THE VOLUNTEER DEFENCE CORPS

1940 - 1945

Graham Philpot

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts ( Research )

School of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

June 2016

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have begun, let alone finished, without the assistance and encouragement of many people. Firstly, I would like to thank Professor whose willingness to take on the role of my supervisor was much appreciated. I owe a great debt not only for his suggestion of the topic but also for his patience and invaluable advice when answering my numerous questions. As well, I would like to thank my co-supervisor, Associate Professor Eleanor Hancock, who took me on late in my thesis and whose guidance and useful suggestions made this thesis much improved. Without her assistance over the past year the final product would not have been possible.

Next, I would like to acknowledge the assistance offered me in the early stages of my thesis by the at the Australian Defence Force Academy Library, in particular Tobie Garrick and Felicita Carr. They were more than helpful in guiding me through the resources of the library and to assist me in obtaining the research articles I required to begin this journey. I would also like to thank the staff at the for their support and assistance in sourcing archival records. The office staff in the Humanities and Social Sciences School, especially Bernadette McDermott, Marilyn Anderson-Smith and Shirley Ramsey, were always ready to help and their efforts were very much valued.

The on-going support and interest offered by family and friends was greatly treasured and in particular I would like to thank Samuel, Stephen, Brad and Angela. It would be remiss of me not to mention my friends in the hockey team. All people mentioned were always ready to listen to my seemly endless prattle about one aspect or another of the thesis.

Finally, my main thanks belong to my wife who unfortunately became a researcher’s widow for the life of my thesis. Her patience, understanding and tolerance with the interminable piles of books, notes and all-round mess were beyond measure. Without her love and support I could not finished, or even commenced, this thesis.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Glossary

Introduction 1

Chapter 1 Origins of the Volunteer Defence Corps 14

Chapter 2 RSL-Volunteer Defence Corps: July 1940 - May 1941 48

Chapter 3 A Defined Role for the Corps: May 1941 – December 1942 81

Chapter 4 New Military Roles for the VDC, 1943 – 1945 113

Chapter 5 Political and Social Value of the VDC 1942 – 1945 139

Conclusion 167

Bibliography

Figures:

1.1 Volunteer Defence Corps marching before the issuing of uniforms 5

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Introduction

There is a long tradition of training citizens for service in part-time military forces in . For over one hundred and fifty years, since volunteer units were raised to defend , and during the Crimea War, the tradition has continued.1 The Second World War, unlike the previous world war, brought the battlefront to the very doorstep of the Australian mainland and had a profound impact on its political, military and social establishments.

The identification of Japan as a possible aggressor to Australia had arisen as early as 1905 after the Japanese fleet had inflicted a crushing defeat on the Russian fleet at Tsushima. After 1905, the British redeployed the Royal Navy battleships to meet the growing German threat but this resulted in having only cruisers, a smaller and faster ship with a greater range but much less heavily armed, deployed on the China Station.2 This belief of Australia’s being vulnerable to attack was further strengthened with the distribution of the northern German island colonies in the Pacific to Japan following the First World War, creating the perception of Japan becoming ‘near neighbours rather than distant cousins’.3 The Australian military and political establishments believed the speed and ease of the German victory over France in 1940 would lead Japan to enter the Second World War. Japan’s subsequent entry into the conflict in December 1941 and its successful rapid advance through south-east Asia brought the war to the forefront of the Australian consciousness. Since the majority of the , the 2nd Australian Imperial Force (AIF), was serving in the Middle East, the question of the defence of the nation fast became

1 T. (Tom) B. Millar, ‘Citizen Army, Reserve or Saturday Soldiers?’, Quadrant, Vol. 19, No. 5, August 1975, p.35. 2 The redistribution meant there were nine battleships in the Mediterranean, twenty-four with the Channel and Atlantic fleets but significantly none on the China Station. Previously, seventeen battleships had been deployed in the Mediterranean and China Stations, George Boyce (ed.), The Crisis of British Power: The Imperial and Naval Papers of the Second Earl of Shelbourne 1905-1910, Historian Press, London, 1990, pp.184- 190. Also, the rise of American naval power in the Western Hemisphere meant the British could release battleships from that region to fortify its presence elsewhere. 3 Albert Palazzo, ‘The Overlooked Mission: Australia and Home Defence’ in Peter J. Dean (ed.) Australia in 1942: In the Shadow of War. Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2012, p.54.

1 a pressing issue.4 The threat of an invasion reached its zenith in the six-week period following the fall of on 15 February 1942, a threat that was unique in Australian history, and fear gripped the Australian public.5 Nonetheless, recent literature demonstrates the Japanese military had not drawn up any significant plans for an invasion of the Australian mainland as they considered other regions possessed greater strategic importance.6

After several years of consistent lobbying by the Returned Sailors’, Soldiers’ & Airman’s Imperial League of Australia, the establishment of a Returned Services League Volunteer Defence Corps (RSL-VDC), as part of the reconstituted army reserves, was authorised by the Government in July 1940. For ease of reference, the term RSL will be used throughout this thesis irrespective of its name at the corresponding time. The original Returned Sailors’ & Soldiers’ Imperial League of Australia had been formed in 1916 but altered its name in 1940 to include the growing air force component of the military forces, becoming the Returned Sailors’, Soldiers’ & Airmen’s Imperial League of Australia. This was the official name of the organisation at the time the RSL-VDC was established. The current and most widely recognisable name, the Returned Services League (RSL), was adopted in 1966.7 Initially, the RSL-VDC was to consist solely of men who had seen overseas service in the First World War. In light of the swiftness of the German victories in France and the Low Countries, the RSL had intensified its lobbying for its members to play some, as yet undefined, role in home defence. became the new Prime Minister on the death of Prime Minister in April 1939 and while the Menzies government did

4 , ‘Defending Australia in 1942’, War & Society, Vol. 11, No.1, May 1993, p.2. At the end of December 1941, Australia had three divisions serving overseas, the 6th, 7th and 9th, fighting under British command in the Middle East with two brigades of the stationed in Malaya while the third brigade was stationed in Darwin. 5 Michael McKernan, All In! Australia in the Second World War, Thomas Nelson, Melbourne, 1983, p.130. McKernan quotes the Daily Telegraph, a Sydney newspaper, which conducted a survey in late February 1942 and reported that fifty-four per cent of the respondents thought the Japanese would invade, though the size of the survey was not given. If a survey had been conducted in northern , it would have most probably been a greater percentage due to its closeness to New Guinea. 6 For greater detail see Peter Stanley, Invading Australia: Japan and the Battle for Australia 1942, Viking, Victoria, 2008. For a Japanese perspective, see Hiroyuki Shindo, ‘The Japanese Army’s ‘Unplanned’ South Pacific Campaign’, Peter J. Dean (ed.) Australia in 1942: In the Shadow of War, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2012. 7 ‘Returned Sailors’, Soldiers’ & Airmen’s Imperial League of Australia’, 2011, Trove, viewed 16 November 2015, http://nla.gov.au/nla.party-618002>

2 not fully support the formation of such an organisation as the RSL-VDC, the political circumstances at the time facilitated the RSL’s push for a role in home defence. At this stage of the war, the RSL-VDC were authorised to act only as a source of personnel for the other two classifications within the army reserve force, Class “A” and Class “B”. Significantly, the RSL-VDC was given no specific military role or government assistance. By its very nature, this structure was not fit for purpose and soon proved to be unworkable.

An initial military role was specified for the VDC after its incorporation into the army in May 1941 in view of the increasing likelihood of Japan entering the war. As control of the organisation was transferred from the RSL to the army, the prefix RSL was removed from the Corps’ name. Its allotted role was the provision of static defence for key points in each unit’s local area which included such duties as coast watching and the defence of aerodromes. At this time, there was a common belief amongst senior military personnel that the voluntary and part-time VDC was only a competitor for the scant military resources available. In fact, there was a definite undercurrent of hostility within the Army: the VDC units were merely tolerated and seen as a ‘nuisance from a Defence point of view only being given official recognition under pressure.’8 As the war progressed, however, the roles assigned to the VDC involved more than the provision of static defence. Indeed, the VDC underwent several transformations throughout its five year existence as its military and political usefulness changed.

The RSL controlled the VDC until May 1941 when it was transferred to the Citizen Military Force and was organised, controlled and administered by the Military Board. This brought the organisation under military authority and meant that it was duly integrated into home defence. By this stage of the war, when the German assault on Russia was providing an endless supply of disheartening headlines, the entry of Japan into the war seemed inevitable. As the strategic position of the Allies in the Pacific worsened with Japan sweeping all before them heading southward, the threat of an invasion became real. The

8 Letter from the Commanding Officer 1st Cavalry Division, - John.Dalyell. Richardson to Eastern Command 17 October 1941, AWM 193, 203.

3 determination of the population to resist an invasion on home soil, using all and any means, was fortified by the detailing of the exploits of Russian partisans against the all-conquering German Wehrmacht. The popular media promotion of their actions spawned a number of civilian splinter groups wishing to copy their guerrilla feats against the German invader.9 Indeed, it is easy to understand the increasing alarm of the population, particularly those people living in the northern parts of Australia, in the face of the advancing threat. The government actively promoted the VDC as the organisation to join for men wishing to contribute to the defence of the Australian homeland. Such was the government’s success that in December 1942, despite the threat of an invasion abating, the government announced an increase in the establishment of the VDC to accommodate the surge of volunteers wishing to join. The Minister for the Army, , was of the opinion that the work of the VDC was ‘setting an example of service that stiffens to a very great extent the general public’s determination to get on with its wartime job’.10 The government was urging the public to see themselves ‘in the second line of service to Australia, immediately behind the frontline.’11 Importantly though, the increase was against the advice given by the Commander-in-Chief Australian Military Forces, General Sir , who saw ‘no military necessity’ in any further increase.12 The military role of the VDC in the defence of Australia transformed with the likelihood of an invasion diminishing but began to take on a greater socio-political value.

This thesis will not focus exclusively on the military role played by the Volunteer Defence Corps during the Second World War. As noteworthy as the military role was, this thesis will also examine the political and social dimensions of the Corps and investigate the factors that shaped these contributions made by the organisation to the Australian war effort. Up to this point, the focus of scholarly attention has been on the military campaigns

9 For pamphlets urging the general population to undertake partisan action and discussing the execution of such action see Ion Idriess, The Australian Guerrilla, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1942 and Rupert Lockwood, Guerrilla Paths to Freedom, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1942. 10 Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, Australian War Memorial, , 1970 p.64. Frank Forde was the member for Capricornia, a Federal parliamentary seat in Queensland so the statement might have a degree of political value for his political constituency, which was closer to the Japanese, as well as appealing to the nation. 11 Michael McKernan, The Strength of a Nation: six years of Australians fighting for the nation and defending the home front in WWII, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2008, p.361. 12 Letter from Blamey to the Minister for the Army, Frank Forde, 13 October 1942, NAA A2671, 491/1942.

4 and, in particular, the battles in which Australia participated, either on land, sea or in the air, or the social aspects of Australian wartime society.13 The Volunteer Defence Corps has been the least studied component of the home defence forces in the annals of Australian military historiography despite the clear military, social and political value that can be accredited to the Corps during the Second World War.

Figure 1.1: Volunteer Defence Corps marching before the issuing of uniforms (AWM P02018.087)

The photograph of elderly men dressed in suits and hats, marching with a certain degree of military precision, and shouldering their rifles [Figure 1.1 above] gives a misleading impression of the actual role played by the Corps. Arguable, this image has been reinforced by the long running and hugely popular BBC comedy series titled Dad’s Army’, centred on fictional characters of the British Home Guard. Ironically, if not for the British television series it is possible there would be little recognition of the existence of a home guard let alone an Australian home guard. The picture, together with other pictures of similar images, provide only a small insight into the real purpose of the organisation but was widely used in the print media to illustrate patriotic male civilians all pitching in to ‘do their bit’.14 In reality, the photograph most likely catches the early stages of the organisation with the men giving the appearance they did not consider themselves old men ‘playing soldier’.

13 For an example of a military battle study see Craig Stockings, Bardia: myth, reality and the heirs of Anzac, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2009, for a general overview on the home front see Michael McKernan, ‘All In!: Australia during the Second World War. 14 For examples see The Mail, 29 June 1940, p.17; The Age, 21 October 1940, p.9; The Age, 26 January 1942.

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Current academic research in the field omits any detailed analysis of the VDC, relegating it to the backwaters of Australian military history. This thesis will provide the first detailed account of the organisation by examining the political, military and social roles placed upon it and identifying the factors that led to the modification of these roles over its lifespan. This analysis will enable an evaluation of the contribution by the VDC to the Australian war effort.

A review of the literature reveals that the VDC has been largely ignored by military and social historians. The first category of historical literature relating to the VDC is that of the official histories. In the first volume in The Official Histories of Australia in the War of 1939-1945 Series One, To , provided a brief overview of the formation of the VDC and added that the ‘later history of the VDC will told in Vol. V of the series.’15 In the fifth volume, South-west Pacific Area - First Year, Dudley McCarthy only gave several pages to the inception of the VDC, in marginally greater detail than Long, while overlooking any other aspects of its contribution to the war effort.16 In The Government and the People, 1942-1945, Paul Hasluck briefly discussed the VDC, in conjunction with the short-lived People’s Army of 1942, while summarising the establishment and military roles of the VDC. Hasluck did not address any political aspects of its role and its social impact on Australian communities.17 The official histories, because of their nature and broad scope, lack any notable level of depth in assessing the reasons for establishing the organisation or of the various roles performed by the VDC during wartime. In light of the lack of any substantive examination of the VDC in the official histories, the Australian War Memorial publication, On Guard, has taken on an undeserved degree of significance. On Guard was published one year before the disbandment of the VDC in 1945 and consisted of a series of personal anecdotes and poems, primarily contributed by members of the VDC, in addition to a short summary of its history and administration. This gave the publication a striking resemblance to C.E.W. Bean’s iconic The Anzac Book printed in 1916 which concerned itself with the . It also contained a brief subjective history of the formation of the VDC.

15 Gavin Long, To Benghazi Series 1 Vol. 1, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952, p. 87. 16 Dudley McCarthy, South-west Pacific Area - First Year, Series 1, Vol. V, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1959, pp.2-4. 17 Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, pp.61-64.

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On Guard provides a history of the VDC only up to its publication date and has seemingly been conferred a position as an official reference, a position that is not warranted.18

The second body of literature concerning the VDC consists of academic works which usually examine one or more aspects of the VDC. Albert Palazzo, in The Australian Army, supplies a short summary of the role and organisational structure of the VDC and summarises its role as Deny, Delay, and Protect.19 Palazzo provides a brief outline of its history interspersed with examples of the experiences of the local battalions of VDC. In his work, For Hearths and Homes, Craig Wilcox focuses on the history of citizen soldiering from 1854 until the end of the Second World War. Wilcox does examine the VDC in greater depth and, as well, presents a short overview of the origins and duties of the VDC contrasting their origins with the formation of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles. He also outlines the relationship between the government and the VDC in regard to the citizen-led People’s Army that sparked into life in early 1942.20 Nonetheless, the book overlooks, in any depth, the social and political aspects of the Corps. Gerry Kristianson in The Politics of Patriotism is solely concerned with the VDC as an example of the political lobbying activities of the R.S.L. Any passing reference given to the Volunteer Defence Corps are associated with the political manoeuvring leading up to the establishment of the organisation. While the military and social aspects are overlooked, this oversight is understandable given the focus of the work.21 The Black Diggers, authored by Robert Hall, highlights the discrimination against the Aborigines in the Australian military forces during the Second World War.22 Any mention of the VDC only occurs in the wider context of discrimination that was displayed throughout

18 On Guard with the Volunteer Defence Corps, Australian War Memorial for the Volunteer Defence Corps, Canberra, 1944. For the referencing, see McCarthy, South-west Pacific Area - First Year, p.3. It is also used as a reference in numerous works; see for example Peter Sekuless and Jacqueline Rees, Lest We Forget: History of the Returned Services League 1916-1986, Rigby Publications, Sydney, 1986. C.E.W. Bean’s The Anzac Book was first published in 1916 and consisted of contributions from a number of sources, mostly members of the A.I.F., who fought at Gallipoli. 19 Albert Palazzo, The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001, Oxford university Press, Melbourne, 2001, pp.186-188. 20 Craig Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998, pp.125-144. For a more complete history of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles see Ian Downs, The New Guinea Volunteer Rifles, Pacific Press, Queensland, 1999. 21 G (Gerry). L. Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1966, pp.44-85. 22 Robert Hall, The Black Diggers: Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders during the Second World War, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 1997.

7 the Australian military forces in the Second World War. By far, Wilcox and Palazzo provide the most detailed account of the VDC but both fail to present any insight into the various roles of the VDC. This thesis will fill the absence of any comprehensive analysis of the VDC in the existing academic literature.

The third body of literature relates to the general military in the Second World War. This body of literature discusses mainly the military roles performed by the VDC, although in most cases the VDC makes only a brief cameo appearance. These works fall into two categories. The first category is those studying the involvement of the VDC in a particular military action. For example, there have been several studies of the bombing of the coastal communities in Northern Australia, especially the towns of Darwin and Broome. In the Shadow’s Edge, Alan Powell considers principally the military strategies in the northern region of Australia but, however, only briefly refers to the VDC prior and during the attack on Darwin.23 The second category studies the use of the VDC in an accessory role for special operation groups such as the North Australia Observer Unit.24 The fear of a Japanese invasion of the vast northern areas of Australia led to many reports of sightings of the Japanese landing in Australia. Occasionally, the VDC was involved in an auxiliary role to assist in the investigations of any reported enemy sightings in addition to conducting coastal surveillance in their own right. The most frequent investigation examined is known as the ‘Gulf Scare’ where there were reported sightings of Japanese troops landing in the Gulf of Carpentaria but, once again, the VDC is only mentioned in passing.25 In fact, in some military history accounts the VDC is not referred to at all despite the valuable and important roles they had played.26

23 Alan Powell, The Shadow’s Edge: Australia’s Northern War, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988, specifically p.39, pp.97-98 and pp.255-256. 24 The North Australia Observer Unit (NAOU) was formed to conduct extended reconnaissance patrols over the northern region of Australia. For great detail of their activities see Amoury Vane, North Australia Observer Unit, Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 2000. 25 Richard Walker and Helen Walker, Curtin’s Cowboys: Australia’s Secret Bush Commandos, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1986, pp.152-158 and Vane, North Australia Observer Unit, pp.97-100. 26 For examples, see Frank Alcorta, Australia’s Frontline: The Northern Territory’s War, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1991, Richard Connaughton, Shrouded Secrets: Japan’s War on Mainland Australia 1942-1944, Brassey’s, London, 1994, Noel Hill, Expose!: a history of searchlights in World War Two, Boolarong Publications, Queensland, 1993, Colin Southall, The Defence of Lithgow, Lithgow Council, Lithgow, 1995, Ronald Donald, Fort Bribie, Bribie Island RSL, Queensland, 1995.

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The fourth, and by far the largest, body of literature falls into the category of popular social history of the war years, embracing a more social and community dimension than the previous categories. These works usually rely on personal recollections and reminiscences and, in certain cases, rely heavily on the newspaper articles of the time. This body of literature will be reviewed under three regional sections: national, state or local. The literature in the first section deals with a nationwide overview of Australia during the Second World War. There are numerous works in this section with each work including a collection of remembrances of people who had either a direct or indirect association with the VDC. The reliance on personal recollections for VDC activities is highlighted in Daniel Connell’s book, The War at Home, where the index consists solely of a list of the individual contributors of the recollections.27 Michael McKernan, in his work All In!, offers a passing overview of the VDC but, significantly, equal space is bestowed to the ephemeral People’s Army.28 The second section has a focus on the state histories of the wartime communities and again relies heavily on the recollections of people or, as in one case, only the newspaper articles published during the war.29 The VDC is mentioned only when it is contained in the recollections of the contributors. The third section consists of local battalion histories which contain mostly articles by former members relating the happenings within the individual unit during its existence and sometimes touching on the battalion’s involvement of the community in which the local VDC unit was raised. These histories are written by ex- members of the VDC or authors with an interest in the local history of their community.30 The absence of any major scholastic research concerning the VDC has encouraged the advent of novels incorporating the invasion of Australia and the subsequent exploits of

27 Daniel Connell, The War at Home, ABC Books, Sydney, 1988. 28 McKernan, ‘All In!: Australia during the Second World War. Mckernan uses four newspapers, The Age, Sydney Morning Herald, Daily Telegraph and the news magazine The Bulletin. For several further examples of national perspective see Joan Beaumont (ed.), Australia’s War 1939-1945, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996; Joanna Penglase and David Horner, When the War Came to Australia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992. 29 For examples of the individual states see Jennifer Gregory, One the Homefront: Western Australia and World War II, University of Western Australia, , 1996, Kate Darian-Smith, On the Home Front: Melbourne in Wartime 1939-1945, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1990, Libby Connors et al, Australia’s Frontline: Remembering the 1939-45 War, University of Queensland Press, , 1992. For the compilation of newspaper articles, see Andrew Bolt, Our Home Front 1939-1945, Wilkinson Books, Melbourne, 1995. This is a collection of newspaper articles printed in The Sun or The Herald newspapers of Melbourne during the war. 30 For examples of individual battalion histories see Paul de Pierres, Wheatbelt Warriors: the story of the 15th (W.A.) Battalion Volunteer Defence Corps, 1993, The Green Hornets: The Story of the 7th Battalion Volunteer Defence Corps, Publication Committee, Sydney, 1946.

9 characters, having a natural fighting ability and expertise in bushcraft, resisting the invasion as the basis for their plots.31 The volume and range of popular histories available indicates the degree of engagement the public had on a personal level with a war that had come to Australia’s doorstep for the first time in its history.

Military and social historians have largely ignored the VDC with no body of the literature examining the VDC in any significant depth. Interest in the VDC as a subject in Australia’s military historiography of the Second World War has been, at best, only in a passing nature generally receiving only a bare minimum of scholarly research or an incidental mention. Once trained, whilst not equal in quality to frontline troops, the VDC was of importance to the Australian war effort. Its neglect is undeserved and the absence of any serious scholastic assessment needs to be addressed. Indeed, the VDC reached a membership of approximately 100,000 at its peak in December 1942, arguably when the threat of Japanese invasion had receded. In this context, this thesis will investigate the initial reasons for formation of such a force and provide an examination and assessment of the political, military and social roles of the VDC utilising the primary sources of national and state archives augmented with a wide range of secondary sources of written works and journal articles, thereby filling the existing gap concerning the VDC in the historiographical record of Australia.

The thesis will be structured predominantly in chronological order with the first four chapters linking the initial political factors for the establishment of a home defence reserve and proceed to an examination of the military relevance of the Corps until its eventual disbandment in 1945. The fifth chapter will have a thematic basis examining the political usefulness and the social importance of the VDC within their local communities in which they served during the last three years of the war. This structure has been undertaken in order to analyse certain political and social aspects of the organisation that spanned the

31 John Hay, The Invasion, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1968. The plot is predicated on Australia being invaded by an army of a fictitious South East Asian Republic. In John Hooker, The Bush Soldiers, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998 Australia has been invaded, this time by the Japanese, with the leading characters being members of a retreating VDC and their fulfilment of their duties of a scorched earth policy.

10 time frames of the previous chapters. The conclusion will provide an evaluation of the contribution of the VDC to the Australian war effort. The originality of my thesis lies in the absence of any previous analytical research in examining the VDC and fills the void that exists in the current body of knowledge. Chapter One will present a brief overview of the domestic political climate in the years prior to the formation of the VDC. This is essential to understand the factors that led to the government eventually succumbing to political pressure and authorising the formation of a home defence reserve involving the Returned Services League. This will allow an insight into the reasons behind the government decision to allow a non-government organisation, though arguably a strong and politically like- minded lobby group, such as the RSL complete control of a body of men undergoing military training. Why did the government take this course and run the risk of authorising a private army?

Chapter Two of the thesis will detail the administrative and organisational structure of the newly formed RSL-VDC and its role as an ancillary part of the reconstituted Australian Army Reserve. As agreed with the government on its formation, the RSL-VDC was supported financially and materially, and controlled, solely by the RSL. This chapter will investigate a number of the unique difficulties that these restrictions presented, in particular on the aspects of its military structure, rate of recruitment, eligibility of recruits, size of the force, training, supply of uniforms and weapons and its relationship with the militia. The focus, therefore, will be on the military value and role of the organisation in the defence of Australia before May 1941, a time when the majority of Australian resources were being diverted to the 2nd Australian Imperial Forces (AIF) fighting overseas. As well, the realisation that the Corps was not meeting the expectations of the organisation or the volunteers will be discussed.

Chapter Three will examine the evolution of the Corps from May 1941 to the end of 1942. This chapter will consist of two sections. The first section will deal with the incorporation of the Corps into the army. The deterioration of the Allied strategic position at this stage of the war forced Australia to reassess its home defence plans and the role that

11 the newly re-named VDC would play. This chapter will detail the changes made to the Corps after it was placed under military control and given defined tasks in home defence. The second section will examine the further modifications undertaken by the VDC after Japan’s entrance into the war and the growing anxiety of Australia coming under the threat of attack. The aim of this section is to examine the military role of the VDC as the Japanese launched air attacks on the Australian mainland and increased the perception of an imminent invasion. Various aspects relating to the increase in recruitment set by the government, training and supply of equipment and the difficulties encountered merging a voluntary part-time organisation into a full-time army will be considered. The chapter will finish at the end of 1942 when Australia began to re-evaluate the nature of its war effort.

Chapter Four will discuss the transformation in the military role of the VDC from 1943 till 1945, after the threat of invasion had passed and the Australian government attempted to juggle the political-economic problems of meeting its war production targets in supplying goods to the Allied armies and maintaining an effective military force from the beginning of 1943 till the end of the war. Examination of the new roles assigned to the VDC to free up personnel for more active duty will be conducted and include a discussion of the implications on the VDC of the improving strategic Allied situation. This will involve such aspects as the placement on reserve of all rural units, the difficulties of supplying the required manpower for these new roles and will also briefly examine the military actions undertaken by the VDC. The chapter will conclude with the disbandment of the entire organisation in August 1945.

The final chapter will discuss the political and social importance of the VDC. The government used the VDC as a vehicle to support the Menzies’ government political catch cry of ‘All In’. The utilisation of the VDC to counter the rise of home defence splinter groups in early 1942 as well as addressing the ongoing manpower shortages and the raising of public morale will be discussed. Various aspects of the social impact of the VDC will be investigated including its relationship within its community, the importance of the VDC to the community, the amount of time and support given to the VDC by the community and the extent it upheld the ‘national morale’ during wartime. There will also be an examination

12 of racial issues within the VDC and whether this was a reflection of the racial values of society at the time or the result of a military directive. As well, it will include an analysis of the political and economic importance of offering an opportunity for men to serve in a military capacity that still allowed then to remain employed in vital war production, an area that was rapidly gaining increased importance for the government, will be addressed.

Concluding the thesis will be an assessment of the overall importance of the contribution made by the VDC to the Australian war effort. The assessment will examine the three roles of the VDC and determine which of its roles, political, military, or social, was of the greatest importance or whether the true value of the VDC lay in the synergy of all its roles. The conclusion will determine whether the VDC was an integral part of the Home Defence or merely a reserve of concerned citizens with a pent up enthusiasm to contribute to the defence of Australia.

The Second World War brought the battlefront to the shores of the Australian nation and created a situation unparalleled in Australian history. This circumstance produced a galvanizing effect on all tiers of Australian society. It was the nation’s first experience of ‘total war’. The VDC had begun its existence before Australia came under any direct threat and transformed itself to become the vehicle for men who could not serve in the military, for a variety of reasons, but still wished to contribute to the war effort on a military level. The members of the VDC willingly gave up their time and energy showing a resolute determination to contribute to Australia’s defence. The historical record contains no comprehensive examination or assessment of the contribution made by the VDC to the war effort or the defence of Australia. My thesis will address the lack of scholarship of the VDC and focus on the political, military and social impact of the VDC during the Second World War.

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Chapter One

Origins of the Volunteer Defence Corps

‘It is my melancholy duty to inform you officially that, in consequence of a persistence by Germany in her invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared war upon her and that, as a result, Australia is also at war.’32 With these words on 3 September 1939 the Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, announced Australia had joined Britain and entered the Second World War. Within ten months of entering the war, in a step taken in part to quell the growing calls for a home defence force, the Government had authorised the formation of a voluntary Australian Army Reserve. After many months, in some ways even years, of persistent pressuring and despite the war being fought far from Australian shores, the government granted authorisation for a non-government organisation, the Returned Services League (RSL), to organise and have control of a section of the re-constituted reserve force. This chapter examines the factors that led to the establishment of a home defence force during this relatively early stage of Australia’s involvement in the Second World War. It does so through an analysis of Australian security dilemmas and fears based on geo-strategic factors, international and domestic events. Additionally, the causes for an initial reluctance on the part of the government to authorise the establishment of a home defence reserve, and the dynamics which provided the impetus eventually to overcome this hesitancy, will be examined. Important questions and factors to be considered in this regard include the perceived need for such a force at a military and political level, the impact of the experience of ‘private armies’ of the 1930s, the political influence exerted by the RSL, the unfolding strategic situation of the war and Prime Minister Robert Menzies’s political difficulties at the time. Once the Returned Services League-Volunteer Defence Corps was established, the precedence given to equipping Australian Imperial Force divisions soon made it clear that RSL-VDC effectiveness as a reserve would be very limited. The force needed a meaningful role in home defence to ensure its legitimacy and relevance.

32 Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1965, p.152.

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For many decades Australia’s defence concerns dwelt on the fear that unnamed ‘Asiatic hordes’ would be tempted to sweep down and overrun the predominately white British population. So entrenched was this theme that it permeated not only official discourse but popular culture as well.33 Attention focussed on the vastness of the northern region of Australia and combined with the sparseness of white settlement created the perception of a perpetual defence problem. There had been numerous unsuccessful attempts to increase settlement of ‘white’ people in the region to counter the ostensible ‘Yellow Peril’ lying just over the horizon.34 After Federation, the introduction of the so-called White Australia policy was itself for home defence as much as an immigration policy. The influx of Asian workers to the goldfields, of foreign labourers on the Queensland sugar cane fields and in the pearling industry in north-western Australia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries only strengthened the fear.35 Japan had been an ally in the First World War and in 1919 received a mandate over Germany’s northern island colonies in the Pacific Ocean for assisting Britain in assuring security in the Pacific Ocean. Yet such an alliance had been engineered in Britain, and was resented in Australia.36 With the ratification of the Australian mandate over German New Guinea, the impact of the decision meant Australian and Japanese territorial waters bordered each other near the equator. The geographical closeness of these islands to the Australian mainland caused unease since it presented the possibility of Japan using them as a springboard for any aggressive act against Australia.

33 For example, Kenneth Mackay, The Yellow Wave: A Romance of the Asiatic Invasion of Australia, Richard Bentley, London, 1897. The basic scenario of Mackay’s penultimate novel is that Britain’s attention and military focus was diverted by a Russian attack on India thus leaving Australia defenceless and wide open to invasion. The subsequent invasion was undertaken by ‘asian Mongols’ under Russian command. Also see Augustine Meaher IV, ‘Radical nationalists and Australian invasion novels’, in Craig Stockings and John Connor (eds.), Before the Anzac Dawn: A Military History of Australia to 1915, NSW New South Publishing, Sydney, 2013. Meagher examines several invasion novels in the context of Australian nationalism. They contain the recurring theme of Australia being invaded by mainly ‘asian hordes’ while Britain is preoccupied and the local Australian men rising to task of defying the attackers. 34 Paul Twomey, ‘Munich’ in Carl Bridge (ed.) Munich to Vietnam: Australia’s Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1991, p.12. 35 Pam Oliver, Empty North: The Japanese Presence and Australian Reactions 1860s to 1942, Charles Darwin University Press, Darwin, 2006. Oliver questions the negative image of the Japanese in regard to the Northern Territory. She illustrates the positive influence the Japanese had in the Territory and argues that their depiction as invading hordes is false and undeserved. 36 Robert Thornton, ‘Invaluable ally or imminent aggressor? Australia and Japanese naval assistance, 1914-18’, Journal of Australian Studies, Vol. 12, 1983, p.14.

15

However the British government, with much more global concerns, was dismissive of Australian misgivings.37

Australian defence strategy during the interwar years was predicated on Imperial defence and the ‘’ which relied upon the automatic deployment of a powerful Royal Navy fleet to Singapore if hostilities, threatening Australia, broke out in the Far East. Nonetheless, in spite of the protection offered by Imperial defence, continuing anxieties produced regular defence assessments from successive governments during the 1920s and 1930s.38 In 1920, the Australian Chiefs of Staff issued a report identifying Japan as the primary potential threat to Australian security.39 In a dissenting report, the Director of the Pacific Branch and Foreign Affairs Section of the Prime Minister’s Department, Edmund Piesse, concluded that ‘though Japan loomed large in Australia’s outlook on the world, Australia was of peripheral importance to Japan.’40 The Australian Prime Minister William Hughes, who had spiritedly argued at the post-war Versailles Conference in 1919 against Japan’s proposal to enshrine racial equality in the Covenant of the League of Nations, disregarded Piesse’s report, firmly convinced Japan remained the most likely threat to Australian security.41 The reliance on Imperial defence for the security of Australia was restated at the Imperial Conference in 1923. Fully aware of the absence of any adequate ability on the part of Australia to defend itself from a serious aggressor, the Australian Prime Minister , stated before the Imperial Conference ‘We can only defend this country if we are inside the Empire.’42 Further, in keeping with Australia’s defence shortcomings, Fredrick Shedden, Secretary of the Defence Committee, in a 1929 report

37 Thornton, ‘Invaluable ally or imminent aggressor? Australia and Japanese Naval Assistance, 1914-18’, p.14. 38 Jeffrey Grey, A Military history of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2008, pp.123-128. 39 Anthony Burke, Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2008, p.63. 40 Neville Meaney, Fears and Phobias: E.L. Piesse and the Problem of Japan 1909-39, National Library of Australia, Canberra, 1996, p.60. See Pamela Oliver, Empty North: The Japanese Presence and Australian Reactions 1860s to 1942, Charles Darwin University Press, Darwin, 2006, p.190. Oliver also believes Japanese importance to Australia was far more significant than Australia’s importance to Japan. Also see Henry Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1991. Frei gives an account of Japanese attitudes and intentions towards Australia prior to the outbreak of war. 41 In fact, after the Versailles conference Piesse believed Hughes had simply antagonised the Japanese in his justification of the White Australia policy to no good purpose, David Day, ‘The White Australia Policy’, in Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (eds.), Between Empire and Nation, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2000, p.43. 42 Burke, Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety, p.54.

16 identified that Australia’s large area and small population prevented its successful defence against a major power.43

The emergence of Japanese aggression in Manchuria, Korea and China throughout the 1930s, however, provided reasons for Piesse to reassess his original position on Japanese intentions. Piesse’s revised position argued that Australia should not place any value in British assurances that it would send a fleet to the Far East and the nation should undertake preparations for defending its homeland against invasion.44 Moreover, Australia’s defence forces underwent another assessment in 1932 resulting in the Scullin government concluding the nation was defenceless.45 The degree of concern about Australia’s ability to defend itself was demonstrated when yet another defence report was produced by Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence. He arrived in Australia in late 1934 with the objective of advising the Australian government on defence issues. The forthcoming recommendation was a reduction in the size of the army due to the protection offered by the British Naval base at Singapore.46 The connecting thread of these defence reports conducted during the interwar years was the search for the most effective strategy for homeland defence and, albeit unsuccessfully, to allay the underlying background fear of invasion felt by the government and the people.47

Australia’s geographical location south of Asia and its reliance on Britain were always key considerations in Australian defence strategy. The primary pillar of defence strategy was British sea power, but this too was being questioned in the 1920s and early 1930s by an

43 David Horner, Defence Supremo Sir Frederick Shedden and the making of Australian defence policy, Allen & Unwin, 2000, p.33. 44 Meaney, Fears and Phobias: E.L. Piesse and the Problem of Japan 1909-39, p.60. 45 Margot Simington, ‘The Southwest Pacific Islands in Australian Interwar Defence Planning’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 1977, p.175. 46 Brett Lodge, Lavarack: Rival General, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988, p. 34. 47 For a fuller discussion, see Augustine Meaher IV, The Road to Singapore: A Myth of British Betrayal, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2010. Meaher believes that successive inter-war governments based Australia’s entire defence strategy on the presence or arrival of a British fleet at Singapore in the belief it absolved them of any responsibility for local defence. Also see John McCarthy, ‘Australia and Imperial Defence: Co-operation and Conflict 1918-1939’, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 1971, p.27.

17 increasing number of defence observers and criticism of the strategy began appearing. published an article in the Quarterly in 1933 which suggested it was questionable whether Britain would be able to dispatch the Royal Navy to Singapore if war broke out in the Far East, concurrently with a war in Europe, and called for an increase in the size of Australia’s land forces. Lavarack presciently argued that the Japanese, long recognised as Australia’s most likely threat, would attack in the Far East if or when the Royal Navy was preoccupied with events in Europe and unable or unwilling to send warships to the Far East.48

Compounding the concerns about the effectiveness of Australia’s defence capability were Imperial Japanese territorial ambitions and aggressive military policies during the 1930s. With few alternative policy options available, the Australian government chose conciliation with, and appeasement of, Japan.49 Japan’s expansion into southern China in mid-1937 further increased military concerns necessitating Australia to seek British reassurance on defence and appeasement.50 Nonetheless, in a world slowly emerging from the Depression and despite the growing alarm regarding Japanese military intentions, the level of Australian exports, particularly agricultural produce and minerals, to Japan meant that, by 1934, Australia supplied virtually all Japan’s requirements for wool and within two years this export alone paid for over a third of Australia’s interest payments.51 Japan’s economic importance at the time of its aggression in Asia produced a quandary for Australia. On one level, Japan was a vital trading partner for the economy but at another

48 Lodge, Lavarack: Rival General, Allen, p.34; T.(Thomas) B.(Bruce) Millar, Australia in Peace and War, 2nd ed., Maxwell Macmillan Publishing, Sydney, 1978, p.40. When Lavarack became Chief of the General Staff in 1935, succeeding Major-General Julius Henry Bruche, he campaigned to have the Australian defence policy move away from near total reliance on the Singapore strategy towards strengthening the army and air force to deter any possibility of invasion, Lodge, Lavarack, p.34. 49 Ritchie Ovendale, ‘Appeasement’, in Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (eds.), Between Empire and Nation, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2000, p.152. 50 Ovendale, ‘Appeasement’, pp.162-163. 51 Ian Nish, ‘Relations with Japan’, in Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (eds.), Between Empire and Nation, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2000, p.159; Burke, Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety, p.65. The amount of trade between Japan and Australia is significant in light of the Imperial Economic Conference held in Ottawa in 1932 which resulted in imperial preference in imports and exports between Britain and its dominions. For more detail see Tim Rooth, ‘Ottawa and After’ in Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (eds.), Between Empire and Nation, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2000, pp. 110-129.

