophet replied that if he had appointed an amir, the people would have disobeyed him and anger of God would engulf them.’ However, Sayyuti quotes Hakim that authority of Abu Yakzan is weak. See, al-Sayyuti, Tarikh al-Khulafa,23 21Maulana Muhammad Manzoor Naumani, Ma’arif Al-Hadīth, (Urdu) vol. vii (Karachi: Dar Al-Asha’t, 2007), 573 62

following the way of the Prophet.22 Moreover, Hazrat Ayesha declared that had the Prophet intended to nominate anyone as caliph, he would have been Abu Bakr.23 Similarly, Ibn Taimmiyah does not agree with those who affirm the prophetic nomination of Abu Bakr on the grounds that the Muslims used to call him Khalifat- ur-Rasul which reflects his nomination as such because Khalifah (deputy) is always appointed by someone. He argues that the title does not connote his nomination as such rather Khalifah can be ‘appointed by someone’ as well as can be ‘self- appointed’. Therefore, the title Khalifat-ur-Rasul does not suggest that Abu Bakr was necessarily nominated by the Prophet.24 Moreover, drawing inference from a hadith wherein the Prophet has been reported to have said that Allah and the believers will agree only on Abu Bakr25, Ibn Taimmiyah argues that the Prophet had anticipation that the believers would agree on the succession of Abu Bakr otherwise he would have nominated his successor.26 As said earlier, the debate on the right to caliphate became a catalyst in generating divisions within the Muslim Uma. The claim to caliphate was subscribed by those external to the claim itself because Ali who is considered to be the exclusive legitimate claimant to the caliphate by the Shiites seldom endorsed to their views and thus, never disputed the legitimacy of the first three caliphs. For instance, historical evidence suggests that Ali recognized ‘Uthman as the most deserving one to be elected to the office of the caliph.27 Moreover, Ali continued to perform important functions of judicial and executive nature during the caliphate of first three caliphs. It suggests that Ali who was undisputedly an unimpeachable authority and a court of final appeal on all the issues would never have accepted this office if he had not recognized the legitimacy of the caliphate. However, these differences could not trigger conflict within those Muslims who drew their commitment directly from the Prophet. These differences were explored by those who entered the fold of Islam only to enhance their political clout. Being the bitter enemies of Islam, these hypocrites made all out efforts to promote their personal agenda at the expense of the cause of Islam. A Jew clergy Abdullah b. Saba was one of them. He made unfounded exaggerations about the Prophet that if Jesus Christ could return (zither) to earth, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) would also return. He was successful to misguide the simple Egyptians through his false propaganda even though it had nothing to do with the teachings of Islam. Moreover, he presented Ali in terms of an unearthly entity and thus, tried to convince the people that Ali was the rightful claimant to the caliphate which was unjustly taken over by others.28

22 Muhammad Bin Saad, Tabqāt Ibn Saad, vol.2, 114,115 23Ibn Taimmiyah, Al-Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah, 82 24Ibid., 83 25Sahih Muslim- Fazayl e Sahaba:1 26Ibn Taimmiyah, Al-Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah , 88; also see, Ibn Kathīr, Al-Bidayah, vol.15, 20; also see, Naumani, , Maarif Al-Hadīth vol.vii, 573 27Tabrī, Tarikh al-Umam wal Muluk, vol. 3, 241 28Maulana Muhammad Manzoor Naumani, Irani Inqilab,Imam Khomeini aur Shi’iat,(Urdu) (Lahore: Maktaba Madniyyah, 1984) 103-110 63

These hypocrites could assume physical strength enough to challenge the authority of the caliphate in Medina. They could trigger a chaos (fitnah) that ultimately ended up in the martyrdom of ‘Uthman, the third pious caliph. In subsequent years, the misgivings created by this fitnah translated into physical conflicts that became conspicuous in the form of Battles of Camel and Saffin. The Battle of Camel was fought between Ali and Hazrat Ayesha; the latter demanded that the former being the caliph should take Qisās of Uthmān from the rebels. Ali’s position was that he did not wield sufficient military strength to fight out the rebels. He argued that as soon as he got the required strength, he would definitely ensure Qisās of Uthmān. The battle of Siffīn was fought between Ali and Mua’wiyah when the latter as governor of Syria declared independence from the caliphate of Ali. This constituted the threshold for the sharpening of sectarian fault lines for the generations to come. Those who supported Ali became Shi’an-e-Ali and those who sided with Mua’wiyah were labeled as Shi’ān- e- Mua’wiyah.29 The incident of Karbala may be viewed in terms of an outcome of these sectarian misgivings. However, some may argue that tribal rivalries were salient features of the pre-Islamic Makkan society and were subsequently subsided by the Islamic revolution under the prophetic leadership. Though these rivalries remained subsided by the end of the caliphate of Umar but again surfaced owing to the misgivings created by the hypocrites. The battlefield of Siffīn witnessed these forces of tribal hostilities between Ummayads and Hashimites at work against each other. There is no denying the fact that when Islam reached outside Arabia and lots of people from diverse religo- political backgrounds joined the folds of Islam, a few hypocrites also entered into the ranks of Muslims. The hypocrites in their bid to damage the faith and to promote their vested interests created sectarian cleavages amongst the Muslims by fomenting misgivings among them.

3.2 Theological Explanation of Sectarian Divide: Classical Perspective

Though, the subsequent course of Muslim history witnessed the emergence of cleavages on sectarian lines largely between the Sunnites and the Shiites, yet both streams observed restraints in pronouncing categorical takfīr of each other. Despite that the Sunnites declared the Shiites as rejectionists (rawāfidh) for the latter’s invalidating the right to caliphate of the first three caliphs and the Shiites alleged the Sunnites to be hostile to Ali (nawāsib) yet neither side branded each other as outright apostate.30 The following lines will highlight the points of theological differences within the two sects and will further explore classical Sunnite perspective vis-a-vis Shiite theological standpoint. The points of difference that characterize the Sunnite and the Shiite divide may be enumerated as follow:

29In Arabic language, the word Shia means ‘group’. 30Shmuel Bar, “Sunnis and Shiites—Between Rapprochement and Conflict,”in Hillel Fradkin et al, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology (ed.) volume 2(Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute,2005),87-96 64

One, the Sunnite believed that no one except the prophet was free of error (ma’asūm), whereas, the Shiites claimed that this attribute was not exclusive to the prophet alone rather twelve imams also shared the same. Two, the classical Sunnite scholarship questioned the authenticity of the prophetic traditions narrated by the Shiites on the grounds that instead of ascribing importance to the strength of character to the narrator they believed in the narrator’s commitment to the Shiite doctrine. As this criterion was not recognized by the Sunnite theologians, therefore, when relying upon Shiite narrations, a Spanish clergy attempted to question the veracity of Quran, Ibn Hazam simply declined to recognize these narrations as being originated from the Muslims.31 Similarly, Ibn Khaldūn, a 14th century historian- cum-sociologist, does not recognize the historical evidence produced by the Shiites to be authentic on the grounds that it is not shared by the majority of the Muslim scholarship.32Imam Ahmed and Imam Sha’afi, too, are not convinced of the credibility of the narrations of the ahādīth narrated by the Shiite and thus, do not rely on them.33 Three, the classical Sunnite jurists like Ibn Kathīr do not recognize the legitimacy of very existence of the Shiite doctrine of twelve Imams34 and further argue that the absence of solid theological grounds render the Rawāfidh at loss to ascertain right from the wrong and thus, they fall an easy prey to propaganda relating to false creeds.35 Four, the Sunnites believe that the Shiite have introduced heresies even in the observance of the rituals of the faith. For instance, they include Ali as waliullah in addition to witnessing the divine unity and the Prophethood. Moreover, they follow timings and pattern of offering prayers completely different from the rest of the Ummah. Five, the Sunnites allege that the Shiites observe dissimulation (takiyya) and thus, cannot be trusted. Six, they do not acknowledge the right of the first three caliphs to the caliphate and thus, attack the character of the rightly guided companions of the Prophet. Seven, as mentioned earlier, though classical jurists like Ibn Taimmiyah disapprove of the Shiite for introducing heresies into the faith like committing khurūj against ulil amr yet they do not ex-communicate them for preferring Ali to first three caliphs.36 Ibn Taimmiyah argues that primary objective of the caliphate lies in the assumption and exercise of the political authority and this objective stands legitimately fulfilled when someone occupies the office through consensus of the people of authority.37 As

31Ibn Taimmiyah, Al-Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah 32Quoted in al-Raziq, “The Problem of Caliphate,” 2006 33Ibn Taimmiyah, Al-Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah 34Ibn Kathīr, Al-Bidayah, vol.15, 27 35 Ibn Kathīr, Al-Bidayah, vol.11,259 36Here khurūj may be taken in terms of not recognizing the legitimacy of a caliph who has assumed the office through the consensus of the companions of the Prophet. 37Ibn Taimmiyah, Al-Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah, 89. The people in authority are called ahlul hal wal aqad (those who loose and bind). 65

obedience to those in authority is obligatory (wājib) upon the believers38, therefore, the Shiites who do not acknowledge the legitimacy of the first three caliphs are considered to have left the jamat which amounts to khurūj. 3.3 Political Variables vis-à-vis Doctrinal Differences These doctrinal differences between the Sunnites and the Shiites when juxtaposed with political constructs spawned such historical pre-suppositions that could set in the tone for physical as well as political conflict alongside this polemical divide. In this contextual framework, this study will examine the emergence of Fatimid caliphate, Safāvīd dynasty, the rise of Wahābī ideology and Iranian revolution of 1979. The essentially sectarian nature of these political orders that flourished in certain patches of the political history of the Muslims makes them relevant to our study. In this background, we will examine these schisms from the edge and will develop a comprehension how this sectarian cleavage is being utilized by the extremists to define their codes of war.

3.3.1 Fatimid Caliphate

The Fatimid caliphate (909-1171) was an Ismaili’ite-Shiite caliphate that flourished in North Africa. The Fatimid rulers claimed their descent from Hazrat Fatima, the exalted daughter of the Prophet. Egypt was the ultimate center of the Fātimīds. They took over the defacto political authority from the Sunnite rulers of North Africa who despite declaring them to be politically independent of the Abbasids’ caliphate at Baghdad did not venture to do away with the symbolic religious suzerainty of the Abbasids. Al-Mahdi who happened to be leader of the rival Shiite movement in the Muslim societies resorted to a complete breakup with the Sunnite Abbasids and even aimed at taking over the leadership role from them both religiously and politically. It was in the 9th century that the Islamil’ite missionaries could find a base in Yemen to escalate their propagation against the Sunnite Abbasid caliphate and were successful enough to explore a support-base in North Africa which assumed the form of caliphate under Ubayd ʿAllāh al-Mahdī. This nascent political order had to withstand tough ordeals surfacing from within the Ismail’ite sect and without. Internally Al- Mahdi had to face opposition from those Ismail’ites who brought him to power and externally, he had to face the Malik’ite Sunnite majority and the hostile Khawārij who would not acknowledge their doctrine to be in consonance with the fundamentals of the faith. Politically, he had to encounter problematic Berber tribes and the aggressive Byzantines as well.39 These challenges could not thwart the Fātimīds to unleash the forces of sectarian frenzy to challenge the political configurations largely dominated by the Sunnite Abbasids. Conquest of Egypt in 969 AD was the first important political development in the direction to translate their dream of establishing a universal Ismail’ite imamate into reality. Fātimīds had a sway over vast lands including Hejaz, the land of two holy

38Sahih Bukhari- Kitab al Fitan: 2, ahkam: 4; Sahih Muslim: Imarah: 53-6, 58 39Fatimid, Dynasty, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/202580/Fatimid-Dynasty accessed on 22-1202013 66

sanctuaries. They had strong military expansionist and revolutionary ambitions to be pursued under their caliph who being the recipient of divine guidance was the imam and had spiritual as well as temporal authority. To gain the political ascendency vis-à- vis the Sunnite Abbasids they would win the converts to the Ismail’ite doctrine through preaching by the clandestine missionary network to be subsequently used to subvert the Sunnite political authority wherever possible. All these clandestine missionary activities were pursued under the authority of chief missionary based in Cairo. The disciplined religo-political authority of the chief missionary was novel in the medieval history of Islam which was akin to an institutionalized state church. This office provided a platform to launch intellectual efforts for the promulgation of the fundamental Ismaili’ite doctrines. These doctrines would serve as a political instrument to invalidate the claim of the Abbasids to the caliphate and further to explore and propagate the arguments to support and validate the Ismaili’ite doctrine of caliphate. Apart from these missionary activities, the Fātimīds developed a strategy that reflected their objectives of establishing a world-wide Ismaili’ite imamate to achieve both political as well as religious designs. For instance, they pursued tremendous commercial activities through an alternate trade route passing through Red Sea between Asia and the Near East. This economic policy was aimed at neutralizing the advantageous position of the Sunnite Abbasids who had control over the traditional economic route passing through the Persian Gulf.40 This economic strategy was successful in the sense that it enabled the Ismaili’ites to gain trade independence from the Sunnite-dominated routes of Red Sea and Yemen and also to export their doctrines to Eastern Arabia, Central Asia and India. The Ismaili’te caliphate that reached its zenith during 1057-59 had to suffer decline when they were driven out of Baghdad by the Turks. Several causes contributed to the ultimate failure of the Ismail’ite caliphate which may be enumerated as under: One, the doctrine of Ismaili’ites was in sharp conflict to the Sunnite theological doctrine and thus, was not acceptable to the Sunnite majority at all. The Sunnite scholarship did not even acknowledge any remote relationship between the Ismaili’ite doctrines and the consensus opinion of the majority of the Muslim scholars. Jalaluddin Sayyuti in his luminous work on the historical accounts of the Muslim caliphs Tarīkh Al-Khulāfā did not discussed the Fātimīds simply because he did not consider them even to be Muslims.41 He has quoted Qadi Iyad that someone asked Abu Muhammad Al-Qairwani, a notable Maliki scholar if Ubaidis compel someone to accept their faith, what should one do? He replied that one must prefer death over accepting their creed (aqīda). Likewise, it was declared obligatory upon the believers to migrate from the lands under the Ubaidis’ control.42 Two, the Sunnite scholarship questioned the authenticity of the Fātimīds’ claim to be the descendants of Fatima and thus, their legitimacy to the caliphate which relied

40 Ibid. 41al-Sayyuti, Tarikh al-Khulafa, 20 42Ibid., 20-22 67

exclusively upon their ancestral link with the Quraysh got eroded.43 Sayyuti prefers to call them Ubaidis after Ubaidullah Al-Mehdi, the founder of Fatimid dynasty instead of Fātimīds. He traces the ancestors of Ubaidullah and links them either to the Jews as argued by Qazi Abdul Jabbar Basri or to the Zoroastrians after the opinion of Ibn Khalqan.44 Three, the Sunnites did not trust their faithfulness in Islam and projected them to be the enemies of ulema and desirous of the downfall of the Muslim Ummah.45 Four, the Sunnite majority did not acknowledge the theological legitimacy of the Ismaili’ite bid to create their caliphate within the Abbasids caliphate. The common view with the Muslim scholarship has been that Islam does not permit plurality of the caliphs until it was redefined by Ibn Khaldūn in the 14th century.46 Five, the advent of crusaders that ushered in an era of physical conflict between Christianity and Islam created a sense of integration amongst the Muslims at large. They had the realization that they could not afford any schism in the body politic of Islam during the physical clash with Christian crusaders. This ultimately diminished the prospects of the Fatimid caliphate to flourish in the land which was dominantly Sunnite.47 The interplay of the sectarian forces alongside the rise and fall of the Fatimid caliphate leads us to draw the following conclusions: Firstly, the Ismail’ites used their political authority to spread their doctrines in the Sunnite dominated lands. They established the office of the Chief Missionary in Cairo with the objective to pursue the policy of conversion of the Sunnites to their creed and further to subvert political authority of the Sunnite Abbasids wherever possible. Secondly, the Fātimīds attempted to export their doctrines to the areas beyond their political influence. They exhausted their energies to downplay influence of the Sunnites through different means. In their bid to counterbalance the monopolistic control of the trade route by the Abbasids, they explored their independent trade route passing through Red Sea between Asia and the Near East. All these attempts were part of their grand strategy to install universal Ismail’ite imamate. Thirdly, the Sunnite did not acknowledge the legitimacy of their doctrines and the fault lines between the two got further acute when the Ismaili’ites attempted to use their theological doctrines to pursue political motives. This juxtaposition of politics and religion helped the physical conflict thrive upon the seeds of ideological discord.

43There is a hadīth of the Prophet wherein he has been reported to have said that the caliph must be of the Qurayshite descent. Thus, the traditional Sunnite scholars like Al-Mawardi and others consider the condition of the Quraysh descent essential for the selection of the caliph. See, for example, al-Mawardi, Ahkam-us- Sultaniyyah 44al-Sayyuti, Tarikh al-Khulafa, 20 45 Qazi Abu Bakr Baqilani quoted in ibid., 21,22 46Ibid. Ibn Khaldun was the first important figure in the history of Muslim scholasticism who created a space for the plurality of the caliphs. He argued that Islam is not convinced of spiritual headship devoid of political authority. Since, it is not possible for a caliph to exercise his political authority to the remote areas of his caliphate; therefore, it provides a rationale for the plurality of the caliphs. 47Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/202580/Fatimid-Dynasty accessed on 22-12-2013 68

Fourthly, despite having political authority in certain Muslim lands, the Ismaili’ites could not secure trust of the Sunnite Muslims even in the temporal sphere of life. The Muslims majority did not trust them to fight against the Christian crusaders. Actually, unity of the Muslims under the Abbasids was taken as pre-requisite to develop a tough response to the Christian crusaders.

3.3.2 Safāvīd Empire

With the degeneration of Tamerlane’s political authority in Persia, the Safāvīds got an opportunity to rise to the political power. Shah Ismail exploited this opportunity and established his empire. The Safāvīd Empire (1501-1722) was a Shiite theocracy that flourished in predominantly Sunnite Iran. Its territorial limits extended beyond Persia to the areas falling within modern Turkey and Georgia. The ruling elite followed an aggressive policy of forced conversion of the Sunnite population to their Shiite creed. The doctrinal origin of the Safāvīds dates back to the 13th century Sūfī Order started by one Safi Al-Din (1252-1334) who had converted to the Shiite version of Islam. This Sūfī order could muster up the political support enough to give direction to the subsequent course of politics. This religo-political fraternity declared formal independence from the Ottomans under Shah Ismail in 1501. This political development emerged as a reaction to the Ottomans’ pronouncement to proscribe the Shiite creed. In capacity of king of the Safāvīd Empire Shah Ismail I could successfully bring whole of Iran under his political suzerainty within a decade.48 The Shiite Safāvīds’ chief rivals were the Sunnite Ottomans who considered the Safāvīds’ recruitment from Anatolia as the major threat to their creed as well as political interests. The Ottoman emperor Sultan Bayezid II shifted many Shiites from Anatolia to other parts of his empire so that they may not join the Safāvīd cause. The Ottomans also defeated Shah Ismail I and captured his capital but even then the Safāvīd Empire survived. However, his defeat exposed his claim of being invincible owing to divinely ordained status.49 This battle made the hostilities between the two Empires even more conspicuous which had long lasting imprints upon the policies of the Safāvīd Empire in the subsequent course of political history. It was essentially the product of this polemical hostility between the two Empires that the Shiite Safāvīds resorted to extremist policy against their Sunnite subjects. Though there were large Shiite communities in the areas like Qom and Sabzevar since the 8th century yet the predominant majority in Persia was following the Sunnite version of Islam. Shah Isamail I proclaimed the athnā ‘ashariyya Shiite creed as state religion in order to make up for the political prowess of Sunnite Ottomans. The Safāvīds imported Shiite brains to develop a powerful religious aristocracy under the state supervision. This aristocracy was to work as a powerful tool to suppress the rival

48BBC, Safavid Empire (1501-1722), http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/safavidempire_1.shtml accessed on 28-12-2013 49 RM Savory, Safavids, Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. quoted in, Saylor Org. Safavid Dynasty, http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/HIST351-7.3-Safavid-Dynasty.pdf accessed on 28-12-2013 69

Sunnite creed intellectually as well through the use of brute force. The subsequent course of history witnessed ruthless state persecution of the Sunnite clergy and forced conversion of the Sunnite population to the Shiite creed in general. Under the Safāvīds, the state persecution was not limited to the rival Sunnites alone rather the Shiites following a creed different from the ruling elite’s brand of Shiite creed were also subjected to the persecution with the same vigor. The policy of conversion of the Sunnite Muslims to the Shiite brand found its roots in the following considerations: One, it was part the Safāvīds’ attempts to invoke a religious and cultural identity of the Persians distinct from their political rivals- the Ottomans. This religious and cultural coherence achieved through forced conversion was to be used as a powerful military-cum-political tool to counter the Ottomans. Two, it was presumed that complete conversion to the Shiite sect would create a popular base loyal to the Safāvīd dynasty and thus, would strengthen their political arm. Three, in the newly conquered lands like Azerbaijan and Iraq where the dominant majority of the Muslim population was Sunnite, the conversion policy was used to break the political strength of the Sunnites and thus, to eliminate the support-base of the rival Sunnite Ottomans.

In their reactionary opposition to the Sunnite belief they went on to downplay the importance of even the fundamentals of the Muslim faith as well. For instance, they regarded the visit to shrines of Ahl-e-bait equal in importance to divinely ordained pilgrimage to Makkah (Hajj) or even higher than it.50 This Empire was a prime example where a particular religious creed and state authority were engaged in mutually supportive arrangement under the supreme authority of the king. The Safāvīd theocracy developed strong foundations of the state by exploiting their geographical location at the heart of trade routes. The ruling elite extended patronage to the art and literature and were successful in developing their peculiar civilizational identity. It was the persistent threat from the rival Sunnite Ottomans that kept the Safāvīds politically united and militarily robust. With the decline of the Ottomans’ threat, the forces that were initially a source of power for the Empire transformed into catalysts of disintegration when they started squabbling for the political authority. For instance, the king was no more the ultimate source of religo-political and military strength rather the real authority passed on to the powerful religious clergy. This aristocracy which was once created to serve the interests of the king could now replace the political order itself by declaring that the right to rule rests only with the learned men of the community (mujtāhidēn). However, this unity of political and religious authority with the clergy could not last long and soon they were forced to agree to the division of political and spiritual authority and power sharing with the Afghans. The clergy assumed the spiritual leadership whereas the temporal authority passed on to the Afghans.

50http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/safavidempire_1.shtml accessed on 28-12-2013

To summarize, the policies followed by the Safāvīd ruling elite lead us to draw the following inferences: Firstly, the Safāvīd Empire marked a sharp break from the past when the twelver Shiites had co-existed with the Sunnites. The policies of the Safāvīds brought the hostilities between the two to such an extreme that co-existence between the two became virtually impossible. Secondly, though the doctrinal differences between the Sunnite and the Shiites did exist since long before this empire yet the hostilities accentuated by the Safāvīds discouraged co-existence between the two camps and the Sunnites got concentrated within certain geographical pockets especially near the borders with the Sunnite states. Thirdly, Shiite clergy in terms of formal hierarchical structure emerged during the period of Safāvīds within the Shiite belief. Fourthly, the impact of these polemics was not limited only to the religious extent. These were potent enough to demarcate the territorial boundaries of the states as well. The geographical limits of Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran were not an outcome of ethnic concerns rather the divide between the Sunnite and the Shiites configured these territorial boundaries. Lastly, the forced conversion by Shah Ismail I continued to serve a ‘lesson of history’ for the Sunnites in future whereby the Sunnites would draw legitimacy to violently resist the Shiites and their doctrines.

3.3.3 Rise of Wahābīsm

Wahābīsm emerged in Arabia in terms of a revolutionary ideology. This ideology brought the House of Saud to power. It stood for purification of faith. It condemned the contemporary Arab society to be heretical in character and thus, identified it with pre-Islamic jāhilliyah. Ibn Abdul Wahab, the pioneer of this ideology developed his ten nullifiers of Islam. He proclaimed takfīr for everyone who would not follow his brand of Islam.

3.3.4 Iranian Revolution 1979

Given the radical transformation the 20th century Iran has undergone in terms of changed international order and overwhelmingly Shiite population leading to sectarian homogeneity by default, the Iranian revolution of 1979 reflects a conspicuous shift in conflict paradigms vis-à-vis the road map undertaken by the Fātimīds and the Safāvīds. They focused to draw political legitimacy through accentuating the sectarian fault lines between the Shiites and the Sunnites in an otherwise overwhelmingly Sunnite political order. This study examines this religo- political activism from three trajectories namely anti-imperialism, uprooting the monarchy by reviving the dogma of Islamic state and desire to obliterate the socio- economic and political exploitation of the masses and seeks to attribute the credit to 71

revive the political activism within the Shiites to Khomeini who by reinterpreting their theological doctrines could trigger the change process.

The closing decades of the 20th century witnessed increased assertiveness on part of the Shiite clergy subsequent to the Iranian revolution that sharpened the polemical fault lines between the two sects-Sunnites and the Shiites. The state-system that developed in Iran in the backdrop of 1979 revolution was the brain child of Khomeini. He belonged to athnā-e-ashriyya (Twelver Imam) school of Shiite theology which believed in non-political activism during the period of occultation.51 Moreover, owing to his personal belief in mysticism and theosophy (erfān), he would extend surpassing import to human intuition and cognition in terms of sources of knowledge vis-à-vis rationalism.52 However, despite his eschewing of rationality in favor of intuition we find in him an element of superb juristic rationality which he employs to encourage political activism by opening the doors of Ijtihād during the period of occultation in the Shiite tradition.53 He has the credit to rejuvenate political activism within the Shiite clergy by rationalizing the traditional view of non-activism during the period of absence with the dynamic nature of Islam.54 For instance, he argued that the divinely willed Imam’s occultation during which no one was appointed to run the stately affairs does not imply that socio-economic, political and moral principles of Islam have lost their practical utility. Islam demands its believers to establish an Islamic government to protect the basic tenets of the faith against the enemy by the time the Imam reappears to rejuvenate the glory of Islam himself.55 As ulema (living mujtāhids) are the symbol of authority in the absence of Imam, therefore, they are bound not to be silent spectators of religious degeneration and exploitation of the oppressed.56 This redefinition of the clergy’s political role during the period of absence provided them an opportunity to become active political actors in the drama of power politics in Iran.57 In other words, his Ijtihād in the realm of politics proved to be a driving force behind the 1979 Iranian Revolution which provided the clergy a legitimate ground to challenge the monarchical order of Shah of Iran as the sole guardians of Islamic law. This power struggle between the clergy and monarchical order culminated into the establishment of the government of Muslim jurists (velāyat- e-faqīh)58 and the secular monarchical order was replaced by the political control of the Shiite clergy.

Imam Khomeini’s philosophical dynamism is based upon the following grounds:

51LookLex Encyclopaedia, http://looklex.com/e.o/ijtihad.htm accessed 26-01-2009 52 Roxanne L.Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism 53 Akhavi, “Islam, Politics and Society” 54Muslim Media 55Khomeini, “The Pillars of an Islamic State” 56Imam Ruhullah Khomeini, “The Necessity of Islamic Government,” in Contemporary Debates in Islam, ed. Moaddel and Talattof, (New York: St. Martin’s Press , 2006), 251-262 57 Muslim Media 58 Nikki R. Keddi, “Iran: Change in Islam; Islam and Change,” in International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,(Jul;1980):527-542 72

First, for Imam Khomeini, revolution is an instrument to resist the imperialists bent upon disintegrating the state power of the Muslims by undermining their unity.59 His approach appears to be utilitarian in terms of utilizing the Sunnite sympathies by taking the imperialists to the task for disintegrating the Ottoman empire, the symbol of Muslim unity and replacing it with their cronies who through economic exploitation served as catalysts in the emergence of a class-based society.60 He regarded the struggle to get rid of these rulers as duty of the faithful by following the statement of Ali who entrusted to his great sons, “Be an enemy of the oppressor and helper to the oppressed”.61 He further argued that it was duty of the faithful to overthrow such rulers to rejuvenate the unity and discipline amongst Muslims’ files and he quoted a statement of Fatima al-Zahara, “the imamate exists for the sake of preserving order among the Muslims and replacing their disunity with unity”62. Moreover, his opposition to Shah’s government became more intense when, in 1963, the Shah of Iran granted capitulatory rights to Americans and contracted $ 200 million loan from USA to purchase military equipment. To counter imperialist threats, he urged upon the leaders of the prayers to use the pulpit for the propagation of issues even other than those of purely theological character including the nature of interference of the Imperialist powers in the Muslim countries as well.63

Secondly, Khomeini drawing upon the historical evidences from the early Islamic era revived the dogma of Islamic state and attempted to discover logical grounds for the establishment of an Islamic government but indeed on the Shiite model with the imamate at its pivot. He viewed in the establishment and administration of Islamic state by the Prophet and his immediate successors a strong evidence to suggest that Islam requires its believers to strive for the establishment of a state on the basis of Shariah which aims at regulating not only religious but socio-economic and political affairs of the Islamic society as well.64 He considers Islamic government a necessity largely to preserve the Islamic order, defense of territorial integrity and independence of Muslim Ummah.65 Naturally, to establish a Government which he terms “government of law” he seeks to draw legitimacy to uproot the Shah of Iran’s monarchy. Some critics of Iranian revolution justifiably argue that historically, clergy in Iran, considering Shah of Iran as imperfect ruler did not challenge the institution of monarchy on ideological grounds but their protest remained to the extent of certain unjust steps of the state affecting their local interests and State’s pro-imperialism

59 Even in 19th century Iran opposition to state was characterised by ulema’s concern to promote territorial integrity of the Muslim lands against the designs of Imperialist forces; for details see, William M. Floor, “Revolutionary Character of the Iranian Ulama: Wishful Thinking or Reality?” in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.12, No. 4 ( Dec; 1980): 501-524 60Khomeini, “The Necessity of Islamic Government,” 257,258 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63Kazem Ghazi Zadeh, “General Principles of Imam Khumayni’s Political Thought” trans. A.N. Baqir Shahi, in Message of Thaqalayn: A Quarterly journal of Islamic studies, No. 2 and 3, cited in Bonney, Jihad, 248 64 Khomeini, “Necessity of Islamic Government,” 65 Ibid. 73

policies.66 It is further argued that even in 19th century ulema’s approach to social and economic problems of the Iranian society was secular as is evident from the living conditions of the peasantry on the lands possessed by ulema which were nothing better than those working on the lands possessed by the landed aristocrats.67 As clergy in 19th century Iran were having monopoly over education and court system, therefore, in order to secure their position of monopoly they were not in favor of reshaping the political order. Their opposition to the state got impetus only when government expressed its resolve to secularize the education and to mitigate the influence of the religious courts.68 The critics further argue that initially during the struggle of Iranian Revolution 1979, the institution of monarchy was not challenged by the clergy on doctrinal basis rather it was reform package of Shah of Iran which proved to be launching pad for clergy’s opposition whose head was Imam Khomeini. For instance, Khomeini criticized the Bill on Women Franchise published by the government on September 8, 1962 as being repugnant to Islam.69 However, despite his criticism Khomeini did not start active opposition until he was personally targeted by Shah’s criticism as an agent of Iraq and Great Britain.70 Despite all the criticism the fact remains that Imam Khomeini used the slogan of establishing the Islamic government successfully to justify his revolution in Iranian society.

Thirdly, to Imam Khomeini, a corrupt socio-economic and political order represented tāghūt. Against tāghūt, he argued, a believer was left with no other option but either to revolt against it or to become part of it.71He urged upon the Muslims to rise against the existing political order and replace it with the Islamic system as under the former neither Islamic laws can be implemented nor Islamic way of life can be observed.72 He sought to justify revolution by making a reference to Shiite view of “collective action” which would guarantee human salvation through the implementation of imam’s justice.73 He further argued that to obliterate the rule of corruption was obligatory upon the believers simply because perpetrators of corruption represented the Pharaohs of Egypt about whom Quran says, “Lo! Pharaoh exalted himself in the earth and made its people castes. A tribe among them he oppressed, killing their sons and sparing their women. Lo! he was of those who work corruption.” (Al-Qasas: 4).74

66 Shahrough Akhavi, “The Ideology and Praxis of Shi’ism in Iranian Revolution”, in Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol.25, No.2 ( April; 1983): 195-221; also see, Floor, “Revolutionary Character of the Iranian Ulama” 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. Imam Khomeini sent a cable message to Shah of Iran regarding his severe criticism of Women Franchise Bill. 70 C.M.Lake, “ Problems Encountered in Establishing an Islamic Republic in Iran 1979-1981” in Bulletin ( British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, vol.9, No.2 (1982):141-170 71 Khomeini, “The Necessity of Islamic Government, 256,257 72Ibid. 73 Akhavi, “Islam, Politics and Society” 74 Khomeini, “The Necessity of Islamic Government, 256 74

Furthermore, he pledges to follow the way of Ali of accepting the political power to eliminate the economic exploitation of the masses.75

In view of the foregoing it may well be summarized that firstly, Khomeini took the dogma of Islamic state to provide grounds for revolution; secondly, he based his plan for change on his anti-imperialist approach; thirdly, his revolution plan reflected his approach to eliminate the exploitation of the masses and salvation of humans from the exploitation by the humans; fourthly, as Iran was predominantly a Shiite majority state, therefore, his use of religious rhetoric and symbolism to give an emotional blend to revolutionary struggle against Shah’s regime represented the Shiite historical traditions. For instance he urged upon the Iranian people to revive the spirit of sacrifice after the traditions of Imam Hussain to get rid of present-day Yazīd.76 Lastly, he avoided to confine the dynamism of Islam to the extent of mere rituals rather he discovered within Islam a powerful spiritual force that, in the words of a western scholar of Islam, “governs the life of Muslims from cradle to grave.”77

3.4 Sectarian Rapprochement As against the historical discourse wherein the politics has been instrumental in making the sectarian chemistry across the Muslim lands, the same variable helped in triggering the rapprochement efforts between the two sects during the post-Safāvīd period. In terms of a political compromise, as early as in 1743, Nadir Shah effected a formal agreement between the two sects whereby the Shiite agreed not to slander the companions of the Prophet and the Sunnites agreed to extend recognition to ‘Twelver Shi’ism’ in terms of an authentic school of Muslim scholarship.78 Similarly, in the early 20th century, this spirit was evident from the correspondence between Abd al- Husayn Sharaf al-Din, a Lebanese Shiite scholar and Salim al-Bishri, the rector of Al- Azhar. In this period, Rashīd Ridā, a prominent Sunnite revivalist appeared to be expressing his support for such rapprochement in his dialogue with Iraqi Shiite jurist Muhammad al-Husayn Al Kashif al-Ghita.79 The cause of sectarian rapprochement continued to characterize the historical discourse by the last quarter of the 20th century. In 1959 Iranian Shiite scholar Muhammad Taqi Qummi who was heading a group called Jama’āt al-taqrīb could get twelver shi’ism recognized in terms of an

75 Imam Khomeini quoted the statement of Ali, the fourth pious caliph saying, “I have accepted the task of Government because God, exalted and Almighty, has exacted from the scholars of Islam a pledge not to sit silent and idle in the face of gluttony and plundering of the oppressors, on the one hand and hunger and deprivation of the oppressed on the other-were it not for all this, then I would abandon the reins of the Government and in no way seek it. You would see that this world of yours with all of its position and rank, is less in my eyes than the moisture that comes from the sneeze of a goat”, in, Nahaj al-Balagha ed., Subhi as-Salih (Beirut,1397 A.H./ 1967.C.E) quoted in ibid.,258 76 The reference is to Shah of Iran. See, Floor, “Revolutionary Character of the Iranian Ulama” 77 W.Dietl, Holy War (1984): 13-47 quoted in Noor Muhammad, “ The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction” 78Martin Kramer, “Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses,”(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 79Bar, “Sunnis and Shiites—Between Rapprochement and Conflict”; also See for primary sources, Kramer, “Islam Assembled,”1986 75

authentic school of Muslim jurisprudence by Mahmoud Shaltut, the then head of Al- Azhar.80

Nevertheless, during the last quarter of the 20th century the apprehensions in the Sunnite world regarding the possible repercussions of the Iranian revolution overshadowed the enthusiasm for rapprochement between the two sects. The sectarian violence got further codification on the basis of these apprehensions. The Sunnites got apprehensive that Khomeini would spearhead the drive to export the Shiite ideology to the Sunnite lands through a network of cultural centers and consulates.81 In this scenario, the Sunnite ruling elite in Muslim lands reverted to revive the declining schism as a tool to contain the possible inflow of shi’ism into the Sunnite lands. In this changed scenario, some sections of the Sunnite clergy unleashed a campaign against the ideological colour of the Iranian revolution to the extent that they did not hesitate to argue that revolution in Iran had revived the pre-Islamic Zoroastrianism and further that it was perpetrated by the Jewish lobby.82 It was argued that the Iranians had antipathy towards the Arabs which might be traced in history when the Arabs conquered Persia and destroyed the pre-Islamic Persian glory in which the Shiites used to take pride. Driven by this antipathy, they participated in every move whether it was from the Qarāmitah, the Buwayhids or the Fātimīds that aimed at weakening the foundations of Islam.83 It was in this backdrop that Iranian revolution instead of being taken as role model it proved to be instrumental in reviving the violent polemical fault lines between the Sunnites and the Shiites. The shi’itization policy under the Safāvīds being an unpleasant part of the Sunnite memory could stir their apprehensions that a Shiite clergy-led Iran could satiate its hegemonic designs in the region through the instrument of shi’itazation on the Safāvīd model.84 It was further apprehended that the rise of clergy-led Iran and the decline of the Sunnite Middle Eastern states could attract the Sunnites to the Shiite doctrine owing to its temporal success.85

Moreover, the post-revolution era witnessed rise of enthusiasm in the Shiite community to safeguard their interests. For instance, being encouraged by the success of Iranian revolution, the Shiites in Pakistan who constituted the second largest community after Iran itself established Tehrīk Nifāz Fiqah Ja’afriā in the revolution year 1979 under the leadership of Arif Hussain Hussaini, a student of Khomeini himself. Though the major objective of the organization was declared to protect the rights of the Shiites yet the timings of foundation and the intellectual relation that the

80 Mohamad Jawad Chirri, “Inquiries about Islam,” (Detroit: The Islamic Center of America, 1986) 81 Al-Harbi quoted in Nibras Kazimi,” Zarqawi’s Anti-Shi’a Legacy:Original or Borrowed?”, in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, ed. Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, Eric Brown, volume 4, (Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2006): 53-72 82Abdullah Muhammad al-Gharib, Wa ja’a dawr al-Majūs: al ebād al-tarikhiyaat wal aqa’aidiat was Siyasiyyat le thurat ul-Iraniyyat (Then Came the Turn of the Majus) 1406 AH. 83 Ibid. 84Israel Elad-altman, “The Sunni-Shi’a Conversion Controversy,” in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology ed. Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, Eric Brown, vol. 5 (Washington D. C.: Hudson Institute, 2007) 01-10 85Ibid. 76

founder of this organization had with Khomeini were enough to raise suspicions within the Sunnite clergy regarding the possible export of Shiite ideology after the revolution. It was in this backdrop that in 1985 Anjumun Sipah-e-Sahabah, a deobandi dominated organization was launched to counterbalance the sectarian conflict scenario in Pakistan. The differences between the two organizations remained no more confined to the intellectual limits rather both organizations entered into physical conflict on sectarian grounds. Pakistan virtually became the proxy of Shiite Iran and Wahābī Saudi Arabia. The both organizations being supported by their respective masters developed militant wings in the early 1990s. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Muhammad emerged as militant affiliates of Sipah-e-Sahābah and TNFJ respectively. Where the Shiite clergy’s political ascendency in Iran was a source of tremendous support for the Shiite militant outfit in Pakistan, Afghan jihad happened to be a channel to the inflow of sophisticated weapons and trained manpower to the Sunnite militant outfit in Pakistan.86 In the following years the Sunnites resorted to physical violence in a bid to draw legitimacy for their existence in terms of being instrumental to stop the spread of Shiite ideology whereas the Shiite militants exploited the notion of protection of the fellow Shiites against the numerically strong Sunnite militants.

Even after the lapse of more than a quarter of the century, the apprehensions regarding the export of Shiite doctrines subsequent to Iranian revolution continues to exist across the Muslim world and are instrumental in codifying the violence on sectarian lines. Even the moderate leadership in the Sunnite states like Egyptian cleric Yūsūf Qaradawi who is noted for his use of ecumenical vocabulary for the Shiites while addressing Doha conference in 2007 expressed his concerns on Iran’s efforts to export of Shiite ideology to the Sunnite lands. He categorically refuted the claim of Iranian Ayatullah Taskhiri that the shi’itization campaign was the outcome of some individuals.87 Similarly, other moderate voices like Nasr Farid Wasel, the former Mufti have also joined Qaradawi against the shi’itization of the Sunnite lands.88 Moreover, In Morocco, there are reports regarding the spread of Shiite ideology by those Moroccans who work in Europe where they are being indoctrinated by the institutions connected to Iran.89 Furthermore, in 2007, Algerian Religious Affairs Ministry pointed out the shi’itization activities as well.90 In Sudan too, increase in popularity of Hezbollah leadership evident through the proliferation of Hezbollah’s

86Husain Haqqani, “Weeding Out the Heretics”: Sectarianism in Pakistan,” in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology ed. Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, Eric Brown, vol. 4, (Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute 2006):77-88

87Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s address in Doha Conference for Dialogue of Islamic Schools of Thought: The Role of Reconciliation in the Ummas’s Real Unity Doha, Qatar, 20-22 January 2007 88Ahmed el-Beheiri, Ayman Hamza and Hisham Abdel Halim, “Al-Azhar Scholars Warn of A Dangerous Shiite Tide,” in Al-masry Al-youm, Issue 1587, 17/ 10/ 2008 89Al-Chihab,“Archeology of Shiism in Morocco,” 90Boualem Ghomrassa, “Al-Sulutat al-Jaza`iriyyah Tuhaqqiq fi Nashat Majmu’at Shi’iyyah,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 6, 2007 77

flags suggests that Shiite ideology has managed to secure popular appeal.91 Besides this, similar trends have been reported in Jordan as well.92

Given the sensitivity attached with the sectarian conversion, authentic data regarding the shi’itization is difficult to achieve as most of the converts prefer not to disclose their conversion owing to multiple threat perceptions. Though it can be argued that in absence of empirical data no concrete observation regarding the veracity of such shi’itization trends can be made yet it is needless to suggest that perception regarding shi’itization does exist with the Sunnites that have culminated into the sharpening of this polemical divide and has the potential for physical violence as well.

Viewed from this scenario of mistrust and mutual suspicions, the Shiite approach in the context of the US attack on Iraq happened to be of triggering effect for the sectarian violence in the Muslim lands. The fall of Ba’ath regime in the wake of the US attack turned Iraq into theatre of sectarian conflict between the Sunnites and the Shiites. The Shiites found an opportunity to marginalize the political ascendency of the Sunnites which they held since World War I with the support of the invading forces. This approach alarmed the Sunnites who were already struggling to withstand the blow to their political position in a changed political scenario.93 This sectarian cleavage strengthened the already predominant tone of mutual hostilities that entailed the historic pre-suppositions in terms of treason and heresy and support to the enemies of faith.94 This attempt on part of the Shiites to assume political authority in Iraq with the collaboration of the invading US forces has been viewed by the Sunnite militants in terms of treachery and debauchery.

The foregoing discussion leads us to draw the following conclusions:

First, the theological differences between the two sects could create historical pre- suppositions when juxtaposed with political constructs. Sectarian Empires like the Fatimid caliphate and the Safāvīd dynasty emerged on the basis of these pre- suppositions. Second, these theological differences on the sectarian lines that emerged in the early period of Islam got aggravated on the axis of politics during the subsequent historical discourse. Historical evidence further highlights the utilitarian use of these polemics as they have been exploited to gain the political leverage by the respective camps. Third, the conduct of sectarian empires highlights their passion for the export of Shiite ideology to the Sunnite lands. This passion of the sectarian empires has generated apprehensions that still reverberate into the minds of the rival Sunnites. Fourth, the response of the Sunnites vis-à-vis the Fātimīds and the Safāvīds has always been of mistrust and devoid of confidence. The Sunnites have been suspecting

91 Uthman Isa, “Hatta la Yuqal: Kana al-Sudan Baladan Sunniyyan,” Albainah, issue 166 92Elad-altman, , “The Sunni-Shi’a Conversion Controversy,”

93 Bar, “Sunnis and Shiites—Between Rapprochement and Conflict” 94 Ibid. 78

the loyalties of the Shiites towards the fellow Muslims vis-à-vis the forces of unbelief. Traditionally the Shiites have been admonished by the Sunnite scholarship for collaborating with unbelievers to uproot the Sunnite governments.

Last but not the least, as said earlier, though the doctrinal differences between the two sects had been there since the early phase of Islamic history, yet these differences could never come up to the point of such intolerance that render co-existence between the two sects impossible. It could only become impossible when the forced conversion under the sectarian Empires served as ‘lesson of history’ for the Sunnite. 79

4 Codification of Violence

In the preceding chapters we have discussed that ideological nature of the conflict between the Islamists and the west happened to be a catalyst not only in remodeling the international security scenario but also in transforming the internal dynamics of the Muslim societies. When juxtaposed with the real politic, this ideological character of the conflict germinated militancy as a response to repressive policies of the West. Where this militancy appeared to be a tool to resist the imperialist west, it also affected the socio-religious fabric of the Muslim societies as well. Increased ex- communication emerged in theological discourse when broader theological base got contaminated with extremism. This changed the boundaries of faith on one hand and provided the militants with an opportunity to exploit the old schisms between the Sunnites and the Shiites to legitimize their violence on the other. However, a synoptic view renders it evident that the Islamic society was not polarized across sectarian lines till the emergence of Safāvīd Empire in the 16th century. Popular and syncretic culture remained one of the main targets of the elite class of the clergy. This turned into wide scale persecution when championed by the political objectives of the ruling elite. At times, this deviance cut across socio-political dynamics and was fiercely contested. The case of Roshinya movement is one glaring example depicting the use of force to quell the deviant ideas which were simultaneously supported through codification of the use of violence. The same trend is also discernible at the broader spectrum of the Muslim history especially in terms of Ayubid’s role in takeover of Egypt. In this case, the raison d'être for violence against the fellow Muslims was treason-cum-collaboration with the crusaders. In both instances, the violence was resorted to as means of political settlement achieved through religious injunctions. On top of it, the case of Ibn Taimmiyah against the Mongols also reflects another trend of negotiating political stability through use of violence against the fellow Muslims. These events demonstrate an inherent imbalance that always remained dominant with the elite clergy as well as political rulers. However, it never reached the level of masses. This became only possible only when colonization took place in the Muslim lands. Colonization as a phenomenon codified public and private Islamic law which was later replaced with European codes at least in the public sphere. However, with the advent of printing press and downfall of the Muslim elite, the tendencies of violence were further developed, codified and transmitted against the general masses in the 18th and 19th centuries. One of the outcomes of this trajectory is the formation of Pakistan. However, the post-Pakistan search for religious identity has clearly unmasked the religious trends of the 19th century when it got coupled with state patronage of the use of violence to attain political objectives. This cyclic outburst has been product of codification of violence which was undertaken at the behest of ulema- from Shah Abdul Aziz to Maulana Manzoor Ahmed Naumani. It is in this framework that the current chapter discovers the trajectories upon which violence emerging from identity crises got codified. These trajectories include ‘linkage between violence and collaboration with the colonialists’, 80

‘sectarian violence due to irrelevance of Ummah’ and ‘correlation between violence and ideological nostalgia produced by abolition of Muslim caliphate’. It is in this purview that an attempt will be made to develop the case that violence has been adopted at individual or group level as a means of emancipation and identity when the state structure got incapacitated to resolve the conflict situation and more so the society failed to bridge the sectarian cleavage and thus, leading to the codification of violence at individual or group levels or at times between the states within the fold of Islam. 4.1 Violence and Identity Crisis Nexus

National identity is an outcome of mutually shared beliefs of a group of people that attributes them a character distinct from others. The urge to assume a national identity may be available in different groups but the elements that provide food to this urge may vary.1 These elements may include psychology, culture, common history, political orientations and territorial considerations.2 At times national identity stems from the confluence of these factors but they may not necessarily be of uniform impact. Any one element may overshadow the other in a particular case. For instance, religion provides nationhood to Jews more than any other factor. While being scattered in different parts of the world they claimed nationhood in the name of their religious identity. Even today while living in different countries they draw their national identity from their religion more than any other source. On the other hand, psychology infused a sense of superiority in Germans and thus, inspired them to subdue other nations. This sense of superiority was reflected through German nationalism that drove them to trample other nations. Still history has witnessed the formation of nationhood on the basis of colour and inspired their leaders like Nelson Mandela in South Africa to devote their whole lives for the preservation and protection of their nationhood through resisting racial apartheid. These examples suggest that these elements may be resource to each other like during the World War II psychologically inspired nationalism happened to be the force to achieve political gains and territorial aggrandizement. The World War II provides an example of interrelationship between psychologically driven national identity through the instrument of German nationalism and violence that culminated into the killings of hundreds of thousands human beings. However, the relevance of any particular pattern of national identity recedes into background when an alternative comes in to replace it during the course of history. For instance, nationalism as a source of national identity reverted to a subordinate position when during the Cold War era the co-relation between national identity and violence was reaffirmed by ideological factor which divided the world into two blocks- one block of nations sought to draw their national identity from Communism

1 Montserrat Guibernau, The identity of Nations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 11; some may argue that thesis that view nations is stronger than the sociological perspective. See for instance, Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, (London: Penguin Books, 1991), vii 2 Guibernau, The identity of Nations

and the other preferred to draw it from Capitalism. Even the states having distinct ideological affiliations like the Muslim states could also feel appeal of these ideologies. For instance, Nasser in Egypt introduced Arab socialism whereas political scenario in Pakistan in early 1970s witnessed stirring up the popular sentiments by the political leadership through introducing socialist elements in the political framework. It may also happen that any one element which is a resource to nationhood in particular time frame may be replaced by another element. For instance, in pre- Islamic Arab society these were tribal affiliations which were more relevant than anything else in the constitution of nationhood. Pre-Islamic Arab literature suggests that the Arabs used to take pride in their tribal affiliations which they consider to be their source of physical strength.3 Notwithstanding the strength of these tribal affiliations in terms of providing political configurations to the Arab society and their historical infiltration in the Arab culture, the proclamation of faith by the Prophet Muhammad changed this configuration altogether and got the Arabs acquainted with an element of nationhood to which they were hitherto unaware of. In a considerably short span of time, the nationhood developed on the basis of belief system. Badr happened to be the first battlefield to test the authenticity of this new configuration. Previously, the battles were fought between the parties with the strength derived from tribal pride and affiliations but in case of Badr, the fault lines were changed from tribal affiliations to ideological bonding. Notwithstanding their tribal affiliations, those who professed the new faith constituted a nation vis-à-vis those who put resistance to the new faith. The strength of faith overshadowed even the blood relationships. For instance, Abu Bakr fought against his son Abdur Rehman who was yet in the ranks of pagans. Similarly, Umar killed his uncle Aās b. Hashām.4 Ibn Jozi narrates that it was Aās b. Hashām who defended Umar against the pagans of Makkah when he proclaimed that he had converted to Islam.5 The evidence affirms co-relation between identity crisis and violence where the state as an actor was involved. For instance, nationalism could move the state of Germany to trample other nations during the World War II whereas the ideological conflict between communism and capitalism again had state apparatus behind it. Even in the early period of Islam, Muslims fought to preserve and protect their distinct identity after the establishment of the city state of Madina. Nevertheless, evidence from the accounts of history suggests that the co-relation between the identity crisis and violence continued to exist at the societal level as well. For instance, Tamils in northern Sri Lanka started a campaign to secure their separate national identity and thus, in 1976 formed Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). This was a separatist militant organization that aimed at establishing a separate state for the Tamils.6 Similarly, the rise of Khalistan movement in 1970s in Indian Punjab constituted

3 Maulana Safi-ur-Rehman Mubarakpuri, Al-Rahīq al-Makhtūm (Lahore: Al-Maktabah al-Salafiyyah, 1998),56 4 For details see, Ibid. 302-306 5 Abdul Rehman Ibn Jozi, Manaqib Umar b. al-Khattab, trans. Urdu by Muhammad Tariq Qadri (Lahore: Shakir Publications, 2014), 25,26 6Tamil Tigers, Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/581988/Tamil- Tigers accessed on 6.8.2014 82

another example of interrelationship between identity crises and violence at societal level. Besides this, intifada that started in 1987 in Palestine was also associated with the national identity question against the occupation of Israel.7 4.2 Genesis of Codification of Violence

The following discussion will delineate upon codification of violence emerging from identity crises on the afore-mentioned three trajectories.

4.2.1 Linkage between Violence and Collaboration with the Colonialists

In recent history Europeans used colonialism in terms of an ideology to justify their exploitation of the resources of the colonized lands. They portrayed themselves not as invaders or agents of exploitation rather instruments of civilizing the otherwise ‘uncivilized’ people of third world. However, the subject population could not be overwhelmed by this so called ideology and attempts to legitimize colonialism were soon confronted by the aspirations of the local population articulated in terms of nationalism. It resulted in the eventual collapse of the entire edifice of colonial ideology.8This conflict between the local aspirations and colonial ideals affirmed the linkage between violence and colonialism and further provided a spectrum to explore the phenomenon of the emergence of violence alongside three streaks namely ‘threat to traditional cultural values’, ‘emergence of class conflict’ and ‘economic exploitation’.

First, colonization process resulted in erosion of traditional cultural values which commanded the emotional attachment of the population. For instance, in Africa, traditional system of conflict resolution got eroded and weaker democratic institutions were replaced by colonial authoritarianism.9 The importation of westernization in the garb of modernization to the African lands was construed to be an attempt to impose foreign culture to the traditional values.10 In African political context, some may adopt the thesis of positive effects of colonialism in terms of a factor to understand the process of democratization and westernization of African society.11However, this thesis is rejected on the grounds for being devoid of historical evidence as the society had already developed solid state structure on democratic foundation even prior to the dawn of colonial rule that happened to be a catalyst in the weakening of social fabric

7Intifadah, Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/291859/intifadah accessed on 6.8.2014 8 Robertson, Sociology, 264 9 N.O. Mimiko, “Tradition, Governance, Challenges and the Prospects of Change in Africa,” in Niyi Afolabi, ed. N.O Mimiko, “Tradition, Governance, Challenges and the Prospects of Change in Africa” in Toyin Falola: The Man, The Mask, The Muse ed. Niyi Afolabi (North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2010),641-642 10 K. Kasongo, “Impact of Globalization on Traditional African Religion and Cultural Conflict,” Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, vol.2. N0. 1 (2010): 309 11 D. Arowolo, “The effects of western civilization on Africa,”Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences, vol.1, No. 1 (2010): 7 83

and state structures instead of bringing any positive effects.12 In the social context, colonialism posed a challenge to strong family structure by sowing the seeds of individualism. With the weakening of social structures, the pace of urbanization also got impetus. Moreover, with the westernization of the African society, affiliation with the native language also declined and a tendency to speak foreign language became conspicuous.13

Similarly, the colonial India also approved of strong correlation between violence and identity crises resulting from colonialism. The Muslims’ conceptual identity emerged more prominently after fall of the Mughals. It actually stemmed from the challenges posed by the exploitation at the hands of both the Hindus and the British jointly. The natural course of action of this type of exploitation was a Muslim resistance movement against the odds which threatened the Muslim identities in the subcontinent. The fall of the Mughals followed by advent of the British resulted in dismantling of well-established Muslim cultural identities. It happened when traditional Muslim institutions like Islamic laws, Islamic madāris and Persian language were arbitrarily replaced with the British laws, British missionary schools and English language.14 Besides, the British government’s initiatives to westernize the Indian society, two unofficial agencies-English Press and Missionaries played an important role helping the western values find a foothold in the Indian society. So far as English press is concerned, Statesman and Times of India played vital role in transforming the opinion of Indians in favor of the British. With the growth of English-knowing class in India, the impact of these newspapers on cultural transformation of the society increased manifold.15 It is also needless to suggest that cultural transformation in Indian society owes a lot to the Christian Missions in India. The British Government permitted rather aided the missionary elements to work in India in support of popularizing the western outlook in Indian society. Christian missionaries were encouraged to extend their sphere of work from preaching to teaching. Presbyterian Alexander Duff’s Foundation was established in 1830 in Calcutta which claimed to have appeal for the Indians ranging from the common man to the intellectual elite. Subsequently, a network of mission education institutes like Madras Christian College was established. Besides education activities, the missionary elements were also encouraged to participate in philanthropic activities in Indian society to promote pro-western sentiment in Indian society.16

This cultural onslaught by the British, widely supporting the Hindu interests, had a two-way impact on the regional socio-economic and political environment. In the first

12 Mimiko, , “Tradition, Governance, Challenges and the Prospects of Change in Africa,”640 13 Ibrahim Farah, Sylvia Kiamba and Kesegofetse Mazongo, Major challenges facing Africa in the 21st century: A few provocative remarks, International Symposium on Cultural Diplomacy in Africa - Strategies to confront the Challenges of the 21st Century: Does Africa has what is required? Berlin, 14th-– 17th July, 2011 14 Choudhury Mohammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1967),7 15 Vincent A. Smith, The Oxford History of India, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988),723,724 16 Ibid. 723-725 84

instance, it inevitably humiliated the Muslim community and caused them utmost frustration and a sense of deprivation. Then, the same cultural onslaught encouraged the opportunist Hindus to make strides in the new environment even by downgrading and discriminating the Muslim masses. It was evidenced when the orthodox Hindu common man, mostly under the influence of the religo-political Hindu elite did not resist the anti-Muslim orientations of the British.17 Consequently, the frustrated common man, on the contrary, was driven into a state of utter alienation and subjugation.