18 level Japanese expansionist ambitions renewed the deep rooted suspicions of the country and its intentions.

Such was the Australian government’s commitment to the policy of appeasement, the nation ultimately earned the sobriquet, ‘home of appeasement’.52 Nevertheless, the policy split public opinion. One section of the public endorsed the policy calling for continuing friendship with Japan while diplomatically overlooking the nation’s overt military aggression. This section wanted Australia to remain indifferent to events occurring on the Asian mainland.53 On the other hand, others were committed to the principle that Japan needed to be held to account for its military expansionist actions in Asia. This conundrum of the economic benefit of trading with Japan verses the morality of Japanese aggression was clearly demonstrated in 1938 by the ban imposed by Port Kembla wharf workers on the loading of pig iron onto a ship bound for Japan. The waterside workers, maintaining the ban was political and not industrial, placed the ban in protest to the brutality of the Japanese armies in China and voiced concern that the pig iron would be returned to Australia in the form of bombs.54 The workers were supported by many Church and community leaders who expressed the view that ‘the sympathies of the greater part of the community are with the men on the waterfront’.55 The ban exposed the contradictory nature of government policy as it had previously placed an embargo on the Japanese development of an iron ore mine at Yampi Sound in north-western Australia, giving the shortage of adequate reserves of iron ore as the reason, but still allowed the export of the more valuable form of iron ore smelted as pig iron.56

52 Carl Bridge, ‘Poland to Pearl Harbor’, in Carl Bridge, Munich to Vietnam: Australia’s Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1991, p.43. 53 ‘Defence Inconsistencies’, The Canberra Times, 5th February, 1936, p.2. 54 Alan W. Martin, Robert Menzies: a life, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1993, p.251. 55 Martin, Robert Menzies: a life, p.252. Bishop Moyes of Armidale expressed that view reported in the Sydney Morning Herald, 6 December 1938. 56 For a detailed account of Japanese commercial interests in Australia at this time see William Purcell, ‘The nature and extent of Japanese commercial and economic interests in Australia 1932-41’, PhD Thesis, University of , 1980. The outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 caused a shortage of merchant shipping and Australia had difficulty in disposing of its goods to countries other than Japan as the majority of available shipping was Japanese. Australia continued trading with Japan up to July 1941.

19

Moreover, the paradoxical nature of the appeasement policy had, to a certain degree, bipartisan support. The Opposition Labor Leader, , stated in Parliament that he acknowledged the iron ore from Yampi Sound might be used to manufacture munitions but at the same time warned ‘that the economic solvency of Australia depends very largely upon the maintenance of our external trade.’57 Notwithstanding the inconsistency in the application of the policy, ultimately, the government had no wish to aggravate relations with Japan further and through the efforts of the Attorney-General Robert Menzies, eventually broke the ban.58

In debates about foreign policy, the RSL and some parliamentarians advocated preparation for war by the reintroduction of compulsory military training and forming a force of ex-servicemen to guard factories, bridges and other important installations likely to be sabotaged if war broke out.59 In Federal parliament, South Australian Country Party member, ex-serviceman and future party leader, Archie Cameron, raised questions on issues concerning the state of the army and urged the government to consider the introduction of compulsory training.60 In the press, as well, articles on defence policy began appearing stressing the need for a stronger Army for local security.61 On a broader level, Japanese aggression in China continued to reinforce the public fear of invasion throughout the early 1930s. The perception of Japan gaining momentum to drive south and posing a threat to Australia once more became a recurring theme of popular literature. The literature refreshed the earlier widely held ideas of the Japanese having ‘a wonderful system of espionage and [they] would know of any mines or submarines before attempting to land’.62

57 Jon White, ‘The Port Kembla Pig Iron Strike of 1938’, Labour History, Issue 37, November 1979, p.64. 58 Martin, Robert Menzies: a life, p.256. 59 Andrew Moore, ‘Retreads or Reactionaries?’ The ideological terrain of the Volunteer Defence Corps, 1940- 1945’, presented at the Australian War Memorial History Conference, 9-13 July, 1990, p.6; Gerry Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism, p.71. 60 Lodge, Lavarack, p. 56. Archie Cameron raised the proposal in Feb 1936. 61 Meaher IV, The Road to Singapore: A Myth of British Betrayal, p.91. A number of articles were written by Piesse after changing his belief in Japanese intentions, under the pseudonym of ‘Albatross’, and appeared in The Age and the Sydney Morning Herald in 1936. 62 See Arnold White, The Views of ‘Vanoc’: An Englishman’s Outlook (2nd ed.), The Musson Book , Toronto, 1910, p.400-405, A. K. Shearston-May, New Caledonia: a menace to White Australia : the remarkable colony of Japanese who have become Australia’s nearest neighbour, 1911, pp.117-122. Also see the Lone Hand, a monthly publication and offshoot of the Sydney Bulletin, and an avowed organ of Australian

20

It was popularly believed the Japanese could ‘dispatch of a raiding force of twelve thousand picked men to take the place without any Australians or any European Power being any the wiser.’63

In purely geo-strategic terms, there was no question that by the mid-1930s Japan had become an emerging power in Asia, triggering further military and political unease over its capabilities and intentions. The RSL had regularly added its voice to the ongoing debate on defence issues, having cultivated a privileged role in negotiating with governments, State and Federal, by claiming to be the sole voice representing the views of ex-servicemen. The organisation had developed a country wide network of branches delivering the capability to conduct national campaigns on issues it considered important.64 The branches formed the back-bone of the RSL assisting it to become a strong and highly influential lobbying group with all political parties during the 1920s and 1930s. The organisation keenly monitored defence issues and regularly wrote to the Government arguing for increased defence expenditure and protesting at any measure it considered hindered Australia’s military capability.65 In December 1935, the Minister for Defence Archdale Parkhill gave a major policy speech concentrating on the defence of Sydney, Newcastle, and Brisbane and the provision ‘for units whose function will be to deal with raids by landing parties’.66 In response, the RSL wrote a letter to the Minister questioning the absence of any mention of the defence of the northern regions of Australia. In reply, the Minister assured the RSL that the defence of ‘Northern Australia is prominently before the Government and its advisors.’67

nationalism. Commencing publication in 1907, Lone Hand gave considerable space to discussions of the presumed need for under-populated Australia to defend itself against the crowding hordes of Asia. 63 Pamela Oliver, Empty North: The Japanese Presence and Australian Reactions 1860s to 1942, Charles Darwin University Press, Darwin, 2006, p.4. See also Pam Oliver, ‘Interpreting Japanese Activities in Australia 1888- 1945’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, No. 36, May, 2002. In this article, Oliver substantiates her belief there was no major Japanese spy ring in Australia. At most, Oliver contends the Japanese had a very small spy ring in Australia from 1934 but this was active only around Sydney. 64 This aspect of the organisation was highlighted in the Official Year Book of 1937 published by the NSW branch of the R.S &S.I.L.A. The official League motto, as stated in the Year Book, was ‘The Price of Liberty is Eternal Vigilance.’ 65 For examples see Letter to the Prime Minister from the RSL General Secretary 20 April 1939, Letter to the Minister for Defence from the RSL General Secretary 13 December 1938, NAA A664, 449/401/527. 66 Paul Burns, The Controversy: Political Opportunism versus National Security, 1942-45, Allen & Unwin, 1998, p.13. 67 Burns, The Brisbane Line Controversy, p.15.

21

There was ongoing concern over homeland defence and the League, even from this early stage, aspired to play a leading role in the formation of any force to be used in that task.

As the 1930s unfolded, defence issues were taken more seriously by policymakers, defence figures and serious observers. By December 1938, many believed in the increasing prospect of war. Earlier in the year the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, wrote to the Australian Prime Minister, Joseph Lyons, confirming the dispatch of warships to the Far East in a time of conflict would be dependent on the situation in Europe. British Admiralty strategic thinking focussed on European commitments instead of Far East – and the Australians knew it. Australia could no longer rely on even the illusion that the Royal Navy would guarantee security for the mainland.68

Following Australia’s entry into the war against Germany in September 1939, and the initial German successes in Poland, the conflict went into a pause for the next eight months. The Phoney War was broken dramatically in April 1940 with the German invasion of Norway and later in May, with the invasion of Belgium and France.69 The Low Countries and France fell to German forces and, by the end of June 1940, Britain was preparing for the distinct possibility of an invasion. The Battle of Britain was about to commence. The British Legion, Britain’s equivalent to the RSL, was urging the War Office to establish Local Defence Units.70 In early 1940, the war in Europe had seemed very distant but the unfolding events presented a possible scenario Australia had long feared. With Britain under attack, it became even less likely that the Royal Navy would deploy any significant force to the Far East if Australia was threatened.71 Putting aside the announcement by Japan that she would remain neutral at the outbreak of the European war and British assurances to Australia that Japan would maintain her current friendly relations towards British Commonwealth

68 B. N(Neil). Primrose, ‘Equipment and Naval Policy 1919-42’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol.23, Issue 2, 1977, p.165. 69 Carl Bridge, ‘Poland to Pearl Harbor’, in Carl Bridge (ed.) Munich to Vietnam, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1991, p.42 70 S(Simon). P. Mackenzie, The Home Guard, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p.25. 71 David Horner, High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945, Australia War Memorial, Canberra, 1982, pp.55-59.

22 member countries, the German success in Europe had significantly increased the likelihood of Japan, long seen as the most likely threat to Australian security, entering the war.72 Italy entered the war against the Allies in June 1940 and the following September Japan signalled where her allegiances lay by signing the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Soon after the signing, Japan began taking steps to occupy all French Indochina, which at that time was under the control of Vichy France.73 As these events unfolded, fears of a possible invasion in Australia intensified with the mounting realisation that the Australian mainland itself might come under threat. As a consequence, the RSL through its Federal President began raising repeated, and often loud, calls for formation of a voluntary home defence force.74

As previously noted, the RSL had publicly and privately promoted the need for establishing a voluntary defence force for several years. Many returned soldiers of the First World War believed they had undergone a transition from ‘helpers in national defence’ to ‘guardians of the public good’, convinced their role was to be the guardians of the values of King and Country.75 Many considered they were the defenders of a British Australia and held a strong belief they had earned a special right to have their say in the direction of the country.76 Sekuless and Rees state the RSL upholds the view that the citizen soldier, by virtue of his service, has the right to speak out and be heard on any issue of concern, particularly those affecting the security of the nation at peace which he fought to protect in war.77 Indeed, the RSL Federal President, Sir Gilbert Dyett, stated in the League’s Official Year Book of 1937 that the ‘the policy and principles of the Returned Sailors’ Soldiers Imperial League of Australia [the name of the RSL at the time] are calculated to preserve the integrity and unity of our Empire, to safeguard the interests and promote the welfare of

72 Nish, ‘Relations with Japan’, p.164. 73 In September 1940, Vichy France agreed to Japanese demands to occupy Northern Indo-China as part of their war against the Chinese. In June 1941, Japan began occupying southern Indo-China. Weinberg considers this crucial decision gave an indication of Japan’s intentions as it pointed Japanese troops in the direction of the British and the Dutch possessions in the south and the Americans in the Pacific, Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms (2nd ed.),Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp.248-256. 74 Chris Coulthard-Clark, Soldiers in Politics: The Impact of the Military on Australian Political Life and Institutions, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996, p.176. 75 Coulthard-Clark, Soldiers in Politics, p.162. 76 Sekuless and Rees, Lest We Forget, p.3. 77 Sekuless and Rees, Lest We Forget, p.3.

23

Australia’.78 Such men were the driving force behind RSL agitation for a home guard in the mid-1930s and early 1940s.

Nonetheless, it is necessary to note that the RSL did not speak for the majority of ex- servicemen. The organisation reached 150,000 members immediately following the First World War, slightly under half of all returned servicemen.79 This membership figure had decreased rapidly by 1924 to only nine per cent, thought by some to be due to its close association with the Nationalist government.80 The membership slowly grew throughout the following years and by the outbreak of the Second World War sat at slightly fewer than twenty-five per cent of returned men.81 The League claimed to be non-political, but in fact advocated conservative political views. Though the political influence of the RSL far outweighed the weight of its membership, it is highly likely the members represented ex- servicemen who maintained similar political and philosophical views on their role in home security as those expounded by the League.82

The initial official RSL endorsement for the establishment of a home defence corps originated in October 1936 at the Roseville RSL sub-branch when Major Leonard Danby, a former member of a NSW private army, proposed a resolution for the establishment of a National Volunteer Defence Corps.83 The resolution called for the establishment of a force consisting of returned soldiers, as well as other able-bodied men, between the ages of 41

78 The R.S.S.I.L.A. Official Year Book 1937, published by NSW Branch, 1937. Dyett was knighted in 1934. 79 Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism, pp.234-5. Kristianson places the membership number at 150,000. Martin Crotty, ‘The Rise, Fall and Rise of the RSL, 1916-1946’, When Soldiers Return: November 2007 Conference Proceedings, p.222 places the figure closer to 100,000 using capitation fees paid to the Federal body. Either figure is substantially larger than the 43,629 in 1932. 80 Peter Dennis et al., ‘The Returned Services League’, The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1999, p.501. The inaugural Federal President of the RSL, William Bolton, was a Nationalist Party Senator for Victoria from 1917 to 1923 while still serving as National President of the RSL from 1916 to 1919, Coulthard-Clark, Soldiers in Politics, p.151. 81 Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism, pp.234-5. 82 In 1939, the RSL represented around 41 per cent of potential members, Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism, p.210. As Kristianson notes, this was a higher figure than the British Legion (15 per cent) and the American Legion (12 per cent) but less than the New Zealand Returned Service Association (50 per cent). 83 Moore, ‘Retreads or reactionaries?’, p.6. Moore cites the papers of P.V. Vernon as providing the details of Danby’s association with the Old Guard, a private army operating in NSW during the 1920s and 1930s, ML MSS 5176 Box 10.

24 and 60. The Sydney North Shore sub-branch stated ‘the force would be required if any attempt was made to invade Australia and its formation should assume great national importance.’84 The resolution was duly forwarded to the RSL NSW State Council to be submitted at the next Federal Congress in Hobart. In late 1937, during its 22rd Annual Congress, the RSL passed a similarly composed resolution calling for the establishment of a national volunteer force to be raised from ex-servicemen, and others deemed having suitable military training, for local defence. The force was anticipated to relieve existing forces in selected necessary home duties in case of a national emergency.85 In addition, Danby’s proposal envisaged the Corps helping police suppress civil disturbances and riots and prevent acts of sabotage by disaffected workers in wartime.86

As the likelihood of war increased by the month, the strength of the political influence of the RSL was brought to bear on the government. This was achieved by the almost daily personal contact the RSL Federal President maintained with Federal Ministers, an access unparalleled by any other lobby group.87 In general, the RSL was concerned with defence and foreign policies and regularly informed the government of its position in such matters, irrespective of whether it was sought. In a step taken in part to achieve the establishment of a home defence force, numerous representations were also made to the Military Board regarding the formation of a National Volunteer Defence Corps during this time, including one particular proposal which outlined the structure of a volunteer organisation which placed its cost at £7,000 per annum.88 Equally, on each occasion the Military Board informed the ‘interested parties’ that while taking the proposals under consideration it had, as yet, not made any decision on the formation of such an

84 Sydney Morning Herald, 21 October 1937, p.10. In the future, the North Shore of Sydney would be the nucleus of the People’s Army in early 1942. 85 Dudley McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area First Year, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1959, p.3; On Guard, pp.70-71. The proposal was repeated the following year after the Munich Crisis. 86 Craig Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes: Citizen Soldiering in Australia 1854-1945, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998, p.102. 87 An indication of the political pressure wielded by the RSL is seen at its 25th Annual Congress held in late 1941. Despite the dismal strategic situation of the war at this time, seven Ministers attended an organised luncheon held by the Delegates, NAA A61, J326/1/1. 88 Minute Paper from the Department of Defence 13 January 1939, NAA A664, 449/401/527. Submissions were received from the Roseville sub-branch of the RSL, the Right Honourable W. Hughes, Major Danby and the General Secretary of the RSL, Mr E. Raymont. Major Danby was responsible for the representation outlining a proposed structure of a volunteer organisation.

25 organisation. The Board stated it had not given enough ‘careful examination’ of the matter but assured the writers they would be attending to this matter ‘as early as practicable’.89 Arguably, at this time, the Board did not have a high priority on forming a home defence force.

As a result of the continual lobbying by the RSL, in December 1938, the decided to form a committee with the mandate to investigate the best means to ultilise the services of returned soldiers who were fit and under the age of forty-five years. The committee was chaired by the Inspector-General of the Australian Military Forces, -General Ernest Ker Squires who had accepted the post in June 1938. One of the first tasks undertaken by him was reporting to the government the army’s preparedness for war.90 The RSL was represented by Sir , a highly decorated soldier of the First World War. He had been decorated seven times and mentioned in dispatches on ten occasions. The committee recommended the setting up of a volunteer reserve force, that the personnel required for garrison battalions be nominated exclusively by the League, no limit to be placed on numbers to be enrolled, and that ‘the sole outside authority recognised by the Defence Department in recruiting for the reserve should be the League’.91 The League had offered to assume the organisational and financial responsibility for such a reserve. If these recommendations were acted on, the RSL would be given official status for an armed reserve with the recruitment of such a reserve controlled solely by the League.92 The report was delivered on 16 March 1939, but the unfolding events in Europe meant no action was taken to implement the recommendations.93

The outbreak of war brought a surge of enlistments into the 2nd AIF, but many men were excluded from enlistment due to medical reasons, age or employment in essential

89 Minute Paper from the Department of Defence 13 January 1939, NAA A664, 449/401/527. 90 A. B. (Anthony Brettell) Lodge, 'Squires, Ernest Ker (1882–1940)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/squires-ernest- ker-8613/text15045, published first in hardcopy 1990, accessed online 13 November 2016. 91 On Guard, pp.73-74. 92 Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism, pp.70-72. 93 Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism, pp.70-72.

26 services. For some men denied enlistment in the AIF due to age, the formation of Garrison Battalions at the end of 1939 provided a partial answer, taking up several thousand of the more active men, but only men able to commit to full-time service. The Army envisaged that such battalions would be used to relieve the militia of garrison duty.94 Further, the Military Board deemed the militia, free of static duties, would fulfil the role of home defence once the necessary training and equipping had been completed.95 The crucial point was, however, that a sizable body of civilian men, not all returned servicemen, were unable to serve in the military forces but still wished to be engaged in some form of useful military training. At this stage of the war, there was no organisation through which they could serve.

In this context and with Australia’s entry into the war, RSL sub-branches subsequently wrote to the government, on behalf of their members, urging the government to use the ‘great body of ex-servicemen ready and willing and anxious to serve their Country in time of need’.96 For the government, though they did not necessarily believe it was urgent, there was a growing need for a legitimate organisation to allow for ‘channelling the energies and concerns of men, including ex-servicemen and non-ex-servicemen, into an organisation but [one] amenable to government control’.97 An illustration of the patriotic fervour displayed by some men at the outbreak of the war occurred in Fremantle. With a degree of spontaneity, men met in a quickly convened meeting to organise military training only to discover it was illegal to enlist people for defence training under the Defence Act 1903. The act only permitted rifle clubs to engage men legally for this purpose. Subsequently, many men applied for membership to rifle clubs and began drilling at the local oval under the supervision of ex-servicemen and received shooting lessons from rifle

94 McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area First Year, p.3. 95 McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area First Year, p.3. 96 The original letter was to Curtin, Leader of the opposition, who forwarded it on to Menzies from the Tamworth RSL Branch 18 June 1940, NAA A663, 130/2/339. The letter contained five resolutions passed by the branch on the 1 June 1940. This quotation was part of the third resolution. 97 Coulthard-Clark, Soldiers in Politics, p.176.

27 club members in a revamped hall.98 Nonetheless, such bursts of patriotism or military fervour were not universal or uniform across Australia.99

Three days after declaring war on Germany, on 6 September 1939 Prime Minister Robert Menzies had appealed to Australians to set themselves the working rule, ‘business as usual’. He encouraged the public to continue their work in a normal fashion and others to catch that spirit. It was important that everyone ‘carry on’.100 Indeed, the government attempted to discourage men from rushing to join up, preferring them to remain at work. The Minister for Defence, Geoffrey Street, publicly stated on 13 October 1939 that ‘the withdrawal of militia men from industry had created a serious problem for employers’.101 The war, though serious, seemed far away. Apart from the enlistment into the 2nd AIF and the expansion of the militia and other military organisations, there was little overt sign of war in Australia. Menzies spoke of an all-in war effort in mid-1940 but, despite the upsurge of patriotism, the population still continued to pursue the nature of their peacetime way of life. Moreover, Government Ministers were of the opinion that the majority of the people were not psychologically ready to submit to the drastic measures required in an all-in war effort.102 This state of affairs caused one historian to observe that there was ‘a significant proportion of the Australian public that displayed apathy or indifference to Australia’s involvement in the war.’103 Besides, some spirits were buoyed by the notion that a far-away war would aid job creation and the establishment of a reserve home defence force, at this stage of the war, still seemed unnecessary.

The rapidly deteriorating strategic situation in Europe in May and June 1940, however, stirred the calls for home defence force to an even greater level. During the phoney war, complaints about the blasé attitude of the Menzies government over the

98 Transcript of Susan Green interviewing Derek Jack Sampson in February 1990. Available through the Keith Murdoch Sound Archives at AWM, Accession No. S00918. The meeting occurred at the Fremantle Town Hall. 99 McKernan, The Strength of a Nation, pp.21-22. McKernan gives two examples of young men not swept away with the sloganeering and did not see the war as an adventure. 100 Sydney Morning Herald, 6 September 1939, p.15; Meaney, Australia and the World, p.457. 101 Dennis et al., ‘Citizen Military Forces’, The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p.148. 102 McKernan, The Strength of a Nation, pp.25-26. 103 McKernan, All In! Australia during the Second World War, p.25.

28 country’s lack lustre war effort began emerging. The RSL vented its frustration at the perceived unpatriotic attitude by sections of the community, particularly striking union members and pacifists, whom they accused of being treacherous.104 The League urged the government to ‘take a firm hand with agitators’ along with fellow workers who ‘could do much towards putting the chronic agitators where they belong’ asserting that the striker’s objective was a traitorous one.105 Basically, the RSL viewed any person or organisation not offering full support to be a subversive and needed to be monitored. At this stage, the RSL repeatedly offered its services to ‘act to preserve law and order, guard public utilities and to prevent subversive activities by aliens or disaffected persons.106 In fact, several ex-AIF officers from Queensland considered ‘the measures so far taken to suppress Fifth Column activities to be ridiculously inadequate’.107

Some members of the League considered they could or should play a role in maintaining ‘law and order’ in conjunction with any military duties. In the June 1940 RSL publication, The Listening Post, dismay was expressed involving a letter written by the Primate of Australia, Dr Henry Le Fanu, to the Commonwealth Government protesting the banning of ‘traitorous publications’ and pleading for tolerance for pacifists.108 The monthly publication stated it was a dangerous attitude when Australia was fighting for its very existence and, in regard to pacifists, Le Fanu should not give ‘implied support to the hirelings of Moscow. He that is not with us is against us, and the pacifist … is nothing but a traitor and should be treated as such.’109 A related but different example is seen with another RSL sub-branch urging for the formation of ‘a corps of suitable returned men…fully armed and vested with authority to act would enable the traitorous and treasonable

104 Sekuless and Rees, Lest We Forget, p.96. 105 The Listening Post, Vol. XX, No. 8, August 15, 1941, p.1. 106 Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism, p.71. Disaffected people included striking unionists, Jehovah Witnesses, (who refused to carry guns) , pacifists, enemy aliens and communists, see Kate Darian-Smith, ‘War and Australian Society’ in Joan Beaumont (ed.), Australia’s War 1939-45, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996, p.55. The Jehovah Witness sect was banned from 1941 to 1943 on the suspicion its Adelaide based radio station was transmitting troop departures to enemy raiders, see Bobbie Oliver and William Latter, ‘Spooks, Spies and Subversives!’, in Jenny Gregory (ed.) On the Homefront, University of WA Press, Perth, 1996, p.178. 107 Sekuless and Rees, Lest We Forget, p.96. 108 The Listening Post, Vol. XIX, No. 6, 15 June, 1940, p.19. 109 The Listening Post, Vol. XIX, No. 6, 15 June, 1940, p.19. While Dr Le Fanu was fully supportive of the war effort he disapproved the persecution of communists.

29 activities of various well organised bodies and also…individuals who are disloyal, anti- Christian and pro-enemy to be dealt with’.110

Likewise, the RSL’s concern at level of the nation’s commitment to the war effort had been increased by the rise in written Communist propaganda criticising Australia’s involvement in the war during early 1940. The League believed key industries were being disrupted by communist influenced unions, specifically, the coal industry as the majority of the Miners’ Federation leaders were Communist Party members. In truth, this concern contained a certain foundation as striking coal miners accounted for ninety per cent of the total working days lost due to industrial disputes in 1940. The number of days lost in 1940 more than tripled the previous year’s total.111 More significantly, the RSL had shown in the past that it was more than willing to counter any Communist inspired agitation and had been closely involved with anti-Bolshevik riots in the immediate post World War One years. The Queensland branch of the League had played a substantial role organising a 2000 strong ‘Army to fight Bolshevism’ in the infamous Brisbane Red Flag Riots in 1919. The RSL hierarchy kept the ‘Army’ in readiness as a validation of its ability to maintain law and order if the civil authorities were overwhelmed.112 The roots of the RSL’s anti-communism were deep.113

The RSL had no hesitation in conveying to the highest levels of government its increasing concerns about ‘fifth columnists’ and the insufficient degree of support for the Empire and the war effort. Moreover, there were calls within the parliament for the

110 Moore, ‘Retreads or reactionaries?, p.8. The Hornsby RSL sub-branch made the call in June 1940. 111 Sydney James Butlin and Carl Boris Schedvin, War Economy 1942-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1977, p.372. The Communist Party of Australia rejected Australia’s involvement in the war arguing that the war was being fought by two belligerent capitalist blocs. Its anti-war stance changed when Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stuart MacIntyre, The Reds: the Communist Party of Australia from origins to illegality, Allen & Unwin, 1998, pp.408-411. 112 For a full account see Raymond Evans, Red Flag Riots: A study of intolerance, Queensland University Press, St Lucia, 1988. Also see Donald W. Rawson, ‘Political Violence in Australia’, Dissent, Autumn, 1968, pp.18-27; Andrew Moore, The Right Road: A history of right-wing politics in Australia, Melbourne Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1995. The Red Flag riots gave an indication what actions the RSL was willing to take if it thought the police force was incapable of keeping law and order. 113 Sekuless and Rees, Lest We Forget, p.3.

30

Communist Party to be banned.114 In the beginning, Menzies resisted these calls and was unwilling to infringe ‘the rights and privileges of innocent people’.115 Nevertheless, after introducing an initial ban on written communist propaganda, in June 1940 the government placed a total ban on the Communist Party. The necessity and purpose for banning the party has subsequently been questioned.116 One historian postulates that the banning of the Communist Party was, perhaps, the price extracted by some members of the Country Party to form a coalition government with Menzies, particularly after the Country Party had received numerous petitions from its constituents, many of whom were RSL members, requesting the ban.117

The League, or at least certain members, appeared quite willing to act in a policing role against what they perceived as unpatriotic citizens or actions not totally committed to the war. In addition, the press joined the chorus calling for more Government action and greater community vigilance on the so-called ‘fifth columnists’. A Canberra newspaper article published in mid-1940 decried the lack of government action against people not fully supporting the conduct of the war, especially prominent pacifists and communists. The article claimed they were being disloyal and commented that if they could not be relied upon when the enemy is distant, how could they be relied upon when an enemy was closer to Australian shores?118 In political circles, as the ground-swell against the ‘shirkers’ increased, the political risk in doing nothing rose. In RSL circles, at least one State RSL President, Queensland President Sir Raymond Huish, wrote to the RSL Federal President

114 David Lee, ‘Politics and Government’, in Joan Beaumont (ed.) Australia’s War 1939-45, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996, p.95. Lee states there was pressure from the Country Party members, as well as the moderate sections of the Labor Party, to ban the Communist Party. 115 Martin, Menzies: a life, pp.296-297; Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941, p.588. 116 Lee, ‘Politics and Government’, p.95. Lee does not consider the banning of the Communist Party of Australia accomplished much or that it was necessary for any security purposes. For a history of the Communist Party in Australia see Stuart Macintyre, The Reds, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998. The ban was lifted by Prime Minister Curtin in late 1942. 117 David Carmet, ‘Australian Communists and National Security September 1939-June 1941’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 65, No. 4, March 1980, p.251. 118 The Enemy Within, The Canberra Times, 5 June 1940, p.4.

31 expressing his disquiet about the possibility of civilians taking action against groups judged to be unpatriotic.119

At this time, however, it is important to recognise that the RSL, although the most vocal, was not alone in advocating the establishment of a reserve defence force. The Press began supporting the establishment of a defence reserve questioning whether it was enough to ‘abuse Hitler, criticise our national leaders or contribute a few shillings to some patriotic fund’.120 Earlier, in May 1938, the Chairman of the Commonwealth Council of Rifle Associations, Colonel Sir Charles Edward Merrett, had espoused the utilisation of the rifle clubs for home defence. He maintained rifle club members could receive instruction from military units aligned with the clubs ‘in the duties of guards and sentries at posts such as bridges, waterworks, magazines etc.’121 In fact, seven months later and at the very time a committee was discussing the possibility of best using the services of returned servicemen, the Minister for Defence, Harold Victor Campbell Thorby, announced a plan integrating the rifle clubs into home defence by enlisting their members as special guards for the protection of public utilities, oil tanks, bridges and munitions dumps. The Minister placed a maximum and minimum age restriction on members as well as the requirement to form units under military control. It is noteworthy that the Minister placed the units under control of the army. These conditions, combined with a reluctance of members to undertake drilling and rifle training with militia units, greatly hindered any support for the plan offered by the members.122 As the government was investigating the merits of establishing of a home defence force, the approximately 46,000 rifle club members appeared ideally placed to play a role in home defence.123 Despite appearing to have the front-running as the basis for any

119 Letter from Huish to the Federal President of the RSL, Sir Gilbert Dyett on 21 May, 1940, NAA MP508/1, 82/712/102. A copy of the letter was also sent to the Minister for the Army, Geoffrey Street. 120 ‘Why Not Train Civilians for Big Defence Reserve’, Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 19 May 1940, p.6. 121 Andrew Kilsby, ‘The Rifle Club Movement and Australian Defence 1860-1941’, PhD Thesis, February 2014, p.248. 122 Kilsby, ‘The Rifle Club Movement and Australian Defence 1860-1941’, p.249. 123 The membership number is at the end of June 1939: Kilsby, ‘The Rifle Club Movement and Australian Defence 1860-1941’, p.252.

32 such home defence force, the rifle clubs were overlooked due in part to the lack of commitment shown by the clubs for any degree of military training.124

It was in this context that the RSL, through its Federal President, Sir Gilbert Dyett, continued petitioning the government for the formation of a voluntary reserve in order that First World War veterans wanting to contribute to home defence had an opportunity to do so. Dyett believed such an organisation ‘could be a most useful reserve to the military authorities and a moral force of great power in the community.’125

The legacy of the politically active private armies of 1920s and 1930s, however, still overshadowed any government discussion of forming an armed group of men. During the early 1930s, belief that the communists had infiltrated various government departments and unions and were sufficiently well-armed to seize power forcibly had spread through the country. The fear of a so-called Red revolution gave rise to a number of conservative paramilitary organisations willing to defend ‘law and order’ if, or when, a break down in government occurred. Clearly, the RSL was the most influential organisation assisting the growth of the private armies such as the New Guard in New South Wales and the White Guard in Victoria. Though the armies did not consist entirely of returned soldiers, many of the leaders associated with these organisations came from the citizen forces or had been officers in the AIF. The League thus became an ideal recruiting ground for membership of the private armies as a source of men who strongly believed it was their duty to protect the society.126 Each State had its version of a private army under various names. In NSW there was initially the Old Guard followed by the New Guard, in Victoria the White Guard sometimes known as the League of National Security, In South Australia the Citizen’s League, In Queensland the Australia Legion, In Western Australia the Western Australian

124 The of the rifle club, under the Defence Act 1903, was deemed to be the owner of all arms, ammunition, or other military articles belonging to the rifle club and therefore came under control of the government, Defence Act 1903, Part IX - Legal Procedure, sub-section, 111A Property of Rifle Club vested in Captain, www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/da190356/. This gave the appearance that the rifle club movement was part of the home defence of Australia. 125 Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism, p.73. 126 David Hood, ‘Conservatism and Change: the RSL and Australian Society, 1916-1932’, PhD. Thesis, University of Adelaide, 1994, p.22.

33

Liberation League, and in Tasmania the Civic Patrol. In many country towns, the local leadership of the private army replicated the executive of the local RSL branch.127 The relationship between the RSL and the private armies was undoubtedly close. The RSL regularly ran ‘out of country towns any agitator or non-conformist’.128 The significant number of returned soldiers in the ranks of the private armies emphasised the conviction of some ex-servicemen in their responsibility to maintain law and order.

The degree to which the private armies were able to organize was demonstrated in north-western Victoria in March 1931. A band of armed men suddenly assembled and commenced taking the law into their own hands in the north-western Victorian town of Ouyen. In this heartland of soldier settlements, the White Guard mobilised their members to establish roadblocks around Ouyen solely based on rumours that rioting had broken out in Melbourne and communist groups were marching south from Mildura or north from Ballarat, depending on which rumour was believed, heading for the town. The members were called out to defend their community from the approaching ‘red’ menace.129 In due course, it was realised no such event was occurring. Such intense anti-communist activity by the private armies was very compatible with the RSL’s ideology to maintain and protect British Australia.

In any event, Menzies, for one, was not convinced of the need for a home defence force and maintained that officially recognised defence security organisations, such as the Rifle Clubs, existed and were sponsored by the Commonwealth government. These organisations, suggested Menzies and those of like-mind, could accommodate the members of the public who had ‘an overwhelming desire’ to assist the national war effort by allowing

127 Coulthard-Clark, Soldiers in Politics, p.175. See also Andrew Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier: Conservative paramilitary organisations in New South Wales 1930-32, NSW University Press, 1989, pp.113-144. Moore lists Orange, Millthorpe, Parkes, Canowindra, Trangie, Molong, Forbes, Grenfell, Scone, Narromine, Eden, Trundle, Bogan Gate, and Harden as centres of private army activities, but maintains there were a far greater number, where the leadership of the local RSL and private army was identical. Further see Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia (3rd ed.), Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2008, p.137. 128 Geoffrey Serle, ‘The Digger Tradition and Australian Nationalism’, Meanjin Quarterly, Vol. 24, Issue 2, June 1965, p.157. 129 Michael Cathcart, Defending the National Tuckshop: Australia's secret army intrigue of 1931, McPhee Gribble, Melbourne, 1988, p.14. For a full account of the mobilisation see pp.9-29.

34 citizens who were not members of the AIF or the militia to receive training and ‘perform a national service.’130 Still, not all citizens were allowed to join rifle clubs and receive training in firearms. Many lived in areas that had no club. One lady wrote to the Prime Minister requesting that women be instructed in the use of firearms by allowing them to join Rifle Clubs but was informed the regulations governing rifle clubs made no provision for active female members.131 Additionally, after war was declared, rifle clubs faced government imposed restrictions on new members and ammunition supply was reduced to 150 rounds per member.132 These were hardly the circumstances to provide for real or substantive military training for those with an earnest patriotic desire for it, and a fear it might be needed.

Nationally, there was varied reaction on the issue of the creation of any force resembling the private armies of the 1930s. In Adelaide, The Advertiser claimed there was a ‘spontaneous desire in many parts of Australia to combat fifth column activities by the creation of a sixth column’ but also cautioned on the dangers of forming ‘semi-military organisations’ not under the supervision of the government. Nonetheless, the paper broadly supported a formation of national emergency guard under the control of the Federal government.133 In Western Australia, The Sunday Times endorsed the government’s reluctance to create such a force stating that the ‘Federal Government‘s decision to discourage the formation of private armies to supplement our defence work, will be applauded by all sensible people.’134 The Sydney Morning Herald urged the government to utilise or lose the public enthusiasm for wishing to increase their personal contribution, however small, to the war effort. The paper stated that ‘private armies were not wanted in Australia’ but urged the government to harness the willingness of the public to do more for the war effort.135 If these press comments reflected public sentiment on forming any quasi- military organisation, then the public feeling was mixed, but it was becoming clear that

130 Sydney Morning Herald, 7 September 1940, p.10. 131 Letter from Captain J. Hutchinson AMF 2nd Military District to Miss Rita Gray 3 October 1939, NAA A663, 130/4/41. 132 Kilsby, ‘The Rifle Club Movement and Australian Defence 1860-1941’, p.253. As well, all State and District prize meetings were postponed. 133 The Advertiser, 4 June 1940, p.10. 134 The Sunday Times, 9 June 1940, p.16. 135 Sydney Morning Herald, 4 June 1940, p.8.

35 there was an emerging need, at least in certain sections of the community, for an organisation to cater for those men wishing to undertake some degree of military training.

The calls within the RSL membership to organise and provide training for men ineligible to join the AIF continued to mount. In May 1940, the Queensland Branch President, Huish, wrote to the Federal President Sir Gilbert Dyett that the branch was ‘inundated with requests from sub-branches and individuals, including non-returned soldiers, that we should take some action to immediately form a Volunteer Defence Corps’.136 The urgency of these continuing requests, and the lack of any perceived action on the part of the government, prompted the Federal President to request a meeting with the recently appointed Chief of the General Staff, Sir Cyril , who had taken over upon the death of Lieutenant-General Squires in March 1940. After the meeting on 27 May, Brudenell White wrote to Dyett agreeing in principle to the formation of a Volunteer Defence Corps. He stated that while recognizing that Australia was not under any threat and therefore ‘there is no need for an organised citizen force … the pent up feelings of the community will not be satisfied … particularly to returned soldiers. If their desires are not harnessed, they may be given voice which would be embarrassing both to the Government and those charged with advising them.’137

Simultaneously, Menzies was facing pressure within his coalition government to address the increasing problem of civilians wishing to participate in some form of defence training. On 20 May 1940, Senator Harry Foll, a close confidant and friend of Menzies, wrote to the Prime Minister listing the reasons for the creation of a corps in Australia for the purpose of assisting ‘to maintain order and helping in home defence.’138 Foll argued that the organisation would be of value in allowing a sizable section of the community to ‘give some of their time to the service of their country as they feel that carrying on their ordinary jobs is not really helping’ and counteract sections of the community who believed subversive

136 Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism, p.72. 137 Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism, p.73. 138 Letter to Menzies from Senator Foll 20 May 1940, NAA A5954, 268/1.

36 agents were trying to hinder Australia’s war effort.139 Moreover, such an organisation would prevent ‘hot-heads taking the law into their own hands’.140 He considered the Government could utilise the RSL branches ‘for the purpose of creating a home force to assist in the maintenance of order; to watch for subversive activities and keep an eye on the foreign population’.141 It would also be a deterrent to people wishing to instigate strikes or trouble in industry. It was envisaged that the home force would work in a co-operative effort with the police departments, members of the public and RSL organisations but Foll suggested it should be controlled by the Department of the Interior. Foll expressed his concern that if the formation of an organisation was not initiated ‘people will form all kinds of home defence organisations without any recognised leadership or any co-ordinated policy’.142 Indeed, submissions for the formation of local defence forces had already been submitted to the Army. One submission proposed the setting up of a nation-wide light mechanised reserve force, at no cost to the Government, composed of voluntary and unpaid men willing to assist in local defence.143 In a portent of future problems with such a force, the offer was declined by the Army due to the fact that ‘it was not possible to consider the enrolment of men in detachments which are not themselves part of the military forces.’144

Despite the government’s attention being fully occupied with the training and equipping of the two new divisions of the 2nd AIF, it was becoming urgent for the government to take the lead and circumvent any private attempt to form an organisation that would address the question of military training for civilians.145 Suggestions that the ‘home force’ should be used for intelligence activities or play a role in assisting with law and order were issues that still raised the concern of many in the Government, particularly the Prime Minister. Menzies had been steadfast in his reluctance to form any organisation and was unconvinced of the need of any force that appeared to resemble a private army,

139 Letter to Menzies from Senator Foll 20 May 1940, NAA A5954, 268/1. 140 Letter to Menzies from Senator Foll 20 May 1940, NAA A5954, 268/1. 141 Letter to Menzies from Senator Foll 20 May 1940, NAA A5954, 268/1. 142 Letter to Menzies from Senator Foll 20 May 1940, NAA A5954, 268/1. 143 Submission for a Light Mechanised Reserve Force for local defence and guard duties by S. E. Woodgate 3 June 1940, AWM 61, 507/1/614. 144 Letter to Woodgate from Eastern Command 1 July 1940, AWM 61, 507/1/614. 145 On the 6th March 1940, Menzies announced the recruitment of the after raising the six months earlier.

37 considering any such organisation as highly dangerous.146 As late as mid-June 1940, Menzies had expressed his view in a letter, stating that the suggestion of the formation of a voluntary reserve defence organisation had been ‘carefully considered’ but practical difficulties arose with the ‘existence of loosely organised bodies, no matter how worthy the spirit with which they are inclined, would be more of an embarrassment than a help [and] the added difficulty of equipping such a body with all equipment currently supplied to the Army.’147

In fact, such was the level of political misgivings that Menzies insisted on a public reassurance, principally from the RSL, that any reserve force would not metamorphose into an organisation which, in all but name, resembled a private army and that the establishment of any force would ultimately be under Commonwealth control. In order to dispel any misgivings held by the government, on 4 June the RSL responded by issuing a public statement. The RSL assured the government that

As the objects and ideals of the Returned Soldiers’ League are synonymous with the principles of constitutional government its actions and conduct will continue to be in strict conformity with the laws of the Commonwealth; therefore any plan designed to ensure the preservation of the security of Australia, formulated by the Federal Executive, will not be implemented unless it is approved by the Federal Government.148

Furthermore, as discussions with the Government continued and in part to place additional pressure on the government, the Federal President of the RSL issued another press statement two days later stating, ‘the Returned Soldiers’ League eagerly and proudly embraces the opportunity to arrange for the returned men, including their ex-Imperial

146 Coulthard-Clark, Soldiers in Politics, p.176. 147 Letter from Sir Ernest Fisk to Menzies, 22 May 1940. Menzies replied by letter 17 June 1940, AWM 68, 3DRL 8052/177. Sir Ernest Thomas Fisk, a Menzies appointee, who was Secretary of the Economic Cabinet and Director of Economic Co-ordination. 148 RSL Circular No. 116/40 informing the RSL sub-branches of a press statement released on the 4 June 1940, AWM 54, 1008/2/22.

38 comrades, to render such vital, in fact, indispensable service for the defence of Australia.’149 The press statement continued, ‘the Government … can rest assured that the League will prove worthy of its trust and responsibility to promote and safeguard the security of the Commonwealth.’150 Nevertheless, there was no elaboration on who was threatening the security of Australia. Yet the League wished to organise, fund but, more importantly, control a reserve force thereby providing the solution to the government’s dilemma of accommodating men who could not serve in the military. The most probable explanation is that the RSL perceived the greatest threat facing Australia, at this stage of the war, was internal rather than external. Moreover, if the government was going to adopt the RSL offer, it needed to be confident that it would deter such men away from other less palatable quasi-military organisations and ‘private armies’.

In light of the sustained press and parliamentary pressure from the RSL, the government decided to reconstitute an Australian Army Reserve and established a four man committee to prepare plans for this purpose. Representatives from the General Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel R. M. Thomson, “A” Branch, Lieutenant- R.J. Dowden and J. H. Crombie and the General-Secretary of the RSL, Mr E.V. Raymont attended the inaugural meeting of the committee in Melbourne that was held over three days, 11-13 June 1940. With varying issues needing to be considered, such as proposed methods of employment for such a reserve, organisation, establishments, administration and training, each representative outlined their respective positions. Each party had their own preferences on the proposed reserve force. The General Secretary of the RSL, stated that RSL members ‘strongly desired to do something …in defending Australia in case of emergency and that they wanted some training.’151 In addition, ‘the organisation of any such body to be formed for the purpose should be in the framework of the League.’152 These views were basically unchanged from those expressed previously by the RSL in the December 1938 committee

149 RSL Circular No. 116/40 informing the RSL sub-branches of a press statement released on the 6 June 1940, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 150 RSL Circular No. 116/40 informing the RSL sub-branches of a press statement released on the 6 June 1940, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 151 Report on the Meeting to Examine the Question of the Organisation of an Australian Army Reserve on the 11 June 1940, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 152 Report on the Meeting to Examine the Question of the Organisation of an Australian Army Reserve on the 11 June 1940, AWM 54, 1008/2/22.

39 report. The General Staff, on the other hand, considered there were two goals for the proposed reserve: first, in the event of mobilisation being ordered, to have the required personnel available to bring units of the Citizen Military Forces and existing Garrison Battalions to full war establishment and secondly, to form any additional Garrison Battalions included in the Order of Battle. At the conclusion of the three days, the committee officially endorsed the suggestion of reconstituting the Australian Army Reserve, of which one section would be raised, funded and administered by the RSL, termed the RSL-Volunteer Defence Corps. It was further recommended that a committee should be formed to work out the finer details of such a scheme.153

The RSL received authorisation from the Military Board on 15 July 1940 to begin the enrolling and training of returned servicemen for the purpose of providing personnel for the Class Reserves of the Army.154 The Volunteer Defence Corps was to consist solely of personnel who have had war service and were British subjects, irrespective whether they were financial members of the RSL. Importantly, the Minister for the Army, Geoffrey Street, released his own statement endorsing the parameters for the proposed scheme but also noting that the ‘Commonwealth Government cannot provide any quartering, arms, uniforms, pay or instructors.155 Irrespective of the lack of any government assistance, the League readily assumed the responsibility for such a reserve, financially and administratively, as it had indicated to the 1938 committee report.

The restriction to enrol only ex-servicemen excluded a large number of men who wished to make a contribution to home defence. Other than being the source for Reserve personnel, the authorisation allotted no defined military role to the Corps. This exclusion raised the question of how the RSL-VDC could possibly be involved in home defence with no defined military role. The authorisation seems not to have solved the government’s problem of accommodating men who were ineligible to join the 2nd AIF but, conceivably, increased it

153 Minute Paper 14 June 1940, NAA A663, 0187/1/7. 154 Military Board Instruction A73 15 July 1940, NAA MP 508/1, 66/703/156. 155 On Guard, p.76.

40 by officially excluding non-returned soldiers. The Federal Executive of the RSL appointed Sir Harry Chauvel as the inaugural Inspector-in-Chief in general command of the Corps. Chauvel was supplied with an office and office staff at the RSL Headquarters in Collins Street Melbourne.156 The administration and structure of the reserve force will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

The question of why a section of such a force was controlled by the RSL, a non- government organisation, certainly warrants further analysis. Ultimately, there was a combination of factors that led to the establishment of the RSL-VDC, despite Menzies’ earlier reluctance. The first factor was the unfolding events in Europe. German military successes in Europe in mid-1940 provided the circumstances to bring Japan’s entry into the war closer. In the aftermath of Germany’s rapid defeat of France and the Low Countries, there were increased calls from ex-servicemen, and others, who were ineligible to enlist in the armed forces to render some degree of military service to the war effort.157

The second factor was Menzies’ position in the (UAP). He occupied a precarious political position and had only a tenuous hold on the Prime Ministership. Following the death of Joseph Lyons in April 1939, Menzies had become leader of the UAP, despite his unpopularity within the party, winning by only a very narrow majority: this had a divisive effect on the government.158 The third factor involved the position taken by the Country Party as the coalition partner in the government. Menzies’ election as leader prompted the Country Party to pass a unanimous resolution, one day prior to Menzies being elected leader, stating that ‘the party is definitely unable to co-

156 A. J. (Alec Jeffrey) Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1978, p.227. At the age of 75 years, Chauvel travelled the length and breadth of Australia promoting and inspecting the newly formed force and died in February 1945 due to ill health. 157 Many men would have joined up but the restrictive list of reserved occupations, among other reasons, meant they were denied enlistment on these grounds as the government preferred they remained in their employment, Joan Beaumont, ‘Australia’s War: Europe and the Middle East’, in Joan Beaumont (ed.) Australia’s War 1939-1945, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996, p.7. 158 Martin, Menzies: a life, p.271-273. Menzies had defeated William (Billy) Hughes for the leadership by four votes.

41 operate in a government with Menzies as its Prime Minister’.159 Upon his election, they subsequently moved to the cross benches.160 The Country Party Leader, Sir did not hide his detestation of Menzies. Menzies had resigned the previous month, as Attorney- General and therefore a Cabinet Minister, in protest to the government repealing pension provisions, following strong pressure from the Country Party, in the recently passed National Insurance Bill.161 Page had never forgiven him for resigning from the Cabinet, an action that Page viewed as an act of betrayal and a factor, he believed, that contributed to Prime Minister Joseph Lyons death in April 1939.162 With these convictions, Page spent the following six months condemning Menzies’ elevation to the Prime Ministership. In return, Menzies treated the Country Party with disdain. Indeed, on the day after Menzies was elected leader of the UAP, Page stood up in parliament and, in a pungent speech, stated that with war threatening Australia needed a leader capable of leading ‘a united national effort’. He suggested Menzies did not possess the right qualities for the job questioning his leadership, loyalty, courage and judgement. Menzies’ courage was questioned since he did not volunteer for the 1st AIF in World War One.163 The attack on Menzies was described in the Sydney Morning Herald the following day as ‘a violation of the decencies of debate without parallel in the annals of the Federal Parliament’.164 After the outbreak of the war, Menzies proposed a but informed Page, still leader of the Country Party, he would not countenance a position for Page in the War Cabinet, stating that Page’s personal attacks on him meant he could not work with him with any confidence.165 On 6 September, Page resigned as leader of the Country Party and Archie Cameron became Leader of the Country Party. The party still remained outside the coalition even though Menzies continued to remain reliant on their vote to govern.166

159 Martin, Menzies: a life, p.274, Beaumont, Australia’s War 1939-1945, p.86. 160 Ulrich Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1963, p.252. 161 Martin, Menzies: a life, pp.249-251. Under fierce opposition from the Country Party, the government was forced to greatly modify the Bill, shelving old-age, widows, orphans and invalid benefits, whilst keeping only health benefits, to gain the Country Party’s support. Menzies resigned in protest to these forced changes. 162 Lee, ‘Politics and Government’, p.85. 163 Martin, Menzies: a life, p.276. The family had made the decision that Robert should not volunteer for service though Menzies’ two eldest brothers, Les and Frank, served in the 1st AIF. 164 Martin, Menzies: a life, p.274. 165 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, pp.245-249. 166 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, pp.250-253.

42

The fourth factor was the UAP’s by-election loss to Labor of the Victorian electorate of Corio in early 1940 which further tested Menzies slim hold on the Prime Ministership. 167 Once again, in an attempt to shore up his position, Menzies offered to form a coalition government with the Country Party promising to appoint five Country Party members to the Cabinet, out of a total of sixteen sitting members and, also, allowing its members the unprecedented concession of voting against the government on the upcoming Motor Vehicles Agreement Bill.168 These overly generous terms were impossible to decline and Cameron became Deputy Prime Minister in March 1940 upon the restoration of the coalition.169 Menzies faced the daunting prospect of a federal election within the next six months and the conditions offered to the Country Party undoubtedly emphasized his desperate need to form a coalition government. Indeed, it had become exceedingly necessary to demonstrate to the Australian public there was a working arrangement between the non-Labor political parties, particularly after the Corio by-election loss. On the face of it, Menzies’ predicament appears to have placed Cameron in a powerful position to force any issue of his choosing, especially if it was of special interest to the Country Party’s constituency, including the establishment of a home defence force and support for an all- out war effort, views he had championed for a number of years.170

Subsequently, the Federal election of September 1940 produced a hung parliament with the Coalition and the each winning 36 seats in the House of Representatives. The balance of power was held by two independents; Arthur Coles and Alexander Wilson. Coles, the member for Henty based in the eastern suburbs of Melbourne, had committed to support to the United Australia Party in contrast to Wilson, the member for Wimmera in north-western Victoria, often voted with the Australian Labor Party.171 It is

167 John Dedman, as the Labor Party representative, won the by-election for the Victorian seat of Corio on 2 March 1940. The previous member, Richard G. Casey, had resigned on 30 January after being offered the appointment as the Australian Minister to Washington. 168 The Motor Vehicles Agreement Bill gave Australian Consolidated Industries virtually exclusive rights to manufacture motor cars in Australia. The Country Party opposed the Bill. For greater detail, see Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941, pp.205-206. 169 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, pp.253-257. 170 Beaumont, Australia’s War 1939-1945, p.88. 171 Stella Barber, ‘Coles, Sir Arthur William (1892-1982)’ Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/coles-sir-arthur-william- 12334/text122157, accessed online 16 June 2016; Barry Jones and Tony Lamb, ‘Wilson, Alexander (1889-

43 worth noting that the town of Ouyen, mentioned earlier as a bastion of private army activity, was in the Federal seat of Wimmera. The hung parliament made Menzies reliant on the votes of the two independents to retain government. Nonetheless, in just under a year, due to the ongoing divisions within the coalition, Menzies was forced to resign as leader of the party, and therefore the Prime Ministership, in August 1941; the Prime Ministership ultimately passed to John Curtin in October.172

The Country Party and the RSL maintained a close relationship and, as one historian commented, ‘were unwavering in their loyalty to the British Crown’.173 Many Country Party members were returned servicemen, including Cameron, with the parliamentary wing of the Country Party having a greater percentage of ex-servicemen than the other major political parties. It has been suggested that this was due to the soldier settlement scheme for the returned soldiers of the First World War, a scheme heavily promoted by the RSL and the Country Party.174 The RSL had long been a strong advocate for the establishment of a home defence force and possibly used Country Party support, in conjunction with its own representations, to influence Menzies on the merits of such a force. Cameron in his role as Deputy Prime Minister, as well as the leader of the Country Party, had publicly supported a full commitment to the war effort.175 On balance, it is likely Menzies and Cameron would have reached an agreement. Menzies had been Prime Minister for less than a year and retained only a fragile hold on the Prime Ministership and Government: his political future was reliant on the support of the Country Party in Parliament. In addition, Menzies was facing a general election in September 1940 and political considerations are likely to have influenced any decision taken. He had repeatedly questioned the need for such a force and

1954)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/wilson-alexander-12044/text121607, accessed online 16 June 2016. 172 For greater detail in the events leading up to Menzies resignation, see Martin, Menzies: a life, pp.375-385; David Lee, ‘Politics and Government’, pp.85-92. 173 Neville Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australian Identity: The problem of nationalism in Australian history and historiography’ Australian Historical Studies, Vol. 32 No. 116, 2001, p.79. 174 Ken Inglis, ‘The Anzac Tradition’, Meanjin Quarterly, No. 24, Issue 1, March 1965, p.41. For an account of soldier settlement in Victoria see Marilyn Lake, The Limits of Hope: Soldier Settlement in Victoria, 1915-38, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1987. 175 Geoffrey Searle, ‘The Digger Tradition and Australian Nationalism’, Meanjin Quarterly, Vol. 24, Issue 2, June 1965, p.156. As will be discussed in following chapters, the initial enlistment in the RSL-VDC was heavily embraced by rural areas, approximately 75 per cent of all members resided in the country. This provides an indication of the level of support for a home defence force in these areas.

44 was unconvinced as to its true purpose but, possibly in return for continued parliamentary support, finally acquiesced to the formation of some form of a volunteer defence force. More significantly, as noted earlier, he had insisted on a public statement from the RSL agreeing any organisation required Federal Government approval for the implementation of any plan.

Michael McKernan has argued that the establishment of a RSL Volunteer Defence Force only gave official recognition to activities already being undertaken and provided a degree of control over ‘these private armies [in that it was] better that these private armies …be given clear powers and functions than enthusiastic returned men take the law into their own hands.’176 Peter Stanley agrees that the VDC was ‘a politically acceptable variant on the right wing secret armies’.177 To all intents and purposes, the RSL-controlled force arguably had the appearance of a private army, albeit with official authorisation.178

Nonetheless, the RSL’s claims of an urgent and warranted need to accommodate ex- servicemen were belied by the numbers that enlisted after the Military Board had issued authorisation to establish a reserve force. Immediately upon authorisation on 15 July 1940, the RSL began enlisting recruits requiring them to swear to undertake any training that may be necessary and ‘be loyal to constituted authority’. The call went out for ‘every Digger and ex-Imperial’ to join as they were ‘urgently needed.’179 The League claimed a total membership of approximately 82,000 men located in 1300 branches and sub-branches throughout the nation.180 Though the volunteers did not have to be members of the RSL, by the end of December 1940, the number of enlistments for the new RSL-VDC totalled 37,120

176 McKernan, All In!, p.48. In June 1940 around 4,000 returned soldiers rallied in Sydney pledging to serve the war effort with all their strength. 177 Peter Stanley. Invading Australia: Japan and the Battle for Australia 1942, Penguin Group, Melbourne, 2008, p.141. 178 Coulthard-Clark places his discussion of the Volunteer Defence Corps in his chapter titled ‘Secret Armies’ alongside known secret armies such as Australian Protective League, White Guard, New Guard and Legion of Frontiersmen, Coulthard-Clark, Soldiers in Politics, pp.162-175. 179 Wilcox, Hearths and Homes, p.127. 180 Dyett stated the number of members and branches in a letter to the Minister of Defence, Geoffrey Street, 14 December 1938, A664, 449/401/527.

45 men.181 When the number of enlistments is compared to the total number of returned soldiers, not just RSL members, the percentage plummets to just over eighteen per cent.182 As the initial membership of the RSL-VDC was restricted to returned soldiers it is difficult to gauge total community support for such a force at this time.

For a number of years before the outbreak of the Second World War, there were calls to form a reserve force – all ignored. During this period, the most vocal campaigners for the establishment of the force were ex-servicemen and their representative organisation, the RSL. Members of the RSL continued petitioning the government searching for some type of active role to play in home defence. The calls for a home defence force were made even though the Chief of the General Staff, Sir Brudenell White, acknowledged in May 1940 that ‘Australia was not under threat and there was no military need for an organised citizen force’.183 The Government showed no appetite for establishing such a force and was uncomfortable with any formation of an armed body of trained men having experienced the disruptive nature of the private armies of the 1920s and 1930s on Australian society. Even the strength of the political lobbying by the RSL, through placing constant pressure on the Prime Minister, failed to convince the government of the need for such a force. As the war in Europe intensified, there was a growing desire in certain sections of the community to contribute militarily to the war effort. The Government could no longer ignore the pubic fervour and, ultimately, bowed to political expediency. The RSL, a private organisation, offered to establish, organise, and crucially, to fund a part of any newly reconstituted Australian Army Reserve force as an outlet for the growing frustration of such men but only after the organisation had publicly stated ‘its objects and ideals were synonymous with the principles of constitutional government‘.184The RSL-Volunteer Defence Corps originated from men, mostly RSL members, wishing to contribute to the war but frustrated as to the manner of that contribution. However, the major shortcoming of the force was the

181 Dyett stated the number of members and branches in a letter to the Minister of Defence, Geoffrey Street, 14 December 1938, A664, 449/401/527. By the end of December 1940, the RSL-VDC had 37,120 enlistments. 182 Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism, p.210. Kristianson states just over 200,000 ex-servicemen were eligible for RSL membership. 183 Quoted in Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism, p.73. 184 RSL Circular No. 116/40 informing the RSL sub-branches of a press statement released on the 4 June 1940, AWM 54, 1008/2/22.

46 exclusion of all the male civilians who had not served in the First World War, thereby greatly limiting its value in meeting this perceived need. Significantly, in reality, this rule was not strictly adhered to by nascent RSL-VDC units. Not surprisingly, the government found no meaningful function for the RSL-VDC and with little or no Government support the initial enthusiasm for the defence force gradually fell away. Having arrived on the military and political landscape of Australia, the RSL-VDC searched to find a suitable role. This proved elusive.

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Chapter Two

RSL-Volunteer Defence Corps

July 1940- May 1941

With formal approval at last at hand from the government to form an Army Reserve, the principal challenge facing the RSL lay in finding and then securing an active role for the League in home defence. The League believed it could achieve this through the coordination of a semi-military body of men into a well-structured organisation, capable of being utilised by the nation for home defence. This chapter will examine the initial administrative and command structure adopted by the RSL to achieve its goal and the difficulties it encountered, primarily associated with a lack of financial and material support from the Federal Government. The Army, at this stage, was also an unwilling participant and sought to avoid providing greatly needed assistance in training, through the provision of instructors, and training equipment. Further, the RSL-VDC faced its own unique problems in terms of being autonomous from military control. So too, rival organisations such as the Vulnerable Points Guard (VPG) and the Post Office Volunteer Corps (POVC) harboured aspirations of contributing to home defence in their own right, and had no intention of quitting the field for the RSL-VDC. It was soon realised that the absence of any defined military task allocated to the RSL-VDC, other than to act as a reservoir for Reserve forces for home defence, was a major shortcoming if the organisation was to remain at any level of effectiveness. After receiving government approval, its leaders came to acknowledge within a matter of months that any meaningful and active contribution to home defence could only be achieved if the League relinquished its control and the Corps came under the jurisdiction of the Army. The strategic situation in Europe and North Africa accelerated the need for the government and the military authorities to review its plans for home defence.

The structure decided upon by the four man committee in June 1940 was determined by the army’s requirement for a supply of ready trained reserves for the Garrison Battalions while attempting to accommodate the aspirations of the RSL to occupy a

48 role within home defence. Garrison Battalions guarded major vulnerable points, internment camps and were assigned to the close defence of Fortress Areas.185 The goals of each party were listed in Chapter One. Discussion at the meeting centred on the reconstitution of the Australian Army Reserve which could, in part, meet the respective goals of each party through the formation of a Class “A” Reserve and a Class “B” Reserve. The Class “A” Reserve could provide the personnel to bring the Garrison Battalions up to establishment and the Class “B” Reserve could fulfil the demands of the second goal of having reserves available to form additional Garrison Battalions if the need arose. As such, it was considered that approximately 11,000 men were needed as reserves to meet the requirements for the existing Garrison Battalions and to form the requisite additional Garrison Battalions.186 In addition, the Army judged the principal efforts of the returned soldiers should be directed towards Class “A” and Class “B” Reserves. Yet, while Raymont, the RSL representative, believed the bulk of its members would embrace voluntary enlistment in a Reserve, the limitations of physical fitness and age would make a large percentage of ex-servicemen ineligible to join either Class “A” or Class “B”. The two class structure of the Reserve would not cater to ex-servicemen unable to commit to full-time service but wanting to render part- time service.187

At the end of the three day meeting, the committee recommended that the Australian Army Reserves should consist of the two Classes of Reserves, Class “A” and Class “B”. The Class “B” Reserve would be sub-divided into Garrison Battalion Reserves and the RSL-VDC. The League was given full responsibility for the recruitment of members and administration of the RSL-VDC. Its defined function was to provide a reservoir of trained Imperial ex-servicemen, under the age of sixty, on which the Army could draw for various purposes, when and as the need arose, including the formation of Garrison Battalions.188 It

185 Fortress Areas provided fixed defence of vital installations such as ports and industries. 186 Report on the Meeting on the 11 June 1940, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. The Garrison Battalion Reserve was far below establishment strength. By the end of December 1940 there were only 1,377 reservists available out of an establishment of 10,000, The Army War Effort, 31 December 1940, Chapter Four, NAA A5954, 298/1. 187 Report on the Meeting to Examine the Question of the Organisation of an Australian Army on the 11 June 1940, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 188 Military Board instruction A. 73, 15 July 1940 NAA A663, O186/1/7. The requirement of being a returned soldier presented a predicament as some men had served in the garrison artillery units for the duration of the First World War but were denied eligibility due to not serving overseas and therefore not being returned

49 was envisaged the RSL-VDC would become the predominant provider of eligible Class “B” Reserve personnel.189 At this time, the recommendation further stated that no public funds were to be provided for the RSL-VDC nor was there to be any provision for equipment or uniforms. As far as the army was concerned, the initial purpose of the RSL-VDC was to be a reserve to draw upon when needed, rather than for any fighting per se, either offensive or defensive.

In any event, the recommendation suggests that the committee had reached a compromise solution for the structure of the Reserve force. Although conceding that RSL members felt it was their patriotic duty to contribute on a military level to home defence, the General Staff remained firm in their belief that the primary efforts of the returned soldiers should be directed to supporting the existing Australian Military Forces.190 Nevertheless, the RSL were attempting to establish a vehicle to realise their members’ calls. The proposed structure only partly achieved the League’s goal by allowing returned soldiers to contribute through the third classification, the RSL-VDC. In due course, the Military Board, through Military Board Instruction (MBI) A. 73 issued on 15 July 1940, approved the reconstitution of an Australian Army Reserve and permitted the RSL to undertake the formation of a Volunteer Defence Corps as a part of the Class “B” Reserve of the Army Reserve, albeit with no provision for government funding or material support.191 The Government approval for the RSL itself to administer a section of the Australian Army Reserve is worth noting since the League was a non-government body and was not placed under military control. The League had previously stated that ‘the government ... always had the organisation and the resources of the League at its disposal for the successful prosecution of the war’ and, at this stage of the war, the government planned to utilise this

servicemen. The broadening of eligibility to join the RSL-VDC in early 1941 solved this problem, Letter to Senator Foll 28 February 1941, AWM 60, 1420. 189 In a speech by the Minister for the Army, , 12 March, 1941, NAA A5954, 298/1. 190 Report on the Meeting to Examine the Question of the Organisation of an Australian Army on the 11 June 1940, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 191 Report on the RSL-VDC by the Inspector-in-Chief of RSL-VDC, 9 April 1941, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/295; Military Board instruction A. 73, 15 July 1940, NAA A633, O186/1/7. Interestingly, the Director-General of the initial Australian Army Reserve was Kenneth Mackay in 1916, the novelist and former officer mentioned in the previous chapter.

50 offer.192 Nevertheless, MBI A. 73 restricted the RSL-VDC to act only as a reservoir of trained personnel and, more significantly, had provided no active role for the RSL-VDC in home defence, thus falling well short of what the League and its members had envisaged their role should entail.

Putting aside the restrictions ultimately decided upon by the committee, one month before the release of official government approval to raise a volunteer defence force, the RSL Federal President Sir Gilbert Dyett had issued a circular to all State branches informing them the Department of the Army had approved, in principle, a plan for forming a reserve force.193 In turn, a letter was subsequently circulated throughout the network of RSL sub- branches requesting them to begin enrolling volunteering ex-servicemen immediately, regardless of their League membership status, with the view of establishing RSL-VDC units within their local areas.194 Each local RSL sub-branch was to call a meeting of members to collect names of volunteers willing to form such a unit while the RSL awaited official confirmation of the details.195

Generally, the RSL arranged for the application forms for enrolment to be despatched to all sub-branches in order to record the personal particulars of intending volunteers and their previous experience. Consequently, upon enrolment, the RSL sub- branch would endeavour to classify each enrolled member into one of four categories; Instructional staff, Class “A” Reserves, Class “B” Reserves and additional personnel for relieving or replacing personnel in the first three categories.196 In addition to being under forty-eight years of age, men receiving the classification of Class “A” Reserve had to undertake a medical examination resulting in the medical classification of Fit Class I. These volunteers were required to attend the same training as required of the active Citizen

192 RSL Circular No. 116/40 informing the RSL sub-branches of a press statement released on the 6 June 1940, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 193 RSL Circular No. 116/40 informing the RSL sub-branches of a press statement released on the 6 June 1940, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 194 RSL Circular No. 116/40 informing the RSL sub-branches of a press statement released on the 6 June 1940, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 195 Battalion History, 15th VDC Battalion (VDC), AWM 54, 1008/2/54. 196 Military Board instruction A. 73, 15 July 1940, NAA A663, O186/1/7.

51

Military Forces, which occasionally required them to attend short periods of continuous training. Class “A” Reserve personnel could be called-up for full time duty on the mobilisation order but once these men reached the age of forty-eight years they were transferred to Class “B” Reserve.197 Men given the classification Class “B” Reserve were between the ages of forty-five and sixty years. In order to be classified as eligible for the Garrison Battalion Reserves, men had to be less than 55 years of age, British subjects, passed as Fit Class II and had seen war service.198 In the event of an emergency, the Garrison Battalion Reserves were likely to be called up to perform full time duty at three days’ notice.199 The volunteers, if they met the eligibility criteria, were encouraged to accept classification as Class “A” Reserve or Class “B” Reserve but the requirement of performing full-time duty, in the event of being called up, would in all likelihood have limited the number of men willing to be classified as such.

The remaining volunteers were listed as non-classified. This category encompassed men who were under sixty years of age and too unfit or unable to qualify for Class “A” Reserves or Class “B” Reserves due to their employment or health reasons. It also included men who were unwilling to commit to full-time service but still wished to undertake some degree of military training. No applicant employed in a reserved industry or occupation was accepted for enlistment in Class “A” Reserves or the Garrison Battalion Reserves section of Class “B” Reserves.200 Initially, no medical examination was required for enrolment to qualify for non-classification. This oversight allowed some ex-servicemen, who had been badly wounded in the First World War, (including several with artificial legs), to enrol. Clearly, this was unacceptable and a directive was quickly issued that a medical examination, carried out voluntarily by medical practitioners, was required to be performed to determine the suitability of each prospective member.201

197 Military Board instruction A. 73, 15 July 1940, NAA A663, O186/1/7. 198 Military Board instruction A. 73, 15 July 1940, NAA A663, O186/1/7. The Army War Effort 31 December 1940. Fit Class II classification is fit for any duty other than field formations but with modifications as to age. 199 The Army War Effort, 31 December 1940, Chapter Four, NAA A5954, 298/1. 200 Military Board instruction A. 73, 15 July 1940, NAA A663, O186/1/7. 201 The VDC: Formation and Progress in Western Australia, p.2, AWM 54, 1008/2/53.This example is from Western Australia but the situation is unlikely to have been limited to that State alone.

52

With the completion of enrolment in the units, the sub-branches were required to submit a nominal roll containing the names, medical status and qualifications of the members of the sub-branch detachment who were willing and eligible to be posted to more active units. Furthermore, the RSL was required to nominate personnel with specialised and other instructional qualifications with a view to their appointment as instructors at AIF and other training depots.202 The Army would contact the State Headquarters of the RSL for the provision of any necessary personnel from the different classes of Reserves enrolled in the Corps.203

The opportunity to participate in some form of training was embraced by the majority of RSL branches. Initially there was a keen response, especially with regard to refresher courses in musketry.204 For example, by the end of September 1940, 4,464 members in Western Australia had been classified and accepted into the RSL-VDC.205 Nonetheless, not all sub-branches heeded the call. Some country towns were reluctant to form a RSL-VDC units since ‘no real task for such a body could be seen’, particularly if the proposed unit had no rifle range for practice.206 The RSL focussed on forming of a unit in any willing sub-branch generating a mainly arbitrary structure. The only identifiable common denominator between all the sub-branches was the desire to contribute, in some degree, to home defence. The extent of the dysfunctional and haphazard approach in the early months of the RSL-VDC was clearly demonstrated in Victoria. At the end of October 1940, Victoria had 5,477 men enrolled in the RSL-VDC but they were scattered throughout the State in 209 separate units, with 154 units in the country and 45 units in the city.207 This resulted in areas likely to be involved in home defence, such as the metropolitan regions, having an insufficient number of volunteers. The lack of any standardisation or national structure

202 Report on the Meeting on the 11 June 1940, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 203 Military Board instruction A. 73, 15 July 1940, NAA A663, O186/1/7. 204 History of No. 1 Battalion (WA) p.2, AWM 54, 1008/2/53. 205 The West Australian, 5 October 1940, p.12. 206 Healesville and Yarra Glen Guardian, 8 March 1941, p.3. 207 The early establishment of the VDC (VIC) p.2, AWM 54, 1008/2/54. The much needed re-organisation occurred when the RSL-VDC came under Army control in May 1941, with the State being divided into five Groups conforming to the Brigade areas of Southern Command. The Groups were further divided into Battalions under a Battalion Commander.

53 proved to be a manifest weakness of the organisation in its current configuration. At this stage, there were certainly no plans for any form of integration into the Army.208

Additionally, the autonomous nature of the RSL-VDC resulted in the Army not recognising any military ranks within the Corps. Consistent with MBI A. 73, the Corps had a voluntary membership basis with a ‘no ranks’ format. In practice, this requirement was never realistically going to work successfully. As a result, leaders were given appointments graded according to the size of the units they controlled. Due to the absence of any uniform, again as laid down in MBI A. 73, the grades of appointment were indicated by the use of various coloured cloth strips attached to the armlet. For example, Commander-red, Group Commander- grey, Battalion Leader-yellow, Company Leader-green, Platoon Leader-white, Section Leader-purple, Administration Staff and Liaison Officers-light blue.209 These ‘officer’ appointments plainly had no standing outside the RSL-VDC organisation.210 A distinguishing armlet needed to be worn by the RSL-VDC when attending training or carrying out any other duties as required of them. As well, the ex-Imperial servicemen were permitted to wear the regimental badges of their original units on their armlets 211 When wearing the armlet, members were also expected to wear service and decoration ribbons together with meeting the requirement of saluting uniformed army officers when taking part in Corps’ parades.212

Not surprisingly, difficulties soon arose in relation to the criteria for selection of leaders. Many of the appointed leaders had taken no interest in current military affairs and had little knowledge of modern warfare in 1940.213 Command of each RSL sub-branch unit was by choice of the members and generally the selection process worked well, or at least was well received. Conflict over the selection process surfaced, however, when non-military

208 The Army War Effort, 31 December 1940, Chapter Four, NAA A5954, 298/1. 209 The V.D.C. - Its Inception and History by Major Henderson, p.4, AWM 54, 1008/2/45. 210 For the sake of the thesis, I will use the term officer as they were considered, within the RSL-VDC, as officers. The lack of ranks caused a great deal of confusion and was a problem that required an early resolution. 211 Military Board instruction A. 73, 15 July 1940, NAA A663, O186/1/7. 212 Military Board instruction A. 73, 15 July 1940, NAA A663, O186/1/7. 213 Letter from J. W. Markin to Lt-Colonel R. Travers 2 July 1940, AWM 54, 1008/3/3, 419/105/4.Travers was the Commanding Officer of 17 Battalion RSL-VDC (NSW).

54 factors, such as services to the RSL branch, became the dominant factor. As a result, men whose most recent military involvement was over twenty years ago, were placed in command of, or exercised control over, younger and more recently trained leaders.214 As well, some men who had previously held commissions in the 1st AIF refused to serve under former officers who had previously held a more junior rank than they had held in the last war. Indeed, one member resigned from his unit refusing to serve under a former junior officer but cordially offered to withdraw his resignation if he was placed under the command of any officer, ‘irrespective of his efficiency’, who had held a similar or more senior rank.215

In any event, former high rank or previous war service did not necessarily always equate to a capability in commanding men, and as a result, the quality and suitability of leadership of the RSL-VDC units varied considerably.216 Moreover, the selection of leaders became limited when many of the most capable unit members transferred to Garrison Battalions, the AIF or the Militia thus stripping the potential officers and NCOs from their respective units. These transfers, particularly from country units, were severe enough to cause some units to cease functioning for a period until they could be re-established with the further enrolment of volunteers.217 The question of ranks was quickly recognised as posing a difficult problem for the RSL-VDC but the solution to the problem proved to be elusive in the near term.