Nonetheless, this is not to suggest that discontentment against the colonial rule was exclusive characteristic of the Indian Muslims. Though the Hindus took the advent of the British in terms of an opportunity to enhance their political clout vis-à-vis the Muslims from whom the colonialists usurped the political authority yet they were also averse to the colonial domination of India and were focused to assume the political authority by themselves. In this contextual framework, though the ruling elite in United India surrendered political authority to the British yet both the Hindu and Muslim circles displayed conspicuously conservative approach towards the cultural onslaught of the west by refusing to surrender to an alien culture. Though complete alienation of both the Hindus and the Muslims from the colonial culture was not possible yet their policy of aloofness and opposition to technological innovations was a success that avoided culture fusion of all the three-Hindus, Muslims and the British. Nevertheless, this cultural surrender characterized the Indian society but in a limited way. This surrender was largely evident around Calcutta where secular rationalism triumphed over the conservatism peculiar to the Indian society. This triumph, however, could not escape reaction in the society that culminated into the emergence of religious rhetoric that warranted for codification of violence against the alien threats. With the Hindus, this codification emerged through Brahmo Samaj in 1928 which may aptly be termed as an intellectual response to the western threat18 whereas with the Muslims, this codification of violence emerged through exposing the Wahābī ideology to the practical test by Sayyed Ahmed of Bareilly in the early 19th century who declared India to be land of war (dār-ul-harb) as it was under the foreign occupation.19

Second, the colonialism flourished on the deliberately created social stratification in the colonized lands. This social stratification backed by the relatively powerful military machines of the colonialists barred the locals to rise up against the foreign rulers.20 Major instrument of this social division was through targeting the existing traditional education system. In Kano City of Nigeria, the British introduced such curriculum for ulema which was semblance of secular and Islamic education and thus,

17 Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan, (London: Faber and Faber, 1950),26 Further, Henry Frank Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation, (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1964), 26 18 Smith, The Oxford History of India,729-739 19 Ibid. 802 20Robertson, Sociology, 292 85

replaced traditional education system that was in conflict with colonial objectives. Traditional centers of learning which had been producing traditional clergy got a blow when the British established Kano Law School to provide new scheme of education.21 This school proved to be instrumental in distracting the students from following the traditional Māliki code. Similarly, in Sudan, the British attempted to bring the religious ideals in conformity with the social ideals of the British society. Likewise in India, after the fall of Mughals, the British took over the reins of government and introduced the British secular orientations into the government functionaries. This happened when the Islamic laws were replaced with the British laws, Muslim ‘madāris’ with missionary schools and Persian language with English not just for the official proceedings but even as the medium of education as well. This made it virtually impossible for the Indians to enter into government jobs without acquiring proficiency in English language.22 The Islamic cultural heritage was, thus, either demolished or relegated to the background, making room for the alien secular traits in all walks of life. In this context, where the clergy in their bid to preserve and protect the religo-cultural fabric of society established religious schools like Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband (1866) and Dar-ul-Uloom Nadwatul Ulema Lakhnow (1894), Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan in order to reconcile Islam with western democratic ideals, established Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (1877) which was later on upgraded as Aligarh University with the collaboration of the British. Moreover, Sir Charles Wood’s educational policy of 1854 led to the foundation of three universities at Madras, Bombay and Calcutta. In the post-1857 scenario, this policy was a success in establishing a network of public schools and British government funded private schools across India.23

Though the impact of this colonial approach aiming towards social stratification may not be quantifiable however, evidence suggests that the British happened to be successful in creating complex fault lines in the colonial societies on the trajectories of two mutually divergent phenomena-rationalism and traditionalism. The British- supported rationalism found its advocates in otherwise traditional societies whereas traditionalism could draw strength from historically deep rooted traditions as such. For instance, In African context, Kano provides a case scenario where the British attempted to bring the ulema in line with colonial objectives through rational interpretation of religious precepts. On the other hand traditional ulema (alkalai) remained committed to their traditional religious standpoint.24

In larger perspective, this socio-religious division got further strengthened when a class of apologists emerged who exhausted their energies to explore points of

21 The British established Shahuci Judicial School in 1928 to impart this new course of education. In addition to the traditional subjects like Islamic Jurisprudence and Quranic studies, new subjects like arithmetic were also incorporated in curriculum. See, Tijjani Muhammad Naniya, “The Dilemma of the Ulema in a Colonial Society: The Case Study of Kano Emirate” Journal of Islamic Studies 4:2 (1993): 151-160 22 Smith, The Oxford History of India,719 23 Ibid. 24 Naniya, “The Dilemma of the Ulema in a Colonial Society” 86

congruence between Islamic values and western democratic ideals. Their narrative which found its common place with the apologists ranging from India to Sudan revisited Islamic precepts through western democratic concepts instead of redefining Islam in its own framework. For instance, early 20th century witnessed Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan making endeavors to remove ideological fault-lines between the imperialist west and the Indian Muslims. He focused exclusively upon exploring common grounds between the two. He wrote bilingual commentary of Bible titled Tabyin-ul-Kalām wherein he attempted to discover common grounds between Christianity and Islam. He undertook to bring about reconciliation between the Christian British government and the Muslim subjects.25 Similarly, in Sudan, Mahmoud Muhammad Taha represented this apologetic approach. He advocated democracy and opposed implementation of a version of Shariah. He was convinced of gender parity and equal status of Muslims and non-Muslims. He bifurcated between the Sunna and Shariah and viewed the post-hijrā portion of the Quranic revelation in that-time contextual framework whereas in his opinion it was only the Makkan portion of the Quranic revelations which provided guidelines for the modern age.26 This approach is in direct contrast to the consensus opinion of majority of Muslim clerics. It also ignores the basic tenets of the faith as agreed upon by the majority of ulema rather it focuses upon reconciling Muslim beliefs with the contemporary western values. As the proponents of this narrative ignore the basic tenets of faith and extend scant attention to the ideological differences, therefore, they lose their credibility. They were labeled as apologists. In this backdrop, the division between the rationalists and traditionalists became a permanent feature of the Muslim societies that were to codify the use of violence in the Muslim societies.

Third, in economic terms, colonialism can be defined in terms of an arrangement of a powerful nation to exploit the resources of a weaker nation. For instance, during the colonial era, the Europeans treated the colonized lands as the nurseries of cheap labour, markets of raw material and grounds to strengthen their respective military muscles.27 In Africa, colonialism redesigned the patterns of agricultural production in the sense that such agricultural productions were encouraged that were needed to support the economies of the colonial powers instead of fulfilling the demands of the agriculturalists themselves. This policy engendered the development of the colonialists but hunger, starvation and deprivation became the destiny of the local population.28 Similarly, India was taken as a market for the British commodities where the investors could enjoy monopoly over the means of production as well as a source of raw material for the British Industry. As colonialism transferred the

25 For a detailed discussion, see chapter 1 26 Mahmod Mohammad Taha, The Second Message of Islam 27 Robertson, Sociology, 292 28Farah et al, Major challenges facing Africa in the 21st century; also see, R.A. Alkali, International Relations and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy (Kaduna: North Point Publishers, 2003). For the imprints of the economic dynamics during the colonial rule on the current economic conditions of Africa, see for example, Howard Stein, “Economic Development and the Anatomy of Crisis in Africa: From Colonialism through Structural Adjustment, ” Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen, May, 2000 87

purchasing power of the local middle class either to the foreigners or to those locals who by the dint of their social proximity with the foreigners had taste for the foreign goods, imports increased causing huge damage to the local industry. Moreover, the foreign rule resulted into the drain of savings out of India.29

It is needless to suggest that though relevance of colonialism to power politics has not diminished yet the phenomenon has undergone radical shifts in tactical patterns after World War II. Instead of necessarily making physical intrusions, the colonialists- the USA and the USSR both embarked upon bringing different states under their hegemony through extending their respective ideological webs and could physically bifurcate the world into two ideological camps. However, the phenomenon underwent further changes during the post-cold war period which might be examined from the paradigm of the Global Capitalist Theory. This theory explains shifts in the tactical patterns of imperialism from being state-centered phenomenon into an instrument of Transnational Capitalist Class.30 It explains the US military interventions in terms of support mechanism for this capitalist class against counter-imperialist forces. Iraq happens to be the testing ground for these new tactical imperialistic patterns that operate in the transnational capitalist perspective wherein international oil companies like ExxonMobil, SHELL and BP that represent international capitalist elite, operate.31 These capitalist elite have the potential to maneuver the United States’ decision making to secure their interests worldwide. For instance, a report suggests that President George Bush’s approach not to sign Kyoto Global Warming Treaty was partly due to resistance from the powerful oil company-ExxonMobil.32 These international oil companies have the capacity to resist the US energy policy if not found congruent with their own interests.33

Notwithstanding the changing tactical patterns of the colonialism, the phenomenon has always earned resentment from the Muslims in general and resistance from the Islamists. As said earlier, the colonialism triggered armed resistance in the subcontinent and further codified violence on the trajectory of Wahābī ideology that drew its spirit from Ibn Taimmiyah. Though in the aftermath of World War II, the traditional colonialism gave way to so-called sovereign statehood yet it continued to exploit the economic resources of the Muslim states through ever changing tactics. Thus, the animosity of the Muslims against the colonial authorities in previously colonized lands continued to perpetuate with new dynamics. The animosity that was exclusively directed against the colonial powers as such during the classical colonial

29 Maddison, “The Economic and Social Impact of Colonial Rule in India (1971)” 30Leslie Sklair, “Democracy and the Transnational Capitalist Class,”ANNALS, AAPSS (2002): 581 31 In 2006 ranking, XXEON, SHELL and BP are amongst the 10 top-ranking oil companies of the world. See, for instance, Energy Intelligence Research, “The Energy Intelligence Top 100: Ranking the World's Oil Companies,” 2007 and 2001 editions as quoted in, Robert Pirog, “The Role of National Oil Companies in the International Oil Market”, CRS Report for Congress, August 21, 2007 32John Vidal, “White House sought advice from Exxon on Kyoto Stance,” The Guardian June 8 2005 33 Vlado Vivoda, “International oil companies, US Government and energy security policy: an interest- based analysis”, Centre for International Risk, School of Communication, International Studies and Languages, University of South Australia, Adelaide 88

period, found in Muslim rulers accused of pursing the western colonial agenda, a new target in addition to the previous one. This changed scenario led to revision of theological discourse regarding the nature of relationship between the believers and non-believers which culminated into change in the boundaries of faith through increased application of takfīr.

As Ibn Taimmiyah happens to be resource person for the Islamists, therefore, his views on the question of believers’ collaboration (mawālāt) with the non-believers occupies central place with the subsequent generations of the Islamists to redraw the boundaries of faith. He has discussed the question of mawālāt with the non-believers at length in Kitab-ul-Eeman (Book of Faith) and comes up with its clear refutation in terms of a natural requirement of the faith.34 In converse terms, non-rejection of non- believers’ friendship constitutes characteristic feature of hypocrisy which is condemned by the Quran35: “Bear unto the hypocrites the tidings that for them there is a painful doom. Those who chose disbelievers for their friends instead of believers! Do they look for power at their hands? Lo! all power appertaineth to Allah.” (An- Nisā’a: 138,139). However, he further argues that rendering obedience to the non- believers’ falsehood under compulsion does not constitute approving of unbelief as such. Quran says, “It is no concern at all of thee (Muhammad) whether He relent toward them or punish them; for they are evil-doers.” (Al-Imran: 28) Ibn Taimmiyah considers the act of helping the non-believers and avoidance of categorical rejection of their faith equal to approval of unbelief as such.36 In precise terms, he makes it clear that friendship with the non-believers falls in conflict with the following Quranic injunctions,37 “O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for friends. They are friends one to another. He among you who taketh them for friends is (one) of them. Lo! Allah guideth not wrongdoing folk. O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for friends. They are friends one to another. He among you who taketh them for friends is (one) of them. Lo! Allah guideth not wrongdoing folk”. (Al-Maidah: 51-52) At another place Quran says, “ You shall not find a people who believe in Allah and the latter day befriending those who act in opposition to Allah and His Messenger, even though they were their (own) fathers, or their sons, or their brothers, or their kinsfolk; these are they into whose hearts He has impressed faith, and whom He has strengthened with an inspiration from Him: and He will cause them to enter gardens beneath which rivers flow, abiding therein; Allah is well-pleased with them and they are well-pleased with Him these are Allah's party: now surely the party of Allah are the successful ones.” (Al-Mujaadilah: 22) This narrative was borrowed by Muhammad b. Abdul Wahāb as one of his ten nullifiers of Islam.38 This narrative has been potent enough to revisit and codify the anatomy of violence in the Muslim societies.

34Ibn Taimmiyah, The Book of Eemaan: The Basis, Reality and Invalidation of Eemaan, trans. Muhammad Naīm Yasīn (London: Al-Firdoud Ltd), 206 35Ibid. 209 36Ibid. 204-206 37Ibid. 207 38 Ibn Abdul Wahab, Sharah Nawaqidh Al-Islam 89

4.2.2 Sectarian Violence due to Irrelevance of Ummah:

As discussed earlier, the advent of Islam replaced the secular divisions in the Arab society with the ideological ones by supplanting the tribal pride with religious group feelings (assābiyah) as a resource to nationhood. The old social stratification on the traditional patterns of tribal status, racial considerations, martial capacity and financial position were done away with in the new Arabian society. The new faith identified piety (taqwā) as the only criterion of social ascendency. The Prophet in his farewell sermon categorically repudiated the traditional patterns of social stratifications peculiar to the traditional Arab society and sought to lay down the foundations of a universal brotherhood of the believers. He declared, “All mankind is from Adam and Eve, an Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any superiority over an Arab; also a white has no superiority over black nor a black has any superiority over white except by piety (taqwā) and good action”. By abolishing all other divisive variables, the Prophet sought to establish a universal ideological community (Ummah). He further said, “Learn that every Muslim is a brother to every Muslim and that the Muslims constitute one brotherhood. Nothing shall be legitimate to a Muslim which belongs to a fellow Muslim unless it was given freely and willingly. Do not, therefore, do injustice to yourselves”.39

In retrospect, this ideological community was established simultaneously with the proclamation of faith by the Prophet in Makkah. The believers were declared to be part of one community distinct from the non-believers. The subsequent armed conflict between the believers and non-believers authenticated this new ideological divide. The believers despite having the background of strong tribal dynamics could internalize these ideological ties with such vehemence that on the eve of mawākhāt-e- Madinā in the wake of the Muslims’ migration from Makkah to Madina, some having more than two wives were ready to surrender one of them to their ideological brothers from the Makkan Muslims.40 This brotherhood imbued with the unprecedented spirit of sacrifice defined the communal life pattern of the Muslims in Madina and naturally a role model for the Muslims in the ages to come. This spirit of sacrifice shown by the believers to achieve this unity earned divine commendation in the following words: “And (as for the believers) hath attuned their hearts. If thou hadst spent all that is in the earth thou couldst not have attuned their hearts, but Allah hath attuned them. Lo! He is Mighty, Wise.” (Al- 'Anfāl: 63) Another verse reads as follow: “Lo! those who believed and left their homes and strove with their wealth and their lives for the cause of Allah, and those who took them in and helped them: these are protecting friends one of another. And those who believed but did not leave their homes, ye have no duty to protect them till they leave their homes; but if they seek help from you in the matter of religion then it is your duty to help (them) except against a folk between whom and you there is a treaty. Allah is Seer of what ye do.”(Al- 'Anfāl: 72) It is needless to say that this ideological brotherhood was divinely ordained as follow:

39 See, Last Sermon of the Holy Prophet 40 Mubarakpuri, Al-Rahīq al-Makhtūm, 257 90

“And hold fast by the covenant of Allah all together and be not disunited, and remember the favor of Allah on you when you were enemies, then He united your hearts so by His favor you became brethren; and you were on the brink of a pit of fire, then He saved you from it, thus does Allah make clear to you His communications that you may follow the right way.”(Al-Imran: 103) (Al-Hujurat: 10, Al-Tawbah: 71). Quran disapproves of those who prop up the divisive propensities amongst the community of the faithful. It says, “Lo! As for those who sunder their religion and become schismatics, no concern at all hast thou with them. Their case will go to Allah, Who then will tell them what they used to do.”(Al-'An`ām: 159) The Prophet declared this spirit of brotherhood to be pre-requisite for the faithful and essential for eternal success in the hereafter.41

The divine will to create such an integrated community of the believers not only aimed at creating a socially harmonious society but also a community that could be entrusted with the coercive authority to enforce discipline in the world. Quran reads as follow: “Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind. Ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency; and ye believe in Allah. And if the People of the Scripture had believed it had been better for them. Some of them are believers; but most of them are evil-livers.” (Al-Imran: 110) This authority is reflected and exercised through the caliphate which commands not the will of majority as is the case with western democracy rather will of the entire community of the believers. During the period of pious caliphs (rāshidūn), the authority to choose someone to the office of the caliphate vested with ahl-al- hill wal-aqad (those who lose and bind). It was basically a committee of those close companions of the Prophet who were amongst those whose commitment to the faith was undisputedly recognized across the Muslim lands. As the nature of the office of the caliphate was essentially ideological because the caliph was to represent and exercise the coercive authority of the Islamic state, therefore, caliph was chosen from those people whose credibility in religious terms was acknowledged throughout the Muslim world. Given the uncontested religious credibility, the caliph could legitimately command the will of the entire Muslim Ummah. Moreover, as majority of the close companions of the Prophet whose theological status was undisputedly acknowledged, were residing in Madina, therefore, their bāy’ā to the caliph was enough to earn him legitimacy. Moreover, caliphate was not considered as a prize rather a responsibility to the people as well as to the God. As the rāshidūn were undoubtedly ideal disciples of the Prophet who had been reported to have refused to assign political authority to the one who look for it.42

41 Sahih Muslim 96; At-Tirmidhi, 1301 The Prophet has been reported to have said: "Do not have malice against a Muslim; do not be envious of other Muslims; do not go against a Muslim and forsake him. O the slave of Allah! Be like brothers with each other. It is not allowed for a Muslim to desert his brother for over three days”. 42 Narrated Abu Musa: Two men from my tribe and I entered upon the Prophet. One of the two men said to the Prophet, "O Allah's Apostle! Appoint me as a governor," and so did the second. The Prophet said, "We do not assign the authority of ruling to those who ask for it, nor to those who are keen to have it”; Sahih Bukhari: Ahkam, vol. 9, Book 89, No.263 91

None of them ever desired to hold the political office rather always accepted it with disinclination. Given the heavy responsibility, Umar even forbade anyone from his tribe Banu Adī to ever assume this office after him.43

Even with the switching over of the political order from shūrā-based caliphate to hereditary rule (malūkiyyat), the legitimacy arising out of allegiance (bāy’ā) of the stalwarts of the faith could not get mitigated. Yazīd’s insistence to secure bāy’ā from Hussain was actually aimed at earning legitimacy to his rule which, given the unparalleled religious authenticity associated with the personality of Hussain, was otherwise not possible. However, his refusal to recognize an otherwise invalid rule of Yazīd affirmed the mutually inclusive relationship between legitimacy crises and violence in the Muslim historical discourse. This legitimacy crises produced schisms within the body politic of the Muslims which when juxtaposed with politics facilitated the emergence of sectarian Empires. The Shiite Fatimid caliphate emerged in Egypt out of the Sunnite Abbasid caliphate. In the subsequent course of history, the Shiite Safāvīd Empire emerged in Iran out of the Sunnite Ottoman Empire. The emergence of sectarian empires resulted in the plurality of the power centers as well as multiple centers for legitimacy. The Sunnite power centers could draw legitimacy from their Sunnite subjects whereas the Shiite could explore legitimacy amongst the Shiite population. Though, the underlying spirit of the political order underwent radical changes yet the ruling elite continued to draw legitimacy from the nomenclature of caliphate even though symbolically. The political authority of the caliph receded but symbolically his name continued to be mentioned in the Friday sermons in recognition of his spiritual headship. This symbolic value of the caliphate did not recede altogether till 19th century even when a class of apologists emerged as by- product of the western colonialism that had strong likings for the western democratic values. For instance, though Rashīd Ridā, a 19th century Egyptian reformer, subscribed to western constitutionalism against the absolutism prevalent in the Muslim areas,44 yet he could never delink himself from the classical approach to the caliphate.45

Nevertheless, with the abolition of the caliphate in the early 20th century, the Ummah got irrelevant to exercise coercive authority of the state through the caliphate. As the nation state system that emerged on the ruins of the caliphate had hardly any theological approval, therefore, it could not earn legitimacy to use this authority. This legitimacy crisis strengthened the historically embedded interrelationship between legitimacy crises and violence. Different groups of Islamists emerged who sought legitimacy to exercise this coercive authority which was hitherto sphere of the caliphate. They claimed legitimacy to use violence on the pretext that resistance against the imperialists who had uprooted caliphate which was symbol of Muslim

43 Tabrī, Tarikh al-Umam wal Muluk, 236,237 44 Haddad, “Arab Religious Nationalism in Colonial Era” 45 He borrows traditional approach to caliphate from Al-Mawardi and relies on a tradition of the Prophet that a Muslim who dies without extending allegiance to a caliph dies the death of jahilliyah. See for instance, Ibid. 92

unity was the foremost religious duty of the Muslims. As the collective body of the Muslims to exercise the Quranic laws that govern the Islamic state had already become irrelevant, therefore, it had become individual responsibility of the Muslims to perform this duty. This changed scenario helped a new generation of the Islamists to emerge that assumed the authority to exercise violence by themselves and unlike the apologists, instead of adopting an accommodative approach, directed their resistance against the imperialists for uprooting the caliphate and exploiting the resources of the Muslims.46 This generation included Hassan Al-Banna, Sayyed Qutb, Sayyed Ahmed Shaheed and Sayyed Maudūdī etc.

Anyhow, the developments for the codification of violence on sectarian lines that started with the emergence of sectarian empire could not reach their culmination until the domain of coercive authority remained with the Ummah as a whole. With the erosion of legitimate coercive authority of the Ummah exercised through the caliphate, the sectarian power centers happened to be independent to exercise the authority in pursuance of their sectarian objectives and thus, codification of violence on sectarian grounds reached its logical culmination. As the colonialists developed nation state system on the ruins of the Sunnite caliphate, therefore, the Sunnite resistance groups criticized the Shiites for collaborating with the colonialists to neutralize their political influence. In this course of action, the Sunnite scholarship challenged the theological authenticity of the Shiite belief system. The classical Sunnite narrative further labelled the Shiite belief system to be an outcome of the hypocritical political ambitions. In other words, this polemical divide on theological lines got further accentuated when the Sunnite scholarship tended to trace the genesis of this sect with the political ambitions of Ibn Saba who coined such theological traditions which were alien to the chemistry of the faith. This narrative has been followed by both the classical and the modern Sunnite theorists.

Amongst the classical theorists Ibn Taimmiyah seeks to refute the theological veracity of rawāfidh and nawāsib both being astray from the truth as the former rejects the right to caliphate of the first three caliphs and the latter disapproves of Ali being the part of the chain of the rightly guided caliphs (rāshidūn). Therefore, views of both these groups stand in contravention to the Prophetic tradition that caliphate of the rāshidūn will last for thirty years after the Prophet.47 He argues that by not subscribing to the traditions of the Prophet wherein he has been reported to have declared khurūj against even an invalid Muslim ruler as external to the faith itself,48 the Shiites put themselves outside the pale of jamāt as they decline to render their allegiance to the caliphs of the Muslims who command complete recognition from the Muslims.49 The Shiites’ preference to tread this path, deviant from the majority of the

46 Gole, “Snapshots of Islamic Modernities” 47Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 35:18-20 48 Shaih Muslim, Kitab al-Ammara-wajub Mulazimah Jamat al Muslimeen -1848; Shaih Bukhari, Kitab al Fitan: 2, ahkam:4; Sahih Muslim: Imarah: 53-6, 58 ;Sahih Muslim-Kitab al Ammara: Khiyar al-ummah wa Sharar hum (1855) 49Ibn Taimmiyah, Al-Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah 93

Muslims leads Ibn Taimmiyah to undertake a strict approach against them and thus, he shares the conviction held by the Sunnite scholarship including Imam Mālik and Imam Shāfī that the Shiite narrations are devoid of any religious credibility.50 He also subscribes to Ibn Hazam who declined to rely on Shiite traditions to prove the originality and integrity of Quran vis-à-vis a Spanish clergy.51 Nevertheless, he claims to follow the companions of the Prophet and the Hanbalite traditions that observe restraints in terms of applying takfīr to the Shiites.52 He avoids labeling the Shiite mufāddilah as kuffār simply for their belief in the primacy of the right of Ali to the office of the caliphate.53

However, his contemporary socio-political and religious constructs need to be focused in conjunction with his ideas to uncover his actual response to the question of polemics. He was perhaps the primary figure to offer a well-organized response to the Shiite approach to politics as contained in Ibn Al-Mutahir’s Minhaj al-Karama through his documented work Minhaj al-Sunnah. He traced the origin of the corrupt practices contaminating the contemporary Muslim life from the Shiites, the Jews, the Christians, Mongols and the new converts who happened to confront the religo- political authority of the Sunnite clergy. He argued that spiritual practices carried forward with these new entrants to the fold of Islam were though external to the faith yet they caused innovations flourish in the Muslim society. For instance, transmission of the Coptic Christian practices to the Muslim life is attributed to the Christian converts.54 Ibn Taimmiyah endeavored to explore the similarities amongst the Shiite, the Jews and the Christians and declared the Shiite claim that proclamation of jihad was the exclusive domain of the Imam, had its origins with the Jews and the Christians.55 He also physically participated twice in military campaigns of the Mamūlks against the Shiites in Kasrawan in the early 14th century when the latter made an alliance with the forces of unbelief- Franks and Mongols. He also issued a religious decree against these Shiites to legitimize fighting against them.56 In this backdrop, Ibn Taimmiyah’s support to the Sunnite Mamlūks through military campaigns as well as through issuing religious decrees may be interpreted in terms of an attempt to contain the influence of the Shiite.57 Moreover, the theological interpretation to which narrowing of the definitional scope of heresy owes a lot is an outcome of historical pre-suppositions rather than purely

50 Ibid. 51Prof. Ghulam Ahmed Hariri, in, Ibid. 52 Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 3:345-55 53 Fatawa 3:345-55 54 Subhi Labib, “The Problem of Bida’ in the Light of an Arabic Manuscript of the 14th Century,” in the Proceedings of the 26th International Congress of the Orientalists, 4-10 January, 1964, 4 vols. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1966-70. 4:277 quoted in, Tariq al-Jamil, “Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hillī: Shi’i Polemics and the Struggle for Religious Authority in Medival Islam,” in Ibn Taymiyya and His Times ed. Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed (Karachi: Oxford University Press), 233 55 Ibn Taimmiyah, Al-Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah Fatawa 1:13-24 56 Al-Jamil, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hillī , 233,234 57 Ibid. 94

religious variables.58 These pre-suppositions could codify orthodoxy into the Islamic discourse though not through a formal but an informal authority in terms of hostile rhetoric, informal criticism by the formal sectarian leadership that had the potential to be abused.59For instance, the polemics of Abu al-Mutahir al-Hilli and Ibn Tammiyah defined the distinction between the Sunnites and the Shiites and thus, provided the future theologians with a trajectory for further polemical refutations and counter- refutations.60 In the subcontinent, the anti-Shiite narrative became more intense in the 18th century when puritanical views of Ibn Abdul Wahāb got even more strict exposition with Shah Abdul Aziz (1745-1823).61 He attempted to trace the origin of Shiites to Abdullah Ibn Saba62 who in his bid to avenge the success of Islam during the period of first three caliphs introduced unfounded and wrong traditions into the teachings of Islam like the divine attributes of Ali (ulūhiyyat), return (zahūr) of Prophet Muhammad like Jesus and primacy of Ali’s right to the caliphate etc.63 Though bringing in such wrong traditions into Islam were strongly admonished on the part of Ali yet Ibn Saba was successful in bifurcating the supporters of Ali into four groups. These include those who were sincere to Ali as well as to the cause of Islam (Shian-e-Mukhliseen), those who were convinced of primacy of Ali vis-à-vis other companions of the Prophet (Mufādilah), those who called the first three caliphs as usurpers and were critical of them (tabrāī shiā) and finally those who exaggerated the status of Ali to the level of divinity (ghāli Shiā).64 The subsequent political developments like Battle of Camel, controversy associated with Bagh-e- Fidak etc. enabled the tabrāī section of the Shiites to outnumber the rest of the sections of the Shiites.65 Shah Abdul Aziz further argued that the Shiites employ deceitful means to

58Sherman A Jackson’s introductory note to Al-Ghazalī, Faysal, 3-32 59Ibid. 60 Al-Jamil, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hillī , 233,234 61 He was son of Shah Waliullah who emphasizing upon the rational interpretation of the religion preferred to denounce following (taqleed) of any major school of Muslim jurisprudence like Ibn Abdul Wahab; see for instance, Aziz Ahmed, Studies in Islamic Culture and Indian Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1964), p.201; However, it still requires more research to ascertain whether it was the influence of Ibn Taimiyyah working behind the approach of these religious scholars or it was the common tree of teachers in Madina which was behind the common thinking of both afore-mentioned scholars of 18th century. There is no denying the fact that Muhammad Hayya Al-Sindi, one of the teachers of Ibn Abd al Wahab had a profound influence on this student to denounce the commentaries of the four Sunni Imams. Since, Shah Waliullah was the student of Abul Tahir Al-Kurani, a teacher of Al-Sindi, therefore, it may lead us to presume that the similarities between Ibn Abd al Wahab and Shah Waliullah had their roots in a common source of learning. See, John Voll, “Muhammad Hayya Al- Sindi and Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahab: An Analysis of an Intellectual Group in Eighteenth-Century Madina,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, vol.38. No.1 (1975) 62 He was basically a Jew who converted to Islam during the caliphate of Uthman. This leads the Sunnite scholarship to argue that the Shiite creed has Judaic origin. See, Shah Abdul Aziz, Tohfa athnā-e-ashria, Urdu trans. Maulana Khalil-ur-Rehman Naumani, (Karachi: Dar-ul-Ashaat), 200 63 Ibid. 25-26 64 In modern times, the ghālīs’ belief system is subject to intra- sect criticism. The Shiites refer to a tradition of Imam Jaafar Sadiq wherein he has been reported to have directed the Muslims to keep their youth at a distance from the ghālīs because they are the worst creatures on earth. See for example, Al- Khu’i al-Hashimi, and Mirza Habibullah, Minhaj al-Bara’a fi Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, vol.2 (Tehran: Maktab Islamiya, 1979), 331; also see, Shiyyat 65 Aziz, Tohfa, 26-29 95

lure the Muslims to join their ranks.66 Shah Abdul Aziz like the medieval Sunnite scholarship questioned the authenticity of the Shiite narrations.67 Shah Abdul Aziz relying upon the sources of the Shiites like Usūl-e-Kāfi and the views of even the extinct Shiite sub-sects made the point that even the matters that constituted the fundamentals of faith could not escape polemical contradictions. He challenged the Shiite notion of the exclusivity of reason to unravel the ultimate truth which stood in negation to the Sunnite view that conjunction of reason and revelation was a conduit to approach ultimate truth. The Sunnites believe that had knowledge been the sole domain of reason, the Prophethood would have become irrelevant in terms of human salvation. He discredited Imam Kalaini’s68 views that it was obligatory upon the believers to acknowledge the divine attributes through rationalism on the grounds that such a sublime theosophical capability (erfān) could be developed only through divine will reflected through the Prophethood.69 He reprimanded the Ismailite Shiites for not believing even in the divine attributes like oneness, omnipresence, omnipotence, all-hearing, all-knowing, exclusive divine eternity. These attributes were categorical contradiction of the Quran, ahādīth and the narrations even in Nahj- ul-Balāgha. He further argued that the Shiites doubted in the authenticity of Quran which was clear negation of divine proclamation that its protection would rest with Allah Himself.70 Shah Abdul Aziz further argued that such contradictions continued to persist in the details of the revelation of the Prophethood. He further refuted the Shiite belief that revealing the Prophet to mankind was obligatory upon God. On the contrary, he upheld the Sunnite view that God being omnipotent was free from any obligation and the Prophethood was a divine blessing for the mankind. Quran says, “Allah verily hath shown grace to the believers by sending unto them a messenger of their own who reciteth unto them His revelations, and causeth them to grow, and teacheth them the Scripture and wisdom; although before (he came to them) they were in flagrant error.” (Al-Imran: 164). He argued that the Shiites tended not to acknowledge the prophetic infallibility and further elevated Hazrat Ali to a position even higher than the prophets except Prophet Muhammad (sw) on the day of resurrection. He has further questioned the Shiites belief in the finality of the Prophethood on the grounds that the Shiites believed that Ali had the same relation with the Prophet Muhammad which Prophet Haroon had with Prophet Musa. This analogy amounted to co-sharing of the Prophethood and further negated the finality of the Prophethood of Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) as Ali continued to live after the Prophet. He further identified certain sub-sects of the Shiites which claimed that the Quranic commandments regarding the rituals needed not to be taken in literal sense rather they had implied meanings which were known only to the imam who had the authority to amend or annul even a Quranic commandment.71.

66 Ibid. 69-199 67 Ibid. 230-247 68 For details see, Sheikh Muhammad Yaqoob Kalaini, Usul-e-Kafi, trans. Sayyed Zafar Hassan (Karachi: Zafar Shamim Publications Trust,2003) 69 Aziz, Tohfa, 269-309 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 310-343 96

This hard line polemical narrative got further codification with Maulana Manzoor Naumani who by examining Imam Khomeini’s codification of the Shiite belief system as contained in his three important works Al-Hakūmat al-Islamiyyah, Kashf- ul-Isrār and Tahrīr Al-Wasēlā sought to identify the essentially Shiite character of 1979 Iranian revolution and discredited those who tended to explore its ideological character.72 On this trajectory, he attempted to codify the Sunnite version of Islamic history and belief system in furtherance of previous attempts on the part of the Sunnite scholarship. Some may argue that Khomeini could realize that the occultation of the imam has posed a dilemma of political authority that led to inaction during the period of occultation.73 He resolved to bring this inaction to an end by ascribing the same political infallibility to the Shiite clergy by acknowledging them as living jurists (mujtāhidēn) which was enjoyed by the Prophet and the imams. These living jurists were to act as guardian of the faith by the time the Imam appears.74 Maulana Naumani drew inference therefrom that the infallible status assigned to the architects of Shiite revolution affirmed the mutually inclusive relationship between unqualified belief in the concept of imamate and valāit-e-faqīh during the period of occultation and right to assume political authority.75 Though Imam Khomeini possessed a central place in athnā-e-ashriyyā school of the Shiite faith and was convinced of infallible status of the twelve imams which even transcended the prophets and the angels76 and further that their teachings being eternal like Quran enjoyed the same level of the qualities of being mandatory (wajūbiyyat) as enjoyed by the word of God77 yet Maulana Naumani identified political pragmatism in his polemical narrations in Al-Hakumat al- Islamiyyah. For instance, he followed the traditional Shiites claim regarding the primacy of Ali’s right to caliphate as reflected by the incident of ghadīr-e-khūm and even argued that nomination of Ali was obligatory upon the Prophet to complete the duties of the Prophethood. However, he deliberately distanced himself from athnā-e- ashriyyā traditions of criticizing the first three caliphs on the grounds that they usurped the office of the caliphate. He deliberately skipped mentioning the first three caliphs even when he discussed the discourse of Islamic history. This political pragmatism became more conspicuous when he avoided questioning the authenticity of the Quran but at the same time he showed reverence to Nūrī Tabrāsi who happened to question the authenticity of the Quran in his book Faisal al-Khattab fi Ithbat Tehreef-e-Kitab Rab ul Arbab.78 Nevertheless, this political pragmatism reclined

72 Similar narrative is available with Al-Gharib who labels Imam Khomeini as agent of the US and further identifies the Iranian Shiites not with the Muslims rather with the pre-Islamic fire-worshippers in Persia. See for instance, al-Gharib, Wa ja’a dawr al-Majūs; however, a few like Kalim Siddiqui claim that Imam Khomeini stands for all Muslims of the world irrespective of their sectarian affiliations. See for example,www.muslimedia.com/archives/features98/khomeini.htm ,quoted in, Richard Bonney, 2007 , p.244 73Akhavi, “Islam, Politics and Society” 74 Khomeini, “The Pillars of an Islamic State”; also see, Ayatullah Ruhullah Khomeini, Al-Hakumat al- Islamiyyah (Karachi : Kitab Markaz), 37 75 Naumani, Irani Inqilab, Imam Khomeini aur Shi’iat, 30-33 76 See excerpts from Khomeini, “Al-Hakumat al-Islamiyyah,” in, ibid. 37,38 77Khomeini, Al-Hakumat al-Islamiyyah,39,40 78 Naumani, , Irani Inqilab, Imam Khomeini aur Shi’iat, 38-49 97

when he unleashed grueling criticism culminating into takfīr of the first three caliphs in his book Kashf-ul-Israr and thus, joined the ranks of tabrāī Shiites. The attacks on the integrity of the companions of the Prophet who were witness to the divine revelation were actually, amounted to attempts to question the authenticity of the divine scripture. At the same time, the veracity of the traditions of the Prophet which has been transmitted to us through diffused congruence (ahādīth-e-mutawātrā) was also challenged. Moreover, questioning the integrity of the companions implied as a natural consequence that the Prophetic companionship and training fell short of producing developed personalities.79 Apart from these polemical differences, Maulana Naumani traced the juridical fault lines between the two sects from Khomeini’s Tahrir Al-Wasēlā.80 He also drew parallel between the Christianity and the Shiite belief in terms of exaggerated love and hostility on the part of certain people towards both Jesus and Ali and elevation of such exaggerations to the level of beliefs.81 He corroborated the views of Shah Abdul Aziz regarding the genesis of the Shiite belief and relying upon Usūl-e-Kafī identified such views that stood in direct conflict with the Sunnite belief system like infallibility of imams, obedience to imams as pre- condition to belief as such, authority of the Imams to ascertain lawful and unlawful (halāl and harām), obedience to imams as part of divine ordainment, the ultimate salvation through belief in the infallibility of imams, ascendency of imams to the prophets other than the Prophet Muhammad and last but not the least, imams to be custodians of supernatural powers like the prophets.82 Currently, the codification of polemics provides a trajectory for the militancy to operate upon. All efforts for sectarian rapprochement could not withstand the anti- shiitization narrative to have its sway across the Muslim lands. This sectarian divide is still relevant in the international politics and of course, is an instrument to breed violence in the Muslim world. For instance, the case of Middle East suggests that nation state system could not replace polemics in terms of national identity actor as in post-US invasion Iraq, sectarianism is still catalysts of violence.

4.2.3 Violence and Ideological Nostalgia

The following discussion highlights linkage between violence and ideological nostalgia produced by the abolition of the Muslim caliphate. It further suggests that nation state system being a concept that was devoid of any historical background in the Muslim lands could not win public legitimacy as it was taken as a foreign idea. Moreover, in certain states like Turkey this concept was established at the expense of religiously approved political order that was symbolically important to the Muslim masses. Further, the abolition of the existing political order by the colonialists and their attempt to establish nation state system created a vacuum that was filled by such

79 Ibid. 50-85. The suunite scholarship in general has focused on defending the companions of the Prophet from this sort of Shiite attacks. See for example, Nawab Mohsin-ul- Mulk Sayyed Muhammad Mehdi Ali Khan, Ayyat-e-Bayyanat (Karachi: Dar-ul-Ashaat, 1975) 80Imam Rouhullah Khomeini , Tahrir al-Wasilah, trans. Sayyid Ali Reza Naqvi 81 Naumani, , Irani Inqilab, Imam Khomeini aur Shi’iat , 94 82 Ibid. 96-166 98

political orders that were not desired by the masses. A legitimacy crisis emerged that further flourished on the fault lines between the modernists and the traditionalists. The modernists extended a supporting hand to the idea of nation state whereas the traditionalists remained discontented with it. However, this conflict of ideas gave birth to violence within the Muslim societies and without. Within the Muslim societies, this violence could be witnessed between the militants and the modernists whereas externally it can be seen in terms of a violent struggle between the militants and the west. The nation state system that emerged through Peace of Westphalia83 (1648) shifted the nucleus of political authority from feudalism and Catholic Church to secular political set up in Europe. It not only secularized the future political discourse in Europe rather it provided new basis for national identity. While subscribing to the doctrine of absolute sovereignty of Hobbes, it provided an insulating arrangement against external interference. This rebirth alienated the Europeans from the tradition that road to heaven crossed through Rome. This radical shift in the nature of political order was necessarily an outcome of degeneration of Catholic Church and erosion of feudalism. Authority of the church got eroded owing to shattered religious identity of the Europe whereas emergence of a relatively strong middle class and rise of a commercial society happened to be a serious blow to feudal power structure in Europe.

However, the rise of nation state system that brought about radical transformations in socio-economic and political configuration of the European society did not caught up in legitimacy crises. The shift of power center from Catholic Church and feudalism to nation state could not stir public disapproval whereas the introduction of same phenomenon in the colonized Muslim lands, though in different milieu, could not win public legitimacy. It accentuated the resentment leading to physical violence within the Muslim societies and without. Internally, as said earlier, this phenomenon could have an apologist segment on its right who had developed proximity with the western values during the colonial era. Nevertheless, the majority that constituted demographic character of the Muslim societies reflected strong disapproval and thus, confronted the apologists on the one hand and the west on the other. This public disapproval to the nation state system could be attributed to the following factors:

One, the idea of nation state system was introduced by the colonial powers whose very presence in the Muslim lands was itself devoid of any legitimate import. The legitimacy can be achieved when people recognize the ‘right to act’ of the authority even though they may differ in specific matters84 whereas in case of the colonized Muslim lands, the authority was vested with the European colonial powers who had naturally no legitimate grounds to rule these lands. In this scenario, the introduction of the nation state system by the foreign powers was construed in terms of an instrument

83Full text of the treaty is available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp accessed on 11-09-2014 84M. Weber, Economy and Society (New York: Bedminster, 1968) 99

to perpetuate their rule. The phenomenon could not earn itself public legitimacy in the Muslim lands because of the inability of the political authority to command voluntary public compliance that culminated into its failure to find a foothold in the social system.85

Two, in the context of the Middle East, the introduction of the nation state system was not part of any philosophical renaissance aimed at securing welfare of the individuals as ingrained in the social contract philosophy rather it was an arrangement to facilitate the control-sharing of the Muslim lands amongst the colonial powers. The purpose of this control-sharing was to exploit the economic resources by establishing their hegemony on the colonized lands. After the World War I, in pursuit of this objective, the British and French were actually determined to finish “the eastern question” by dismembering the Ottoman Empire which was materialized through Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916).86 The nation state system got developed in the Middle East as a by-product of the efforts of the British and the French to divide their areas of influence in the region.

Three, the process of installing the nation state system itself could not escape public disapproval.87 As a part of the process to divide up the Middle East, the French and the British introduced Mandate system under the League of Nations. Under this system, the French took over the control of Syria and Lebanon whereas Iraq and Palestine went to the British. Though this system provided for the eventual self-rule of the nation states yet the Muslim subjects unhesitatingly declared it to be an instrument to perpetuate the colonial rule. As discussed earlier, Islam being ideologically non- receptive to imperialism fueled the resistance against the colonial rule. For instance, in Indian context, different resistance movements like Fraizi Tehreek of Haji Shariatullah and more significantly Tehrīk-e-jihād of Sayyed Ahmed Shaheed arose to strengthen the Muslims against the imperialists. Islamism in South and Central Asia owes a lot to Sayyed Ahmed Shaheed who actually subscribed and channelized the puritanical ideas of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahāb to Islamism in these regions.88 The reproduction of his pieces of writings in contemporary militant literature affirms subscription of his ideas by the contemporary militants especially in South Asia.89 Ikhwān in Egypt arose to strengthen the Muslims against the imperialists. This resistance narrative has never receded in popularity with the militants in their struggle against the West. For instance, one of the major irritants in the Muslim world upon which the violent struggle of Al-Qaida is based is the imperialistic approach being

85Legitimacy may be defined as an attribute by which an authority commands voluntary public compliance. It is an “appraisal of action in terms of shared or common values in the context of the involvement of the action in the social system”. See for example, T. Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies( New York: Free Press, 1960) 86 Mike Shuster, The Middle East and the West: WWI and Beyond,August 20, 2004 (12 AM ET) 2004, Programme Title: All Things Considered, hosted by Robert Siegel, NPR News 87 The French and British colonialism emerged at the ruins of Muslim caliphate. See for instance, William McCants, “ Al Qaida’s Challenge,”Foreign Affairs, vol. 90 No.5 (September/October 2011):20-32 88 Haqqani, “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups” 89 “Maktubat Amir al-Mumineen Sayyed Ahmed Shaheed,” in, Hittin, issue 8, 1433 AH. Idara Hittin 100

followed by the United States in the Middle East. For instance, in 1996, Bin Laden issued a decree titled “Declaration of war against Americans occupying the lands of two Holy places” whereby he called upon every Muslim to launch jihad against the infidels who have violated the sanctity of the two holy cities in Hejaz by deploying their troops therein.90 Moreover, in the wake of the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003, the militants’ use of titles like ‘Muhammad’s Army’, ‘Saladin Brigades’ and ‘Ansār al-Sunna’ etc. and their resolve to continue with jihad till the liberation of Palestine and Spain refers to their disdain for the forces of imperialism which they claim to inherit from their heroes in the Muslim history.91

Four, as the identity question for the Muslims was not associated with their territorial limitations rather with an ideology, therefore, territorial nationalism was taken by them to be a prelude to identity crises. In the west, nation state system when pitched against waning theological and feudal structure could successfully secularize the national identity parameters. However, in the Muslim societies, it was translated in terms of an instrument to shatter the ideological unity of the Muslims expressed even though symbolically through Ottoman caliphate. The plan to dismember Turkey which was the seat of Muslim caliphate subsequent to the Treaty of Sevres92 (1920) ignited religious rhetoric almost across the Muslim world. For instance, to support the caliphate against the imminent threat from the colonial powers, religious leadership in British India started Khilāfat Movement. As a part of the Muslims’ struggle to defend the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the Muslims launched exodus from India on the pretext that as the British were posing a serious threat to the Muslims’ symbolic unity, therefore, the British India has become dār-ul-harb. Dār-ul-harb left the Indian Muslims with only two alternatives either to leave the land or to launch jihad. Apart from India, almost the whole colonized Muslim lands were gripped in the similar identity conflict between nationalism and secularism on one side and political Islam on the other. An attempt to introduce secular state institutions like secular constitution of Tunisia in 1861 and introduction of democratic norms in Egyptian society bifurcated the Muslims into modernists who supported the new socio-political set-ups and the religious segments who preferred to look back to the early period of Islam to

90 Osama Bin Laden, “Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, ”issued on 23rd March, 1996, in, Al Qaida in its Own Words, ed. Gilles Kepel & Jean-Pierre Milelli, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (Massachsetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 47-50. One of the prime objectives of Al-Qaida organization is to defend the holy places of Islam against the infidels; see for instance, Shaykh Adil al-Abbab’s interview on targeting non- Muslims Civilians and Yemeni Soldiers, in Al-Qaida in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP-Al- Malahem Media) Inspire, issue 4 (Winter 1431/2010); also see, Don D. Chipman, “Osama bin Laden and Guerrilla War,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26 (2003):163-70 91 Jeffrey Haynes, “Al Qaida: Ideology and Action,” Conflict Review of International Social and Political Philosophy vol.8 No.2 (2005): 177-191 92 Under this treaty, Turkey was to lose those lands which were not originally part of Turkey. Moreover, a few parts of the mainland were also to be given to Greece and a few other non-Muslim states; see for instance, Khilafat Movement, Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/316624/Khilafat-movement accessed on 12-09-2014 101

explore religiously approved system of governance.93 This change in socio-political fabric encouraged the religious segments to organize them to resist this drive which was taken as a threat to religion itself. In Egypt, even the modernists like Abdūhū and Rashīd Ridā upheld the traditional theological standpoint that religion and caliphate were mutually inclusive to each other. For instance, in 1886, in a letter to Sheikh-al- Islam in Constantinople Abdūhū argued that fidelity to Ottoman caliphate constituted the third pillar of the faith.94 Likewise, Rashīd Ridā regarded the Islamic caliphate a pre-requisite to enforce Shariah which is the primary objective of the Islamic state.95 Subsequently, Ikhwān was founded in 1928 which subsequently became a torch bearer for the Muslim fundamentalists across the world. In India, in 1941, Jamat-e- Islami, an institutional manifestation of the ideas of Sayyed Maudūdī was founded as a revivalist party for the establishment of an ideological state96 embodying the spirit of Islamic law and thus, distinguishable from the secular statehood. 97 The purpose of this political party was to pursue the case of political Islamic ideology98 that aimed at restructuring the social order of the world according to Islamic principles.99Similarly, in Sudan, Muhammad Ahmed, a cleric from Samaniyya order, being influenced by puritanical thought in Muslim world proclaimed himself to be Al-Mehdi in 1881 in reaction to the western influence on Muslim ruling elite headed by Khedive, the viceroy of Egypt.100 In Algeria, Abdul Hamid b. Badis founded Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema in 1931 to protect the cultural identity of the Algerian Muslims against the French imperialism and to purify Islamic life from deviant practices.101

It is pertinent to refer to a radical shift in Muslim political thought as espoused by Ibn Khaldūn102 (1332-1406), a Tunisian Muslim historian and sociologist who acknowledged the plurality of caliphs in Muslim world. Prior to this, Muslim ulema like Al-Māwardī 103(972-1058) were almost unanimously in support of unity of political authority represented by a global caliphate. As this shift in the dynamics of political Islam was not external to Islam as such, therefore, it did not affront the Islamists in general. However, the westerners’ attempt to change the mode of

93 Tarek Osman, The Making of the Modern Arab World, BBC News Documentary (14 Dec. 2013)http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b03mfvl3, accessed on 14-9-14 2013 94Kerr, Islamic Reform, 148 95 Haddad, “Arab Religious Nationalism in Colonial Era” 96 Cited in Bonney, jihad,199 97 Smith, “ The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi” 98 In view of Sayyed Maūdūdī’s efforts to revive the ideological spirit of Islam, some regard ideological version of Islam as brain-child of Sayyed Maūdūdī; see for instance, Nasr, “Democracy and Islamic Revivalism” 99 Maūdūdī, jihad fi Sabillah 100http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/358109/al-Mahdi accessed on 16-09-2014. For further details, see, John Voll, “The Sudanese Mahdi: Frontier Fundmentalist,” International Journal of Middle East Studies,vol. 10, No. 2 (May, 1979): 145-166 101See for further details, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/15076/Association-of-Algerian- Muslim-Ulama#ref276365 accessed on 16-09-2014 102 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, https://asadullahali.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/ibn_khaldun- al_muqaddimah.pdf accessed on October 22, 2017 103 al-Mawardi, Ahkam-us- Sultaniyyah 102

governance in the Muslim lands could not avoid resistance from the Muslims. A part of Muslim scholarship in the fundamentalist array of the Muslims like Sayyed Maudūdī in Pakistan preferred to Islamize the existing political system by becoming part of it104whereas the others like Sayyed Qutb resorted to physical violence to uproot the existing order. Though, the contributions of Sayyed Maudūdī in the realm of political Islam are acknowledged worldwide yet the militants get more inclined to the violent struggle of Sayyed Qutb instead of Maudūdī’s peaceful struggle to change the existing political order.105 They prefer to revive the caliphate of early period of Islam instead of what Maudūdī terms as theo-democracy. Currently, revival of the caliphate is the nucleus of Al-Qaida’s global jihad.106 For instance, Bin Laden in his correspondence declared the restoration of the caliphate as the main objective of jihad.107 He clearly outlined difference between the western democracy and Islamic caliphate on the grounds that in the former, even an invalid and non-virtuous could become ruler and the government could make even such laws that were not in consonance with the Islamic ideals whereas in the latter, it was neither possible for a person who did not fulfill certain qualifications to become caliph nor the Islamic caliphate could legislate against the spirit of the faith.108 Al-Qaida categorically refutes the validity of the instruments through which nation-state system was created and thus, believes in the exclusive validity of the caliphate.109 The militants also recognize the fact that their efforts to revive the caliphate in the contemporary unipolar world are resource to violence between themselves and the West. This violence will arise from the fix between militants’ resolve to restore the institution of caliphate and the United States’ tenacity to withstand its revival through military means. This opposition of the west to the realization of Islamic ideal finds practical exposition in the western attitude towards Moroccan caliphate established by Sheikh Abdul Karim Al-Khatabi (1882-1963).110 Notwithstanding Al-Qaida’s conviction regarding the practicability of the revival of ideal Islamic state, this rhetoric has extended rational to the militants’ struggle to weaken the United States to ensure the sustainability of the Islamic caliphate. Further, the militants’ resistance against the United States needs to be taken as means to an end-revival of ideal Islamic state system. Some may argue that Al-Qaida’s attacks on the United States may be interpreted as support-securing strategy to strengthen the rhetoric of creation of

104 Jamat-e-Islami has been participating actively in Pakistani Politics and has been part of coalitions in Pakistani politics as well. In Pakistani politics, Sayyed Maūdūdī appears to be more of reformer than a revolutionary. Revolutionaries follow different approach from the reformers in the sense that they view change as impossible in the existing phenomenon until and unless the power structure of the existing order is done away with altogether. For details see, Horton and Hunt, Sociology, 502-3 105 Maūdūdī’s interview with Muslim,London vol.6 (1967) 106 Schifter, “The Clash of Ideologies” 107 Letters from Abbottbad , SOCOM-2012-0000003; also see, Shaykh Adil al-Abbab’s interview on targeting non-Muslims Civilians and Yemeni Soldiers, in Inspire, issue 4; also see, Haynes, “Al Qaida: Ideology and Action” 108 Interview of OBL with Hamid Mir published in Daily Pakistan, Islamabad (Urdu) 18th March 1997, in, FBIS Report. 109al-Awlaki, “The New Mardin Declaration” 110Letters from Abottabad, No.SOCOM-2012-0000016 103

Islamic caliphate.111 In short, abolition of the caliphate triggered the surge of violence amongst those Muslims who while discrediting the apologists’ attempts to reconcile Islam with western democratic ideals, yearned to revive this institution against those who installed the nation state system in its place. Apart from mainstream Al-Qaida, the revival of the caliphate is the foremost on the agenda of the militants across the spectrum. For instance, approach of ISIS is more instantaneous as compared to Al- Qaida in terms of reviving the caliphate. Al-Qaida had the vision that militant struggle would end up in revival of caliphate whereas Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi proclaimed his caliphate in Iraq and Syria with the vision to extend its boundaries across the globe through militant struggle from its platform.

Last but not the least, under the mandate arrangement, the Palestine went to the British where the British were in favor of creating a Jewish state. The creation of Israel in the heart of the Arab world sowed the seeds of perpetual violence in the Middle East which continues down to the present day. The Palestine conflict still dominates the violence-triggering dynamics not only in the region but across the Muslim world. This irritant provides the grounds for legitimacy to the violence on the part of the Islamists against the west. For instance, Hamas (Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamat al- Islāmiyyah) emerged in terms of a Palestine chapter of Ikhwān.112 Even today, Palestinians’ struggle is inspired by three important figures of Ikhwān namely Al- Banna, Qutb and Izz al-Din al-Qassam.113 Charter of Hamas suggests that Hamas is dedicated to raise the banner of Islam on the width and length of the Palestinian land. (Article 6) Hamas believes that land of Palestine is a sacred trust to all Muslims and no Muslim has the right to forgo even a single inch of this sacred land. Resisting the state of Israel and liberating the Palestinian land through the instrument of jihad becomes the ideological responsibility of the believers on one hand and refers to religious nationalism ideology of the organization on the other. (Article 11)

Though, Hamas has been focused on the liberation of Palestine yet currently, the militant organizations like Al-Qaida pursue a more resilient approach to the issue and rules out the scope of any international arrangement that permit the existence of Zionist entity on the Palestinian land.114 The militants draw to this conflict to legitimize their violence. For instance, Bin Laden, in his message to the American people in 2004, highlighting their non-violent approach towards neutral western states explained that they pursue violent policies against the United States for its alliance

111 Revel Marc Gerecht, “The Gospel According to Osama bin Laden”, Atlantic monthly (January, 2002):46-48, in, Don D. Chipman, 2003; also see, Osama bin Laden, “Transcript of Usama Bin Laden Video Tape”, US Department of Defence, New Release (13 December, 2001) pp.1-7, quoted in, Don D. Chipman, 2003 112 See Article 2 of Hamas Charter. Muhammad Maqdsi, “Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine,” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer, 1993):122-134 113 Today, Hamas military unit Al-Qassam Brigade is named after Izz Al-Din al-Qassam. 114Osama Bin Laden, “Until We Taste What Hamza Bin Abd Al-Muttalib Tasted,” Inspire, issue 2, (Fall 1431/2010) 104

with Israel to inflict atrocities on the Palestinians.115 He further criticized the west to brand those Muslims as terrorists who happen to defend themselves against the oppression on the part of Israel and the US.116 He urged upon the United States to liberate Palestine as a key to end violence.117 Moreover, as said earlier, for Al- Zawahiri, the Palestine issue surpasses even the implementation of Shariah in importance.118 Some may argue that militants-west conflict is not solely internal to the Palestine conflict. For instance, the Muslim lands like Pakistan and Algeria which are not directly linked with Palestine are also bereft with violence between the militants and the respective governments whom the militants declares as the agents of the west. However, as said earlier, the militants claim credence for the use of violence from the issues like Palestine.119

To sum up, the above discussion regarding the genesis of the codification of violence leads us to draw the following broader conclusions:

One, historical evidence affirms positive relationship between the national identity crises and violence. In case of the Muslim societies, the national identity was largely challenged through the instrument of colonialism. This resulted into violence either with state involvement or at societal level.

Two, lessons from colonialism suggest that it has been catalyst in generating violence within the Muslim societies directed against two fronts- against the respective colonial power and against those elements who view reconciliation with the colonialists as a key to survival and thus, are labeled as ‘the apologists’.

Three, even in the post-colonial context, this discord continued to persist. The post- colonial period happened to be a mere redefinition of the context in which these conflicting streams were flowing in the colonial period. Islamists’ resistance against the colonial rulers translated into their defiance against those Muslim rulers who were accused of being in collaboration with the West in pursuance of the western agenda against the fellow Muslims and thus, were labeled as ‘agents of the west’ or ‘apostates’. Moreover, the Islamists continue to disapprove of the so-called moderates who prefer to support these apostate Muslim rulers instead of subscribing to the militant brand of Islam.

Four, the schisms which crept into the early political history of Islam could polarize the Muslim society as a whole only when the violence was codified consequent upon the rise of sectarian empires like Safāvīds in 16th century who resorted to violence on sectarian trajectory to secure their political gains against the rival Sunnite Ottomans.

115 Osama Bin Laden, Message to the American People, (30th October 2004) in Al Qaida in its Own Words, 71-77 116 Osama Bin Laden’s interview with Al- Quds Al- Arabi in Arabic language(March 9, 1994) in FBIS Report - Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statement 1994- January 2004, 2 117 Osama Bin Laden’s interview with Al-Jazeera ( December, 1998) , in Al Qaida in its Own Words ed. Kepel & Milelli, 57-59 118 Azzam, Al-Qaida, 119 Schifter, “The Clash of Ideologies” 105

This codification of violence on the polemical lines kept the historical pre- suppositions alive. The Sunnite apprehensions regarding the 1979 Iranian Revolution are an outcome of these pre-suppositions.

Five, the ‘Ummah’ used to reflect the aspirations of the believers through caliphate whose legitimacy to exercise coercion was acknowledged across the Muslim world. The rise of sectarian empires and the abolition of Ottoman caliphate culminated into irrelevance of Ummah. The erosion of legitimate coercive authority resulted into the relegation of violence to group or individual level.