During the early stages of RSL-VDC, the role of Corps Commander in each State were filled by distinguished soldiers from the First World War whose age had prohibited the majority of them from being offered appointments in the AIF or the militia. In Queensland, the Corps Commander was -General Lachlan Wilson (aged 69), in New South Wales Major-General H (aged 53), in Victoria Major-General Sir (aged 67), in South Australia Brigadier-General Raymond Leane (aged 62), in Western

214 Letter from J. W. Markin to Lt-Colonel R. Travers 2 July 1940, AWM 54, 1008/3/3 419/105/4. 215 Letter from ex-Major E. Vidal to Lt-Colonel R. Travers 6 September 1940, AWM 54, 1008/3/3, 418/105/4. 216 Report to Lt-Colonel Travers 5 August 1940, AWM 54, 1008/3/3. 217 The VDC: Formation and Progress in Western Australia, p.5, AWM 54, 1008/2/53.

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Australia Brigadier-General Alfred Bessell-Browne (aged 62) and in Tasmania Lieutenant- Colonel Leslie Mullen (aged 57).218 There were regular changes of Corps Commanders due to poor health or the attainment of the retirement age of sixty-five years. In fact, several of the original Corps Commanders were over the retirement age when appointed.

More importantly, the suspected association between the private armies and the RSL re-surfaced with the Corps Commanders’ appointments. Indeed, as one historian contends, it is likely that the first three Corps Commanders in New South Wales all had connections with the Old Guard of the 1930s and that the private army’s former district organisation in New South Wales formed the administration of the RSL-VDC. 219 The Corps Commander in South Australia was also believed to have had affiliations with that state’s private army.220 Wilcox also argues that the majority of the appointed Corps Commanders of the RSL-VDC had previous associations with the various private armies of the 1930s.221 Nonetheless, it would seem on balance, there is little evidence of the private army associations, despite their undisputed presence within the organisation, displaying any controlling or significant influence on the RSL-VDC organisation. To a certain extent, the arbitrary establishment of the RSL-VDC units would handicap any attempt of a controlling influence.

The restriction in MBI A. 73 of the RSL-VDC to returned soldiers only was quickly recognised as impractical and unenforceable. In contradiction to the clear restrictions placed on the organisation by MBI A. 73, on the ground the RSL-VDC was overlooking the enrolment of non-ex-servicemen as auxiliaries and allowing them to participate in training and other activities though not permitting them membership of the RSL-VDC.222 This auxiliary participation forced the non-returned soldiers to be issued with a separate

218 Dudley McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area First Year, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1959, p.3. 219 Moore, ‘Retreads or reactionaries’, p.7. Moore named Major-General Gordon Bennett, Brigadier-General and Major-General J. D. Richardson as having previous associations with the Old Guard. Heane would replace Major-General H. Gordon-Bennett in September 1940 when Gordon-Bennett was called up to command the newly formed 8th Division AIF. 220 Moore, ‘Retreads or reactionaries’, p.7. 221 Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, p.128. 222 History of the 4 Battalion VDC (NSW), AWM 54, 1008/2/31.

56 armband without the letters RSL embroidered on it, in contrast to RSL-VDC members who wore the officially approved armband.223 By the end of November 1940, the strength of the Corps was recorded as 37,120.224 It is unclear whether this figure included non-returned members, since the recording procedure was ill-defined with each sub-branch dealing with the issue independently. It was becoming clearly apparent that a scheme was needed to bring ex-servicemen and civilians together in one organisation.

Moreover, letters began appearing in the newspapers questioning the rationale behind such enrolment restrictions, with some men participating in training several times a week only to be informed later that their services could not be used since they were non- returned soldiers.225 In reality, the issue was treated differently, on a state by state and unit by unit basis. For example, in September 1940 the NSW RSL-VDC Corps Commander, Major- General H. Gordon Bennett, raised no objections provided the men were over 35 and their number did not exceed twenty per cent of company strength. These volunteers were only to be accepted by invitation, could hold no rank as NCOs or officers and their memberships were to be regarded as ‘unofficial’.226 This necessitated men with no war service being taken on in the form of auxiliaries. In rural Victoria, surplus men were able to train as auxiliaries under their own leaders and formed a reserve pool of men which could be drawn on for filling vacancies in the unit as they arose.227 While giving the volunteers an opportunity to receive some military training, it produced an unauthorised, and undesirable, distinction between RSL-VDC unit members and auxiliary members. To counter this growing problem, a partial solution was reached by a Ministerial direction, announced in early March 1941, that if the number of recruits for the RSL-VDC was insufficient for a particular area, men who had not served overseas would be allowed to enlist to supplement the Corps.228 This provided a degree of much needed uniformity in addressing the problem but only applied in areas

223 History of the 4 Battalion VDC (NSW), AWM 54, 1008/2/31. The Taree unit had the letters DTC (Defence Training Corps) embroidered on their armband. 224 Report on the RSL-VDC by the Inspector-in-Chief of RSL-VDC, 9 April 1941, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/295. Individual State totals were Queensland-6,000, New South Wales-12,000, Victoria-6,000, South Australia- 8,000, Western Australia-4,000, Tasmania-1,000 and Australian Capital Territory-120. 225 The West Australian, 1 March 1941, p.13. 226 Summary of a Conference of RSL-VDC Company Commanders 29 September 1940, AWM 54, 1008/3/3. 227 History 21 Battalion VDC (VIC) p.7, AWM 54, 1008/2/54. 228 In an announcement made by the Minister for the Army, Percy Spender, March 1941, NAA A5954, 272/9.

57 where there were insufficient numbers of ex-servicemen. More to the point, it did not address the growing groundswell of men who had not served in the last war, mainly located in the metropolitan areas rather than rural regions, who wished to participate in basic military training.

The issue of men who had not served overseas in wishing to offer their services had, in fact, already been raised before the RSL-VDC was inaugurated. Two weeks prior to the official announcement of the formation of the Australian Army Reserve, Dyett had written to the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Brudenell White, suggesting that an additional Class for the Australian Army Reserve be authorised.229 Dyett had proposed that this additional class, to be termed Class “C” and auxiliary to RSL-VDC units, should consist of non-ex-servicemen over the military age of 48 and ineligible for full-time military service due to health issues or occupation.230 Despite not being ex-servicemen and therefore not officially authorised to join the RSL-VDC, it was suggested that the new Class “C” volunteers could still attend the same parades and training as the RSL-VDC units.231 Furthermore, several weeks later, Dyett wrote to the Prime Minister reminding him of his offer in July to provide training to civilians as auxiliary RSL-VDC personnel. Dyett had been receiving reports concerning the enrolment of non-ex-servicemen from the State Presidents. The Queensland State President of the League, Sir Raymond Huish, wrote to the RSL Federal President on 5 September 1940 stating his State was well-organised and in a ‘position to absorb, either into the Corps, or as an Auxiliary, civilians over age, who, as you know, are continually making requests to us to be allowed to train with the ex- servicemen.’232 Furthermore, he added ‘quite irrespective of what action the Government has taken … the cold fact remains that civilian organisations in various forms are springing up all over the country.’233 Partly as a result of Huish’s letter, in mid-September, Dyett informed the Prime Minister that several sub-branches of the RSL had ignored the Military

229 Letter from Dyett to White on 1 July 1940, NAA A663, O186/1/7. 230 Letter from Dyett to White on 1 July 1940, NAA A663, O186/1/7. AIF rejections rose from only 3,900 in 1939 to 193,144, over 22 per cent of men examined, in 1942. This provided many prospective members for the VDC, men wishing to serve but unable to join the AIF, see Joan Beaumont, The Australian Centenary History of Defence Vol. 6, Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001, p.120. 231 Letter from Dyett to White on 1 July 1940, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/373. 232 Letter from Huish to Dyett 5 September 1940, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/373. 233 Letter from Huish to Dyett 5 September 1940, NAA MP508/1, 283/701/373.

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Board Instruction and included non-ex-servicemen in their units.234 This letter requested that the government ‘expand our scheme to such an extent as to satisfy the desire of those civilians who are over the military age, and who are actually doing similar work to the Defence Corps, as separate Units, without State or District control or supervision.’235 The central body of the RSL was attempting to exercise some degree of control over the newly formed units but local autonomy dominated the new organisation.

It is useful at this point to compare the early experience of the RSL-VDC with that of the Home Guard in Britain and the Home Guard of New Zealand. The British Home Guard had come into existence following Germany’s long-anticipated attack on France and the Low Countries. The newly appointed Secretary of State for War, Anthony Eden, announced on 14 May 1940 the raising of a home guard, originally named the Local Defence Volunteers (LDV). Its role, as part of the Army, was set out in the Army Council Instruction 924 in 6 August 1940.236 At this time, unlike Australia, Britain was facing the very real and immediate threat of invasion and the government could not ignore the calls from all quarters to form local defence detachments. The LDV was launched without any staff, funds or premises of its own, with the War Office relying on ‘public-spirited’ people, preferably ex-officers, to organise and take command of these units.237 In the early stages, the British Home Office and the War Office expressed apprehension at establishing an armed force of civilians, judging it would cause more problems than it would solve.238 In contrast to the RSL-VDC, the Home Guard was under control of the Army from the very beginning and placed under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces. Enrolment was not restricted to ex- servicemen with the criteria being ‘any man aged from seventeen to sixty-five with knowledge of firearms and capable of free movement’.239 Initially, membership was voluntary but with the change of roles from static defence to the manning of anti-aircraft

234 Letter from Dyett to Menzies on 5 September 1940, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/373. 235 Letter from Huish to Dyett 5 September 1940, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/373. 236 Norman Longmate, The Real Dad’s Army: The Story of the Home Guard, Hutchinson Library Services, London, 1974, p.47. 237 Longmate, The Real Dad’s Army, p.12. 238 Mackenzie, The Home Guard, p.26. 239 Ian F. W. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-1945, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991, p.266; Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1957, p.106. Approximately 40 per cent of its members had seen service in the First World War, Mackenzie, The Home Guard, p.37.

59 guns and searchlight at the end of 1941, the government made enrolment compulsory in areas where Home Guard units were below required strength.240 In Australia, in comparison, membership remained on a voluntary basis throughout the war. By the end of June, Churchill had re-named the LDV the British Home Guard and the force had ballooned to nearly one and a half million men.241

New Zealand, likewise, experienced an upsurge of its citizens, largely from rural areas, wishing to contribute to home defence.242 In order to meet this growing demand, the government decided there should be ‘a voluntary, government-run, locally organised, non- military force, reasonably trained and fit, to do anything from coast-watching while at their daily work to assisting the police or serving with the Army in an emergency’ and approved the formation of the New Zealand Home Guard on 2 August 1940.243 Again, in contrast to the RSL-VDC, the New Zealand Home Guard was under Army control from its very formation and previous military service was not a requirement to join. As well, being under Army control, the organisation was given a role within home defence. At first there was a reluctant acceptance by the Army which complained that it was fully occupied at that time with the New Zealand Expeditionary Force and training the Territorial Force (Militia). The Army explained it could do very little for it and would not supply uniforms, arms or ammunition.244

Nonetheless, the New Zealand government, like the Australian government believed the forming of a Home Guard would meet the demand from those citizens who were ‘frothing to do some hard useful work without thought of payment’ with individual units based on communities.245 In March 1942, with the Japanese threatening the South-west

240 Mackenzie, The Home Guard, p.109-111. 241 Longmate, The Real Dad’s Army, p.11. Often quoted jibes for the LDV suggested the initials stood for Look, Duck and Vanish, Last Desperate Venture or Long Dentured Veterans. 242 Nancy Taylor, The New Zealand People at War: The Home Front Vol. 1, in Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45, Historical Publication Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1986, p.454. 243 Taylor, ‘The Home Front’, p.453. 244 Taylor, ‘The Home Front’, p.453. 245 Taylor, ‘The Home Front’, p.454.

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Pacific, membership reached a peak of approximately 100,000. This number, a number equivalent to Australia, is worth noting especially when comparing the size of the respective populations (Australia 7,000,000; New Zealand 1,600,000).246 Within twelve months, the public support for Home Guard had declined so much, the government made membership of the Home Guard compulsory in April 1942 and absence from parades without leave could lead to prosecution.247 In spite of the compulsion, attendances at parades remained haphazard as illustrated by one platoon commander having 36 men one week while the following week no-one attended.248 In the end, with the improving Allied situation, the New Zealand Home Guard was stood down at the end of 1943.249 The NZ VDC has been summed up by some as ‘a guerrilla force of freelance nuisances to the invader’.250

In Australia, aside from the eligibility issues arising from the inauguration of the RSL- VDC, the lack of government support affected the organisation in three significant ways; funding, supply of equipment, which included uniforms, and training. In terms of funding, the RSL assumed total financial responsibility for the new organisation. This responsibility was addressed through several means. First, shortly after establishment, the respective State Governments and various private enterprises progressively began contributing towards the cost of administering the RSL-VDC. For example, the NSW government provided a furnished suite of offices in Sydney, a typist, trained record and despatch staff and telephone service for use by the RSL-VDC and later supplied two ‘All lines’ railway passes for use by the Commander and a staff officer.251 It was estimated the cost of administration to the State Government and individual VDC members of the RSL-VDC in NSW alone, from July 1940 to May 1941, was approximately £20,000.252 In Victoria, the State Government provided assistance by the provision of administration offices, supplies and staff and, similar

246 Taylor, The Home Front, p.460. 247 Taylor, ‘The Home Front’, p.473. There were certain occupations and groups that received exemption. They were police, firemen, seamen, doctors, chemists, Maoris, magistrates, judges, Ministers of religion, blind and disabled persons, hospital patients and prisoners. 248 Taylor, The Home Front, p.469. 249 Taylor, ‘The Home Front’, p.477. 250 Taylor, ‘The Home Front’, p.466. 251 Conference held at RSL Headquarters 28 February 1941, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/295. 252 Letter to G.O.C Eastern Command from Commander RSL-VDC (NSW) Brigadier-General Heane 2 July 1941, AWM 193, 203.

61 to NSW, two free State rail passes.253 In fact, the Inspector-in-Chief of the RSL-VDC, Sir Harry Chauvel, made mention in his report on the Corps in mid-1941, that no other State Government had helped the RSL-VDC to the extent of the Victorian and New South Wales governments.254 Nonetheless, assistance in establishing an administrative centre was not confined to these two States. In Western Australia, in a display of patriotic community spirit, the offices of the RSL-VDC Headquarters were furnished with the support of local businesses through the donation of furniture.255

Second, in an effort to raise their own funds, the RSL-VDC made local appeals and arranged other fund raising activities. In order to legalise these activities, all New South Wales units registered under the Charitable Collections Act. Many RSL-VDC units instigated their own fund through the voluntary subscription by the members with collections taken up after parades. From these funds, the units could purchase equipment needed for training such as water bottles, haversacks and first-aid dressings.256 As well, numerous members purchased their own army manuals and provided the free use of private vehicles.257 The more affluent units even made arrangements for the purchase of their own uniforms for their unit.258 In addition, the highly decorated Corps Commanders used their influence within the community to raise funds from friends and well-wishers.259 The combination of all these activities allowed the RSL-VDC to meet its current contingencies, and allowed the State Headquarters of the RSL to assume the cost of funding the postage and petty cash expenses for a number of units prior to these individual units organising their own funding.260 Moreover, the lack of government funding was not restricted to the Corps. Similarly, the Air Raid Precaution (ARP) wardens had to supply their own meals while on duty, pay any transport costs involved in going to and from their stations and any postage

253 Report on the RSL-VDC by the Inspector-in-Chief of RSL-VDC, 9 April 1941, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/295. 254 Report on the RSL-VDC by the Inspector-in-Chief of RSL-VDC, 9 April 1941, NAA MP508/1,286/701/295. 255 The VDC: Formation and Progress in Western Australia, p.6, AWM 54, 1008/2/53. 256 History of “A” Company 4 Battalion VDC (Q), 30 June 1942, AWM 54, 1008/2/12. 257 History of “A” Company 4 Battalion VDC (Q), 30 June 1942, AWM 54, 1008/2/12. 258 de Pierrres, Wheatbelt Warriors, p.8. The Merredin unit collected sufficient funds for each man to be supplied with a uniform through the local store. See also The official history of 18 Battalion VDC Cootamundra (NSW) p.4, AWM 1008/2/31. 259 Volunteer Defence Corps NSW: VDC History, p.4, AWM 54, 1008/2/11. 260 Moore, ‘Retreads or reactionaries?’, p.3.

62 charges arising from official duties.261 Nonetheless, like the VDC, each warden did manage to receive a government funded armband signifying their official status.262

To counter the lack of government support in terms of supply of equipment, many VDC units improvised and produced their own weapons. With the confiscation by the Army of .303 rifles, particularly in rural regions, many variations of rifles were produced ranging from basic wooden rifles to rifles complete with an iron butt and a removable bayonet.263 At the very least, these rudimentary weapons allowed rifle drill to take place. In Pemberton, Western Australia, a former British Army machine gunner made copies of the Lewis and Spandau machine guns, thus enabling the unit to claim it possessed two machine gun sections. 264 So severe was the shortage of all equipment that virtually everything required by the unit, in order to train or even function, had to be improvised. As well as dummy weapons, one unit even succeeded in making a fifteen ton German cruising tank.265 In light of the lack of federal government support, some individuals took it upon themselves to assist with the supply of weapons to the RSL-VDC units. In this regard, the South Australian State Commandant Brigadier Harry Bundock made available 5,000 Martini Cadet Rifles to the South Australian RSL-VDC and these were immediately distributed throughout the State through the RSL sub-branches.266 As well, the Victorian RSL Headquarters sought approval to purchase ammunition for the State’s RSL-VDC units in order they could perform musketry practice but received approval to purchase just 500 rounds of .22 inch ammunition.267

261 McKernan, All In!, p.118. 262 McKernan, All In!, p.118. 263 Daniel Connell, The War at Home, ABC Enterprises, Sydney, 1988, p.38. One member in Casino produced fifty wooden rifles in his furniture factory in order that the men in his unit could begin drilling. As well, he made wooden rattles that imitated the sound of machine gun fire to add authenticity to their training 264 Gay Eivers, ‘Pemberton Goes to War’ in Jenny Gregory (ed.), On the Homefront, University of WA Press, Perth, 1996, p.13. Also see de Pierres, Wheatbelt Warriors, p.8. With the eventual arrival of new machine guns, the repaired German machine guns were recalled and many towns lost their First World War mementos. 265 History of the 4 Battalion VDC (Q) 30 September 1944, AWM 54, 1008/2/12. Unfortunately, there are no details on how such a tank was manufactured. 266 The V.D.C. – Its Inception and History by Major Henderson, p.2, AWM 54, 1008/2/45. Nevertheless, the .310 Martini Cadet rifles issued to the members were often considered toys and not recognised by many as weapons for defence, let alone offence. 267 Letter to the Military Board from General Officer Commanding Eastern Command 31 October 1940, NAA 508/1, 286/701/127.

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In a further example, a request by a RSL-VDC Staff Officer in October 1940 to the Department of the Army for supply of serviceable, or even unserviceable, rifles for drill purposes, machine guns, .303 rifle ammunition and .310 Cadet Rifle ammunition received the more typical reply. The request was disallowed stating there was no available ammunition for either type of rifle and all available stocks of rifles and machine guns were already on issue.268 As a result of the lack of support, there was growing concern within the sub-branches and the Federal RSL office received numerous letters warning that ‘the men were becoming restless in the absence of adequate equipment’ and explaining ‘that a digger without a rifle will remain merely a stuffed battledress till he receives his rifle and can take his rightful place in the defence of his country.’269 The chronic shortage of equipment and uniforms provided the early portrayal of the RSL-VDC as old men, dressed in a variety of clothing including suits, drilling with wooden rifles as seen on in Figure 1.1.

Such equipment shortages were not a uniquely Australian problem. The British Home Guard likewise experienced a shortage of weapons even though they were under Army control. The 11th Shropshire Battalion, for example, trained with Crimean War cavalry carbines and a Manchester battalion were training with one hundred year old Snyder rifles.270 In its worst manifestation, as a result of the shortage of rifles, a ‘pike’ was issued in 1941 to Home Guard units for street fighting and soon became the British Home Guard’s most despised weapon, being no more than a gas pipe with a seventeen inch bayonet fitted to one end.271

Compounding the issue, there appeared to be some misunderstanding within the Government and the volunteers themselves about the role of the RSL-VDC in home defence and any provision of government support for the Corps. In September 1940, the Minister for

268 Letter to the Department of the Army in Melbourne 28 October 1940, NAA MP 508/1, 286/701/125. 269 Sekuless and Rees, Lest We Forget, p.96. The letters were written from the State Secretaries’ of Western Australian and New South Wales. 270 Longmate, The Real Dad’s Army, p.65. 271 Longmate, The Real Dad’s Army, p.76. Britain had experienced the problem of insufficient rifles and uniforms during the First World War when Kitchener’s call for volunteers in 1914 had resulted in over one million men volunteering which far exceeded the one hundred thousand target, see Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, Headline Book Publishing, London, 2001, p.43.

64 the Army, Percy Spender, in answering a parliamentary question regarding provision of uniforms for the Volunteer Defence Corps, replied ‘that men who joined the Class “A” Reserve of the Citizen Forces or Class “B” Reserve for Garrison Battalions had received uniforms and personal equipment but not the RSL-VDC.’272 He rightly stated that the provision for such items ‘had not been contemplated when authority was given for the formation of the Corps’, adding that he believed that the RSL President had ‘conferred with the State Presidents and their attitude on this matter was satisfactory’.273 The question arose following a press statement released on 21 September from Menzies indicating that the Corps ‘would be constituted as part of the Defence Organisation with official status, and that as soon as certain requirements have been provided [presumably Menzies was referring to the equipping of the newly formed divisions] the Corps would be issued with uniforms and equipment’.274 Menzies later claimed his statements had come with qualifications, but did not state what they were, and that the provision of uniforms and equipment would only occur after other requirements, such as passing a medical fitness examination, had been filled. Surprisingly, he reaffirmed his position that no non-returned soldiers would be admitted to the Corps.275

Moreover, the lack of equipment impacted on the ability of the RSL-VDC units to train. The RSL-VDC was permitted to carry out such voluntary training as could be mutually arranged between the militia and State Branches of the League.276 While many militia units were willing to provide instructors and equipment to assist in the training of the local RSL- VDC members, training could only occur when the local militia could provide instructors, weapons, and training stores.277 In other words, the militia had to supply the unit with its

272 War Cabinet Minute 3 September 1940, NAA A5954, 268/2. 273 War Cabinet Minute 23 September 1940, NAA A5954, 268/2. MBI A. 73 Instruction Point 14 (f) states ‘uniforms and equipment will not be issued to members of the Volunteer Defence Corps. An armlet be issued and will be worn when attending training parades or carrying out other duties as required of them.’ 274 War Cabinet Minute 24 September 1940, NAA A5954, 268/2. 275 War Cabinet Minute 24 September 1940, NAA A2671, 30/1941. The reality was very different, especially in country regions. In early 1941, the average percentage of RSL members in each unit in northern NSW of the RSL-VDC was approximately thirty per cent. The balance of the unit consisted of non-returned soldiers and men not eligible for call up for reasons such as age, health or marriage, Report by Major-General Fewtrell, Commander 1 Division p.1, AWM 193, 443 Part 4. 276 Military Board instruction A. 73, 15 July 1940, NAA A663, O186/1/7. 277 “A” Coy History, 21 Battalion VDC (VIC), AWM 54, 1008/2/54.

65 entire equipment if any training, other than drilling, was to be carried out. Due to the volunteer nature of the force, most training was undertaken on the weekend. The weekend was considered the most suitable time in light of the individual’s work commitments and the availability of the AIF and militia instructors but it was a very individual and unpredictable situation. Each unit was reliant on personal relationship with, or the goodwill of, the nearest militia group and this relationship determined the degree of assistance that was offered. In one instance in November 1940, the Commander of the NSW RSL-VDC, Brigadier-General James Heane, on behalf of sub-branch units located in the southern areas of the State, wrote to Eastern Command requesting RSL-VDC volunteers be permitted to attend schools of instruction conducted by Southern Command as these schools were closer to the units if they wished to attend a course. The short reply informed him that this was not possible as there were no ‘schools of instruction held in Southern Command which members of the RSL-VDC may attend.’278 Many units experienced difficulty obtaining assistance from the militia and ultimately improvised with in-house instructors.279 There were few officers experienced in the modern mobile war tactics able to give meaningful instruction.

Ultimately, the majority of available in-house instructors relied on the knowledge they had acquired in the First World War and used the corresponding army manuals from that era.280 To overcome any decrease in enthusiasm, the RSL-VDC Headquarters offered planning suggestions for training periods. It was proposed that the one-and-a-half hour training period could be broken up into three equal periods. The first period would involve physical training while the second period would deal with drilling. The suggestion for the final period was for lectures on field and tactical exercises.281 In the absence of any strategic task or any allocation of a defined role in home defence being assigned to the RSL-VDC, there was a degree of uncertainty in knowing exactly what to train for.

278 Letter from RSL-VDC NSW to Eastern Command 13 November 1940, AWM 61, 411/1/303. The first school of instruction in New South Wales for metropolitan battalions commenced on 22 July 1940, just one week after official authorisation, with over one hundred members attending, Volunteer Defence Corps NSW: VDC History, p.7, AWM 54, 1008/2/11. 279 Early history of VDC in areas now administered by No. 6 Battalion (WA), p.1, AWM 54, 1008/2/53. In Katanning Western Australia, the local RSL-VDC unit was very fortunate to have two instructors in their ranks. 280 Report by Major-General Fewtrell, Commander 1 Division p.2, AWM 193, 443 Part4. 281 Training Instruction No.3 9 July 1940, AWM 54, 943/15/3.

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Despite the difficulties organising training events for RSL-VDC units presented, particularly for rural units, instruction courses for officers and NCOs in the Sydney metropolitan area began as early as July 1940. Forty-five men from various RSL-VDC metropolitan units were invited to attend a course in Sydney lasting two nights a week for four weeks and were required to bring gymnastic shorts and sand shoes, athletic singlets, a notebook and pencils.282 The syllabus of the training included squad, platoon, company, and battalion drill, rifle exercises, arms training, bayonet training, physical training, recreational games and lectures.283 A course in August 1940 on specialising in physical training was also conducted in Sydney and a Primary Instructor’s Badge could be purchased for the cost of two shillings upon qualifying. A manual of drill and physical training also became available for sixpence together with a military text book on map reading and field sketching at a cost of one shilling.284 As was the usual practice, members paid for all resources required. However, even in the event of obtaining places at schools of instruction, there was concern expressed by the instructors at the standard of junior officers attending the lectures which reinforced reservations whether that the officer appointments being made by the sub- branches were determined by ambition rather than ability.285

Training problems were, however, larger than simply equipment shortages and availability of instructors. As a consequence of the initial structure, a further problem quickly arose regarding the physical training of a RSL-VDC unit. As previously discussed, each unit was able to consist of three different classes of men; those classified for Class “A” Reserve, Garrison Battalion Reserve and those classified as ineligible for either. Moreover, each classification was required to perform different roles and, therefore, should undertake the correct training for their classification. In addition, although many original diggers had readily enrolled to join the RSL-VDC, it became apparent that the physical requirements of training would prove greater than the enthusiasm of the ex-soldiers and some platoons finished with as many onlookers as participants at parades.286 This resulted in further

282 Training Instruction No.2 5 July 1940, AWM 54, 943/15/3. 283 Training Instruction No.2 5 July 1940, AWM 54, 943/15/3. 284 RSL-VDC Training Instruction No. 7, 11 September 1940, AWM 54, 1008/1. 285 RSL-VDC Training Instruction No. 10, 14 October 1940, AWM 54, 1008/1. 286 Salient of facts of the formation and development of the RSL-VDC WA, p.5, AWM 54, 1008/2/53.

67 medical examinations being required to determine whether the volunteers were fit enough to commence the required physical training. It was stressed that the wearing of coats, collars and ties should not be allowed during any exercise but the wearing of the khaki armband was permitted.287 Interestingly, in rural areas, a larger proportion of men were physically fitter due to the agricultural nature of their work unlike metropolitan members who were more apt to be employed in less arduous occupations.288 One unit leader suggested separating the unit into three separate platoons to accommodate various training regimes but this proved to be very difficult.289 Partly as a result of these teething complications, some states attempted to standardise physical training so a general standard of fitness could be achieved by all men in all units but with no cohesive co-ordination of training, units ultimately concentrated on what they considered best suited their own district 290

Further administrative problems associated with the original set-up of the organisation began coming to light. Insofar as the RSL-VDC units were part of the RSL organisation, and not under the Department of Defence jurisdiction, this meant the voluntary and part-time force did not come under Army regulations.291 This unique context raised unforeseen complications in regard to the right to compensation for RSL-VDC members. The distances involved in travelling regularly to and from parades, particularly for the rural units, increased the incidence of traffic accidents. Any death or injury of a member would obviously cause considerable hardship for their widow and family. The Government had a legal obligation to make provision for widows and families of members of the Military Forces under the Defence Act 1903-1939.292 The difference, however, was that the RSL-VDC was organised and administered by the RSL. While the Military Board had approved their formation, there had been no provision for any compensation for members injured or killed

287 RSL-VDC Training Instruction No.5, 26 August 1940, AWM 54, 1008/1. Prior to the issuance of any uniforms, the armband provided the expectation that it would demarcate the VDC from the civilian population so in the event of any conflict they would be deemed soldiers and not civilians. A fighting civilian normally warranted immediate execution while a captured soldier would hopefully be treated as a . 288 History 6 Battalion VDC (VIC) p.2, AWM 54, 1008/2/54. 289 A letter to Wallace Wurth RSL-VDC Headquarters, 30 September 1940, AWM 54, 1008/3/3. 290 Volunteer Defence Corps NSW: VDC History, p.7, AWM 54, 1008/2/11. 291 Advocate, 28 October, 1940, p.4. 292 Letter from Crown Solicitor to the Attorney-General’s Department 3 April 1941, NAA A472, W2662

68 whilst on duty for the RSL-VDC. In September 1940, an accident involving three RSL-VDC members driving to various country towns inspecting units resulted in one death and injuries to the other two men. Appeals for compensation following the accident elicited an opinion from the Crown Solicitor on the Commonwealth’s liability. The opinion stated the Commonwealth was under no legal liability under the Defence Act since the Corps was not kept up by enlistment as part of the Defence Forces and members neither agreed to serve for any period of time nor take an oath of enlistment.293 In the absence of any regulatory framework for compensation to members, the Corps Headquarters tried to secure personal accident insurance for the members. A policy was presented to the sub-branches which granted compensation in the event of Death by Accident at a payout figure of £100, while Temporary Total Disablement by Accident insurance provided payment of £2 per week, limited to only thirteen weeks, for an annual cost of three shillings and ten pence per volunteer.294 The lack of compensation would understandably result in some reluctance to volunteer or serve as a reason for withdrawing from the Corps. The men and their families could ill-afford to be deprived of any earnings as a result of an accident.

In the early months after the raising of the RSL-VDC units, it proved very hard to maintain consistent parade attendances due to the voluntary nature of the organisation. Attendances fluctuated on an almost weekly basis and there was a growing dissatisfaction and discouragement within the organisation, necessitating unit leaders to spend many hours attempting to maintain interest.295 In the absence of any genuine direction from the Federal Government, the initial burst of enthusiasm which had seen 10,000 members of the RSL-VDC throughout NSW presented themselves for drill training on a Sunday afternoon in August, began to wane.296 Some country units even went into recess over the Christmas period due to the work commitments of the members and the festive events during this

293 Letter from Crown Solicitor to the Attorney-General’s Department 3 April 1941, NAA A472, W2662. No compensation was paid to the families. Regulations were passed under the Defence Act and National Security Acts providing for compensation after inauguration into the Army. 294 RSL-VDC Administrative Memo No.13, 6 November 1940, AWM 54, 1008/1/8. There is no indication of the number of members, if any, who took up this option. 295 History 21 Battalion (VIC) p.3, AWM 54, 1008/2/54. 296 Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, p.127.

69 period.297 The decline in motivation was compounded by the continuing lack of support in the form of weapons and equipment which led to a further decrease in numbers. Insofar as the volunteers were concerned, the majority of men were unaware of the conditions laid down in MBI A.73 regarding the formation of the RSL-VDC. This left many volunteers disillusioned when the Corps was not established on a proper military footing and had no defined role in home defence.298

The lack of government support, Craig Wilcox argues, was due to the fact that the government wished to distance itself from an organisation of questionable military value.299 Given that the government did not wish to support the RSL-VDC, Wilcox contends the government still hoped that its formation would ‘revive the spirit which sustained the old volunteer forces’.300 Arguably, the priority of the government at this juncture of the war was the raising and equipping of new AIF Divisions, not providing material or financial support to a quasi-military group of men it did not control. In agreeing to the formation of the organisation, the government had stated it would not provide any support and, despite widespread demands, the government, on the whole, kept its part of the agreement as set out in MBI A. 73.

Importantly, the ability of the RSL-VDC to carry out its role in the newly reconstituted Army Reserve was put to the test in October 1940. Having undertaken the responsibility of providing personnel for Garrison Battalion Reserves, the RSL was invited by the army to assist in the raising of three new Garrison Battalion Reserves for duty around the metropolitan Sydney, Port Kembla and Newcastle areas. A recruiting campaign for volunteers was instigated with a circular being sent out to all RSL branches in the adjacent areas informing the members that vacancies existed in new Garrison Battalions. The branches were very willing to assist in the recruiting process, with some even submitting the

297 History 6 Battalion VDC (VIC) p.2, AWM 54, 1008/2/54. 298 Report by Brigadier-General James Heane Commander NSW RSL-VDC 19 February 1941, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 299 Wilcox, Hearths and Home, p.127. 300 Wilcox, Hearths and Home, p.127.

70 names of possible officers, along with the complete set of required papers and medical forms, to the relevant army authorities.301 Nevertheless, recruiting was considerably slower than expected requiring another memo to be sent stressing the urgency of the requests for volunteers to apply for the raising of the three new Garrison Battalion Reserves.302 Enrolment in the Garrison Battalion Reserve permitted the volunteers to be called up into a Garrison Battalion, not their RSL-VDC unit, in the case of an emergency and this deterred many from volunteering. Ultimately, some 1200 enlistments responded to the campaign.303 By the end of 1940, the RSL-VDC had been unsuccessful in producing sufficient numbers of Class “A” and Class “B” Reservists on a national scale, with little prospect of any large degree of improvement in the situation.304

By December 1940, instructions were issued for all members of Class “A” Reserves to be included in the Australian Military Forces’ establishment strength and the Class “A” classification ceased to exist.305 As well, by the end of 1940, the number of men enrolled in the Garrison Battalion Reserves had superseded the set establishment of 7,277 by over two hundred and fifty. The category of Class “B” Reserve was discontinued a year later as it was considered all the eligible and willing men had been absorbed into Garrison Battalions.306

Notwithstanding the acceptance of the conditions laid down in MBI A.73, and less than three months after formation, the RSL commenced making representations to the Government for the provision of uniforms, equipment and a capitation allowance.307 As well as federal representations, there was growing pressure from the individual sub-branches on the government to become involved in the supply of equipment. For example, the Coogee- Randwick RSL branch had written a letter to the Minister for the Army, Geoffrey Street, in

301 RSL-VDC Administrative Memo No. 12, 28 October 1940, AWM 54, 1008/1/8. The new Reserves were the 7th, 8th and 13th.Garrison Battalion Reserves. 302 RSL-VDC Administrative Memo No. 14, 14 November 1940, AWM 54, 1008/1/8. 303 Volunteer Defence Corps NSW: VDC History, p.4, AWM 54, 1008/2/11. 304 A speech by the Minister for the Army, Percy Spender, 12 March, 1941, NAA A5954, 298/1. 305 The Army War Effort, 31 December 1940, Chapter Four, NAA A5954, 298/1. 306 The Army War Effort 31 August 1941 p.23, NAA AWM 113, MH1/164. The establishment of this class stood at 7,519 by the end of 1940. 307 Extract from War Cabinet Minute, Melbourne 23 September 1940, A5954, 268/2.

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September 1940, requesting a supply of ‘sufficient arms’. Despite government policy of not supplying uniforms and personal equipment to the RSL-VDC, the new Minister, Percy Spender, in granting the request stated he ‘had difficulty rejecting such requests’ and instructed the army to provide the volunteers with greater access to arms.308 Taking into consideration, Australia’s ongoing uniform and equipment commitments, it would seem a polite refusal by the Minister, in line with the terms of MBI A.73, explaining the nation’s priorities would have been appropriate. Provision of much needed equipment to a RSL sub- branch of ex-servicemen, many likely to be unfit for active service, when the war was many thousands miles away from Australian shores, indicates there was increasing political pressure being placed on the government to play a more active role in home defence at this time. Usually the government denied any requests for the supply of weapons.

Concomitantly in October 1940, the newly appointed NSW VDC Commander, Brigadier-General James Heane, wrote to the RSL President suggesting that the time ‘was opportune to approach the Commonwealth Authorities with a view to the future status of the Corps being determined in relation to the special functions to be allotted in time of emergency’.309 Heane further argued that a defined role had to be articulated ‘in order for future training and activities [to be relevant] and [this was] dependent on recognition of the Corps by the military and the allocation of specific duties in connection with home defence.’310 A week later, Heane wrote to the Inspector-in-General of the RSL-VDC suggesting the time had arrived to review the objectives of the RSL-VDC, since as such, they were ‘practically nil excepting the training of men’ and believed this made it difficult to keep the men together.311 The emphasis, as in the letter to the RSL Federal President, was on examining what defined role the organisation should play if mobilisation orders were given. Moreover, in light of the failure to provide sufficient numbers of Garrison Battalion

308 Palazzo, The Australian Army, p.188. The original letter was written to the then Minister for the Army Geoffrey Street who unfortunately died in an air crash in October 1940. The new Minister, Percy Spender, replied to the request. Spender was the Member for Warringah in the House of Representatives. 309 Letter to RSL Federal President from Brigadier-General Heane, 16 October 1940, AWM 193, 213. 310 Letter to RSL Federal President from Brigadier-General Heane, 16 October 1940, AWM 193, 213. 311 Letter to General Sir Harry Chauvel from Brigadier-General Heane, 23 October 1940, AWM 193, 213.