Six, the irrelevance of Ummah created a vacuum that has been filled by the militants’ nostalgia calling for the revival of the caliphate. In their bid to translate this longing for the past into political reality, the militants could look for legitimacy to their use of violence by devising the codes of war.

Last but not the least, the conditions of the 18th and the 19th century pitted Muslims against each other, transformed the relationship between state and society and sharpened the sectarian differences to new heights where violence was codified not only at the level of society but at the level of the state formation as well. This process culminated into formation of new states which derived their ideological formation based on sectarian acrimony against another Muslim sect chiefly in the Middle East. The role of colonialists served as a catalyst in crystallizing these ideological differences into states. Iran and Gulf states are an outcome of such transformation produced through indirect colonial interventions based on new imperialistic designs. The post-cold war era saw a new trend of further extension of these influences in the Muslim hinterlands and at its frontiers that ushered into a new level of violence relegated from state to society within the Muslim countries. The next chapter maps the outcome of this development which resulted in intra and inter-state violence with redefined codes. 106

5 Codes of War

We have argued in the preceding chapters that the ideological conflict between the Islamists and the West provided a sphere for the militancy to flourish when introduced to the political realism within the Muslim societies. Though violence crept into the body politic of Islam at an early stage yet its codification resulted from the adoption of the sectarian violence at state level and ultimately documentation of public and private Islamic law during the colonialism which was later on, replaced with the secular European codes. In the post-colonial context when the imperialists revised their tactics of exploitation in terms of achieving the colonial objectives through securing the collaboration of the Muslim rulers, the triangular conflict involving the colonialists, the Islamists and the apologists got redesigned to adjust a new target whom the militants term as the western agents or apostate rulers. This phenomenon has led to serious internal as well as external ramifications which include desire for ideological renaissance by galvanizing the denunciation of the West, renewed anti-imperialism notion, passion to liberate the sanctuaries of Islam and desire to neutralize the forces of unbelief for their oppression against the Muslims. In this framework, the current chapter will seek to identify the militants’ codes of war in their resistance against the west and the elements of apostasy within the Muslim societies. These codes of war include targeting those who follow democracy, fighting against the imperialists, elimination of distinction between the combatants and the non-combatants, no space for peace with non-believers, vengeance-driven actions and above all, cleansing the elements of apostasy within the Muslim societies. These include elements of heresies, the Shiites and local supporters of the west whom the militants terms as ‘the nearer enemies’ which further include the apologists, government functionaries and media. This study will also highlight the gaps between theory and practice of the militants with reference to their codes of war. 5.1 Militants’ Codes of War 5.1.1 Targeting those who Follow Democracy

Given the irrelevance of Ummah to exercise the coercive authority through caliphate and the resulting legitimacy crises that affirmed the mutually inclusive relationship between violence and identity crises, the violence was adopted at societal level to secure national identity through ideological renaissance. Secular democratic ideals were discredited as foreign ideas and the western attempts at their promotion in the Muslim societies were taken as a part of the scheme to marginalize the Islamists who resolved to revive the early political order of Islam through the instrument of jihad.1 The United States’ efforts to democratize the Muslim societies on the model of Post WW-II Germany and Japan by promoting democratic elements through foreign aid ended up but only in casting the militants’ nostalgia to revert to the early Islamic

1 Statements of Al-Zawahiri released in response to Arab Spring; see, Letter from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM-2012-0000013 107

system in a well-defined separate framework vis-à-vis the apologists and the agents who are alleged to promote the western agenda in the Muslim lands. At the outset, Bin Laden highlighting the marked incompatibilities between democracy and the Islamic system in terms of selection process of the rulers and allocation of sovereignty that define the nature of legislative procedures2 gave clarity and precision to the militants’ vision to eradicate democracy through reviving the caliphate. He argued that sovereignty which was otherwise an exclusive divine attribute, if allocated to individuals as is the case with democracy, leads to autocratic tendencies with the ruling class.3 Moreover, as Al-Zawahiri suggests that following a system that claims to share a divine attribute amounts to committing apostasy by converting to a new faith of ‘majority worshipping’. In this paradigm, he condemns democratic constitutions in Muslim lands like Pakistan as the instrument of unbelief.4 The subscription to this narrative by other Al-Zawahiri-inspired Al-Qaida affiliates like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan5 (TTP) reflects that the militant perspective as a whole disregards the fundamentalist stream followed by Hamas, Ikhwān and Jamat-e-Islami by denouncing their participation in democratic process to bring change in Muslim societies. He further argues that installation of Jewish control on the Palestinian land was actually inspired by this majority mood6 in the west that seeks to protect and promote imperial interests in the Muslim lands7 through cultivating a class of the apologists as their support-base.8 This narrative got furtherance with Zarqawi and Al-Maqdisi9 who labelling democracy as heretic in spirit emphasized upon its elimination through global jihad. Zarqawi reiterated that democratic process by recognizing human role in legislation which was otherwise a domain exclusive for God alone culminated into polytheism.10 Regarding the question of secularism which provides for separate domain for politics and religion and at the same time provided basis for democracy to flourish upon, Zarqawi insisted that the separation of politics and religion amounted to advising God “what is and what is not His prerogative”.11 The narrative that viewed participation in democratic process as apostasy entailing death sentence found its further exposition with Al-Maqdisi who pronounced takfīr to those who got involved in democratic

2 Bin Laden’s interview with Hamid Mir, 18th March 1997, in FBIS Report. 3Osama Bin Laden’s second letter to the Muslims of Iraq (18-10-2003) and his “Message to the American People” (30th October 2004)in Al-Qaeda in its own Words, ed. Kepel and Milelli,67-77 4 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Subah wal Qandeel 5 Geo News, February 21, 2014 - 1350 PKT; also see, Dawn News, Feb 07, 2014 05:28pm 6Al-Zawahiri’s statement in the aftermath of the Arab spring, Letters from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM- 2012-0000013 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9His ideas has influenced scores of contemporary militants including Abu Musa’ab Zarqawi. He is known to be the most influential living jihadi theorist who is acknowledged as a reference person in the circles of Al-Qaida. See, Samir Khan, “The Central Issue,”, in Al-Qaida in Arabian Peninsula (Al- Malahem Media) Inspire Issue 4 (Winter 1431/2010) 10 Hillel Fradkin, “Recent Statements of Islamist Ideology: Bin Laden and Zarqawi Speak,” in, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol.1 ed. Hillel Fradkin et al (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute,2005),5-11 11 Ibid. 108

process because it amounted to preferring man–made laws over the divine laws. He argued that democracy constituted an innovation (bida’ā) which would lead to apostasy as it amounted to seek religion other than Islam.12 However, his views on declaring those who follow democratic process appeared to be devoid of clarity when he argued that elected representatives were subject to takfīr whereas those who elected these representatives were not subject to takfīr because they elected them not seeking democracy in terms of religion rather owing to their worldly services13 This narrative earned Al-Maqdisi an important place in the array of militants and further strengthened the nexus between him and Zarqawi who would later on, rely on the same narrative to discredit those who took part in 2005 elections in Iraq.14 Zarqawi followed Al-Maqdisi in terms of declaring democracy as separate religion which was based upon the seven principles which were contradictory to the basic spirit of Islam. These principles included popular sovereignty, freedom of faith, freedom of expression, popular mandate to resolve the conflicts, secularism, freedom to form political parties and pre-dominance of majority opinion.15 This narrative is also shared by Al-Qaida affiliates worldwide including Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Harkat al-Shahab al-Mujahideen in Somalia16 and TTP in Pakistan17 which claim to strive for the revival of caliphate and elimination of man- made systems. This narrative has assumed the shape of war code across the militant landscape. It is evident in AQAP’s resolve to fight against those who convert to what they term as ‘religion of democracy’ instead of Islam.18 Similarly, in 2014, Al- Shabab’s19 attack on the Somalian parliament20 and Boko Haram’s militants’ offensives during presidential elections campaign21 need to be viewed as part of larger militant perspective that believe following the democratic norms amounts to unbelief (kufr). Iraq has also experienced similar reaction against the democratic process in 2014 elections where the polling stations have been stormed by the militant.22 TTP too proclaims to fight against those who follow democracy as it does not acknowledge

12 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Al-Deemoqratiyya Deen,( Democracy: A Religion ); also see, al- Maqdisi, This is Our Aqeedah, 55,56 13 Ibid. 14 Nibras Kazimi, “A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi,” in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol.2 ed. Hillel Fradkin et al, (Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute,2005), 59-73 15 Abu Musa’ab al-Zarqawi, Jamhuriyyat, Aik Mustakkil Madhab (Urdu) Democracy: A Permanent Religion, in Hittin, 8, 131-144 16 Shaykh Abu Basir’s interview with Al-Malahem Staff, in Inspire, issue 1, (Summer 1431/2010); also see, al-Abbab’s interview in Inspire, issue 4; also see, Mukhtar Abu Zubair’s (Amir, Harkat-al- Shabbab al-Mujahideen, Somalia) statement in , Qaideen-e-jihad ke Aqwal (urdu) Statements of jihadi Leadership, in Hiitin 8, compiled by Hasan Habib,150 17 Ahya-e-Khilafat, 2013 18al-Abbab, Inspire, 4 19 An Al-Qaida outfit in Africa 20 Mark Doyle: “Al-Shabab can hit almost at will,”BBC’s Report on Somalia Parliament Attacked by al-Shabab in Mogadishu, May 24, 2014 21 Aryn Baker, “Boko Haram Militants Are Back on the Attack in Nigeria as a Presidential Election Looms”,Times January, 9, 2015 22 Associated Press in Baghdad, “Iraq militants kill 21 in polling station attacks ahead of elections,” April 28 2014 15.04 BST; also see, “Iraq militants in military uniforms attack balloting center in predominantly Sunni area, ” CBS News, April 22, 2014, 8:39 am 109

divine sovereignty.23 Besides this, the available militants’ websites unequivocally terms democracy as the system of unbelief (kufr) and besides humiliating the politicians in general, label even certain heads of religo-political parties as apostates.24 Apart from Al-Qaida and its affiliates, ISIS, too, follow the same passion to revive the Islamic caliphate through somewhat different roadmap. For Al-Qaida, reviving the caliphate requires extensive homework in terms of developing means25 to withstand anticipated resistance from the United States26 as happened in case of Al-Khatabi’s emirate in Morocco.27 On the other hand, ISIS has already declared caliphate in Syria and Iraq as a launching pad for the revival of Islamic order across the globe.The evidence suggests that ISIS follows the same takfīri ideology that views democratic process in terms of infringing upon the divine domain and thus, condemns those who participate in this process as apostates.28 As nation states provide sphere for democracy to function and both operate in terms of what some term as ‘mutually dependent logics’29, therefore, the militants’ hostility towards democracy is equally directed against nationalism as well. They label the constitutions of the Muslim nation states as ‘Shariah of nationalism’ and thus, condemn their followers as apostates and clients of unbelief (tāghūt). This narrative finds its rationale with the militants’ inferences drawn from the historical accounts of different prophets who surrendered their national affiliations and preferred to migrate from their respective homelands when their nation-fellows refused to submit to their faith and attempted to intimidate them by the tool of nationalism. (Al-Ibrahim: 13) They intimidated prophet Shoaib by threatening him to expel him from his own homeland.(Al-Ara’af:88) Similar threats were also faced by prophet Lūṭ (Al- Ara’af:82) Prophet Muhammad had to face similar threats of expulsion from Makkah.(Al-Anfa’al:30) The militants argue that his prophet’s preference to migrate to Madina for the sake of faith suggests that his Shariah does not recognize any virtue in national patriotism and further, that it is faith that warrants the believers’ submission instead of nation state as such. The militants label the national institutions as organs of apostasy which are liable to be fought against.30 This approach towards nationalism is shared by the militant landscape as a whole that refuses to acknowledge

23 Wali-ur-Rehman (TTP Amir Mehsud chapter) statement in, Qaideen-e-jihad ke Aqwal (urdu) Statements of jihadi Leadership, in Hiitin 8, compiled by Hasan Habib, 152 24 See for instance, Jihad blog, http://jihadepakistan.blogspot.com/search/label/ accessed on 21-01- 2015 25Letters from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM-2012-0000017; also see, Revel Marc Gerecht, “The Gospel According to Osama bin Laden,”Atlantic Monthly (January, 2002):46-48; also see, Don D. Chipman, 2003 26Letters from Abbottabad, Nos.SOCOM-2012-0000017, SOCOM-2012-0000016 27US opposes establishment of Islamic Caliphate; also see, Letters from Abbottabad, No. 2012- 0000016. 28“The Return of Khilafa,” Dabiq, issue 1, 1435 AH. 29 Marc Helbling, Nationalism and Democracy: Competing or Complimentary Logics? Living Reviews in Democracy, November, 2009, Center for Comparative and International Studies (Zurich: University of Zurich)1-14 30 Maulana Asim Umar, Watniyat Ka Global Butt (Urdu) Nationalism: A Global Deity, in Hittin, issue 8 (Sha’aban 1433 AH): 167-180 110

any theological legitimacy of the democratic institutions for being based upon unbelief.

5.1.2 Fighting the Imperialists

The militants’ codes of war in terms of fighting against the imperialists reflect dynamism in the course of their evolution. As Azzam developed his codes of war in purely Sunnite framework, Bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri, Al-Maqdisi, Zarqawi and other contemporary militants’ outfits did not hesitate to discredit the Muslim theology developed over the span of almost one thousand years. Azzam followed Imam Qurtubi’s viewpoint that jihad (resistance) against the exploitative imperialists who were bent upon destroying the believers’ assets constituted the fundamental religious obligation upon the believers31 as is evident from the Holy Quran, “Go forth, light- armed and heavy-armed, and strive with your wealth and your lives in the way of Allah! That is best for you if ye but knew.” (At-Tawbah: 41).32 Moreover, Quranic injunctions categorically denounce the avoidance of jihad in these words: “If ye go not forth He will afflict you with a painful doom, and will choose instead of you a folk other than you. Ye cannot harm Him at all. Allah is Able to do all things.” (At- Tawbah: 39). Given the all-encompassing nature of these divine injunctions, the believers’ discretion with regard to resistance against the infidel imperialists becomes virtually meaningless. In this purview, the Prophet did not exempt even the blinds like Ibn Umm-e-Makhtum until the divine verdict regarding their exemption was revealed.33 This divinely ordained resistance found practical exposition with the Prophet himself and his companions.34 Prophet himself participated in twenty-seven battles out of which he fought in nine battles.35 Azzam argued that jihad would be launched from a base called Al-Qaida al-sulbah by a vanguard of committed volunteers. He further argued that jihad being a touchstone to discern hypocrisy from sincerity36 would provide space to test the commitment of these volunteers and would also help them experience practical realization of divine unity (tauhīd al- Uluhiyya) as distinct from its theoretical aspect (tauhīd al- Rabubiyyah). The practical aspect of tauhīd constituted the actual domain of the Prophethood which could be better understood through military jihad instead of mere intellectual ordeals (Al-Ankabut: 69).37 This military jihad as an instrument of protection of the oppressed against the oppressors was essential for the eternal salvation of the believers.38 In this context

31 Abdullah Azzam, Ad-Difa’a un a’aradi al-Muslimeen a’aham farud al-a’yan (Defence of the Muslim Lands- the First Obligation after Emaan) 32 As quoted in Azzam, Join the Caravan 33Abdullah Azzam. Join the Carvan, Religio-Scope Archives, 2002 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37Abdullah Azzam, Tauheed Al-Amali, Al-Awal min Silsala-tul-Maqalat, Reha’ min jannat al-Firdous (The First of the Series of Treatises: Breezes, From the Gardens of Firdaws): At-Tibyan Publications 38“How should ye not fight for the cause of Allah and of the feeble among men and of the women and the children who are crying: Our Lord! Bring us forth from out this town of which the people are oppressors! Oh, give us from thy presence some protecting friend! Oh, give us from Thy presence 111

Azzam termed ribāt as the most exalted form of worship which was equally essential for avoiding disgrace to Ummah.39 Given the importance attached with the subject of military jihad, he corroborated the viewpoint of Ibn Rushd and Imam Hajar Asqalani who inclined to interpret jihad, when used in its generalized sense, in terms of armed struggle.40 His theory constituting bedrock for the subsequent generations of the militants to develop dynamics of global jihad with their own revisions explained the context of evolution of the codes of conflict against the imperialists on the following lines: One, Azzam argues that on offensive side, jihad will continue to be fard-e-kafāyā till all submit to the call of Islam41whereas it will convert into fard-e-ayn42 in case of non-believers’ aggression to a Muslim territory or if they capture a group of believers.43 His approach reflects strong imprints of all the four major schools of Islamic scholasticism. With Shāff’ites, jihad becomes fard-e-ayn, when the distance between the invading enemy and the believers becomes shorter than the distance that permit the believers to offer a shortened prayer.44 Similarly, the Hanf’ites believe that jihad becomes individual obligation when any Muslim territory is exposed to foreign invasion.45 Mālik’ites believe that if the invading enemy makes a surprise attack on a Muslim territory, jihad becomes fard-e-ayn.46 Ibn Qadamah, a Hanbalite theorist in his al-Mughni identifies three situations that convert the nature of jihad from voluntary (fard-e-kafāyā) to obligatory (Fard-e-ayn). First, when the forces of unbelief confront the believers in the battlefield; second, when the unbelievers aggress into a Muslim territory; three, when the imam calls to the believers to march forth. Nevertheless, Ibn Taimmiyah’s views regarding the transformation of jihad from fard-e-kafāyā to fard-e-ayn provide grounds for revisions whereupon Azzam based his theory of global jihad.47 Ibn Taimmiyah takes the Muslim lands as a whole and argues that foreign aggression on any part of the Muslim lands invokes individual obligation of jihad on the trajectory of ‘nearer enemy doctrine’ next in importance only to faith itself.48 In practical terms, it implies that if the local believers upon whom aggression has been made are incapacitated, the individual obligation will shift to the next circle of the believers nearer to theatre of aggression and so on. In this

some defender! Those who believe do battle for the cause of Allah; and those who disbelieve do battle for the cause of idols. So fight the minions of the devil. Lo! the devil's strategy is ever weak”. (An- Nisa: 75,76) 39 Azzam, Join the Caravan 40Ibn Hajar Al-Asqalani, “Fath-ul-Bari” 6/22, in, ibid. 41“Hashiyat Ash Shouruni and Ibn al Qasim in Tahfa al Mahtaj ala al Minhaj” 9/213, quoted in, Azzam, Ad-Difa’a un a’aradi 42Jihad during the prophetic era was of varying types. For instance, Badr was desired (Mustahabb) whereas The Trench and Tabuk were declared as fard-e-ayn and Khyber happened to be fard-e-kafāyā where only the witnesses of Hudaybiyah (6 AH) were permitted to participate. See, Join the Caravan 43 Azzam, Ad-Difa’a un a’aradi 44“Nihayat al Mahtaj by Ramli” quoted in Azzam, Ad-Difa’a un a’aradi 45 Ibn Aabidin (Hashiyat Ibn Aabidin -3/238), quoted in ibid. 46Hashiyat ad Dussuqi quoted in ibid. 47 Azzam, Join the Caravan 48 Fatawa Al-Kubra 4/608; and Fatawa Al-Kubra 4/520, quoted in Azzam, Join the Caravan 112

way, the individual obligation may encompass the whole Muslim Ummah if required to safeguard the Muslim lands.

Two, for Azzam, though jihad is fard-e-kafāyā in its offensive tone, however, its obligatory status changes into fard-e-ayn in face of enemy’s aggression as Islam attaches utmost significance to the protection of five fundamental elements including faith, life, honour, mind and property even if the aggressor happens to be a Muslim.49 This emphasis upon resisting the invading enemy is reflected from the fact that Islam does not permit a Muslim woman to surrender rather enjoins upon her to prefer death over her being captured if her honour (ard) is under threat.50 The genesis of ‘nearer enemy doctrine’ finds its roots with the early period of Islam which for example, is evident from the dialogue between Rabia’ah b. Amir, the commander of Muslim army in Syria with Sergius, his Roman counterpart. Rabia’ah held that Romans were preferred to wage jihad against as they were nearer than the Persians.51 However, if imminent threat stems from a distant enemy, then he will be fought prior to the nearer enemy as the Prophet preferred to fight against Harith Abi Dirar and then at another occasion against Khalid b. Abi Sufiyan who happened to be imminent threats as compared to the nearer enemies.52

Three, apart from linking Ibn Taimmiyah’s ‘nearer enemy’ doctrine to contemporary global jihad, his interpretation of ‘individual obligation’ (frad-e-Ayn) grants theological sanction to wage jihad by the believers in their personal capacities without permission of those in authority. He argues that when jihad becomes fard-e-ayn, permission is not required even from parents as no permission is required to observe other fundamentals of the faith. It entails same level of religious obligation as is associated with other fundamentals of the faith.53 As fard-e-ayn surpasses all other religious obligations, therefore, if there is likelihood that the caliph has already suspended jihad or will not allow to wage jihad or waiting for permission will harm the cause of jihad, it is not obligatory upon the believers to get permission from the caliph.54

Though Azzam’s resolve to fight the imperialist infidels continued to persist with Bin Laden and other contemporary militants yet his ‘nearer enemy’ doctrine underwent radical revisions. It no longer remained focused solely upon the actual invading infidels rather those who happened to collaborate with infidels against the fellow Muslims were also defined as ‘nearer enemies’. This perspective got reinforced in the

49Azzam, Ad-Difa’a un a’aradi 50Ibid. 51Imam al-Waqidi, Futuhusham (The Islamic Conquest of Syria), trans. Maulana Sulayman Al-Kindi, Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd, 16-18 52Azzam, , Ad-Difa’a un a’aradi 53 Three Imams-Abu Hanifa, Al-Sha’afi and Malik extend jihad (fard-e-ayan) religious obligation equal with Salat, Zakat etc. however, Ahmed bin Hanbal gives preference to Salat. Azzam argues that abandoning jihad without any valid excuse is like eating during day of Ramadan without any excuse. Moreover, jihad like other fundamentals of faith is permanent in their obligation. See, Join the Caravan 54 Abdullah Azzam Extracts from the Wasiyyat (Urdu trans.) Ahmed Farooq (Muslim World Data Processing Pakistan, April 12, 1986 113

context of the US invasion in Iraq and their military presence in Hejaz as a part of the scheme to control and exploit the Muslims’ resources55 largely through the transnational companies backed by military prowess. These companies could find opportunity to exploit the oil resources which were hitherto inaccessible to them.56 The oil producing capacity of these companies increased from 55 wells in 2009 to 313 by 2013. The increase in oil producing capacity of these companies resulted in corresponding rise in the value of petroleum exports from 39307m$ to 89402m$ during the same timeframe. Resultantly, net income of these transnational companies also increased exponentially. For instance, net income of BP rose up to 72% from 13740 m$ in 2009 to 23681 m$ in 2013. Similarly, ExxonMobil could increase its income by 132% by 2012 from 19280m$ in 2009 to 44880m$ in 2012. Likewise, Shell could also increase its income by 113% in three years by 2012.57

In this perspective Bin Laden decreed that Muslims’ humiliation vis-à-vis Israel and exploitation of their resources invoked individual obligation of jihad upon the believers.58 This call for jihad as fard-e-ayn becomes more pronounced in the context of the US presence in Hejaz. He subscribed to the fatawa issued by the Afghan Union of Ulema which approved of the views of Imam Malik, Ibn-al-Mundhir, al-Jawzajani, Shaykh Salman al-Awdah and Shaykh Safar al-Hawali regarding the non- permissibility of seeking help of the non-believers.59 In view of this, he dismissed theological legitimacy of the Saudis’ claim to seek help from the US for the defense of Hejaz.60 In his fatawa titled “Declaration of jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries”, he stressed upon the believers to fight against what he calls as ‘the forces of unbelief headed by the United States’61 and their local allies to force them to liberate Jerusalem as well as to ensure their exit from the holy sanctuaries of Islam in Hejaz.62 The land of Hejaz being the direction of prayers and the seat of prophecy is out of bound for the non-believers and thus, he excommunicated the Saudi regime for being loyal to the US.63 He further accused them for having violated the will of the Prophet by inviting the US army in the land of

55 Abdel-Muhsin al-Rafi, “The Rafidhi-Crusader Alliance in Iraq “Al-tahaluf al-rafidhi al-salibi fil Iraq,” quoted in Kazimi, “Zarqawi’s Anti-Shi’a Legacy.” In an interview with Majalla, a London based magazine, Abu Muhammad al-Ablaj disclosed Bin Laden’s concerns regarding channelization of militants to the war theatre in Iraq in wake of the US attack. See, Haynes, Al Qaida. On grounds of his anti-imperialistic posture, some may draw parallel between Bin Laden and Lenin in terms of resisting the west for their onslaught against the socio-economic structure of the societies of their respective concerns to create their ideal states. See for instance, Chipman, Osama bin Laden and Guerrilla War. 56Even after the withdrawal of the US troops from Iraqi soil, these companies are to stay behind to inflate their profits from huge investment made by them. see, Dahr Jamail, Western Oil Firms Remain as US Exits Iraq, Feature Al-Jazeera, January 7, 2012 (18:45) 57 OPEC. Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2014 58 Osama Bin Laden, “World Islamic Front Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” 1998 in in A-Qaida in its Own Words ed. Kepel & Milelli, 53-56 59FBIS Report January 2004, 63,64 60“Osama Bin Laden Declares Jihad on Americans” published in al-Islah, London, 2nd September, 1996 in, FBIS Report, 22 61Osama Bin Laden, Letters from Abottabad, No. SOCOM-2012-0000019 62 Laden, “World Islamic Front Statement Urging Jihad”; also see, Laden, “Declaration of Jihad against the Americans” 63Laden, “Interview with Peter Arnett and Peter Bergen” 114

Hejaz because the Prophet had directed the believers to expel the non-believers from this land.64

In this perspective, at times he used the cover of secular history to reject the western portrayal of the Muslims as terrorists if they defend themselves.65 If the Europeans had the right to defend themselves against the Nazis, how Muslims could be deprived of this right to exercise against the Jewish-Christian alliance that has killed the children of the Muslims.66Bin Laden urged upon the militants to target specifically the interests of only those imperial states which happen to perpetrate violence against the Muslims.67 He offered a framework to examine 9/11 and subsequent series of violence in terms of reactionary and preemptive strikes of oppressed Muslims to counter the oppressor west especially the US through economic boycott and military jihad.68 Nevertheless, he tended to evoke religious frenzy amongst the Muslims by explaining the US presence on Arabian soil in the context of crusades69 that called for resistance on the part of the believers as decreed by a Saudi cleric Sheikh Bin Uthaymin.70 In this crusade-context, besides the actual imperial infidels, jihad would also focus upon the ‘nearer enemies’ including the pro-west rulers, Arab nationalist and Socialist political parties and the apologist intelligentsia because of their support to the western clients in the Muslim lands.71 Owing to his unflinching devotion to fight out the crusaders from the Islamic sanctuaries, he disapproved of his militant fraternity like Ikhwān and Hamas for their relatively mild standpoints about the international charter that recognized the Zionist entity on the Palestinian land,72 However, despite ruling out options of peaceful solution to the conflict,73 strategic pragmatism became evident in his theory when he explored the examples of making strategic peace with the infidels from the early history of Islam like the Prophet’s offer of one-third of the agriculture produce to Ghatfan to neutralize them during the Battle of Ahzāb (5 AH) and later on, his appeasing conduct at Hudaybiah (6 AH). He shared this strategic pragmatism with Ibn Taimmiyah when he explored room to defer

64Laden, “Declaration of Jihad on Americans”; also see, Bin Laden’s interview with Abdel Bari Atwan, “The Secret History of Al-Qaida”(London: Abacus, 2006),38 65 Bin Laden’s interview with al-Quds al-Arabi 66 Bin Laden’s interview with Robert Fisk 67Letters from Abottabad, No.SOCOM-2012-0000016 68Osama Bin Laden’s Message to the American People, 30th October 2004; also see, Osama Bin Laden Declares Jihad on Americans” published in al-Islah, London, 2nd September, 1996 in, FBIS Report, 22; also see, Osama Bin Laden, “Declaration of Jihad Against the American Occupiers of the Land of Two Holy Cities,” Nawa-i-Afghan Jihad, June, 2012; also see, Letters from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM-2012- 0000016 69 Osama Bin Laden’s interview with Gwyen Robert, correspondent of Channel4 Television Network 2100 GMT February 20, 1997, FBIS Report,38. According to the US Secretary of Defence, William J. Perry, the US presence on Saudi soil was aimed at securing the vital American interests. See, Defence Issue vol.11 No.8, US Department of Defence 70Atwan, “The Secret History of Al-Qaida”, 38 71Bin Laden’s second letter to the Muslims of Iraq, 18-10-2003; Bin Laden’s interview with Robert Fisk; also see, Atwan, “The Secret History of Al-Qaida,”38 72 Bin Laden, “Until We Taste What Hamza Bin Abd Al-Muttalib Tasted” 73Time Magazine interview with Bin Laden, January 11, 1999 115

jihad during such conditions that may result into loss (mufāsidā) instead of benefit (maslāhā) to the Muslims.74

Notwithstanding certain ideological differences75 between Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri regarding formal fusion of certain localized militant outfits like Harkat as-Shahab al- Mujahedeen with mainstream Al-Qaida which the former restrained to sanction in his lifetime76, the proclamation of global jihad on the trajectory of ‘distant’ as well as ‘nearer’ enemies confirms predominant impression of Al-Zawahiri on Bin Laden.77 This leads some to argue that in the post- Afghan War scenario Bin Laden has been providing front and finances to the organization whereas Al-Zawahiri has been providing intellectual spirit to the organization. In strategic terms he argued that given the military superiority of the US, it would not be possible for the believers to secure localized power. This military superiority of the US could only be neutralized through transnational jihad which would simultaneously be directed not only against the external enemy but also against the nearer enemy- the apostate rulers of the Muslim lands.78

Besides Azzam, Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri, the idea of jihad in terms of anti- imperialistic tool is shared by the militants as a whole but of course, with variety of response to the imperialist threat. For instance, for Al-Maqdisi and Zarqawi, resistance to the exploitation of Muslims’ resources at the hands of the imperialists constituted a part of the faith.79 In converse terms, to surrender the Muslims’ resources to the non-believers was to forego one’s faith.80 On this paradigm, they subscribed to the ideology of Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri as against Azzam by declaring the Muslim rulers who surrendered their resources to the imperialists as apostates. Similar approach is reflected in AQAP which believe that jihad against the imperialists and their local collaborators will remain fard-e-ayn till the expulsion of the Americans and their allies from the Arabian Peninsula.81The case of Mali suggests

74Letters from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM-2012-0000017; Ibn Taimmiyah has quoted the following Quranic verse to make the point that adverse effects should not outweigh the positive ones during enjoining of good and forbidding of evil: “O ye who believe! Ye have charge of your own souls. He who erreth cannot injure you if ye are rightly guided. Unto Allah ye will all return; and then He will inform you of what ye used to do”. (Al-Maidah: 105) See, for example, Ibn Taimmiyah, Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil, trans. Salim Abdallah ibn Morgan, https://d1.islamhouse.com/data/en/ih_books/single/en_Enjoining_Right_and_forbidding_wrong.pdf accessed on October 22, 2017 75Though, Bin Laden has always been central to the decision-making in Al-Qaida yet at the same time has ideological differences with Al-Zawahiri whose leading role in providing ideological spirit to the militants constitutes serious concern with the junior ranks of the organization. See, Letters from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM-2012-0000014 76Al-Zawahiri’s letter to Bin Laden, No. SOCOM-2012-0000006 77Bin Laden, “Until We Taste What Hamza Bin Abd Al-Muttalib Tasted”; also see, Bin Laden’s second letter to the Muslims of Iraq, 18-10-2003 78Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet’s Banner 79 al-Maqdisi, This is Our Aqeedah; Zarqawi’s sharing of this notion is well reflected in his resistance during the US invasion in Iraq. 80 Ibid. 65 81 Khan, The Central Issue; Abu Basir’s interview with Al-Malahem, Inspire Issue 1, Summer 1431/2010 116

that Tanẓīm al-Qā‘idah fī Bilād al-Maghrib al-Islāmī also called Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), also follows anti-imperialist approach largely against the French militaristic imperial designs alongside Mauritanian army since 2010 through utter disregard of Malian political leadership.82 Similarly, in 2012, Jamāʿat at-tawḥīd wal-jihād fī gharb ʾafrīqqīyā, also called, Monotheism and jihad Movement in West Africa (MOJWA) which is a branch of AQIM has threatened to fight out the states following imperialist policies in Mali.83 Apart from the formal worldwide affiliates of Al-Qaida, this perspective is followed by the militant fraternity as a whole including ISIS whose one of the proclaimed objectives is fighting out the invading Americans in Iraq and uprooting the existing autocracies through self-proclaimed caliphate.84 In Thailand, a document titled Berjihad di Patani (Yawi script) seized from the militants calls for jihad against Siamese (the colonialists).85

The militant perspective vis-à-vis western imperialism is not limited to military resistance rather it encompasses resistance at economic and cultural fronts as well. Bin Laden urged upon the believers to fight the American imperialism through economic boycott in addition to military struggle. In this context, some may go the extent of exploring the commonalities of approach between Lenin and Bin Laden in their drive against the onslaught of western socio-economic system.86 Moreover, a document titled “Mujahideen’s Roadmap” signed by the Abu-Hafs al-Masri Brigades, an Al-Qaida affiliate in Iraq focused upon undermining the trust of the investors in US economy in addition to military means to fight against the imperialist America.87 Furthermore, Bali bombing which was orchestrated by Jama’a al-Islamiya88 in 2002 made an example of the militants’ reaction against the cultural onslaught of the west in the Muslim lands. Jama al-Islamiya in its quest for revival of Dar-ul-Islam constituted a strong nexus between Islamism in Southeast Asia and the transnational militancy.

Nevertheless, in the whole diaspora of the militants belonging to different geographical and cultural landscapes, Afghan Taliban appearing closer to Azzam’s classical approach to jihad, came out to be an isolated example where resistance against the western imperialism is not directed to what the militants label as ‘nearer

82Siv O'Neall, “Chronicle of a Programmed Collapse in Mali,” Axis of Logic, trans. Jean-François Bayart, January 27, 2013. 83 Hindustan Times, July, 01, 2012 84Abu Muhammad Adnani’s Statement in , “Qaideen-e-jihad ke Aqwal” (urdu) (Statements of jihadi Leadership), Hiitin 8, compiled by Hasan Habib, 151 85Wattana Sugunnasil, “Islam, Radicalism, and Violence in Southern Thailand: Berjihad di Patani and the 28 April 2004 Attacks,” Critical Asian Studies 38:1 (2006): 119-144 86 Don.D. Chipman, “Osama bin Laden and Guerrilla War,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26(2003):163-70 87 Mujahideen Roadmap, 2004 88 Jama al-Islamiya was founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 1990s in Malaysia. See, for example, Angel M. Rabasa, “Radical Islamist Ideologies in Southeast Asia,” in, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol.1 ed. Hillel Fradkin, et al (Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2005), 27-38; for further details regarding the ideology of Jama al-Islamiya, see, Rohan Gunaratna, “The Ideology of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiya,” in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology ed. Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, Eric Brown, volume 1, (Washinton D. C.: Hudson Institute, 2005), 68 117

enemies’.89Notwithstanding the inherent difference of approaches and the question of theological legitimacy, the fact remains that the contemporary Islamists use anti- imperialistic nature of Islam to mobilize the jihadi support to counter the west.

5.1.3 Eradicating Apostasy within the Muslim Societies

The rhetoric to revive the Ummah through cleansing the elements of apostasy within the Muslim societies has led to evolution of the codes of war on following three basic trajectories: elimination of heresies within the Muslim societies, fighting the Shiites and violence against the local imperial support-base. All these elements constitute the broader spectrum of apostasy within the Muslim societies.

5.1.4 Elimination of Heresies

The militants’ response to what they term as ‘heresy of ideas’ is essentially an outcome of Al-Zawahiri’s efforts to caste the puritanical views of Ibn Abdul Wahāb and Sayyed Qutb into ideological mold for the militants.90 Al-Zawahiri has been conspicuously influenced by Ibn Abdul Wahāb and Sayyed Qutb. Ibn Abdul Wahāb identified his contemporary Arabian society with pre-Islamic jāhilliyah. He claimed that the faith got contaminated by heresies (bida’ā) soon after the Prophet and thus, the Islamic society reverted to pre-Islamic jāhilliyah. In view of this, the theology that developed during the period of one thousand years of jāhilliyah deserved to be discredited. The same discourse got a new shape with Sayyed Qutb who sought to draw parallel between the western civilization and the jāhilliyah order that required to be resisted through military jihad and further denounced the Muslim leadership as ‘apostates’ for being loyal to the imperialist west against the fellow Muslims. He took jihad not only in terms of an instrument to defend the faith in face of imperialism but also to fight all un-Islamic practices to revive its purity.91 In this background, the militants cherish to revive the purity of faith by fighting out the heretics in Muslim societies. Like Ibn Abdul Wahāb and Sayyed Qutb, they identify the modern societies with pre-Islamic jāhilliyah order for being engrossed in polytheistic practices.92 In this extreme position by those who did not follow what Ibn Abdul Wahāb termed as ‘pure Islam’ were declared nothing better than the followers of pre-Islamic jāhilliyah society. This resulted in squeezing of the boundaries of faith and resultant expansion in the ambit of takfīr. They unanimously label the political transformation from the caliphate to democracy as reflection of heresies that culminates into polytheism because it recognizes the popular sovereignty which is otherwise exclusive domain of

89 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, “Message to the People of Yemen,” Inspire, issue 1, Summer (1431/2010) 90 Gilles Kepel, “The Brotherhood in the Salafist Universe,” in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, ed. Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, Eric Brown, volume 6 (Washington D. C.: Hudson Institute, 2008), 20-28 91Rohan Gunaratna, “The Ideology of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiya” 92 See for example, Hikmatullah Lodhi, Nusrat Mehsud, Umair Siddiqui,(TTP) Nisab-e-Harab, (urdu) Manual of War, volumes 1&2, First Edition, September 2012, Idara-e- Aida’ad

118

God. They further argue that adapting to democracy actually amounts to converting to a new faith and thus, it invokes the question of apostasy. Likewise, the militants view secularism in terms of an instrument to limit the scope of faith in the temporal sphere. They declare it as heretical as it amounts to defining the scope of divinity as such and instead thereof calls for submission to man-made laws.93 Bin Laden includes secular political parties working in the Muslim lands into the fold of takfīr and argues that participation in democratic process that culminates into submission to man-made laws instead of divine system amounts to negation of the Lordship of God.94 Beyond Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri, the militants, as a whole reflects the same narrative. Harkat-al-Shabbab al-Mujahedeen in Somalia aims to rejuvenate the Ummah95 through purifying the faith of all innovations (bida’ā). Likewise, Ansar Din Group, an Al-Qaida affiliate in Northern Mali destroyed many Sūfī shrines in Timbuktu as they consider these shrines to be engendering idolatrous practices.96 In Nigeria, Boko Haram considers participation in any social activity associated with the western civilization as forbidden in Islam and aims to fight against those who take part in any such activity.97 AQAP aims to fight against the forces of jāhilliyah by uprooting man-made systems on the other.98 Moreover, in Syria, Al-Nūsrā Front killed the administrator of Khalid b. Walīd’s shrine. In Pakistan, TTP and its local chapters also resolve to eliminate innovations and elements of shirk through the instrument of jihad.99 It seeks to fight out Sufism for contaminating the purity of faith by introducing innovations into it as well as for encouraging idolatrous practices. It has been involved in plotting to kill prominent Muslim scholars belonging to Barelvi sect in the country. It claimed responsibility for targeting the shrines of Sūfīs across Pakistan and has also claimed to have targeted Eid Milad (Celebration of the Prophet’s birthday) processions.

Currently, ISIS appreciates Zarqawi for his pronouncing of takfīr and subsequent killings of Kurdish Secularists-Barzani and Talabanī and further those who approve democracy as political order because it amounts to shirk.100Moreover, ISIS militants like the Wahābī movement are prompt in erasing anything they believe to be pagan accretions introduced through heresies. They claim to erase the remnants of pre- Islamic civilizations on the pattern of the Prophet Muhammad and the prophet Ibrahim who broke idols to establish the unity of God. Besides targeting the pre-

93Hillel Fradkin, “Recent Statements of Islamist Ideology: Bin Laden and Zarqawi Speak, ”, in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology vol.1 ed. Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, Eric Brown (Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2005), 5-11 94 OBL’s second letter to the Muslims of Iraq, October 18, 2003 95Mukhtar Abu Zubair’s (Amir, Harkat-al-Shabbab al-Mujahideen, Somalia) statement in , “Qaideen-e- jihad ke Aqwāl” (urdu) Statements of Jihadi Leadership, comp. Hasan Habib, Hiitin 8,150 96“Timbuktu shrine destruction 'a war crime,” The Telegraph, March 20, 2015; also see, “Ansar Dine fighters destroy Timbuktu shrines,” Al-Jazeera, July 1, 2012 97Farouk Chothia, Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists? BBC News Africa, January 21, 2015 98al-Abbab’s interview in Inspire, issue 4; also see, Abu Basir, Qaideen-e-jihad ke Aqwal (urdu) in Hiitin 8, 152 99 Nisab-e-Harb, 22; also see, Will of Tariq Mansoor Afridi, Amir TTP Darra Adam Khel, Ahya-e- Khilafat 100“The Return of Khilafa,” Dabiq, Issue 1 119

Islamic remnants like Assyrian antiquities, they are keen to level different shrines to ground not unlike the Wahābī originators of the 18th century. As the Wahābī movement targeted the shrines of some leading companions of the Prophet and his family members (ahl al-bayt) including Hazrat Khadija and Hazrat Fatima in the 18th century, ISIS, to mention a few, has not restrained to target even the tomb of the Prophet Younous in Mosul.101

5.1.5 Violence against the Shiites

The shrinking of the boundaries of faith on the premise of reverting back to its purity led to proliferation of the decrees pronouncing takfīr on sectarian grounds. There is hardly any sect in the Muslim societies that could escape such sort of labeling. The Shiites owing to their peculiar aloofness from the Sunnite majority emerging from the historical presuppositions developed on the political trajectory exposed themselves to unhindered violence vis-à-vis the Sunnite militants. The militants’ approach towards polemics is informed largely by two key figures-Al-Maqdisi and Zarqawi. Initially, Al-Maqdisi was categorical in pronouncing unqualified takfīr for the Shiites. He declared his disavowal (bara’at) from both rawāfidh102 and nawāsib because of the former’s derogatory attitude towards the exalted companions of the Prophet and the latter’s hostility towards the family of the Prophet (Ahl-e-bayt).103 However, he developed moderation on the question of polemics after his arrest by the Jordanians. This ecumenism is evident in his agreement with Ibn Taimmiyah that the rawāfidh may not be identified with the Christians and the Jews. He became critical of the violent campaigns against them for having potential to lead chaos in the Muslim societies.104 He criticized Zarqawi for his blind violence against the Shiites in Iraq as the medieval Muslim scholars like Ibn Taimmiyah accorded sanction to the killings of only the Shiite elite whereas the Shiite laity having hardly any rudimentary knowledge of their belief system was declared devoid of any theological grounds warranting violence against them.105He further argued that the sanction accorded to violence against the Shiites by the Sunnite scholarship during Iran-Iraq war had utilitarian origins instead of any theological legitimacy. Nevertheless, Al-Maqdisi failed to inculcate this moderation in Zarqawi who instead of internalizing any moderation preferred to continue with his unabated violence against the Shiites by delinking himself from his previous mentor. He declined to base his criterion for target selection on the distinction between the Shiite laity and the ruling class on the grounds that democratic framework dilutes this distinction as the authority to elect the rulers vests with the common man.106 In the context of Iraq, he did not incline to Al-Maqdisi’s narrative which he borrowed from Ibn Taimmiyah to

101 Kareem Shaheen, “ISIS Attacks on Ancient Sites Erasing History of Humanity,” The Guardian, Beirut, March 9, 2015 102 Those who reject the right of the first three caliphs to office of the Caliphate. 103 al-Maqdisi, This is Our Aqeedah, 38 104 Nibras Kazmi,“A Virulent Ideology in Mutation” 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 120

direct his violence against the Shiites by drawing distinction between the Shiite layman and the ruling class on the pretext that contemporary ground realities were altogether different from the 13th century context wherein Ibn Taimmiyah drew a line of distinction between these classes of the Shiites. Zarqawi undertook to explore evidence from historical accounts of political Islam to legitimize his killings of the Shiites who could not be out rightly declared as apostates because of the conflicting opinions of the jurists that created confusions regarding their religious status. He identified the contemporary Shiites in Iraq with 13th century Abbasid vizier Al- Alqemi for their hypocritical conduct in terms of supporting the infidels against the fellow Muslims107. Al-Alqemi is alleged to have supported the infidel Turks against the Muslims.108 In this context, he developed a narrative that eliminating the Shiites was pre-requisite to secure victories against the external enemy as happened in the case of the pious caliphs who could bring vast lands into the fold of Islam only when they eliminated apostasy from Hejaz.109 Moreover, he viewed the sectarian violence in utilitarian perspective in terms of a catalyst to unite the Sunnites for jihad110 and further as a ‘final solution’ to the Shiite problem through their complete elimination.111 Zarqawi’s tough approach vis-à-vis the Shiites was also owned by Bin Laden in defining the militants’ response against the Shiites across the globe. He affirmed Zarqawi that violence on sectarian fault lines in Iraq was linked with the Shiites collaboration with the US invading forces.112 In view of this, elimination of the Shiites became the central point of the militant ideology across the globe. AQAP target the Shiites for being partner in what they term as ‘triangle of the enemies of Muslim Ummah’ along with Zionist-Crusaders alliance and apostate regimes.113 As in theological terms takfīr of the Shiites in the first place is pre-requisite for fighting them out thus, Al-Qaida does not hesitate in pronouncing takfīr to the Shiites on the presumption of protecting the honour of the Prophet. AQIM also shares the standpoint of AQAP that places the Shiites in the ranks of Zionists and Crusaders.114 Al-Nūsrā

107 al-Zarqawi’s statement on May 19, 2004, quoted in, Bar, “Sunnis and Shiites—Between Rapprochement and Conflict” 108 The narrative that the rawafidh has been extending helping hand to the forces of unbelief against the Sunnite Muslims is common place amongst the Sunnite scholarship. See Zarqawi’s letter titled Wa ‘aad ahfad Ibn Al-‘Alqemi (The Grandchildren of Ibn Al-‘Alqemi have Returned); also see, Shaykh al- Islam Ibn Taymiyya, The Syllabus of the Sunnah (Minhaj al-Sunnah), 1st ed. vol.3(1406 A.H.), 377-78 quoted in Nibras Kazimi, “Zarqawi’s Anti-Shi’a Legacy,”. For the similar narrative, see for example, Imad ‘Ali Abdul-Sami’ Hussein, The Treachery of the Shi’a and Its Impact on the Defeats of the Islamic Nation (Khiyanat al-shi’a wa athereha fi haza’im al-ummah al-islamiyyeh); Al-Harbi, “The Secret Plans of the Shi’a” (“Mukhattetat al-shi’a al-sirriyyeh”) in Al-Bayyan Magazine, March 1998; Abdel-Muhsin al-Rafi’i , The Rafidhi-Crusader Alliance in Iraq (Al-tahaluf al-rafidhi al-salibifil Iraq 109 Al-Zarqawi, Hel ataka hadīth al-rafidha (Has Word of the Rafidha Reached You?), quoted in, Kazimi, Kazimi , Zarqawi’s Anti-Shi’a Legacy 110Ibid. 111Ibid. 112 Video Tape Released by Bin Laden) quoted in, Haynes, “Al Qaida: Ideology and Action”; also see, al-Abbab’s interview in Inspire, issue 4 113 Ibid. 114Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaida Branches Urge Jihadist Unity against US,” The Long War Journal, Foundation of Defence and Democracies, September 16, 2014 121

Front also shares the anti-Shiite narrative of Al-Qaida that views Shiites as traitors for their alleged collaboration with the enemies of Islam.115 Similarly, TTP declares Shiites to be elements of apostasy within the Muslim societies which need to be eliminated. TTP’s war manual (nisāb-e-harab) does not recognize the Shiite to be part of the faith owing to their innovations in the fundamentals of faith.116 The Taliban argue that corruption in faith owes to misleading ideas of the Shiites. They further argue that history is replete with the instances of their treason against the Muslims in collusion with the non-believers whether they were Tartars in 13th century, the crusaders against Salahuddin Ayubi, the British imperialists in Bengal in the 18th century, the Indian Hindus on the issue of Ayyodiah Mosque and more recently, the American invaders in Iraq in 2008. The militants drawing upon these historical evidences sum up that the Shiites do not believe in the sanctity (hurmat) of the blood and the property of the Sunnites. 117 On the issue of polemics, the awarding of tributes to Zarqawi and projection of the Sunnites killed by the Shiites as heroes are reflective of subscription of this narrative by ISIS. This narrative provides for pronounced takfīr of the Shiites and legitimizes unremitting violence against them.118In case of ISIS, some may argue that the Sunnites’ political marginalization in post-Saddam Iraq at the hands of the Shiites through engineered elections with the collaboration of the west has earned popularity to the ISIS’ rhetoric with the Sunnites. Former premier Nur al-Maliki’s bid to transform Iraq into a Shiite state through repressive means has also been instrumental in channelizing the Sunnite volunteers to join the ranks of Islamic State. This context led to Zarqawi’s appreciation with the ISIS which was evident from their reference to his speech titled “And Thus the Way of the Criminals Becomes Evident” (Wa li Tastābinā Sabīl-ul-Mujrimīn). Abū Muhammad al-‘Adnānī ash-Shāmī, official spokesman for ISIS also appreciated the ISIS fighters for killing the Shiites.119In this backdrop, he declares fighting against the Shiites even after the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq as one of their prime objectives.120 A holistic view of the militant landscape leads us to presume that the militants take the Shiites to be external to the faith as such and thus, resolve to eliminate them as being constitutive of apostasy within the Muslim lands.

5.1.6 Fighting against the ‘Nearer Enemy’

Even within the ideological frontiers of the militants one can fairly identify the figures like Abdullah Azzam who have always avoided directing their war against the fellow Muslims. Though, he does not proclaim takfīr to the invalid Muslim rulers in general yet he lays down such strict criteria for the Muslim rulers to make peace with the non-

115Message for Shia’s from Abu Hafs Khateeb of Jabhat al-Nusra - Syria War (Video) 116Nisab-e- harb, 24,25 117 Muhammad Mutti-ur-Rehman, “Ahl-e-Sunnat ke Seenay par Rafidhi Riasat ka Khawab,” Hittin 8 118 “The Return of Khilafa,”Dabiq, Issue 1 119Excerpts from “Indeed Your Lord is ever watchful” Dabiq, issue 4 120Abu Muhammad Adnani-Spokesman Daesh statement in , Qaideen-e-jihad ke Aqwal (urdu) Statements of Jihadi Leadership, in Hiitin 8, 151 122

believers that even a benign distraction therefrom renders the Muslim rulers vulnerable to be labeled as apostates by the subsequent generations of militants. He developed these limits largely on the following three grounds: One, he validated the militant perspective that foregoing a piece of Muslim land would fall beyond the legitimate authority of the Muslim rulers and two, permitting the non-believers to reside in the two holy sanctuaries of Islam was in conflict with the established Islamic practices sanctified through a prophetic tradition that called for expulsion of the non- believers from the territorial limits of these holy places and three, the question of seeking help from the non-believers would warrant scholarly rationalization of two apparently conflicting traditions of the Prophet. One tradition refers to the Prophet’s refusal to accept help from a polytheist at Badr121 but the second tradition suggests that the Prophet accepted the assistance of Safawan b. Ummayah at Hunayn. The rationalization of these two traditions led Azzam to argue that acceptance of the assistance from the non-believers must be a cautious exercise that should be performed only in emergent situations.122 It is evident that though he avoided loose application of takfīr yet his affirmation of hijrā from dār-ul-harb confirmed his partial subscription to takfīr wal hijrā of Qutb123 and further affirmed his linkage with the classical theorists like Qurtubi.124

After Azzam, an era of loose application of takfīr was ushered in by the militants. For instance, Bin Laden exhorts upon the believers across the globe to review their loyalties towards their respective rulers who happen to support the heretics instead of the fellow believers in the current conflict scenario.125 His conviction of ‘nearer enemy’ doctrine is informed through the following points: one, he defined the Muslim rulers who became part of the western arrangements to fight the militants in Somalia and Yemen as ‘apostates’; 126 two, he desired to create revolutionary ripples in Arabia to uproot what he labelled as ‘apostate’ Saudi regime that had lost its legitimacy127 for inviting the US forces to the land of Hejaz; 128 three, the Saudis supported the communists vis-à-vis the believers in Southern Yemen.129 This ‘nearer enemy’ doctrine also embraces the apologist clergy who support their western clients. 130 He welcomed the recent Arab Spring for having provided a chance for the collapse of the Middle Eastern autocracies that had become agents of the western powers.131

121 Sahih Muslim 122Azzam, Azzam, Ad-Difa’a un a’aradi 123 Qutb, Muālim fil tarīq; also see, Qutb, “Jihad in Cause of Allah,” 225,226 124 For instance, Azzam has taken a reference from Tafsīr-e-Qurtubi regarding the significance of hijra and has quoted a narration on the authoirity of Ikrimah that Durmah b. Ays in wake of divine permission of hijra, despite being seriously sick insisted upon being shifted to Madina and died on the way. (Tafseīr-e-Qurtubi 5/349) in, Azzam, Join the Carvan 125 Letters from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM-2012-0000016 126 Bin Laden’s second letter to the Muslims of Iraq dated 18th October, 2003 127 Bin Laden’s interview with Robert Fisk 128 Bin Laden Declares Jihad on Americans, 2nd September 1996 129 Osama’s interview with CNN, 1997 130Bin Laden’s interview with Hamid Mir; also see, Letters from Abbottabad, Bin Laden’s letter to AQAP, No. SOCOM-2012-0000016; also see, Bergen, Holy War, 19; also see, Bonney, Jihad, 125 131Letters from Abbottabad , SOCOM-2012-0000010 123

However, the evidence suggests that he agreed to Al-Qaida’s lower formations’ advice to eschew violence in the Muslim countries through directing the resistance solely against the infidel forces and that too, preferably inside the war theatres. His advice to TTP leadership to shift their focus of war to the external fronts reflects his utilitarian approach to the issue aimed at avoiding the loss of public image of the organization through a coherent media policy.132 He further resolved to take battle to the US soil through enlisting the Muslim emigrants in the US having the US citizenship as long as they had not pledged not to damage the American interests.133 Looking from the edge, this shows his reverence for the international treaties even with those at war with the believers134 as against those militant affiliates like AQAP that do not recognize the sanctity of the treaties with the infidels. He further urged his field formations to identify the killing fields keeping in view the low security alert, optimum impact potential and marginalized chances of collateral damage to the Muslims.135

Not unlike Bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri legitimized violence against those Muslim rulers who were alleged to be in collaboration with the crusaders. He, too, appreciated the current Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen against the rulers whom he called the ‘Zionist Arabs’ for their collaboration with the crusaders against the believers by joining the US in its war against the believers and further for extending tortuous treatment to the Muslim fighters on their arrest. He condemned the secular Egyptian rulers for their corruption and for being loyal to the Zionists. This loyalty was reflected through providing Nile Water and gas to Israel, denying medical treatment to people of Gaza and permitting the Israelis to enter Sinai without visa.136 Jihad which was previously focused on the forces of unbelief was reinvented into a global struggle encompassing even the Muslim rulers who being client of the west were fighting against the fellow Muslims.137 Al-Zawahiri subjected Abdullah Saleh, the former President of Yemen to severe criticism and called for uprising against him for his fighting against the militants alongside the Americans.138 Though, Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri called for violence against the ‘apostate rulers’ of the Muslim lands yet the strategic restraint to avoid collateral damage while targeting the nearer enemy which was evident with Bin Laden reverted to background with Al-Zawahiri.139 The labeling of Muslim rulers accused of collaborating with the west was generalized with Bin Laden whereas it became more precise with Al-Zawahiri as reflected from his doctrine of ‘individual responsibility’. Moreover, Bin Laden had always been

132 Letters from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM-2012-0000018, SOCOM-2012-0000015, SOCOM-2012- 0000016, No. SOCOM-2012-0000019 133Ibid. No. SOCOM-2012-0000016 134Ibid. No. SOCOM-2012-0000015 135Ibid. No. SOCOM-2012-0000019 136Ibid. No. SOCOM-2012-0000013 137 See Al-Zawahiri’s statement in response to the Arab spring. Ibid. No. SOCOM-2012-0000013 ; also see, Knights under the Priphet’s Banner; also see, Azzam, Al-Qaida 138 Al-Zawahiri, “Message to the People of Yemen” 139 This theory is extension of Al-Faraj’s proclamation of takfīr to the Muslim rulers who pursue collaborate with the crusaders. See, Al-Faridah al-Gha’iba 124

concerned about positive image of Al-Qaida at least in media presentation which naturally warranted at least neutral relations with media whereas Al-Zawahiri specified state- friendly media to be the subject to takfīr and violence ensuing therefrom.140 Al-Zawahiri differed from majority of the fellow militants for his emphasis upon Palestine issue more than enforcement of Shariah. It was evident from his condemnation of Saudi regime to apostasy for their slackness regarding the Palestine issue despite that they enforced Shariah.141 Al-Maqdisi142 claimed to follow a middle road between the Khawārij who ex- communicated the believers for the commission of major sins and the Murji’ah who unduly avoided to ex-communicate those who were liable to be declared kafir.143 Though, he is considered to be the pioneer of radical Islamist ideology yet his theory is caught up with multiple contradictions. For instance, he claimed to follow traditional Sunnite school yet he did not hesitate to permit violence against the Muslim rulers which constitutes a point of categorical difference with the classical Sunnite scholarship. He is acknowledged as reference person for Al-Qaida militants144 yet his approach to jihad happen to be somewhat different from other ideologues of Al-Qaida including Bin Laden. Bin Laden declared violence against the Muslim rulers who committed apostasy by collaborating with the infidels against the fellow Muslims foremost in priority even against the actual infidel enemy.145 He followed the traditional approach of making resistance to the enemy which was the nearest one146 but this approach underwent radical change with Al-Maqdisi when he removed any difference between the actual infidel enemy and what he termed as apostate Muslim rulers. The primacy to fight the apostate rulers in the Muslim world vis-à-vis the actual infidels was an outcome of his conviction that unbelief arising out of apostasy was more severe than the actual unbelief. Furthermore, he identified the prayer leaders (imams) appointed by the invalid rulers (tāghūt) with the soldiers who defended the policies of tāghūt yet he avoided to invalidate prayers behind them. He agreed with Qadi Iyad (Ash-Shifā) to follow a cautious approach in proclamation of takfīr yet he was the first to declare the House of Saud as unbelievers.147 Following

140 Azzam, Al-Qaida 141 Ibid. 142 Al-Maqdisi was the pioneer of militant Islamist ideology who had tremendous influence on framing Zarqawi’s extremist views prior to his capture by the Jordanian authorities. His subsequent release as a moderate Islamist by the Jordanian authorities could not erase his earlier extremist impressions from Zarqawi’s mind. Though he claims not to share the Kharjai’ite footprints in terms of ex-communicating the fellow Muslims yet the fact remains that he holds the extremist views in this regard amongst the array of contemporary militants. Owing to his extremist standpoint he is ranked amongst the resource persons from whom Al-Qaida draws its ideological spirit. See, Khan, The Central Issue 143 Al-Maqdisi, This is our Aqeedah, 57 144 Khan, The Central Issue 145 Al-Maqdisi, This is Our Aqeedah, 65 146 The tradition of resisting the enemy who is in the closest proximity is evident from Imam Waqidi’s account of dialogue between Rabia’h Bin Amir’s (commander of Muslim army in Syria) dialogue with Sergius (commander of the Roman army) for prioritizing resistance against the Romans vis-à-vis the Persians. See, Imam Waqidi, Futuhusham,16-18. Actually Rabiah drew from the following Quranic verse, “O ye who believe! Fight those of the disbelievers who are near to you, and let them find harshness in you, and know that Allah is with those who keep their duty (unto Him)”. (At-Tawba: 123) 147 Al-Maqdisi, This is our Aqeedah, 59-65; also see, Kazimi, “ A Virulent Ideology in Mutation” 125

Ibn Abdul Wahāb and Sayyed Qutb, he drew a parallel between the pre-Islamic jāhilliyah and the modern society in terms of reflective of the traits of jāhilliyah. He tended to differ with those who defined ‘unbelief’ as an outcome of negation of faith by heart in exclusive terms rather ‘unbelief’ was also reflected through verbal statements and acts. He further argued that those who did not consider acts or verbal statements in terms of reflective instruments of ‘unbelief’ would actually support the forces of modern jāhilliyah.148 While relying upon the incident of Hatib from the early accounts of Islamic history149 he argued that supporting (mawālāt) the unbelievers would attract the label of takfīr irrespective of the fact that it was affirmed by heart or otherwise150 and thus, he ex-communicated the Saudi monarchy151 for supporting the US against the fellow Muslims.152 The narrative to fight against the ‘nearer enemy’ is also shared by the militant affiliates worldwide. It was under the influence of Al-Zawahiri that AQAP developed the theory of khurūj against the rulers by recognizing two mutually exclusive standpoints of the Sunnites: first, the believers are permitted to rise against the rulers as is evident from the early Muslim history which has the examples of revolts of Hussain b. Ali against Yazīd b. Muawiah, rising of Abdullah b. Zubair against Marwan and Muhammad Al-Nafs Al-Zakiyyah and Zaid b. Ali against the Abbasids; second, as agreed by the majority of classical ulema, the believers are not permitted to rise against the rulers even if they are oppressors and invalid. Al-Qaida’s branch in Arabia believes that if the rulers commit disbelief then the believers come under obligation to uproot them through force.153 Nevertheless, the interpretation of ‘unbelief’ is also subject to Al-Zawahiri’s influence who holds that helping the forces of unbelief against the believers necessarily constitutes ‘unbelief’ and thus, warrants khurūj on part of the believers. For instance, he labeled the Egyptian and Arab rulers as apostates because of their siding with the crusaders against the believers and thus, appreciated the Arab spring in terms of an attempt on the part of believers to uproot their rulers who had joined the ranks of the unbelievers.154 In this pursuit, AQAP takes khurūj against the ‘nearer enemy’ as fard-e-ayn on the part of the believers.155

148 Al-Maqdisi, This is Our Aqeedah 149 Al-Maqdisi has quoted the incident of Hatib who entered into allegiance (wilāyah) with the non- believers and extended help to them against the fellow believers. In this context, the following verse was revealed: “O ye who believe! Choose not My enemy and your enemy for allies”. (Al- Mumtahinah: 1) Allegiance (Mawālat) with the non-believers constitutes ‘unbelief’ (kufr) irrespective of the condition that it is allegiance of heart (Mawālat al-Qalbiyyah) or otherwise because Allah says: “And if any amongst you takes them as Awliya, then surely he is one of them”until this verse “… they say: we fear lest some misfortune of a disaster may befall us.(Al-Maidah, 51-52);see, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Millat Ibrahim Wa Da’wat Al-Anbiya Wal- Mrrsalin Wa Asalib At-Taghut Fi Tamyi’iha Wa Sarf Ad-Duati Anha (Arabic) trans. “ The Religion of Ibrahim and the Calling of the Prophets and Messengers and the Methods of the Transgressing Rulers in Dissolving it and Turning the Callers Away from it”. Second Edition At-Tibyan Publications, 197

150 al-Maqdisi, Millat Ibrahim 151 Kazimi, Kazimi, “ A Virulent Ideology in Mutation” 152 Al-Maqdisi, This is our Aqeedah, 65 153 al-Awlaki, “The New Mardin Declaration” 154 Letters from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM-2012-0000013 155 Khan, “The Central Issue” 126

This narrative was also shared by Al-Maqdisi who justified khurūj against those Muslim rulers who extended conspicuous support to the enemies of the believers and handed over the resources of the Muslim lands to the forces of unbelief. Similarly, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) believes that fighting against the ‘apostate rulers’ in the Muslim lands is fard-e-ayn upon the believers which in its religious spirit is as important as the five elements of Islam. This religious obligation will continue to exist upon the believers as long as the rule of these ‘apostate rulers’ exists.156 This narrative got further exposition with the militants across the globe. Al- Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) resolves to uproot the ‘apostate rulers’ as their prime objective.157 Previously, they declared their military support to overthrow the regimes in Tunisia and Algeria. They also approved of the efforts of Al-Jama’a al- Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya (FIG) to uproot Ghaddafi’s regime in Libya. FIG’s armed resistance was aimed at what they termed as apostate regime of Ghaddafi which was making inhuman repression against the fellow Muslims and exploiting the economic resources of the country.158 FIG sought to identify Ghaddafi with the pharaohs for his treatment of the Libyan Muslims on Israeli pattern.159 Moreover, in Nigeria, Jamat Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah-wal-jihad commonly known as Boko Haram also aims to replace the existing rulers whom they consider as apostate160 with Islamic caliphate. Their initial affiliation with Al-Qaida and subsequent allegiance to ISIS161 also confirm their rejection of the existing political systems in religious terms. Likewise, Al-Shabbab in Somalia has been fighting against President Sharif Ahmed who was head of Transitional Federal Government. Recently, ISIS has proclaimed its own caliphate which runs counter to the existing political orders and in practical terms demands their uprooting through violent means. In view of the foregoing, it may be argued that the militant perspective on the right to rebel against the Muslim rulers lacks coherence and uniformity in their ranks. Abdullah Azzam never supported revolt against the rulers in the Muslim lands. Al- Zawahiri, Al-Maqdisi and Al-Zarqawi support targeting the ‘nearer enemy’ in the foremost to mobilize the believers to fight the ‘distant enemy’. In case of Bin Laden, he categorically pronounced takfīr to those Muslim rulers who followed the western agenda but evidence is available that being moved by pragmatism, he directed Al- Qaida apparatus to focus on resistance to the western enemy in the foremost to avoid distortion of the organization’s public image which may end up in erosion of its support-base. Moreover, the ascendency of Egyptian elements in Al-Qaida leadership has transformed the ideological orientations of the organization from pursuing the

156 Nisab-e- Harab, 55,79 157Abu Musa’ab Abdul Wadood, Amir Tanẓīm al-Qā‘idah fī Bilād al-Maghrib al-Islāmī also called Al- Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) , 151 Hittin, 8 158Interview of Abu Bakr Al-sharif, one of the founders of Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyyah Al-Muqatilah (FIG), The Libyan Regime is Living in a Situation of Hysteria (first published in 15th issue of Nida’ul Islam, Oct.-Nov. 1996) 159 Interview with Omar Rasheed, the Spokesperson for The Fighting Islamic Group in Libya, trans. Keysar Trad, Nidā-ul-Islam, 26, April - May 1999 160Chothia, “Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists?” 161 Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to ISIS in March, 2015; see for example, Al-jazeera, March 8, 2015 127

traditional Sunnite approach of Azzam to Al-Zawahiri’s reactionary approach which is more aligned with Qutb and Al-Faraj. Azzam happened to be moderate in terms of extending the label of takfīr within the Muslim society and directed his philosophy towards the defense of the Muslim lands in face of foreign aggression instead of fighting out the Muslim governments.162 He did not label the contemporary Muslim rulers as kafir and thus, followed traditional Sunnite standpoint that did not permit revolt even against the imperfect Muslim rulers. As long as his philosophy was configuring the resistance model of the Islamists, the codes of war remained predominantly on traditional Sunnite pattern. For instance, the phenomenon of suicide terrorism remained external to the jihadi tactics in war against the Soviets.

5.1.7 Attacks against the Local Supporters of the ‘Nearer Enemy’

The militants seek to fight against the following segments of the localized supporters of the so-called apostate regimes in the Muslim lands: the apologists, the LEA personnel and above all, the media. They direct violence against them for siding with the ‘nearer enemy’.

5.1.7.1 The Apologists As said earlier, the militants’ definition of ‘the nearer enemy’ covers the apologists who extend their support to ‘the apostate regimes’ in the Muslim world and do not follow the militants’ brand of Islam.163 They further believe that the western ideologies can be transplanted in the Muslim lands.164 Bin Laden condemns the Muslims as the apologists who call for compromise with the ‘apostate regimes’ and their western masters instead of waging jihad against them.165 In more précised terms, Al-Zawahiri while making reference to certain works166 of a leading American think tank recognizes the apologists as their allies committed to promote the American interests in the Muslim world.167 In the militant landscape, though a few like Al- Maqdisi claim that difference of opinion does not entail violence, yet they condemn the clergy who support the non-believers against the Muslims and give their fatāwā according to the whims and wishes of their apostate regimes to have fallen outside the boundaries of the faith.168 In the same perspective, in Pattani, Thailand too, the militants share Al-Qaida narrative regarding takfīr. Berjihad di Patani ex-

162 Azzam, Ad-Difa’a un a’aradi; also see, Azzam, Join the Caravan 163Bin Laden’s interview with Hamid Mir; also see, Letters from Abbottabad, No.SOCOM-2012- 0000016; also see, Bergen, Holy War, 19; also see, Bonney, Jihad, 125 164 Haddad, “Islamism: a Designer Ideology for Resistance” 165Osama Bin Laden’s second letter to the Muslims of Iraq 166Cheryl Benard, Civil and Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies,(Arlington:RAND Corporation, 2003); also see, Angel Rabasa et al, “Building Moderate Muslim Networks” (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2007) 167Letters from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM-2012-0000013 168Al-Maqdisi, This is our aqeedah, 64 128

communicates those who support the non-Muslims by declaring them as hypocrites (munāfiqūn).169

In addition to those who support ‘the nearer enemy’, the militants as a whole unleash violence against those who make allowance for the cultural values of the western infidels in the Muslim societies. Though, as Al-Maqdisi argues that physical identification with non-believers does not attract ex-communication170 yet the militants’ attacks against the music outlets, obscenity and prostitution should be viewed in this framework. Previously in 2005, Hamas banned Music and dance in some areas under their control including Gaza strip. A similar course was adopted by Taliban who put ban on music in electronic media when they took over in Afghanistan.171 Currently, in Pakistan’s north western province the militants have been active to thwart this cultural fusion through violent means. Further, though Al- Maqdisi asserts that acquiring education in public schools run by the unbelievers, though undesirable, does not liable one to be subject to takfīr172 yet certain militant outfits like Boko Haram promotes a version of Islam which renders it forbidden (harām) for the Muslims to take part in political or social activities associated with western society including voting in elections, wearing shirts and trousers or receiving a secular education.173 In Nigeria, Boko Haram categorically declares acquiring the western secular education as non-permissible (harām) rather reprehensible. Abu Bakr b. Muhammad Shekau, the chief of Boko Haram while affirming linkages between their jihad in Nigeria with global militancy resolved to target ‘the outposts of the western culture’.174 Besides this, AQIM’s association with Boko Haram affirms their approval of the latter’s objectives including resistance to the western culture into the Muslim lands. Moreover, Jama’ al-Islamia-orchestrated Bali bombing in 2002 constitutes a conspicuous example to counter the onslaught of the western culture in Indonesia.175 Al-Shabbab in Somalia claims to revive the purity of the Islamic way of life by wiping out the western cultural influences from the Somalian society. In the area under their control, it forced the radio stations not to play music.176In the same pursuit, the ISIS-affiliate in Libya burnt musical instruments to revive their puritanical

169 Berjihad di Patani is a document in Yawi script which was recovered from the militants in Thailand. This document calls for extremist application of takfīr. See, Sugunnasil, “Islam, Radicalism, and Violence” 170 Al-Maqdisi, This is our Aqeedah, 59-61 171 “Libya: Islamic State Burns 'Non-Islamic' Musical Instruments,” The Clarion Project, February 22, 2015 172 Al-Maqdisi, This is our Aqeedah, 59-61 173Chothia, “Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists?” 174 C. J. Radin, “The Threat of Boko Haram for Nigeria, Africa, and Beyond,” Threat Matrix, A Blog of the Long War Journal, April 23rd, 2012 175 Some may argue that this bombing which was mainly targeted at the foreign tourists was focused on devastating the tourism in Indonesia which is one of the major sources of state income. However, more plausible view is that a free approach to the western cultural values may have triggering effect to get this reaction from the miltants. Jama’ah Islamiyah introduced suicide bombings in the South East Asia. In Bali bombings on October 12, 2002, about 180 people were killed and more than 300 got injured. See, Rabasa, “Radical Islamist Ideologies in Southeast Asia” 176 The Clarion Project 129

ideology.177This worldwide militancy has led to distinction between the radical militants and the modernists in the Muslim societies.178Interestingly, both sections have virtually failed to earn public legitimacy as a whole. The former failed because they undertake violent means to achieve their goals whereas the latter could not succeed for their overemphasis on westernization of the Muslim societies. The majority has been moderate but has never delinked itself from the basics of the faith.179

5.1.7.2 Government Functionaries The militant narrative on the question of attacking the employees of the Muslim governments lacks uniformity. Though Al-Maqdisi does not proclaim takfīr to those doing jobs within the system of unbelief180, yet Al-Zawahiri’s concept of ‘individual responsibility’ broadens the scope of takfīr to such an extent that embraces LEAs personnel and other government functionaries in its ambit. He argues that no one can claim exemption from being subject to takfīr merely on the grounds that he was following the orders of the government. He drags the members of security mechanism to the ambit of takfīr for becoming party to the commission of crimes by extending compliance and support to such governments.181 Similarly, AQAP derives legitimacy to their killings of Muslim soldiers in Yemen on the grounds that by fighting against the Muslims alongside the Americans and by guarding the places like parliament, ribā-based banks, places of social vices like clubs etc. embassies and cultural centers of the unbelievers, extending protection to Ismail’ite sect and above all, creating hurdles in the way to establish khilāfat they have committed irt’idād and thus, are liable to be killed.182 The militant outfits follow the same narrative worldwide. To take the example of a few, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al-Shabbab follow the same extreme version of takfīr on the basis of ‘individual responsibility’ as is reflected in their targeting of government functionaries. Besides the LEAs, TTP targets the Polio vaccination teams in Pakistan for pursuing the Western agenda to control population growth in third world. 183In Thailand too, Berjihad di Patani calls for launching suicide attacks against the LEAs to defend Pattani Dar-ul-Islam. The ISIS too, claimed responsibility of suicide attack in Jalalabad on government functionaries in April 2014.184

5.1.7.3 The Media As said earlier, Bin Laden was concerned about positive media image of Al-Qaida whereas Al-Zawahiri does not hesitate to target state-friendly media to ward them off

177Ibid. 178Reuven Paz, “The Impact of the War in Iraq on the Global Jihad”, in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 1, ed. Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, Eric Brown, (Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute,2005), 39-49 179Masmoudi, “What is Liberal Islam?” 180 Al-Maqdisi, This is Our Aqeedah 181 -Zawahiri, Shifa Sudur al-Momineen, quoted in, Azzam, Al-Qaida 182 al-Abbab’s interview in Inspire, issue 4 183Adnan Rashid’s open letter to Malala Yousouf Zai published in Ahya-e Khilafat, Sept. 2013, 34-36 184 “Islamic State Claim Responsibility for Jalalabad Bomb in First Afghanistan Attack,” The Telegraph, April 19, 2015 130

from blemishing the image of the organization.185 TTP categorically threatened to attack the media if it did not stop blemishing their public image.186 In Nigeria Boko Haram threatened to target the media outlets for distorting their image and for their offences against the faith.187 A few media reports suggest that they have actually waged war against the media in Nigeria.188 The Somali-based Al-Shabbab follows the same anti-media approach.189 The ISIS also declares the media as apostate for blemishing the image of the militants.190 In December 2013, they claimed responsibility of attacking Salaheddin TV in Tikrit191 because the media outlet was distorting the image of the Sunnite Iraqis.192 Moreover, the militants aim to fight against the media houses by accusing them of importing the western cultural values in the Muslim societies and thus, contaminating the purity of the Islamic way of life.

5.1.8 Elimination of Distinction between the Military and Civilian Targets 5.1.8.1 Violence against Non-Believers The reactionary tone with the militants that has led to erosion of distinction between the military and the civilian targets is an outcome of three major irritants that include the US military presence in Hejaz, Israeli occupation of Al-Aqsa and the threat of western aggression into the Muslim world. This reactionary tone has been conspicuous in the conflict between the militants and the West. Bin Laden exhorted upon the militants to inflict violence against the civilian and military targets alike. Through a religious decree, he endeavored to explore theological legitimacy to target the US civilians alongside the military targets on the following grounds: one, the US itself did not observe any distinction between the civilian and military targets for nuclear strikes during the WW II; two, the US civilians cannot be absolved from the responsibility of the sins of their governments which come into existence through their will and subsequently support them through their taxes193 and three, even having a religion other than Islam is enough to target the non-believers. This narrative is followed almost universally by the Al-Qaida-affiliates. AQAP had all appreciations for the suicide operation on the US plane in 2009 which was launched to avenge the killings of the Muslim civilians belonging to Yemenite tribes in Abyān

185 Azzam, Al-Qaida 186 ARY News, August 6, 2014 07:13; also see, Mushtaq Yusufzai, Taliban plan attacks on media outlets, journalists, The News, Monday, October 15, 2012 187 “In Nigeria, Boko Haram threatens attacks on media,”Committee to Protect Journalists (CJP) 188 “Nigeria: Boko Haram Wages War on Journalists,”All Africa, June 8, 2012 189 “Al-Shabaab Terror Continues to Threaten News Providers,” Reporters without Borders, September, 25 2013 190 “The Return of Khilafa,”Dabiq, issue 1 191Mohammed Tawfeeq and Joe Sterling, Militants in Iraq Storm TV Station; Anchor among Dead, CNN International, December 23, 2013 192 Saut al-Iraq, December 24, 2013; also see, “ISIS–Major Threat to Media Freedom in both Iraq and Syria, Reporters without Borders, December 30, 2013 193 Bin Laden, “World Islamic Front Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders”; also see, Osama’s interview with John Miller, February,1 1999; “Accused Terrorist Leader Usama Bin Ladin Declares War on All Americans,” “CBS releases interview with Bin Ladin January, 13 1999,”in FBIS Report 131

province.194 Moreover, as said earlier, AQAP reinterprets the evidences from the Islamic history to justify killings of the non-believers for merely following a religion other than Islam. Al-Awlaki argues that during the early period of Islam, the Arabian pagans, the Persian Zoroastrians and the Roman Christians were killed simply because they continued to follow their respective belief-systems.195 Al-Abbab further argues the classification between the civilians and the military targets have hardly any grounds in Shariah.196 He refers to a tradition of the Holy Prophet wherein the Prophet has been reported to have enjoined upon the believers to fight against those who do not believe in Allah. He further makes reference to Ibn Hajar who infers from the Prophet’s dispatching of his companions to kill one Ibn Abi al-Haqīq without offering him warning, that if one does not embrace Islam after receiving the divine message, he becomes liable to be killed.197 In this regard, he quotes a tradition of the Prophet wherein he has been reported to have said, "I was instructed to fight the people until they say: 'There is no one worthy of worship but Allah.” Whoever says 'There is no one worthy of worship but Allah', has protected his life and wealth from me except with its right and to Allah is his accountability”. Apart from AQAP, other militant outfits follow the same suit. To quote a few examples, in Pakistan, TTP resorted to massacre of the religious minorities largely the Christians. Al-Shabbab targeted the non-believers in their attack on Garissa University Campus in Kenya in April, 2015 and earlier the Christians in Northern Kenya.198 They also claimed to single out non-Muslims for killing at Westgate Mall in 2013.199 Similarly, Boko Haram offered the Nigerian Christians the only choice- either convert to Islam or be killed.200 The ISIS follows the same approach which is evident in their treatment of the non-believers. The ISIS claimed responsibility to behead more than twenty Coptic Christians in Libya in February 2015.201 The indiscriminate killings of the Yazīdīs in northern Iraq at the hands of the ISIS constitute ample evidence that the ISIS shares the militant narrative of killing the civilian non-believers merely on the grounds that they follow a religion other than Islam.202 5.1.8.2 Violence against the Believers The narrative based upon disregarding the distinction between the combatants and the non-combatants is not limited to those following the religion other than Islam, rather, it also embraces within its ambit even those who either do not come up to the militants’ image of a true Muslim or as a part of tactics to pressurize the respective

194Inspire,1 195al-Awlaki, “The New Mardin Declaration” 196 Inspire 4 197 al-Abbab’s interview in Inspire, issue 4 198Abdalle Ahmed Mumin in Nairobi and Alexandra Wexler in Johannesburg, “Islamists Kill Scores in Kenya College Attack,” The Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2015 199 “Al-Shabab says it singled out non-Muslims in Kenya Mall Attack,” CBS, September 25, 2013 200Robert Windrem and Alexander Smith, “Boko Haram: 200,000 Christians at Risk of Massacre in Nigeria,” CBS News 201“Video shows beheading of Copts at IS hands; Egypt declares week of mourning,”Ahram Online, February 15, 2015 202Raya Jalabi, “Who are the Yazīdis and why is Isis hunting them?” The Guradian August 11, 2014 132

governments. They have not been hesitant to kill the Muslims largely on the following pretexts: First, they do not fulfill the criteria of being a true Muslim; second, their killings may be sanctioned as part of collateral damage because necessity makes a things legal which is otherwise illegal203 and third, those who support the non- believers against the fellow Muslims. Berjihad di Patani in Thailand sanctions the killings of the civilian Muslims for their support the non-believers.204 In Pakistan, though there is no scarcity of evidence that proves TTP’s frequent involvement in the killings of the innocent civilians yet Peshawar school incident in 2014 is the worst evidence wherein more than 100 innocent students were killed.205 Similarly, Boko Haram targeted the students in Yobe state of Nigeria in 2013206. They also claimed responsibility of killings dozens of Muslims in a mosque attack in Nigeria in 2014.207 The ISIS too, has reportedly killed scores of the Sunnite Muslims in Syria and Iraq. Apart from targeting the civilian per se, the militants seek to target the civilians to pressurize their respective governments. In this perspective they use different tactics like kidnapping of those who matter, attacking the media outlets, business centers, kidnapping and killings of the tourists. They also attack the soft civilian targets to generate money through kidnapping for ransom, robberies etc. Though, there have been certain voices from the mainstream Al-Qaida leadership against the indiscriminate killings of the Muslims by certain militant groups like TTP yet the dominant factor behind these voices have been strategic instead of ideological.208 They learnt from the Iraqi experience that killing of the Muslims by the militants had resulted in their alienation in the Muslim societies. They had to face social alienation in Iraq following their attack on the children of Al-Anbār tribe in Iraq.209 Nevertheless, the ideological reservation against the killings of the civilians comes on the part of Afghan Taliban as is evident from their Urdu website. They condemned the Peshawar school incident as being un-Islamic.210

5.1.9 No Space for Peace Agreements with Non-believers

The militant perspective has hardly any space for peace agreements with the non- believers. Azzam argued that provisions of peace agreements as reflected through Hudaybia Pact were withdrawn through the Verse of Sword when the Muslims were no more militarily weak as they were during the initial years of Islam. He argued that when jihad became fard-e-ayn it nullified the previous peace treaties with the non- believers. He further argued that peace treaties were permitted only if they promoted the Muslims’ interests. As the Muslim lands were waqf lands for the entire Muslim

203 al-Abbab’s interview in Inspire, issue 4 204Sugunnasil, “Islam, Radicalism, and Violence” 205 “Scores Killed in Attack on Peshawar School; Taliban Claims Responsibility,” Al-Jazeera, December 16, 2014 206Gillian Parker, “Yobe School Killings: Another Boko Haram Slaughter, this Time of Children, The Christian Science Monitor, July 8, 2013 207Heather Murdock, “Boko Haram attacks Muslims and kids, puzzling everyone,” The Christian Science Monitor, August 4, 2013 208Letters from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM-2012-0000007 209Ibid. No. SOCOM-2012-0000016 210jihad Ki Pukar, Emirate Islamiyyah Afghanistan,December 16, 2014 133

Ummah so any compromise on them would fall beyond the purview of any peace agreement with the non-believers. Moreover, if any agreement entails compromise on the approved practices of the faith, it will lose its legitimacy. For instance, if any agreement provides for the polytheists to reside in Arabian Peninsula or to return a Muslim woman to the infidels, it will lose its legitimacy because it will amount to negation of categorical injunctions of Quran and Sunnah (nasūs-e-qattiā).211 Moreover, it is also not permitted to enter into such agreements with the non-believers that result into projection of the values and religo-social norms of unbelief into the Muslim societies.212 So far as, sanctity of the peace agreements with the non-believers is concerned, the militant perspective lacks coherence. Interestingly, Bin Laden appears somewhat moderate as compared to his subordinate ranks. His moderation is reflected through, for instance, his resolve to recruit only those US Muslims to launch operations inside the US who have not pledged not to damage the interests of the US.213 Moreover, a piece of Bin Laden’s correspondence suggests that he urged upon Al-Qaida field formations to administer oath from the new entrants not to break a covenant even if it is with a non-Muslim enemy.214 This moderation is not visible with the militants at large who show no reverence for the international treaties with those at war with the believers215 more particularly on the following grounds: one, as Adil al-Abbab argues that Islam extends guarantee of protection to only those who either pay jizzyā and thus, are called dhimmīs or with whom the believers enter into a covenant and thus are called Ahl al-ahad.216 As the US in particular and the West in general are at war with the believers, therefore, they cannot be included in both these categories.217 Two, most of the Muslim governments have ceased to have right to enter into covenants with the non-believers on the part of the believers because they are governed by the man-made laws instead of divine laws, ally with the non-believers against the fellow Muslims and above all, as Anwar al-Awlaki argues the nations that are fighting against the Muslims constitute dar -ul- harb with which no peace treaty is permitted in Islam.218

211 Azzam, Ad-Difa’a un a’aradi "Expel all Jews and Christians from the Arabian peninsula". (Al-hadīth) “O ye who believe! When believing women come unto you as fugitives, examine them. Allah is Best Aware of their faith. Then, if ye know them for true believers, send them not back unto the disbelievers. They are not lawful for them (the disbelievers), nor are they (the disbelievers) lawful for them. And give them (the disbelievers) that which they have spent (upon them). And it is no sin for you to marry such women when ye have given them their dues. And hold not to the ties of disbelieving women; and ask for (the return of) that which ye have spent; and let them (the disbelievers) ask for that which they have spent. That is the judgment of Allah. He judgeth between you. Allah is Knower, Wise”.( Al Mumtahinah: 10.) 212 Ibid. 213Letters from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM-2012-0000016 214Ibid. No. SOCOM-2012-0000015 215Ibid. 216The person of covenant is the one who belongs to a nation that has a treaty of peace with the Muslims. 217 al-Abbab’s interview in Inspire, issue 4; al-Awlaki, “The Ruling on Dispossessing the Disbelievers,” 218 Ibid. 134

5.1.10 Commission of Major Sins Warrants Takfīr

The militants’ narrative on the religious status of those found to have committed major sins is also caught up with categorical contradictions. They claim not to follow khawārij for proclaiming takfīr to those charged with the commission of major sins219 yet at the same time, they do not restrain to label them ‘apostates’. Al-Maqdisi claims to differ with khawārij with regard to invoking takfīr against those who commit major sins and he further observes restraints to ex-communicate the people of irja’ā unless their irja’ā does not lead them to negation of tauhīd.220 Similarly, Al-Awlaki argues that Al-Qaida cannot be identified with Khawārij as it does not follow Khawārij’s extreme mukkaffarah based on the commission of major sins.221 On the other hand, they direct violence against those involved in the acts of moral turpitude, engagement with ribā-based banking etc. They base their perspective of violence against those who have committed major sins on the grounds that Islam ordains to kill those who commit offences like robberies even if they are otherwise believers.222

5.1.11 Vengeance-based Violence

Almost whole body of the militant literature is replete with references to the religious scripture. The purpose of these references is to earn theological approval for the acts of militancy. However, it is also common place with the militants to resort to take vengeance either directly or indirectly by putting the question of theological legitimacy in the background. In theory, the militants identify themselves with the local civilian Muslims yet in practice, there is no scarcity of evidence that proves their frequent involvement in the killings of the innocent civilians mostly to take revenge of the killings of their fellow militants.223 Peshawar school incident in 2014 is the worst evidence wherein more than 100 innocent students were killed.224 Moreover, TTP claimed responsibility of twin attacks in Karachi in November 2013 and termed them to be driven out of reaction against ashūrā violence in Rawalpindi on November 25th, 2013 wherein many Sunnites were killed by the Shiites. It appeared from the statement issued by TTP that it resorted to attack the civilians to pressurize the government to meet their demands regarding arrest of those involved in ashūrā violence.225

5.2 Contradictions and Gaps

As said earlier, the militants’ narrative lacks coherence and universality. It is caught up with multiple contradictions between theory and practice as well. The following lines highlight these contradictions to prove the militants’ theological immaturity:

219 Khan, “The Central Issue” 220 Al-Maqdisi. This is our Aqeedah, 57 221 al-Awlaki, “The New Mardin Declaration” 222al-Abbab’s interview in Inspire, issue 4 223 As-Sihab’s Interview with Wali-ur-Rehman, Ziqa’ad 1430 AH 224 “Scores killed in attack on Peshawar,” Al-Jazeera 225 “TTP claims responsibility for Karachi twin blasts,” The Tribune, November 23, 2013 135

One, as discussed earlier, certain militant outfits who champion unremitting violence on the question of polemics claim not to believe in physical violence on sectarian basis. Despite being overt champion of sectarian violence, TTP’s Mohmand Chapter claims not to believe in physical violence on sectarian grounds.226

Two, in theoretical terms, the militants claim not to adopt violent means against those who have difference of opinion with them227 but in practice they do not tolerate those not subscribing to their version of faith. TTP condemns the Muslim scholars in Pakistan as apologists who do not subscribe to their version of Islam and condemn TTP’s anti-state activities.228 In June 2009, TTP claimed responsibility of killing Maulana Sarfraz Ahmed Naeemi, a Barelvi Muslim scholar for issuing a decree labeling suicide bombing as non-permissible (harām) in Islam. In an open letter to Malala Yousoufzai, TTP’s activist Adnan Rashid made it clear that she was attacked for opposing Taliban narrative in its writings.229 In the same pursuit, ISIS executed six Muslim clerics for their condemnation of burning of a Jordanian pilot alive by the ISIS militants as disgusting and alien to Islam.230 The ISIS had burnt Mu’ath Kasasbeh alive, a Jordanian pilot taken hostage by ISIS subsequent to the issuance of a fatwā.

Three, the proponents of Nisāb-e-harb argue that for the non-believers the sources from where the morals of war originate are international conventions like Geneva Convention. They violate these morals time and again as they found hardly any binding force behind these morals. On the other hand, Islamic Shariah lays down the morals of war (Ada’āb al-Qitāl) or (Illat al-Qitāl). The proponents of Nisāb-e-Harb argue that Muslims cannot violate these morals because these have divine sanctions behind them even if the enemy crosses all limits in violation of war morals as enunciated by international conventions. The proponents claim that due to the divine sanctions behind these morals, there is no evidence available in military history of the Muslims where they have molested the honour of a lady or where they have killed innocent children.231 There is no denying the fact that Islam has laid down morals of war with divine sanctity behind them in terms of binding force. These morals were enforced with full vigour during the prophetic era and afterwards during the period of the early caliphate. However, the evidence suggests that in case of TTP, there exists huge gap between theory and practice with regard to observance of the morals of war as laid down by Shariah. Their massacre in Peshawar school in December 2014 where

226 Ahya-e-Khilafat, September, 2013 227 Al-Maqdisi, This is our aqeedah, 64; Nisab-e-Harb 228 Maulvi Abdul Jabbar Siddiqui, “Mufti Brathdran aur Din-e-Jamhuriyyat: Mufti Taqi Usmani aur Mufti Rafi Usmani ki Jamhuriyyat ke Muta’laq Ara’a ka Muhakima” (Mufti Brothers and Faith of Democracy: An Overview of the Narrative of Mufti Taqi Usmani and Mufti Rafi Usmani regarding Democracy), Al-Muwahideen Islamic Library, Internet Edition, Muslim World Data Processing Pakistan. 229 Adnan Rashid’s open letter to Malala Yousouf Zai published in Ahya-e Khilafat, September 2013, 34-36 230 Mary Chastain, “ISIS Executes Imams for Condemning Burning of Jordanian Pilot,” BreitBart, February 5, 2015 231 Nisab-Harb,41,42 136

more than one hundred children were killed and many other examples of civilian massacre bring their claims of observance of the morals of war to ashes.232 Four, according to TTP’s Nisāb-e-Harab the political warfare aims to uproot what the militants term as “apostate rulers in the Muslim lands” largely through political tools. These tools include political means to increase public support and reduce the opposition from the society.233 But the evidence suggests that there is huge gap between theory and practice of TTP. They use military means like physical violence against the state and the ruling elite to achieve what they terms as political objectives. Beyond TTP, if viewed even from the broader perspective of militant landscape, it appears that in practice, the militants undertake predominantly the military recourse to achieve their objectives. They epitomize the objectives only for theoretical purposes whereas for all practical purposes they rely largely upon military means. Non-violent means like preaching material and websites etc. are used in terms of support-base for physical violence. Attacks on the ruling elite and politicians in Pakistan and beyond are examples of the use of military means to achieve the political objectives. In Egypt, military means instead of economic means were adopted to damage the tourist industry which was major source of Egyptian economy. The tourists were attacked to discourage them to visit Egypt. Likewise, Bali bombing was an example where military means were adopted to curtail the onslaught of western culture into the Muslim societies. In brief, the following conclusions may be drawn from the above discussion: One, the militants proclaim takfīr to those who follow democracy which amounts to infringing upon the divine domain of law-giving for it recognizes man-made laws. In other words, following democracy implies conversion to a new faith and thus, warrants killings of its followers as a legal requirement (hukm-e-sharī). Moreover, as democracy functions in the sphere of nation-state system, therefore, by rejecting nationalism, the militants condemn those who follow the constitutions of the nation states as apostates and clients of unbelief. Two, theological independence from the permission of rulers to wage jihad by a believer as his individual obligation can be traced back to Azzam who largely followed traditional Sunnite version of jihad focusing solely on aggressor enemy. However, the militants challenge the theological discourse developed over centuries by introducing radical revisions in the theory of jihad. In addition to aggressor enemy, they redirected jihad to home front against those as well who happen to collaborate with infidels against the fellow believers. Three, the imprints of Wahābī ideology in terms of identifying the contemporary Muslim societies with pre-Islamic jāhilliyah are conspicuous in the militants’ narrative. They cherish to revive the purity of Islam and pronounce takfīr against those who introduce bida’ā into the practice of faith. This narrative results in squeezing the boundaries of faith by developing pre-suppositions that those not

232 Daily Motion, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2czgsp_tehreek-e-taliban-pakistan-ttp-claim- responsibility-for-peshawar-school-attack_news, accessed on 22-01-2015 233 Nisab-e-Harab, 55 137

following Wahābī brand of Islam are identified with the followers of pre-Islamic jāhilliyah. Four, despite making frequent references to classical theorists including Ibn Taimmiyah, the militants’ narrative on polemics is more hardcore and strict than the classical theorists. Ibn Taimmiyah avoided proclaiming universal takfīr for the Shiites in general. He did not ex-communicate the Shiite common man but only the leadership whereas the militants do not recognize any such distinction. They seek to unleash and legitimize their violence against the Shiites in collective capacity more on the trajectory of historical accounts of political Islam than on theological grounds. Five, besides approving of violence against the ‘nearer enemy’, they also sanction violence against the ‘apologists’. These apologists include the local supporters of the ‘nearer enemy’ and further those who believe in assimilation of the western socio- political and cultural values. Based on Al-Zawahiri’s account of ‘individual responsibility’, the militant perspective embraces within itself takfīr for those who follow the system which they are a part of including LEAs personnel, other government functionaries and media etc. Six, the militants’ ethics of war do not recognize any distinction between the military and civilian targets. Being a non-Muslim constitutes a cause sufficient enough to become a target of violence. Even in case of the believers, non-subscription of the militant version of faith, mawālāt with non-believers and necessity of collateral damage expose them to violence. Seven, western aggression into the Muslim states which invokes the individual obligation of jihad leads not only to nullification of previous peace agreements between the two nations but also eliminates the future prospects of peace until the liberation of the occupied lands. Last but not the least, the militant narrative is caught up with multiple gaps between the theory and practice. Their urge to secure strategic and political gains and that too under theological cover leads to these gaps. Their narrative gets caught up with multiple contradictions and incoherence when despite glaring inconsistencies between the commandments of faith and their violent actions, they insist on drawing theological legitimacy to their violence. 138

6 Fuel of Faith: Pakistan- A Case Study

During the last decade, thousands of Muslims lost their lives due to the present conflict. These large scale killings failed to evoke the response by the society at large as well as on the part of the state to stem this tide of relentless killings of the Muslims at the hands of the militants. This situation is primarily result of many factors which require inquiry not only into the causes of violence but a fresh insight has to be made on the underlying motivational factors that have driven the militants to cause such carnages within the Muslim society from which it remained immune for many centuries. The current chapter will precisely focus on the people involved in killings of the fellow Muslims within the context of Pakistan in the name of religion and will trace their ideological and motivational factors through the lenses of their wider contexts within the framework of jihadi’ bent crouched in the name of liberating Islam. The analysis will revolve around qualitative interviews of different religious leaders of various sects and sample survey of religious clergy in Pakistani society within the context of jihad, violence and takfīr. In addition, the study will further trace their genesis, evolution and development in the wake of present intellectual discourse pertaining to use of violence against the fellow Muslims and its use as the primary means to serve Islam. It will also be proved that militants and their masterminds do not operate in silos but are invariably linked with each other through their belief in use of violence developed by their ideologies based upon modifications in the ideology of Islam. While exploring localized ideological environment in the Pakistani society, the research will progress on the following trajectories: degeneration of the Muslims, boundaries of faith, takfīr followed by killings on polemical grounds, theological status of suicide attacks, khurūj against the Muslim rulers, question of compatibility between Islam and democracy and question of theological legitimacy of jihad undertaken without the approval of those in authority. The empirical evidence drawn therefrom will be weighed against the terrorists’ profiles to the points of convergence or divergence, as the case may be, from the ideological streams developed by the localized ulema in the society.

6.1 Localized Ideological Environment The western scholarship is divided on the question of interrelationship between terrorism and the religious seminaries. The profiling of the militants in the contextual framework provided by the ideology leads to two fundamentally opposite streams. Some like Jessica Stern (2000, 2001), Peter Singer (2001) and Robert Looney (2002) believe in strong relevance that exists between traditional religious seminaries and ideological indoctrination of the militants. Others like Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey (2006)who failed to collect any affirmative evidence regarding madrassa background of the terrorists reject the theme that provides for close linkage between the terrorists and the religious seminaries as sources of indoctrination. They find that most of the 139

terrorists involved in major acts of terrorism including World Trade Centre bombing 1993, bombings of the US embassies in Africa in 1998, 9/11 attacks and Bali bombings had background of secular education. The same notion has been shared by Marc Sageman (2004) and Alexander Evans (2006).

As against both of these streams, this study exposes the non-exhaustive nature of these themes. Their proponents ascertain direct, formal and primary linkages between the religious seminaries and the terrorists and most of the part underestimate indirect, informal and secondary sources of indoctrination of the militants. In religious seminaries, the ulema are constrained to influence only those who formally join madrassa education system whereas the secular section of the society remains out of bounds for these ulema. However, in an indirect and informal arrangement, the localized ulema though not necessarily, madrassa clergy have the means to influence the mindset of otherwise secular elements in the Muslim societies as a whole. These ulema constitute the group which as Stephen Humphreys puts it ‘makes the Muslim society Islamic’.1 They happen to cut across almost every section of the Muslim society and are found operating in the capacities ranging from semi-literate imams in country-side mosques to foreign qualified heads of large seminaries. This portion is not related to discern the authentic and valid standpoint of ulema in sectarian contexts which naturally comes out from those ulema who are considered theologically well qualified. It aims at discovering intellectual streams as and how these flow in the society largely through semi-literate imams. As said earlier, these imams have access to even more diverse range of audience than the formal madrassa ulema who have interaction mostly with those enrolled as formal madrassa students. This source of what we term as ‘informal religious indoctrination’ is by-product of remodeling of the education system in the colonial era. In the Indian context, madras system in pre- colonial era was designed to educate the Indians for the state employment as well as to produce religious leadership.2 However, with the replacement of madrassas with the missionary schools and Persian language with English, this system was virtually deprived of their input in the state employment. They were relegated only to produce religious leadership for India and were no more capable of making significant contributions in the public sphere. As a side effect of this marginalization and compartmentalization of religious and temporal spheres, the clergy assumed unimpeachable authority in all the matters religious. Even otherwise, secular educated class was left with hardly any choice but to look towards semi-literate imams for routine guidance in the matters of faith. In this situation, as said earlier, besides madrassa ulema, clergy working beyond madrassa system could find even diverse audience for themselves.

1 R. Stephen Humphreys, “Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry”, I. B. Tauris Publishers, New York: 2009 p. 187 2 This system owes a lot to Mullah Nizamuddin Sehalvi of Madrassah Farangi Mahal, Lakhnow who codified Dars-e-Nizami curriculum for Madrassa education which is followed by most of the Madaris even today. 140

In this perspective, this study approaches the ulema belonging to three major sects namely Ahl-e-hadīth, Deobandis and Barelvis formally associated with the madrassa system or working beyond it. A sample survey has been conducted upon the clergy belonging to these sects to test their intellectual response to the streams leading to militancy. In addition to sample survey, structured interviews have also been conducted so that detailed account of the ulema’s response in the context of jihad, takfīr and violence could be examined. The views expressed by the respondents may not reflect the collective standpoint of a particular sect rather these are views as nurtured and projected by semi-literate clergy who claim to follow a certain sect and thus, influence their audience and indoctrinate their own views in their minds.

6.1.1 Degeneration of the Muslims

As discussed elsewhere, rhetoric to overcome the prevalent degeneration of the Muslims through reviving the religious ideals of Islam constitute the hallmark of the militant ideology. In this context, the respondents during this survey were asked to ascertain the major factors contributing to the contemporary degeneration in the Muslims. Out of the given options as mentioned in Table 6.1, the dominant majority attributed the current degeneration in Muslims to their alienation from the religious ideals. The survey conducted on three sects reflects that 80% of ahl-e-hadīth respondents attributed this degeneration to religious alienation alone whereas negligible segment of this sect attributed it to moral or political factors. This affirms ahl-e-hadīth respondents’ subscription of the ideology of Ibn Abdul Wahāb who, as discussed elsewhere, drew parallel between pre-Islamic jāhilliyah and his contemporary degenerated Arab society. He argued that same evils had surfaced in contemporary society which had been contaminating the pre-Islamic Arab society against whom the prophetic struggle was directed.

Apart from ahl-e-hadīth, the majority of the Hanfite respondents too, held alienation from religious ideals as the primary cause leading to degeneration in the Muslim societies. Amongst the Hanfites, 46% of the Barelvi respondents and 60% of Deobandi respondents declared estrangement from religion as the prime cause of the Muslims’ degeneration. However, 30% from both of the Hanfite sects attributed this degeneration to moral turpitude whereas 25% of the Barelvis regarded this degeneration as an outcome of political decadence. If we look in between the lines, not unlike ahl-e-hadīth, even with these Hanfite sects, religious alienation constitutes the major cause of this degeneration as morality and politics are not taken to be independent variables by the Muslims in general. They claim to develop their moral and political ideals not beyond the umbrella of religion. Nevertheless, unlike those who draw inspiration from Wahābī ideology, the Hanfites avoid to draw parallel between pre-Islamic Arab society and the so called contemporary degenerated Muslim societies.

141

Table 6-1 Major Causes of Muslims’ Degeneration What are the major causes of the Muslims’ degeneration? Religious Moral Political Any Other Do Not Know 1. Ahl-e-hadīth 88 6 6 0 0 2. Hanfite/ Barelvi 45 30 25 0 0 3. Hanfite/Deobandi 60 30 0 0 10 Source: Field Research by the Author

6.1.2 Boundaries of Faith

The degeneration in the Muslim societies occurred when the purity of faith got contaminated owing to different bida’ā that crept into the practice of faith over the period of time. The survey respondents were asked whether commission of bida’ā puts an otherwise believer outside the limits of faith. Majority of the respondents coming from all the three sects included in the survey responded in negative. As shown in Table 6.2, only 20% of ahl-e-hadīth and 15% of Deobandi respondents held that introducing bida’ā into faith puts a believer outside the boundaries of faith. This is, of course, a minority view which does not represent collective standpoint of a particular sect. The data also reflects revisions in the intellectual standpoint of ahl-e- hadīth who generally draw their ideological inspiration from Ibn Abdul Wahāb who in his condemnation of bida’ā had gone to the extent of declaring the 19th century Arab society nothing short of pre-Islamic jāhilliyah.

Moreover, the local ulema, irrespective of their sectarian affiliations, had agreed opinion that only refutation of categorical injunctions of the Quran and the Sunnah (nassūs-qattiyā) put someone outside the boundaries of faith. However, there are voices within the local ulema that mere verbal affirmation of the fundamentals of faith does not suffice to become a believer rather verbal declarations must be followed by supportive actions. If someone claims to be a believer but his actions are found in clear violation of the fundamentals of the faith, he would not be placed in the ranks of the believers.3

Table 6-2 Takfīr on the Basis of Bida’ā

Does commission of bida’ā put any believer outside the pale of Islam? Yes No Don’t Know 1. Ahl-e-hadīth 20 80 0 2. Hanfite/ Barelvi 0 100 0 3. Hanfite/Deobandi 15 80 5 Source: Field Research by the Author

3 Author’s interview with Maulana Ammar Nasir, Deputy Director, Al-Shariah Academy, Gujranwala on December 20, 2014; also, author’s interview with Maulana Abdul Sattar Hamid, Provincial President, Jamiat ahl-e-hadīth, Punjab. 142

6.1.3 Takfīr of the Shiites and Violence on Sectarian Grounds

To uncover the local ulema’s approach to the dynamics of takfīr on the trajectory of polemics, the survey respondents were questioned if the Shiites stood outside the boundaries of faith. As shown in Table 6.3, in general, not a single respondent from ahl-e-hadīth pronounced takfīr to the Shiites. Only 8% of Barelvi respondents did not subscribe to the faithfulness of the Shiites. In the opinion of 60% of Deobandi respondents Shiites in general fall outside the limits of faith. These results emerged from a more generalized question regarding the religious status of the Shiites.

The response towards the Shiite became more precise and clear when the clergy were given an opportunity to qualify their response through qualitative interviews. The response of the ulema was divided on the status of the Shiites who believed in the primacy of the right of Ali to the office of caliphate. Those who avoided pronouncing takfīr to the Shiites in general argued that though their interpretations of religious edicts and narration of historical facts were lacked in authenticity yet they believed in the finality of the prophet hood of Hazrat Muhammad and also believed in the authenticity of the Shariah. Therefore, they could not be declared as unbelievers. However, there was consensus amongst the clergy that the Shiites who fall in the following categories stand outside the fold of Islam: one, ghālī Shiites who exaggerate the status of Ali to the level of divinity4; two, tabrāī Shiites who slander the companions of the Prophet and three, who do not believe in the companionship of the Abu Bakr.5 Belief in the companionship of Abu Bakr is considered to be mandatory to become a Muslim because it is established in the holy Quran in the following words: “If ye help him not, still Allah helped him when those who disbelieve drove him forth, the second of two; when they two were in the cave, when he said unto his comrade: Grieve not. Lo! Allah is with us.” (At-Tawbah: 40)

Table 6-3 Takfīr of the Shiites Do the Shiites stand outside the boundaries of the faith? Yes No Don’t Know 1. Ahl -e-hadīth 0 100 0 2. Hanfite/ Barelvi 8 92 0 3. Hanfite/Deobandi 60 40 0 Source: Field Research by the Author

So far as violence on the grounds of polemics is concerned, the survey, as shown in Table 6.4 found consensus in the ranks of the local ulema belonging to all the three sects that sectarian differences do not permit violence. In interviews, the ulema were found in agreement on the conditions that sanction the killings of an otherwise believer. The conditions include killings for Qisās, stoning to death (rajam) of someone married who commit zina and killings for committing apostasy. However,

4 Ibid. 5 Author’s interview with Maulana Rafiq Ahmed Majaddadi, Sajjada Nasheen Khanqah Abu-al Biyan, Gujranwala 143

there are also other conditions like killing of one who create violence in the land (fasād fil aradh) which are not free from juristic differences. The ulema happened not to support violence on the grounds of polemics mainly because of two reasons: one, most of them do not believe in takfīr of the Shiites as a sect in general and two, even those who are not inclined to acknowledge the Shiites as believers, they support to get their fate decided through the legal process.

Table 6-4 Sectarian Violence Do Sectarian differences provide grounds for killings? Yes No Don’t Know 1. Ahl-al- Hadīth 0 100 0 2. Hanfite/ Barelvi 0 92 8 3. Hanfite/Deobandi 0 100 0 Source: Field Research by the Author

6.1.4 Suicide attacks against whom Qitāl is Warranted

As the phenomenon of suicide attacks being used as war tactics by the militants has conspicuous theological connotations, therefore, the survey respondents were asked about the permissibility of launching suicide attacks against whom armed jihad is sanctioned. As reflected in Table 6.5, almost half of the respondents from the three sects were found convinced of theological sanction of the suicide attacks against whom Qitāl was warranted. However, 50% of the respondents from each sect declared the suicide attacks as non-permissible (harām) in any case whatsoever.

In personal interviews with ulema, those who believed in the permissibility of the suicide attacks in the given scenario argued that suicide attacks in terms of war tactics should not be viewed in the context of suicide per se but as a tool to inflict more damage to an enemy against whom jihad was sanctioned. On the other side, those who believed that suicide attacks were non-permissible in any scenario whatsoever made inference from the Quranic verse that reads as under: “Spend your wealth for the cause of Allah, and be not cast by your own hands to ruin; and do good. Lo! Allah loveth the beneficent.” (Al-Baqarah: 195).

Table 6-5 Permissibility of Suicide Attacks Is it permissible to launch suicide attacks against whom Qitāl is sanctioned by the Shariah? Yes No Don’t Know 1. Ahl-e-hadīth 47 53 0 2. Hanfite/ Barelvi 46 46 8 3. Hanfite/Deobandi 40 50 10 Source: Field Research by the Author 144

6.1.5 Khurūj against Unjust Muslim Rulers

Targeting what the militants term as ‘the nearer enemy’ constitutes one the most important codes of war with the militants. In this context, to discern the approach of the religious clergy on this issue in Pakistani society, the respondents in the survey were asked whether it was permissible for the believers to stand in revolt against the Muslim rulers even if they were unjust. During the survey, it was found that 73% of Ahl–e-hadīth respondents did not believe in the permissibility of khurūj against the Muslim rulers even if they were unjust. Similarly, the Hanfite Barelvi respondents also supported traditional Sunnite standpoint that did not approve of khurūj even against invalid Muslim rulers. Amongst the Barelvi respondents, 77% declared it non- permissible for the believers to stand against the unjust Muslim rulers. However, 90% of the Deobandi respondents, as contrary to traditional Sunnite view believed in permissibility of khurūj against unjust Muslim rulers. (See, Table 6.6)

Table 6-6 Khurūj against Unjust Rulers Is it permissible for the believers to revolt against unjust Muslim rulers? Yes No Don’t Know 1. ahl-e-hadīth 20 73 7 2. Hanfite/ Barelvi 23 77 0 3. Hanfite/Deobandi 90 10 0

Source: Field Research by the Author

In interviews, some Deobandi ulema argued that though the question of khurūj had not been discussed in Quran yet importance of obeying those in authority was well established in traditions of the Prophet (sw). Moreover, it is also evident from Abu Bakr’s address on assuming the caliphate wherein he made it clear that the rulers could command obedience of the believers as long as they remain obedient to Allah and His Prophet (sw). Though both Barelvi and Deobandi ulema follow the Hanfite school yet during the interviews the ulema from both sects had differences in their interpretation of historical facts about the standpoint of Imam Abu Hanifa on the question of khurūj against unjust Muslim rulers. Some of the Barelvi respondents out rightly ruled out any allowance in the Hanfite ideology to revolt against unjust Muslim rulers until they remain Muslims.6 On the other hand, some Deobandi respondents argued that in principle, the Hanfite jurisprudence permitted the believers to commit khurūj against the unjust rulers as was evident from the support of Imam Abu Hanifa to the khurūj of Imam Zaid bin Ali and Nafs-e-Zakiyyah. However, in view of repeated failures of these attempts of khurūj, the Hanfite ulema too, do not support such attempts simply because they are less likely to succeed.7

However, during the course of the interviews when the ulema were asked if there was any situation which absolved the believers from the onus of obedience to the rulers,

6 Ibid. 7 Interview with Maulana Ammar Khan Nasir 145

there was consensus amongst them that disobedience to Allah and his Prophet on the part of the rulers would deprive them of the right to command obedience of the believers.8 It is established by the following tradition of the Prophet: “There is no obedience to the creation in disobedience to the Creator."9 Moreover, in another tradition, the Prophet has been reported to have said: “Obedience is in what is right."10The respondents were divided on the question that if the Muslim rulers’ support to non-believers against the fellow Muslims would deprive them of the right to claim obedience from the believers. The dominant majority of Ahl-e-hadīth and Barelvi respondents did not approve of khurūj even if the rulers supported non- believers against the fellow Muslims which was otherwise immoral and disapproved by Shariah. However, majority of the Deobandi respondents approved of khurūj against the rulers in this scenario on the grounds that the believers were ordained to cooperate in the acts of piety and virtue alone. If the Muslim rulers unjustly cooperate only with the non-believers against some section of the fellow believers, it extends such affected Muslims the right to stand up against such rulers. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 6.7 only 7% of Ahl-e-hadīth, 38% of Barelvi and 10% of Deobandi respondents considered it permissible for the Muslims to launch suicide attacks against the rulers even if they support the non-believers against the fellow Muslims.

Table 6-7 Permissibility of Suicide Attacks against the Supporters of the Non- Believers Is it permissible for the Muslims to commit suicide attacks against those who support unbelievers against the fellow Muslims? Yes No Don’t Know 1. Ahl-e-hadīth 7 93 0 2. Hanfite/ Barelvi 38 54 8 3. Hanfite/Deobandi 10 80 10 Source: Field Research by the Author

Again, in the context of khurūj, the respondents were asked whether demand for the enforcement of Shariah would make allowance for the khurūj against the existing rulers. As Table 6.8 shows, only 33% of Ahl-e-hadīth, 8% of Barelvi and 25% of Deobandi ulema responded in affirmation against majority of the respondents who did not approve of khurūj even to make demand for the enforcement of Shariah. Against them, majority of the respondents were opposed to commission of khurūj even for the enforcement of Shariah. Besides this, during the course of interviews, majority of the ulema from diverse sectarian backgrounds were found in favor of adopting peaceful means for the enforcement of Shariah largely through preaching (da’awā wal arshād).

8 Interview with Maulana Abdul Sattar Hamid 9 Musnad Ahmed; Hakim, Mustadrak 10Sahih Bukhari; Sahih Muslim 146

Table 6-8 Khurūj to Demand enforcement of Shariah Is it permissible for the Muslims to commit khurūj against the Muslim rulers on the basis of demand for the enforcement of Shariah? Yes No Don’t Know 1. Ahl-e-hadīth 33 60 7 2. Hanfite/ Barelvi 8 92 0 3. Hanfite/Deobandi 25 75 0 Source: Field Research by the Author

It also became evident that in a scenario where the Muslim rulers made oppression against a group of Muslims, the majority of the Ahl-e-hadīth and Barelvi ulema did not acknowledge the right to armed revolt against the rulers. However, majority of the Deobandi ulema gave the oppressed right to rise in armed revolt against the oppressor rulers but only in self-defense. They further argued that this armed struggle should be purpose-specific to counter the oppression and it would in no way aimed at acquiring the political authority through uprooting the existing one.

As shown in Table 6.9, an analysis of the available data on the question of khurūj highlighted that the respondents who supported khurūj against the rulers too had different approaches. 20% of Ahl-e-hadīth supported khurūj against the injustice on the part of the rulers whereas this ratio rose up to 33% with those who supported khurūj to demand for the enforcement of Shariah. Nevertheless, with the Hanfites, this tendency was opposite from Ahl-e-hadīth. For instance, 23% of the Barelvi respondents supported khurūj against the injustice of the rulers whereas on the question of khurūj to demand for the enforcement of Shariah, this ratio declined to 8%. Similarly, 90% of Deobandi respondents were in favor of khurūj against unjust Muslim rulers whereas in the context of enforcement of Shariah, this ratio fell to 25%.

Table 6-9 Permissibility of Khurūj against Injustice of Muslim Rulers and Khurūj to Demand for the enforcement of Shariah: a Comparison Khurūj against Injustice Khurūj for Shariah 1. Ahl-e-hadīth 20 33 2. Hanfite/ Barelvi 23 8 3. Hanfite/Deobandi 90 25 Source: Field Research by the Author

6.1.6 Democracy and Islam

As discussed in the previous chapters, a major part of the militants’ struggle is directed against those who follow democratic ideology. The survey respondents were asked if there existed any incompatibility between democracy and Islam. As shown in Table 6.10 below, 13% of Ahl-e-hadīth, 38% of Barelvi and 45% of Deobandi respondents declared democracy incompatible with Islam. In interviews, there was found consensus amongst the ulema belonging to all the three sects that democracy in 147

terms of an ideology based upon popular sovereignty stood in contradiction to the spirit of Islam that categorically declared sovereignty to be an exclusive attribute of Allah.11 In other words, in terms of public participation in the decision-making process, democracy found divided response from the respondents whereas as a system that was based upon popular sovereignty, democracy and Islam were unanimously viewed mutually exclusive.