72 reserves, Heane called for a meeting of the various State Commanders in mid-November to discuss the most valuable utilisation of returned soldiers.312

The ramifications of the continuing lack of government support were being felt throughout the organisation. Unit numbers were depleted as men began taking on other duties such as the fire brigade reserve and police reserve who accepted active men and, notably, non-ex-servicemen.313 An indication of the decrease in numbers is shown by the Ballarat unit which boasted three hundred members in October 1940 but several months later this number had dwindled to barely one hundred.314 This diminution of members was seen across the nation. In another example, the northern NSW units, again initially formed with much enthusiasm, fell by up to fifty per cent of their strength, with the remaining volunteers gradually losing their enthusiasm for training and commitment to the unit.315 To counteract the loss in the number of ex-servicemen, some units allowed non-returned soldiers to enlist as allowed by MBI A.73 in the event of insufficient available ex-servicemen. For example, the Kojonup unit in Western Australia promoted the enlistment of non- returned soldiers increasing the original number from 50 to 180 in a matter of months illustrating there was a sizable reservoir of willing replacements that were not returned soldiers.316

So, nearing the end of 1940, it was becoming evident to the RSL that the RSL-VDC organisation needed to be given a definite role in home defence plans if its full value, or any value, was to be utilised. Each interested party had differing views of what this utilisation should involve and how best to achieve it. In December 1940, a Military Board memorandum proposed that the RSL-VDC should have a definite role in local areas for static defence but the Board did not consider it should be an integral part of the Army. It again

312 Letter to General Sir Harry Chauvel from Brigadier-General Heane, 23 October 1940, AWM 193, 213. 313 History 6 Battalion VDC (VIC) p.2, AWM 54, 1008/2/54. 314 History 20 Battalion VDC (VIC) p.2, AWM 54, 1008/2/54. 315 Report by Major-General Fewtrell, Commander 1 Division p.2, AWM 193, 443 Part 4. Major-General Gordon Bennett’s last order to members was to ‘maintain their interest’ until the war was won, see Special Order by Major-General Gordon Bennett 30 September 1940, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 316 Early history of VDC in areas now administered by No. 6 Battalion (WA), p.1, AWM 54, 1008/2/53.

73 emphasised that the Army had no intention of allowing civilians to be enrolled unless ex- servicemen were not available to complete the quotas.317 From the government perspective, the Minister for the Army confirmed the absence of any government financial support, reiterating no uniforms were to be issued to members of the Corps. The reluctance of the government to enrol civilians in the RSL-VDC, despite evidence that this was already taking place, was re-affirmed in a War Cabinet Agendum one month later.318 On the other hand, the RSL-VDC envisaged the organisation becoming an integral part of the AMF, having a defined role in home defence plans that would be shown in the Order of Battle and have equal standing as the Garrison Battalions in the AMF.319

By this time, the strategic situation provided the required impetus for an agreement to be reached between the three parties. The swift military success of Germany in Europe severely limited the ability of Britain to dispatch the Royal Navy to assist in the defence of Australia in the event of an attack. No reasonable government could ignore the possibility of invasion of Australia. This forced the government to begin focussing on home defence. In early 1941, the Army began re-evaluating its defence plans of Australia. Lieutenant-General , appointed Chief of the General Staff on the unfortunate death of Brudenell White in an airplane accident on the 13 August 1940, reported to the government on 10 February 1941 recommending the need to include the RSL-VDC in the overall defence plans in the event of an invasion and the incorporation of the Corps as an integral part of any home defence force.320 This was in contrast to the Army’s previous position. Therefore, in the increasing likelihood that the RSL-VDC would be called upon to help in home defence, the Federal government would have to provide financial resources to the voluntary organisation.321 Crucially, as McCarthy observes, if the government was going to provide

317 War Cabinet Minute 12 February 1941, NAA A2671, 30/1941. The Minister for the Army also confirmed the Military Board’s view that membership to the RSL-VDC was restricted to ex-servicemen as set out in the MBI A.73, unless the quota could not be filled by returned soldiers. This was considered highly likely in isolated districts and rural areas. 318 War Cabinet Agendum 21 January 1941, NAA A5954, 272/9. 319 Report on the RSL Volunteer Defence Corps by Brigadier-General Heane, 19 February 1941, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 320 Report from Sturdee to the Minister of the Army 10 February 1941, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 321 Report on the Conference by the Chief of the General Staff February 1941, AWM 54, 1008/1/13.

74 equipment and funding to the RSL-VDC, it would have to come under control of the Army.322 At this time, the Army was engaged in the training and equipping of the AIF and the militia and could ill-afford to spend time and equipment training the RSL-VDC.

Meanwhile, in response to the proposed, but as yet unofficial, role for the RSL-VDC in home defence, on 12 February 1941 War Cabinet approval was received for the supply of 50,000 sets of uniforms, at a cost of £3/3/- per man totalling £157,000, for issuing to members subject, of course, to the men passing a prescribed medical test.323 Although the reported strength of the RSL-VDC was roughly 35,000 members, the supply of 50,000 uniforms was approved since it was expected this would increase membership and the time lag in the supply of any uniforms would take six months.324 The government though assumed no further financial obligation other than the £157,000 to supply uniforms.325 The RSL issued instructions to measure members for their forthcoming uniforms but, paradoxically, it was to apply only to returned servicemen, leaving a significant number of members in many units without a uniform.326 Wisely, many unit commanders ignored this instruction, concluding it would cause serious disruption within their unit, with some commanders even suggesting their unit would possibly collapse if it was implemented.327 Nonetheless, two months later, an annual capitation allowance to meet the general expenses of the Corps, which included transportation fares of administrative staff and VDC instructors, general office expenditure and administrative equipment and stores, was approved by the government. The capitation fee was approved at ten shillings per head totalling £25,000 annually.328

322 McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area First Year, p.3. 323 Note on Supplement No.1 to Agendum 30/1941 refers to Minute No. 738 12 February 1941, NAA A2671, 30/1941. 324 War Cabinet Agendum discussion on the Issue of uniforms 24 January 1941, NAA A2671, 30/1941. There appears to be differing accounts of the membership numbers. A secret report by the Army states the approximate membership of the RSL-VDC in March 1941 was 31,400, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/373. 325 Note on Supplement No.1 to Agendum 30/1941 refers to Minute No. 901 (B) 18 March 1941, NAA A2671, 30/1941. 326 In some units in rural NSW, it was estimated up to 70 per cent of members were not ex-servicemen. A report by Major-General Fewtrell, Commander 1 Division p.1, AWM 193, 443 Part 4. 327 Report by Major-General Fewtrell, Commander 1 Division p.2, AWM 193, 443 Part 4. 328 War Cabinet Agendum 30 April 1941, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/373.

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Nevertheless, the proposed plan envisaged the creation of a home defence force in each Command and Military District to detect a hostile landing and harass and delay the enemy until such time as the Covering Field Force could arrive and take action.329 Units of this home defence force would be of greatest value in coastal regions but would also be required inland to defend lines of communication, aerodromes and other important points.330 Such a force needed to be part of the military organisation and would have a defined role in defence plans. A conference was held at League Headquarters in Melbourne on 28 February 1941, attended by the RSL Federal President, RSL State Presidents, Inspector-in-General of the RSL-VDC and the RSL-VDC Corps Commanders of each state to discuss the future of the Corps.331 Also in attendance was the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Sturdee, and the Adjutant-General, Major-General Victor Stantke, who addressed the conference explaining the intentions of the Army regarding the future role of the Corps in the proposed Home Defence Scheme.332 In order for the Corps to fulfil this role, and thereby serve a national purpose, it needed an appropriate and detailed nation-wide plan involving the standardisation of unit formation and training. To achieve this, and facilitate integration into the Home Defence Scheme, it would be necessary to adopt Army- structures. This would deliver a much needed uniformity than the current arbitrary structure and administration of RSL-VDC units. This requirement led to resolutions being passed at the conference favouring the RSL-VDC being taken over by the Department of the Army.333

In fact, before the conference, Sturdee had written to the Minister for the Army, Percy Spender, recommending the RSL-VDC be constituted as an adjunct to the AMF under the operational and general administrative control of Army Commands nationwide and have a set establishment of 50,000.334 On 7 March 1941, Army Headquarters wrote a

329 Minute Paper 10 February 1941, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/373. 330 Minute Paper 10 February 1941, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/373. 331 Report on the Conference by the Chief of the General Staff February 1941, AWM 54, 1008/1/13. 332 Report on the Conference by the Chief of the General Staff February 1941, AWM 54, 1008/1/13. 333 The VDC: Formation and Progress in Western Australia, p.8, AWM 54, 1008/2/53. 334 Report on the Conference by the Chief of the General Staff February 1941, AWM 54, 1008/1/13. In 1941, there were four Commands; Northern Command, Eastern Command, Southern Command and Western Command. Southern Command was further divided into 3, 4 and 5 Military District.

76 memorandum to the State RSL-VDC Headquarters outlining these principles.335 Concurrently, with the spectre of the private armies still very much on the government’s mind, the Minister for the Army, Percy Spender, announced the RSL-VDC was to come under army control and the provisions for its absorption were designed to prevent the corps becoming a private army with political influence.336 This decision would split the RSL-VDC from its original affiliation with the RSL and, officially at least, allow men who had not served in the First World War the opportunity to participate, if only on a part-time basis, in defence of Australia.337 By authorising the opening up of enrolment to non-returned personnel, the expected influx of new men eliminated any prospect of the Corps becoming a private army.

While each party agreed there was a role for the RSL-VDC, discussions continued in order to determine what shape the role might undertake. During this period, the Prime Minister gave an unqualified undertaking that the RSL-VDC would be the only sanctioned form of home guard and clarified the roles of Garrison Battalions and the RSL-VDC.338 This was important. Significantly, while the RSL-VDC was attempting to fulfil its role as a reservoir for trained reserve personnel, fragmentation began with regard to guarding responsibilities, with several different organisations shouldering guard duties at various vulnerable points. The government needed to clarify the various roles of the groups jostling to take up a role in home defence. The Army resolved that the Garrison Battalions would guard major vulnerable points with some larger points requiring a reserve Garrison Battalion. The points not requiring a large force would become the responsibility of the RSL-VDC.339 Originally, the Military Board had proposed that local Rifle Clubs be constituted as Vulnerable Point Guards (VPG) for the purpose of guarding aerodromes. The Army authorised the issuing of rifles and a supply of ammunition to the Rifle Clubs for the task despite having previously impressed

335 Letter from the General Staff Eastern Command to RSL-VDC Headquarters, 7 March 1941, AWM 193, 213. 336 Daily Telegraph 8 March 1941, ‘Army Control of Volunteers’, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 337 Daily Telegraph 8 March 1941, ‘Army Control of Volunteers’, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 338 A report from the NSW RSL President on a meeting with RSL-VDC NSW Commander Brigadier-General Heane, 29 January 1941, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 339 A report from the NSW RSL President on a meeting with RSL-VDC NSW Commander Brigadier-General Heane, 29 January 1941, AWM 54, 1008/2/22.

77 their rifles and ammunition.340 In the absence of a local Rifle Club, it was proposed that members of the local RSL-VDC form a VPG to provide protection.341 These VPG units were established under the Rifle Club regulations which brought them under Army Command in contrast to the RSL-VDC units which were under the control of the RSL.342 One benefit of being placed under Army Command was the approval of the issue of petrol ration tickets by the Quartermaster-General, particularly useful for units living in country districts, for the purpose of attending parades.343

Another group that had assumed the task of guard duties was the Post Office Volunteer Corps (POVC). These Post Office units guarded vital communication services controlled by the Postmaster-General’s Department.344 In April 1941, the POVC were informed that they would not be maintained as a separate entity and were instructed to contact the local RSL-VDC units to amalgamate.345 Subsequently, arrangements were made for the members to join their local RSL-VDC unit or to shift the unit, as a whole, into the RSL- VDC structure.346 The Deputy Director of the Postmaster-General’s Department of each State provided the local RSL-VDC with a list of Post Offices requiring guarding.347 Some mergers proved to be challenging as the POVC unit contained members drawn from many districts in the metropolitan area presenting problems in assembling the men for training and duty. There was also the additional difficulty in obtaining permission from the Postmaster-General’s Department due to the essential nature of the work. It was finally decided that any POVC staff, provided they were granted permission from the manpower

340 Letter to the Military Board from the G.O.C. Eastern Command 27 December 1940, AWM 193, 167 Part 3. 341 Letter to the Military Board from the G.O.C. Eastern Command in reference to guarding an aerodrome 15 January 1941, AWM 193, 167 Part 2. 342 Letter from Captain Wheeler Moruya District V.P.G. to Eastern Command 24 June 1941, AWM 193, 315. The members of rifle clubs took an oath to serve when called upon and formed a portion of the reserve of the Military Forces. 343 Letter from Military Board to Eastern Command 19 March 1941, AWM 193, 167 Part 2. 344 Letter from the Director VDC to Military Board 12 May 1941, AWM 193, 203. 345 Letter to Deputy Director of Posts and Telegraphs 15 May 1941, AWM 193,213. 346 Letter from Director VDC to 7 Military District 17 April 1941, AWM 54, 1008/2/6. 347 Letter from Director-General Posts and Telegraphs to Department of the Army 13 May 1941, AWM 193, 268 Part 4.

78 authorities, could join their local RSL-VDC unit if they wished, but many POVC members who did join struggled to commit the required time to RSL-VDC duties.348

Much was achieved in the first few months of 1941, notably the identification of future roles and improving the relationship between the RSL-VDC and the army. Despite discussions outlining the proposed principles, there still remained ambiguity within the Army Commands’ understanding of the Corps’ role in home defence. In mid-April 1941, the various Army Commands submitted operational disposition reports of units under their command and all reports detailed considerable movement of RSL-VDC battalions or groups from areas of enrolment to forward covering areas.349 The proposed role was to be static in nature and there was never any provision for any unit to have any large degree of mobility. As well, the operational reports involved extended absences from civil employment, clearly overlooking the fact that large numbers of the volunteers were employed in reserved occupations and extended absences needed to be cleared by the Manpower Directorate.350 The Military Board issued a memorandum reiterating that RSL-VDC units were to be ‘employed locally in the areas in which they reside or work and will be called out for active operations only when the situation demands local defence measures being put into operation; that is when an attack is imminent.’351 In addition, due to the length of time they would likely be required, it was recommended the units be ‘raised from personnel whose occupations are not of a reserved nature’ and were requested to avoid any large movement of RSL-VDC units in their area of command.352

The authorisation allowing for the formation of the RSL-VDC on 15 July 1940 had been designed so that the organisation could act only as a reservoir of trained personnel

348 Letter from Deputy Director Posts and Telegraphs NSW Commander RSL-VDC 21 May 1941, AWM 193, 213. 349 Memorandum from the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence 17 April 1941, AWN 193, 268 Part 4. 350 The Manpower Directorate assumed the responsibility for the List of Reserved Occupations. 351 Memorandum from the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence 17 April 1941, AWN 193, 268 Part 4. 352 Memorandum from the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence 17 April 1941, AWM 193, 268 Part 4. Reserve Garrison Battalions were not necessarily posted in the locality where the members enlisted and might very well be posted anywhere within the country, while the RSL-VDC members would only serve in or around the district where they lived or worked.

79 and provide reserves for militia and garrison battalions. This role fell well short of the League’s expectations and, at this time, it was not considered for any role in home defence. Initially, the RSL-VDC was structured on a sub-branch’s ability to raise a unit rather than any military requirement for a unit in any particular location. This resulted in a militarily dysfunctional organisation with scattered individual units having differing policies on matters such as admission of non-returned soldiers. The authorisation had dictated it should be a separate organisation from the army, organised and financed by the RSL and, as such, did not have any military standing. The lack of equipment, uniforms and training facilities enormously hindered the activities of the RSL-VDC. As a result, in the absence of any genuine direction, the initial burst of enthusiasm started to wane and attendances at parades dwindled. Many members who had joined in the expectation of performing a vital service were disappointed and left. In these early stages of its existence, the Corps had survived only on the enthusiasm of its dedicated members.

Moreover, even after only five months formation, it was becoming clearly apparent that the RSL-VDC required restructuring and revitalising as it was not succeeding in fulfilling any useful purpose for the Army, the Government or the League. The RSL-VDC had not developed in a manner that its proponents had hoped for and in order for this to occur, it needed to come under the guidance of the Army and receive, at some level, financial assistance from the government. Until it was made an integral part of the army structure, it would be difficult to reach any degree of efficiency. The impetus for revitalisation was provided by the changing strategic war situation and the recognition of its potential domestic value by the army and government. Discussions for inauguration into the army began in early 1941 but it would take until May that year for the inauguration to become official.

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Chapter Three

A Defined Role for the Corps

May 1941 - December 1942

The Government, the RSL and the Army all realised by early 1941 that the VDC needed to come under official military control. Each party conceded that, for the organisation to perform any credible role in home defence, it required more comprehensive government support and more rigorous control. This chapter, first, examines the assigned tasks, administration, structure, membership, training and supply issues involved in the VDC’s official inauguration into the Army, before to the entry of Japan into the war. The incorporation of a part-time force into a full-time organisation posed many challenges. Yet, the international military situation made it clear that reviewing home defence plans was imperative and no responsible federal government could realistically ignore the threat posed by a belligerent Japan. The crossing of the floor of the House of Representatives by two independents during a vote caused a change of government in October 1941 but did not result in any departure from the task at hand, organising a defence of the nation. The entry of Japan into the war in December 1941 transferred the focus of the war much closer to home and brought a heightened sense of urgency to home defence. It also represented something of a watershed moment for the VDC. The second part of the chapter will examine the impact Japan’s entry into the war had on the VDC’s organisational and command structure in terms of increased establishment, the introduction of ranks, issues arising from the part-time nature of the Corps and training procedures. The examination will continue till the end of 1942 when the primary role for the VDC would once more shift in line with the changing nature of Australia’s strategic circumstances and the overall direction of its war effort.

Any analysis of the VDC in the early months of 1941 requires contextualisation against the strategic challenges Australia faced at this stage of the war. The strategic situation in 1941 had forced the government to consider the transformation of the VDC

81 from being a pool of reserves into a military-controlled organisation, with newly defined tasks in the defence plans of Australia. Prime Minister Menzies had spent the first half of 1941 in London advocating Australia’s case for a build-up of British forces in the Far East, largely to no avail.353 With the defeat of France, Britain was focussing on far more immediate threats much closer to home and Japan, taking advantage of the situation, began establishing military bases in the northern region of French Indochina. The disquiet felt by Menzies regarding the current international state of affairs was also being experienced at home. Opinion within the military on Japanese intentions was divided with some military officers convinced that Japan posed a real threat while others were more inclined to believe it would not have sufficient strength to endanger Australia’s near region seriously while simultaneously engaged in fighting in China.354 Yet, only one year earlier, an army appreciation concluded that if Japan was willing to undertake certain risks, she could invade Australia.355 In mid-1941, Japanese troops embarked on the occupation of southern French Indochina, having recently secured a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union.356 The likelihood of Japan entering the war and threatening Australia was increasing rapidly.

Unsurprisingly, fears of Japanese aggression and expansionism were especially heart- felt in Queensland. In early 1941, more than six months before Japan entered the war, the Queensland Minister for Home Affairs, Edward (Ned) Hanlon, had written to the Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Fadden, a Queenslander himself, raising the possibility of enemy landings in Queensland. Hanlon named eighteen coastal towns and cities as vulnerable and suggested coastal artillery should, at least, be situated at Cairns, Bowen, Mackay and Gladstone in northern Queensland.357 More to the point, he also wanted the RSL-VDC, still at that point under the control of the RSL, armed with machine guns to bolster its local capabilities and urged the provision of an effective communications network to report any

353 Martin, Menzies: a life, pp.316-336. Menzies had decided to travel to Britain on 24 January 1941 to voice concern at the state of defences in Singapore. A conference held the previous October examining Singapore’s defences had concluded they were ‘gravely deficient’ in military, air and naval strength. 354 Lodge, Lavarack: Rival General, Allen, p.34. 355 Horner, High Command Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945, pp.31-32. 356 D. Clayton James, ‘American and Japanese Strategies in the ’, in Peter Paret (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986, p.706. 357 Burns, The Brisbane Line Controversy, p.39. The towns listed were Cooktown, Cairns, Mareeba, Innisfail, Tully, Ayr, Bowen, Proserpine, Mackay, Sarina, Rockhampton, Gladstone, Bundaberg and Maryborough. Fadden, Leader of the Country Party at this time, represented the Queensland seat of Darling Downs.

82 suspicious activity in the north Queensland region.358 By mid-1941, with the international situation further deteriorating, it became particularly prudent to begin considering the need for the static defences of key localities. There was a growing concern regarding home defence and the VDC was actively promoted by the Government as the channel through which men could contribute in a military manner. Any serious rise in the VDC’s capabilities, however, first required serious administrative and command re-arrangements.

The key Military Board Instruction, ‘A 53’ was issued on 15 May 1941 and provided for the formal affiliation of the Volunteer Defence Corps as an adjunct to the Australian Military Forces (AMF), and for it to function under the operational and general administrative control of the Military Board.359 Following its incorporation into the Army, the organisation was allotted a defined operational role in the defence of Australia, - a role long pursued to no avail by the RSL. The newly VDC-assigned duties in local defence involved:

(a) Static defence of localities including aerodromes, broadcasting stations and other key points.

(b) Protection of vulnerable points.

(c) Guerrilla warfare activities.

(d) Timely warning of enemy movements to superior military organisations.360

The precise manner by which these assigned duties were allocated and addressed varied slightly, in line with the flexible nature of the VDC, within the different localities throughout the country. For example, Western Command added coast observations and coastal defence to its VDC duties, while in the Northern Command, the guarding of internees and prisoners of war and other internal security duties were listed.361 So too, if their localities housed important industrial works or essential services such as munitions

358 Burns, The Brisbane Line Controversy, p.39. 359 The VDC – Formation and Progress in Western Australia, p.10, AWM 54, 1008/2/53 Part 5. 360 War Cabinet Agendum No. 343, 1941, NAA A2671, 343/1941. 361 Western Command, AWM 54, 10008/2/24; Northern Command Operational Instruction No. 8 30 March 1942. AWM 54, 1008/2/37.

83 factories or water pumping stations, viewed as vulnerable points, and were also to be guarded by local VDC units.362 In short, the VDC had ceased to be simply a reservoir of reserves and took on a much more specific and defined set of responsibilities.

As a corollary to the VDC coming under the command of the army, there were suggestions that a new title would be appropriate. After much discussion, the Military Board directed that the Corps would remain known as the RSL Volunteer Defence Corps or, alternately, the Home Guard, but the term Volunteer Defence Corps was far more commonly used throughout the nation and military forces.363 As a result, the organisation will be referred to as the VDC for the period after May 1941.The new colour patch decided upon at a VDC Corps Commanders Conference in May 1942, incorporated the original black VDC monogram in a red circle enclosed within a khaki background.364

Overall, beyond specific duties to be undertaken as required, the generally held role of the VDC was one of providing static defence in depth. In the event of an emergency, it was emphasised that the employment of the VDC would be primarily in its members’ home locations and members would only be called upon to fight in areas in which they resided or worked. In this regard, the role of the VDC was not to initiate individual action but more to coordinate any action under the regional army command, which controlled all active and passive defence of that region.365 In addition, they would provide immediate protection against paratroopers or small enemy units, ensuring numerous centres of resistance throughout the country which could be reinforced from the civil population.366 VDC units were also to be employed at night, in shifts, to guard additional vulnerable points that previously it had not been possible to provide protection.367 An example of the size of the task in providing protection for vulnerable points is illustrated in the requests for guards by

362 Standing Orders for the Volunteer Defence Corps, Department of Defence, 1942, p.6, AWM 54, 1008/1/8. 363 Letter from the General Staff regarding Volunteer Defence Force –Title 15 July 1941, AWM 193, 268 Part 3. 364 The Army War Effort 10 October 1942, p.33, AWM 113, MH 1/165. 365 Volunteer Defence Corps Manual Pamphlet No.1, Military Board, Melbourne, July 1941, p.6. 366 Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, p.63. Enemy paratroopers were a major cause of concern, even more so since Crete had recently fallen in May 1941 where Germany had made extensive use of paratroopers to achieve victory. As well, they had been used in the invasion of the Low Countries in June 1940. 367 Letter to VDC Units from Director VDC 16 April 1942, AWM 193, 268 Part 1.

84 the Water Board in Sydney. The Water Board believed sixty-five water supply locations, thirty-five power stations and eighteen gas works needed VDC protection. Each of these needed 195, 105 and 54 VDC members respectively.368 Moreover, the presence of the VDC undertaking these tasks was envisaged to have the added benefit of assisting in maintaining community morale.369 The latter role played by the VDC will be discussed in Chapter Five.

In terms of lines of administrative control, the Military Board insisted on a clear definition of the relationship between the VDC and the Army that was understood by both parties. Unlike CMF Garrison Battalions, who could be mobilised and transferred as required, VDC units were not to be moved or to be given any sort of mobile role. It was stressed, time and time again, that in an emergency VDC volunteers were to continue their civil employment, considered to be of profound national importance, until enemy action no longer made it possible.370

In order to manage its newfound set of roles, the Corps underwent much needed administrative and structural reform. Under the new ‘military’ administration, a Director of the VDC, having the equivalent rank of a brigadier, was appointed to the staff of the Adjutant-General at Army Headquarters in Melbourne. The Director was responsible for the general administration of the Corps, dealt with enquiries and correspondence on all matters (except operational issues) relating to the Corps.371 Though the RSL had relinquished control of the VDC, it had still managed to maintain a presence within its structure, with the new military regulation providing for the ‘co-operation of the RSL in any future re-organisation or recruitment.’372 Even though the League’s officials did not now formally constitute any part of the VDC, the RSL State Presidents were to be the Liaison Officers between the RSL and

368 Protection of Vulnerable Points issued by the Metropolitan Water Supply and Drainage Board, AWM 193, 49. 369 War Cabinet Agendum, 30/1941, AWM 54, 1008/1/1. 370 Standing Orders for the Volunteer Defence Corps, Department of Defence, 1942 p.5, AWM 54, 1008/1/8. 371 A newspaper article ‘Defence Corps Director’ in the Sydney Morning Herald 7 March 1941, p.9, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 372 Report of the Inspector-in-Chief of RSL Volunteer Defence Corps 30 June 1941, p.4, AWM 54, 1008/1/13.

85 the VDC Corps Commander for their respective States.373 Indicative of the RSL’s influence at this stage was the fact that the RSL State Presidents successfully nominated Lieutenant- Colonel George Francis Murphy, the current President of the RSL New South Wales and State Controller of Prisons in New South Wales, to be the first Director.374

Despite the fact that the VDC was to be commanded and administered through Army Headquarters, it still needed to be re-structured on a state level, to be able to support the state-based militia forces and carry out its assigned roles. In general terms, the integration into military administration from May 1941 led to a large increase in the volume of organisational and administrative work. These tasks were conducted by volunteers, during their spare time, but the expansion of the administration tasks and the gradual increase in the supply of essential equipment presented logistical problems that required addressing. The lack of paid full-time personnel to attend to the clerical duties associated with the receiving and issuing of equipment valued at many thousands of pounds, for example, began causing the Army some concern. The Army required full accounting of Government stores and widespread discrepancies began appearing due to the lack of experienced full- time personnel to account for such stocks.375

Importantly, the degree of ‘charity’ of the members at sub-branch level was one of the casualties of inauguration. Prior to military control, the RSL-VDC members had borne many of the administrative and transport expenses. Despite the best intentions of members upon enlistment, payment for these expenses soon emerged as an issue once under the control of the Army. VDC volunteers considered they were entitled to some allowances with the change of administration, and the failure to be provided with petrol coupons, for example, proved to be a major problem. Many volunteers drove to parades, taking several other members with them, and had willingly absorbed the ten to fifteen shillings expense,

373 Instruction No. 12, 21 June 1941, AWM 54, 1008/2/7. 374 A newspaper article ‘Defence Corps Director’ in the Sydney Morning Herald 7 March 1941, p.9, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. Murphy was a decorated First World War veteran having served in Gallipoli and France. He was Director VDC from 1941-42, ultimately retiring as Director of Military Prisons in 1946. 375 Letter from Army Quartermaster General to Northern Command concerning “Q” Administration – VDC Units 14 January 1942, AWM 60, 1506.

86 but once under military control the lack of provision of petrol coupons brought them to the point where they were not inclined to ‘waste any more of their time’.376 At least two Sydney metropolitan members tendered their resignations in August 1941 on the grounds of insufficient supply of petrol coupons to cover the mileage.377 There was a general belief that with government control should come government funding and that official sources should assume at least a portion of the cost, especially considering the Army ‘ran’ the VDC.378

The diffuse original organisation of the RSL-VDC had been dictated by the initial enthusiasm of individual RSL sub-branches, rather than any pre-determined military plan or configuration. The new structure of the VDC, however, was required to correspond and conform to the Army’s various state-based ‘Line of Communication Areas’ (L of C), with an Army-appointed VDC Corps Commander in each L of C Area.379 The Commander was responsible for policy, training and the provision of equipment and clothing. Each L of C Area was further divided into Groups, each Group consisting of three or more VDC Battalions. These Battalions customarily averaged around four hundred members and were further composed of companies, consisting of platoons and sections. There were three sections to a platoon, three platoons to a company and four companies to a battalion. The size of a VDC section was generally governed by local requirements.380 If the operational tasks assigned to the VDC battalions required technical sub-units such as Artillery, Medical, Engineers or Signals, these were included in the battalion order of battle.381

In each state, however, the previously autonomous nature of the RSL sub-branch VDC units produced many anomalies, wherein some important military areas had very small

376 Letters of resignation dated 10 and 12 August 1941, AWM 54, 1008/3/3. 377 Letter to Minister for the Army, Percy Spender from Jack Travers, General Manager of Consolidated Press Limited and Commander of 17 Battalion VDC (NSW) 16 August 1941, MP508/1, 118/702/472. The problem was obtaining the supply of petrol coupons rather than the cost for the petrol. The monthly cost was estimated to be from ten to fifteen shillings. 378 Letter to Minister for the Army, Percy Spender from Jack Travers, 16 August 1941, MP508/1, 118/702/472. 379 The Line of Communication Areas was essentially demarcated by the individual State boundaries, Volunteer Defence Corps Manual Pamphlet No.1, p.8. 380 Standing Orders for Volunteer Defence Corps, Department Of Defence, Melbourne, 1942, p.7, AWM 54, 1008/1/8. The group level of command was discontinued by the army in 1944. 381 The Army War Effort 29 February 1944, p.32, AWM 113, MH1/167.

87 or weak units while areas of lesser strategic importance housed large detachments. There was thus a serious need to readjust the distribution of detachments on a strictly operational basis and not raise or sustain detachments simply because personnel were available. Increasing the size and number of units in coastal areas, for example, was considered essential, as these areas were regarded as more liable to enemy attack. In less important country areas, which were more likely to be bombed than subjected to an enemy ground assault, the size of the VDC units was to be decreased.382 As a result, many local units, especially in rural areas, were deemed superfluous and needed to be amalgamated or disbanded. There were, predicably, community appeals against the restructuring.383 Nevertheless, the strengths of metropolitan and coastal units, localities where the VDC would most likely be required for duty, registered an increase. To rub salt into the wounds of disgruntled members, the replacement of former platoon leaders with younger and more active leaders often accompanied such forced amalgamations, greatly facilitating the task of rejuvenating some VDC units.384 The aim of the resultant restructuring was to produce a co- ordinated plan of static defence and place the VDC on a more efficient and greater professional basis, yet it came at a personal cost for many members in rural communities.

The formal integration into the Army also heralded significant changes to the membership criterion of the VDC. Under the new regulations, the restriction of having served overseas was officially removed, even though it was only ever arbitrarily enforced by individual RSL-VDC units. An establishment ceiling was set at 50,000 where previously none had existed. To provide an indication of the number of ex-servicemen currently in the VDC, the Military Board requested the VDC to investigate the percentage of volunteers who were returned soldiers. The percentage ascertained was just over one half, at fifty-five per cent.385 The organisation from then on encompassed a wider pool of men, who for reasons

382 Letter from the General Staff regarding Volunteer Defence Force –Title 15 July 1941,AWM 193, 268 Part3. 383 Letter from the Warragul VDC unit to the Minister for the Army Forde 30 March 1942, NAA MP70/5, 158/1/110. Only 30 men of the original 400 Warragul members remained in the amalgamated VDC unit. 384 Letter to VDC Commander Lieutenant-Colonel S. Perry from the ex-Riverstone Platoon Leader VDC 24 May 1942, AWM 193, 268 Part 4. 385 Letter to the Military Board from the Director of the VDC 5 September 1941, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/327. The Director of VDC estimated the percentages of ex-servicemen in the VDC for each State as: QLD-56 per cent, NSW-43 per cent, VIC-78 per cent, SA-46 per cent, WA-42 per cent and TAS-75 per cent. The Director also

88 of age or medical circumstances were unable to enlist in the military forces. More importantly, the new regulations allowed men employed in reserved occupations or essential services to enlist. Eligible personnel were males from eighteen to sixty years, natural born British subjects with a level of physical fitness classified as fit Class IIB.386 VDC enlistment did not, however, exempt any man from liability to be called up under the provisions of the Defence Act. The broadening of the membership criteria presented many men, previously unable to join the military forces, with an avenue to contribute to home defence albeit on a voluntary part-time basis.387 This, in turn, had significant political ramifications which will be investigated in greater detail in Chapter Five.

The new regulations governing the VDC did not meet with unqualified endorsement and many of the original VDC members were hesitant to re-enlist under the new regime. For example, in a progress report to the Eastern Command at the end of June 1941, the NSW VDC totalled only 11,081 members, approximately thirty-five per cent below its allotted establishment strength of 17,000.388 Prior to recent re-organisation, the active RSL-VDC strength was stated at 17,217.389 Various reasons for the lower than expected figure included the late arrival of enrolment forms, and as a consequence the limited time for medical examinations, for some the actual failure of the medical tests and the lack of information regarding the location and extent of the duty required.390 The dominant reason cited was, however, the lack of any evidence of assistance, in the form of equipment and elementary training, from the authorities.391 Again, there was a clear expectation that military control ought to equate to immediate, and on-going, full military support. Any shortfall in members was soon overcome, however, thanks to the changes in the eligibility

emphasised the estimates were issued with ‘considerable reserve’ as it was impracticable to obtain precise figures without incurring a large expense. 386 The Army War Effort, 31 August 1941, p.23d, AWM 113 MH1/164. 387 The Army War Effort 30 October 9142, p.19, AWM 113, MH 1/165. 388 Letter to Eastern Command regarding the Re-organisation of VDC as an adjunct to AMF 7 July 1941, AWM 193, 203. 389 Letter to Eastern Command regarding the Re-organisation of VDC as an adjunct to AMF 7 July 1941, AWM 193, 203. 390 Letter to Eastern Command regarding the Re-organisation of VDC as an adjunct to AMF 7 July 1941, AWM 193, 203. 391 Letter to Eastern Command regarding the Re-organisation of VDC as an adjunct to AMF 7 July 1941, AWM 193, 203.

89 criteria. The majority of the new members were employed in reserved occupations or essential services or were former members of the 2nd AIF.392 By April 1941, 17,581 men had been discharged from the AIF. Grey reflected that this was due to ‘lax application’ of medical standards to the early volunteers and the failure of some volunteers to handle the demands of the fighting in and Greece.393 This influx of new members caused the average age to fall to thirty six years.394 The government had also approved a capitation fee of ten shillings per member per annum, up to the level of establishment therefore totalling £25,000, to be used for expenses such as rent, lighting charges and clerical assistance.395 Further, since VDC units were now a formal part of the army, all VDC members, including current members, had to be enlisted, undertake attestation and undergo a medical examination or be discharged. This process removed any lingering doubts about the Corps’ official status.396

As previously noted, the autonomous nature of the RSL sub-branches had also produced a wide diversity in the level and standard of training in their respective original RSL-VDC units. Following inauguration, the training regime of the VDC required a degree of standardisation and much improvement. Aside from increased expectations of physical fitness, one of the chief goals in the training of VDC units was to secure the continuing interest and enthusiasm of all members. The difficulties created by the lack of qualified instructors, combined with a severe shortage of equipment continued and contributed to the reasons why some original members hesitated to re-enlist. In many instances, the instructors within the unit were below standard, with ex-medical corps and artillery

392 Letter to Eastern Command regarding the Re-organisation of VDC as an adjunct to AMF 7 July 1941, AWM 193, 203. 393 Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Vol. 1, The Australian Army, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001, p.118. 394 The Army War Effort 29 February 1944, p.33, AWM 113, MH1/167. By comparison, 65 per cent of the British Home Guard was under the age of 43 in 1941, Report on The Future of the (British) Home Guard, p.3, NAA B6681, 201/1941. 395 War Cabinet Agendum 345/1941, AWM 54, 1008/1/1. 396 The lack of uniforms and the carrying of non-military weapons was a cause for deep concern for the British Home Guard. The German press repeatedly reported that they would treat any Home Guard captives as partisans, implying they would be shot if caught, see David Yelton, ‘British Public Opinion, the Home Guard and the Defence of Great Britain, 1940-1944, The Journal of Military History Vol. 58, No. 3, 1994, p.467. Also, attestation was now necessary since the VDC had been given military status.

90 personnel attempting to instruct modern infantry tactics.397 The Volunteer Defence Manual, published by the Military Board just months after the VDC’s military inauguration, was warmly welcomed. It consisted of fifteen pamphlets on various training syllabuses, covering a variety of operations in which the VDC might be employed and any weapons which they might need to use.398 Ironically, one pamphlet was entitled ‘The Technique of Instruction’ and explained the various methods of maintaining the interest of the class, the sequence of instruction and the use of models. The section had fifteen examples on ways to achieve this, including avoiding counter attractions, avoidance of ‘cleverness’ and maintaining enthusiasm.399 In pamphlet No.2, as a further example, general principles such as leadership, war, strategy, and tactics were explained.400 The pamphlets were designed to supply commanders, who were responsible for the training of their command, with suggested training methods and programs, while at the same time allowing them to individualise training to their own particular unit.