Table 6-10 Democracy and Islam Is Democracy Incompatible with Islam? Yes No Don’t Know 1. Ahl-e-hadīth 13 87 0 2. Hanfite/ Barelvi 38 54 8 3. Hanfite/Deobandi 45 55 0 Source: Field Research by the Author

6.1.7 Permission of Muslim Rulers to Wage Jihad

The contemporary militants diaspora is comprised of self-starting individuals who draw inspiration from the stereo-types that fuel them to launch self-proclaimed jihad within a Muslim state or without in their private capacities and beyond the umbrella of their respective rulers. In this backdrop, besides ascertaining the views of the respondents regarding various conditions that sanction jihad in their respective ideological frames, the respondents were also asked whether permission of the Muslim rulers was pre-requisite to launch jihad even against whom it was sanctioned. Though majority of both Hanfite sects were convinced that jihad could only be waged with the approval of the Muslim rulers yet 13% of Barelvi and 10% of Deobandi believed otherwise. In case of Ahl-e-hadīth, 63% of the respondents had the conviction that permission of the rulers was not required whereas 37% were convinced that permission of the rulers was pre-condition to wage jihad. (See, Table 6.11) Analysis of the available data leads us to argue that on the question of the requirement of the permission of the Muslim rulers for jihad, all the three sects have differences in their ranks. Besides Ahl-e-hadīth whose majority do not consider the Muslim rulers’ permission as pre-requisite to launch jihad, there exists a non- negligible stream even within the Hanfite sects which support launching of jihad by the believers in their personal capacities.

Table 6-11 Jihad without Rulers’ Permission Can a group of Muslims launch jihad without permission of a Muslim Government? Yes No Don’t Know 1. Ahl-e-hadīth 63 38 0 2. Hanfite/ Barelvi 13 87 0 3. Hanfite/Deobandi 10 90 0 Source: Field Research by the Author

11 Interview with Maulana Ammar Khan Nasir 148

In view of the survey findings and the complementary interviews with the religious leaders, following conclusions can be drawn: one, the current degeneration in the Muslim societies is an outcome of ideological alienation of the Muslim masses in general; two, though in minority but there exists a stream within the religious leadership especially with ahl-e-hadīth and Deobandis that tends to proclaim takfīr on the basis of commission of bida’ā into the practice of faith; three, though dominant majority of the Sunnite ulema do not believe in the Shiite narrative of historical facts and their interpretations of religious edicts, yet not unlike classical theorists, they do not pronounce takfīr to them as collective entity. However, in current scenario, Deobandis are more vocal in their takfīr of the Shiites as compared to Barelvis and Ahl-e-hadīth. Though there is unanimity amongst the Sunnite clergy regarding takfīr of ghālī and tabrāī Shiites, yet Deobandis do not hesitate to proclaim takfīr to them in general too. They argue that since, the concept of takayya with the Shiites provide them with a religiously approved way to conceal their actual views so it becomes difficult to make categorization between them on the question of takfīr; four, despite conviction of some ulema regarding takfīr of otherwise believers on the trajectory of either polemics or commission of bida’ā, there is unanimity amongst them that Shariah does not sanction killings on the grounds of difference in the matters of beliefs (aqāid). However, this unanimity amongst the ulema regarding prohibition (hurmat) of the killings on the basis of differences in beliefs is not enough to avoid reactionary response across the society against the followers of such sects against whom fatāwā of takfīr exist. In other words, despite unanimity of opinion against killings on sectarian grounds, the stream that is based upon takfīr in this context has the potential to unleash a wave of violence on polemical grounds on behalf of certain reactionary elements; five, there is a sharp divide amongst the local ulema irrespective of their sectarian affiliations regarding theological permissibility of suicide attacks against whom jihad (Qitāl) is warranted. A large section of ulema does not believe in taking suicide attacks against the enemy in terms of suicide per se rather they view this phenomenon in terms of a tool to inflict damage to the enemy; six, though in principle, the Sunnites do not support khurūj against the Muslim rulers yet strong streams exist with the local clergy that provide for khurūj against the Muslim rulers in case they are unjust, support the non-believers against the fellow Muslims and on the grounds to demand for the enforcement of Shariah; seven, a large section of the Muslim clergy believe in mutual incompatibility between Islam and democracy and last but not the least, though majority of the Hanfite clergy believe that permission of the rulers is pre-requisite to extend legitimacy to jihad against the enemy, yet a minority section with the Hanfite do exist that believe in legitimacy of jihad even without approval of the rulers. In case of Ahl-e-hadīth, majority of the local clergy have been found to be convinced that permission of the rulers is not imperative to wage jihad against the enemy.

The above drawn conclusions reflect the nature of ideological environment as projected by so-called localized clergy. In order to determine that how this ideological environment allows, condone or support the people who are directly involved in 149

killings and militancy across wider spectrum of Muslim society primarily focusing on state elements including LEAs personnel who challenge them and the Shiites. The linkage between these two streams of violence will be traced through identification of their beliefs, social backgrounds, group identities, participation in other conflicts outside the country and ambitions to salvage the Ummah from unbelief, apostasy and heresies in line with their ideology nurtured by ulema in the wider society as discussed earlier in this chapter.

6.2 Militant Landscape

The following portion of this chapter is devoted to discern the militants’ response in terms of terrorist activities to the afore-mentioned intellectual streams as espoused by ulema coming from diverse sectarian backgrounds. Through the quantification of their response, an attempt has been made to discover the points of convergence or divergence as the case may be in relation to ulema’s approach. This quantification has been made analyzing the data of 100 terrorists involved in different cases of terrorism across Pakistan during the last one decade. The terrorists included in the sample are mainly those who have been either directly involved in the acts of terrorism or were handlers and facilitators of the terrorists. However, one cannot escape limitations regarding data collection of the terrorist activities in one way or the other. These limitations include difficulties in direct access to the terrorists apprehended by LEAs, analyzing the terrorism patterns as the terrorists keep on changing their strategies and targets deliberately to maintain element of surprise, and problems in selection of the sample using traditional techniques as they are moved by ideological concerns rather than anything else. In view of these limitations, the data collected in this study largely rely on police interrogation reports.

This part of the study aims to explain the dynamics of local environment surrounding the terrorists’ diaspora in the context of Pakistan. The empirical evidence will be examined to identify the nature of targets and modes of violence adopted by the terrorists. On these paradigms, the study while ascertaining the ideological strands of the terrorist networks operating in Pakistan seeks to explore the question that how far it is true that militant landscape in Pakistan reflects converging trends between terrorist operations and the intellectual streams espoused by ulema with regard to crucial issues of jihad, takfīr and violence.

6.2.1 Localized Militant Environment

This study examines the environment surrounding the local terrorists’ networks in Pakistan. In this regard, academic background, age groups, sectarian affiliations, nature of terrorist networks and their linkage with theatres of international conflict will be examined. 150

6.2.1.1 Academic Background We argued in the opening part of this chapter that religious seminaries are not the sole source of indoctrination as is commonly assumed by some sections of the western scholarship rather this indoctrination also partly originates from the religious segments of the society who are otherwise external to formal madrassa system. These elements include semi-literate imams who have more diverse range of audience as compared to madrassa ulema. The madrassa ulema have access largely to those enrolled as formal madrassa students whereas semi-literate local imams have potential to indoctrinate even the secular elements of the society as well. The data collected of the terrorists reflects that 19% of them have purely religious education background as against 28% of them having secular education background whereas 49% of the terrorists in the sample have both types of education. (See, Table 6.12)

Table 6-12 Academic Background Academic Background (%) Religious Secular Both Illiterate 19 28 49 4 Source: Field Research by the Author

As shown in Table 6.13, amongst those having religious education background, 57% had religious education of primary level whereas 20% of them had secondary level madrassa education. There were only 23% who had post-secondary level religious madrassa education. Primary level madrassa education includes rudimentary learning which most of the part includes learning to read Quran in madrassa. Secondary level madrassa education includes memorizing the holy book (Hifz-e-Quran) and going through various books of traditions of the Prophet (Daura-e-hadīth). The post- secondary level madrassa education includes Dars-e-Nizami and Almiyyah Course.

Table 6-13 Religious Education Religious Education (%) Primary Secondary Post-secondary 57 20 23 Source: Field Research by the Author

Amongst those educated in secular traditions, 47% of the terrorists were under- Matric, 32% had Matriculation, 9% had intermediate level of education, and 9% were graduates whereas 3% had education of post-Graduation level. (Table 6.14) Further inquiry reveals that against 68% having direct academic linkage with madrassa system, amongst those who had purely secular academic background, 25% had indirect and secondary madrassa connection whereas 33% got linkage with terror networks through local imams whereas 42% of the secularly educated were directly influenced by the militants’ propaganda. The data analysis leads to the conclusion that terrorist operatives in Pakistan are not necessarily the primary product of the madrassa system alone. Further that madrassa education is not the sole variable in their 151

indoctrination rather they also hail from secularly educated class which is exposed to alternative sources of indoctrination. These sources have been identified as indirect linkage with madrassa system through immediate or extended family members, peers’ linkage with religious seminaries, semi-literate local imams and above all, the militant propaganda tools in the locality.

Table 6-14 Secular Education Secular Education (%) Under Matric Matric Intermediate Graduation Post-Graduation 47 32 9 9 3 Source: Field Research by the Author

6.2.1.2 Age Group The local militant environment further rejects the commonly held notion that teenagers are the most likely targets of the indoctrination that leads them to join the ranks of the terrorist organizations. The data suggests that only 7% of the terrorists arrested were below 20 years of age, 39% were in 20-30 years bracket whereas 48% were between 30-40 years of age. The ratio of those above 40 years was only 7%. The empirical evidence leads to the argument that indoctrination is not necessarily somewhat which is made by the extremist terrorism ideologues to teenagers through short and random religious sermons. It is developed through long process with multiple formal and informal variables working behind it. Though brainwashing of teenagers who become fuel of terrorism takes place with the terrorist ideologues in the immediate context yet the long term variables like family environment and peer influence are, of course, the complementary factors behind this brain washing. Once radicalized, these long term variables appear to be relatively more relevant to forestall the efforts for their de-radicalization. (See, Table 6.15)

Table 6-15 Age Group Age Group (%) Below 20 Below 30 Below 40 Above 40 7 39 48 7 Source: Police Interrogation Reports

6.2.1.3 Linkage with Theatres of International Conflict As said earlier, the ideological indoctrination of the terrorists draws its roots from the surrounding milieu. However, the impact of the environment becomes more vehement when supported by volatile physical conditions like the one emerging from international aggressions. The linkage of the localized terrorists and their networks with the theatres of international conflict becomes a conspicuous feature of the militant environment in Pakistan. The theatres of international conflict provide venues for the development of comradeships amongst the militants. As reflected in Table 6.16, the data suggests that 47% of the terrorists have been fighting in Afghanistan, 6% in Indian held Kashmir and 2% have been in the Middle East some way or the 152

other. In most of the cases, these terrorists developed their comradeship in these war theatres. This companionship continued to exist even on their return to their homeland but, indeed, with changed targets largely from external enemy to domestic enemy. Most of the proscribed militant organizations operating within Pakistan have the history of fighting in the theatres of international conflicts. For instance, militant organizations like Al-Badr, Jaish-e-Muhammad have the past of fighting in Indian held Kashmir whereas groups like Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Harkat-e-jihad-e-Islamī have also the history of fighting against the Indians in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) and against the imperialist forces in Afghanistan as well. The militants view fighting against the imperialist enemy as fard-e-ayn. Though, 45% of them did not have any experience of practical participation in internal conflict yet they could find FATA in terms of militants’ fusion center after American invasion of Afghanistan in the post- 9/11 scenario when the militants fled to the Pakistani side of the Pak-Afghan border.

Table 6-16 Linkage with International Conflict Linkage with Theaters of International Conflict (%) Nil Afghanistan Kashmir Middle East 45 47 6 2 Source: Police Interrogation Reports

6.2.1.4 Sectarian Affiliations The terrorists examined in this study were found to be predominantly from Deobandi sect whereas 5% of them had affiliations with Barelvi sect and 2% were from Ahl-e- hadīth. This is not to infer from the predominant affiliation of the terrorists examined in this study with Deobandi sect that Hanfite Deobandi sect as such sanctions terrorist activities yet the streams developed by the semi-literate ulema, as examined elsewhere in this chapter, provide the seeds of this radicalization. For instance, 90% of the localized so-called clergy were prompt to proclaim legitimacy to khurūj against the Muslim rulers if they were unjust as compared to 20% and 23% of the clergy from Ahl-e-hadīth and Barelvi sects respectively. Nevertheless, as the data is not free from ‘availability syndrome’, which does not allow to draw conclusions in comparative framework yet it do provides window to view the streams flowing out of the sectarian backgrounds as they are projected by the localized clergy. In view of this, it may well be argued that though most of the terrorists examined in this study had Deobandi affiliations yet the evidence further confirms that Barelvi and Ahl-e-hadīth sects were not absolutely free from these streams. (Table 6.17)

Table 6-17 Sectarian Affiliations Sectarian Affiliation (%) Barelvi Deobandi Ahl-e-hadīth 5 93 2 Source: Police Interrogation Reports 153

6.2.1.5 Ideologically Diffused Nature of Terrorist Networks The empirical evidence as shown in Table 6.18 suggests that TTP and LeJ have the biggest terrorist following in the country whereas other organizations that occupy their place in terror networks include Al-Badr, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkat-ul- Mujahideen12, Harkat-e-jihad-e-Islamī and Lashkar-e-Khurasan etc.

Table 6-18 Organizational Affiliations Organizational Affiliation (%)

Harkat-ul- Harkat-e-jihad-e- Lashkar-e- Al-Badar TTP JM LEJ Others Mujahideen Islami Khurasan

4 21 7 9 30 12 5 12 Source: Police Interrogation Reports

Table 6-19 Multiple Organizational Affiliations Multiple Organizational Affiliations (%) One Two Three Four 48 34 14 4 Source: Police Interrogation Reports

The study finds organizational affiliations at a subordinate position vis-à-vis to ideological diffusion in the terrorists’ networks. This ideological convergence provides space for the operatives to switch over from one organization to another without deviating from their original ideological standpoints. The data shows that 48% of the terrorists were associated with single organization, 34% had the history of switching over from at least one organization to another, 14% have changed their organizational affiliations thrice and 4% had changed their affiliations for as more as four times. (See, Table 6.19) The commonalities in ideological viewpoints makes the terrorist networks an amalgam of ideologically diffused organizations that provide space for horizontal movement of their members.

The following figure 6.1 highlights the linkage of different organizations through the shifting of affiliations of their operatives within the terror networks. The data suggests that terrorists keep on changing their organizational affiliations according to their convenience without being felt hindered by the ideological constraints.

12 It is also labelled as Harkat-ul-Ansaar and Jamiat-ul-Ansār 154

Figure 6-1 Inter-organization Movement

Al- Badr LEJ/Sipah e Sahaba

TTP Harket-e-jihad- e-Islami

Jaish-e - Lashker –e- Muhammad Khurasan

Harkat Ul Others Mujahedeen

Source: Police Interrogation Reports

Such a close nexus between these organizations is possible only if they are ideologically diffused. This diffusion is mostly reflected through their commonality of targets and modes adopted for their violent activities. As shown in figure 6.1 the data shows that there exists strong commonality of targets amongst the militant organizations across the country. The shared targets include fighting against the imperialist forces and their Muslim supporters in the theatres of war, fighting the Muslim rulers who are accused of collaborating with the infidels against the fellow Muslims and also those who are found in support of these regimes like the apologists, coercive organs like army, LEAs, and other government establishments, the Shiites, those who are accused of committing bida’ā into the practice of faith, foreigner as 155

well as local non-Muslim civilians and above all, the political activists who support democracy. Besides the targets, the modes of violence adopted by these organizations also provide them points of convergence. For instance, in addition to conventional types of attacks, suicidal attacks, kidnapping for ransom and robberies are modes of violence that are common with the major terrorist organizations working in Pakistan.

6.2.2 Ideological Framework of the Terrorists

The following discussion delineating upon the targets and modes of violence commonly adopted by the terrorist networks will identify ideological stands of the terrorists in comparison with ideological viewpoint of the local ulema as established through empirical analysis in this chapter on the trajectories of crucial issues relevant to militancy in Pakistan.

As shown in Table 6.21, out of the terrorists whose profiles have been examined in this study, 17% have the history of fighting against the imperialist enemy in the war theatres, 34% have been involved in fighting against the ‘nearer enemy’ or those that constitute its support-base including army, LEAs, government establishments, the apologists and pro-government political activists. There were 35% who have been involved in violence on sectarian fault lines. Most of them (28%) had their violence directed against the Shiites whereas 4% have been involved in killings of the Barelvis. Besides this, there were 3% who have been involved in attacks on the holy shrines. In addition to these targets, foreign civilians have been targeted by 5% of the terrorists whereas 7% were found involved in killings of civilian non-Muslims domestically including Hindus, Christians and Qadianis. Furthermore, 2% have been involved in the killings of political activists for their support to democratic norms. For the purpose of this study, the ratios are not as important as the nature of targets is because it exposes the ideological orientation of the militants.

Table 6-20 Nature of Targets Nature of Targets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Civilian Imperialist Nearer Foreign Advocates of Shiites Barelvis Shrines Non- Enemy Enemy Civilians Democracy Muslims

17 34 5 28 4 3 7 2 Source: Police Interrogation Reports

156

Table 6-21 Operational Patterns of Terrorist Organizations

Organizations Targets Modes of Violence

Al Badar • Imperialist Forces • Kidnapping for ransom • 'Nearer Enemy' and its support-base • Suicide attacks • Foreigner Civilians • Conventional attacks • the Shiites

TTP • Imperialist Forces and their local supporters • Kidnapping of foreigners • 'Nearer Enemy' and its support-base • Kidnapping for ransom • Foreigner Civilians • Suicide attacks • Advocates of Democracy • Conventional attacks • the Shiites • Robberies with general • the Barelvies public • the Shrines • Robberies with the Shiites • Local Muslim and Qadianis • Non-Muslim civilians • Hired Assassinations

Jaish-e-Muhammad • Imperialist Forces and their local supporters • Kidnapping for ransom, • 'Nearer Enemy' and its support-base • Suicide attacks • Foreigner Civilians • Conventional attacks, • the Shiites • Robberies

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen • Imperialist Forces and their local supporters • Kidnapping of foreigners • 'Nearer Enemy' and its support-base • Suicide attacks • Foreigner Civilians • Conventional attacks • the Shiites

LeJ • Imperialist Forces • Kidnapping of foreigners • 'Nearer Enemy' and its support-base • Kidnapping for ransom • Foreigner Civilians • Suicide Attacks • Advocates of Democracy • Conventional attacks • the Shiites • Robberies with general • the Barelvies public • the Shrines • Robberies with the Shiites • Local Muslim and Non-Muslim civilians • Hired Assassinations

Harkat-e-jihad-e- • Imperialist Forces and their supporters • Kidnapping of foreigners Islami • 'Nearer Enemy' and its support base • Suicide attacks • Foreigner Civilians • Conventional attacks • Advocates of Democracy • Robberies with general • the Shiites public • the Barelvies • Robberies with the Shiites • Local Non Muslims including Qadianis and Qadianis

Lashker-e-Khurasan • Imperialist Forces and their supporters • Kidnapping of foreigner • 'Nearer Enemy' and their support-base • Suicide Attacks • Foreigner Civilians • Conventional attacks • the Shiites • Robberies with general • the Barelvies public • Local Non Muslims including Qadianis

Other • Imperialist Forces and their supporters • Suicide Attacks • the Shiites • Conventional attacks • 'Nearer Enemy' and its support-base

Source: Police Interrogation Reports 157

6.2.3 Ideological Streams of the Terrorists

The ideological streams of the terrorists as coming out of the analysis of the profiles of the terrorists in this study may be summarized as follow:

6.2.3.1 Urge to Revive the Muslim Ummah As said earlier, the empirical evidence suggests that dominant majority of the local ulema believe that current degeneration in the Muslims has resulted from their alienation from the ideals of faith. The empirical evidence further confirms that in furtherance of the same perspective, the militants cherish to rejuvenate the glory of the Muslims even though through violent means. For 96% of the terrorists, the major urge behind their violence was ideological aimed to uplift the cause of the Muslims by thwarting their prevalent degeneration as against only 4% who resorted to militancy to eliminate social injustice.

6.2.3.2 Violence against those Accused of Undermining the Purity of Faith The majority of Ahl-e-hadīth and Deobandis avoid to proclaim takfīr for introducing innovations into the practice of faith yet in both sects, the elements, though in minority exist that do not hesitate to proclaim takfīr for the commission of bida’ā. The militants follow this minority stream in their urge to revert back to the purity of faith. The militant networks are moved by loose application of takfīr against those who happen to introduce innovations (bida’ā) into the faith. In this purview, the data reflects that the Barelvis who are commonly accused of committing bida’ā by the Deobandis and Ahl-e-hadīth, have been the targets of terrorism. Moreover, the data further reflects that terrorists examined in this study have been involved in attacks against the holy shrines which they label as ‘centers of bida’ā.

6.2.3.3 Violence on Sectarian Grounds As said earlier, the militant culture as a whole is characterized with violence on polemical fault lines. The extremist stereo-types developed over the centuries on sectarian grounds make the Shiites prime target of the Sunnite militants. In historical perspective, despite the existence of sharp sectarian divide, the tolerance between the two sects was explicit in the Indian society. This tolerance was evident from the fact that both the Sunnites and the Shiites used to attend sessions of theological learning jointly at the religious madrassa at Farangi Mahal, Lakhnow. This level of sectarian tolerance declined when the rulers like Nawab of Awadh in Indian society supported conversion of Shiism in UP. His support to Shiism extended the Shiites a sense of separate identity on one hand and sharpened the polemical divide on the other. This schism became more vehement in the nearer past when Iran underwent a revolution in 1979. In anticipation of the chances of export of the Shiite ideology to the Sunnite lands, the Sunnite started precautionary measures in their lands to forestall the anticipated export of the Shiite ideology. This gave way to violent struggle between the two sects to secure their respective spheres of influence almost across the Muslim lands including Pakistan. 158

As empirical evidence suggests, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, though the Sunnites unanimously believe in takfīr of ghālī and tabrāī Shiites yet majority of Ahl- e-hadīth and Barelvi ulema avoid placing them in collective terms in the ranks of non- believers. However, the Deobandi ulema have been more vociferous in their proclamation of takfīr to the Shiites in general. Despite unanimity amongst the ulema regarding prohibition of violence on sectarian grounds, the exclusionary theme on the fault lines of polemics carries within it the potential of violence against whom decrees of takfīr exist. This potential is evident with the terrorist networks examined in this study. The data suggests that the Shiites have been targeted by almost every militant organization represented in this data. 28% of the terrorists in the sample have been involved in violence against the Shiites. On the top of these organizations are TTP and LeJ for spearheading violence against the Shiites. Besides killings on polemical grounds, the empirical evidence further confirms the involvement of organizations like Harkat-e-jihad-e-Islami, LeJ and TTP in the commission of robberies against the Shiites as well.

6.2.3.4 Fighting the ‘Nearer Enemy’ Besides fighting against the non-believer aggressors in the theaters of international conflict which the militants take as fard-e-ayn, they are equally active in their fight at the domestic front as well. The structured interviews complemented by survey analysis conducted on local ulema reveals sharp differences in their ranks on the issue of khurūj against the rulers. Though, the Sunnite scholarship in general, do not approve of khurūj against the Muslim rulers, yet some sections of the local Sunnite ulema in Pakistani society extend legitimacy to khurūj against the existing rulers if they support infidels against the fellow believers, do not enforce Shariah and commit injustice in the Muslim lands. The data shows that the militants generously provide space to this stream in their framework as almost all militant organizations represented in the data believe in khurūj against the Muslim rulers whom they accuse of supporting the non-believers against the fellow believers. They label them as ‘agents of the non-believers’ and thus, consider them ‘nearer enemies’. They unleash violence not against such rulers but also target those who support them. For the militants, the support-base of these rulers includes coercive organs of the state like army and other LEAs, political activists of the ruling parties and the government establishments. The data shows that of the terrorists examined in this study, 34% were involved in violence against what they term as the ‘nearer enemy and their support- base’.

6.2.3.5 Violence against the Advocates of Democracy A large section of the local ulema in Pakistan believe that democracy and Islam are mutually exclusive to each other. The study of the terrorists’ profiles confirms that similar narratives characterize the militants approach to the advocates of democracy. Viewing democracy in terms of a religion distinct from Islam, the militants’ ideologues pronounce takfīr to those who take part in democratic process without any reluctance. Besides this, the militants also target those whom they label as ‘the 159

apologists’ as they attempt to reconcile Islam with the western democratic norms. The data also bring forth a stream of violence directed against ‘the apologists’ for their advocacy of democracy.

6.2.3.6 Targeting the Foreigner Civilians In addition to the afore-mentioned codes of war entailing some sort of ideological character, the militants’ violence is driven by utilitarian considerations as well. They select such targets that may serve as a tool to help them follow their codes of war. All militant organizations represented in the data have been found involved in acts of terrorism against the foreign civilians largely to achieve the following objectives: one, to mount pressure on the rulers. In this respect, they target foreigner civilians of those countries like China with whom Pakistan has close ties and their civilians are involved in different development projects in Pakistan; two, to get ransom money from the government for their release; three, to get their fellow-terrorists released in exchange of the kidnapped foreigner civilians; four, to give a message to the foreign governments to remain aloof from the War on Terror.

6.2.3.7 Targeting the Local Non-Muslims The militants’ ideology as revealed by the study of terrorists’ profiles is based upon the premise that following of a religion other than Islam by an individual virtually counterfeits his right to life. Though such an extremist approach can hardly flow out of any ideological source yet the surrounding environment imbued with extremism and reactionary zeal may lead to the emergence of such brutal ideas. On the basis of available data, this study highlights that the terrorist networks in Pakistan do not hesitate to target the civilian non-Muslims in the country. The terrorists whose profiles have been studied during this research have been found involved in violence against the Hindus, the Christians and the Qadianis along with their supporters. TTP has also been involved in targeting Qadianis by committing robberies against them.

6.2.3.8 Launching Suicide Missions The survey conducted on local ulema in the earlier part of this chapter highlighted a section of the Sunnite ulema that legitimizes launching of suicide missions as war tactic to enhance the volume of damage to the enemy. The same line is followed by the militants in their terrorist operations within the country. The terrorists included in this data have been using suicide attacks in terms of war tactic against those whom they believe violence is religiously sanctioned. All militant organization studied here have the history of resorting to suicide attacks against their targets.

6.2.3.9 Involvement in Conventional Crime The terrorist outfits have been found involved in conventional crime in the society as well. Though it is not possible even for themselves to justify their involvement in crime in any ideological frame yet they term their involvement in heinous crime as a bid to muster resources to support themselves to follow their codes of war. The profile study of the terrorists reflects that those belonging to Lashkar-e-Khurasan, Harkat-e- 160

jihad-e-Islami, LeJ and TTP have been involved in conventional crime in the society including robberies, kidnappings for ransom, and hired assassinations etc.

6.2.4 Impact of Militants’ Ideological Streams

This part of the study will analyze how the militants’ ideological orientations shape and transform the character of violence in the name of religion. It will further assert that conclusions drawn from the study of terrorists’ profiles are amply reflected in the militant violence in Pakistan.

6.2.4.1 Sectarian Killings Killings on sectarian differences are the characteristic feature of violence in Pakistan. Though, schisms on sectarian grounds are embedded deep in the history of the Muslims yet their differences remained within the limits of theological differences surrounded by mutual strain between the followers of different sects. However, this tension could translate into physical violence when the tolerance between the religious scholars of both the Sunnites and the Shiites got evaporated in the echoes of Iranian Revolution of 1979. The success of this revolution was taken in terms of a threat to the Sunnite theology beyond the territorial limits of Iran. The Sunnite kingships of the Middle East being alarmed by the possibilities of export of shiitization in the Sunnite world with the backing of Iran felt constrained to thwart such possible developments by promoting Sunnite organizations to counterbalance the Shiite organizations. In Pakistan, Therīk-e-Nifāz-e-Fiqah Jaafria (TNFJ) was founded in 1979 to protect the rights of the Shiite community. As a counterbalance, a Sunnite organization-Sipah-e-Sahabah Pakistan (SSP) emerged in the early 1980s with loose application of takfīr to the Shiites as its catchphrase. Not long after the emergence of these rival sectarian organizations in the country, traditional strain between the opposite sects that had already engrossed into ex-communication was now prone to physical conflict on sectarian lines. In this backdrop, both sectarian organizations developed their militant wings to counterbalance each other in physical violence against each other. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi emerged as militant wing of SSP as against Sipah-e-Muhammad of TNFJ. In this atmosphere, the Wahābī rulers of the Middle East assumed the status of the guardians of the Sunnite Islam through projecting their Wahābī ideology to withstand the Shiite ideology.

The empirical data as shown in figure 6.2 reflects upward trend in sectarian violence especially after 9/11. The number of incidents rose from 109 in the year 2000 to 341 in 2007 with corresponding increase in killings from 149 to 341 in the same timeframe. This data not only includes the casualties of the targeted rival sect but also those who lost their lives in terms of collateral damage in these incidents of sectarian violence. This upward trend in the incidents of sectarian violence continued to persist till 2013. This escalation in the incidents of sectarian violence was the result of fusion of different militant organizations with shared ideology in the tribal belt adjacent to Pak-Afghan border. Some sections of tribal Pakhtuns having war-tested fighting skills developed in Afghanistan shifted to this side of the border in wake of the US invasion 161

in Afghanistan. In this scenario, LeJ militants who had already ties with these elements could enhance their capacity in terms of workforce, violence modes and techniques through their fusion with TTP, the local Al-Qaida affiliate. LeJ after developing nexus with TTP, launched suicide attacks against the Shiites. However, sharp downward trend is visible after 2013. This declining trend owes to the state response vis-à-vis militancy.

Figure 6-2 Killings in Sectarian Violence in Pakistan (1989-2016) 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 Injured 800 Killed 600 Incidents 400 200 0 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015

Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal

Figure 6-3 Shiites Causalities (2001-2016) 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 Injured 800 600 Killed 400 200

2005 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2001 Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal

162

Similarly, as shown in figure 6.3 below, the number of the Shiites causalities also witnessed upward trend since the year 2000. In the year 2002, in reported 4 incidents 6 Shiites lost their lives. The figure rose as high as 504 in 81 incidents in 2013. However, in the subsequent years, the Shiite casualties declined considerably due to decrease in incidents of sectarian violence when the militant organization got incapacitated in the backdrop of military operation against them.

Though, physical violence emerged largely between the two sects- Shiites and the Sunnites yet, the Hanfite Barelvis- numerically the largest sect in Pakistan too, could not remain immune from this violence. The Barelvis too, had to face the labeling of takfīr on pretext of being involved in bida’ā not only from the Wahābī quarters but also from the Hanfite Deobandis whose vehemence in takfīr of the Shiites and opposition to Barelvis is categorically established. The militants have been targeting the shrines of the Sūfī saints across the country which, as they believe, had been converted into the centers of bida’ā by those who follow mystical approach- largely the Barelvis. During the last 11 years (2005-2016) as shown in Figure 6.4 in 17 militant attacks on the shrines of the Sūfī saints reviewed in this study, 263 persons were killed.

Moreover, the militants’ fight against the local tribal people belonging to the Barelvi sect affirms their takfīri notion. In Khyber Agency, Lashkar-e-Islam, a militant fighting group has been at war with Ansar-ul-Islam, anti-Taliban group consisting of local tribal people largely belonging to the Barelvi sect. Similarly, killing of Pir Samiullah in Swat in 2008 also speaks of the militants’ anti-Barelvi demeanor.

Figure 6-4 Attacks on Sufi Shrines 90

50 Killed 40 Incidents

0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal 163

6.2.4.2 Suicide Attacks Suicide attacks which have become characteristic feature of terrorism in Pakistan emerged in this region when ideological streams of Al-Qaida started flowing from Al- Zawahiri. Prior to 9/11, suicide missions were not part of the modes of violence adopted by LeJ that had been spearheading terrorism in Pakistan. It was only under the ideological umbrella of TTP, that militant outfits resorted to this tactic against their intended targets.

Figure 6-5 Suicide Attacks 2500

2000

1500 Incidents Killed 1000 Injured

500

2013 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2014 2015 2002 Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal (data up to November 2015)

As shown in Figure 6.5, this phenomenon has seen an upward trend since 2002. The number of incidents rose up to 76 in 2009 as compared to only 01 in 2002. The period 2009 onwards reflects decrease in such incidents however, this declining trend does not reflect any ideological shift vis-à-vis this phenomenon rather it may be due to military operations that have incapacitated and shattered the organizational discipline of the militant outfits.

6.2.4.3 Attacks against Western Targets The militants have been targeting the western targets in Pakistan to avenge the aggression of the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. For them, fighting the infidels who have invaded the Muslim territory is fard-e-ayn upon every believer. They do not make distinction between the combatants and non-combatant western civilians. The data of major attacks on western targets in Pakistan as shown in Figure 6.6, suggests that in one decade from the year 2002 to 2012, the militants conducted 27 major attacks on the western targets in Pakistan. These attacks left 98 local and foreign civilians dead and 401 injured. To attack the western targets mostly civilians, the terrorists have been attacking the Christian churches, missionary schools, hotels and 164

restaurants, tourist spots, Consulates, working projects where foreign labour is working and NGOs.

Figure 6-6 Attacks against Western Targets 200 180 160 140 120 Incidents 100 Killed 80 Injured 60 40 20 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 2012

Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal (data up to November 2015)

Apart from these attacks, the militants have been targeting NATO supply line to frustrate the western forces in Afghanistan. As shown in Table 6.22, during the period 2008- 2014, total 309 incidents of violence took place across the country which claimed 143 lives and 254 persons got injured. The region-wise breakup of these incidents shows that Baluchistan remained on the top in terms of number of incidents and the number of people killed in these incidents. Total 177 incidents of violence took place which left 46 persons killed and 75 injured. In FATA, during the given time-frame, 85 incidents resulted in the killings of 59 persons whereas 195 got injured. In KPK, 18 persons were killed and 52 got injured in 33 NATO-related incidents of violence whereas in Punjab, the number of incidents declined to 8 wherein 19 persons lost their lives and 15 got injured. In Sindh province, only 6 incidents took place which resulted in the killing of 01 person and 7 got injured.

165

Table 6-22 Attacks on Western Targets (Region-wise Breakup)

Years Baluchistan FATA KP Punjab Sindh

Killed Killed Killed Killed Killed

Injured Injured Injured Injured Injured

Incidents Incidents Incidents Incidents Incidents 2008 2 1 1 2 2 50 4 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2009 14 5 3 4 5 10 7 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2010 66 12 32 17 9 13 8 1 3 6 15 15 2 0 1 2011 59 19 20 33 20 10 11 10 35 2 4 0 3 0 6 2012 10 0 6 10 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2013 18 6 7 10 11 5 3 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0

2014 8 3 6 9 7 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal (data up to November 2015) 6.2.4.4 Violence against Media

Violence against print and electronic media is also a salient feature of militancy in Pakistan. This violence is product of perception with the militants that media in Pakistan usually serves the western agenda and naturally is hostile to their narrative. Thus, simply for being on the other side of the fence, the media become what the militants term as ‘legitimate target of their violence’. Since 2002, 49 incidents of terrorism have taken place against media across Pakistan. The figure 6.7 below includes only those incidents wherein militants belonging to religious militant outfits were involved. These 59 incidents of terrorism left 49 media persons dead and 47 injured. In 59 incidents of terrorism, there are 09 incidents wherein the media persons were not targeted but were killed in terms of collateral damage. In these 09 instances, 10 media persons were killed and 16 got injured while performing their professional duties.

166

Figure 6-7 Attacks against Media 14

8 Incidents Killed 6 Injured 4

0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal

6.2.4.5 Violence against Religious Minorities The militants’ narrative vis-à-vis the religious minorities warrants violence against them simply for not being Muslims. The militant narrative refutes the tolerance which has been hallmark of Islamic teachings and practices since the days of the Prophet (sw). Through this narrative, the militants aim to achieve the objectives which include the following: one, targeting the minorities to avenge killings of their fellow militants; two, to frustrate the government of Pakistan in its bid to counter militancy; three, the militants instead of viewing the minorities especially the Christians as fellow Pakistanis in nationalistic terms identify them with their co-religionist west which they believe is bent upon damaging the Muslim Ummah. In this purview, they attempt to draw legitimacy for targeting the local Christians in reaction to the western policies. So far as Ahmedia community in Pakistan is concerned, they declare them as apostates as they do not believe in the finality of the prophet hood of the Prophet Muhammad (sw).

The review of 08 attacks against the Christians as shown in the table 6.23 suggests that 147 persons were killed and 310 got injured in these acts of violence. Moreover, in 2010, in militant attacks against Ahmedia community in Punjab, 103 people were killed and 111 got injured.

167

Table 6-23 Violence against Minorities S. No. Years/Targets Killed Injured

2001 1 18 9 Catholic Church, Bahawalpur

2 2002 5 40 Protestant Church, Islamabad

3 2002 6 4 Christian Missionary School, Murree 4 2002 4 24 Mission Hospital, Taxila 5 2002 7 3 Institute for Peace and Justice, Karachi 6 2002 3 15 United Presbyterian Church near Sialkot 7 2005 8 19 Ahmadiyah Place of Worship, Mandi Bahauddin 8 2010 95 92 Ahmadiyah Bait-al-Noor, and Darul Zikr, Lahore 9 2013 85 145 All Saints Church, Peshawar 10 2015 19 70 Two Churches, Youhanabad, Lahore Total 250 421 Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal

6.2.4.6 Attacks on ‘Nearer Enemy’ and its Supporters Accusing the governments of following the western agenda against the fellow believers, the militants unleash violence against them and what constitutes their support-base. They have been targeting the top-brass executive and political leadership in the country. In post 9/11 scenario, the violence has been directed against government establishments including army, police and other law enforcement agencies and the civilians found in support of the government policies.13 As shown in Figure 6.8 below, the data reflects that in their fight against the state apparatus, the militants killed 6663 LEAs personnel during the period 2003-2016. In the given period, the violence claimed lives of 21489 civilians as well. These civilians were either killed in terms of collateral damage resulting from the acts of violence, or were targeted for supporting the government policies, or standing opposed to militant narrative of faith. For instance, under the government patronage, the local tribal elders organized their tribal fraternity to protect their traditions and values against this phenomenon of militancy largely in FATA and Baluchistan. In their resistance alongside the LEAs against the militants, as shown in Figure 6.9, in 102 incidents of

13President Musharraf was attacked twice for allegedly in collaboration with the west against the fellow Muslims in War on Terror. Similarly, Mr. Shaukat Aziz, the former premier and Benazir Bhutto, the chairperson of Pakistan People’s Party were also attacked by the militants for allegedly pursuing the western agenda. 168

clashes, 149 tribal elders were killed. These causalities occurred either in clashes between the militants and government sponsored tribal groups or in militants attacks on tribal jirgas (councils). Apart from this, pro-government political leadership was also attacked by the militants.14 The motivation behind these attacks was to target the supporters of the governments which they term as the ‘nearer enemies’ for their alleged collaboration with the infidel west against the fellow Muslims. This motivation to fight against the Pakistani government for their alleged collaboration with the west is also reflected in the ISIS. Their literature found in Southern Punjab categorically declares war against the government which they label as atheist and un- Islamic. They further resolve to fight against the organs of the state like judiciary and executive for their following of the policies of an un-Islamic government.

Moreover, the militants condemn the constitution of Pakistan for being based upon unbelief as it affirms the western democratic ideal of popular sovereignty instead of divine sovereignty.15 The militants’ attacks on the political leadership in Pakistan may be viewed in two perspectives: one, the political leadership associated with the ruling party share the collective responsibility of pursuing the western agenda and two, the militant ideology renders those who take part in the political process liable to be killed as they have chosen democracy in terms of a religion other than Islam. As shown in Figure 6.10, the exponential rise in militants’ attacks on the electoral process a few weeks before June, 2013 General Elections affirm the militants’ narrative against the political process in Pakistan. Total 148 militant attacks were launched against the electoral activities during the period from January to May, 2015 wherein 170 persons were killed. Most of these attacks were launched during April and May, just before the elections in June, 2013. Out of these 148 attacks, TTP and its affiliates perpetrated 108 attacks that claimed lives of 156 persons. According to media reports, prior to 2013 elections in Pakistan, TTP distributed pamphlets warning people not to go for voting.16 It is to be noted that even the religo-political leadership of the country could not remain immune from these militant attacks. For instance, JUI (F) leadership was targeted due to their collaborative posture to the existing political system which the militants label as un-Islamic.

14 To quote a few examples, Aftab Sherpao, the Interior Minister during Musharraf era, the top brass leadership of Awami National Party (ANP) including Asfandyar Wali, the party head, Bashir Bilour, the then Senior Minister in ANP government, Mian Iftikhar Hussain, the then information Minister were attacked by the militants. ANP remained in power in KPK during the period 2008-2013. The militants also launched suicide missions against former PML-Q President, KPK Amir Muqam. 15 The militants’ approach to the political system as enshrined in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan is mainly based upon Al-Zawahiri’s monologue titled Al-Subh wa’ Al-Qindil. 16 Zahir Shah Sherazi, “TTP distributes threatening pamphlets against elections”, Daily Dawn, 25 April 2013.

169

Figure 6-8 Human Loss of LEAs 3500

3007 3001 3000 2738

2500 2324 2155

2000 1796 1781 Civilians 1522 1500 LEAs Personnel

991 940 1000 765 654 732 676 608 597 533 612 435 430 469 500 325 339 293 140 184 24 81 0 20032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016

Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal

Figure 6-9 Human Loss of Tribal Elders

45 42

30 24 25 20 No of Incidents 19 20 Killed 15 15 12 12 12 11 11

10 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 5 2

0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal

170

Figure 6-10 Terrorist Attacks on Party Leaders/ Workers, Candidates and Voters (Jan.1-May 15, 2013) 400

350

300

250 Incidents 200 Killed

150 Injured

100

0 January February March April May (till 15th )

Source: Elections 2013: Violence against Political Parties, Candidates and Voters: A Report by Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan, May, 2013

6.2.4.7 Attacks on Educational Institutions The data for the period 2004-2013 suggests that Pakistan was on top of ten countries in the world in terms of the number of attacks on educational institutions. During the given period, total 724 attacks were launched against the educational institutions which constitute 10% of the total incidents of violence against different targets in the given period. However, in terms of number of fatalities, Pakistan was on 4th out of 10 top-affected countries of the world. In the given period, 179 persons were killed in violence against educational institutions. Relatively low ratio of fatalities vis-à-vis the number of incidents was due to the fact that in most of the cases, the institutions were unoccupied at the time of incidents. Most of these attacks were launched to disrupt the education infrastructure mostly for girls.17

Though majority of these incidents went untraced yet TTP happened to be the largest perpetrator as it came out responsible for 136 attacks which constitute 77% of the total traced incidents including most brutal attack on Army Public School, Peshawar in December, 2014 that claimed 145 lives including 132 students ranging between 08 to 18 years of age.18 Apart from TTP and its affiliates, this narrative based upon resisting the acquiring of secular education in government schools is also shared by the ISIS. Quite recently, in pamphlets traced in Taunsa Sharif, a town in Dera Ghazi Khan in South Punjab, the ISIS pronounced war against those who acquire secular education. In their message, the ISIS also condemned secular education for the girls.

17 START’s Global Terrorism Database 18 Ibid. 171

The empirical research on the local ulema and study of the terrorists’ profile in the context of Pakistan lead to the following broader conclusions:

One, the fuel of terrorism may not necessarily come from the formal madrassa system rather many of them have secular education background. These secularly educated terrorists have, nevertheless, some way or the other informal and secondary linkage with the madrassa system. As formal students of the madrassa system are solely influenced by their respective religious patrons who make their ideological bent precise and clear, the secular youth have more complex ideological bent which is transformed by multiple variables like semi-literate local imams, family and peers’ influence etc. Strong evidence exists that confirms that the ideological streams exploited by the terrorists in Pakistan flow from the surrounding ideological culture as espoused not necessarily by the formal madrassa ulema and authentic religious scholars belonging to a particular sect but mostly as projected by these ill-qualified local imams.

Two, the militants adopt selective approach to earn theological legitimacy to their acts of violence. They may not necessarily opt for an authentic standpoint on any issue of their concern. Instead of it, they may prefer to subscribe to the views of an unauthentic clergy even though flawed which suit them to legitimize their violent acts.

Three, the militant outfits owing to their common ideological strands represent a world view of the militancy instead of working in silos. This world view provides space to adjust variety of terrorist networks sharing common ideology and dispense with limitations emerging from social, cultural and territorial alienation. The emerging outfits in a locality may not need to search for the fresh recruits rather ideological commonalities between these networks make the horizontal movement of their experienced soldiers from one outfit to another easier. The militants take pride for being part of a worldwide militant brotherhood.

Four, the evidence suggests that with the militants, ideology has precedence over organizational affiliations. There has been found frequent tendency amongst the terrorist operatives to shift their organizational affiliations yet they hardly change their mental programming. Absence of ideological constraints in switching over their organizational affiliations has ascribed militancy a transnational character. ISIS could win over experienced soldiers from the ranks of Al-Qaida affiliates even in lands which were socially and culturally alien to the organization originating from Syria and Iraq only because of ideological commonalities. To cite a few examples, many foot soldiers from TTP and LeJ, formerly al-Qaida affiliates in Pakistan joined the ISIS. Such a massive shifting of organizational affiliations could happen only because the militants’ diaspora shares largely common ideological standpoints.

Five, in most of the cases, the militants justify their violence as being part of their broader objective to revive the ideals of the faith. Their targets and violent means to 172

achieve these targets need to be viewed in militant ideological frame as they seek to justify them in theological terms. In this perspective, mutually shared common ideological standpoints come up with commonality in targets and modes of violence adopted to achieve them. 173

7 Killing Fields

The ideological conflict between the militants and the west codified during colonialism led to evolution of codes of war with the militants with strong repercussions for the west and for the Muslim societies too. The study has further drawn inferences based upon empirical evidence from the profile study of the militants in the context of Pakistan. On the basis of these inferences, the current chapter will seek to identify killing fields of Al-Qaida in transnational context and the factors that have contributed to the emergence of these flash points of violence from four paradigms: bipolar backyards in terms of sectarian split between the Shiites’ and the Sunnites’ like in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq; state oppression by the totalitarian regimes like in Somalia, Algeria and Egypt; unhealed wounds in Muslim lands like Gaza and Palestine and last but not the least, theaters of international aggression like Iraq. It will be argued that all these factors provide suitable grounds for Al-Qaida to operate by assimilating their ideology with the resistance to the western ideology and a struggle for the liberation of Ummah.

7.1 Bipolar Backyards in terms of Sectarian Split

This part of the study explores the conflict scenarios in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq as bipolar backyards in terms of sectarian divide between the Shiites and the Sunnites. It aims to make two points which are as follow: One, despite sharing common anti- imperialist and anti-Zionist themes, the militant outfits operating in these states have seldom surrendered their sectarian identities to achieve these themes by forming a united front. These sectarian identities in a militant framework have been instrumental in diverting militancy inside the Muslim societies instead of pursuing anti-imperialist objectives at external front. Two, this study further uncovers the vulnerabilities of the centuries-old schism amongst the Muslims that have potential for being exploited by the actors in the militant landscape to secure political and strategic gains.

7.1.1 Sectarian vs Anti-Imperialist Themes

Not unlike rest of the Muslim lands, in Middle East too, the anti-imperialist rhetoric is a resource for the militant outfits to draw legitimacy for their existence. Notwithstanding their sectarian affiliations, anti-Zionist and anti-American stands are taken in terms of a source to draw legitimacy by the militant organizations in the region. Whether it is Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Sunnite Al-Qaida affiliates or ISIS in Syria and Iraq, all rely on anti-imperialist rhetoric for their existential legitimacy. In case of Hezbollah, Israeli occupation of some parts of Sothern Lebanon in 1982 also known as Operation Peace for Galilee provided grounds for its emergence as a militia, indeed with the support of Iran, to resist the Israeli 174

occupation.1 Resistance to Israel along with eliminating the colonial remnants like the Americans and the French from Lebanon and transplantation of Iranian model of vilayat-e-faqīh in Lebanon2 were visualized to be the major goals of the organization. The military strategy adopted by Hezbollah to resist Israel and other imperialists earned it huge public approval within Lebanon. Its status got elevated parallel to the state itself.3 Its military strength was estimated to be more than the state military strength. In the backdrop of the Lebanese protests (2006-2008), Hezbollah was granted veto power in the National Unity Government.4 Its role to liberate lands from the Israeli occupation was also recognized. Its armed status was validated in the words that its arms were the common property of all Lebanese.5

Though, Hezbollah’s anti-imperialism and anti-Israel posture led it to an elevated standing within the Lebanese government structure yet it could never surrender its sectarian identity within Lebanon and without. The sectarian orientation of Hezbollah is evident from the following points: One, it continues to draw financial support and theological inspiration from the supreme Shiite leadership in Iran. In 1990s, Hezbollah’s decision to become part of the political process in Lebanon was endorsed by Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran. Moreover, it has also been permanent recipient of political support from the Shiite Syrian regime. At the end of civil war, through Taif Agreement provided for disbanding all the militias in Lebanon, Syria allowed Hezbollah to build its arms and also control Shiite area bordering Israel.6 Two, at the domestic front, despite its most cherished anti-Israeli rhetoric, it has never been able to command trust of the Sunnites. The Sunnite leadership has always been weary of the growing influence of Hezbollah in the government structure. The electoral map confirms the growing gap between the two communities. For instance, in 2009 parliamentary elections, 93.1% votes of the Shiites went to Hezbollah whereas 76% votes of the Sunnites were bagged by Future Movement. The political indicators are important to highlight the sharp sectarian undercurrents in the Muslim communities as the attempts of both Hezbollah and Future Movement to dent each other’s’ sectarian support-base ended up in failure.7 Three, to the utter disapproval of the Sunnites at home, Hezbollah has been actively supporting the Shiite Assad regime in Syria against the regimes’ Sunnite adversaries. In Syrian context, hero of one sectarian community in Lebanon is foe of the other. The Sunnites disapprove of the Assad regime for their alleged role in assassination of Rafiq Hariri whereas Hezbollah

1 “Who are Hezbollah?”, BBC News, 08:28 GMT, Sunday, July 4, 2010 2Hezbollah opposed consociationalist model of democratic governance on the basis of 1932 census. Consociationalism refers to a power sharing arrangement in a democratic framework that claims to ensure inclusion of diverse groups of a plural society in state institutions. See, Ziad Majed, “Consensus, democracy and representation in Lebanon: Between agony and electoral reform,” Accord, issue No.24, Conciliation Resources, http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord24_ConsensusDemocracy.pdf accessed on 09-12-2015 3 “Iran-Syria vs. Israel, Round 1: Assessments & Lessons Learned”, in, Sep 13, 2012 17:36 UTC, Defense Industry Daily 4 “Lebanon Unity Deal Gives Hezbollah Veto Power,” NBC News, 7/11/2008 5 “Lebanon is Hezbollah”, CNN I-Report, December 1, 2009 6 Jeffrey Goldberg, “In the Party of God: Are terrorists in Lebanon preparing for a larger war?” 7 Randa Slim, Lebanon’s Dangerous Sunni-Shiite Divide Widens, Al-Monitor, May 29, 2012 175

views the Alawite regime as ally and thus, terms the current crisis in Syria in terms of a conspiracy launched by Zionist-Crusaders alliance to break Iran-Syria and Hezbollah nexus.8 Hassan Nasr Allah did not hesitate to identify the Sunnite rebels in Syria with Israeli Jews and justified their military adventure in Syria as “critical and definitive battle”.9 He termed his resistance to ISIS in Syria as existential and called for broader support from the plural society of Lebanon by portraying ISIS as common threat to humanity.10 Following the same tone, Hezbollah fighters take fighting in support of Syrian regime as their obligation.11 On the other hand, in a milieu when the spillover of Hezbollah’s fighting against the Sunnite militants side by side with Assad regime is being felt at home and sectarian tension has increased to cause a possible sectarian violence, 12the Sunnites in Lebanon are categorical in their aloofness from Hezbollah’s military adventure in Syrian crisis. In response to Lebanese chapter of Al-Nūsrā Front’s announcement of targeting Hezbollah’s operational areas inside Lebanon as legitimate targets, Sa’ad Hariri, categorically proclaimed Sunnites’ disavowal from Hezbollah’s participation in Syrian crisis.13 In this background, Hezbollah is likely to lose its inroads into the Sunnite community of Lebanon which it could make following its anti-imperialist and anti-Israel approach. Its all-out intervention in Syrian crisis may result in emergence of sectarian violence within Lebanon as besides alienating the domestic Sunnite population, it has turned itself into a cherished target of the Sunnite militants operating beyond Lebanon.

In Syrian context, the most important Sunnite groups fighting against the Assad regime and its Lebanese support-arm Hezbollah include ISIS and Al-Nūsrā Front. Al- Nūsrā Front14 does not consider the Shiite regime of Syria as Islamic and thus, aims to uproot it and install a Shariah-based state system on Sunnite pattern in lieu thereof. They aim to restrain themselves to fighting the Assad regime whom they label as ‘nearer enemy’ and Hezbollah whom they label as its agent instead of targeting the western states.15 Though, they do not aspire for global jihad16 yet anti-imperialist notion is explicit in their labeling of the US and Israel as the enemies of Islam17 and further warning them not to intervene in the Syrian crisis.18 Nevertheless, anti- imperialist orientation of Al-Nūsrā Front is eclipsed by the sectarian orientation of the group. As said earlier, their violence is aimed at replacing the Shiite regime in Syria

8 ibid. 9 “Hezbollah Says Presence in Syria Greater Than Ever Before”, NDTV, October 18, 2015 10 “Lebanon's Hezbollah Urges Backing for Fight against Islamic State,” NDTV, May 25, 2015 11 “Hezbollah fighters say a 'duty' to help Syria's Bashar al-Assad,” NDTV, April 11, 2014 12 Loveday Morris and Suzan Haidamous, “For Lebanon’s Sunnis, growing rage at Hezbollah over role in Syria,” Washington Post, June 12, 2013 13 “Hariri: Sunnis ‘refuse’ to join Hezbollah-Al Qaida war”, Gulf News Lebanon, 17:34 January 25, 2014 14 Al-Nusra Front is an Al-Qaida off-shoot in Syria that emerged in January 2012 to uproot the Assad regime. It also operates against Hezbollah in Lebanon. See, “Zawahiri disbands main Qaida faction in Syria,” Global Post, 8-11-2013 15Ruth Sherlock, “Inside Jabhat al Nusra - the most extreme wing of Syria's struggle,” The Telegraph, December, 2 2012 16“Mapping Militant Organizations: Jabhat al-Nusra,” Stanford University 17 “Profile: Syria's al-Nusra Front,” BBC, April 10, 2013 18Sherlock, “Inside Jabhat al Nusra” 176

with a regime based upon the Sunnite version of Shariah. Al-Nūsrā leadership announced bounties worth millions of dollars for the killings of Bashar Al-Assad and Hassan Nasr Allah. Al-Nūsrā further called for escalation in attacks on the Assad’s strongholds in retribution of killings of the Sunnites by the pro-Assad Russian forces.19 They have also launched suicide missions against the Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon which they consider as legitimate targets for their violence.20 The sectarian nature of violence unleashed by Al-Nūsrā gets further exposition in their treatment of Druze community- an off-shoot of the Isma’ilite branch of the Shiites.21 They were forced to forego their faith and convert to the Sunnite version of Islam. They were further forced to demolish their scared places.22 In Syrian context, like other salāfi militant organizations, ISIS too, follows the anti-western and anti- imperialist agenda. It aims to fight the Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their local agents to materialize their worldwide caliphate. At the same time, the sectarian violence is the characteristic feature of its militant adventures in Syria as it resolves to fight against the Shiite regime and its Shiite allies like Hezbollah for being the local collaborators of the crusaders alliance.23

In addition to current conflict scenario in Syria where ISIS occupies a central role in fight against the Shiite regime and its aides in its quest for establishing a Shariah- based caliphate system, Iraq provides a contextual framework to explain the sectarian- linked genesis of the ISIS. The organization has its roots in Al-Zarqawi’s Jama'at al- Tawhid wal-jihad established in 1999. After pledging its allegiance to Al-Qaida in 2004, this organization assumed a new title Tazīm Qaidā al-jihād fī Bilād al-Rāfidēn (Organization of Jihad's Base in Mesopotamia). It got highlighted owing to its excessively violent attacks against the Shiites and the Iraqi government installations and the western targets. In 2006, this organization became part of Mujahedeen Shūrā Council, a conglomeration of many Sunnite militant groups to fight against the Shiites and the imperialist forces. Later on, the Shūrā announced to establish an Islamic state in the Sunnite majority areas of Iraq. Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi was declared to be its emir. In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the leader of “Islamic State in Iraq” and proclaimed it to be global caliphate of the Muslims in 2014. Despite its assumption of global character and resolve to fight the western imperialism, it has always boasted to

19 “Nusra Front issues bounties for Assad, Nasrallah,”Al Arabiya News, Middle East, AFP, ReutersAmman and CairoTuesday, October 13 2015 20 “Al Qaida-linked group Al Nusra Front claims deadly car bombing in Lebanese capital Beirut,” ABC News, January 21 2014 21 According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, this creed emerged from the Ismailite teachings; however, it assimilated the influence of different elements including Jewish, Christian, Gnostic, Neoplatonic, and Iranian under the doctrine of monotheism. This creed got propagation in Cairo in 1071 CE under Hamza ibn Ali. This creed draws its title from an associate of Hamza ibn Ali, namely Muḥammad al- Darazī. The creed was turned into a ‘doctrine of the soteriological divinity’ of al-Hakim bi Amr Allah, the sixth Fatimid caliph (996-1021). According to Druze belief system al-Hakim did not die but went into occultation to reappear to unfurl a golden age. http://www.britannica.com/topic/Druze accessed on 10-12-2015 22 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi’s Blog, Additional Notes on Druze of Jabal al-Summaq, 6-10-2015, http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/10/additional-notes-on-the-druze-of-jabal-al-summaq accessed on 10-12-2015 23 Dabiq, issue 4 177

follow Al-Zarqawi’s violent approach to the Shiites. The first issue of Dābiq, ISIS’ online magazine pays rich tributes to al-Zarqawi and acknowledges ISIS leadership’s appreciation of his sectarian violence. The magazine attempts to justify the sectarian violence by stirring the emotions of the Sunnites through projection of those Sunnite militants who had been killed fighting with the Shiites.24 ISIS attempts to secure retributive legitimacy for their violence against the Shiites by using the acronym of Safāvīds for them in order to link them to the historical account of violence of the Safāvīd Empire against the Sunnites.25 The ISIS further appreciates Al-Zarqawi’s proclamation of takfīr to the Shiites and their subsequent killings.26

7.1.2 Vulnerabilities of the Polemics

Besides sectarian identities, the Middle East embodies multiple identities frame that defines the regional conflict scenario. Saudi Arabian regime has been fighting against the fellow-salāfī organizations like Al-Qaida and now the ISIS. A considerable part of the Iraqi army in their war with Iran consisted of the Shiite Iraqis. Lebanese civil war witnessed clashes between Hezbollah and Amal activists despite having common sectarian background.27However, these multiple identities have never been able to overshadow the sectarian affiliations in the regional conflict. The centuries old schism in Islam is transforming the religo-political landscape of the Middle East today.28 This schism is prone to be exploited in terms of a tool to secure political gains not only by the national governments like Lebanon, Syria and Iraq where these schisms are inter- playing rather the regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran are also involved in proxy wars on the trajectory of polemics. Besides this, the sectarian violence also serves as catalyst to mobilize the Sunnite militant networks in global perspective.29 These vulnerabilities of polemics are even more prominent in the states where the ruling elite belong to minority sect. For instance, in Syria under Alawite regime of Assad, the Shiite minority is ruling the Sunnite majority. Likewise, in Iraq, under Saddam, a Sunnite minority has been ruling the Shiite majority.30 In these cases, the marginalized majority sections are more likely to exploit the polemics to resist the sect-wise minority ruling elite.

In case of Lebanon, the state recognized Hezbollah’s permanent role in decision making given its potential to command the Shiites as well as its military potential to counter the military adventures of Israel. In domestic scenario in Lebanon following Hezbollah’s open participation in Syrian civil war, the Shiite-led Lebanese

24 Dabiq, Issue 1 25 For a detailed account, see chapter 3 26 Abū Muhammad al-‘Adnānī ash-Shāmī, official spokesman for ISIS in a speech appreciated the ISIS fighters for killing the Shiites. See for example, Excerpts from “Indeed Your Lord is Ever Watchful,” Dabiq, issue 4 27 Council on Foreign Relations, The Sunni- Shia Divide 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Paul Vallely, “The vicious schism between Sunni and Shia has been poisoning Islam for 1,400 years and it is getting worse,” Independent, February 19 2014 178

government got an opportunity to marginalize already depressed Sunnite sections of the society. Moreover, given the huge influx of refugees, the regional states like Syria and Iran have got an opportunity to exploit the sectarian fissures more vehemently to secure political and strategic gains in the plural Lebanese society. In the scenario of marginalization of the Sunnites, the militant groups like Al-Nūsrā Front and ISIS are exploiting the sectarian schism to recruit their foot soldiers.31

Syria is a peculiar example where pro-democracy protests against the Assad regime that started in 2011 turned into civil war not between the pro-democracy and pro- authoritarian regime elements rather between the Sunnite militants and the pro- government Shiites. This reflects the vulnerabilities of the polemics to be exploited for achieving political designs. The initial chaos emerging from pro-democracy protests and mishandling of the protestors by the Assad regime provided leverage to the sectarian forces to maneuver the scenario. In current scenario the polemics are defining the civil war. Assad regime is depending upon the Shiite support base in its struggle for survival against the Sunnite militants. The Alawite regime is exploiting its Shiite identity to build up its survival capacity by securing support from the Shiite Iran and Hezbollah against the Sunnite militants who are supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Arabian states to counter-balance Iranian influence in the region.32 Both sides do not perceive the sectarian schism to be generating a conceptual threat rather real threat which requires an all-out struggle to counter it.

In case of Iraq, the Sunnites despite being in minority had been in control of the political authority for centuries until Saddam regime was uprooted in the wake of US invasion in 2003. The political authority was transferred to the Shiites with Nur al- Maliki becoming the Prime Minister in 2006. The transfer of authority to the Shiites created apprehensions in the Sunnites regarding their political future. In this scenario, the Ba’athist remnants are attempting to exploit the sectarian identities to gain political and strategic gains. They used sectarian cloak to muster up support in their resistance against the imperialist forces as well as against the Shiites who could assume political authority with the support of the imperialist forces.33 Moreover, the Shiite regime installed after Saddam has not been able to work out a power-sharing formula to involve the Sunnites in the decision making. Under Maliki, the Sunnites felt disillusioned for being politically marginalized under his alleged sectarian- motivated government. The political milieu of disgruntlement created spaces for the ISIS to exploit the Sunnite emotions. The ISIS successfully exploited these spaces to channelize the Sunnite volunteers to join its ranks on the pretext of resisting Maliki’s bid to transform Iraq into a Shiite state through repressive means. On the other hand, the Shiite Maliki regime in Iraq has been supported by the Shiite elements in domestic

31 Alessandria M a s i , “Crackdown in Lebanon pushes some Sunnis toward ISIS, Al-Nusra,” International Business Times, October, 29, 2014 32 “Syria: The story of the conflict,” BBC News, October 9, 2015 33 Some argue that the army officers serving in Saddam’s Ba’athist regime have been working with the ISIS in the current scenario. See for example, Liz Sly, “The hidden hand behind the Islamic State militants? Saddam Hussein’s,” Washington Post, April 4, 2015 179

as well as in the regional context. For example, at domestic front, Ayatollah Ali al- Sistani mobilized the Shiites in Iraq to join the national army to fight the ISIS34whereas in the regional context, the Shiite government in Iraq is supported by the Shiite Iran largely on the basis of common sectarian identity.

7.2 State Oppression by the Totalitarian Regimes 7.2.1 Conceptual Framework

While delineating upon ‘state oppression’ in terms of a structural concept which may be eradicated not through uprooting the rulers rather the system that provides space for the oppression to perpetuate, it seeks to identify the types of state oppression. These types include economic exploitation through denial rather predation of development opportunities for the citizens, political marginalization of certain sections through denying them role in decision-making, and repression against selective ethnic or religious groups through physical violence. This typology of state- oppression provides venues for the anarchic solution of the problem aiming at uprooting the existing political order.35 It further confers upon the oppressed, a license to exploit alternative means beyond the state mechanism to do away with this oppression.36 In this theoretical framework, this part of study seeks to explore the question that how far it is true that oppression of the totalitarian regimes like in Somalia, Algeria and Egypt paved the way for violent reaction from the oppressed groups. In theoretical terms, the state oppression may be discussed as follow: One, theorizing the concept of economic exploitation highlights the converse relevance between oppression and privilege. It further confirms that there is always a privileged section that thrives at the altar of the oppressed. The delivery of ‘public good’ constitutes a fundamental content in the social contract between the rulers and the ruled. Failure of equitable service delivery by the state to its citizens culminates into abrogation of this contract. This abrogation of the contract is bound in ‘cause and effect’ relationship largely in the frame of what Collier and Hoeffler term as ‘greed and grievance’ model. The grievance is taken as an outcome of ‘economic inequality’ or ‘economic injustice’ on the part of the ruling elite. Greed is identified in terms of desire of the political elite to perpetuate its control on national power through controlling the national resources. When the civil war like situation emerges following the abrogation of the contract between the ruler and the ruled, the model of ‘greed and grievance’ provides a trajectory to prolong this violent situation.37

34 Hayder al-Khoei, The World Today (October & November 2014):38-40 35 Peter T. Leeson, “Better off Stateless: Somalia before and after Government Collapse,” Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (2007):689–710, Available online October 10, 2007, www.sciencedirect.com 36 Iris Young, “Five Faces of Oppression, ”in Oppression, Privilege, & Resistance, ed. Lisa Heldke and Peg O’Connor (Boston:McGraw Hill, 2004) 37 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers New Series 56 No.4 (2004): 563-95; also see, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “ On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa”, in, Journal of Conflict Resolution 13 (Feb. 2002) 13-28; also see, Raphael Chijioke Njoku, History of Somalia, (California:Santa Barbra, 2013) 180

Two, another form of state oppression is reflected through political marginalization of certain groups. In theoretical terms, social risk and political alienation are bound together in mutually inclusive relationship. Higher the level of social risk, higher the level of political alienation.38 The essence of political participation lies in equality of rights and opportunities which can only be guaranteed if the interest of every individual is given equal weightage.39 Conversely, political marginalization takes place when certain individuals or groups are relegated to disadvantaged position. This relegation is reflective as well as outcome of socio-political and economic exclusion of some groups in a society. This socio-political marginalization is taken as a tool by most of the totalitarian regimes to sustain the political power. They aim to promote those individuals and groups which constitute their support-base at the cost of marginalization of those believed to be on the other side of the fence. This marginalization naturally leads to decline in political trust and the resultant decrease in political involvement. With the doors of political involvement closed in a given system, the marginalized sections of the society are constrained to look for alternatives to counter this forced alienation mostly by developing a reactionary approach.

Three, apart from economic exploitation and political marginalization, the totalitarian regimes do not hesitate to resort to physical violence against those groups, mostly ethnic or religious, whom they consider as possible potential threat to their political power-base. As totalitarian states come into existence through violence, therefore, they aim to retain their monopoly on the means of violence more vehemently vis-à-vis their democratic counterparts. As normal patterns of totalitarian regimes suggest, they permit one party to assume and exercise political authority and do not permit opposition to their authority. Physical violence is used as an instrument to suppress the opposition elements. Violence is further employed to terrorize the subjects in order to incapacitate them of independent thinking. However, the level of success of using violence to suppress the public aspirations is an open question. In normal course of history, use of violence invites violent reaction from those upon whom violence is imposed. The following discussion will focus upon Somalia, Algeria, Egypt and Mali on the above theoretical paradigms and will further explore the dynamics of violence in these states.

7.2.2 Somalia

In the Somalian context, the post-colonial era witnessed a violent and repressive political culture surrounded by an economic environment lacking even in the basic amenities of life. The political culture emerging from such an economic environment

38 Maria Oskarson, “Social and Political Marginalization in Hard Times,” Paper prepared for the 2010 American Political Science Association (APSA) annual meeting in Washington D.C. , USA September 2-5 2010 and Swedish Political Science Meeting in Gothenburg, September 30 to October 2 2010 39 Stanley I. Benn, “Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of Interests” 181

engendered a revolutionary culture wherein war lordism and militarism emerged to replace the state governance. The warlords like General Aideed and Ali Mehdi exploited the situation to their personal or group interests. They managed to strengthen their group economies through controlling black market, drugs and weapons business and by further controlling the food flow from the UN. Their control on food flow enabled them to maintain their authority on general public on one hand and the group-economies thus, strengthened could extend these warlords, the capacity to acquire weapons to sustain the civil war.

Moreover, despite possessing the essentials of modern nationalism including same religion, one ethnicity and common language which could make Somalia a role-model for the egalitarian African states, the Somalians continued to remain divided on clan- affiliations. Owing to these clan divisions, they could not give Somalia, the character of a cohesive and homogeneous society. The Somalian society is traditionally divided into four major clans which are further divided into sub-clans and extended family networks. These major tribes include the Biyomaal, the Ogaden, the Hawiye and the Darod. The political marginalization on tribal basis is not a new phenomenon rather it is embedded deep in the history of Somalia. The colonialists also used this trajectory to control the fulcrum of power in their favor. They promoted certain tribes whom they considered their ‘local friends’ at the cost of marginalization of the others who were taken otherwise. The Biyomaal, the Ogaden had to face political exclusion owing to their anti-colonial resistance. The Biyomaal made resistance against the Italian colonialists in South Somalia whereas the Ogaden resisted the British in `British Somaliland. Between the Hawiye and Darod tribes, the Italian colonialists promoted Majeerteen, a sub-clan of Darod whereas Hawiye was relegated to a marginal political position. This tribal marginalization in terms of a governance tool continued to exist even in the post-colonial era. For instance, the political ascendency of Darod continued to exist in the post-independence period when the military regime of Siyad Barre assumed the political authority. Barre belonged to Darod tribe. The Hawiye, though in numerical majority as compared to Darod, remained politically marginalized as Somalian administration remained mostly in the control of Darod. However, the Hawiye could undermine the governance in Mogadishu during the Barre regime. Moreover, international community’s approach to the Somalian problem further aggravated the gulf between the tribes. International community, most of the time, supported the weaker groups in Somalia. Their support to Abdulahi Yousouf, a warlord belonging to sub-clan of Darod after the collapse of state structure resulted in resentment amongst the tribal groups. The religious extremism also got accentuated as international support of Abdulahi Yousouf was taken in terms of an attempt to install another Darod dictatorship in Mogadishu.

Furthermore, in 1969, on the debris of crises of governance ensuing from the assassination of President Abdir Rashid Sharmarke emerged Siad Barre’s military regime. The military regime highlighting the so-called mutual compatibilities between socialism and Islam assumed ‘Scientific Socialism’ as its ideology and an era of close 182

ties was ushered in between the Barre regime and the Socialist world. Soviet Model intelligence network was established through establishing National Security Service and National Security Courts, notorious for their repression against the regime’s dissidents. This totalitarian structure aimed to transform the clan-based society into a socialist society where the clan-loyalties became an offence. At external front, following Ethiopian crisis subsequent to fall of Haile Selassie in 1974, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in Ogaden sought support from Barre whose mother was also from Ogaden in their military violence in Ethiopia following Djibouti’s independence from France in 1977. Though Barre could secure initial military success in Ethiopia yet the Soviet concerns to fill the vacuum after the withdrawal of the US from Ethiopia changed the military scenario. Barre could not maintain its initial military success for long as with the support of the Soviet Union and Cuba, Ethiopia started recovering its areas back from Somalia. These military developments led to heavy influx of Somalian refugees from Ogaden desert to Northern Somalia inhabited mostly by Isaaq tribe.40 Barre attempted to settle the Ogaden refugees on the Isaaq lands which instigated the Isaaq tribesmen to follow the path of violence against the government as well as Ogaden refugees. In order to safeguard their clan interests, they formed Somali National Movement (SNM) and declared Somaliland Separatism as its ideology. However, they had to face brutal reaction from the Barre government in terms of genocide of the Isaaq. Besides, SNM, another group Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) largely supported by Majeerteen clan had their operational bases in Ethiopia. As said earlier, in addition to SNM which was already hostile to Barre regime, SSDF also got disillusioned from Barre when he entered into an agreement with Ethiopia in 1988 to withdraw his support from the Somalian guerrillas. This move of Barre was taken as betrayal by the Ogaden tribes which were hitherto supported by the regime. This situation led to multiplying of clan-based guerilla groups and violent response from the regime and thus, civil war engulfed the state of Somalia.41

In 2002, Transitional Federal Government (TFG) based in Kenya was established through a series of peace talks but this government was weak enough to even base itself on the Somalian soil. In this situation, the Islamists stepped in to fill the vacuum of governance. The Islamic Courts Union (Ittihād al-mahākim al-islāmiyya) was established as a rival administration of TFG. In 2006, they managed to take over Mogadishu after overpowering the militias of clan warlords.42 They changed their nomenclature to Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC). Ethiopia sent its troops to Somalia to fight against SICC which was welcomed by international community. The international community was already disillusioned of SICC for its links with Al-Qaida and also because it had challenged TFG, the only legitimate arrangement recognized by the international community. SICC were forced to leave Mogadishu in 2007. SICC

40http://www.britannica.com/place/Somalia/Cultural-life#ref419661 accessed on 28.11.2015 41Ibid. 42Ibid. 183

were largely disintegrated but Al-Shabbab survived to continue guerilla fighting till now.43

7.2.2.1 Militant Landscape in Somalia Somalia provides a peculiar example where the state oppression contributed to militancy in the country. The violence orchestrated by the totalitarian regime of Barre, as discussed earlier, provided the militants with a field to operate by assimilating their ideology with the resistance to the west as well as the ‘nearer enemies’ in their bid to liberate the Ummah from the prevalent degeneration. In this scenario, Harakat al- Shabaab al-Mujahedeen commonly called Al-Shabbab emerged out of ICU when the latter got splintered into several factions following its defeat by TFG and Ethiopian army in 2006. Al-Shabbab owes its allegiance to Al-Qaida.44 Though its foot soldiers are largely concerned with clan-related infighting instead of global jihad yet Al- Shabbab by manipulating their vulnerabilities could give ideological colour to their resistance to TFG and African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) by labeling them to be the ‘enemies of Islam’. As it owes its allegiance to Al-Qaida, therefore, it shares ideological strands with Al-Qaida. Their ideological alignment with Al-Qaida naturally results in common modes and targets of violence with other Al-Qaida affiliates worldwide. It proclaims salafī version of Islam and seeks to revert to the early period of Islam. It further resolves to reject all forms of governance except the rule of Shariah. It seeks to establish an Islamic state in Somalia by waging jihad against the crusaders and their agents whom they label as ‘apostates’ who follow the agenda of the crusaders in Somalia.

The ideological streams of Al-Shabbab reflected through their patterns of violence can be summarized as follow:

One, Al-Shabbab proclaiming salāfī version of Islam yearns to revive the purity of faith by reverting back to the golden period of Islam. It resolves to fight against those who, in their view, contaminate the purity of faith through introducing innovations in its practice. They are opposed to the mystic traditions and even attempted to eliminate Salahiya Sūfī order from the region.45 Their clashes with Ahl-as-Sunnah wal’ Jama’a, a Sūfī group in Somalia may also be viewed in this context.46

Two, it aims to target the western interests within Somalia and without. Though they mostly target the places where there is possibility of the killings of the westerners yet they have also threatened Uganda and other African countries for their links with the African Union’s Mission in Somalia. Moreover, they target hotels as they provide lodgings to the infidels from the west and also the members of the apostate regime in

43Ibid. 44By the CNN Wire Staff, Updated 0607 GMT (1407 HKT) February 10, 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/09/world/africa/somalia-shabaab-Qaida/ accessed on 28-11-2015 45 Muuse Yuusuf, “An Act of Desperation by Al-Shabaab,” Somali Think Tank, October 7, 2011, http://somalithinktank.org/746/ accessed on 29-11-2015 46 “Sūfī Militia Says Al-Shabab Planning to Attack Galgadud Region,” Voice of America, September 14, 2010 184

Somalia.47 To quote a few examples, Al-Shabbab claimed responsibility of launching suicide attack in Kampala in 2010 and also targeting UN compound in Mogadishu in 2013 which claimed heavy loss of life. In their bid to attack the western interests in the region, they targeted a restaurant in Djibouti which was popular with the westerners.48

Three, Al-Shabbab targets the Somalian regime that they label as ‘agent of the west’. Besides attacks on government infrastructure and personnel, the militants launched an attack on Presidential palace in Somalia in February, 2014.49 They also target the Ethiopian army and African Union Mission whom they consider as supporting the Somalian government. Their attacks on the Kenyan soil including attack on Westgate Mall and Garissa University may be viewed in terms of reaction to the military involvement of Kenya in Somalia. Al-Shabbab escalated its militant activities in response to military intervention of Kenya in Somalia. The militants launched 80 attacks in Kenya in 2014 as compared to 37 in 2013.50

7.2.3 Algeria

In the backdrop of military-supported coup to prevent Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) from assuming political authority in 1991 elections, the military leaders gained control over the economic resources of Algeria. Actually, unaccountable monopoly of the ruling elite and military leadership over the economic resources reflects their unchallenged control over the political authority. The military leadership struggled to maintain the political patronage, which they deemed essential to their political domination, through the funds accumulated through exploitation of the national resources. This happened to reinforce interrelationship between the corruption and rejection of transparent political process. The privileged access to economic resources naturally led to massive corruption. The vested interests of the ruling elites could never be challenged within the existing system. The socialist model of economy that was adopted after independence in 1962 strengthened the public sector under tight administrative control, as visualized under single party system. It led to the emergence of what some term as ‘state capitalism’. Nevertheless, the economic liberalization, too, virtually failed to provide genuine boost to the economy rather proved to be blood-line to the parasitic elite. The benefits of free market remained beyond the reach of masses as the rulers having control over the oil exports to Southern Europe were the sole beneficiaries of the export proceeds instead of general masses. The oil and gas exports are the major source of revenue generation for the Algerian economy.

47 Mary Harper, Africa editor, “Why do al-Shabab Target Hotels?” BBC World Service, November 7, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34745495 accessed on 29-11-2015 48 National Counter Terrorism Centre, Counter Terrorism Guide, http://www.nctc.gov/site/index.html accessed on 30-11-2015 49 Omar Nor and Laura Smith-Spark, “Al-Shabaab militants attack Somali presidential palace in Mogadishu,” CNN, February 21, 2014, 50 “Al-Shabaab Attack on Garissa University in Kenya,” START, Background Report, , April, 2015, 185

The continuous exploitative economic milieu led to alienation amongst the general masses from the existing order.51

Moreover, the state of Algeria has not been able to ensure equitable opportunities of political participation to the masses in general since its inception in 1962. The phenomenon of political marginalization in Algeria is largely an outcome of the state- design. The political process in the infant state was to revolve around a single party system on the socialist pattern which, in the absence of an organized opposition, became an instrument of serving the interests of the military-backed ruling elite. The privileged position thus, secured was maintained largely through relying on the coercive organs of the state instead of the popular sentiments which naturally led to the erosion of the state institutions. The ruling elite backed by the military got huge potential of exploitation on both political and economic axis. The ruling elite developed a system of patronage to draw support to perpetuate their monopoly on political authority by sidelining those perceived as ‘others’. The disruption of the electoral process in 1991-1992 through a military-backed coup when Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was all set to secure majority in the People’s National Assembly may be viewed in this context. The suspension of the electoral process virtually rendered the state dysfunctional and incapacitated to resolve the problems of popular exclusion from the political process in the future. The alienation from the political process has a rising trend since 2001 not only amongst the Islamists rather also from the Berber regions of Kabylia against the neglectful and contemptuous response of the ruling elite to the popular demands.

Furthermore, the state repression promotes a political milieu of violence. The groups against whom this violence is directed prefer to establish organizations as defensive shield against such oppression. Through establishing such exclusive organizations, they devise ‘anti-system frames’ to direct their violence to uproot the agents of repression.52 The culture of brutality as generated through a broader environment of state repression provides grounds to the oppressed to draw legitimacy to their acts of reactive violence. This environment further alienates the violent groups from the mainstream and they start viewing their organizational objectives and strategies to achieve them in an emotive rather than pragmatic manner. The ‘anti-state frames’ are created on the premise that the existing system has become dysfunctional devoid of any possibility of reform. The frames promote a resolve amongst their architects to obliterate the existing system. In Algeria, during the post-1992 coup, state repression created an environment wherein exclusive organizations flourished with their ‘anti- system frames’. In the face of state repression, the target groups preferred to leave inclusive organizations like FIS and preferred to join exclusive organizations like GIA

51 “Algeria’s Economy: The Vicious Circle of Oil and Violence,” ICG Report, ICG Africa Report No. 36 Brussels, 26 October 2001; also see, George Joffé, “The Role of Violence within the Algerian Economy,” Journal of North African Studies, 7, 1 (Spring 2002) 52 Mohammad M. Hafez, “From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria,”in, Islamic Movement: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quinon Wiktorowicz (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 2004), 38 186

(al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha) to reinforce themselves against the coercive organs of the Algerian state. They developed ‘anti-system frames’ that rejected the possibilities of reconciliation within the existing system.53 This group spearheaded violent campaign against the state during the closing years of the 20th century. However, carrot and stick strategy of the government remained successful in leading to erosion of this group which was eventually survived by a splinter group “Salafīst Group for Preaching and Combat” (Al-Jamā‘ah as-Salafīyyah lid-Da‘wah wal-Qiṭāl) which pledged its allegiance to Al-Qaida in 2003. In 2007, this group announced to operate under the acronym “Organization of Al-Qaida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb” (Qaidat al-jihad ﬁ Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami) often abbreviated as AQIM.

7.2.4 Egypt

In the Egyptian context, the Islamists have always discredited the state system for being exploitative and non-responsive to the aspirations and needs of the masses. Even the post-colonial state system was declared non-interpretive of the dreams of the Egyptians regarding their cherished system frame. In Egypt, the Islamists have been yearning to develop non-state systems to compensate for the state’s functions. In 1928, Ikhwān-ul-Muslimeen was established with the proclaimed objectives of obliterating the exploitative western influences and reviving the ideals of Islam in terms of solution to the problems of the Muslims. As a social movement, Ikhwān performed for the education uplift and also in health sector in the Egyptian society. In his famous treatise on jihad, Hassan Al-Banna, the founder of Ikhwān regarded jihad to be an instrument of preventing injustice and oppression.54 With the collapse of King Farouk regime in 1952 on the charges of corruption and poor governance, the Islamists had expectations that the new regime of Nasser will redesign the state- system frame according to the aspiration of the masses. These expectations could never be fulfilled for the Islamists who would experience brutal and unending political marginalization during the years to come.

Nasser sidelined the Islamists who viewed Islam in terms of exclusive solution to the problems faced by the contemporary Muslims. Their marginalization became more vehement rather brutal when they made a failed attempt at the life of Nasser in 1954. He responded with aggressive crackdown on Ikhwān which was banned by the regime. His regime adopted socialist ideology through promulgation of 1956 constitution that provided for one-party political system. Though Islam was recognized as official religion yet it was not Islam but Socialism that was accorded the status of an ideology to transform the state and society in Egypt. He embarked upon an era of nationalization in the country on socialist pattern. He identified himself with the state and ushered in an era characterized with strict censorship of

53 Ibid. 39 54 Al-Banna, jihad, 187

communications, surveillance of the citizens and least value for human rights.55 In this political environment, the Islamists were never granted opportunities of participation in political process by the regime rather they were forcibly dragged out of even the margins of politics. The utter denial of any role in the political process also marginalized the inclusive elements within the Ikhwān and won appreciation for the rejectionist theory of Sayyed Qutb. He, declaring the existing state system to be based upon the jāhilliyah social order, ruled out the option of reforming the system through inclusive efforts. He urged upon the fellow believers to uproot the existing order which was based upon ignorance and provided space for the rulers to pursue the agenda of the infidels against the fellow believers.56

Not unlike FIS in Algeria, the Ikhwān too, underwent internal fragmentation in the wake of excessive state repression exhibited in terms of arrests, incarceration in desert concentration camps and execution of its leadership by the Nasserite regime. The top- class leadership of Ikhwān including Hassan Al-Banna, its founder and Sayyed Qutb, the chief architect of the anti-system frame in Egypt were amongst those executed by the Nasser regime. Against this oppression and state-violence, the inclusive segments in Ikhwān were relegated to the marginalized positions vis-à-vis the exclusionists who largely drawing upon Sayyed Qutb’s theory of takfīr sought to explore anti-system frames for their operations in Egypt. Those executed were started being glorified as heroes against the ruling elites labeled as western agents. In this milieu of state repression and rise of counter anti-system rhetoric, the organization could not avoid undergoing internal fragmentation too. With the mainstream Ikhwān reverting to the background, different splinter groups emerged of which two are important for this study – “Islamic jihad” and “Jama’a Al-Islamiyyah”. These groups ushered in an era of resistance against the west and the rulers in the Muslim lands whom they labeled as ‘nearer enemies’ for pursuing the western agenda against the fellow believers.

The rise of this militancy is embedded in the political landscape emerging from the failure of the post-colonial state system to cater for the economic needs of the Egyptian youth. They, when confronted by the socio-economic problems of rapid population growth and ensuing urbanization, got frustrated. This frustration exposed the inefficiency of the ideas of the state structure imported from the west. Through seeking theological legitimacy to uproot the existing state system and installing the Islamic system in lieu thereof, became the central point of the struggle of the Islamic movements in many Muslim states including Egypt. A combination of ideological grounds to uproot the nationalist state system as provided by Qutb and the structural socio-economic and political problems made Egypt a reference state for the rise of militant movements since the early 1970s.57 Initially, Jama’a al-Islamiyyah which was largely concentrated and involved in social work in university campuses was used

55 Robert St. John, “Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt,” http://www.britannica.com/biography/Gamal-Abdel-Nasser accessed on 4-12-2015 56 Qutb, , Muālim fil tarīq 57Gilles Kepel, “Islamists versus the State in Egypt and Algeria,” Daedalus, Vol.124, No.3, The Quest for World Order, (Summer, 1995):109-127 188

by Sadaat regime to counter-balance the leftists. Later on, it was realized that it posed a threat more serious than the leftists to the state. With this realization, the state started clamp down upon Jama’a al-Islamiyyah which resulted in militant backlash. Against the state clampdown, a number of militants went into hidings. They got further fragmented largely into two groups. One was headed by Shukri Mustafa who following the prophetic tradition of migration from Makkah left Cairo to make a victorious comeback like the Prophet. However, the state could neutralize this group and its leadership. The second group also held responsible for Sadaat’s assassination was Abdul Salam Faraj’s “Islamic jihad”. Faraj believed in targeting the state directly instead of waning resources in social work. Though even by assassinating President Sadat, they could not succeed in monopolizing the state in Egypt but at least, they could put the legitimacy of the state in question.

During Hosni Mubarak era, the emigrants who having been frustrated by the economic recession of 1970s, had gone to Arabia to explore employment opportunities started coming back with a considerably sound financial position but also with somewhat transformed ideological vision. In Arabia, they could assimilate the Wahābī influence in their ideological orientations. As long as, they did not challenge the state system, they were treated in terms of a source of stability and further as a source to draw legitimacy to the state. The movement to uproot the existing impious state system and replacing it with the Islamic one again arose in Egypt largely led by two organizations namely Tanzim al-jihad under Abdul Zumur and Jama’a Islamiyyah led by Sheikh Omer Abdul Rehman. Tanzim al-jihad exhibited political patience whereas Jama’a al-Islamiyyah opted for activism in terms of violence against the state structure through mobilizing the victims of state repression. “Islamic jihad” too opted for the same route of violence. The attacks on foreigners and tourist industry invited public reprobation against the militants which prompted the state to strike back successfully.58 In this scenario, Al-Zawahiri emerged to lead Islamic jihad who later on, during his stay in Afghanistan, merged the organization with Al-Qaida and became its chief ideologue along with Bin Laden.

7.3 Unhealed Wounds in the Muslim Lands: Gaza and Palestine

Unhealed wounds which the Muslims believe to have been inflicted by the west continue to be resource to the militants’ strength in the Middle East. On one hand, these conflicts provide grounds for recruitment for the militants and on the other, the militants seek to justify their violence through exploiting these conflicts which is evident through their repeated references to these conflicts.59 While delineating upon the background of the militancy in Gaza and Palestine, the following discussion will

58 Apart from Somalia, Algeria and Egypt, there are also other states like Mali and Nigeria where state repression exacerbated militancy. 59 This narrative is endorsed even by the US policy-making circles. See for instance, the statement of Rob Malley, senior advisor to President Obama for the Counter-ISIL Campaign in Iraq and Syria, “Obama’s ISIS czar sayswe can’t defeat extremism without resolving Palestinian issue” , in, Mondoweiss, December, 14, 2015 189

examine the transformation of militancy in these lands from religious nationalism under Hamas to transnational militancy under ISIS.

7.3.1 Militant Religious Nationalism

The genesis of militant religious nationalism emerged from the Islamists’ conflict with the secular movement for the liberation of Palestine. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) founded in 1964 aimed to provide a point of convergence to fragmented resistance groups for the liberation of Palestine from Israeli occupation. The charter60 categorically declared Zionism in terms of a colonial, racist and Fascist ideology upon which the state of Israel had been established. (Article 19) The charter declared liberation of Palestine and undoing the Jewish entity to be nationalist duty of the Arabs instead of religious one. (Article 14). The nationalist character was dominant enough to dispense with the religious character of the organization. It made no reference to religion whereas besides calling for resistance in a nationalist spirit, it urged upon the Arabs to inculcate nationalism in the frames of minds of the new generation through education and other means of enlightenment. (Article 8) Initially, Palestine Liberation Army, its military wing was fused with the armies of neighboring Arab states and the guerilla factions were at marginalized positions in decision- making. However, Arabs’ defeat at the hands of Israel during Six-Days War reversed the scenario and the guerilla factions got more autonomy and leverage.61 In 1968, the guerilla factions attained representation in Palestine National Council (PNC), the legislative body of the PLO. Al-Fatah was the most prominent of these radical factions aiming to eliminate Israel and substituting it with a secular state that would accommodate Jews, Muslims and Christians as equals.62 Since late 1960s, PLO embarked upon violence against the Israeli targets largely from its bases in Jordan and Lebanon under the leadership of Yasser Arafat who became its head in 1969. However, during mid-1970s, PLO endeavoring for legitimacy in terms of sole representative body of the Palestinians stopped attacking targets outside Israel and thus, could secure membership in Arab League in 1976. In the wake of intifada in 1987, PLO assumed a conciliatory tone vis-à-vis Israel as quasi-Palestinian government in exile established in 1988 tacitly acknowledged Israel’s right to exist.63 It withdrew from its goal of replacing Israel with a secular Palestinian state in favor of a policy of co-existence between two states- Israel and Palestine. The conciliatory tone of PLO vis-à-vis Israel culminated into mutual recognition between the two sides in Oslo Accords in 1993. The backlash to this conciliatory posture got translated in the form of second intifada with dominantly religious character in the year 2000. As the secular elements got marginalized owing to their conciliatory approach to the

60Palestine National Charter of 1964, published by, Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations 61Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Palestinian political organization, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Palestine-Liberation-Organization accessed on 30-12-2015 62 Other factions include Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic (DFLP), and al-Ṣāʿiqah. 63 PLO recognized the United Nation’s Resolutions 242 and 338. 190

Zionist entity, the religious elements which were at the backbenches during first uprising were now spearheading the uprising.64

On the premise of Arafat’s accommodative approach to Israel and failure of Oslo Accords to resolve the issue, the Islamists got an opportunity to make inroads into the body of resistance in Palestine. The Islamists rejected the chances of peaceful settlement of Palestine conflict for being unrealistic given the repressive and illegitimate nature of the Zionist entity. They believed that the secularists failed as they did not permit faith to discipline their resistance which is the only possible solution to the conflict. Sheikh Ahmed Yasin strongly condemned PLO for its secular approach and declared cooperation with it as non-permissible (harām) for the believers unless they subscribed to Islamic ideology.65 Some may argue that rise of religious nationalism does not necessarily confirm the Palestinians’ turn to Islam rather as an alternative answer to the question after the failure of the secularists.66 The external factors like Iranian Revolution, Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel and Islamists’ movement in Egypt contributed to the promotion of this alternative.67 It is in this perspective that Islamic resistance groups emerged to provide religious solution to the issue. Dr. Fathi Shiqaqi, himself a member of Ikhwān, founded the Movement of Islamic jihad (MIJ) as religious solution to the Palestine question.68 MIJ believed jihad to be the only solution to the Palestine problem. PLO’s formal standpoint of two-state solution provided a platform for Ikhwān to challenge the status of PLO as sole representative body of the Palestinians by exploiting the anti-Israelite notion through Hamas.69 It further triggered Ikhwān to share the jihadi solution to the Palestine issue with MIJ.

Ikhwan legacy in Palestine dates back to 1935 when Abdul-Rehman Al-Banna came to Palestine to do preliminary homework for establishing Ikhwān’s chapter in Palestine which was later on inaugurated in 1945. Besides public disillusionment from the secularists and success of Iranian revolution, the dynamic figure of Sheikh Ahmed Yasin was also instrumental in rapid rise of Ikhwān to command anti-Israel popular sentiments vis-à-vis the secularists. In 1973, Sheikh established al-Mujamma al Islami (The Islamic Centre) in Gaza which would soon control all institutions established by Ikhwān including Islamic University in Gaza. Multiple groups in Gaza, West Bank and Jordan vying for the cause of Palestine merged to form a united front under “The Muslim Brotherhood Society in Jordan and Palestine”. Moreover, Ikhwān also exploited its control on the institution of waqf to enhance its public following. Though

64Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Palestinian political organization, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Palestine-Liberation-Organization accessed on 30-12-2015 65 Ann M. Lesch , “Prelude to the Uprising in the Gaza Strip,”Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 20, No. 1 (Autumn, 1990): 1-23 66 Iyad Barghouti and Lisa Hajjar , “The Islamist Movements in the Occupied Territories: An Interview with Iyad Barghouti,” Middle East Report, No. 183, Political Islam (Jul. - Aug., 1993): 9-12 67 Ibid. 68 Ramadan 'Abdallah Shallah and Khalid al-'Ayid, “The Movement of Islamic jihad and the Oslo Process,”Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 28, No. 4 (Summer, 1999): 61-73 69 Wendy Kristianasen, “Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas Respose to Oslo,” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 28, No. 3 (Spring, 1999): 19-36 191

initially, al-Mujamma focused largely on preaching and training of the youth aimed at their spiritual return to Islam instead of armed resistance to Israel yet in the wake of intifada, it switched over to military jihad to respond to public sentiments.70

To pursue military jihad, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin founded Hamas in 1987 and next year its branch in West Bank was also established. It announced its 36-Articles charter in 1988 which clearly highlighted its ideological dynamics.71 It proclaimed itself to be branch of Ikhwān (Article 2). By inviting the believers sharing its ideological standpoint to join its ranks (Article 4), it claimed universal character but only in terms of its ideological appeal aimed at securing recognition with the Muslims worldwide (Article 7) In terms of its goals, the charter is embroiled in conflict between the nationalist and ideological standpoints. Though in broader terms, it projected Islam to be the only solution to the evils contaminating the contemporary world and claimed to fight oppression through jihad (articles 9 & 10) yet it did not avoid labeling itself to be a Palestinian organization. (Article 6). Moreover, though it acknowledged Palestine to be waqf land for the whole Muslim Ummah (article 11) and thus, called them to strive for its liberation in terms of a religious obligation (article 15) yet at the same time, it declared nationalism to be an inalienable part of its religious ideology.(article 12) Looking from the edge, the charter of Hamas leads to the following observations: one, though like MIJ, it recognized military jihad to be the only solution to the Palestine conflict and helped popularization of jihad under its banner yet it always retained its nationalist character and scope of its jihad remained confined to the liberation of Palestine alone; two, it attempted to accommodate both nationalist and Islamic approaches to the frame of Palestinian uprising; three, despite acknowledging itself to be a branch of Ikhwān, its religious-nationalist character was in direct contradiction with Qutb’s view of jihad. He argued that restricting jihad to defend one’s homeland amounted to subordinating Islamic way of life to the importance associated with one’s homeland which was alien to Islamic consciousness.72

7.3.2 Global Religious Militancy

Palestine has always been core conflict which has been characterizing the conflict model between the Islamists and the West. Though, the nature of the resistance to the Zionist entity has been dynamic and changing from secular to religious-nationalist to global militancy yet its importance in terms of a source to legitimize violence has never diminished. Though some may argue that even the liberation of Palestine would not satisfy the militants who aspire for global caliphate yet the fact remains that Palestine issue has always been central to conflict between the militants and the west.

70 Beverley Milton-Edwards, “The Concept of jihad and the Palestinian Islamic Movement: A Comparison of Ideas and Techniques,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,vol. 19, No. 1 (1992): 48-53 71 For text of the charter see, Muhammad Maqdsi , “Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine,” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer, 1993): 122-134 72 Milton-Edwards, “The Concept of Jihad and the Palestinian Islamic Movement” 192

With the militants, this issue has primacy vis-à-vis other issues. This issue has precedence over the enforcement of Shariah which is explicit from the Al-Zawahiri’s proclamation of takfīr to the Saudi regime for their inaction on this issue even though they enforce Shariah.73 His criticism of democracy is also partly associated with Palestine issue on the grounds that it was democratic mood that inspired the west to install Zionist entity on the Palestinian land.74 For Bin Laden too, one of the primary objectives of jihad is to liberate the holy sanctuaries of Islam including Palestine.75 Moreover, in his fatawa issued on 12th Oct. 1996, Bin Laden exploited the Palestine issue to mobilize jihadi spirit amongst the believers. Furthermore, in his message to the American people, he criticised the atrocious policies of the American government against the Palestinians.76

Not unlike Hamas, Al-Qaida believes jihad to be only solution to the Palestine conflict and declares the incumbent Palestinian Authority as western agent for their sympathies with the infidels which warrants takfīr.77 He also condemns those who advocate peaceful solution to the conflict and ask for collaboration with the ‘apostate regime’ of the Palestinian Authority through participation in political process.78 Besides commonality of objective to liberate Palestine, the ideological differences between Al-Qaida and Hamas have also been conspicuous. Al-Qaida believed that Palestine is the core catalyst for its global religious militancy aimed at creation of global caliphate whereas for Hamas, liberation of Palestine is the ultimate objective. Apart from the scope of jihad, the two organizations differ in strategy to achieve their goals as well. Al-Qaida outrightly rejects the international charters that recognize the Zionist entity on the Palestinian land for which Hamas leadership shows some deference.79 However, despite these differences, Al-Qaida leadership has always kept the undertones of these differences low so that the forces of unbelief may not benefit from these differences. The available evidence suggests that top leadership of Al- Qaida has been directing the field formations to avoid conflict with Hamas followers as despite deviations from Shariah, they are after all believers, thus, evil should not be supported through opposing them.80 Moreover, Al-Qaida, though reluctantly, supported to accept funds from organizations like Hamas with whom differences exist if the scarcity of funds was likely to result in stoppage of jihad against the infidels.81

Nevertheless, these differences between Hamas and those pursuing for global jihad under ISIS became more pronounced. ISIS which too, exploits Palestine issue to give direction to its militancy has posed the ever biggest challenge to Hamas power-base in

73 Azzam, Al-Qaida 74Letter from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM-2012-0000013 75 Bin Laden’s interview with Al-Jazeera ( December, 1998) 76 Osama Bin Laden’s Message to the American People (30th October 2004) 77Osama Bin Laden’s second letter to the Muslims of Iraq (18-10-2003); also see, Osama Bin Laden, “Wrath of God”, interview with Time Magazine, January 11, 1999 (http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2054517,00.html accessed 21.05.2013) 78Osama Bin Laden’s second letter to the Muslims of Iraq (18-10-2003) 79Bin Laden, “Until We Taste What Hamza Bin Abd Al-Muttalib Tasted” 80 Bin Laden’s address to AQAP, Letters from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM-2012-0000016 81Letters from Abbottabad, No.SOCOM-2012-0000008 193

Gaza and has been successful to forge inroads even into its military wing. A number of defections within Al-Qassam Brigade have taken place on the pretext that Hamas is not much Islamic.82 Jordanian King Abdullah also confirmed that ISIS was recruiting its foot soldiers from Gaza through exploiting the Israeli’s repression on the Palestinians.83

Hamas declines to approve of the killings of civilians by the ISIS as a war tactic.84 On the other hand, ISIS has threatened to strike against the secularists- Al-Fatah and Hamas too alongside Israel for not enforcing Shariah to the required degree in the areas under their control.85 In short, as said earlier, besides radical transformations in the character of resistance to Israel with different organizations, the conflict has always been central to the conflict model between the Islamists and the west.

7.4 Theaters of International Aggression

Taking Iraq as a test-case, the following discussion seeks to explore the question that how far it is true that the theatres of international aggression in the Muslim world provide space for the mobilization of militant forces. The post-Saddam Iraq reflects three-pronged conflict scenario- militants’ resistance against the invading foreign forces, violence against the local support-base of the US and violence on the trajectory of polemics.

From the US invasion in Iraq in 2003, the militants could explore theological legitimacy for their violence in the context of religious obligation of jihad in the face of foreign invasion into the Muslim lands. Thus, Iraq though having long history of socialist rule since World War II, witnessed resistance against the foreign intervention which was predominantly religious in character. This religious colour is evident from the subscription of labels of religious import like ‘Saladin Brigades’, ‘Al- Mutawakileen’ and ‘Muhammad’s Army’ by the resistance groups.86 The religious sentiments associated with the resistance could accommodate the reactionary and extremist version of jihad as espoused by Al-Qaida and its affiliates which identify Iraq and Afghanistan to be the prime venues to hit the ‘snake’s head’.87 Thus, Al- Qaida could discover Iraq in terms of an ideal launching ground for global jihad.88

82Aaron Klein, “Gaza becoming Center for Export of ISIS Fighters,” WND Exclusive, published: 06/29/2015 83 Scott Pelley, “King of Jordan: ISIS used Gaza conflict as recruiting tool” CBS News, September 25, 2014 84 Creede Newton, “ISIS Gains a Foothold in Gaza,” The Daily Beast, September 12, 2015; also see, Céline Lussato, “Hamas v. ISIS, An Islamist Civil War Simmers In Gaza,” World Crunch,September 24, 2015; Raed Omari, “What if ISIS emerges in Gaza?” Al Arabiya News, June 7 2015; Fares Akram, “Gaza's Hamas Rulers have a New Problem: ISIS-Sympathetic Jihadists,” Business Insider, June 8, 2015 85 Jordan Schachtel, “ISIS Threatens to Take Gaza from Rival Terror Group Hamas,” Breitbart, July 1, 2015 86 Haynes, “Al Qaida: Ideology and Action” 87 Letters from Abbottabad, No. SOCOM-2012-0000018 88Ibid. No. SOCOM-2012-0000017 194

Though Al-Qaida’s extremist narrative may not find large following with the Muslims in normal circumstances89, yet its continuous exploitation of the Muslims’ sufferings in the international war theatres like Iraq and Afghanistan could develop anti-Americanism into a converging point for majority of the Muslim groups from diverse backgrounds to subscribe to the extremist version of jihad.90 Abu Hafs al- Masri Brigade, an Al-Qaida affiliate issued “The Mujahedeen Roadmap” that sanctioned the killings of the Americans, Jews and the Christians by eliminating any distinction between the combatants and the non-combatants. This distinction has been disregarded on the grounds that as they have an indirect role in decision making, therefore, they are responsible for their states’ invasion into the Muslim lands. The roadmap further urges upon the unity of the militant groups to globalize the scope of jihad in Iraq. This global jihad would not only engulf the western powers but also their supporters in the Muslim states whom the militants label as their ‘agents’.91

Thus, against the US invasion in Iraq, Al-Qaida’s immediate focus has been to drive the occupying forces out of Iraq. They believe that elimination of the western military presence from the Muslim soil will not only bring economic exploitation and repression against the Muslims to an immediate end92 rather as Al-Qaida and its affiliates like Ansār Al-Sunnah in Northern Iraq believe that resistance in Iraq will also serve as jumping off ground to liberate Palestine and other areas under western control which were once Muslim through mobilizing the anti-western sentiments.93 In the context of Iraq, Al-Qaida channelized their foot soldiers94 to globalize their resistance against the west. They urged the Muslims in the west to observe theological conditions that govern dār-ul-harb.95 In this perspective, Anwar Al-Awlaki has discussed two key questions that determine the militants’ approach to the west. One, whether the theological status of the western nations is of dār-ul-harb or dār-ul-ahd for the Muslims in general and two, in case the western states are declared dār-ul- harb whether the Muslims living there are bound by their covenant not to commit violence against these states. In answer to first question, Awlaki categorically

89Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Ideology”; also see, Paz, “The Impact of the War” 90A media report suggests that people in Iraq were attracted towards the puritanical perspective of religion as laid down by Wahabism more vehemently after the US invasion of Iraq. See, N. Pelham, “Iraq’s Holy Warriors Draw Inspiration from Arab Puritan of another Country,” Financial Times, March 18, 2004. 91 Al-Qaida’s T he Mujahidin's Roadmap, July 1, 2004; Madrid Bombings may be viewed in the context of this roadmap. Al-Qaida attacked Muhammad b. Naif, Assistant Minister for Defence of Saudi Arabia for his continued support to the US; also see, Abu Basir’s interview with Al-Malahem Staff, in Inspire, issue 1 92 Ibid. 93Haynes, “Al Qaida: Ideology and Action” 94Ibid. 95 The militants frequently use three terminologies to ascertain theological status of the west vis-à-vis the Muslim states. These include dar-ul-kufr, dar-ul-Islam and dār-ul-harb. Al-Maqdisi defines dar-ul- kufr where the law of unbelief and non-believers’ authority to legislate are predominant; dar-ul-Islam is where the laws of Islam are supreme and the believers and their legislation are predominant, see This is our Aqeedah; dār-ul-harb are those peoples who enter into war with the Muslims and dar-ul-ahd are those nations with whom the believers are found to have a covenant. Anwar al-Awlaki, “The Ruling on Dispossessing the Disbelievers wealth in Dar al-Harb,” Inspire, issue 4, (2010) Al- Malahem Media

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declined to acknowledge that the Muslim leaders could enter into covenants with the peoples of unbelief because they have lost their theological legitimacy by following man-made laws and allying with the non-believers against the fellow Muslims. About the second question, he argued that the western nations which actively participated in invasion of Iraq or any other part of the Muslim world could no more be considered as dār-ul-ahd rather they had become dār-ul-harb. Thus, their Muslim citizens were no more bound by their covenants which would stop them from harming the interests of their states of residence.96

As far as the internal landscape of the Muslim societies is concerned it could not remain immune from the natural fall out of confrontation between the militants and the imperialist west. The western invasion of the Muslim lands including Iraq came under theological scrutiny with the militants. As a result of this scrutiny, the scope of cooperation between the ruling elite in the Muslim states and the west got redefined. The states like Iraq which happened to be subject to western aggression were declared to be dār-ul-harb because the militants believed that after the US invasion, the decision-making process was no more controlled by the Muslims and the country was being governed by man-made laws. Having been declared as such, these Muslim states and their citizens become subject to theological conditions that govern dār-ul- harb. These conditions include either waging jihad or migrating from dār-ul-harb.97 The post-Saddam Iraq reflects increased subscription to radical anti-western notions and liberal proclamation of takfīr to those who support the western sponsored arrangements for Iraq instead of Islamic political discourse.98 Al-Qaida identified the militants as awlia’a (friends) of Allah and those supporting the infidels against the fellow believers were declared as apostates warranted to be killed.99 The same narrative became relevant to all Muslim states with similar dynamics. In case of Yemen, AQAP sought to legitimize killings of the Yemenite soldiers on the pretext that they were guarding the embassies of the western nations fighting against the believers in Iraq and Afghanistan.100 In the same vein, Al-Qaida affiliates worldwide have unleashed violence against those whom they allege to have supported the west against the fellow Muslims.

So far as fall out of US invasion on sectarian dynamics of Iraq are concerned, the fall of Ba’ath regime was followed by violent conflict on the sectarian trajectory.This conflict may be viewed from diverse perspectives: One, it may be viewed in terms of a localized conflict where a Sunnite ruling elite attempts to revitalize its political authority against a new Shiite power elite that has seized political authority with the collaboration of a foreign power and also by the dint of majority. Two, ethnic context may also explain the conflict where the Shiite ethnic majority challenge the socio- political primacy of the Sunnite ethnic minority. However, the most plausible

96Ibid. 97 The same narrative was espoused by Sayyid Ahmed Bareili in India against the British and Sikh rule. 98 Paz, “The Impact of the War” 99 Awalaki, “The Ruling on Dispossessing the Disbelievers wealth in Dar al-Harb,” 100Ibid. 196

explanation to this sectarian violence is based upon the way the political authority passed over to the Shiites allegedly under the patronage of the US. In this scenario, they were labeled as hypocrites by the Sunnite militants. Having been identified as allies of the unbelievers, the Shiites also became the natural targets of the Sunnite militants who unleashed violence against the invading foreign troops. This fire of sectarian hatred was being constantly fueled by the accusations and counter- accusations from both sides. The Sunnites were more vocal in their accusations against the Shiites for being part of the triangle with the Christians and the Jews to translate the Jewish plans to occupy the holy sites in the Muslim world into reality and further their hegemonic designs to control the resources of the Muslim world by establishing control over Iraq.101 Thus, the vacuum created by the US invasion of Iraq and breakdown of the military machine leading to deteriorated security situation ignited the ethnic and sectarian schisms to turn post-invasion Iraq into a new battle ground.102

Analytical review of the genesis and evolution of the killing fields of the militants leads to the following broader conclusions:

One, though the militant outfits in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq share anti-imperialist agenda yet these have always retained their sectarian identities. These identities have been channelizing the militancy inside the Muslim societies instead of reinforcing resistance against the imperialistic threats. Two, in utilitarian perspective, the militants have been exploiting these schisms to secure strategic and political gains. The militants have been exploiting the sectarian violence as a tool to mobilize the sectarian networks to boost militancy in global context. Three, though multiple identities-frame defines the conflict scenario in the Middle East, yet it has never been able to eclipse the relevance of sectarian identities to transform the religo-political landscape of the region. Four, the societies which have been victim to state oppression has been fertile to militancy in terms of reactive and anarchic solution to protect continuously denied rights to the marginalized sections. This anarchic culture leads to increased relevance of the religious dogmas to extend legitimacy for violent means adopted by the marginalized sections. Five, the militants may attempt to establish administrations rival to dysfunctional state structures like in Somalia to fill the governance vacuum. These attempts put them in direct confrontation with the totalitarian state structures which guard their monopoly over the means of violence more jealously as compared to democratic states which do not come into existence through violence like totalitarian regimes rather through consensus. Six, the militants attempt to explore the alternative solution to the governance crises through reviving the purity of faith. Thus, by reverting to the purity of faith, they reject everything that is not Islamic and does not find its place during the period of the salaf. This exclusionary approach places them on the other side of the fence vis-à-vis the non- believers and the believers who do not subscribe to their brand of Islam. Thus, the

101Quoted in Kazimi, “Zarqawi’s Anti-Shi’a Legacy” 102 Paz, “The Impact of the War” 197

struggle to explore governance alternatives embraces within itself, the seeds of discord with the non-believers and those following another brand of Islam. Seven, being in conflict with each other, the guardians of the dysfunctional state structures and the militants who claim to offer a Shariah-based alternative look for their respective support-solutions. The militant outfits look for becoming part of their pro- ideological networks whereas the regimes look towards the western powers by offering to protect their interests. This situation locks both sides into a more severe conflict scenario where the militants take refuge in lose application of takfīr for the ruling elite on the pretext of supporting the infidels against the fellow believers. Eight, the unhealed wounds in the Muslim lands like Gaza and Palestine have also contributed to perpetuation of militancy in the entire Muslim world in general and in the Middle East in particular. A strong anti-Israel stance has been the lifeline to the resistance movements. PLO could retain its ascendency in terms of sole representative body of the Palestinians until it adopted a conciliatory tone that culminated into Oslo Accords. Its secular nationalist appeal gave way to religious nationalism of Hamas when the latter declared jihad to be the only recourse to the liberation of Palestine. In the same vein, global religious militancy seems to put Hamas in shade by publically rejecting its so-called deference to international charter that recognizes the Zionist entity. Last but not the least, targets of international aggression in the Muslim world like Iraq and Afghanistan provide space to the militants to draw legitimacy to their violence by invoking theological doctrines that discipline the believers’ conduct in case of foreign aggression into a Muslim territory. The militants seek to legitimize violence not only against the invading enemy rather also against those who support the enemy from within. 198

8 Counter Narrative

In the preceding chapters, we have exposed the narratives of violence espoused by the militants, the ‘apologists’ and the ‘agents’. The militant narrative being evolved largely on the trajectory of takfīr and khurūj challenges even the definition of the Muslim and Islam whereas the narratives espoused by the ‘apologists’ and the ‘agents’ may be taken in terms of rejectionist response to the militants. The narrative of the ‘agents’ is based upon blatant use of repression against the militants. They are alleged to be the coteries of the west who promote western agenda and thus, are labeled as the apostates. The narratives espoused by the militants and the ‘agents’ lead to similar sort of unremitting violence against each other. The ‘apologists’ narrative provides a support-base to the westernized rulers in the Muslim lands by exploring the venues to reconcile Islam with the western democratic ideals. The militants claim to follow ‘authentic Islam’ by following the fundamentalist and salafī theological traditions whereas the ‘agents’ assert to go along nation state ideology. In support to the nationalist ‘agents’, the apologists claim to be modernists by following the western ideology expressed through democracy.

While affirming the scope of all the three narratives beyond academic squabbles, the following discussion will acknowledge their incapacity to avoid violence in their mutual conflict. The militants reverting to salafī version of Islam aim to revive the socio-political order on the pattern of early caliphate and thus, seek to legitimize their violence against the existing secular political orders in the Muslim world. They further claim that the west is bent upon promoting the ‘apologists’ who foster western democratic norms in collaboration with the ‘apostate rulers’ in the Muslim lands. This study will examine the militants’ narrative which unleashes violence from the trajectories of their defined codes of war in the pursuance of which, the self-starting militants do not pay any heed to the ethics of war. In this purview, this study seeks to transform the contemporary ideological discourse through the refutation of these codes of war by revisiting the primary sources. By redrawing the boundaries of faith through challenging the socio-political constructs founded on historical pre- suppositions, this study offers a counter narrative that ultimately culminates into refutation of the militants’ claim to follow ‘authentic Islam’.

8.1 Limits of Faith

As discussed elsewhere, radical revisions in the boundaries of faith occurred owing to prevailing of socio-political variables upon the fundamentals of faith which have always remained constant. This led to liberal application of takfīr to those accused of undermining the purity of faith by introducing bida’ā into its practice. This loose application of takfīr blurred the precise definition of the faith and the believers. Nevertheless, while relying upon well acclaimed and authentic Muslim scholarship and historical evidences from the period of the salaf, the following discussion seeks to 199

redraw the boundaries of the faith and ascertain the conditions leading to its invalidation. It seeks to uphold the defining character of the religious fundamentals in determining the limits of faith vis-à-vis the socio-political variables.

The structure of faith stands on its fundamental beliefs.1 All those who believe and confirm the truthfulness of divine revelations and veracity of the prophetic transmissions descended through a sound medium of narrations constitute the ideological brotherhood. In other words, to be a believer requires affirmation and conviction of the unity of God and authenticity of His prophets (as) which could be achieved only through rendering total submission to what the Prophet has brought down from Allah. After professing the faith, it is refutation of the same fundamental beliefs whose affirmation is required to enter into Islam in the first place, that puts a believer into unbelief. Mere commission of wrong deeds does not nullify the faith unless one develops belief in the permissibility of otherwise impermissible deeds.2 Takfīr is a sensitive issue in terms of entailing strong repercussions in the sense of leaving either the one who applies it or upon whom it is applied as non-believer. Thus, the Muslim scholarship has been cautious and never let the speculations move its application.3 In the course of Muslim history, takfīr has not been pronounced for two sects-‘Khawārij’ and ‘Rawāfidh’ whereas ‘Jahāmmiyah’ and ‘Qarāmitah’ have been ex-communicated. While examining the theories of classical jurists like Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Kathīr and Imam Ghazālī, this study will ascertain the theological grounds for the application of takfīr and will further develop an argument that all sorts of heresies do not lead to ex-communication rather it is refutation of any fundamental element of the faith that invokes takfīr.