Meanwhile, as the VDC developed under newfound military control, Australia experienced a change of government. Upon his return from Britain, Menzies came under increasing criticism from within his party and was urged by several of his ministers to resign due to his unpopularity in New South Wales and Queensland.401 By changing leader, they believed the government would have the best chance of winning the next federal election. Ultimately, Menzies resigned on 28 August 1941 and the Deputy Prime Minister, Arthur Fadden, was elected by the coalition members. This proved to be a stop-gap measure. Fadden’s prime ministership lasted only forty days and when the two Independent members voted with the Opposition against the Budget, the government resigned.402 Curtin,

397 Letter to Eastern Command regarding the Re-organisation of VDC as an adjunct to AMF 7 July 1941, AWM 193, 203. 398 Volunteer Defence Corps Manual Pamphlet No.1, Organisation 1941, Military Board, Melbourne, July 1941, p.2. The other pamphlets were Organization and General Instructions, Operations, Section Field-craft, Platoon Tactics, Field Works, Application of Fire, Light Machine Gun Training, Anti-tank Rifle Training, Anti-aircraft Training, Grenade Training and Protection against Gas. 399 Volunteer Defence Corps Manual Pamphlet No.1, p.10-14. 400 The VDC – Formation and Progress in Western Australia, p.18, AWM 54, 1008/2/53 Part 5. 401 Martin, Menzies: a life, pp.380-383. The Ministers giving the advice to Menzies were , Senator Harry Foll, Percy Spender from the UAP and Country Party Ministers Earl Page Jack McEwan, Tom Collins and Hubert Anthony. 402 Sir Arthur Fadden, ‘Forty days and forty nights: Memoir of a war-time Prime Minister’, Australian Outlook, Vol. 27, Issue 1, p.9.

91 and the Labor Party, assumed the reins of government on 7 October 1941. The new government did not make any change to the pace or shape in the home defence plans of the military. In fact, official historian Sydney Butlin suggests the change in government only expedited effective action on economic and defence matters that had been planned in mid- year but were floundering under the political weaknesses of the Menzies government.403 An indication of the issues facing the incoming government is shown by two events. Three weeks after taking office, Curtin had to announce that the HMAS Sydney was sunk off the Western Australian coast. HMAS Sydney had engaged the German raider Kormoran but had taken a direct hit, exploded and sunk with the loss of the entire crew of six hundred and forty-five officers and men. The Kormoran also sunk as a result of the engagement.404 By early December 1941, Australia was at war against Japan.

For patriotic Australian citizens, faced with the spectre of possible invasion from an Asian power (a dreaded social fear for many decades as discussed in Chapter One), the wish to contribute to the defence of the nation was intensifying. As one Sydney journalist wrote, ‘war has ceased merely to be on Australia’s doorstep. It is on the mat reaching for the knocker.’405 The approaching menace of Japan instigated yet more changes to the VDC to fortify its ability to meet its roles. On the administration and training front, the necessity of employing full-time staff was becoming paramount as it was no longer possible to rely solely on the voluntary services currently being offered. The VDC, as part of home defence forces, had to be capable of effectively organising and training the personnel for its assigned tasks and training of the Corps. Thus, in December 1941, approval was given for the appointment of permanent staff for the VDC.406 The Corps Commanders and Group Commanders, with their staff, were called up for full-time duty and each battalion had a core of permanent staff to co-ordinate or undertake the guarding vulnerable points, aerodrome defence and coastal watching, training activities and other essential duties as deemed necessary by the Corps Commander. The call up to full-time duty was deliberately designed so as not to

403 Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, p.502. 404 McKernan, The Strength of a Nation, pp.141-142. 405 E.K. Dum, The Bulletin, 11 March, 1942. E. K. Dum was the pseudonym used by Malcolm Henry Ellis in his column for The Bulletin. 406 War Cabinet Agendum 343/1941, 5 December 1941, NAA A2671, .343/1941.

92 impede essential services.407 In fact, men employed in reserve occupations or essential industries were not eligible to perform full-time duty in the VDC at all.408 The War Cabinet approved £85,000 to be made available to meet the cost of employing permanent staff.409

The subsequent division of the VDC into full-time and part-time personnel following the onset of war with Japan required further administrative definitions and refinement. In February 1942, with the Japanese seemingly approaching Australian shores, Lieutenant- General , the General Officer Commanding in Chief Home Forces, recommended in a report that the VDC should be classified into two new categories. Category “A” would be for full-time duty (FTD) personnel, who volunteered for continuous service or service for intermittent periods that could involve some days or weeks at a time. While performing full-time duty, such members would be entitled to pay and allowances as for other AMF personnel. Personnel in this category would be provided with a Service Rifle and bayonet.410 The second category, Category “B”, would be for part-time duty (PTD) personnel and these members would only be called up for FTD when, or if, the enemy had landed in Australia. The vast majority of VDC members would therefore perform part-time duty in or near their localities, at such times as they could spare, while continuing to perform their civil employment. Mackay believed it would be adequate to arm this category of VDC soldier with old .310 calibre rifles until modern service rifles became available.411 It is notable that the number of VDC members who served on a full-time basis never exceeded 3,000, even though the government had authorised up to 5,000 members to be recruited for full-time duty.412 This figure is relatively small, around three per cent, when viewed in context to the total number of VDC members. One reason for such a low percentage was that men who were willing, medically able and permitted to commit to full-time duty had

407 Memo on VDC referring to Call-up for full time duty clarifying telegram A958 from A.H.Q. 18 December 1941, AWM 60, 1432. 408 Report on the Operational Role of the VDC for Army Headquarters 17 February 1942 by Mackay, AWM 54, 1008/2/25. 409 War Cabinet Agendum 30/1941, 30 September 1941, AWM 54, 1008/1/1 Part II. 410 Report on the Operational Role of the VDC for Army Headquarters 17 February 1942 by Mackay, AWM 54, 1008/2/25. 411 Report on the Operational Role of the VDC for Army Headquarters 17 February 1942 by Mackay, AWM 54, 1008/2/25. 412 The Army War Effort 29 February 1944, p.33. By the end of 1943, the total number of full-time VDC personnel was 2,247 comprising of 311 Officers and 1936 Other Ranks.

93 already enlisted in the militia. The majority of members were employed in reserved occupations, whether in rural or metropolitan areas, and required prior approval by the appropriate authority, normally the Manpower Officer, before they could commit to full- time duty, even despite previously being part-time members of VDC.413 As well, this restriction on full-time duty meant conscription had a minimal effect on the VDC.

The rapid Japanese advance brought a corresponding rapid rise in men volunteering to take part in the defence of their country. The increase over the previous year in enlistment across all services, Royal Australian Navy, Army and the Royal Australian Air Force, in 1942 was approximately 288,000.414 Likewise, the enlistment in the VDC grew. In February 1942, the establishment for the VDC was increased to 80,000 with authorisation of a further £5,000 to cover the extra capitation allowance.415 By the end of June 1942, this flood of new and ‘non-traditional’ members was beginning to create difficulties. In spite of Japanese forces being on Australia’s doorstep, the Adjutant-General, Major-General Stantke, wrote to all VDC Corps Commanders indicating that, while he acknowledged the Corps had received instructions not to refuse enlistment of personnel, there was currently no immediate defence role that warranted numbers beyond the present increased establishment of 80,000 members.416 At this stage, although any additional enrolments in full strength units were still accepted, they were retained only as supernumeraries and trained alongside the VDC unit. These supernumeraries could not be issued weapons, equipment or uniforms under present establishment numbers. Many volunteers complained quite bitterly about the lack of supply of uniforms and weapons without realising they were supernumerary to establishment and therefore not entitled to them.417 Meanwhile, the Corps Commanders received instructions not to discharge any existing member but not to increase the strength of units nor fill vacancies, until normal wastage had reduced the total strength to the approved establishment. While the instructions were targeted primarily at country battalions, the suggestion was made to cut the ‘dead wood’, men who did not

413 Call up for full-time duties memo from Northern Command 7 January 1942, AWM 60, 1432. 414 Grey, A Military History of Australia, p.153. 415 War Cabinet Minute 10 February 1942, AWM 54, 1008/1/1. 416 Letter to all Corps Commanders from the Adjutant-General 28 June 1942, AWM 60, 1483. 417 Letter from the Adjutant-General concerning VDC Unit at Mt Morgan 25 July 1942, AWM 60, 1491.

94 regularly attend parades, from all units.418 In the context that the re-structuring of the VDC had already caused some rural units to be disbanded, many more letters of complaint were written to the Minister for the Army. In addition, the Adjutant-General specifically requested these instructions were to be passed confidentially to Battalion Commanders with ‘no press or any other publicity’ to be given.419

There were several possible motives for keeping the above instruction out of the press. First, any increase in VDC numbers led to a subsequent increase in the provisioning of the Corps, placing a greater burden on already limited government resources. The counterweight to this consideration concerned the public commitment to the war effort and the need to sustain public morale. Secondly, publicly limiting, or in some cases decreasing, the size of rural VDC units might have caused difficulties amongst the very primary producers that the government was anxious to exhort to greater efforts. Nonetheless, by October 1942 the VDC consisted of 110 Battalions, distributed across Australia, and approval was granted for another increase establishment to 100,000 on the 31 December 1942.420 At this time, ex-servicemen accounted for only twenty per cent of total members, due to the inflow of new members.421 The latter increase allowed for absorption of a considerable number of supernumeraries, approximately 18,000, into VDC units.422 It is important to note that the supernumeraries were chiefly located in rural areas as approximately seventy-five per cent of VDC strength was raised outside the metropolitan area.423 As will be discussed in Chapter Four, this precluded a large number of volunteers for any assigned tasks, current or future, in coastal or metropolitan areas.

418 Routine Order No. 1, 5 Battalion Queensland 23 August 1941, AWM 52 36/1/55 August 1941 to July 1942, 5 Battalion VDC Queensland. AWM 54, 1008/2/26. 419 Letter to all Corps Commanders from the Adjutant-General 28 June 1942, AWM 60, 1483. 420 War Cabinet Agendum 491/1942, NAA B6680, 491/1942. The battalion breakdown for each State was Queensland – 22, New South Wales – 32, Victoria – 26, South Australia – 10, Western Australia – 15, Tasmania – 5, The Army War Effort 10 October 1942, p.32, AWM 113, MH1/165 421 The Army War Effort 29 February 1944, p.33, AWM 113, MH1/167. 422 War Cabinet Agendum 491/1942, NAA B6680, 491/1942. Peak strength of the Corps was attained in September 1942, with a total 98,415 members. This consisted of 3585 full-time members and 94830 part-time members, The Army War Effort 31 August 1945, NAA A5954, 300/4. 423 Minute Paper, War Cabinet Agendum 23 October 1943, p.2, NAA MP742/1, 286/1/102.

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It is important to consider the manpower pool of Australia from which the VDC could draw its members. At the outbreak of war in the Pacific, the number of men aged from fourteen to sixty-four was over two and a half million of which two million and four hundred thousand were employed.424 This figure included 431,000 men in the armed forces leaving around two million males in employment.425 At this time, 930,000 were ineligible to enlist in the armed forces due to their employment in reserved occupations.426 Concurrently, the membership of the VDC, which also excluded men employed in reserve occupations, was listed as 47,500, or approximately four and a half per cent of available men.427 When the government amended the eligibility criteria allowing men employed in reserved occupations to enlist in the VDC, an extra 930,000 males became eligible to serve part-time in the VDC.428 As stated previously, the VDC reached its peak membership of roughly 100,000 at the end of 1942, implying around 50,000 of the available extra men joined the VDC, a slight rise to approximately five per cent of working men. Grey states the enlistment in the three arms of the defence forces in August 1942 was over six hundred and fifty thousand or roughly twenty four per cent of the total male population over the age of fourteen.429 The lack of complete statistics in the 1940s makes any comparative analysis problematic as Grey’s figures included males from fourteen to seventeen years old despite their being too young to enlist in either the army or the VDC. Grey includes male and female enlistment in his figures but, in regard to the inclusion of the enlisted women, the percentage would not be greatly affected as female enlistment only commenced in 1941.430 The lower enlistment percentage of the VDC is most likely explained by the demographics of the VDC. In rural areas, where the large majority of VDC members were located but the total number of available men was lower, the VDC tallied around nineteen per cent. In metropolitan areas, on the other hand, there was a far larger number of available men, and lower membership,

424 Sydney Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1955, p.482. The figure stated by Butlin was 2,540,770. 425 Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, p.491. 426 Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, p.491. 427 War Cabinet Agendum 343/1941, NAA A2671, 343/1941. 428 Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, p.491. 429 Grey, A Military History of Australia, p.153. The total of 656,096 consisted of 22,775 personnel in the Navy, 525,678 in the Army and 107,643 in the Air Force. Butlin lists the total male population in 1942 was 3,607,770 but approximately 800,000 males were under the age of fourteen resulting the total number of males fourteen and over being roughly 2,800,000, Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, p.491. 430 Grey, A Military History of Australia, p.153.

96 with only four per cent enlistment in the VDC.431 The combination of these two figures accounts for the five per cent enlistment of available men. Although not a large percentage of available men enlisted in the VDC a significant number did.

As increasingly more men were filling the ranks of the VDC in the first nine months of 1942, there developed some doubt as to the eligibility of enlistment of certain individuals in the VDC due to the ambiguity between ‘naturally born British subjects and naturalised British subjects’. The enrolment form, as instructed in MBI ‘A53’, only listed ‘naturally born British subjects’ for eligibility’. The Military Board ruling proclaimed, subject to Military Intelligence clearance in doubtful cases, it had no objection to naturalised British applicants.432 The restriction of naturally born British subject would be later amended to naturalised British subject.433 Surprisingly, approval was given for the enlistment of Malays for fulltime VDC duty on Thursday Island, despite their not being naturalised British subjects.434 In contrast, one volunteer offered his services to the local VDC unit in northern Queensland, only to be rejected, claiming the decision was the result of ‘a few individuals for political reasons and also personal animosity’.435 He protested to the Minister for the Army requesting an investigation into the reasons for rejection, stating that while his place of birth was Germany, he was a naturalised British subject. The reply stated it was not the normal practice to list the reasons for refusal of service and, while his offer of service was appreciated, it was regretted that it could not be taken up.436

431 These figures are based on the fact that 75 per cent of VDC members were located in country areas implying 75,000 of the peak figure of 100,000 were in rural employment. Butlin states that 395,000 men were employed in rural industry in 1942 resulting in a nineteen per cent enlistment. Conversely, the remaining 25,000 VDC members in metropolitan areas enlisted from a manpower pool of roughly 536,000 men employed in reserve occupations in metropolitan areas, Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, p.491. 432 Letter to Eastern Command clarifying the application of Bohumil Kardell to join the Dubbo VDC Unit 8 July 1941, AWM 193, 268 Part 3. 433 War Cabinet Agendum, 30/1941, NAA A2671, 30/1941. 434 Teleprinter message from Assistant Attorney-General Northern Command 15 January 1942, AWM 60, 1437. 435 Letter to Minister for the Army from Mr Frank Ryland of Julatten, Queensland 23 April 1942, AWM 60, 1474. 436 Reply from Assistant Attorney-General Queensland L. of C. to Mr Frank Ryland 20 June 1942, AWM 60, 1474.

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With the approach of Japanese forces in 1942, the practical difficulties in the new VDC system began to crystallise – especially if the organisation were ever to be mobilised. The new membership criteria, for example, allowing men employed in reserve occupations or essential industries to be eligible for membership, produced something of a conundrum if an emergency occurred. At face value, it appears the defined tasks of the VDC place it firmly within the home defence plans but the new membership regulations placed a caveat on the role. The Department of the Army had placed the restriction on VDC members employed in reserved industries that, except in the ‘gravest local emergency, [they] will only be called up for full-time duty with the consent of the relevant manpower authority’ with every desire and intention for there to be ‘no interference with production since they would not be taken away from their home localities.’437 Indeed, the Military Commander who called VDC members up for full-time duty, if hostilities approached their local area, was required to give full consideration to the necessity for a member’s civil employment to continue as long as possible as well as their return to their respective occupations as soon as possible, once the need for their military service had passed.438 Men employed in these reserved industries could not be expected, nor be required, to be available at short notice. Already, VDC officers working for essential services like the Water Board were informed they would not be given leave to be available if called up for service and had to resign their commissions.439 In theory, it was possible that a VDC unit might not be able to raise enough men to carry out their allotted tasks.

In an emergency, in order to mount any static defensive action, even in co- ordination with the Army, the VDC would need to be called up long before the enemy were literally ‘knocking on the door’. In the event VDC units were called up, especially units in industrialised centres, the battalion’s probable strength would be depleted through manpower regulations, at a most critical stage. The actual number which could be called up before industry stopped and the number which would not be available until after the closing

437 Letter to the Department of the Army concerning VDC – Manpower Regulations from the Military Board 11 March 1942, NAA A1831, 1942/275. 438 Letter to VDC Units from Director VDC 16 April 1942, NAA SP1048/7, S9/5/73. 439 Letter of resignation from Ray Taylor to C.O. 17 Battalion VDC New South Wales 3 June 1941, AWM 54, 1008/3/3.

98 down of main industrial centres, needed to be determined before the emergency situation arose. There were suggestions that only fifty per cent of men in the VDC Battalions in the Sydney and Newcastle area would be available for their allotted tasks.440 The conundrum does not appear to have been addressed nor a resolution reached, possibly due to the fact of an invasion becoming increasingly unlikely soon after such problems became clear. In practice though, it was recognised by at least one leader, that personnel would very well likely make themselves available if a general mobilisation of the VDC was called out, regardless of their employment.441

The problem of availability, however, was not only confined to men employed in essential industries. In event of a full VDC mobilisation, the sheer act of contacting all the members would also prove to be a difficult task. This problem would affect city and country units alike. Members did not necessarily inform family, friends or employers where they would be at any given time, and petrol rationing and time constraints restricted the ability to go and search for each member. As well, it is to be remembered that private telephone ownership was rare at this time. An illustration of the difficulty encountered is seen in Griffith in mid-1943 when only seventy per cent of “G” Company VDC volunteers presented themselves for duty during a trial mobilisation.442 Nonetheless, this figure compares closely with the British Home Guard, where a report indicated that authorities thought a turnout of around seventy per cent of the paper strength would be likely in the event of a call up for mobilisation.443

Leaving the problems of availability in the event of an emergency to one side, there were further difficulties in obtaining sufficient VDC personnel for duty. Enthusiasm for enlistment was not always matched with an equal amount of enthusiasm for routine duty such as turning up for parades and training or designated tasks. Members did not always

440 Letter to VDC Headquarters from General Staff, Eastern Command 1 January 1941, AWM 193, 203. 441 Letter to General Staff, Eastern Command, from Brigadier-General James Heane VDC Commander NSW 3 November 1941, AWM 193, 50. 442 Report on the trial mobilisation of “G” Company 17 Battalion VDC on the 9 May 1943, AWM 54, 1008/2/27. 443 Report on The Future of Home Guard, p.3, NAA B6681, 201/1941.

99 readily volunteer for the tasks allotted to them. Sometimes, the response for volunteers was so inadequate, that little or no guarding was done at all. With regard to part-time members, there was no guarantee that any men would volunteer for duty, or if they did, continue after doing it for several weeks.444 This would result in certain posts being manned for a while, but they could then remain unmanned for an indefinite period. A progress report in late January 1942 indicated there was a shortfall of over three hundred men in the manning of vulnerable points.445

A useful example of such a shortfall was seen in Western Australia. The VDC supplied night guards on vulnerable points in metropolitan and country areas on a weekly basis, reaching a maximum of approximately 1,000 men performing the role weekly. This placed an increasing hardship on members already having difficulty combining voluntary VDC tasks and their civil vocations. Many members were being called upon to work extra shifts in their essential occupations, resulting in unavailability for VDC duty. Seemingly, the Western Australian VDC was alone in performing this duty as the Garrison Battalions were supplying the guards in other States. Although initially receiving little sympathy from the Corps Commander, gradually the guard numbers were reduced and eventually the VDC was relieved of the duty completely.446 Due to the difficulties of constant rostering personnel, full-time members were often preferred for manning duties of vulnerable points.

It is necessary, nevertheless, to acknowledge that many VDC volunteers experienced considerable difficulty in juggling working and family commitments with VDC duty which, at times, meant some requests for assistance could not be met. The Adjutant-General wrote to all State VDC Commanders in August 1942, requesting each State investigate the possibility of releasing as many full-time members of Garrison Battalions and the VDC guarding vulnerable points as possible, by replacing them with part-time VDC members on a shift system. All states replied, citing remarkably similar reasons why this would not be possible,

444 Manning of Vulnerable Points by Personnel of VDC in a letter to Eastern Command from Commander 2 Garrison Brigade 18 January 1941, AWM 193, 50. 445 Progress Report on the Manning of Vulnerable Points by Personnel of VDC 26 January 1942, AWM 193, 50. 446 The VDC – Formation and Progress in Western Australia, p.23, AWM 54, 1008/2/53 Part 5.

100 listing the main factors as work demands of extra shifts in essential industries, distances to travel to duties, total number of extra available members required to enable the shift system to work effectively and the detrimental effect it would have on parade attendance, especially in metropolitan areas, due to fatigue as the main factors.447

At the same time, in many respects, there was a growing appreciation by Army authorities of the roles the VDC could play. The assistance of the VDC was sought by the Army for various tasks, particularly if the Army lacked the manpower to carry them out, and the area was considered likely to come under attack. For example, Lieutenant-General John Lavarack, while commanding the First Australian Army in Queensland, requested the VDC to be used to form demolition squads due to the lack of manpower within his command to carry out the task. The VDC provided a ready solution since they resided in the immediate vicinity of the demolition sites.448

The worsening strategic situation for Australia in early 1942, combined with the increased likelihood of the VDC serving alongside the CMF, accelerated the resolution of a major point of friction within the organisation. The question of ranks within the VDC had been raised soon after inauguration in May 1941 as MBI A 53 allowed no system of Army ranks, with VDC leaders, as previously indicated, being given only appointments. This system of appointments had been adopted for several reasons. First, the British Home Guard originally used this system which gave a ready template for the original VDC to follow. Secondly, the VDC had its genesis in the RSL sub-branches and the leaders were often selected for factors other than suitability for command. Thirdly, the Army was opposed to the scenario of ranked VDC officers, with little or no training since the last war, being able to exercise control over Army officers who had received modern training by virtue of having a

447 Letter to all State VDC Corps Commanders from the Adjutant-General 17 August 1942, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/1019. 448 Letter to Land Headquarters on the formation of VDC Demolition Squads from Lieutenant-General Lavarack, Commander First Australian Army, 26 February 1943, AWM 60, 347.

101 higher rank.449 Under the initial authorisation allowing the RSL to form the Corps, a member of the VDC holding an appointment, but no military recognised rank, could not exercise command over any part of the Australian Military Forces.450 The system of appointments, however, proved unsatisfactory once the VDC came under military command.

Recommendations made by the Adjutant-General, Major-General Stantke, in a report to the Military Board had recognised the problem of ranks as early as September 1941. Stantke recommended the granting of Commissioned, Warrant and Non- commissioned ranks in the VDC.451 Yet it took five months and the constituting of the VDC as a Corps of the Citizen Military Forces before military ranks were granted. Approximately 5,000 part-time duty VDC members were appointed or promoted as officers for Corps, Group and Battalion Staff and as Battalion, Company and Platoon commanders, though after January 1945, the appointment of officers was restricted to ex-AMF officers.452 The amount of time that could be devoted to duties and the ability to lead were two factors taken into consideration before any nominations for commissions were submitted.453 For example, the full-time duties of a Lieutenant in the VDC included assistance in training and drawing up of training syllabus, liaison between units, headquarters, and corps headquarters, administration which included the compiling of returns and correspondence and incorporated the duties of a quartermaster in the recording and issuing of clothing, equipment and training stores.454 Nonetheless, as would be expected, a regular, reserve or auxiliary forces member holding an active commission took rank and precedence over a corresponding ranking officer in the VDC. 455 The restructuring of the VDC had ensured a greater number of its leaders had the ability to instruct and lead while, to a certain degree,

449 Letter written by the Adjutant-General Major-General Victor Stantke to the Military Board on 10 September 1941, NAA B6681, 250/1941. 450 War Cabinet Minute 12 February 1941, NAA A2671, 30/1941. 451 Letter written by the Adjutant-General Major-General V. Stantke to the Military Board on 10 September 1941, NAA B6681, 250/1941. 452 The Army War Effort 31 August 1945, NAA A5954, 300/4. 453 Letter written by the Adjutant-General Major-General V. Stantke to the Military Board on 10 September 1941, NAA B6681, 250/1941. 454 Report on Volunteer Defence Corps to Military Board from Northern Command 12 August 1941, AWM 60, 1429. 455 Letter written by the Adjutant-General Major-General V. Stantke to the Military Board on 10 September 1941, NAA B6681, 250/1941.

102 unsuitable officers had been removed from the Corps.456 The recognition by the Army of the VDC ranks offered a further sign of its integrated role in home defence.

Another point of administrative friction encountered by the VDC after its formal inauguration into the Army was the issue of entitlements, involving compensation entitlements and retirement ages. While FTD VDC members posed only minor problems in respect to entitlements due to their full-time service, the Military Board was reluctant to award the entitlements of full-time service to men who only contributed part-time service. Army Regulations determining the entitlements and eligibility to compensation or a pension had to be redefined for part-time members of the VDC since they only dealt with full-time duty personnel. Although under Army control, problems arose since its members were engaged in civil employment and not employed by the Department of Defence and prior to passing regulations under the Defence Act in February 1942, there were no provisions for compensation for members of the Corps.457 For any injuries or deaths that occurred pending the passing of the regulations, they were dealt with by an ex-gratia payment, subject to approval by the Treasury.458

Inconsistencies remained despite the regulations being amended to incorporate the VDC. For example, a private in the VDC might be a businessman or a bank manager in his civil occupation and any compensation would likely be only a fraction of what they would lose due to time off work if he sustained any injury while doing volunteer duty. This was an important issue for members as the majority had families to be considered. A VDC Sergeant lost his hand in a grenade accident in June 1942, which resulted in his being offered just over £600 in compensation. The payout amount was based on the pay rate of an AMF Sergeant at the time of the accident, five and a half pounds per week but the VDC

456 At a meeting of the bipartisan Advisory War Council in March Mr Percy Spender, a UAP member of the Council, had suggested that retired AMF officers should be utilised and replace VDC officers approaching retirement age or at least over sixty. Army , for example, retired at fifty-five years of age. The Minister for the Army, Frank Forde, informed Spender instructions had already been issued, Meeting of the Advisory War Council 18 March 1942, NAA A2684, 842. 457 Note from Assistant Secretary (Finance) 20 November 1941, NAA A2671, 343/1941. 458 Letter to Attorney-General, Dr Herbert Evatt from Mr Frederick Shedden, Secretary War Cabinet, 28 November 1941, NAA A2671, 343/1941.

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Sergeant’s weekly salary was seven pounds as a hotel manager. Moreover, having lost a hand, he could no longer be employed as a hotel manager. Furthermore, it took nearly one year for any compensation to be paid, with payment only being authorised in April 1943.459

Additional problems arose, again because of their voluntary and part-time status, concerning compensation whilst on duty. Clarification was required to determine, in the event of being called-up, when a PTD VDC member actually was on duty. PTD members were eligible for compensation while on war service or on duty but the ‘on duty’ clause created a problem. If a member was required for immediate action from his home and became incapacitated or killed at any time after leaving his home, the member or his family, would be entitled to compensation as he was considered to be ‘on duty’. This placed the PTD VDC members in a more advantageous position than normal full-time duty personnel, who were not entitled to compensation for any injuries sustained as a result of travelling to or from their place of employment. The act of going to or coming from work or a parade was not considered a portion of work or the parade and, consequently, any injury received was not covered by the Army.460

After official attachment to the army, VDC members needed security in their rights to entitlement, for themselves and their families, before taking attestation and serving for the duration of the war. Some VDC members were injured, or worse killed, across Australia during their voluntary service. The first, and fortunately only, Western Australian VDC fatality occurred in April 1942 when a country unit member was thrown out of a truck on the way home from voluntary guard duty.461 One man died and twelve were injured as a

459 Correspondences concerning the compensation claim of Sergeant H.C. Webster, NAA MT 885/1, W/2/292. 460 Routine Order No. 9, 5 Battalion Queensland 9 April 1942, AWM 52 36/1/55 August 1941 to July 1942, 5 Battalion VDC Queensland. 461 The VDC – Formation and Progress in Western Australia, p.23, AWM 54, 1008/2/53 Part 5. On 4 April 1942, A. E. Danes, 13 Battalion VDC Moora broke his neck after falling from the truck and died two days later.

104 result of throwing a small plastic bomb in Queensland in October 1942.462 By the time of disbandment in August 1945, there had been a total of forty-nine deaths in the VDC.463

Other anomalies arose due to the distinct regulations governing the VDC. For example, the variation of retirement ages produced legal problems. The retirement age of AMF personnel was 60 years. In contrast, the retirement age for VDC members was 65 years. Therefore, members from the ages of 60 to 65 years would not be entitled to benefits under the Defence Act Section 57, since compulsory retirement from the Army occurred at 60 years.464 In light of these technical problems, regulations regarding enlistment, compensation and the general administration of the Corps were later amended, addressing many of the incongruities and thus accommodating the fundamental part-time and voluntary nature of the VDC.465

In terms of logistics and material support, after months of chronic shortages, the worsening military situation hastened the government’s resolve to issue uniforms and equipment to the VDC. The supply and distribution of uniforms and equipment had already commenced, albeit slowly, before inauguration. Since approval for uniforms had been given in March 1941, approximately 32,000 uniforms, of the 50,000 required, had been delivered with another 30,000 on order to cover the increase in establishment authorised in early 1942.466 The Army upheld that supply to the VDC should be permissible only after the needs of the AIF and the CMF had been met. Political pressures in early 1942 obliged the government to instruct a quantity of equipment and uniforms had to be made available to the VDC (see Chapter Five). Articles to be issued to members included hat, jacket, trousers, shirt, gaiters, boots and an arm band. These were to be supplied as they became available, which in many circumstances proved to be over a year in coming, except the armband.

462 Summary of the History of 5 battalion Southport Queensland compiled by Lieutenant A. Shanks, Sheet 13, AWM 52, 36/1/55 July 1944. 463 The Army War Effort 31 August 1945, NAA A5954, 300/4. 464 Letter to the Military Board regarding Re-organisation of VDC as adjunct to AMF 8 July 1941, AWM 193, 268 Part 3. 465 Summary of Changes between October 1941 and February 1942 concerning the VDC, NAA A6923, 5/02. 466 War Cabinet Agendum 30/1941, p.2, AWM 54, 1008/1/1.

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These were readily supplied.467 Due to the approaching threat, distribution was to be expedited on a priority basis, to battalions with immediate tasks in vulnerable areas.

As usual in troubling times, some members harboured unrealistic expectations of the government’s ability to supply all their needs immediately. In numerous letters written to the government concerning the lack of equipment being supplied to the VDC units, each unit claimed it was being neglected when compared to other units.468 In February 1942, the people of believed that the southern states received ‘first cut’ of any VDC issues of weapons and equipment and North Queensland only got any remaining equipment after Southern Queensland.469 They understood that the AIF and the militia should be equipped first but believed North Queensland, being the most threatened region of the eastern states should be next in the supply line. A public appeal met their requirements in web-equipment but there was still an acute supply shortage of tunics and trousers. A hue and cry broke out when a recent consignment of new rifles had to be exchanged for lesser models, since it was believed that the new rifles were wanted by one of the southern states.470 In any case, letters complaining of the lack of rifles or, if rifles had been supplied, the lack of ammunition became a feature exacerbated by numerous examples of inefficiency and insufficiency in the supply. One Battalion in Victoria had been issued 188 .303 rifles, of which nearly two-thirds were unserviceable, and 18,000 practice rounds. Nonetheless, the Battalion had nearly 300 serviceable .310 Martini Cadet Rifles, but no ammunition. When brought to the attention of Headquarters, they were unable to clarify when this situation would be rectified.471 In fact, at the end of June 1942, the annual allotment of ammunition for training purposes equated to less than one round per week for rifle practice.472

467 War Cabinet Agendum 30/1941, NAA A2671, 30/1941. 468 Letter from VDC unit Springsure Queensland to Director VDC 21 February 1942, AWM 60, 1427. 469 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 February, 1942, p.7. 470 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 February, 1942, p.7. 471 Letter to VDC Headquarters (Vic) from Lieutenant-Colonel B.O.C. Duggan Commander No.8 Ballarat L. of C. sub-area, 17 November 1942, NAA MP70/5, 158/1/347. In the letter, while recognising the utterly unsatisfactory position of the VDC, Duggan enquires when it might be rectified. The reply from VDC Headquarters on the 23 November informed Duggan that Headquarters could see no improvement in the situation in the immediate future. 472 The Director of Military training informed the VDC of the annual allotment of ammunition 3 July 1941, NAA MP508/1, 11/717/345. The annual allotment was set at 40 .22 RF Miniature rounds per man and 25 .303 rounds per man.

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At the same time, some of the more disgruntled units claimed an exaggerated number of members to fortify their appeal for equipment, not realising that the supply of uniforms, equipment and weapons was made only for maximum establishment, irrespective of the number of supernumeraries.473 One unit wrote that unless they were ‘supplied uniforms in the very near future, the unit will not be doing any VDC work at all, unless you [the Minister] can allow a regulation that they should be allowed to do so in the nude.’474 The initial issue of uniforms were manufactured on the assumption that VDC volunteers would have ‘developed a large girth’, having gained some weight over the years, and the subsequent alterations required to take in the uniform in order to fit the volunteer usually incurred ‘a cost of between ten and thirty shillings per uniform’ for each person.475 One member drily commented that his uniform was ‘not too bad, only the trousers chafe under the arm-pits’.476 Nonetheless, on at least one occasion, delays in supply were the fault of the units themselves, due to procrastination in submitting attestation forms and sizes of uniforms required. 477

In some instances, complaints regarding the shortage of equipment were made to the Minister of the Army by civilians, rather than members of the Corps. The Ministerial reply usually highlighted the role Australia had played in supplying rifles and uniforms to the Allied Forces, particularly Great Britain. Furthermore, the reply would add, that since the entry of Japan into the war, the Government had changed its priority of supply and currently concentrated on Australia’s immediate needs, with every effort being made to equip the VDC once the Militia units had been better equipped.478 The on-going equipment shortages

473 Letter to Army Headquarters Melbourne from Northern Command Headquarters 24 April 1942, AWM 60, 1461. The Townsville unit of 16 Battalion VDC Queensland claimed its current strength at the time was 991 members while actual members totalled 387. 474 Letter to Minister of the Army from the Home Hill VDC, approximately 100 KM south of Townsville 27 July 1942, AWM 60, 1524. 475 The VDC – Formation and Progress in Western Australia, p.16, AWM 54, 1008/2/53 Part 5. 476 The VDC – Formation and Progress in Western Australia, p.16, AWM 54, 1008/2/53 Part 5. 477 Letter to Queensland L. of C. Area from the Queensland VDC Commander 1 September 1942, AWM 60, 1524. 478 Letter to Mr W. F. Henderson from the Minister for the Army, undated, AWM 60, 1459.

107 had an increasing detrimental effect on the units involved and were hardly conducive for maintaining the interest and morale of members.479

Once under military control, the army became responsible for training the VDC for its various roles in home defence plans. The entry of Japan in the war had raised the level of urgency in providing adequate and effective training. On 4 February 1942, approval was given for the full-time appointment of one instructor for each metropolitan VDC Battalion and two instructors for each country Battalion. The primary function of these permanent instructors was to ensure an improvement in the level of training through the training of the men to become instructors in their own right.480 In addition, a mobile cadre of instructors, comprising of a captain and four sergeants, visited all battalions, conducting training at various centres as required. These instructors travelled as far afield as Carpentaria in northern Queensland, training groups of VDC members.481 In the country regions, training had previously been carried out within the unit and this caused the large disparity of effectiveness between various units. Apart from instructing members in the use of modern weapons, one of the aims of the mobile training units was eventually to enable every unit to possess a qualified and capable instructor.482 The training under qualified instructors proved to be a great success as shown by the record turnout of members, especially country units, unaccustomed to such informative sessions. Many country units’ only contact with the army occurred when the mobile training units arrived to commence a week’s training, concentrating on the use of various machine guns, usually a Vickers or Bren machine gun.483 Ironically, the modern weapons had to be brought along by the instructors due to the severe shortages of equipment. As explosives became available, instruction was also undertaken in the use of explosives to demolish bridges and installations.484 By November

479 Letter from Queensland Member of Parliament, Mr G. W. Martens to Forde, 29 April 1942, AWM 60, 1516. 480 Teleprinter Message No. M522 10 February 1942, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/930. 481 Report on Mobile Training Unit – “F” Group, 11 July 1942, AWM 54, 238. 482 Training Instruction No.2, VDC – SA L of C Area 2 June 1942, AWM 52 36/1/8 March to July 1942. 483 ‘VDC Reaches its Most Advanced Stage in Queensland’, The Argus, 7 November, 1942, p.2S. 484 Graham McKenzie-Smith, Australia’s Forgotten Army: The Ebb and Flow of the Australian Army in W.A. 1941-1945 Vol. 1, Highland Press, Canberra,1994, p.21.

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1942, there were three mobile training units operating in the isolated areas of Northern, Central and Southern Queensland, with training sub-units further extending their reach.485

In order to increase the efficiency and capabilities of the VDC to an acceptable standard, the army wanted to pass as many members of the Corps as possible through its infantry training schools, giving them intensive courses in “independent warfare”. Initially, the intention was to send nearly thirty VDC personnel to the Wilson’s Promontory Camp for Instruction with the objective of increasing the number to 250 as soon as practicable. 486 By March 1942, its principal training centre in Gippsland was turning out 220 fully-trained VDC men every five weeks and returning them to their units to act as instructors.487 Therefore, it was imperative that the choice of officers and NCOs attending the schools and courses of instruction be carefully considered. As was customary at this stage of the war, the VDC competed with the army for places in these courses. Such was the demand by the army for these courses, that VDC cadre courses at the Guerrilla Warfare School in Victoria were abolished due to a lack of adequate accommodation for both groups, caused by the increase in army personnel, who were reinforcing the various Independent companies, taking the courses.488 Normally, pay and allowances were not authorised for PTD VDC members to attend any training lasting less than six days but these courses, conducted for longer than six day enabled members to receive pay and allowances at the daily rate for the rank corresponding to his rank in the Corps.489 The syllabus of the training schools was confined to relevant knowledge needed by the unit to carrying out the tactical role assigned to it. For example, there was to be no instruction in automatic weapons that were not authorised for issue to the VDC.490

485 ‘VDC Reaches its Most Advanced Stage in Queensland’, The Argus, 7 November, 1942, p.25. 486 Teleprinter Message No. M522 10 February 1942, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/930. 487 Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, p.63. 488 Minutes Paper to the Director VDC from the Director of Military Training 24 May 1942, NAA MP508/1, 286/701/848. To address this issue, the army proposed to establish Guerrilla Warfare Schools in all States. 489 Statutory Rules 1942 No.388, NAA A6388, 392. 490 Instruction from Headquarters Queensland L. of C. on Training VDC 4 September 1942, AWM 60, 1532. During the year 1942-43, 1400 full-time and 9100 part-time members attended Schools and Courses in throughout Australia, AWM 54, 1008/2/12.

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Integration into home defence plans required the VDC leadership to be kept fully informed of the types of operational tasks, envisaged by the Army, which the VDC would perform in the event of an emergency. Regular liaison with the Army was necessary to ensure that training, corresponding to these tasks, could be introduced and the current training regimen remained relevant.491 The Army War Effort in June 1942 listed eight areas of training in which the VDC should attain proficiency. These were weapons training, physical training, thorough knowledge of their own locality, preparing and passing of verbal, written and telegraphic messages, preparation and manning of defences, actions of patrols and observation posts, ability to carry out limited counter attacks and rapid assembly of the unit.492 In some respects, the VDC was being developed into a valuable resource.

Yet the capacity of the participants themselves occasionally limited what could be achieved by training courses. Not all members chosen for training could satisfactorily complete the course to the standard expected by the Army. In December 1942, a two week staff officers’ course report recommended that the participants, many having held their appointments for a considerable time, were not qualified to hold their Commands.493 The recommendation further stated that the Staff Officers had to improve without delay or be replaced. Some possessed the necessary modern training knowledge but lacked the physical fitness to meet the demands of the position, with the report noting that the age of several staff officers was over sixty years. Other men were not up to date on modern training methods or tactics.494 If the Corps was to reach the level of effectiveness required to carrying out its growing responsibilities, the practice of promoting suitable younger men to staff positions was a required and continuing process. Regardless of the benefits of training, as the war progressed and the perceived threat of invasion gradually dissipated, maintaining enthusiasm and interest proved to be an ongoing challenge. The training still had to be tailored to the unit’s operational task but for many rural units, the task was becoming more theoretical than genuine.

491 Agendum of VDC Corps Commanders Conference 14-16 may 1942, AWM 61, 442/1/568. 492 The Army War Effort, Allied Land Forces Headquarters, Melbourne, 30 June 1942, p.20. 493 Report on the VDC No. 1 L.H.Q. Staff Course 16-29 November 1942, AWM 193, 132 494 Report on the VDC No. 1 L.H.Q. Staff Course 16-29 November 1942, AWM 193, 132.

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Geographic isolation was a further problem for VDC personnel in the remote northern and north-western regions of Australia. Insurmountable logistical problems sometimes prevented their attending training courses. With success being experienced with training courses by mobile instructional units, it was thought this training could be duplicated in these remote regions. A training school held at a station 600 km south of Darwin was viewed as a ‘complete failure’, since no regard had been given to the distances needed to travel in order to reach the station and the seasonal work being carried out on other stations, severely limiting the number of men who could or would attend.495 The enormous distances to travel, lack of air transport and the impracticality of moving overland in the ‘wet season’ would prove to be insurmountable problems for the VDC in the Northern Territory. It was eventually realised that any training must be undertaken at the end of the ‘wet season’ in April but this restriction greatly limited what could realistically be achieved.496 These difficulties highlighted the enormity of the problems in defending northern Australia.

At a time when the war was becoming ever closer to Australia, the incorporation of the VDC into the Army in 1941 furnished the Corps with defined roles within the defence plans of Australia. Integration into the CMF broadened the membership and provided an avenue for men wishing to contribute to home defence when they considered Australia needed it most. The VDC had to undertake the necessary administrative and organisational restructuring to emerge as a force capable of carrying out its newly defined duties. There was now the requirement to achieve a degree of efficiency and reliability through training and supply of equipment to warrant the new responsibilities of the VDC. The ‘playing soldier’ option was no longer feasible as the possibility of a call up of the Corps increased in unison with the advancing Japanese. Whatever the strengths and weaknesses were of the VDC, by 1943, the defined roles assigned to the VDC in mid-1941, such as guerrilla warfare, were beginning to be made redundant. At this stage of the war, the overall focus of the Government was positioned on the emerging domestic manpower crisis, superimposed on

495 Letter from the Commander of Northern Territory Force to Headquarters Allied Land Force 28 January 1943, NAA MP742/1, 286/1/93. 496 Letter from the Commander of Northern Territory Force to Headquarters Allied Land Force 28 January 1943, NAA MP742/1, 286/1/93.

111 the need to maintain a military force capable of playing an active role in the war. The growing efficiency of the VDC allowed for its primary role within the home defence plans to be readjusted as the war continued to distance itself from Australian shores and the government reassessed its economic commitment to the Allied cause.

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Chapter Four

New Military Role for the VDC, 1943 - 1945

In 1943, it became clear that the threat to Australia’s mainland was diminishing. As a consequence, the Australian Government needed to reassess and rebalance the country’s war effort in order to accommodate competing military and economic pressures such as Australia’s role on the battlefield and the level of munitions and food production needed to maintain Allied forces in the region.497 The reassessment encompassed a new main role for the VDC which involved the manning of anti-aircraft (AA), coastal artillery (CA) and searchlight (SL) batteries. Such a change in role also necessitated an internal re-organisation for the VDC which included new arrangements for recruiting and training and a range of associated difficulties. During this period the VDC was further employed in a range of supplementary military roles such as search and rescue. From 1943 on a combination of manpower or rather workforce shortages in Australia, a growing degree of ‘complacency’ in the domestic war effort and movement of the ‘front line’ further and further away from Australia complicated all aspects of VDC maintenance and development.

The assigning of a new primary role in home defence for the VDC in May 1943 by the Military Board was partly a result of the fact that the perceived threat of a Japanese invasion had greatly diminished. The government was in a position to deliberate on decisions fundamental to the future direction of the Australian war effort. The most pressing challenges related to the growing domestic and international pressure for increased economic production, particularly for agricultural products, while simultaneously attempting to manage a manpower shortage.498 The political impact of the manpower shortage on the VDC will be discussed in the succeeding chapter. The economic pressure compounded the political pressure to maintain a sufficiently large military force, capable of

497 For a more extensive list of issues see David Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996, p.150. 498 S. J. Butlin and C. B. Schedvin, ‘Reassessing Manpower Priorities’, War Economy 1942-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1977, pp.348-390.

113 playing an active role in the war, in the hope of securing a meaningful role at any post-war Allied conference.499 Any inability to increase food production would jeopardize Australia’s commitment of food supplies for Britain and India, long regarded as an integral role in Australia’s war effort, and for the American forces fighting in the South-west Pacific.500 On the other hand, any increase in food production would involve the prising of men from industrial production, mainly munitions factories, or, more importantly, from the Army. The allocation and use of manpower thus became pivotal in any redirection of Australia’s war effort and the VDC had an important role to play in the solution to the problem.

As the front lines were being pushed back away from Australia’s shores, the need to man home defences was lessening, more so in the southern areas of Australia. In early January 1943, in response to manpower pressures, the army began preliminary investigations into employing part-time duty VDC in static anti-aircraft defences in Southern Line of Communication area defences as a means of reducing the full scale manning of static AA defences.501 In fact, on 23 March 1943, in an appreciation on the current strategic situation, Blamey advised the government that the recent Allied successes in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea enabled the forces on the Australian mainland to be reduced, declaring it was ‘a justifiable risk, since the risk of invasion had greatly diminished, although not completely disappeared.’502

In May 1943, the revised main role of the VDC became the provision of part-time duty personnel to man AA, CA and SL batteries south of Townsville, in the event of an emergency.503 The aim of these new assignments was to release a significant number of military personnel, currently manning the AA, CA and SL batteries, for more active service. The new home defence role took precedence over the existing roles which, if necessary,

499 Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, p.150. 500 John Robertson, Australia at War 1939-1945, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1981, p.196. See also David Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, p.150. 501 Employment of VDC Personnel in Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defences, AMF Headquarters, 3 May 1943, p.4, AWM 54, 243/18/11. 502 Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-45, p.295. 503 Employment of VDC Personnel in Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defences, AMF Headquarters, 3 May 1943, p.4, AWM 54, 243/18/11.

114 were to be modified in order to meet the personnel requirements for manning the batteries. The order of priority of the new roles would be the manning of light AA Batteries, heavy AA gun stations, AA searchlight sections, coast defence batteries and coast artillery searchlight sections.504 In addition to the physical manning of the batteries, the VDC were to supply a shadow manning unit for all officers and other ranks in AA and CA operation rooms, control rooms, and AA Headquarters.505 In an emergency situation, the part-time members would reinforce the full-time members, using a shift system in order to deal with any task requiring continuous duty, though it was intended that the VDC would eventually replace all AMF personnel.

A further role of providing close protection of heavy industry was given to battalions within the Fortress areas, mainly in the Newcastle area, and personnel received an individual issue of rifles, sub-machine guns and ammunition, which were kept at their respective homes.506 It is noteworthy that the vast majority of AA batteries requiring VDC manning were located, in or adjacent to, major population centres. In other words, the rural VDC units played only a very minor part in the new primary role. The original role of the Corps, static defence of home localities, remained the primary role in country areas but had assumed a secondary function for metropolitan VDC units.

As with the earlier incorporation into army command, the VDC battalions required reorganisation to meet the operational requirements of these new tasks. A number of metropolitan battalions had to convert from traditional infantry roles to coastal defence and AA roles, justifying the breaking up of some units and the amalgamating of others to form VDC units that could be assigned the new role.507 It was also, once again, proposed to use this opportunity, as a tactful means of releasing officers who were ‘unwanted and

504 Employment of VDC Personnel in Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defences, AMF Headquarters, 3 May 1943, p.4, AWM 54, 243/18/11. 505 Employment of VDC Personnel in Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defences, AMF Headquarters, 3 May 1943, p.4, AWM 54, 243/18/11. 506 Brief Outline of the Operations of the VDC NSW, 21 April 1944, AWM 1008/2/28. 507 Conference of Group Commanders VDC (NSW) 16 May 1943, p.1, AWM 54, 1008/2/35.

115 unsuitable types of men.’508 Understanding this might be difficult in some cases, it was suggested that any requests from Battalion Commanders, recommending the discharge of an officer due to the man’s inefficiency, would be met favourably by Corps Headquarters.509 In some units, the change in the VDC’s primary role was not fully recognised or wanted.510 Several Commanders were hesitant to coax the men into these new tasks and there was a degree of reluctance by some VDC members who, for various reasons, did not wish to transfer to artillery, anti-aircraft or searchlight roles. In light of the lessening threat of attack, these members took the changeover as a chance to cease attending parades and resign.511 If, as a result of this reluctance, there were insufficient numbers of suitable VDC personnel volunteering for the manning of the AA and Coastal Defences approval had been given to increase enlistments.512 If there was still a shortfall in numbers, then the battery would be manned by garrison battalion personnel.513

As highlighted, the new role was far from being uniformly embraced. Problems soon appeared concerning the shortfall in the recruitment of volunteers from the local VDC units willing to undertake the VDC’s new operational roles. As discussed in Chapter Three, it was difficult to guarantee the availability of sufficient VDC personnel for duty if the need arose. The army had anticipated the problem. To ensure enough members would be available for duty to man the batteries, it requested the VDC to raise additional volunteers from within its ranks, in other words above the establishment required, for the task. The number of extra recruits was to be equal with total establishment plus a percentage ranging from fifty per cent to two hundred per cent, dependent on the location and category of the battery.514 These extra volunteers were envisaged to ensure sufficient availability of personnel, at short notice, to man the batteries.

508 Report from a VDC Conference in Sydney, 1943, AWM 54, 1008/2/40. 509 Report from a VDC Conference in Sydney, 1943, AWM 54, 1008/2/40. 510 Employment of VDC Personnel in Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defences, AMF Headquarters, 3 May 1943, p.4, AWM 54, 243/18/11. 511 Conference of Group Commanders VDC (NSW) 16 May 1943, p.1, AWM 54, 1008/2/35. 512 Employment of VDC Personnel in Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defences, AMF Headquarters, 3 May 1943, p.4, AWM 54, 243/18/11. 513 Conference of Group Commanders VDC (NSW) 16 May 1943, p.4, AWM 54, 1008/2/35. 514 Employment of VDC Personnel in Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defences, AMF Headquarters, 8 October 1943, p.2, AWM 54, 243/18/11.

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Nonetheless, recruiting these additional volunteers from within the VDC proved difficult. The experience of the provides a good illustration. The struggle to achieve the required recruitment of 1,500 VDC volunteers for the shadow manning of the Fremantle Fortress was only overcome by recruiting from nearby outer metropolitan units, located adjacent to the Fremantle area.515 From some sections of the army, the reluctance of sufficient personnel to volunteer in the Fremantle area to man the local battery was unjustly attributed to the district appearing to have little ‘national spirit’.516 Likewise, the manning of AA, LA and CA batteries in Townsville and Cairns suffered recruitment shortages and had to rely on adjacent units to meet establishment.517

While recruiting for volunteers for the AA batteries and coastal artillery was proving to be testing, of greater concern was the recruiting of volunteers for the burdensome task of full-time manning of the searchlight batteries. It was proposed that, if the batteries required 24 hour manning, men working near the battery might possibly be on day duty, while men living nearby could be available for the night shift.518 The Director had sought discussions with the Group Commanders from several States in relation to the impracticability of requiring VDC volunteers to carry out this task.519 Many Commanders considered recruiting for SL duty would be very difficult, if not impossible, and each cited an unwillingness of members to give up their time, particularly while others in the community did not contribute any time.520 Furthermore, under the existing regulations part-time members who performed duty exceeding six hours were entitled to be compensated for any loss of earnings incurred but part of the roster involved manning the searchlight batteries at night. As the majority of the PTD VDC personnel would normally work during the day, there

515 Report to Land Headquarters from the Commander 3 Australian Corps 26 February 1944, NAA MP742/1, 286/1/128. 516 Report to Land Headquarters from the Commander 3 Australian Corps 26 February 1944, NAA MP742/1, 286/1/128. 517 Letter to Land Headquarters regarding the Re-Organisation of Static Anti-Aircraft Defences 10 August 1944, NAA MP742/1, 286/1/149. Eventually, the Army ceased training VDC members from nearby rural units and placed them on reserve. 518 Conference of Group Commanders VDC (NSW) 16 May 1943, p.1, AWM 54, 1008/2/35. 519 Conference of Group Commanders VDC (NSW) 16 May 1943, p.4, AWM 54, 1008/2/35. 520 Conference of Group Commanders VDC (NSW) 16 May 1943, p.4, AWM 54, 1008/2/35.

117 would be no loss of earnings and, therefore, they would not be entitled to any reimbursement.521

Indeed, it is easy to understand the reluctance of personnel to volunteer for the duty. One reason would be the geographic location of the units. The metropolitan units, who were assigned the major portion of the new duty, made up only twenty-five per cent of the total number of VDC members.522 In the aftermath of the poor responses to recruitment, a resolution was found in the elimination of continuous manning of SL batteries by the VDC, which resulted in a reduction in the number of VDC personnel required.523 Only in the event of an emergency was the VDC to be required to provide continuous manning.524 Nevertheless, not all units experienced difficulties achieving the required volunteers for AA duty. As early as July 1942 the VDC units located at the Newcastle commenced training on the guns. There were no problems in achieving the required number of men to transfer to the AA detachment.525 Surprisingly however, in Lithgow, there were no searchlight batteries to man since the Army believed the Japanese would only attack the munitions factories in daylight. Subsequently, the VDC members could only train on the AA batteries during daylight hours, in other words their working hours, resulting in lower output of production.526 The requirement for AA protection at Lithgow gradually diminished and, by early 1944, the batteries were removed thus enabling the employees to concentrate fully on their paid industrial work.527

In addition, difficulties arose in relation to the original static role of the VDC. The nature of role of static defence role in home localities meant mobility was not a high priority of the VDC units. The static role required the concentration of men and equipment for

521 Conference of Group Commanders VDC (NSW) 16 May 1943, p.4, AWM 54, 1008/2/35. This situation prompted an amendment to be inserted into the existing VDC regulations to overcome this anomaly. 522 Minute Paper War Cabinet Agendum 23 October 1943, p.2-3, NAA MP742/1, 286/1/102 523 Employment of VDC Personnel in Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defences, AMF Headquarters, 8 October 1943, p.2, AWM 54, 243/18/11. 524 Employment of VDC Personnel in Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defences, AMF Headquarters, 8 October 1943, p.4, AWM 54, 243/18/11. 525 VDC War History 32nd Battalion VDC NSW (Steel Industry) p.4, AWM 54, 1008/2/31. 526 Southall, The Defence of Lithgow, p.49. 527 Southall, The Defence of Lithgow, p.49.

118 efficient implementation of the defensive role. The new primary role meant the VDC unit tasked with manning their assigned battery might be located a distance away raising the question of transportation. The lack of any military transport often handicapped VDC recruitment efforts. The transportation time to the battery and training time could be significant, especially if the volunteers did not reside locally. As a response to the transportation hurdle, full-time duty on coastal artillery by the VDC would only be required after a reasonably long warning, thus ensuring that the personnel did not have to reside in the vicinity of the CA battery.528 If members were to supply their own transport, provision for tyres, spare parts and compensation for the use of the vehicle required addressing. In fact, Blamey acknowledged the ‘free loan of many hundreds of privately owned motor vehicles, involving the wear and tear of tyre equipment and other parts which could not be replaced, was an important factor in the individual service rendered by members of the Corps’ in his written farewell address to the VDC in mid-October 1945 529 Where the military was prepared to supply transport, in contrast, such as for the manning of the coastal artillery at Albany, a small country town on the south coast of Western Australia, by the local VDC unit there were few problems.530

In July 1943, only two months after being authorised for its new role and in line with the prevailing military view that an invasion was improbable, the manning of Coastal and static AA defences were re-classified into Full Scale, Reduced Scale and VDC Scale. Full Scale manning meant the batteries were solely manned full-time by AMF personnel and ready for immediate action.531 In Reduced Scale, sufficient part-time VDC personnel were trained to enable the whole of the defence to be continuously manned only in the event of an emergency. Otherwise, approximately fifty per cent of the artillery battery was manned by AMF personnel on a continuous basis.532 For the VDC Scale, the total battery was to be manned by part-time VDC personnel on six hours’ notice, with only sufficient AMF

528 Employment of VDC Personnel in Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defences, AMF Headquarters, 8 October 1943, p.3, AWM 54, 243/18/11. 529 Letter to all VDC Corps Commanders from Blamey 13 October 1945, Corps Headquarters Volunteer Defence Corps Queensland, AWM 52, 36/1/5 July to December 1945. 530 Report to Land Headquarters from the Commander 3 Australian Corps 26 February 1944, NAA MP742/1, 286/1/128. 531 David Horner, The Gunners A History of Australian Artillery, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1995, p.391. 532 Horner, The Gunners A History of Australian Artillery, p.391.

119 personnel made available to train the VDC volunteers and maintain the battery’s equipment. In recognition of transport difficulties, it was judged that six hours’ notice was the minimum practicable time required in any call-up, due to the possible travel involved to reach the battery stations from homes and places of employment of the volunteers.533 The reasonably long warning, if full-time duty was to be required, highlighted the increasing prospect that the personnel did not reside or work in the vicinity of the battery.534 At this time, all AA and CA defences south of the Tropic of Capricorn were on Reduced Scale except the Sydney, Newcastle and Kembla Fortresses. VDC Scale applied to VIC, SA, Tasmania and NSW L of C Areas other than the above exceptions.535

The nature of training of personnel undertaken varied and remained dependent on the operational role of the individual VDC unit. Personnel assigned to AA, CA and SL duties had to undertake at least a minimum of four hours training per week at the batteries as part of their normal battalion training. The Military Board had stated that there would be no distinction between training and manning duties, since both were normally carried out concurrently.536 This is an important concession to encourage members to volunteer for duty on the batteries. Any duty performed by PTD VDC members of the Corps which was certified as duty by the Military Board, meant the volunteer was entitled to pay and allowances at a daily rate. The rate was commensurate with the hours on duty. For example, twenty four consecutive hours resulted in one day’s pay sliding to a period of not less than six consecutive hours receiving one quarter day’s pay. No pay was authorised for any duty of less than six hours.537

As well, sleeping accommodation was organised, if there was overnight training (manning), and procedures were set in place to ensure the same men proceeded to the

533 Horner, The Gunners A History of Australian Artillery, p,391. 534 Employment of VDC Personnel in Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defences, AMF Headquarters, 8 October 1943, p.3, AWM 54, 243/18/11. 535 Employment of VDC Personnel in Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defences, AMF Headquarters, 8 October 1943, p.3, AWM 54, 243/18/11. 536 Report on Training of VDC Personnel, 5 July 1943, NAA MP70/5, 158/3/124. 537 Pay and Allowances VDC in AA and Coastal Defences, 11 November 1943, AWM 54, 1008/1/2.

120 same station, each time they attended training. The level of accommodation at AA, CA and SL batteries caused much concern for VDC personnel. Many middle-aged VDC volunteers were unaccustomed to sleeping in tents with floor boards and physically unsuited to living in tents exposed to winter weather conditions.538 The rigours of the tent accommodation began to cause problems with regular attendance of training. In numerous cases, men in reserved occupations were not sufficiently robust to endure the conditions in winter weather and continue to carry on their civil employment. Growing incidence of sickness and general discomfort became areas of significant concern to the VDC and their civilian employers. Repeated requests to the Army for the provision of huts were made and, with some reluctance, the Army eventually provided some hut accommodation.539

Despite showing keen interest, several of the older members struggled to cope with the more technical details and led to the proposal that team members should be handpicked, with concentration on members capable of performing the duty.540 The new task of manning of the AA batteries was realistically the domain of the younger members of the Battalion.541 Unsurprisingly, as some members struggled to cope with their new duties, reports of lethargy within the gun teams began to emerge. A common complaint from AMF instructors was the failure of the volunteers to attend all training periods which meant the sequence of learning was lost. Indeed, in one instance a second course for training was abandoned due to lack of interest.542 The largest problem facing the VDC, at this time, was maintaining the enthusiasm and commitment of units involved in manning AA, CA and SL batteries.

Some metropolitan Battalions favoured the training in searchlights to become part of the general syllabus for all ranks, rather than only for active duty personnel, believing it

538 Hutted accommodation required for VDC at AA, SL and CA sites report by Brigadier V. England VDC Commander (NSW) 25 July 1944, AWM 61, 559/1/240. 539 Hutted accommodation required for VDC at AA, SL and CA sites report by Brigadier V. England VDC Commander (NSW) 25 July 1944, AWM 61, 559/1/240. 540 Report on Training of VDC Personnel, 5 July 1943, NAA MP70/5, 158/3/124. 541 Employment of Members of VDC in Accordance with Physical Standards, 24 April 1944, p.1, Corps Headquarters Volunteer Defence Corps Queensland, April to June 1944, AWM 52, 36/1/5. 542 Report on Training of VDC Personnel, 5 July 1943, NAA MP70/5, 158/3/124.

121 would assist in retaining all the men’s interest. By only selecting the most motivated men to form specialist groups, the remaining men, not chosen, would eventually lose any incentive to remain in the unit and cease attending all parades. The new role for active VDC units caused many members to leave the unit, not wishing to undertake artillery training after years of infantry training. The remaining members were eventually placed on reserve status awaiting the disbandment of the Corps.543

Regardless of the change of the military role of the VDC in 1943, the progress of training the men transferred to the reassigned units also presented problems. A report submitted by an instructor lamented the attitude of the other ranks stating ‘VDC officers have attempted to co-operate under rather difficult conditions and with men who, to say the least, are rather difficult to handle’.544 Over the course of three weeks the numbers attending the training ranged from twenty below the required number to twenty over the required number greatly affecting the consistency of any training. The Instructor believed the cause lay in the VDC members’ belief that they were doing voluntary duty and deserved ‘special consideration’, with the main grievance being not having a Sunday off. Typical comments of the NCOs and OR reported included ‘The men of my company are supposed to finish up their four weeks training today and are to have next Sunday off. They all have gardens to do just as I have and they have been told they would be trained in four weeks.’545 Moreover, there was a reluctance to re-organise their units into smaller gun or instrument crews instead of the current larger infantry platoons. The enthusiasm of the VDC was displayed by one man who stated ‘I want to have a go at everything. I’d like a fortnight on the H. & R.F., a fortnight on the Predictor and the same on the guns.’546 Others had to leave early due to work commitments in the afternoon highlighting the unique circumstances of the VDC. Enthusiasm, however, did not directly correlate with nor guarantee efficiency.

543 Report on Central Group Meeting 7 September 1943, AWM 52, 36/1/8 September 1943. 544 Report on VDC Training by Lieutenant J. Just 10th Australia A.A. Battery 21 August 1943, NAA MP70/5, 158/3/133. 545 Report on VDC Training by Lieutenant J. Just 10th Australia A.A. Battery 21 August 1943, NAA MP70/5, 158/3/133. 546 Report on VDC Training by Lieutenant J. Just 10th Australia A.A. Battery 21 August 1943, NAA MP70/5, 158/3/133.

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These men all volunteered to be transferred to the batteries but appear to have had a haphazard approach to a duty that required training and skill to become proficient.

Difficulties in replacing personnel who were leaving began to occur by the end of 1943. While the strength of the metropolitan Battalions appeared stable, this concealed the many members whose discharge had been approved but were still on the unit’s books.547 Considerable wastage had mainly occurred in the Other Ranks during the Manpower Release to Industry Scheme but age of retirement and medical unfitness had contributed to the remainder.548 It was becoming increasingly difficult to attract personnel with the necessary qualifications as replacements.

Meanwhile Prime Minister Curtin announced, in mid-July 1943, that the government no longer considered Australia under the threat of invasion and maintained the only threat to the mainland was the possibility of limited and unexpected nuisance raids.549 Moreover, Curtin acknowledged that the primary role of the VDC had changed to include protecting Australia from these raids and reaffirmed that the Government would provide every facility to increase its fighting power, although this would be limited by capacity to provide arms and equipment.550 The reaffirmation of the new role for the VDC by the Prime Minister, in itself, did not ease the army’s concern that the number of VDC volunteers would begin to dwindle.551

There were several valid reasons for these concerns. There seemed to be emerging a general feeling among some VDC members that their services were not as necessary as in

547 Confidential Report from Corps Command VDC (Q) 30 December 1943, AWM 54 1008/2/39. 548 Confidential Report from Corps Command VDC (Q) 30 December 1943, AWM 54 1008/2/39. The Manpower Release to Industry Scheme was authorised by the War Cabinet on 1 October 1943 and was to involve the release of 20,000 men from the Army and the Munitions industries respectively, with the majority of the releases to be directed rural production. For greater detail, see S. J. Butlin and C. B. Schedvin, ‘Reassessing Manpower Priorities’, War Economy 1942-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1977, p.348-390. 549 The Newcastle Morning Herald & Miners’ Advocate, 16 July 1943, p.3. 550 The Newcastle Morning Herald & Miners’ Advocate, 16 July 1943, p.3. 551 The Army War Effort 29 February 1944, p.35, AWM 113, MH1/167.

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1942 and had little or no value.552 It was hard to maintain the motivation of the volunteers and impress on the men the necessity of continued training in light of the improving situation of the war. As well, there was growing criticism that the VDC members were wasting their time ‘playing soldier’, time considered by some that could be put to a more productive use.553 Manpower requirements, particularly since the majority of members were working in essential industries with a heavy workload, greatly limited any spare recreational time of the volunteers. In the metropolitan units, many members could not make themselves available for the regular training parades, especially for gunnery training, and had to be discharged. Indeed, it is easy to understand that members had become hesitant to continue using the little spare time they enjoyed training for a role that, the politicians were telling them, was rapidly becoming redundant.554 In rural areas, all farming properties were being worked with a shortage of labour and consequently falling efficiency of this sector. Farm improvements were being neglected. Shortage of labour, distances to be travelled and petrol restrictions prevented members from regular parade attendance. In reality, men were attempting to do two jobs simultaneously, manage the farm and attend parades, making it difficult to do either job satisfactorily. If parade attendance was made compulsory, the greater majority of members would have either resign or been discharged for non-attendance. The application of a certain amount of leeway prevented the disbandment of many rural units.555

The level of concern was such, that Blamey wrote a general letter to the VDC Corps Commanders in July 1943 stating the VDC remained ‘as important as ever and consequently the need to increase its morale and fighting efficiency to the highest level’ needed to be maintained.556 Blamey further stated that the level of training should be eased when a satisfactory standard had been achieved due to the long working hours of the men in agricultural and essential industries, thereby hoping to eliminate any possible complaint

552 Quarterly Training Report 1 July -30 September 1943, No. 2 Group VDC (Bunbury), p.1, AWM 54, 1008/2/53 Part 6. 553 An Attachment to notes on a War Cabinet Agendum No.501/1943 3 December 1943, p.1, NAA A5954, 268/2. 554 Half Yearly Training Report 13 Battalion VDC (WA) 31 July 1944, AWM 54, 1008/2/53 Part 2. 555 Training Report for Quarter ending October 1944, VDC Western Command, p.5, AWM 54, 1008/2/53 Part 2. 556 Letter from Blamey to Volunteer Defence Commanders, 8 July 1943, NAA A5954, 268/2.

124 from the Manpower authorities that continuing military training was wasting time.557 Blamey also voiced concern that VDC members were raising questions of relaxing their efforts in the duties allotted to them. The ‘surprises of war’ could not guarantee the security of Australia until the enemy had been totally defeated.558

In many respects, the change in the primary role had elicited mixed reactions from VDC units. In some units, being assigned to man the batteries gave a fresh interest in training, giving the members a sense of purpose. One VDC officer, Captain Anderson, wrote in his local paper, in regard to the manning of the local AA guns, the ‘VDC is as essential as it ever was’ and volunteer numbers remained high.559 This observation contrasted greatly with the two neighbouring VDC units, however, who were not assigned to AA duties and suffered a serious drop in membership.560

The Military Board was hesitant to reduce the training activities of those metropolitan VDC units not involved in the new operational role. It was feared that any lowering of the general standard of training of the Corps could have an unfavourable impact on the new primary role with, perhaps, a flow on effect to the war effort in general. Training exercises were considered a necessary part of keeping up the military efficiency of the Corps, even though the government had publicly stated that the immediate danger of an invasion had substantially ended. Significantly, the number of hours spent on infantry training stayed firm in these units and training in map reading, explosives, various weapons, rifle grenades signals and rifle exercises remained part of the syllabus, with officers and NCOs undertaking additional training.561 As an example, the time devoted to training in NSW, during 1943, consisted of two to three weekends a month and one night per week,

557 Letter from Blamey to Volunteer Defence Commanders, 8 July 1943, NAA A5954, 268/2. 558 Letter from Blamey to Volunteer Defence Commanders, 8 July 1943, NAA A5954, 268/2. 559 Peter Stanley, ‘The Soldiers on the Hill: the defence of Whyalla 1939/45 Part 8: 1943: How much more entertaining this is?', Sabretache, Vol. 28, No. 2 April/June 1987, p.29. The report was in the Whyalla News. 560 Stanley, ‘The Soldiers on the Hill: the defence of Whyalla 1939/45 Part 8: 1943: How much more entertaining this is?', p.29. The neighbouring units were Port Pirie and Port Germein. 561 Training Report for Quarter ending March 1943, 13 Battalion C Group (Q), p.1, AWM 54, 423/8/20.

125 averaging between twenty to thirty-five hours per month.562 Any reduction in the training programmes needed to be measured against any dampening in the members’ enthusiasm. Along similar lines, rural units were to be provided with instructional facilities and equipment merely sufficient to keep the members’ interest and enthusiasm at previous levels. Accordingly, training in rural areas reflected their continuing original role of static defence, to harass and delay the enemy and protect selected vulnerable points. However, despite their best efforts, by mid-1943, enthusiasm for parade attendance was gradually lessening.

Although the government publicly stated its support for, and professed the importance of, the VDC, in the first half of 1943 the Corps was still beset by shortages of arms and equipment. The equipment shortage further compounded the problem of declining parade attendance. Even at this stage of the war, the supply of equipment was still being prioritised depending on the location and the operational role of the unit. As a consequence of the prioritisation, preference was given to the ten VDC Battalions north of the Tropic of Capricorn located in Western Australia and Queensland which were authorised to be fully equipped.563 The twenty-nine Battalions in Fortress and AA areas were to be equipped at eighty per cent of establishment and the remaining seventy-two Battalions, stretching across the nation, were equipped at approximately fifty per cent of establishment.564 By mid-1943, there was an additional allocation of more modern equipment which included armoured carriers, tank attack guns, .303 rifles, Bren guns, sub- machine guns and mortars to VDC units.565 Ironically, by the end of 1943, at a time of decreased enthusiasm and the absence of any real threat to Australia, all VDC members had received uniforms and equipment equivalent to that of an active AMF unit.566

562 Report on the Volunteer Defence Corps NSW with special reference to medical services 23 November 1943, AWM 54, 1008/1/19. 563 Minute Paper War Cabinet Agendum 23 October 1943, p.4, NAA MP742/1, 286/1/102. One battalion was located in WA and the remaining nine battalions were in Queensland. 564 Minute Paper War Cabinet Agendum 23 October 1943, p.4, NAA MP742/1, 286/1/102. 565 The Army War Effort 29 February 1944, p.34, AWM 113, MH1/167. 566 The Army War Effort 3 March 1945, p.13, AWM 113, MH1/169.

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On the domestic front, the public lifting of blackout restrictions and the removal of barbed wire from the beaches illustrated the general easing of any threat and the improvement in the Allies strategic situation in the war.567 In early December 1943, the War Cabinet reviewed the role of the VDC. The wastage from March 1942, arguably at the height of the threat to Australia, to September 1943 had been approximately 10,000, the last quarter accounting for nearly a third of the total number.568 A major factor in the fall in members was the repeated press statements from politicians that Australia was no longer threatened with invasion.569 Nevertheless, the VDC was not alone in the tailing off in enthusiasm with the ARP and other organisations experiencing similar problems.570 Once again, such was the concern that the public should perceive any downgrading of the importance of sustaining the war effort, Blamey was prompted to suggest that the Prime Minister state publicly that the war was yet to be won and reinforce the need to stop any complacency permeating through either the VDC or the general public.571 The military view at the present time was that ‘no action be taken to reduce materially the activities of VDC units, since such a step may result in a lowering of the general standard of the Corps and react unfavourably on the primary role, or detract from the general war effort’.572 The sustaining of the VDC’s activities was an attempt to illustrate to the public, and VDC members, the continuing need to maintain the current level of commitment to the war effort, despite the obvious improvement in the Allies’ strategic situation.

In response to Blamey’s concerns, the VDC Commanders took steps in an attempt to limit the declining attendances at parades and address some issues of concern of the members in order to maintain the motivation and enthusiasm of VDC personnel. First, the Commanders reduced the timing of parades for VDC units to fortnightly instead of weekly.573 This reduction in parade attendance allowed the volunteers, the majority of

567 Sydney Morning Herald, 31 August 1943, p.4, AWM 54, 1008/1/19. 568 An Attachment to Notes on War Cabinet Agendum No. 501/1943 3 December 1943, p.1, NAA A5954, 268/2. 569 Training Report for Quarter ending 30 September 1943, VDC (WA) 5 October 1943, p.4, AWM 54, 1008/2/53 Part 6. 570 McKernan, All In!, p.118. 571 The Army War Effort 29 February 1944, p.35, AWM 113, MH1/167. 572 The Army War Effort 29 February 1944, p.35, AWM 113, MH1/167. 573 The Army War Effort states the average hours per week was seven in 1943, p.32, The Army War Effort 29 February 1944, p.33, AWM 113, MH1/167.

127 whom worked in reserved occupations or essential industries, to concentrate on their civil occupations and spend more time with their families. The shortage of labour and the necessity to maintain economic production had become two of Australia’s major concerns. It also had the added benefit, particularly for rural members, of saving petrol and tyre usage. Secondly, there was to be increased visits by mobile training instructors to local centres, thereby reducing the travel time to attend parades.574 These visits, as previously stated, were very popular and a major incentive to attend the instruction. Importantly, the VDC still provided an outlet for members wishing to continue to contribute in a military sense during their recreational periods. These steps were largely successful as shown by the steady membership strength. At the end of 1943, the strength of the Corps was listed at 85,857, only fifteen per cent less than its peak number in mid-1942.575

At this stage of the chapter, it would be useful to examine the myriad of additional roles performed by the VDC. VDC personnel were called upon to assist the military in a number of ways throughout the war, ranging from searching for downed aircraft, providing assistance in natural disasters, guarding derailed ammunition trains, investigating possible sightings of enemy landings to providing ‘how to live off the land’ lectures for Allied servicemen. Many search missions were undertaken by the local VDC unit involving the organising of a ground search for downed or missing aircraft in all manner of terrains, including the ocean, jungle and rugged bush land.576 VDC units provided search parties and local guides to locate the missing aircraft and occasionally assisted in the removal of bodies. Because they were not in combat, honours and awards were rarely received by VDC volunteers. Nonetheless, a Queensland FTD 17 Battalion VDC member, Corporal John Stevens, was awarded the Medal of the Order of the British Empire on recommendation from his Battalion Commander for his outstanding work in the search for a downed plane in the jungle terrain west of Cairns in mid-March 1943 and for locating the two survivors and recovering the bodies of the other three occupants.577

574 Minute Paper War Cabinet Agendum 23 October 1943, p.1-2, NAA MP742/1, 286/1/102. 575 The Army War Effort 29 February 1944, p.33, AWM 113, MH1/167. 576 de Pierres, Wheatbelt Warriors, p.31. Also see Walker and Walker, Curtin’s Cowboys, pp.152-153. 577 Recommendation for Award, 13 September 1943, AWM 54, 391/19/1. Stevens was recommended for the award by Major E. Markham for actions performed between 10-13 March 1943.