8.2 Grounds of Takfīr

In classical perspective, it is not all sorts of heresies but refutation of any fundamental element of faith that invoke takfīr.4 In the course of early Muslim history, takfīr has

1 These include belief in Allah, His prophets, His angles, His revelations, the Last Day, resurrection after death and the Divine Decree (taqdeer). In detail, according to Imam al-Tahawi, the unity of God is expressed through his exclusive attributes. Attribution of human qualities to Allah amounts to shirk which nullifies one’s faith. Belief in prophets means that all of them were divine messengers during their respective time-frames within a definite scope. Prophet Muhammad is the seal of the prophethood and his prophethood is eternal and for all. Though divine revelations descended upon all prophets, yet Quran revealed to Prophet Muhammad is the literal word of God with explanation. Its eternity is confirmed and is not created like human speech. Identifying it with human speech amounts to falling in unbelief. With Imam al-Tahawi, belief in the unseen is part of the belief because of the limitations of human reason to access the metaphysics. Thus, disregarding the limitations of human reason and exploring metaphysics through rationalism leads to skepticism. He thus, argues that refutation of what is accessible exploring the non-accessible through amounts to commit unbelief (kufr). See, Imam Abu Ja`far al-Tahawi, Aqeeda-e-Tahawiyyah, www.siratalmustaqim.com/pdf/aqeedah- tahawiyyah.pdf, accessed on January 2, 2016 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 3:345-55; also see, Jackson’s introductory note to Al-Ghazalī, Faysal, 3-32. He argues that labelling of takfīr depends upon the scope of criteria that determines orthodoxy. 200

been pronounced for the sects namely Jahāmiyyah and Qarāmitah whereas takfīr was not invoked in case of khawārij and rawāfidh despite the fact that both of these sects introduced innovations into the faith. The following discussion while underlining the rationale behind theological labelling of these sects will determine the grounds of takfīr.

8.2.1 Khawārij

Though the companions of the Prophet (sw) fought against the khawārij but they did not invoke takfīr against them. Ali did not fight against them until they started shedding blood of the believers. His military campaign against them was aimed to protect the Muslims from their violence.5 Ali avoided initiating fighting against them until they launched the offensive themselves.6 It is evident from history that takfīr was not pronounced against them. For instance, Abdullah b. Umar and other companions offered their prayers behind Najdah Al-Haruri. Abdullah b. Abbas consulted them on the matters of religious import. Imam Bukhari affirmed the authenticity of Najdah in terms of a link in narration of ahādīth.7 Owing to this reason, even in battles they were dealt differently from unbelievers. Their women were not made captives and their property was not dealt with as spoils of war (ghanīmāh).8 After the battle, all the wounded were extended medical treatment.9 On the basis of this mild treatment, Shaybanī built war ethic against those who commit khurūj. He argued that it was neither suitable for the Muslims to pursue those who in case of defeat escape from the battlefield nor to kill their wounded persons.10

8.2.2 Rawāfidh11

As discussed elsewhere, those who rejected the right of the first three caliphs to the office of caliphate were labeled as rejecters (rawāfidh). Later on, those who supported Ali against Amir Muawiah, they were being called supporter of Ali (Shīăn-e-Alī). They argued that close relationship with the Prophet granted Ali primacy to the right to caliphate vis-à-vis other companions of the Prophet. On the contemporary, the Sunnites believe in legitimacy of rights of all the rightly guided caliphs in the same order as it went on in the history. In religious perspective, the Sunnites believe in

5 Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, 560 6 Ibn Kathīr, Al-Bidayah, vol.7, 369,374 7 Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, 556 8 Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, 560. Ibn Kathīr has explored evidence to the effect that Ali did not get khumus from their property confiscated during the battle of Nehrwan in 38 A.H. and returned the property to its real owners. See, Ibn Kathīr, Al-Bidayah, vol.7, 379. For detailed analysis regarding the conduct in the battles against those who commit khurūj, see, , Muhammad Ibn Al-Hasan Al-Shaybani, Kitab Al-Siyar Al-Saghir (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute Islamabad, 1998) 9 Ibn Kathīr, Al-Bidayah vol.7, 379 10Al-Shaybani, Kitab Al-Siyar, 135 11As conflict between the Shiites and the Sunnites defines the conflict model within the contemporary Muslim societies, therefore, a separate chapter has been devoted to revisit the polemics. For details, please see, chapter 3. 201

exclusivity of the Prophet in his infallible status whereas the Shiites extend this infallibility to their imams as well. Moreover, according to the Sunnites, for the narration of the ahadīth, it is the character of the narrator which is important whereas the Sunnites argue that the Shiites give more weight to affiliation with the Shiite doctrine instead of character of the narrator.12 In the political context, the Sunnite caliphate continued to exist till the 20th century when the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished. On the other hand, imamate continued to pass through the descendants of Ali until the 12th Imam Mahdi went into occultation. Majority of the Shiites are called athnā-e-ashrīyyā (the twelvers) because they believe in the twelve imams and further holds the view that the 12th Imam Mahdī who went into occultation will reappear in the world prior to the Day of Judgement and will establish justice in this world.

In this polemical background, it is argued that a large part of the classical Muslim scholarship do not pronounce takfīr to the Shiites in their collective capacity merely for believing in primacy of the right of Ali to the caliphate. Though, as has been said earlier, the Shiites are regarded as rawāfidh by the Sunnites because they reject the right of the first three caliphs to the office of caliphate and the Sunnites are declared as nawāsib (enemies of Ali), yet the classical perspective suggests that both sects have always expressed restraint from pronouncing takfīr to each other.13 Ibn Taimmiyah argued that the Shiite mufaddilah at least in their collective capacity who simply believe in the primacy of Ali’s right to the caliphate vis-à-vis the other three caliphs could not be ex-communicated. He further suggested that their takfīr amounted to going against the Quran, Sunnah and the consensus of the companions.14 This view was also shared by other Muslim scholars including Imam Ahmed who categorically suggested that they could not be declared as unbelievers.15 About rawāfidh and their critics Al-Ghazālī had moderate view when he suggested that both of these mutually opposite groups were not liable to attract the label of takfīr simply because none of the two held the opinion that what the Prophet brought down to us was not truth. On this premise, he further argued that the Shiites could not be declared as unbelievers simple because they overemphasize imamate.16 Al-Ghazālī has the credit to redefine the boundaries of faith through drawing a clear distinction between heresy and apostasy.17He argued that heresy did not necessarily constitute apostasy. He was in favor of broadening this definitional framework that could adjust the competing theological standpoints. Al-Ghazālī relies upon a prophetic tradition wherein the Prophet has been reported to have said that leveling false charges of unbelief against a fellow Muslim renders the one who so charges as unbeliever.18 Al- Ghazālī draws distinction between primary and secondary principles of belief. The

12Ibn Taimmiyah, Al-Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah 13Bar, “Sunnis and Shiites—Between Rapprochement and Conflict” 14 Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam 15 Ibid. Fatawa 3:345-55 16 Al-Ghazalī, Faysal,112,113 17Jackson’s introductory note to Al-Ghazalī’s Faysal, 3-32 18(Sahih Muslim 1:78-9 Bab hal man qala li akhihi al-muslim ya kafir); Ghazali, Faysal, 132

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primary principles include belief in the unity of God, Prophethood of Muhammad and the day of resurrection. Everything that is external to these three elements of faith is of secondary nature. The refutation of anything of secondary nature does not entail takfīr with the exclusive exception of the refutation of religious principles channelized down to us through ‘diffused congruence’ from the Prophet. Even in this case, difference of opinion on matters like issues involving some legal question or matters relating to the right to caliphate etc. will not attract takfīr but may raise the question of inventing innovations in the faith at the most. However, as said earlier, he reiterates that affirmation of doubt in the truthfulness of whatever has been brought down to us by the Prophet even if it involves some issue external to the three primary principles surely puts the one outside the pale of Islam.19 However, contradicting an isolated tradition (khabar-e- ah’dī)) will not attract takfīr but only the one who negates the veracity of anything channelized through ‘diffused congruence’ will be condemned to have committed an act amounting to unbelief.20 The status of ijma’ā as definitive proof itself is disputed amongst the Muslim scholars (mukhtalaf fīh).21 Al-Ghazālī recognizes ‘unbelief’ as a legal question like other legal issues which entails serious implications including loss of life and property here and condemnation to hellfire in the hereafter. Therefore, labeling of takfīr needs to be exercised with utmost caution.22

8.2.3 Jahāmiyyah

The evidence generated from the course of Islamic history suggests that a few ulema like Ibn Al-Mubarak23 do not include Jahāmiyyah in the list of Muslim sects because they do not believe them to be Muslims. This view is also shared by majority of the followers of Imam Ahmed whereas some other Hanbali’ites include them in the list of Muslim sects and thus, count the number of the sources of heresy to be five. Ibn Kathīr has explored another sect called Qarāmitah whom he declared as unbelievers. These sects have been declared as apostates because they refuted the fundamentals of the religion. For instance, in case of Jahāmiyyah, the following phases reflect the evolution of their thought process: First, they argued that Quran as a set of meanings was created by Allah and revealed to the Prophet. They viewed Quran as a set of meanings on the presumption that speech was not befitting characteristic of Allah and thus, they developed disbelief in the following Quranic verse: “And if anyone of the idolaters seeketh thy protection (O Muhammad), then protect him so that he may hear the Word of Allah, and afterward convey him to his place of safety. That is because they are a folk who know not.” (At-Tawbah: 6) Second, they had doubts regarding the Quran in terms of creation of God. Three, they held that Quran was revealed to the Prophet only as a set of meanings whereas it was subsequently expressed by the Prophet through his own words. Four, Quran being the attribute of Allah cannot be

19 Ibid. 113-114 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 115 23 He was student of Imam Malik and Imam Abu Hanifa. He was a great mohaddith and thus, earned the title Amir Al-Mauminin fil hadīth. He was born in 118 A.H. 203

memorized by the humans. Therefore, what is the part of our memory is not Quran.24 This sect was excommunicated by the ulema on the following grounds: Firstly, primary texts were available to refute their doctrine; secondly, their doctrine culminated into negation of the creator and thirdly, their views stood in contravention to the evidence recognized by human nature in normal course of life.25

Al-Ghazālī while distinguishing between exegesis (tafsīr) and theology refers to Imam Ahmed bin Hanbal’s views regarding the Jahāmiyyah sect. He argues that tafseer provides only the meanings of text whereas theology seeks to examine these meanings within some external framework. He refers to Quranic verse “He mounted the throne” istawā ala’ al-arsh (As-sajada: 4) and argues that tafseer provides only for the meanings of the text whereas to examine the controversies between the Jahāmiyyah sect and Imam Ahmed surrounding this verse is the domain of theology. Jahāmiyyah argue that God is omnipresent and not specific to one particular place like throne. In response, Imam Ahmed argues that all are agreed that God’s existence preceded every other creature because he himself is the creator of everything. Imam Ahmed further argues that if we ask Jahāmiyyah whether God has created all other creatures from inside Himself or external to His self, they can respond to this question from the following three possible standpoints: One, God created other creatures from inside Himself. It amounts to disbelief because evil cannot be part of God. Second, God created things external to His self but after their creation entered into them. This view also culminates into kufr because God cannot enter any despicable place. Third, the view that God created everything external to His self and remained external to His creatures is the view of the Muslims that is not shared by Jahāmiyyah. Thus, Imam Ahmed draws inference that Jhammiyah’s views regarding God end up in kufr.26

8.2.4 Qarāmitah

Qarāmitah flourished in 278 AH. They were mostly disciples of the Persian philosophers and at the same time believed in the Prophethood of Zoroaster. In Islamic perspective, they were not particular in observing defining limits of what was permissible or otherwise. Their callousness towards the limits of faith was largely inspired by the Rawāfidh’s proselytization of false creeds. In socio-political context, they earned the label of mahmarah for using red colour in terms of religious symbol to express their affiliation exclusively with the Abbasids. Ibn Kathīr has quoted Abu Bakr Al-Bāqalānī who in his book hatak al-Isrār wā kashaf al-Isrār has condemned this sect for their false propaganda regarding preference of Ali to other three pious caliphs and further for slandering the companions of the Prophet. The Prophet strictly prohibited the denigration of his companions. For instance, Imam Dhahbi27 has

24Estes,Yusuf, Beliefs About the Quran, http://yusufestesquran.com/jahmiyyah/ (accessed on August 15, 2013) 25 Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 3:345-55 26 Jackson’s introductory note to Al-Ghazalī’s Faysal, 3-32 27 Imam Shamsuddin Dhahabi, Al-Kabair, trans. Major Sins, http://www.islamguiden.com/arkiv/majorsins.pdf accessed August 30, 2013 204

quoted a hadīth that the Prophet said, “He who loves them, loves me but he who hates them, hates me, and he who offends them, offends me and in turn offends Allah and he who offends Allah, Allah almost takes him”28 In another tradition, the Prophet said, "The sign of faith is love of the helpers (Ansa’ar), and the sign of hypocrisy is hatred of the helpers”.29 In yet another transmission the Prophet strictly warned the believers not to insult his companions in the following words: “Do not revile my companions, for by Him in Whose Hand is my soul, were one of you to spend gold equal to mount Uhud, you would not attain the reward of the handful of one of them or even half of it.”

Moreover, the Qarāmitah committed violence in Ka’bah in the year 317 A.H. and killed many people. They shifted Hijr-e-Aswad to their area of influence.30 Ibn Kathīr has declared them zindīq and unbelievers on the following two grounds: one, they believed in the Prophethood of Zoroaster and used to follow Persian philosophers instead of Islam; two, they transgressed the limits of faith in terms of what was permissible and otherwise.

A critical analysis of these four sects by the classical theorists helps us to infer that takfīr can be invoked only in the case where someone forgo any of the fundamental principles of Islam like unity of God, Prophethood and life hereafter or where any element of the faith like prayer, Zakat, Fasting and Hajj is not recognized. As khawārij and rawāfidh did not forgo any of the fundamentals of the faith, therefore, they were not excommunicated whereas Jahāmiyyah and Qarāmitah disregarded these fundamentals and were excommunicated. On this premise, the following discussion will examine the classical narrative of takfīr as espoused by Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Kathīr and Imam Ghazālī to ascertain the grounds of takfīr in theological discourse.

Ibn Taimmiyah

As compared to other classical scholars, we find relatively liberal application of takfīr with Ibn Taimmiyah with whom the debate on takfīr undergoes micro-analysis. He argued that approval of unbelief and disapproval of belief revokes the belief of an otherwise believer. He added that approval of an unbeliever’s denial of divine unity and the finality of the Prophethood on the part of a believer provides enough grounds to nullify his faith. Conversely, if one disapproves of a believer’s affirmation of the tauheed and the Prophethood, it too, amounts to commission of kufr (unbelief).31 He went a step ahead by enumerating the following modes of affirming the kufr: One, if a believer expresses his agreement with the religion of the non-believers and supports them through different means against Islam, he is said to have approved of their

28( At-Tirmidhi) quoted by Imam Dhahbi in Kabair 29(Bukhari and Muslim) quoted by Imam Dhahbi in Kabair 30 Ibn Kathīr, Al-Bidayah vol. 11, 126-128, 296,297 31 Ibn Taimmiyah, The Book of Eemaan, 203 205

unbelief32.Two, as laid down in Quran, reflecting indifference to the faith in face of its mockery by the non-believers amounts to kufr. Quran says, “He hath already revealed unto you in the Scripture that, when ye hear the revelations of Allah rejected and derided, (ye) sit not with them (who disbelieve and mock) until they engage in some other conversation. Lo! in that case (if ye stayed) ye would be like unto them. Lo! Allah will gather hypocrites and disbelievers, all together, into hell.” (An-Nisā’a: 140).33Three, friendship (Mawalāt) with non-believers is a sign of approval of unbelief.34 He draws this inference from the following Quranic verse, “Thou wilt not find folk who believe in Allah and the Last Day loving those who oppose Allah and His messenger, even though they be their fathers or their sons or their brethren or their clan. As for such, He hath written faith upon their hearts and hath strengthened them with a Spirit from Him, and He will bring them into Gardens underneath which rivers flow, wherein they will abide. Allah is well pleased with them, and they are well pleased with Him. They are Allah's party. Lo! is it not Allah's party who are the successful?” (Al-Mujaadilah: 22) This mawālāt include inclining towards unbelievers and adhering to their beliefs(Hud:113)(Al-Qalam:9), showing courtesy at the expense of one’s own belief, obeying the commands of unbelievers(Al-Imran:149)(Al- Kahf:28)(Al-Ana’m:121) and above all, following their desires.(Al-Baqarah:120)35. Imam Tabrī in his Tarīkh al-Umam wal Malūk holds almost similar view and includes helping believers against the unbelievers as part of mawālāt.36Though, Ibn Taimmiyah considers mawālāt in terms of a sign of hypocrisy yet as a part of mitigating circumstances, he exempts a believer who enters into mawālāt and is forced to submit to unbelief. He draws this inference from the following Quranic verse: “Let not the believers take disbelievers for their friends in preference to believers. Whoso doeth that hath no connection with Allah unless (it be) that ye but guard yourselves against them, taking (as it were) security. Allah biddeth you beware (only) of Himself. Unto Allah is the journeying.” (Al-Imran: 28). Application of takfīr becomes liberal with Ibn Taimmiyah when he argues that hypocrisy amounts to kufr as well. If a person’s acts are inconsistent with his beliefs, he will be considered as disbeliever in this world and will be liable to the application of the laws of apostasy.37 It is argued that label of takfīr will not be applied to anyone who offers prayers unless he is a hypocrite38.

Ibn Kathīr

The question of friendship with non-believers has been addressed by Ibn Kathīr on the basis of the following Quranic evidence: “Whoso disbelieveth in Allah after his belief - save him who is forced thereto and whose heart is still content with the Faith - but

32 Ibid. 205,206 33 Ibid. 210 34 Friends of Allah mean those who believe in Allah and render obedience to Him in their acts and belief whereas friends of Satan are those who obey Satan in their acts and belief. Ibid. 209, 212 35 Ibid. 212-214 36 Tabrī, Tarikh al-Umam wal Maluk, vol.6,313 37 Ibn Taimmiyah, Book of Eemaan,192 38 Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam,Fatawa 3:345-55 206

whoso findeth ease in disbelief: On them is wrath from Allah. Theirs will be an awful doom.” (An-Nahl: 106) He draws inference from this verse that if a believer is forced into disbelief, he has two options either to go along with the unbelievers for self- preservation or to refuse and surrender to disbelief as Bilal did.39 Ibn Kathīr further suggests that those who were forced to leave their homeland to avoid atrocities of the unbelievers being inflicted upon them because of embracing Islam will also be forgiven by Allah. He draws inference from the following verse: “Then lo! thy Lord - for those who became fugitives after they had been persecuted, and then fought and were steadfast - lo! Thy Lord afterward is (for them) indeed Forgiving, Merciful.” An-Nahl: 110) However, approving of unbelief or disapproving of belief may be rephrased otherwise that may imply that one forbids something permitted by Allah and His Messenger and permits something that is forbidden. This constitutes heresy which Ibn Kathīr condemns vehemently. To him, bida’ā amounts to inventing lies against Allah and whoever changes what have been already declared harām or halāl by Allah according to his own whims and wishes becomes heretic.40

Imam Al-Ghazālī

The classical theorists have agreed opinion that refutation of truthfulness of whatever the Prophet (sw) brought down to us leads to kufr. In this pursuit, Imam Abu Jaafar at- Tahāwī has defined kufr in terms of not accepting what the Prophet brought to be true. He further argues that nothing places a believer outside the pale of Islam other than renouncing the one that brought him into it.41 Similarly, Ibn Kathīr holds that negating a hadīth that has reached us through ‘diffused congruence’ (mutāwātir) is considered to be an act of heresy. For instance, about the incident of mīrāj there is agreed opinion of the believers in affirmation of isrā42 and if anyone rejects this consensus, he is considered to have committed heresy.43

In the same vein, Al-Ghazālī defines kufr in terms of believing what the Prophet brought to be anything other than truth and faith is to believe that what the Prophet brought was truth. This definition is comprehensive in its meanings because it covers all aspects of belief and unbelief. For instance, Jews and Christians are considered to be unbelievers because they do not affirm the truthfulness of the Prophethood of Prophet Muhammad (sw). The pagans are also unbelievers because they do not recognize any of the prophets. Atheists also fall in the same category because they do not recognize even the existence of God.44 He further suggests that implications of the definition of kufr are very strong which include legitimizing the killing of someone ex-communicated and declaring him to be condemned to hell forever. These implication demands one to be cautious while defining the kufr. It must be defined in terms of a ‘legal designation’ (hukm-e-sharī) on the basis of some evidence in terms

39 Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr 40 Ibid. 41al-Tahawi, Aqeeda-e-Tahawiyyah 42Isrā refers to ascending of the Prophet to the highest heavens. 43 Ibn Kathīr, Tafseer Ibn Kathir 44 Al-Ghazalī, Faysal, 88-96 207

of clear text or analogical deduction therefrom instead of following one’s own whims and wishes.45

Given the seriousness associated with the issue, Al-Ghazālī is very cautious in his approach and prefers silence on the issue because silence entails no liability which takfīr involves.46 For Al-Ghazālī, refutation of the fundamentals of Islam (usūl-ud- dīn) including belief in God, Prophethood and the life hereafter leads to kufr. He further argues that issues which are supported by consensus of the companions (ijmă) and traditions of the Prophet that have been channelized to us through ‘diffused congruence’ (tawātur) also constitute the basis for takfīr.47 To be more precise, he recognizes the ambiguity prevailing around those issues whereupon we find consensus of the companions (ijmā) because some like Al-Nazzam, a Mutazillite theologian may not affirm it as definitive source in itself.48 He reasserts that one must not label someone as kafir if he believes in God and His Messenger and there is no reliable evidence about refutation of this belief.49

In brief, a critical examination of the classical theorists leads us to draw the following conclusions: One, commission of bida’ā does not necessarily attract the label of kufr. For example, all the three classical theorists discussed above have the unanimous opinion that khawārij and rawāfidh, though committed heresies but they cannot be labeled as kuffār. Two, giving up any fundamental constituent of faith amounts to kufr. Three, having a view that whatever the Prophet brought is something other than truth amounts to kufr. Four, commission of a major sin does not put the sinner outside the pale of Islam provided the fundamentals of faith are not refuted. This inference is drawn from the following Quranic verse: “Lo! Allah pardoneth not that partners should be ascribed unto Him. He pardoneth all save that to whom He will. Whoso ascribeth partners unto Allah hath wandered far astray.” (An-Nisā’a:116). This opinion is held by all those who contradict the view of the Kharjities and the Mautazilites that commission of sin is equal to the commission of unbelief. They refer to a hadīth wherein the Prophet categorically forbade to label anyone who believes in Allah and His Messenger as kafir on the basis of any sin he has committed.50 Five, the classical theorists are very cautious in terms of labeling someone as kafir and even amongst the heretical circles they exempt those who commit heresy out of ignorance and mistake. For instance, in classical perspective if one denies the obligatory status of the elements of Islam, he falls in the ambit of apostasy but even then the mitigating criteria exempt those who hold such views out of ignorance and mistake.51

45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 112 47 Jackson’s introductory note to Al-Ghazalī’s Faysal, 3-32. According to Al-Ghazalī, refutation of an isolated report from a single source does not attract takfīr. See, ibid. 114 48 Ibid.114 49 Ibid. 112 50Naumani, Manzoor Naumani, Ma’arif Al-Hadīth, vol.i, 87,88 51Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam,Fatawa 3:345-55 208

8.3 Khurūj

The following discussion will attempt to identify the parameters of obedience to the rulers as laid down by Imam Tahāwī, Ibn Kathīr, Ibn Taimmiyah, and Imam Al- Ghazālī.

8.3.1 Imam Tahāwī

As the unity of the faithful (jamāt) is central to the sociology of Islam, therefore, it discourages, by all means, what creates cleavages amongst the believers. In this pursuit, it enjoins upon the believers not to differ from majority in the matters of faith. To guard against the possible cleavages in jamāt, it upholds the validity of prayers behind an imam who is morally upright or even otherwise. It also confirms the validity of funeral prayer for those following Makkah for the prayers direction (ahl al- qiblā). Imam Tahāwī argues that the best course to follow for the believers is of the Prophet and of the majority to avoid schisms in their ranks. The prophetic course does not approve of khurūj against the Muslim rulers even if they commit oppression rather it ordains upon the believers to follow alternative peaceful means to remove the oppression. In view of this, Imam Tahāwī develops his point that as long as the rulers do not command the believers to do something morally wrong, obedience to the rulers will continue to be part of divine obedience and the believers will be religiously obliged to obey them.52

The rationale behind this emphasis upon obedience to the rulers is to preserve collective identity through their identification with the jama’at (group).The Prophet said, “The Jews divided into seventy-one sects (firqah), all of which will go to Hell except one; the Christians will divide into seventy-two sects, all of which will go to Hell except one; this Ummah will divide into seventy-three sects, all of which will go to Hell except one”.53 Some people asked the Prophet about the sect which will be saved. He said, “The one which will follow the way I and my companions follow today”. In another version, last part of the hadīth is as under: “It will be the jama’at and the hand of God will be on the jama’at”. Though Islam is not convinced of absolute and unqualified submission to the rulers yet at the same time, it lays down great emphasis upon the obedience to ulil amr54 even though they are not ideal.

8.3.2 Ibn Kathīr

Similarly, Ibn Kathīr also emphasized upon the overwhelming importance associated with the obedience to those in authority. He out rightly rejected the Kharij’ite

52 al-Tahawi, Aqeeda-e-Tahawiyyah 53 Imam Abi Abdullah Muhammad b. Abdullah al-Hakim has also narrated a hadīth regarding the bifurcation of ummah into different sects in Al-Mustadrak alal Sahahain. trans. Shah Muhammad Chishti “Kitab-ul-Eiman,” Hadīth No. 10 (Lahore: Idara Paigham-ul-Quran,2009) 54 For Ibn Taimmiyah, ulil amr includes both scholars as well as rulers who enjoin good and forbid evil; see ,Ibn Taimmiyah, Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil 209

contention against Ali that he violated the Quranic injunctions by consenting to the appointment of arbitrators during the battle of Siffīn.55 He argued that Quran enjoined upon the believers to resort to human arbitration in case of dispute between husband and wife. “And if ye fear a breach between them twain (the man and wife), appoint an arbiter from his folk and an arbiter from her folk. If they desire amendment Allah will make them of one mind. Lo! Allah is ever Knower, Aware”. (An-Nisā: 35) Moreover, he declared the objections raised by Khawārij on the appointment of arbitrators to be unfounded as the Prophet himself affected Hudaybia pact with the Quraysh in 6 AH.56 He further argued that khawārij also revolted against Amīr Mua’wiah under the leadership of Farwā b. Nau’fal.57 With Ibn Kathīr, we find categorical rejection of the Khawārij on the grounds that they resorted to takfīr of Ali who had got information regarding their commission of robberies and their disregard to what is permissible and what is not. Actually, they flouted the religious sanctity attached with human life. Among others, they unjustly killed Abdullah b. Khabāb, a companion of the Prophet along with his wife. Moreover, they also killed Al-Harrab b. Marra al-Ab’adī, the messenger of Ali.58

8.3.3 Ibn Taimmiyah

In furtherance of the same classical narrative, Ibn Taimmiyah has quoted many Quranic verses and traditions of the Prophet which highlight importance of obedience to those in authority. For instance, Ibn Taimmiyah categorically makes it clear that the final authority to rule rests with Allah and his Messenger because no one except the Messenger is infallible and the obedience is only in right things.59 He substantiates his argument with the Quranic evidence. “O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in authority; and if ye have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to Allah and the messenger if ye are (in truth) believers in Allah and the Last Day. That is better and more seemly in the end”. You who believe! Obey God and obey the Messenger and those charged with authority among you. If you differ in anything among yourselves refer it to God and His Messenger”. (An-Nisā: 59) Quran further says, “Mankind were one community, and Allah sent (unto them) prophets as bearers of good tidings and as warners, and revealed therewith the Scripture with the truth that it might judge between mankind concerning that wherein they differed. And only those unto whom (the Scripture) was given differed

55 When Ali and Muawiyah opted for tahkīm (arbitration) during the battle of Siffīn, and appointed Abu Musa Ash’ari and Amr bin al-Aas as their arbitrators respectively, a group of the followers of Ali seceded from him on the grounds that no person can be an arbitrator, it is only the hukm of God that must prevail. They shifted to Harura and Ali had to fight against them. The one who objected to the appointment of arbitrators was Arwa bin Azeena. See, Ibn Kathīr, Al-Bidayah, vol.7, 364,365. This group of Khariji’tes are also called Haruriyyah because after seceding from Ali, they had their first meeting at a place called Harura. In their view, everyone who happened to have committed a major sin had become infidel and thus, it is the duty of every Muslim to fight against such infidels. See, Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam 56 Ibn Kathīr, Al- Bidayah vol.7 57 Ibid. vol.8, 34,35 58 Ibid. vol.7, 373 59 Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 19:67-71 210

concerning it, after clear proofs had come unto them, through hatred one of another. And Allah by His Will guided those who believe unto the truth of that concerning which they differed. Allah guideth whom He will unto a straight path” (Al-Baqara: 213). Another Quranic verse makes the ultimate authority of God and His messenger more transcendent in these words: “And in whatsoever ye differ, the verdict therein belongeth to Allah. Such is my Lord, in Whom I put my trust, and unto Whom I turn”. (Ash-Shūrā: 10) Moreover, Ubādah b. As-Sāmit stated that they pledged to the Prophet to render their obedience even in case of individual injustice.60Another hadīth reported on the authority of Abu Hurayrah embodies the same general idea wherein the Prophet commanded the believers to extend their obedience to the rulers even in case of individual injustice.61 Ibn Taimmiyah has quoted another hadīth on the authority of Usayd b. Hudayr that an individual from ansār requested the Prophet to award him any post the way awarded to others. The Prophet asked him to be patient even if he did not get what was due to him after the Prophet.62 Ibn Taimmiyah declares the importance attached with the obedience to those in authority equal to the importance of prayers, fasting and pilgrimage.63 He has quoted another tradition of the Prophet wherein the Prophet stressed upon the importance of obedience to the amīr (ruler) being part of the jamāt and declared that anyone who died being in the state of khurūj (revolt) to amīr died the death of jahillyah.64 To emphasize upon the importance of obedience to ulil amr (those in authority) Ibn Taimmiyah has quoted many traditions wherein the Prophet has urged upon the believers to obey amīr whether he may be a slave with limbs cut off.65 In another hadīth quoted by Ibn Taimmiyah, it has been made clear that even if one sees a ruler committing some sin, he should not withdraw his obedience. In other words, if a ruler is not ideal and comes short of qualifications required for becoming khalīfāh, he still has the right to obedience provided he does not forego any fundamental of the faith.66

60Sahih Bukhari, ahkam:43, fitan: 2; Sahih Muslim, imarah:41,43,80; An-Nasa’i, Sunan, bay ‘ah:1-5,8; Ibn Majah, Sunan jihad:41; Malik, Al-Mawatta, baya ‘ah:1, jihad:5; also see, Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 35:8-15 61Sahih Bukhari, ahkam:43; Abu Dawud, Sunan:5,ilm:16,adab:88; Ibn Majah, Sunan, muqaddamah:6,baya’ah:3 62Sahih Bukhari, manaqib al-Ansar:8; Sahih Muslim, imarah:16,48; An-Nasa’i, sunanqudat:4; Ahmad, Musnad, IV:351,352); also see, Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 35:8-15 63 Ibid. 64Shaih Muslim Kitab al-Ammara-wajub Mulazimah Jamat al Muslimeen -1848); also see, Shaih Bukhari- Kitab al Fitan: 2; ahkam: 4; Sahih Muslim: Imarah 53-6, 58) quoted in, Ibn Taimmiyah, Al- Muntqa Min Minhaj al-Sunnah, 96 65Sahih Bukhari, zakat:4, adhan:54,56, ahkam:4; Sahih Muslim, imarah:36,49,50, hajj:141; At- Tirmidhi, sunan, fitan:30; Ibn Majah, sunan, jihad:39; Sahih Muslim, masajid:240, imarah:35,37; Ibn Majah, Sunan, jihad:39 quoted in, Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 35:8-15 66Sahih Muslim, imarah: 36; An-Nasa’i: Sunan, bay’a:26) quoted in, ibid. Ibn Taimmiyah has quoted many ahadīth that stress upon the importance of obedience to those in authority. For instance, see, Sahih Bukhari, jizya:22, adab:99, hiyal:9, fitan:21; Sahih Muslim, jihad:8,10-12; Abu Dawud, sunan, jihad:150; At-Tirmidhi, sunan, siyar:28,fitan:26; Ibn Majah, sunan, jihad:42; Ahmad, Musnad, I:411,441, II: 16,29,48,56,70,75,96,103, 112, 116,123,136,142,156,III: 7,19,35,46,61,64,70,84,142,150,250,270. Also see, At-Tirmidhi, sunan, fitan:26, Ahmad Musnad III:70; Sahih Muslim, jihad:17 211

Nevertheless, the Sunnite perspective as a whole has been divided on the question of khurūj. A major section of the Sunnites believes in non-permissibility of khurūj even if the rulers happen to be oppressor, commit violence against the believers unjustly and are involved in impiety.67 However, Imam Abu Hanifa being moderate on the issue affirmed theological legitimacy of the revolt on utilitarian grounds. For him, khurūj is justified if it proves to be instrumental in replacing the oppressor rulers with just and pious ones. He argued that ordaining good and forbidding evil through peaceful means was mandatory at the first instance. However, he retained the option of armed revolt if the peaceful means fail68 but the course of armed revolt should not be adopted if the chances of success are not evident.69 His views about khurūj got practical exposition in the way he supported the khurūj of Imam Zaid b. Ali. Though, he supported his khurūj by even identifying it with the Prophet’s battle at Badr in terms of religious legitimacy, yet he restrained himself only to financial support of the revolt as he had apprehensions that the revolt had least chances of success. In case of khurūj of Nafs-e-Zakkiyah,70 he categorically supported the khurūj against the Abbasids. He declared the act of supporting the revolutionaries more important than jihad against the non-believers.71 He declared participation in this khurūj to be an act of piety fifty times higher than a supererogatory pilgrimage.72 The statements of Imam Abū Hanifā have been quoted by the noted scholars like Abu Bakr Jassās, Al- Mua’fiq Al-Makkī, and Ibn Al-Bazzāz. Actually, he believed that if chances of success of a noble khurūj were conspicuous, it would become mandatory (wājib) on the believers to stand with the revolutionaries.73 This view was also shared by Imam Mālik. He was asked whether it was permissible to support the khurūj while bound by allegiance to the Abbasids. He declared allegiance to the Abbasids as void for being forced upon the believers and therefore, provided space for theological legitimacy for public support to khurūj. For this, he had to face physical torture by Jaafar b. Salman, the Abbāsīd governor.

It is to be noted that with regard to khurūj, Imam Abu Hanifa’s standpoint is not a solitary example rather this was shared by all the noted scholars during the 1st century after Hijra. Abu Bakr in his first address after assuming the office of the caliph made his obedience conditional to his obedience to Allah and His Prophet. Moreover, consultation (shūrā) with the believers at large grants legitimacy to the bāy’ā’. Umar ibn Al-Khattāb did not believe in legitimacy of bāy’a made without consultation with

67 Al-Ashari’, “Maqalaat Al-Islameen,” vol.2, 125, quoted in, Abul a’la Maūdūdī, Khilafat-o- Malukiyyat (Lahore: Idara Tarjman-ul-Quran, 2002) 264-266 68 al-Jassas, Ahkam al-Quran, vol.1, 81, quoted in, ibid. 264-266 69 Ibid. 70 This attempt to revolt had started since the period of the Ummayads. Even Al-Mansur himself pledged his allegiance to Nafs-e-Zakkayah. See, Tabrī, Tarikh al-Umam wal Maluk, vol.2,155-156. But after coming to power, he became an ardent enemy of this revolutionary movement and aimed at their suppression. 71 Al-Jassas, Ahkam al-Quran vol.1,81, quoted in, Abul a’la Maūdūdī, Khilafat-o-Malukiyyat, 264-266 72 Al-Muafiq Al-Makki vol.2, 83 quoted in ibid. 73 Abul a’la Maūdūdī, Khilafat-o-Malukiyyat, 272 212

the believers.74 Imam Hussain arose against the unjust rule of Yazīd b. Muawiyah. Actually, Imam Abu Hanifa upheld the same tradition when he argued that revolt against invalid ruler was not impermissible in itself. However, chances of success of a noble revolt should be ascertained beforehand. Similarly, when Abdul Rehman ibn Ash’ath resorted to khurūj against the oppressive governance of Hajjāj ibn Yousouf, he had support of leading ulema and jurists including Saeed b. Jubair, Ibn Abi Lailā and Abu Al-Jantrī.75 Even those who did not support Ibn Ash’ath like Hassan Basrī, they did not declare the khurūj impermissible as such rather they restrained to support out of pragmatic considerations.76 However, later on, the majority of Sunnite ulema in view of the repeated failures of these attempts of armed revolt were constrained to develop a narrative that would not provide for any space to such attempts.

8.3.4 Limitations of Obedience

However, this should not lead to presumption that Islam gives unimpeachable authority to the rulers. It affirms subordination of the rulers’ authority to the Will of God. Islam recognizes Allah to be the final law-giving authority and it ordains that human decision-making must conform to the divine commandments. “Whoso judgeth not by that which Allah hath revealed: such are disbelievers”. (Al-Maidah: 44) It further says, “And it becometh not a believing man or a believing woman, when Allah and His messenger have decided an affair (for them), that they should (after that) claim any say in their affair; and whoso is rebellious to Allah and His messenger, he verily goeth astray in error manifest”. (Al-Ahzab: 36) The human decision-making depends upon its obedience to the final omnipotent authority for legitimacy. The rulers lose their right to command obedience of the believers if they disobey the Creator.77 It further ordains that human decision-making should conform to the divine commandments. Quran identifies obedience to the Prophet with divine obedience in the following words: “Whoso obeyeth the messenger hath obeyed Allah, and whoso turneth away: We have not sent thee as a warder over them”. (An-Nisā: 80) Both Quran and hadīth are the primary sources for the believers to draw legitimacy for their decision-making. This qualified authority was well-acknowledged by the salaf. On assuming the office of the caliph, Hazrat Abu Bakr made it clear upon the believers that his obedience was incumbent upon them until he remains obedient to Allah. During the period of the salaf, the caliph did not have veto power rather all the decisions were made in consultation with the noted companions (ahl-al-hil wal-aqad) of the Prophet. Though on certain occasions, the caliph over ruled the opinion of the shūrā yet this overruling of the opinion of the companions cannot be identified with the use of veto power by the caliph rather it was Allah’s and His Prophet’s verdict which was upheld. Therefore, in actuality, veto power was vested with Allah and His

74 Sahih Bukhari, Kitab Al-Muharibeen, Bab Rajam Al-Jabla min Az-zina; Al-Asqalani, Fath-ul-Bari, vol.12, 125, https://archive.org/details/FathAlBariVol01, accessed on October 22, 2017; Ahmad, Musnad, Hadīth No.391 75 It has been quoted by leading Muslim historians like ImamTabrī, Ibn Sa’ad and Ibn Kathīr 76 Ibn Saad, Tabqāt Ibn Saad vol.7, 124 77 Sahih Bukhari; Sahih Muslim 213

apostle. During his last days, the Prophet dispatched an expedition against the Byzantines under the command of Usāmā. The troops had just left Madina when they received the news of the Prophet’s demise. The expedition was postponed for the time being. When Abu Bakr assumed the office of the caliph, the Islamic state was faced with serious security challenges from within and without. The companions proposed either to defer the expedition to ensure the availability of troops within Madina to face any possible security threat or to replace young Usāmā with some senior war veteran. Against these suggestions, Abu Bakr upheld the decision of the Prophet. The same narrative is followed by the authentic Sunnite scholarship like Ibn Taimmiyah. For instance, he argues that since ulil amr draw their right to obedience through divine commandments, therefore, in case of their disobedience to God, they, as a logical consequence, lose their right to obedience.78

The standpoint of the salaf and narrative of the authentic Muslim scholarship vis-à-vis Khārji’ties leads to the following conclusions: One, Islam attaches paramount significance to obedience to the rulers even if they happen to be imperfect. This obedience is revoked only in case of refutation of any fundamental of faith by the rulers. The Muslim scholarship avoids approving of khurūj if it is likely to create anarchic situation. Two, there are many traditions of the Prophet which reflect prophetic condemnation of the Kharjities. For example, he said, “He is not of my Ummah who rises against my Ummah, kills people good and bad, and spares neither a believer nor any of our clients (dhimmīs). He is not of us nor are we of him”.79 The prophet further said, “You will scorn your salah, your fasting and your reading of the Quran when you compare it with their salah, fasting and reading. But their reading of the Quran will hardly go down their throats. They will dart out of Islam just as an arrow passes out through a prey. Kill them wherever you find them; you shall be rewarded for killing them on the Day of Judgment”.80 All this leads us to argue that clear prophetic transmissions are available permitting fight against Khawārij, Ali fought against them and the salaf had consensus upon fighting against them.

8.4 Religious Necessity of Caliphate

Islamic political system is based upon divine sovereignty. The prophets were assigned leadership role for the guidance of humanity not only in religious matters but also in socio-political spheres. The Prophet is reported to have said, “The political leadership of Banī Israel was with their prophets. When one messenger had passed away, another would have taken his place. But after me, there would be no prophet but khulāfā”.81 Allah concentrated multi-dimensional leadership role in His prophets (as). As the

78 Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa: 19:260-7 79Sahih Muslim, imarah: 53, 54; An-Nasa’i: Sunan, tahrim: 28; Ahmad, Musnad, II: 296,306,488). Also see, Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 35:8-15 80At-Tabrani, Al-Mu‘jam al-Kabīr, Baghdad, 1403, 1983, 11:103-4; Abu Nu’aym, 3:278; Al-Haythami, Majma’ az-Zawa’id (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Arabiyyah, 1402/1982), 1:114 quoted in, Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 35:8-15 81 Imam Muslim, Al-Jamia Al-Sahih 214

chain of Prophethood reached its final end with Prophet Muhammad, therefore, the leadership role got transferred to the caliph who acting as deputies of the Prophet would perform this leadership role for the believers. In this sense, the political system of Islam is labeled as caliphate. The caliph as deputy of the Prophet is responsible for the enforcement of Shariah and discharge of executive, military and political affairs.82 Anyone who assumes this leadership role is bound to follow the course enunciated by the Shariah.

The caliphate thus, established will be conspicuously distinct from theocracy wherein the ruler is taken as divine representative whose disobedience amounts to defiance of God. Theocracy rejects all types of limitations and the rulers assume unimpeachable authority. On the other hand, caliph is by no means has infallible status and is strictly accountable to the masses for his conduct. He assumes the office with the consultation of the fellow believers and can be impeached by them as well. His authority is disciplined and bound by the laws of Quran and Sunnah. In this backdrop, structure of government in Islam is based upon four grounds: one, government come into existence through will of the people; two, the caliph will be bound by the Shariah; three, will of the people will be subordinate to the laws of Quran and the Sunnah and four, the caliph will be accountable to the people. Having defined the cardinal principles of state governance, Islam does not insist upon establishing a peculiar form of government rather leaves it to the discretion of the believers to undertake any system within the confines of these broader principles. Islam is least concerned about nomenclature but definitely about the nature of governance. Once, it is established that caliph will act as deputy of the Prophet and will discharge his responsibilities according to his Sunnah, the title of government becomes irrelevant. It is evident from Quranic accounts of four distinguished personalities. Hazrat Dawūd and Hazrat Salman were kings besides being prophets whereas Hazrat Yousouf was vizier to a king. The kingship of Hazrat Talūt was announced by God Himself. In short, following inferences are drawn: One, Muslim government will be subordinate to the Sunnah of the Prophet for the enforcement of Shariah and discharge of its functions. Two, the Muslims are obliged to establish this government and three; any nomenclature can be used for such government.

8.5 Public Consent Caliphate does not come into existence through arbitrary process rather its legitimacy depends upon public consent behind it. This is evidently expressed through the following tradition of the Prophet: “Your good rulers are those who love you and you love them and your bad rulers are those who despise you and are despicable to you.”83 The political system of Islam is founded on mutual trust between the rulers and the ruled. In this perspective, Umar prohibited the believers to follow someone who pledges allegiance to someone without shūrā and also refused to acknowledge the one

82 Ibn Khaldun, History, vol.1 p.339; Shah Waliullah, Izala Al-Khifa, p.28 83 Sahih Muslim 215

to whom allegiance is pledged as imam of the believers.84 The procedure followed for the selection of the pious caliphs reflects the ideal level of public trust. The consultation was not limited to a few chosen one rather the whole community pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr when he was selected the first caliph of Islam. Owing to this broad level of consultation, his selection is regarded to have been effected through consensus of the believers (Ijmā Ummah). When Imam Hassan surrendered his right to caliphate to Amīr Muāwiah, the latter became caliph of the believers through consensus.85 After Amīr Muāwiah, the ideal level of legitimacy that was secured through public consent declined when arbitrary nomination replaced selection through public consent. The phenomenon of arbitrary selection that started with the nomination of Yazīd could come to its end with the very elimination of the institution itself in the first quarter of the 20th century. The Sunnah of the companions of the Prophet regarding the selection of the caliphs suggests that following three types of selection procedures are permissible: one, the caliph is selected through consensus of the Ummah; two, caliph nominates anyone his successor who fulfills the qualifications for the office; three, anyone who qualifies for the office captures the political authority and strengthens his control over it. However, the most secure of all these selection types was the one adopted for the selection of Abu Bakr through consensus of the believers.86

The expression of public trust to the caliph may be either through direct or indirect procedure. Ibn Taimmiyah and Abdul Wahāb Sherāni believe in direction expression of public consent whereas Imam Nawwi and Shah Waliullah are convinced of its indirect expression through those who loose and bind (Ahl al-hill wal aqad).87 Shah Waliullah includes ulema, Qadis, ruling class, military commanders and those who are well-wishers of the believers in the definition of Ahl al-hill wal aqad. It is not to suggest in any case that if a few people pledge allegiance to a caliph, it becomes obligatory upon the rest to follow suit. It is pertinent to refer to last Friday sermon of Umar which is narrated by Imam Bukhari. Hazrat Umar was told about few people who had mutually decided that when Umar passes away they will select someone their caliph and others will have to pledge allegiance to the caliph of their choice. Umar warned not to do this and warned the believers that those who intend to select caliph without consultation with the believers as a whole actually intend to usurp the right of the believers in general to select the caliph. He vehemently stressed upon the believers not to pledge allegiance to such a person. The method of selection of the caliph by a committee of a few chosen as happened in case of selection of Uthmān does not revoke the general body of believers’ right to express their consent. Imam Bukhari has quoted that Abdul Rehman b. Auf, a distinguished member of the selection committee for third caliph went door to door in Madina to ascertain the

84 Sahih Bukhari, vol.2,1009 85 Abu Ammar Zahid al-Rashidi, Islam, Jamhūriyyat and Pakistan (Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2013), 33 86 Shah Waliullah, Hujjatullah al-Bālighā, trans. Urdu by Maulana Abdul Haq (Lahore: Farid Book Stall) 601-605 87 Imam Nawwi, Sharah- e-Muslim, vol. 3 p.125; Shah Waliullah, Hujjatullah al-Bālighā, 601-605 216

opinion of the general believers. When he found public opinion in favor of Uthmān, he pledged his allegiance to him. Ibn Auf opted to ascertain public opinion directly, yet evidence is also available which suggests that the Prophet discovered public opinion indirectly through public representatives. After the battle of Hunayn, the Prophet returned the war captives of Banū Hawāzan by securing believers’ indirect opinion through their representatives.88 In brief, hereditary kingship is far from an ideal political system that Islam envisages but has been acknowledged by the Muslim scholars on the basis of an unavoidable necessity to secure the Ummah from further anarchy. The ideal form remains the caliphate of Abu Bakr which was established through the consensus amongst the believers.89

8.6 Instruments of Political Divide Political parties are pre-requisite of the modern democratic political process. Though the party system cannot be traced back to early Islamic age yet the question of its theological legitimacy requires further inquiry because at that time party system in terms of an instrument of political divide was not existent in any society whatsoever. In lieu of party system, tribal affiliations happened to be the instruments of political divide. Political landscape of Makkah was characterized by divide between the Ummayads and the Hashmi’tes whereas in Yathrab, Banu Aus and Banu Khazraj were at daggers drawn against each other. This political divide on the trajectory of tribal affiliations (assabiyah) has been affirmed by Islam as well. This affirmation was reflected in military formations on tribal basis during the Battle of Badr. Moreover, believers’ division between ansār and muhajirīn also reflect a new typology of political divide. The Prophet handed over separate battle flags to ansār and muhajireen at Badr. When the Prophet passed away, this divide got more pronounced as expressed when Abu Bakr was selected to be the first caliph of Islam. It not only continued to characterize the political landscape of Madina, it also got recognition with the Prophet and his companions. It has led to evolution of an argument that Islam recognizes the political divisions as long as these do not pose threat to the integrity of Muslim Ummah. In view of the above, the existence of political parties in terms of a modern instrument of political divide becomes permissible if they provide for mutually cooperative arrangements for the furtherance of believers’ cause. The political parties may provide for a broader arrangement wherein the nationalist ideological cause may be elevated to transnational ideological level. In this new arrangement, the territorial Muslim states may co-exist in terms of a broader ideological brotherhood. This ideological fraternity can be achieved through keeping the mutual disputes subservient to aspirations for broader unity.

8.7 Candidature With regard to candidature for any position, it is often argued that Islam does not approve of offering one’s own self for a particular slot. Had this been the case,

88 This Incident has been reported by almost all major books of Muslim History and Seerah of the Prophet. 89 Abu Ammar Zahid al-Rashidi, Islam, Jamhūriyyat and Pakistan Islam, Jamhuriyat and Pakistan, 37 217

Prophet Salman and Prophet Yousouf would not have yearned for kingship and vizierate. Thus, offering one’s services for a particular slot is not impermissible in itself. The Prophet’s refusal to accede to the requests for appointments against certain slots on the part of a few was motivated by certain factors. The Prophet did not accede to Abu Dharr Ghaffari’s request for his appointment as administrator for his incapacity to secure public trust.90 The Prophet also declined to appoint someone administrator on the grounds that someone avaricious could not be posted to this position.91 Again the Prophet advised Abdul Rehman b. Sumrā not to demand for authority (ammārā) because its achievement without demand is followed by the divine help whereas if it is achieved on demand, it is left on one’s own responsibility.92 Another prophetic tradition makes the issue more clear. The Prophet is reported to have said, “Whosoever amongst the believers secured the position of Qādī, if his justice remained dominant over his injustice, he would be rewarded with paradise and if his injustice was dominant over his justice, he would be condemned to hell.”93 Thus, distinguished ulema like Sheikh Abdul Haq Dehlvi and Maulana Zafar Uthmānī made the point that if one had self-confidence to fulfill the responsibilities associated with the slot and he did not demand it for the sake of power but service to mankind, it is not impermissible to make such demand. Moreover, in-depth inquiry into the traditions of the Prophet regarding the prohibitions of demand for a slot makes it evident that these prohibitions are not exclusively directed against political positions but also against judicial and executive slots as well. In actuality, if offering one’s services for judicial and executive positions becomes impermissible, the whole state structure would cease to function. The suggested course is to make such arrangements which allow for only those to assume such posts who qualify for these offices in terms of capabilities and integrity.94

However, the structure of democratic governance in its western connotations is built upon four grounds which include popular sovereignty, secularism, nationalism and public participation in decision-making process. Islam categorically rejects the first two grounds whereas it accepts nationalism with certain qualifications. Islamic perspective on nationalism finds better exposition with Iqbal for whom Muslim nationalism can lead to Islamic universalism. In this sense, the creation of Pakistan was not regarded as an end in itself rather a means to the revival of Islam. He was averse to the idea of territorial nationalism if taken as an end in itself but he approved it if taken as a stepping stone for the revival of Muslim universalism. Some may seek to highlight nationalism being against to the spirit of the faith by relying upon the historical accounts of different prophets who preferred to migrate (hijrā) from their homelands for the sake of faith. They draw inferences that the prophets preferred faith over their national identities. Actually, this perspective fails to identify the underlying spirit of the prophets’ migration from their homelands. The objective of hijrā was not

90 Sahih Muslim vol.2,121 91 Ibid. 125 92 Ibid. 93 Abu Dawūd, vol.3, 503 94 Abu Ammar Zahid al-Rashidi, Islam, Jamhūriyyat and Pakistan, 50,51 218

to establish the competing levels of loyalties towards homeland or faith. The hijrā aimed at achieving the objectives of projecting and protecting the faith against the forces of infidelity. The prophets’ ultimate objective was to make the ‘word of God’ dominant and hijrā may be viewed in terms of acquiring a space to make efforts to achieve this goal. Had it been possible in Makkah, the Holy Prophet might not have shifted to Madina. Likewise, the Prophet did not ask the believers to eschew their tribal affiliations but subordinated these tribal identities to supra ideological identity. Similarly, it is not imperative to shun the national identity of the believers today rather attempts can be made to subordinate their national identities to a broader ideological identity through diffusion of conflicts within the Muslim states on the model of European Union. Moreover, the history of the evolution of the medieval Muslim thought suggests that revisions in the state structure have not been taken in terms of threat to the faith as such. Initially, as discussed elsewhere, Al-Māwardī in his Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah supported unified Muslim caliphate of the Qurayshite descent.95 However, this version underwent radical revisions with Ibn Khaldūn who in addition to waving off the condition of Qurayshite ancestry of the caliph sought to legitimize the plurality of caliphates on pragmatic grounds. He argued that expansion of the Muslim rule would render it difficult for a caliph to exercise political control across the Muslim lands, therefore, his position would be relegated to merely spiritual headship devoid of political authority which Islam did not idealize.96 Nevertheless, owing to the intellectual dynamism of the faith, these radical revisions did not get translated into threats against the faith as such that may warrant violence on the pretext of defending the body of faith. Furthermore, besides other variables, violence against the Muslim nation states is product of failure on the part of the militants to view a Muslim nation state as an integral part of a broader but diffused ideological nationhood instead of an isolated entity. They fail to understand that their violent disapproval of the very concept of the nation state being colonial hangover will not bring any good to the larger interest of the Muslim Ummah rather it will weaken the Muslims’ military and state power. The violence against the Muslim states finds no place with Islamic theology. Even the medieval Muslim scholars like Ibn Taimmiyah whom the militants take as resource person stressed that jihad in terms of enjoining good and forbidding evil would be launched when its benefits (maslaha) would outweigh its adverse effects (mufāsidah).97 They make this inference from the following Quranic injunction: “O’you who believe, yourselves are your personality, those who go astray will not harm you when you stick to guidance”. (Al- Maid’ah:105))

As said earlier, though consensus exists that caliphate on the pattern of Prophethood is the ideal Islamic system yet when khilāfat transformed into malūkiyyat, the Muslim scholarship accepted it even though hesitatingly. On the question of obedience to

95 Al-Mawardi, Ahkam al- Sultaniyyah 96 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah 97Ibn Taimmiyah, Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil; also see, Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought,(NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2000), quoted in ,Richard Bonney, Jihad, 117 219

invalid rulers, Ibn Taimmiyah’s standpoint is summarized as under: one, on the question of validity of monarchy Ibn Taimmiyah has a moderate view vis-à-vis Khawārij, Mutazillah and Murji’ah. Khawārij and Mutazillah holding an extremist view condemned any attempt to dispense with khilāfat on the basis of doctrine of necessity whereas Murji’ah considered monarchy as legitimate form of political order in principle. To Ibn Taimmiyah, monarchy as a form of government is a shift from khilāfat, therefore, constitutes bida’ā (innovation). He substantiates his argument with a tradition of the Prophet who urged upon the believers to follow his way and the way of the pious caliphs.98 However, Ibn Taimmiyah does not permit the believers to revolt against the monarchical system on the grounds that monarchical system stands in contradiction to the ideal political system. He argues that though establishing khalifat is obligatory upon every believer yet this obligation can be dispensed with on the basis of the doctrine of necessity. It becomes acceptable only if it promotes vilayah (governance).99 He further makes it clear that to command the obedience is the right of the rulers as long as they do not command to do something sinful and as long as they do not forgo any part of Shariah.100 He further explains that if someone believes in tauhīd and the Prophethood but forgoes an element of Islam like Salat, Saum, Zakat or Hajj, he will be fought against until he reverts to right track.101

Ibn Taimmiyah does not permit the believers to resort to khurūj against those in authority even if their level of legitimacy is lesser than the pious caliphs and they do not come up to the ideal criteria as laid down by Islam. He further believes that even in case of individual injustice on the part of rulers, the believers are not entitled to revolt against them. Moreover, transformation of khilāfat into monarchical system too does not permit the believers to commit khurūj against the rulers simply because they are monarchical in character. However, if the rulers forgo any part of Shariah, they lose their right to obedience and it becomes mandatory upon the believers to uproot them. It is on this ground that he issued a fatwā against the Mongol rulers when he visited their camps and found no arrangement for prayers (iqāmat-e-salāt).

So far as Ibn Kathīr is concerned, his position on the question of monarchy is not much different from Ibn Taimmiyah. He does not permit the believers to revolt against the monarchical order and draws justification for monarchy though in terms of an invalid political system as compared to prophetic pattern of political governance from the following tradition of the Prophet wherein the Prophet asked Amīr Mu’awiyah to be good and considerate if he got the political authority.102 Moreover, Umar b. al-Khattāb neither approved nor condemned the pomp and show which was peculiar to monarchy displayed by Amīr Mu’awiyah in the capacity of governor of

98 At-Tirmidhi, Sunnan, ilm: 16;Abu Dawūd, Sunan, Sunnah:5;Ibn Majah: Sunan, muqaddamah:16; also see, Ibn Taimmiyah, Ibn Taimmiyah Expounds on Islam, Fatawa 35:18-20 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101Ibid. Fatawa 28:510-516 102 Ibn Kathīr, Al-Badayah, vol.8, 32 220

Syria.103 Moreover, there are still others who argue in favor of monarchy but having a lesser degree of legitimacy as compared to khilāfat an-nubuwwah indeed on the basis of following traditions of the prophet wherein the Prophet had anticipated that political authority on prophetic pattern will last for only thirty years.104 Moreover, the prophet further stated, “The people of Israel were ruled by their prophets. Whenever a prophet died another prophet took his place. But there will be no prophet after me; there will be only deputies (khulāfā), and they will be many”. Thereupon the people asked him, “What do you advise us to do?” He said, “Keep the pledge you make to one who comes first and then to the one who comes next, and give them their due, for God will call them to account for the people He puts under them”.105

8.8 Fixing the Polemical Context

As discussed elsewhere, the sectarian narrative that developed during the course of Muslim history identifies the issues that led to differences and the resultant soaring of relationships between the family of the Prophet and the first three caliphs of Islam. The following discussion by examining the primary sources seeks to refute this narrative. The counter narrative, through rereading the primary texts, attempts to discover the historical evidence that relationships between the family of the Prophet and his first three caliphs were based upon mutual affection, cooperation and respect. It challenges the argument that differences between the two camps became the basis for the schisms amongst the supporters of the two camps in the ages to come. The evidence suggests that affectionate behavior of the companions of the Prophet is part of how they have been defined in Quran. On this premise, the following discussion seeks to suggest that this affectionate behavior of both ahl-e-bayt and companions of the Prophet remained evident not only in the days of the Prophet but during the entire course of orthodox caliphate.

Quran is witness to the sublime character of the companions which reflects mutual affection and unity in their ranks as an inalienable trait of their personalities that unite them into an ideological brotherhood.106 (Al-Hujarat: 10), (Al-Imran: 103) Quran further defines the companions of the Prophet as follow: “Muhammad is the messenger of Allah. And those with him are hard against the disbelievers and merciful among themselves. Thou (O Muhammad) seest them bowing and falling prostrate (in worship), seeking bounty from Allah and (His) acceptance. The mark of them is on their foreheads from the traces of prostration. Such is their likeness in the Torah and their likeness in the Gospel - like as sown corn that sendeth forth its shoot and strengtheneth it and riseth firm upon its stalk, delighting the sowers - that He may enrage the disbelievers with (the sight of) them. Allah hath promised, unto such of them as believe and do good works, forgiveness and immense reward”. (Al-Fatah: 48)

103 Ibid. 123 104 Abu Dawūd, Sunan:8; At-Tirmidhi, Sunan, fitan:48; Ahmad, Musnad, v: 220,221 quoted in, Naumani, Ma’arif Al-Hadīth, vol.vii,574,575 105Sahih Bukhari, anbiya 50; Sahih Muslim, imāra; 44, Ibn Majah, sunan, jihad:42 106 Maulana Muhammad Naf’ey, Ruhama’ Bayna’hum, vol.1 (Lahore: Dar-ul-Kitab, 2014),26,27 221

This verse highlights four personal traits of the companions which include strictness against non-believers, mutually affectionate, absorption in prayers and reflection of piety from their faces. These characteristics are neither peculiar to a particular class of the companions nor meant for a specific timeframe. These are eternal traits of all the companions like the message of Quran itself. Similarly, the Prophet declared the believers to be part of a whole instead of isolated entities. The following discussion while relying upon the evidence from private and public lives of ahl-e-bayt and the first three caliphs seeks to suggest their lives reflect practical exposition of the Quranic expression of their personality traits. The evidence will be generated to reject the perception that their mutual conduct was fraught with differences.

8.8.1 Days of the Prophet

During the days of the Prophet, the companions were bound together in adorably cordial relationships. As confirmed through both Shiite and Sunnite narratives, this cordiality between the companions and ahl-e-bayt was evident on the eve of wedding of Hazrat Ali and Hazrat Fatima, daughter of the Prophet. Similar cooperation is evident in the conduct of Hazrat Ayesha and Hazrat Umm-e-Salma, the exalted wives of the Prophet towards Hazrat Fatima on this occasion.107

However, Hazrat Fatima’s wedding was not a solitary occasion of close cooperation between Hazrat Ayesha and Hazrat Fatima. It was regular pattern of conduct between these exalted ladies. Hazrat Ayesha has been reported to have said that she never witnessed someone having resemblance of speech more than Hazrat Fatima with the Prophet. She further states that whenever Hazrat Fatima had come to visit the Prophet, he would have stood up to welcome her. Similarly, Hazrat Fatima’s conduct too, was extremely respectful towards Hazrat Ayesha.108 According to both Shiite and the Sunnite narrations, Hazrat Ayesha has been reported to have stated that she had not witnessed anyone more truthful than Hazrat Fatima except the Prophet himself.109 Al- Haythami has quoted Hazrat Ayesha to have declared Hazrat Fatima to be the best

107 Hazrat Abu Bakr and Hazrat Umar took part in making arrangements for the wedding with great enthusiasm. When Ali sold his vest to Uthman to arrange finances for his wedding, Uthman as a goodwill gesture returned the vest instantly along with the amount already paid to Ali. All the three participated in wedding (nikah) ceremony on prophetic invitation and had been witness to the nikah. Besides the four caliphs of Islam, the cordiality in relationships also existed between the exalted wives of the Prophet and his daughter Hazrat Fatima. Hazrat Ayesha and Hazrat Umm-e-Salma made arrangements for the rukhsti of Hazrat Fatima .They renovated and furnished the house and also prepared food for the couple. They further stated not to have ever witnessed a wedding better than of Hazrat Fatima. See ibid. 42-73; For Shiite narrations see, Sheikh Abu Jaafar Tusi, Amālī and Hafiz Abu Al-Maueed Maufiq, Manaqib-e-Khwarizmi whereas for Sunnite traditions see, Sunnan Ibn Maja, Kitab An-Nikah, Chapter on Walima quoted in Naf’ey, Ruhama’ Bayna’hum, vol.1, 74-78 108 Hakim Neeshapuri, Mustadrak, vol.3, 154-161; Ibn Abd al-Barr, Al-Isti'ab fi ma'rifat al-ashab; Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, Al-Isaba fi tamyiz al-Sahaba, Tazkara Fatima quoted in Naf’ey, Ruhama’ Bayna’hum, vol. 1, 79 109 Quoted in, ibid. For shiite narrations, see, Sheikh Abbas Qummi Shii, Muntahi al-Amāl, vol.1, Chapter on Fazail-e- Fatima; for Sunnite narrations see, Abu Nu`aym al-Isfahani, Huliyāt –ul- Awliyā, vol.2, chapter on Tazkara Sayyeda Fatima 222

human being after the Prophet himself.110 Similarly, Hazrat Fatima’s conduct towards Hazrat Ayesha was also exemplary. Actually, the Prophet himself had advised her to have affection with Hazrat Ayesha 111 the mutual trust between them is explicit from Hazrat Ayesha’s reference to Hazrat Fatima in her narration of hadīth regarding the permissibility of eating meat of sacrificial animals.112 Both of them maintained this level of trust even after the Prophet. The trust level between them was so high that Hazrat Fatima disclosed an otherwise confidential talk between herself and the Prophet to Hazrat Ayesha on her insistence.113

Their mutual trust did not diminish even after the demise of Hazrat Fatima. This trusted relationship existed between Hazrat Ayesha and Hazrat Ali as well after Hazrat Fatima passed away. For juristic opinion regarding massah al’al-khuffain, Hazrat Ayesha referred the issue to Hazrat Ali.114 Moreover, in response to Ali’s declaration of fasting on the day of Ashūrā, Hazrat Ayesha acknowledged Ali to be the best amongst all in his understanding of prophetic Sunnah.115 Abu Bakr who was also the father of Hazrat Ayesha was the one who shifted Ali’s mother Fatima b. Asad to the grave along with the Prophet and Abbas b. Abddul Matlab whereas Umar was amongst those who dug the grave.116 This trust did not decline even in the face of battles like Camel and Siffīn. When Hazrat Ayesha received the news of Ali’s martyrdom, she prayed for him with sincerity and devotion.117 During the last days of Hazrat Ayesha, Ibn Abbas visited her and narrated her prophetic transmission in which the Prophet had stated that Hazrat Ayesha would be his wife in paradise too. On hearing this narration Hazrat Ayesha prayed for Ibn Abbas.118 Ibn Jozi has quoted a number of traditions wherein Ali has been reported to have highlighted the exalted status of Abu Bakr.119In one of the traditions Ali has been reported to have said that Abu Bakr would be the foremost amongst the believers to enter the paradise after the Prophet.120

8.8.2 Financial Rights of Ahl-e-bayt during the Caliphate of Hazrat Abū Bakr

110 Al-Haythami, Majma al Zawa'd, vol.9, 201, quoted in, ibid. 111 Sahih Muslim, vol.2 Chapter on Fazail-e- Ayesha ; Nisaai, Kitab Ishrat al-Nisa vol.2 112 For original text see, Musnad Ahmad, vol, 2 ahadīth-e- Fatima. The level of trust between the two exalted ladies is reflected from the following ahadīth: see for instance, Sahih Bukhari, vol.1 p.439, Bab al-Dalil Ali an al-khamas al-ghawaib and further see, Sahih Bukhari, vol.2 pp.807, 808, Bab Alal- Mirrat fi bayt Zoji’ha 113 This talk was with reference to the Prophet’s disclosure of his early demise which made Hazrat Fatima weep followed by good news that she would be the chief of women folk in paradise that made her smile and then the Prophet’s good news. See, Sahih Muslim, vol.2, p.290, chapter on Fazail-e- Fatima 114 Sahih Muslim, vol.1 Bab al-Tawaqqiat p.135 115 ; Ibn Abdul Barr, Al-Isti'ab: tazkara Ali-al-Murtaza, vol.3, 40 116 al-Haythami, Majma al Zawa'id: Manaqabat Fatima binnat Asad, vol.9, 256,257, quoted in Naf’ey, Ruhama’ Bayna’hum, vol. 1, 79 117 Ahmad, Musnad: Musnadat Ali al-Murtaza vol.1, 86,87, 118 Quoted in Naf’ey, Ruhama’ Bayna’hum,vol.1,98,99 119 See footnotes Nos. 120,139,141,144,150 of this chapter 120 Ibn Jozi, Manaqib Umar b. Al-Khattab, 71 223

During the pious caliphate, the financial rights of Ahl-e-bayt were fully protected. Abu Bakr as the first caliph, continued to financially support ahl-e-bayt exactly on the pattern of the Prophet without even any slight deviation. By following a proverb that your friend’s friend is your own friend, he religiously endeavored to fulfill his obligations towards the family of the Prophet. Hazrat Fatima and Hazrat Ayesha demanded their financial rights in terms of prophetic inheritance in three areas which included sadāqāt from Madina, income from Fidak and khums from Khyber. Abu Bakr referring to a tradition of the Prophet wherein the Prophet had said that whatever the prophets had left behind (tarākā) did not count as inheritance but as sadāqā. On this ground, though, he did not acknowledge inheritance rights of ahl-e-bayt in these areas yet he continued to meet their daily life expenditures from the income generated from these sources like the Prophet did.121 In view of the foregoing, the following inferences may be drawn: One, ahl-e-bayt continued to receive their financial rights from these sources exactly the way they used to receive during the days of the Prophet. The decision not to grant inheritance rights over these sources of income was actually not out of the caliph’s decision rather emerged out of a prophetic transmission. Two, the caliph did not use his discretion to distribute the finances to ahl-e-bayt rather he followed the practice of the Prophet. Three, the disposal of income from these sources including khums and faī remained with Ali himself.122

The certification of Imam Baqir that ahl-e-bayt did not face any injustice during the caliphate of the first two caliphs has been confirmed by the Sunnite as well as Shiite scholarship. Imam Baqir further advised Kathīr al-Nawā to keep a relationship of love with Abu Bakr and Umar not only in this world but in the life hereafter as well.123 Imam Zayd too, confirmed that ahl-e-bayt did not face any injustice on the issue of Fidak. He said that if he were in the place of Abu Bakr, he would have taken the same decision on the issue of Fidak.124 It is to be noted that all the pious caliphs including Ali retained the status of Fidak as source of income for ahl-e-bayt instead of transferrable piece of inheritance.

8.8.2.1 Ali’s Baya’ā to Abu Bakr and Role in State Administration The narrative that Ali did not pledge his allegiance to Abu Bakr at all or at least, during the life time of Hazrat Fatima is devoid of any solid evidence. It is argued that Ali and few other companions pledged their bay’ā to the first caliph within a short span. This is established from a narration reported by Abu Saeed al-Khudri which has been quoted by Ibn Kathīr and others including Imam Ahmad, al-Hakim and Bayhaqi

121 See, Sahih Bukhari, Kitab al-Manaqab, Bab-ul-Manaqab Qarabat Al-Rasulullah; Sahih Bukhari, Kitab Al-Mughazi Bab Hadīth Bani Nadhir 122 It is also confirmed through Shiite narrations. 123 For Sunnite references, see, Abi Talib Muhammad Ibn Ali Ibn al-Fatah al-Harbi al-Isha’ari, Kitab Fazail Abi Bakr al-Siddique (Multan, Mohallah Qadeerabad: Maktab Diniyya Salafiyya); also see, Allama Nooruddin al-Samhudi, Wafa al-wafa Be-Akhbar Dar-ul-Mustafa al-Juzz al-thalith, (Egypt),1001 . For Shiite references, see, Ibn Abi Al-Hadid, Shar’a Nehj-ul-Balagha, vol.4 (Beirut and Syria, 1956), 113, as quoted in Naf’ey, Ruhama’ Bayna’hum, vol. 1, 79 124 Imam Zayd was real brother of Imam Baqir and his words have been quoted by both Sunnite and Shiite scholars. For Sunnite quotation of his words, see, Ibn Kathīr, Al-Badayah, vol.5, 290. For Shiite reference, see, , Ibn Abi Al-Hadid Shii, Shar’a Nehj-ul-Balagha, vol.4, 113 224

in their works.125 Ibn Kathīr has argued that Ali and Zubair b. Al-Awwam pledged their allegiance to Abu Bakr on the same day.126 The Shiite scholar Al-Hadīd in his commentary on Nehj-ul Balāghā has also quoted that though Ali and Zubair had developed temporary reservations for not being consulted on the issue of caliphate yet they expressed their agreement in the primacy of right of Abu Bakr to the caliphate. On the grounds that Abu Bakr accompanied the Prophet in the Cave and further, the Prophet directed him to lead the prayers during his illness.127 It is to be noted that narration of Ibn Shehab Zuhri regarding the delayed baya’ā of Ali has been declared as weak in authenticity by ulema like Bayhqi in his Sunnan al-Kubra and Ibn Hajar Al-Asqalani in his Fatah Al-Bari. According to Ibn Kathīr’s research, Ali pledged his allegiance on the first or second day of Abu Bakr’s assuming office of the caliphate. Ibn Saad has also quoted a tradition on the authority of Hazrat Hassan that Ali himself said that when the Prophet chose Abu Bakr to lead prayers during his illness, they chose him to lead in the temporal sphere as well.128 Further, it is established that Ali never left Abu Bakr and always offered his prayers behind Abu Bakr. He also accompanied Abu Bakr in fighting against the apostates after the Prophet.

Both Shiite and the Sunnite historians agree that Ali was amongst the leading jurists during the period of first two caliphs who used to frequently consult him on the questions of jurisprudence and state administration.129 The decision to fight against those who refused to pay zakat was made in consultation with Ali who had argued that even a meager relaxation in the collection of zakat would amount to violation of the Prophet’s conduct.130 Importance associated with Ali’s advice in military affairs is reflected from an incident which has been quoted by numerous Muslim historians including Ibn Kathīr. Hazrat Ayesha narrates that once Abu Bakr dropped his plan to physically command a military campaign by himself on the argument of Ali that if anything bad had happened to him, the Islamic system would have lost its true direction.131 The Shiite narrations also confirm that Ali had been proactive in his cooperation in state administration during the caliphate of Abu Bakr .The Shiite narrations also confirm that during the initial days of Abu Bakr’s caliphate, Ali rose against the apostates of Arabia for their elimination.132 Again in the wake of threats of

125 Ibn Kathīr, Al-Badayah vol.6 and 7; Imam Ahmad, “Kitab al-Sunnah” p.96 published from Makkah; al-Hakim, Al-Mustadrak vol.3, 76, first published Deccan; Imam al-Bayhaqi, Al-Sunnan al-Kubra, vol.8, 143: Chapter on Qital ahl al-Baghi’; Imam al-Bayhaqi, Al-Aitqad ala Mazhab as-Salaf, 178 as quoted in Naf’ey, Ruhama’ Bayna’hum 126 Ibn Kathīr, Al-Badayah, vol.6, 302 127 Al- Hadid, Sharah Nehj-ul-Balagha, (Beirut), vol.1, 154 128 Muhammad bin Saad, Tabqat, vol. 2, 24,25 129 Ibid. Bab ahl-e-ilm wal fatwa min Ashaab Rasulullah. For Shiite traditions, see for example, Ahmed Ibn Abi Yaqoob, Tarikh Yaqoobi, trans. Urdu by Maulana Akhtar Fatehpuri, vol.2 (Karachi: Nafees Academy), 211 130Quoted in Naf’ay, Ruhama’ Bayna’hum, vol.2, 40-60 131 Ibn Kathīr, Al-Badayah, vol.6, 315. This incident has also been quoted by Sayyuti in Tarīkh al- Khulāfā 132 Nehj-ul-Balagha 225

attack on Madina during the early days of the first caliph, Ali himself guarded the city.133

In the preceding discussion, it has been observed that Ali pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr immediately after his assuming office of the caliphate. Abu Bakr also protected the financial rights of ahl-e-bayt with utmost caution. The authentic sources of both the Sunnite and the Shiite origin confirm mutual trust between Abu Bakr and ahl-e- bayt. Ali’s participation in decision-making during the period of first caliph is testimony to this mutual trust. This trust exposes the invalidity of sectarian narrative which thrives upon mutual misgivings between Abu Bakr and ahl-e-bayt. This ideal level of cordiality amongst the companions of the Prophet continued to exist during the caliphate of Umar as well.

8.8.3 Ali’s Willing Baya’ā to Hazrat Umar and Role in State Administration

During his last days, Abu Bakr proposed Umar to be the next caliph of the believers in black and white. Prior to public announcement of the proposed nominee, when the believers came to know that someone amongst them had been proposed to be the caliph, Ali categorically stated that he would not accept anyone but Umar to be the next caliph.134 When Umar’s nomination was made public, he instantly pledged his allegiance to him along with others.135 Besides this, the evidence collected from the Shiite as well as Sunnite sources suggests that Ali, on assuming the office of caliphate himself, made reference to his willing baya’ā to all his precursors.136 In view of the willing baya’ā on the part of Ali, it is argued that legitimacy of the caliphate was through consensus amongst the companions and ahl-e-bayt.

The mutual trust between Ali and the second caliph of Islam is further reflected in the former’s frequent appreciation for the latter. When Ali was requested to assume office of the caliph immediately after the martyrdom of Uthmān, he appreciated Umar’s model for the selection of the caliph through the instrument of shūrā and deferred the matter for its finalization on the same pattern.137 Moreover, Ali identified Abu Bakr and Umar to be amongst the fourteen nobles divinely gifted to the Prophet from his Ummah.138 In a tradition, Ali has been reported to have acknowledged Umar to be the one who ascertains right from the wrong.139 He also reiterated a prophetic tradition wherein the Prophet prayed for honour to the faith through Umar.140 Ibn Jozi has

133 Tabrī, Tarikh al-umam wal Maluk: Ahwal Al-Sunna al-Hadi Ashra’a, vol.3, 223; also see, al-Hadid, Sharah Nehj al-Balagha, vol.4, 228 134 Naf’ey, Ruhama’ Bayna’hum, vol.2, 50 135 Ibn Saad, Tabqāt: Tazkara Abi Bakr, vol.3, 142; also see, al-Sayyuti, Tarīkh al-Khulāfā: Mardh al- Wafat Abu Bakr al-Siddique, 61 136 The argument has been quoted by Maulana Naf’ey that the Shiite and the Sunnite scholars has quoted that Ali himself made reference to his willing bay’ā to his predecessors. See, Naf’ey, Ruhama’ Bayna’hum, vol.2, 40-60 137 Al-Tabrī, Tarīkh al-umam wal Maluk, vol.5, 156 discussion on 35 AH. 138 At- Tirmidhi, Abwab al-Manaqab, Manaqab Ahl-e-bayt, 541 139 Ibn Jozi, Manaqib Umar b. Al-Khattab, 36 140 Ibid., 21 226

quoted a hadīth wherein Ali has been reported to have said that the Prophet declared that Umar and Abu Bakr would be the chiefs of elderly people in paradise with the exception only of the prophets.141 On another occasion, Ali declared Umar to be strong as well as trustworthy.142 In another tradition, Ali declared Abu Bakr and Umar to be righteous and the torchbearers of guidance for the believers who contributed to the success of the Ummah.143 Ali has been reported to have identified Umar and Abu Bakr to be the ideal personalities for the believers forever and further that love for them is mandatory to get closeness with faith.144 He declared both of them to be the best personalities after the Prophet.145In his meeting with a delegation of the Christians from Najran, Ali appreciated Umar’s capability to make good decisions (rashīd-ul-amr) and thus, always upheld his decisions.146 Given his appreciation of Umar’s administrative capabilities, Ali continued with his administrative reforms during his own caliphate. In this background, some like Yahya b. al-Adam al-Qarshi (d.203 A.H.) argues that both had similar life characters (seerah).147

Like Abu Bakr, Umar continued consulting Ali on the important issues of governance and religious interpretation.148 Ibn Abbas reports that Umar declared Ali to be the best judge (Qadi).149 On assuming the office, Umar asked Ali to adjudicate amongst the people.150 Thus, as narrated by Ibn Kathīr, he appointed Ali as chief justice of Madina.151 It is to be noted that though Ali worked as chief justice of Madina yet in matters of his own disputes he would voluntarily come to Umar for decision.152 This reflects his complete trust in the uprightness and justice of Umar.153 The authentic sources of Islamic history of both Shiite and Sunnite origin are replete with the examples where Umar sought Ali’s juristic opinion on administrative and judicial matters. For organizing tarāweeh prayers in the mosques, Ali prayed for Umar.154 It is also established that Umar used to hold Ali and his sons- Husnain in high esteem. Deputing Ali as his deputy by Umar for umpteen times is reflection of cordiality in relationship between the two. This cordiality is also evident from naming the children after Umar. Umar was name of one of the sons of Hazrat Ali. Moreover, Imam Hassan’s son was also Umar and this name continued to exist in the generations of ahl-e-bayt following Imam Zayn al-Abideen.

141 Ibn Jozi, Manaqib Umar b. Al-Khattab, 58,59 142 Al-Tabrī, Tarīkh al-umam wal Maluk, vol.5, 156 discussion on 23 AH. 143 Ibn Sa’ad, Tabqāt: Tazkara Abi Bakr Siddique, vol.3, 149 144 Ibn Jozi, Manaqib Umar b. Al-Khattab, 65,66 145 Ibid. 69 146 Imam Abu Yousouf, Kitab al-Khiraj, 4 147 Ibid. 24 148Ibn Sa’ad, Tabqāt: Bab Ali, vol.2, 109 149Ibid.: Bab ahl-e-ilm wal fatwa min Ashaab Rasulullah, 102 150 al-Jozi, Manaqib Umar Ibn al-Khattab, 63 151 Ibn Kathīr, Al-Badayahh, vol. 7, 31 discussion under 13 AH. 152 Sahih Bukhari, Fardh al-Khums, vol.1, 435,436; Sahih Muslim, Hukm al-Faye,vol.2, 81 153 Naf’ey, Ruhama’ Bayna’hum, vol.2, 119,120 154 Al-Sayyuti, Tarīkh al-Khulāfā: awalliyat-e-Umar,97 ; for shiite traditions, see al-Hadid, Sharah Nehj-ul-Balagha, vol.12, 98 227

8.8.4 Relationship between the House of Uthmān and Ahl-e-bayt

Hazrat Uthmān earned the title zūl-naurayn for having the honour to have married two daughters of the Prophet. As Sayyuti has argued, this was the distinction which only Uthmān could ever have in the whole mankind.155 He was the foremost after the Prophet Lūt (as) to have migrated for Islam with his wife to Abyssinia.156 Ibn Athīr has also confirmed nikah of Hazrat Uthmān with Hazrat Ruqqiya.157 He could not participate in the Battle of Badr because of illness of Hazrat Ruqqiya who later on passed away. However, the Prophet reserved his share in the spoils of war and also promised him spiritual reward as well. After the demise of Hazrat Ruqqiya, Hazrat Uthmān had the honour to have second daughter of the Prophet - Hazrat Umm-e- Kalthum in his nikah in 3 AH.158 Actually, this nikah was divinely ordained.159 Uthmān’s nikāh with the Prophet’s daughters is also established through the Shiite narrations.160 The family relationship between Banu Hashim and the house of Uthmān is even more wide-ranging. There were many instances of inter-marriages between the two families. For instance, granddaughter of Ja’afar Tayyar was married to Uthmān’s son, Abban b. Uthmān.161 Later on, Fatima b. Hussain, another granddaughter of Ali also got married with Abdullah b. Umr, grandson of Uthmān.162

8.8.4.1 Ali’s Baya’ā and Role in State Administration Ali’s immediate and willing baya’ā to Uthmān is confirmed with both Sunnite as well as Shiite scholarship. Ibn Taimmiyah in Minhaj-as-Sunnah, Ibn Hajar in Asāba fi tamayyaz al-Sahāba and Ibn Athīr in Asad al-Ghaba fi Mua’arfat al-Sahāba has quoted the consensus baya’ā of all the companions included in the six-members committee for the selection of the caliph including Ali .The Shiite narrations too, confirm that Ali pledged his allegiance to Uthmān though with reluctance. The Shiite narrations also confirm that Uthmān’s selection as caliph was in accordance with the selection process laid down by Ali in Nehj-ul-Balagha.163 Since the selection procedure was laid down by Ali himself, his offering of baya’ā through following the procedure does not confirm his reluctance.

Besides this, common family ties contributed to mutual trust between the Hashmites and Uthmān .This trust is reflected through Uthmān’s consultation of Ali in the matters of statehood, appointment of the Hashmites on key posts, the Hashmites’ trust in the Uthmānīte justice and Uthmān’s regard for the nobility of the Hashmites. This trust is evident from the Hashmites’ approval of the caliphate of Uthmān. Like his

155 Al-Sayyuti, Tarīkh al-Khulāfā: Tazkara Uthman ibn Affan, 105 156 Ibn Sa’ad, Tabqāt, vol.2,133 157 Ibn Athīr, Usud al-Ghaba fi Mua’arfat al-Sahaba, Urdu trans. Maulana Muhammad Abdul Shakoor Farooqi Lakhnawi, vol 2 (Lahore:Al-Meezan), 517 158 Ibid. also see, Ibn Sa’ad, Tabqāt, vol.2, 133 159 Al-Hakim, Mustadrak: Tazkara Umm-e-Kalthum, vol.4, 49 160 Al-Hadid, Sharah Nehj-ul-Balagha, vol.1, 303 161 Ibn Qatayba Denouri, Al-Mua’arif, p.86 162 Ibn Sa’ad , Tabqāt: Tazkara Fatima binnat Hussain, vol.8, 346-348 163 Naf’ey, Ruhama’ Bayna’hum, vol.3, 65-68 228

illustrious predecessors, Uthmān continued to consult Ali in the matters of statehood. The Shiite scholars also confirm that on the pattern of the first two caliphs, Uthmān too entrusted the responsibility of enforcement of hudud laws to Ali.164 Uthmān asked Ali to enforce hudud upon Walid b. Uqbah on the charges of taking alcohol.165 This incident is also confirmed through the Shiite narrations too.166 Likewise, Ali enforced hudud in many other offences as well. Moreover, during the caliphate of Uthmān, a number of key posts were occupied by the Hashmites. Mughira b. Naufal was appointed as Qadi167 whereas Abdullah b. Hārith was governor of Makkah during the caliphate of Uthmān.168 Furthermore, many instances are available in the course of Islamic history which suggests that the Hashmites used to bring their disputes to Uthmān for adjudication. This reflects their trust in the uprightness and justice of Uthmān.169 Besides this, Hazrat Uthmān like his predecessors had always been respectful to the house of Hashim. As a gesture of respect, Uthmān always used to alight from the horse while passing by Abbas.170 Uthmān himself led funeral prayers for Abbas.171 Abban b. Uthmān led funeral prayers for Muhammad b. Hanfia,172 son of Ali and Abdullah b. Jaafar Tayyar.173 These instances lead us to develop the case that there was no mistrust between the Hashmites and Uthmān .They were bound together in mutually supportive arrangements for the common cause of the faith.

8.9 War Ethics

Islam has a strong ethical system at its base which disciplines the conduct of the believers. Any ethical system comes under trial when it is exposed to a conflict scenario and even more so when the followers of one ethical code are pitched against those who do not believe in this particular code. Islam does not believe that ‘ends justify means’. Its war ethics have never been subordinate to utilitarian concerns. War ethics have always been defining the strategic and tactical maneuverings in Islam. The philosophy behind the military morals is mainly based upon following two grounds: One, nobility of intentions does not legitimize the acts which are otherwise ignoble. Idol worship is not permissible as a means to secure divine closeness. The prophetic tradition which recognizes intention to be the determining factor for legitimacy of actions174 applies only to those acts which are ostensibly fair and virtuous. The acts

164 Ibid. 120 165 Sahih Bukhari :Manaqab Uthman 166 Ibn Abi Haddid, Sharah Nehj-ul-Balagha, vol. 2, 67 Even the authentic Shiite narrations reject the charges of committing bida’a’ upon Umar by increasing the punishment of alcohol-taking. Imam Ja’afar Sadiq has approved of this increase in punishment. See, Naf’ey, Ruhama’ Bayna’hum, vol.3, 124 167 Ibn Athīr, Usud al-Ghaba fi Mua’arfat al-Sahaba, vol. 3, 242 168 Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, Taqrib al-Tehzib, trans. Urdu by Maulana Niaz Ahmed, (Lahore: Maktaba Rehmania) 169 Naf’ey, Ruhama’ Bayna’hum, vol.3, 132-138 170 Ibn Kathīr, Al-Badayah, vol.7, 162, Tazkara Abbas under 33 AH. 171 Ibid. 172 Ibn Sa’ad, Tabqāt , vol.3, 115 173 Ibn Athīr, Usud al-Ghaba fi Mua’arfat al-Sahaba, vol 2, 217 174 Sahih Bukhari, Kitab al-Wahī Hadīth No.1 229

which are otherwise impermissible, unjust and evil cannot be justified on the pretext of noble intentions. Two, like the message of Islam is eternal and universal in itself, the principles drawn therefrom too, have the same character. Their application is well- defined and is far from reactionary in spirit. While relying upon these two premises, the following discussion will make an inquiry into the ethics of war through a micro examination of the evidence from the primary texts of the Islamic history.

8.9.1 Suicide Killings

Islam does not recognize human life to be the personal property of a human being but a divine trust. Human beings are obliged to protect the sanctity of this trust. It urges upon the believers to protect their lives being the most exalted form of divine blessings. In the words of the Prophet, the bodies of the believers have rights upon themselves.175 The commission of suicide amounts to flagrant violation of this trust which invites strong condemnation. The commission of suicide will bring awful doom to the one who commits it.176 The Prophet warned the believers that the one who committed suicide through whatever means will surely be condemned to hell and will suffer painful torment.177 The Prophet has been further reported to have said that the one who commits suicide will be tormented with pain in hell through the same way he adopted to commit suicide.178 The Prophet further said that once, moved by anxiety, an injured person cut off his hand with a knife and consequently died because of over bleeding. Allah made paradise out of bound for him for violating His will.179 Yet, in another tradition, the Prophet anticipated about someone who was acclaimed by the companions for his gallantry in fight against the infidels but later on, committed suicide owing to unbearable pain of injuries.180 Moreover, the Prophet declined to offer funeral prayers for those who committed suicide.181 These prophetic transmissions lead us to infer that commission of suicide is strictly condemned in Islam and warrants eternal torment in hell.

The commission of suicide being an ignoble act cannot turn into a noble act merely on the premise of self-proclaimed virtuous intentions behind its commission. Jihad is a noble cause which warrants virtuous means to achieve its noble goals. On this pretext, launching suicide attacks cannot earn theological legitimacy because noble cause can only be achieved through noble means. Because of its categorical condemnation by the Prophet, the suicide attacks cannot be theologically recognized in utilitarian

175 Sahih Bukhari, Kitab Al-Saum, Bab Haq al-Jism fil Saum, 697:2 176 Sahih Bukhari, Kitab al-Tibb; Bab Sharb al-sim wal adwa’a behi wa bema yukhaf min hu wal khabith 177 Ibid.; also see, Sahih Bukhari, Kitab al-Janaiz: Bab Ma Ja’a fi Qaatil al-nafs 178 Sahih Bukhari, Kitab-ul-Adab, Bab min Ukfer Akha’hu beghair Ta’awil fa howa kama qala 2264:5 179 Sahih Bukhari, Kitab Al-Anbiyya, Bab Ma Zikr an Bani Israel 180 Sahih Bukhari, Kitab Al-Mughazi, Bab Ghazwa Khyber 181 Sahih Muslim, Kitab al-Jana’iz: “On Not Offering Prayer over Someone who Committed Suicide”; also see, Al-Nasai, Sunan: Kitab al-Janaiz: “On Not Offering Prayer over Someone who Committed Suicide”; Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Janaiz:“The Imam Should Not Offer Prayer over someone who Committed Suicide” 230

context which acknowledges suicide attacks in terms of war tactic to inflict excessive damage to the enemy even against whom jihad is religiously warranted.

8.9.2 Distinction between Combatants and Non-Combatants

The military morals of Islam are based upon sharp distinction between the combatants and the non-combatants without discrimination of belief. Islam strongly condemns violence against those not involved in military adventures against an Islamic state. However, the military morals of Islam are not restricted to the non-combatants alone rather even the combatants are dealt with under these ethical codes.

8.9.3 Violence against the Fellow Believers

Islam condemns violence against the believers on the grounds of religious, political and ideological differences. The Prophet declared sanctity of a believer’s life to be greater than that of Ka’ba, the House of God on earth.182 Inviolability of the life of a believer is better reflected through a prophetic declaration which identifies the murder of a single believer to be an offence more serious than even the destruction of the whole world.183 Strong emphasis upon this inviolability is evident from the Prophet’s forbidding the believers of even pointing a weapon towards a fellow believer.184 The Prophet prohibited the believers to kill someone who proclaims Islam even under the fear of being killed in the battlefield.185 The prophetic condemnation is directed not only against those who actually kill a believer but even against the abettors as well. In the words of the Prophet, these abettors will be denied divine blessings for their abetment in the unjust killings of the believers.186

The violation of the sanctity of a believer’s blood will surely invite a dreadful torment. (Quran, 4:93) Divine wrath will come to the one who violates the sanctity of a believer’s life. (6:151) The sanctity associated with this offence is evident from the fact that it is mentioned in Quran in conjunction with shirk. The Prophet, in his last sermon, categorically highlighted the sanctity (hurmat) of life and property of the believers.187 Since inviolability of a believers’ life is established through Quran and authentic traditions of the Prophet, mere a conviction in the permissibility of the killings of a believer unless warranted through hukm-e-sharī amounts to kufr. The military morals of Islam do not sanction killings of Muslims who are not liable to be killed through a categorical injunction. If a believer is warranted to be killed in terms

182 Ibn Maja, Sunan, Fitan, Hurmat Dam al-Mauminin wa Malu,hu, 183 Al-Tirmidhi, Sunan: Kitab al-diyat:” What has Come to Us Concerning the Gravity of Killing a Believer,”; Al-Nasai, Sunan: Kitab tahrim al-dam: The Sanctity of Blood; Ibn Majah, Sunan: Kitab al- diyat: “The Gravity of Killing a Muslim Unjustly” 184 Sahih Muslim, Kitab al-Birr wal Sila wal Adaab, Bab Nahi an Ishara bil Salah 185 Sahih Bukhari, Kitab-ul-Mughazi, Bab Baath al-Nabi Usama bin Zaydi l al-harqat min Jhayena; also see, Sahih Muslim, Kitab-ul-Eeman, Bab Tehreem Qatal al-Kafir Baad an Qala: La Ilah illa Allah; also see, Sahih Bukhari, Kitab-ul-Mughazi, Bab Shahud al-Malaika Badr 186 Ibn Majah, al-Sunan : Kitab al-Diyat: “The Gravity of Unjustly Killing a Muslim” 187 Sahih Bukhari: Kitab al-Hajj 231

of punishment required by a hukm-e-sharī like Qisās, it will be carried out through the state. No one in one’s private capacity is entitled to enforce the coercive injunctions of Shariah.

8.9.4 Violence against Non-Believers

Non-believers in a Muslim state fall in the following three broad categories: one, who become subject to the Islamic state under some agreement. They are called the People of Covenant. Two, those who agree to pay a certain amount as tax (jizzyāh) when they become subject to the state after being overwhelmed in their fight against the Muslims. They are called the dhimmīs. Three, those who happen to be residing in a Muslim state under any other circumstances. An inquiry into the manners the non- believers were treated during the early period of Islam highlights that Islam recognizes the distinction between the combatants and non-combatants for application of violence against them even in the battlefield.

8.9.5 People of Covenant

In case of the People of Covenant, once an agreement is reached, the Muslims are bound to deal them strictly in accordance with the provisions of the agreement even if the terms of agreement appear distasteful to them. The Prophet entered an agreement with the Christians of Najrān. A portion of the text of this agreement reads as follow: “The protection of God and the guarantee of the Prophet Muhammad, extend on Najrān and neighborhood, that is to say on their goods, their people, the practice of their worship, their absent and present, their families and their sanctuaries, and all that large and small, is in their possession”.188 The obligation to observe these terms of agreement is so strongly emphasized that the Prophet warned the believers that he would himself be the complainant on the Day of Judgment against those who would infringe upon their rights, burden them beyond their endurance and usurp anything from them against their will.189 Further on the question of treatment with the People of Covenant, Imam Abu Yusuf says that they will be dealt with strictly in accordance with the provisions of the contract and no additions will be permitted.190

8.9.6 People of Guarantee

The dhimmīs are levied a tax in return of state guarantee for the protection of their lives, property and honour. Hazrat Umar enjoined Abu Ubaidah, the commander of the Muslim armies that the believers forego the right to take liberties with them and their property, the moment, they accept jizzyāh from them. It must be noted that Islam recognizes distinction between the combatants and non-combatants even in the imposition of jizzyāh to the dhimmīs. It is levied only upon those who have fought or

188 Imam Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Khiraj, trans. Urdu by Maulana Niaz Ahmed Okarwi, Lahore: Maktaba Rehmania) 208-219; This agreement has also been mentioned by Ibn Sa’ad in Tabqāt 189 Abu Dawud, Kitab al-jihad 190 Imam Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Kharaj, 208-219 232

has the capacity to fight against the Muslims.191 Non-combatants like women, children, old, disabled and lunatics will be exempted from this tax.

In general terms, Islam does not recognize any discrimination between the believers and non-believers regarding the sanctity associated with their right to life. Quran strongly condemns the killing of human beings irrespective of their religious affiliations and declares it an offence equal in severity of eliminating the whole mankind. “For that cause We decreed for the Children of Israel that whosoever killeth a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as if he had killed all mankind, and whoso saveth the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind. Our messengers came unto them of old with clear proofs (of Allah´s Sovereignty), but afterwards lo! many of them became prodigals in the earth”. (Al-Maeda: 32). The Prophet has declared the paradise to be out of bound for the one who unjustly kill a non-believer.192 The equality in right to life for the believers and non-believers is further evident from the uniformity in punishment to the killer in both cases. The punishments either retribution or restitution as the case may be will be uniform whether the victim happens to be a Muslim or Non- Muslim.193 However, Imam Bukhari has quoted a hadīth wherein the Prophet prohibited killing a believer in retribution of a non-believer’s murder.194 An apparent anomaly between the Hanfite standpoint and the afore-quoted tradition of the Prophet has been resolved by the jurists. Al-Jassas argues that a non-believer as mentioned in this hadīth means a non-Muslim who is in state of war with the Muslims.195 Otherwise, inviolability associated with the life and property of a non-believer being a well-established principle of Islamic governance is evident from the Sunnah of the Prophet. During the period of the Prophet, a Muslim killed a dhimmī. The Prophet ordered for his execution by saying that he was responsible for ensuring redressal for the weak.196 Similar conduct was adopted by the pious caliphs as well. Hazrat Umar ordered for execution of a person from the tribe of Bakr bin Wāil in retribution of killing a dhimmī of Hīra. Likewise, Hazrat Ali ordered execution of a person in retribution of killing a dhimmī but later on, the heirs of the deceased willingly accepted monetary compensation and they, themselves requested for his release. Hazrat Ali has been further reported to have said that the non-Muslims have accepted the status of dhimmīs on the categorical understanding that their properties and lives will remain inviolable like of the Muslims.197

191 Abul a’la Maūdūdī, Islamic Law and Constitution (Lahore: Islamic Publications (pvt) Ltd., 1990), 282 192 Al-Nasai, Sunan: Kitab al-qasama: “The Gravity of Killing Non-Muslim Citizens”; Abu Dawud, Sunan: Kitab Al-jihad: “Fulfilling the Contract of a Non-Muslim Citizen and the Sanctity of his Contract” 193 Ibn Abi Shayba, al-Musannaf, 5:407 194 Sahih Bukhari, Kitab al-ilm: “On Writing down Knowledge” 195 al-Jassas, Ahkam al-Quran,: “A Muslim’s Murder of a Disbeliever”, pp.140-144 196 Maūdūdī, Islamic Law and Constitution, 283 197 Ibid. 233

Having confirmed the inviolability of the long list of the rights of the non-believers in an Islamic state which include right to life, property, honour, religious rites and personal law, it is argued that nothing revokes these rights except two conditions: one, they leave the Muslim state and opt to join its enemies and two, they rise in khurūj against a Muslim state.198 The above instances from the early period of Islamic history show that the non-believers living in an Islamic state enjoy tremendous level of protection to their lives and property under the state guarantee.

As said earlier, the instances further suggest that Islam believes in bifurcation between the combatants and non-combatants amongst the believers and non-believers both. A conspicuous bifurcation between the combatants and non-combatants is reflected from the treatment of the Prophet with the delegation from Musaylama (the liar). They confessed their apostasy by acknowledging their faith in false claim of Prophethood on the part of Musaylama yet the Prophet showed extreme restraint and treated them well because of their diplomatic status.199 This instance led to evolution of a defining principle of international relations that provide for protection to the diplomats by the Islamic state. Being established by authentic traditions, the violation of this principle amounts to trespassing the limits prescribes by the Prophet regarding the treatment to the diplomats. This bifurcation between the combatants and the non- combatants is reflected from the Muslims’ conduct in the battlefield as well. As said earlier, on the basis of bifurcation between the combatants and non-combatants, Islam not only claims to provide state-guarantee to the non-combatants rather it provides guidelines to discipline the Muslim military in the battle ground as well. These codes of war constitute a categorical evidence to suggest that battle, in itself, is a moral adventure in Islam. These codes originate from the instructions of Prophet and the pious caliphs which the Muslim troops were enjoined to follow in letter and spirit. Abdullah b. Abbas narrates, “When the Messenger of Allah would dispatch troops he would say [to them], “Do not act treacherously, do not misappropriate the spoils of war, do not mutilate the dead bodies and do not kill children and priests.”200 Since whole Islamic struggle aims at lofty ideals, Islam does not approve of any act which is otherwise reprehensible. It has forbidden mutilating even the animals in the battle.201 Al-Shaybanī has narrated another hadīth on the authority of Al-Hasan that the Prophet prohibited the killing of women.202 He argues that a woman will not be executed even if she has committed apostasy. Ibn Abbas says if a Muslim woman apostatizes, she will not be killed but will be imprisoned till the time she embraces Islam again. If a female apostate denies the charges of commission of apostasy and bears witness to the

198 Ibid. 286 199 Al-Darimi, Sunan, 2:307; Ahmad bin Hanbal, Musnad, 1:404 200 Ahmad b. Hanbal, Al-Musnad, 1:330. This hadīth is also narrated by Al-Shaybani from Imam Abu Hanifa on the authority of Alqamah b. Marthad. See, Al-Shaybani, Kitab Al-Siyar, ,30 201Ibid. 49 202 Ibid. 234

divine unity and Prophethood when produced before Imam of the Muslims, it will amount to her repentance.203

The same military morals were followed by the companions of the Prophet. Tabrī has reproduced the address of Hazrat Abu Bakr to the troops of Usama b. Zayed expedition wherein Abu Bakr forbade him to misappropriate, break the trust, mutilate the dead, and kill the children, women, and old. He also forbade Usama to cut or burn date-palm. He further anticipated that Osama will come across such people who have preferred to live in seclusion and further advised him not to kill such people in their monasteries.204 The same bifurcation between the combatants and non-combatants was followed by Umar. Ibn Qudamah has quoted a narration from Umar wherein he enjoined not to kill non-combatant farmers.205 The evidence available from the Sunnah of the Prophet and his companions leads us to argue that Islamic codes of war are based upon recognition of sharp distinction between the combatants and the non- combatants. Islam never permits its adherents to inflict any damage to the non- combatants whether Muslims or non-Muslims. Killing a non-combatant stands in categorical violation of the Islamic injunctions.

8.9.7 Vengeance Driven Violence

In Islam, everyone is responsible for his own deeds. Quran and Sunnah do not hold anyone responsible for the misdeeds committed by someone else. Punishment is awarded to one who commits something wrong and no one else including the family members of the offender is forced to share the responsibility for an offence which they did not actually commit. Quran categorically declares, “Say: Shall I seek another than Allah for Lord, when He is Lord of all things? Each soul earneth only on its own account, nor doth any laden bear another's load. Then unto your Lord is your return and He will tell you that wherein ye differed”. (Al-An’am:164) A tradition of the Prophet further emphasizes upon the issue. The Prophet said, “No one shall be held responsible for the injustice of a co-religionist”.206 Baladhuri, in Futhū al-Buldān has quoted an incident that in Lebanon, once some people arose to revolt against the government. The governor, Saleh b. Ali crushed the revolt through military muscle. He put all the male combatants to sword. He also put some non-combatant civilians to exile. Imam Auzā’ī reprimanded the governor vehemently. In his letter to Saleh, he argued that he failed to understand why some people had been held responsible for the acts of others and had been forced to leave their homes. By reiterating the Quranic injunction that every soul is accountable for his own deeds, Imam Auzā’ī reminded Saleh of the words of the Prophet that he would be the complainant against all such Muslims who would burden the people of Covenant and the People of Guarantee

203Ibid. 70 204 Tabrī, Tarikh al-Umam wal Muluk vol.2; also see, Ibn Abi Shayba, Al-Musannaf, trans. Urdu by Maulana Awais Sarwar, Kitab-ul-Jihad vol.6 (Lahore: Maktaba Rehmania) 205 Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughni, 9:251 206 Abu Yusuf, Kitab Al-Kharaj, 78; Al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-Buldan, 90 235

beyond their endurance.207 This Islamic perspective challenges the very foundations of the militants’ narrative to kill the innocent citizens to avenge the oppression inflicted upon them by someone else. The narrative that sanctions the killings of the western citizens on the grounds of indirectly supporting their oppressive regimes by electing them to power and through tax-payments has no supportive evidence from the early Islamic history. During the early days of the Islamic history, when Islam challenged two contemporary superpowers- the Roman and the Persian Empires, the Muslims did not hold their subjects responsible for the wrong deeds of their co- religionists merely for contributing to the revenue of their empires. Killing someone other than against whom retribution is due is an act without legitimacy. In view of the above, following conclusions may be drawn: One, takfīr cannot be invoked if the one against whom its application is intended believes in the truthfulness of whatever has reached us [Shariah] though the Prophet. Two, the sectarian divide has not developed on the grounds of soar relationship between ahl-e-bayt and the companions. The historical evidence suggests that there existed cordiality between them in all phases of their lives. Three, khurūj is not permissible even if the rulers do not fulfill the ideal conditions prescribed for an Islamic ruler. It becomes permissible only when a ruler commits flagrant violation of any fundamental principle of the faith. Four, in Islam, legitimacy of the rulers and public consent behind their selection are mutually inclusive. This consent may be secured either through direct means or indirect ways. Five, democratic system based upon divine sovereignty is in consonance with Islamic ideals. Political parties which are part and parcel of the modern democratic system can legitimately operate within Islamic political system provided they do not pose any threat to the integrity of the Muslim Ummah. Similarly, offering one’s services for a particular office is not prohibited provided one has the confidence to fulfill the responsibilities associated with the slot and has not demanded it for the sake of authority but for the service to mankind. Six, the war is a moral affair in Islam and it observes sharp distinction between the combatants and the non- combats. Seven, Islam severely condemns suicide missions even against whom the Qitāl is warranted. Eight, Vengeance-based violence has no place in Islam as it does not hold any one responsible for the deeds of the other.

207 Ibn Jabir al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-Buldan, trans. English by P.K.Hitti (The Origins of the Islamic State), (New York: Columbia University, 1916),251 236

Conclusion

The revolutionary surge created by political Islam aims at reviving the socio-political order of the salaf. The militants on the pretext of establishing caliphate on the model of the Prophet seek to earn theological legitimacy to their violence against the west as well as against the Muslims. Ideology happens to occupy a central place in the conflict and designs the framework of conflict along with three groups of actors. These include ‘the fundamentalists’, the ‘apologists’ and the ‘agents. The fundamentalists aim to revive the faith by reverting to the early period of Islam. The apologists cherish to reconcile the Islamic ideals with the norms of western democracy. The agents are alleged to be those who collaborate with the western powers against the fellow believers.

Once, it is established that nature of the conflict is essentially ideological, its implications appear to be largely internalized to the Muslim societies. These implications are strong enough to culminate into revisions in the limits of faith despite that fundamentals of faith have remained constant. Actually, this change in the boundaries of faith owes to interplay of socio-political variables. Initially, takfīr could only be invoked in case any fundamental principle of Shariah was renounced. Subsequently, through the interplay of socio-political variables, boundaries of faith got revised and even the bida’ā of secondary nature were accorded the mandate to invoke takfīr. Moreover, theological definition of the boundaries of faith was not exclusive to the socio-political milieu of the respective theologians who evolved their ideas in conjunction with historical pre-suppositions. The objectivity of the ideas got compromised by the defining influence of these historical pre-suppositions on theology and further led to extremism in theological discourse. This extremism in behavior led the clergy to believe in unimpeachable status of their theological interpretations. Difference of opinion to their theological interpretations was taken in terms of refutation of the validity of the divine scripture itself. Theological divinity, thus, evolved would invoke takfīr on the grounds of theological differences. This extremism is further evident with the militants who pronounce takfīr to the believers on the commission of major sins like involvement in ribā-based business enterprises and even for adopting the cultural traits of the west.

As said elsewhere in this study, the ideas of heresy when transmuted into polemics created permanent schisms within the Muslims as a whole. Though, in the first place, the sectarian cleavages got developed from the aberrations of Islamic history which created spaces for the emergence of theological differences, yet in subsequent course, these disagreements on the issues of theological import when juxtaposed with political realism offered grounds for the emergence of historical presuppositions. These conjectures proved potent enough to provide foundations to the sectarian empires like the Fatimid caliphate and the Safāvīd dynasty. The rise of these sectarian empires suggests that polemical divide that got aggravated on the axis of politics has 237

also been exploited by the ruling elite to secure political gains. Their passion for the export of the Shiite ideas to the Sunnite world needs to be viewed in terms of their quest for political gains. This passion, as a natural consequence, created alarms within the rival Sunnite world against the possible export of shiitization in their lands. The Sunnite response vis-à-vis these sectarian empires were of mistrust coupled with the charges of treason against the fellow Muslims at the behest of the non-believers. This mistrust got further reinforced with increased mutual intolerance when forced conversion under these empires could serve as ‘lesson of history’ for the Sunnites.

This lesson could change the boundaries of faith and further provided the militants to exploit this centuries-old schism between the Shiites and the Sunnites to bring legitimacy to their violence against each other. The implications internalized to the Muslim societies get further exposition with affirmative relationship between the identity crises and violence. The national identity got actually eroded when it was challenged by the colonialism. The violence swept the Muslim societies either under state patronage or at societal level. This violence was directed against either respective colonial powers or against those who believed in reconciliation with the colonialists as a key to their survival. They are labeled as the ‘apologists’. The post- colonial context is witness to the persistence of this anti-colonial sentiment with a certain level of redefinition. Islamists’ resistance against the colonialists transformed into defiance of the ruling elite found in connivance with the colonialists against the fellow believers. In this perspective, the militants disapprove of the ‘apologists’ for their support to the westernized rulers in the Muslim states. As said earlier, the splits that sneaked into body politic of Islam during the early days could only reach the masses when the violence was codified under the sectarian empires like Safāvīd dynasty in the 16th century. The pre-suppositions that emerged from the early days continued to persist through codification of violence under these sectarian empires. Moreover, rise of these empires and abolition of the Muslim Caliphate in the 20th century rendered the ‘Ummah’ irrelevant in terms of a legitimate coercive organ to control violence. In this way, violence succeeded to reach the level of masses. In their bid to fill the gap created by the irrelevance of Ummah, the militants could claim grounds of legitimacy to their violence aimed at reviving the caliphate. However, the 18th and 19th centuries witnessed Muslims pitted against each other and codification of violence even at the level of state formation. Iran and Gulf states may be viewed in terms of an outcome of such transformations achieved through indirect imperialist interventions.

In the backdrop of relegation of violence to the level of masses, the codification of violence at society and state level led to formation of codes of war with the militants. These codes of war get exposition in the following contexts: One, for the militants, following democracy invokes takfīr as its recognition of human mandate for law- making amounts to infringing upon the domain which is exclusive to God. This negation of exclusivity of the divine sovereignty revokes the belief of a believer and he becomes liable to punishment warranted for the commission of apostasy (irtidād) 238

as legal requirement (hukm-e-sharĭ). Since nation state system provides space for democracy to function, the militants do not hesitate to condemn the followers of the democratic constitutions to be apostates. Two, the militants ventured to discredit the theology developed over centuries. This rejection of the Muslim scholarship is evident from their revisions of fundamental nature in their theory of jihad whereby they internalized jihad to the Muslim societies in addition to an aggressor enemy. Three, despite their differences with the contemporary Wahābī sheikhs on some theological issues relating to jihad, the militants share jāhilliyah notion of Ibn Abdul Wahāb. They cherish to revive the purity of faith and pronounce takfīr to those who introduce bida’ā into the practice of faith. Four, the militants seek to legitimize their violence against the Shiites in general on the basis of historical pre-suppositions more than on religious grounds. Despite their frequent references to Ibn Taimmiyah, the militants are strict on the question of polemics than Ibn Taimmiyah himself. Ibn Taimmiyah avoided pronouncing takfīr to the Shiite common man whereas the militant narrative does not find any difference between the Shiite leadership and common man. Five, militants’ violence is directed against whom they call ‘apostate rulers’ in the Muslims states as well as against their local support-base. Six, the militants do not observe any distinction between the combatants and non-combatants being the targets of their violence. They disregard this distinction in case of both believers as well as non- believers.

Having the afore-mentioned militants’ codes of war mirrored against pattern of terrorism as evident from the findings of empirical research in Pakistan, the following findings are drawn: First, the surrounding culture produces ideological currents which are subscribed by the militants. These undercurrents are not necessarily produced by formal madrassa system but mostly by semi-qualified local clergy, family environment and the peer character. Second, the militants solely focus upon legitimizing their pre-conceived codes of violence. It is the question of suitability of a standpoint instead of its authenticity that governs their choice of following. Three, owing to commonalities of ideological stands between different outfits, the militants find themselves bound in a global brotherhood. Their subscription of a common ideology compensates for the need of experienced foot-soldiers to the newly emerging outfits. This also leads to argument that ideology has precedence vis-à-vis organizational affiliation. As most of the militant networks share ideological strands, therefore, their soldiers never feel constrained to shift their organizational affiliations while retaining the same ideological standpoints. Four, common ideological strands lead to common targets and modes of violence. Shift from one organization to another does not often required revisions in targets and modes adopted to neutralize them.

Apart from Pakistan, the killing fields of militancy reflect that in case of Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, despite retaining common anti-imperialist themes, the militants never surrender their sectarian identities. They seek to exploit these sectarian identities to mobilize militancy in the global context to secure political and strategic gains. The societies like Somalia, Algeria and Egypt which have been victims to state oppression 239

happen to be fertile grounds for militancy where the militant outfits can find their workforce through cashing upon their marginalization. Moreover, anarchic culture creates appeal to the militants’ notion for reversion to the purity of faith in search of a just socio-economic and political order. In this search of purity, they reject everything which they believe to be not Islamic and thus, assume an exclusionary character vis-à- vis those who do not feel inclined to their version of the faith. The militants cherishing for ideal alternative state governance find themselves in direct conflict with the guardians of dysfunctional state structures. Both sides look for their alternative support solutions. The militants cherish to become part of global militant brotherhood whereas their adversary regimes look towards their western patrons and thus, earn the charges of apostasy for collaborating with the western powers. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that Gaza and Palestine have always been central to the agenda of militant organizations. The historical accounts of the militant organizations suggest that the organizations could occupy central place in the militant diaspora as long as they remained stick to jihad in terms of sole solution to the conflict. Any reconciliatory posture on these issues may deprive them of popularity with the militants. The same happened with PLO in the aftermath of Oslo Accords and similarly Hamas is also criticized by Al-Qaida and ISIS for its deference to the international charter that recognizes Israel. So far as, the theatres of international aggression are concerned, they are also a source of theological support to the militants in the context of Islamic perspective on resisting the foreign aggression into the Muslim lands. Last but not the least, it is only negation of any fundamental principle (nassūs-qattiyā) of the faith that invokes takfīr. Like takfīr, polemical divide happened to characterize the Muslim society on the basis of socio-political constructs instead of mutual differences between ahl-e-bayt and the companions. The takfīr developed on the trajectories of socio-political variables is not liable to lead to khurūj against the rulers even if they do not come up to the level required for the ideal Muslim rulers. The evidence suggests that authentic Muslim scholarship has never let the transformations in political order set the course for takfīr. In present context, democratic model of state governance cannot be labelled as a faith in itself other than Islam if it recognizes sovereignty of God. As all the important constituents of the democracy except popular sovereignty are not in contradiction with Islam, therefore, charging those participating in democratic process of committing apostasy is misleading. The war being a ‘moral affair’ in Islam makes sharp distinction between the combatants and the non-combatants. Violence against the non-combatants is strictly condemned by the Prophet and his companions. Even in case of those against whom military jihad is sanctioned, the Sunnah of the salaf does not allow unhindered violence. It strictly prohibits torturing, treacherous and inhuman tactics like suicide bombings and desecration of the dead bodies even against enemies. Moreover, vengeance-based violence against enemy which sanctions killing of one who has not actually commit any offence in lieu of actual offender has no linkage with the conduct of the salaf. 240

Last but not the least, the counter-narrative rejects the narratives as espoused by the ‘apologists’ and the militants. The former fails to defend their so-called framework vis-a-vis the fundamentalists who cherish to revert to the early period of Islam. They are out rightly discredited for not taking the salafī traditions as their primary point of reference. The militants’ narrative is also rejected for being based upon misleading interpretations of the salafī traditions. The counter-narrative argues that militants’ claim to follow the salafī Islam has no substance at all. It is, rather based upon misleading interpretation of the salafī Islam. In this purview, this study leads to an argument that the militant narrative is devoid of any theological standing not only in modernist rather fundamentalist perspective as well.

241

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