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The proficiency of VDC units proved to be of great assistance to the army. For example, when a train carrying artillery, ammunition and weapons was derailed near Rockhampton in June 1942, the VDC was summoned, at very short notice, to provide the necessary guards to secure the area.578 In Victoria, VDC Headquarters claimed that the recapture of practically all escaped P.O.W.s was, directly or indirectly, attributable to the work of their members and ‘their expert local knowledge’.579 The VDC were also involved in the Gulf Scare in April 1943, when it was reported that the Japanese Army had landed in the Gulf of Carpentaria. The VDC, together with the North Australia Observer Unit, investigated the incident but found no evidence of any Japanese landing. Apparently, the report began with a young Aboriginal lad telling the station manager he saw a boat containing Japanese soldiers and the station manager then duly reporting it to the army. The rumour ballooned and in the ensuing chaos many people attempted to flee to the south.580

In northern Queensland, VDC personnel metamorphosed into instructors. Training lectures by the local 17 Battalion VDC members, highly experienced in living off the land, were given to over 200 very appreciative AIF, RAAF and American personnel. These ‘how to live off the land’ lectures provided invaluable notes and photographs showing the edible fruits and vegetables in the jungle.581 The lectures were credited with saving the lives of four servicemen after their plane was forced down in Japanese occupied territory. The men had attended a lecture the previous day and lived entirely off the land for many days until finally rescued. The rescued men believed their survival had hinged on what they had learnt in the lecture on what was edible in the jungle.582

At the beginning of 1944, in order to balance the competing demands being placed on it, the government needed to tread a fine line between ensuring the public maintained

578 Brief outline of the history of the VDC (Q), AWM 54, 1008/2/12. The train smash occurred at Etna Creek, thirteen miles from Rockhampton on the 134 June 1942. 579 History of the Victorian VDC by Brigadier W. Scott, AWM 54, 1008/2/54. 580 Vane, North Australia Observer Unit, pp.97-100. Also see Walker and Walker, Curtin’s Cowboys, pp.64-65. 581 Brief Outline of History – VDC (Q) p.7, AWM 54, 1008/2/12. For a list of the subjects covered by the VDC course see AWM 52, 36/1/5 April to June 1944. They ranged from catching snakes to making rope from grass. 582 Jungle Lectures and Trips, Letter from Wing Commander R Truscott to VDC Cairns 6 May 1944, AWM 52, 36/1/5, Corps Headquarters VDC Queensland, April to June 1944.

129 its war effort while organising the economy to meet its current, as well as its post-war, obligations while simultaneously addressing the manpower shortage. At this stage of the war, the retention of many inland units had ceased to have any military value but any large scale reduction in the rural units could possibly have a detrimental effect on the metropolitan units. Though the army had decided in 1943 that no action be taken to reduce the activities of the VDC units, it retained the option of conducting regular monitoring on the standing of the rural units.583 In early January 1944, the decision to reduce these units gradually was taken, with location and diminutions of unit strength being the determining factors.584 In contrast, no metropolitan unit was to be disbanded unless its normal wastage made it uneconomic to continue its training.585

In a War Cabinet meeting in early December 1943, it was recommended the Prime Minister publicly praise and endorse the continuing efforts of the VDC and reiterate the warning that the war was still being fought and yet to be won.586 The statement was part of an effort to maintain the level of public commitment to the war effort through the acclamation of the VDC commitment. Significantly though, in May 1944, in line with the policy of reducing the number of country units and the improving strategic situation, it was decided to divide the VDC into two sections, active units and reserve units. The active units of the Corps fell into three categories. The first category consisted of units allotted to anti- aircraft, coastal artillery and searchlight battery duties. The second category involved units tasked with close protection of Fortress areas and the third category were all units north of 20° South latitude, that is units north of Bowen in Queensland which included Townsville. Inland sub-units above this latitude only remained active on the recommendation of the First Australian Army or 3 Australian Corps.587 The maximum establishment for the active part-time units was set at 33,600 personnel, of which approximately ninety per cent were

583 Volunteer Defence Corps – Future Policy 10 January 1944, Corps Headquarters Volunteer Defence Corps Queensland, January to March 1944, AWM 52, 36/1/5. 584 Volunteer Defence Corps – Future Policy 10 January 1944, Corps Headquarters Volunteer Defence Corps Queensland, January to March 1944, AWM 52, 36/1/5. 585 War Cabinet Minute No. 3211 8 December 1943, NAA A5954, 268/2. 586 War Cabinet Minute No. 3211, 8 December 1943, NAA A5954, 268/2. 587 Letter from the Chief of the General Staff to all Headquarters, 3 May 1944, p.1, Corps Headquarters Volunteer Defence Corps Queensland, AWM 52, 36/1/5 April to June 1944.

130 involved in battery duties or Fortress protection.588 In other words, the majority of active VDC units would be located in, or near, major population centres. It was considered vitally important that the active units remain efficient and continue their commitment to their main military role. As a result, active units in fortress areas still held parades three Sundays a week, while the majority of active battalions paraded only twice a month.589

In general though, the majority of the VDC volunteers, roughly 40,000, were not engaged in the primary role and were placed on reserve.590 Despite being placed on reserve, there was no intention that these units would be disbanded, at least not at this stage. Unit identity and structure was to remain intact to ensure a speedy and efficient resumption of the unit’s activities, if the need arose. A reserve basis did mean however, that voluntary parades for rifle practice were limited to one per month, though a greater number of parades could be held if the members wished, provided no expense would be borne by the Commonwealth or the provision of additional FTD staff.591 Four Victorian country units justified their suspension of all training activities by stating that ‘all available manpower is being used for re-fencing and general rehabilitation’ adding that there was still ‘a very real danger of grass fires’ as well.592 Limiting the number of parades released volunteers from a substantial portion of their service. For rural units, this allowed many of the members to devote more time to rural production. As well, the mobile training cadres, that had proved to be so popular, were disbanded. The approach was to have all the policy changes implemented by the end of July 1944.593 In keeping in line with the past amount of government support, the capitation allowance for reserve units was reduced by three quarters to two shillings and sixpence per member, though there was some provision for this amount to be doubled if expenses exceeded the participated amount.594

588 Letter from the Chief of the General Staff to all Headquarters, 3 May 1944, p.1, Corps Headquarters Volunteer Defence Corps Queensland, AWM 52, 36/1/5 April to June 1944. 589 The Army War Effort 7 March 1945, p.13, NAA A5954, 300/1. 590 Department of Defence Note to Acting Secretary of Defence 2 September 1944, NAA A5954, 268/2. 591 Letter from the Chief of the General Staff to all Headquarters, 3 May 1944, p.2, NAA A5954, 268/2. 592 Report on Major Training Activities in Victoria for March 1944 3 March 1944, NAA MP70/5, 158/3/184. 593 Letter from the Chief of the General Staff to all Headquarters, 3 May 1944, p.1, Corps Headquarters Volunteer Defence Corps Queensland, AWM 52, 36/1/5 April to June 1944. 594 Volunteer Defence Corps – Capitation Grant 9 October 1944, AWM 61, 531/1/716.

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Nonetheless, members in reserve units could, for time being, retain their .303 rifles, leather equipment and uniforms plus an allocation of 100 rounds of ammunition for rifle practice but all other equipment, training stores, explosives and spare ammunition were to be returned to Ordnance Depots by the end of July 1944.595 The numbers of full-time battalion staff were reduced down to the Adjutant and a NCO, who had the responsibility of ensuring all the equipment was collected, accounted for and returned. Despite the initial problems with a lack of supply, equipment valued at approximately £1,000,000 had been issued to the VDC by 1945.596 Once all the equipment and stores had been returned, the Battalion car or truck, together with driver, was also returned to Ordnance Depot.597

Yet the return of the equipment faced several handicaps. The enormous size of some Battalion areas made the complete return of all equipment difficult. The vast areas in the northern regions of Australia involved travelling long distances in order to return any equipment and the cost of the expenditure incurred for retrieval made it unviable. For example, the 23 Regiment VDC (Q), covering an area of 160,000 square miles, made the collection of equipment by FTD VDC personnel or conversely the return of equipment by the member unviable.598 The weather was another factor affecting equipment collection as the wet season made travel by road prohibitive.599 Furthermore, many country units faced discrepancies in returning personal equipment, camping and training stores. In the early functioning of the units, there appears to have been limited recording of the identity of the individual receiving particular items. Units had personnel returning equipment when there was no record of them receiving any, while other cases occurred where former members had left the district, prior to being discharged, without returning any equipment. One investigating officer reported that no records existed on a consignment to sub-units and if there had been any [record] ‘it can only been assumed that this has been lost or destroyed

595 Letter from the Chief of the General Staff to all Headquarters, 3 May 1944, p.2, Corps Headquarters Volunteer Defence Corps Queensland, AWM 52, 36/1/5 April to June 1944. 596 Department of the Army Minute Paper on VDC Demobilisation 19 September 1945, NAA MP742/1, 240/1/1958. 597 Letter from the Chief of the General Staff to all Headquarters, 3 May 1944, p.2, Corps Headquarters Volunteer Defence Corps Queensland, AWM 52, 36/1/5 April to June 1944. 598 Progress Report on Disbandment of VDC Queensland 19 November 1945, NAA MP742/1, 240/1/1958. 599 Progress Report on Disbandment of VDC Queensland 19 November 1945, NAA MP742/1, 240/1/1958.

132 by members who have never had a proper appreciation of Army Accounting Procedure’.600 Nevertheless, there was a high percentage of equipment returned.601

As the war moved further away from Australian shores, the operational activities of the VDC progressively lessened. By February 1945, only three per cent of the part-time duty personnel were still actively employed in AA and coast defence duties, with the remainder having been placed on the reserve list.602 In fact, with the gradual reduction in the scale of defence of defended ports, the number of active VDC units was progressively reduced to the extent, that by July 1945 the entire Corps was functioning only on a reserve basis.603 An illustration of the impact of the gradual reduction on the VDC can be seen through the prism of the Brisbane VDC unit. Initially, in January 1944, over 2100 VDC personnel in the Brisbane area had elected to transfer to man anti-aircraft and searchlight batteries and coastal artillery, but by mid-year parade attendance by the volunteers had fallen by thirty per cent.604 As earlier identified, by July 1944, all VDC units not involved in battery duty passed into reserve status and, by December 1944, were joined by the majority of the remaining active units, the exception being personnel manning the Bribie Battery.605 The remaining 160 part-time VDC members manned the batteries at Fort Bribie until they were passed into reserve in mid- 1945.606

When Japan surrendered in August 1945, the complete disbandment of the Corps was announced.607 At this time, the VDC still had 400 FTD and 64,984 PTD listed members on its books, though many part-time members no longer attended parades.608 It was envisaged that demobilisation would be completed by the end of November for all L of C

600 Quarterly Training Report July 1944 No. 5 Battalion VDC (WA), p.1, AWM 54, 1008/2/53 Part 2. 601 Quarterly Training Report July 1944 No. 5 Battalion VDC (WA), p.1, AWM 54, 1008/2/53 Part 2. 602 The Army War Effort 7 March 1945, p.13, NAA A5954, 300/1. 603 The Army War Effort 31 August 1945, p.25, NAA A5954, 300/4. 604 Volunteer Defence Corps - Queensland “Stand Down Parades” p.3, AWM 52 36/1/5 July to December 1945. 605 Volunteer Defence Corps –Future Policy 2 December 1944, AWM 54, 1008/2/38. 606 Volunteer Defence Corps - Queensland “Stand Down Parades” p.3, AWM 52, 36/1/5 July to December 1945. 607 The Army War Effort 7 March 1945, p.13, NAA A5954, 300/1. 608 The Army War Effort 31 August 1945, p.25, NAA A5954, 300/4.

133 areas except Western Command and New South Wales.609 Certificates of Discharge were to be issued to all serving PTD and FTD personnel, citing the reason for discharge being ‘because of the disbandment of his Corps’.610 Blamey acknowledged the dedication and commitment shown by VDC members in a written farewell address to all disbanding units, stating that ‘training at regular parades and exercises in recreational hours, and attendance at Army and VDC Schools and Courses during periods of annual leave from civil employment, meant no small sacrifice…’.611

It could be suggested that being placed on reserve, and ultimately disbanded, was met with relief combined with regret. Some members felt relief that the conflict had finally ended, or was soon to end, and they no longer needed to devote the majority of their spare time to the Corps and its activities.612 In contrast, a survey of several battalion war diaries and interviews of former members indicate others had enjoyed the regular meetings and activities and the resultant friendships forged within the unit.613 For example, one farmer reminisced, ‘We trained every Friday, Saturday and Sunday all through the war. I joined the VDC because I was turned down for the Army. I enjoyed it…it was certainly better than sitting doing nothing and thinking about the war.’614 Several units, particularly in rural towns, wished to continue the weekly meetings after the war had finished and the unit had been disbanded. As Clarrie Buckeridge, a member of a Brisbane VDC unit explains, ‘When the whole show was over our mob said ‘Geez, it’s going to be not much good not seeing

609 Department of the Army Minute Paper on VDC Demobilisation 19 September 1945, NAA MP742/1, 240/1/1958. 610 Department of the Army Minute Paper on VDC Demobilisation 19 September 1945, NAA MP742/1, 240/1/1958. 611 Farwell letter from Blamey to disbanding VDC units, AWM 52, 36/1/5 July to December 1945. 612 Transcript of Oral History Recording of interview of Christopher Johnson by Daniel Connell 5 September 1989, p.17, Accession No. S00725. 613 Final Parade “B” Company 5 Battalion (Q), p.2, AWM 52, 36/1/55 September to October 1945, Final Parade of “A” and “E” Company 5 Battalion (Q), p.1, AWM 52, 36/1/55 September to October 1945, War Diary B Group 5 Battalion (NSW) 19 November 1944, p.2, AWM 52 36/1/58 February to November 1944. There are numerous transcripts of oral recordings of former VDC Members, for several examples see Lawrence Stuart Turnbull (W48012) interviewed by Susan Green, 17 January 1990, p.13, Accession No. S00783; Edward Alfred Keating (Q215374) interviewed by Daniel Connell, 4 September 1989, p.16, Accession No. S00724; Carl Otto Alfred Lennig (Q215495) interviewed by Daniel Connell, 6 September 1989, p.23, Accession No. S00723. 614 Quoted in Joanna Penglase and David Horner, When the War Came to Australia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992, p.46. The reminiscences were from a Gulgong NSW farmer, Ray Adams.

134 each other.” So I said “How about we form a rifle club?”615 The formation of the West End VDC Rifle Club followed which continued for about ten years.616 An indication of the camaraderie is illustrated in the Queensland VDC, where in the face of impending disbandment, units had managed to achieve an average of sixty per cent attendance at parades in the first six months of 1945.617 For these men, when they were placed on reserve it became a case of standby rather than stand down.

If an invasion had occurred, the VDC would have been called upon to participate in the defence of Australia. The military effectiveness of the VDC was fortunately never tested and the question of its capability was never answered. Over the ensuing years, there has been many views on whether the VDC would have, or indeed could have, proved to be an effective military force. Indeed, at least one Army Commander considered the organisation might achieve some military value believing it was vital to train and equip the VDC into an ‘efficient military machine’.618 As early as October 1941, Major-General J. D. Richardson, Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, wrote to Eastern Command advocating the presence of the VDC but stressed his deep reservation that ‘at the present time, in spite of all their goodwill … they are quite unco-ordinated in a military sense, and would undoubtedly die gallantly on the beaches.’619 In order to prevent this scenario, Richardson pointed out that ‘they required proper military leadership and be fully armed and equipped to attain acceptable military value.’620 This was of fundamental importance if the VDC was to achieve any satisfactory level of military efficiency. Significantly, achieving the proper military leadership, equipment and training proved to be an ongoing, though sometimes thought of as elusive, goal of the Corps. Arguably, the goal was only in sight after the threat has passed and more than half the organisation had been placed on reserve footing.

615 Quoted in Libby Connors et al., Australia’s Frontline Remembering the 1939-45 War, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1992, p.197. 616 Connors et al., Australia’s Frontline Remembering the 1939-45 War, p.197. 617 Appendix B to Corps Headquarters VDC (Q) Training Report 1 January- 30 Jun 1945, AWM 52, 36/1/5 July to December 1945. 618 Letter from the Commanding Officer 1st Cavalry Division, Major-General J.D. Richardson to Eastern Command 17 October 1941, AWM 193, 203. 619 Letter from the Commanding Officer 1st Cavalry Division, Major-General J.D. Richardson to Eastern Command 17 October 1941, AWM 193, 203. 620 Letter from the Commanding Officer 1st Cavalry Division, Major-General J.D. Richardson to Eastern Command 17 October 1941, AWM 193, 203.

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Several historians believe the VDC achieved the required training to give it militarily effectiveness when the threat of invasion was at its greatest. As Stanley noted, the VDC would have ‘taken one with them’ if an invasion had occurred. He believed they had the knowledge and the training to engage the Japanese Army in street fighting.621 Another historian, Southall suggested in The Defence of Lithgow, that the VDC had a good beginning and gradually developed into an ‘elite’ force as the years progressed.622 The VDC could hardly be thought of as an elite force but they undeniably played a useful, though non- fighting, role. Southall further contends that the VDC was well accepted by Army Command and the Corps had an effective balance of old experienced ex-servicemen and enthusiastic young recruits.623 Indeed, by the end of 1943, the average age of a VDC volunteer was relatively young at thirty-six and all units were fully equipped and in uniform.624 In mid- 1944, one VDC Group Commander had ‘no doubt that the personnel … would have been a formidable force for an enemy to contend with if the necessity had ever arisen’ but adds a rejoinder stating ‘whilst it cannot be claimed that Battalions were very highly trained from the point of view of operating as complete units, personnel were efficient in the handling and use of weapons.’625 The Group Commander’s assessment of the VDC being a formidable force is likely misplaced and, by that stage of the war, half of the Corps had been placed on a reserve footing.

Despite the focus on the question of their fighting prowess, it would be more meaningful to concentrate on the Corps’ other contributions to home defence. The VDC had carried out important, though often mundane, tasks during the war. For example, after the decision to withdraw the coastal observation posts south of the Tropic of Capricorn was taken in mid-1943, the General Staff of the First Australian Army sent a letter to VDC Headquarters expressing its gratitude for undertaking, in all-weather conditions, a ‘wearisome’ duty with any results not readily apparent.626 The Eastern Area Headquarters

621 Stanley, Invading Australia, p.142. 622 Southall, The Defence of Lithgow, p.44. 623 Southall, The Defence of Lithgow, p.46. 624 The Army War Effort, 31 August 1945, p.26, NAA A5954, 300/4. 625 Training Report 1 January – 31 July 1944 No.2 Group VDC, p.5, AWM 54, 1008/2/53 Part 2. 626 Letter to V DC Headquarters Brisbane regarding Withdrawal of VDC Observation Posts from the General Staff First Australian Army 29 August 1943, AWM 36/1/5, August to December 1943.

136 appreciated the ‘good work well done by men, who having served the Empire before were again available in a time of crisis.’627

More importantly, the volunteers accepted new military roles when the nature of the nation’s need changed. No longer concerned with the threat of invasion, the need for an increase in military manpower was achieved through the VDC taking on a new role of manning coastal artillery, anti-aircraft guns and searchlight batteries. VDC training consequently changed from infantry training to becoming proficient in the handling and firing of heavy and light anti-aircraft guns and coastal artillery and manning searchlight batteries. By 1944, the number of troops released for more active duty had increased to 6,000.628 This was a significant and important contribution to Australia’s war effort and elicited appreciation from the nation. General Blamey, in a letter dated 13 October 1945 to the Corps Commanders of the VDC, stated ‘it is certain that all ranks could have been relied upon to perform… the tasks assigned to the Corps’ and ‘the influence of the Corps on Australia’s war effort can be said to have been most beneficial’.629 In late August 1945, in a statement acknowledging the Corps’ military and civic contribution, the Deputy Prime Minister Forde stated that he ‘only had the highest praise for the men of the VDC for their sustained enthusiasm, their excellent discipline, their high standard of efficiency, and their conscientious devotion to duty. They made a most valuable contribution to Australia’s war effort, and created a tradition of national service which will live on in our history.’630

On balance, though the military effectiveness of the VDC did greatly improve as the war progressed, it was only achieved well after the threat of invasion had passed. It could be argued that at the time when Australia was under the greatest threat, the VDC was woefully under equipped and undertrained. At that time, the majority of the VDC units were armed

627 Letter to V DC Headquarters Brisbane regarding Withdrawal of VDC Observation Posts from the General Staff First Australian Army 29 August 1943, AWM 36/1/5, August to December 1943. 628 Palazzo, The Australian Army, p.187. 629 Letter to all VDC Commanders from General Blamey, 13 October 1945, AWM 52, 36/1/5 July to December 1945. 630 Statement by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Army, Mr Frank Forde, on the Disbandment of the VDC 24 August 1945, AWM 54, 1008/1/5.

137 with single shot Martini Cadet Rifle, and little else, and it is highly doubtful they could have stopped any invading forces. Training men to reach an adequate state of military effectiveness to defend their homes and hearths requires time. The best outcome they could achieve would be to hinder the enemy, or perhaps delay his advance, until regular forces reached the area. Similarly, the British Home Guard, with the added fear of enemy parachute troops, was considered to have been unable to contest seriously an invasion force. At best, as with the VDC, it was hoped they would possibly slow down any advance, in the expectation of the arrival of the army to tackle the invaders.631

Nonetheless, their military value does not solely lie with their fighting effectiveness. The changing priorities in Australia’s war effort resulted in transforming the military role of the VDC in home defence. As a response to the army’s requirement for more troops in order to undertake offensive operations in the South-West Pacific in 1943, the VDC steadily assumed the responsibility of manning anti-aircraft, coastal artillery and searchlight batteries. The repositioning of the military role meant that the static defence role previously laid down was considered secondary to the manning of the batteries. After eighteen months, as the immediate threat to the Australian mainland diminished, this role was re- evaluated. In mid-1944, the demand for wartime labour being experienced by Australia was such that over half of the VDC members were place on reserved status, thus releasing many men to continue their war effort through their reserve occupations. The remaining active units were gradually placed on reserve status with the Corps being disbanded at the cessation of hostilities.

631 Mackenzie, The Home Guard, p.180-182; Longmate, The Real Dad’s Army, p.122-126. The New Zealand Home Guard had been disbanded at the end of 1943, after being placed on reserve in June 1943, when the country no longer considered itself at risk of invasion. See Nancy Taylor, ‘The Home Front Vol. 1’, The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-1945, Historical Publications Branch, Wellington, 1986, p.479-480.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Political and Social Value of the VDC 1942 - 1945

From early 1942, at a time when it seemed like it may well be needed in its direct ‘home defence’ role, the VDC in fact proved to be a highly effective resource for alternative reasons – the resolution of domestic difficulties facing the government. First, the Allied strategic situation in the Pacific was at a low point, compelling Australians to concentrate in greater real terms than previously on the defence of their country and communities. In many sections of the public, there was a growing groundswell to participate, to some degree, in basic military training. In a deliberate response, and largely to offset the escalation of calls for a civilian defence force, it became imperative for the Government to promote an existing alternative, the VDC. The calls for the formation of a civilian defence force which allowed all willing citizens to learn rudimentary military skills such as shooting and the use of explosives, reached its zenith in the early months of 1942. Politically, the government needed to be seen in control of current home defence arrangements and used the promotion of the VDC to meet the challenges presented by appeals for the formation of a force not under direct government or military control. The VDC thus became a necessary outlet to control public enthusiasm. As time progressed, by early 1943, the national priorities concerning the war were undergoing adjustments. Economically, the government needed to increase agricultural production in the light of a shortage of manpower. Steps were taken by the government to use the VDC to tackle this problem. Last, and in a wider context, from 1942 the VDC was utilised as a propaganda tool in that the apparent commitment and enthusiasm of its members were used by the government to help shore up public morale and galvanise Australia’s war effort.

In the aftermath of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, there was increasing pressure on the Government to position the country on a higher war footing. In December 1941, the Curtin Government announced that the current situation of Australia required ‘a

139 complete revision of the whole Australian economic, domestic and industrial life.’632 In a press release published on 27 December 1941, Curtin emphasised the need to increase in the war effort by all Australians, stating ‘I am telling you bluntly that the war has come to Australia and Australians must conduct themselves accordingly …We are all in danger. We must all be at the place of duty and service.’633 In late January 1942, with Japanese forces rapidly moving southward, a threat to Australia’s security appeared to be looming further escalating the level of public anxiety. Forde, as Minister for the Army, released a press statement declaring, ‘the Government regarded an attempt by Japan to invade as a logical possibility of the military situation which is developing in the Pacific. It is not the only possibility but it is certainly one of them.’634 At the same time, Curtin continued with this theme, warning striking waterside workers in Sydney their industrial disruptions placed them in jeopardy of losing their exemption from military service and that he considered men who were not working or in the fighting forces as enemies of the country.635 The impact of the Prime Minister’s call and the current strategic situation was to stir men, especially those in reserved occupations, into action, in order to ‘play their part’. These men wished to become involved militarily, even if on a part-time basis, to supplement their economic contribution to the war effort.

As a result of these factors, there was a surge in the patriotism of the masses wishing to play a role in the defence of their country. As such, there were public appeals to commence forming a range of civilian defence groups, particularly guerrilla units, in readiness to meet any possible invasion. The lionising of the exploits of civilians, men and women, in the Spanish Civil War and Russians partisans, by the media and left leaning groups, drove a public impetus to be instructed in the defence of their homes and homeland in the event that war came to Australia’s doorstep.636 Indeed, in the 1920s, there had been a growing belief that men without any prior training were more than capable of matching

632 Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, pp.56-59. 633 The Argus, Pacific Allies Unite, 27 December 1941, p.1, The Canberra Times, Moves Pending in the Pacific, 27 December 1941, p.2. 634 Sydney Morning Herald, 30 January 1942, p.7. 635 Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, pp.56-59. 636 For examples see Idriess, The Australian Guerrilla, and Lockwood, Guerrilla Paths to Freedom.

140 soldiers who had been trained.637 Many newspaper articles campaigned for the public to be trained in rifle shooting and guerrilla tactics and for a ‘People’s Army’ to be formed and officially recognised.638 In one particular Sydney newspaper, the Sydney Telegraph, the promotion of a People’s Army was spearheaded by the actions of Lieutenant-Colonel Jack Travers, former Commander of 17th Battalion VDC located in the North Shore area of Sydney, through his position as General Manager of Consolidated Press Limited and publisher of the Sydney Telegraph. The promotion of the People’s Army ideals and goals, while lambasting the VDC organisation, appears to have been for personal reasons as Travers, having resigned from the Corps, claimed there had been maladministration and ‘gross bungling’ at the VDC Headquarters.639 A far more commonly held public sentiment at the time was voiced by a New South Wales parliamentarian writing, ‘we’re all ready to help, whether it be with Molotov cocktails, dynamite picks or rolling pins’.640

With the intention to address the public’s desire to contribute to home defence, a Provisional People’s Army Committee (PPAC) formed in Sydney on 1 February 1942, to coordinate all the local initiatives which had unfolded in the previous few weeks.641 A booklet, for public use, informing people how to form a ‘People’s Army’ detachment was promised to be forthcoming.642 Civilian units in this new, unofficial and heterogeneous movement had already been formed in NSW at Kuring-gai, North Sydney, Hornsby, and St Ives with Illawarra, Paddington and Artarmon-Chatswood in the process of forming units.643 Through the formation of these units, the aim was to give the ‘thousands of civilians who want to do something, to prepare through military training, [allowing them to] help the military not hinder them’644.The Committee wanted to extend the formation of units to

637 Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, p.85. 638 Collection of newspaper articles from a number of different newspapers including Daily Telegraph, Common Cause, and the Sydney Morning Herald, AWM 68, 3DRL 8052/117A. 639 Sydney Telegraph 8 February, 1942, ‘VDC lead by bunglers’. For a greater account of Jack Travers’ turbulent association with the VDC see AWM 54, 1008/3/3 which deals solely with Lieutenant-Colonel Jack Travers. 640 McKernan, All In!, p.122. The quotation is attributed to Elizabeth Lillian Fowler. 641 Goulburn Evening Post, 4 February 1942, p.5. The title, People’s Army, was soon replaced by Australian People’s Defence Auxiliary to promote the group as an auxiliary to the VDC, Letter to the Director of Military Intelligence from the Assistant Director-General for Security 19 May 1942, MP508/1, 286/701/1106. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the title of People’s Army will be used throughout. 642 Goulburn Evening Post, 4 February 1942, p.5. 643 Goulburn Evening Post, 4 February 1942, p.5. 644 Sydney Morning Herald, 27 January 1942, p.9.

141 every suburb, country town and district in the state, including industrial areas and mines. The expansion was fundamental if the PPAC were to fulfil several of its objectives, for instance ‘the preparation to cope with the enemy wherever and whenever they attacked’ and ‘fighting to defend their suburb or factory or office building.’645 The People’s Army particularly promoted the training of men and women in guerrilla tactics. As might be expected at this stage of the war, popular literature on fighting and the exploits of the Russian partisans, using guerrilla tactics, was eagerly devoured by many Australians who readily believed they were capable of similar deeds.646 There were numerous letters to the major newspapers urging the Government to give the ‘tens of thousands [people] restless for activity’ training as they were not content to just standby if the Japanese land.647

In political terms, the government had no desire to give any credence to perceptions that it was not doing enough or was not in control of the issue of home defence. The government fully recognised the public outcry for the formation of civilian defence groups – and the political and military danger therein. The Minister for the Army, Forde, was reported, in early February, that he was aware of the ‘numerous reports that civilians in Australia, particularly in the Eastern States, that have been expressing their desire to form guerrilla bands or people’s armies to fight and harass any of our enemies who might attempt an invasion of Australia and these reports had been carefully considered by the military authorities.’648 In the face of mounting pressure, the approach taken by the government to counter the emerging problem of civilian defence groups was two-fold. Each approach gives an indication of the political usefulness of the VDC to the government. First, the government promoted the VDC as the official organisation which male civilians could join if they wished to contribute to the defence of Australia in order to direct public attention away from alternative organisations. The Minister for the Army, Forde, steadfastly refused to countenance a People’s Army, expressing the view that the VDC was already such

645 Goulburn Evening Post, 4 February 1942, p.5. 646 For several examples see Major G.D. Mitchell who wrote Soldier in Battle which details how to overcome the fear of battle; Major W.A.S. Dunlop, The Fighting Soldier which dispenses advice on how to be a better soldier; Aubrey Spencer, How to Use the Service Rifle which instructs people with no previous experience on how to care and use the service rifle. 647 Daily Telegraph, 5 February 1942, p.2, AWM 68, 3DRL 8052/117A. 648 Kalgoorlie Miner, 12 February 1942, p.2.

142 an army and there could be no justification for a private alternative.649 As well, Curtin passed further comment on the issue, outlining the government’s belief that ‘the availability of opportunities the public had for serving their country lay in the existence of the three fighting forces in Australia; the Australian Imperial Force, the Australian Militia Force and the Volunteer Defence Corps.’650 Moreover, Curtin added, ‘there is no justification whatsoever for any organised public movement to enable individuals to find an opportunity for service.’651

In the early days of formation as the RSL-VDC, the Menzies government had given an undertaking that the organisation would have exclusive recognition and no other form of home guard, or any other organisation, would be sanctioned.652 The Curtin government maintained this undertaking. Furthermore, the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant- General Sturdee, had written a memorandum to Forde on 30 January 1942 recommending that the VDC, an organisation endorsed by the government and the military, must form the focal point around which centres of resistance can be built up through the additions from the civil population.653 Sturdee was also opposed to the drain of resources, in terms of training and organisation, which any civilian defence group would place on the army at large.654 Forde echoed Sturdee’s view when he stated five days later: ‘There is no justification for private armies in this country and if armies, not under Government control were established, the result would be chaotic.’655 It was unrealistic to believe the military would allow armed civilian guerrilla bands, based on the partisan experience of Spain and Russia, roaming the countryside in the event of an invasion and, ultimately, getting in the way of the military. Indeed, Forde went so far as to pronounce ‘the formation of an irregular People’s Army would be an embarrassment to those directing the country’s defence’.656

649 Daily Telegraph, 8 February 1942, p.5, AWM 68, 3DRL 8052/117A. 650 Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, p.62. Curtin made the comment on 6 February, 1942. 651 Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, p.62. 652 A report from the NSW RSL President on a meeting with RSL-VDC NSW Commander Brigadier Heane, 29 January 1941, AWM 54, 1008/2/22. 653 Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, p.63. 654 Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, p.63. 655 Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, p.62. 656 Sydney Morning Herald, 4 February 1942, p.8.

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Secondly, the government decided that the establishment of the VDC would be greatly expanded and ‘would be the equivalent of the People’s Armies in Russia and China’.657 There had been a number of earlier political appeals to the government advocating an increase in the establishment of the VDC in order to undercut the People’s Army. In one appeal, the Queensland Premier, William Forgan Smith, had written to Forde, strongly urging for an increase in the VDC establishment, believing ‘the move in this direction [any formation of a People’s Army] was largely being sponsored by Communists and others of like character’.658 Moreover, ‘it would be absurd to provide guerrillas with arms to the detriment of the trained personnel’, he argued, and he continued to point out that citizens who participated in guerrilla warfare, once caught, would be executed.659 In a follow up letter three days later, Forgan Smith expanded on his position stating ‘people do not yet fully realise that we cannot participate in a war without every individual being affected, the best alternative is to give as many as possible a duty to perform’ and offered his support in any campaign for recruits to the VDC.660

In early February 1942, in regard to the expansion of the VDC, Forde released a statement informing the public that any man, even those in reserved occupations, wishing to join the VDC would be accepted.661 Indeed, the government maintained that all nascent and unauthorised civilian forces could be organised within the existing framework of the VDC but had conceded the Corps might need to be further expanded to cater for the growing demand to participate in home defence. To counter the ongoing criticism that the VDC was not specifically trained for partisan warfare, Forde again reiterated that in the event of an invasion a major role of the VDC would involve ‘guerrilla warfare’ and the decision to ‘widen the scope of the VDC was made to cover all those men desiring to join …

657 Sydney Morning Herald, 4 February 1942, p.8. 658 Letter to Minister for the Army from Forgan Smith 4 February 1942, NAA MP 508/1, 286/701/930. 659 Letter to Minister for the Army from Forgan Smith 4 February 1942, NAA MP 508/1, 286/701/930. 660 Letter to Minister for the Army from Forgan Smith 7 February 1942, NAA MP 508/1, 286/701/930. Forgan- Smith called for an ‘immediate drive for recruits for the VDC’ in Cairns and Townsville and supply of sufficient equipment. The Minister stated in his reply that he did not see any problems in obtaining enough recruits. NAA MP 508/1, 286/701/930. 661 War Cabinet Agendum 2 December 1942, No. 491/1942, NAA A2671, 491/1942.

144 a people’s army.’662 Consequently, this resulted in many thousands of men, mainly in reserved occupations, applying to join the VDC. Again, this instruction was a step taken in part to tackle directly the growing interest, from all sectors of the community, in civilian defence groups and deflate public calls for the creation a People’s Army.663

Indeed, the previous restriction on the size of the VDC was one of the reasons given in the call to form a People’s Army. While the Government consistently reiterated its aversion to the concept of private armies, it had been overlooking one of the fundamental problems of the Corps in that it was not large enough to accommodate the growing demand of the public for a degree of military training. The need to increase the VDC’s establishment was clearly illustrated in the mining community of Cessnock, where one hundred and sixty miners wished to form a People’s Army unit, because the establishment of the local VDC unit had been authorised at only fifty men.664 At this stage of the war, early 1942, this number was entirely inadequate to accommodate the number of miners who wished to contribute to home defence. Arguably, there might have been an element of pressure from a union significantly influenced by the Communist Party to form a unit, but on balance, dismissing the miners’ recognition of the danger from Japan at this time and their willingness to make a contribution to home defence would be unfair. Eventually, it was agreed that the men should attach themselves to the local VDC as an auxiliary unit.665

The call for a People’s Army also raised questions concerning the political nature of such an organisation. There were a number of well-known communists such as Ion Idriess, a popular author at the time, and , a prominent feminist, who were active leaders

662 Morning Bulletin, 11 February 1942, p.6. The military view was that guerrilla warfare, while useful in harassing enemy communications in a battle, would not win any war, Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, p.56. 663 War Cabinet Agendum 2 December 1942, No. 491/1942, NAA A2671, 491/1942. 664 Report to Eastern Command from Major B. C. MacGregor of Intelligence Corps (Newcastle), 9 February 1942, NAA A8911, 34. 665 Report to Eastern Command from Major B. C. MacGregor of Intelligence Corps (Newcastle), 9 February 1942, NAA A8911, 34.

145 in calling for the formation of a People’s Army.666 This prompted questions about the possible left-wing nature of the group and the perception that it might be transformed into a private army.667 Indeed, the Assistant Director for Security, B. Tyrrell, had raised his concerns regarding the People’s Army with the Director of Military Intelligence in May 1942, citing it was ‘completely Communist controlled’ and was being incorrectly portrayed to the public as an auxiliary to the VDC.668

On the other hand, the exact extent of the Left’s influence in the People’s Army is contested by some historians who suggest that the Right might have been more influential. Michael McKernan, for example, argues that it was conceivable, or at least was highly likely, that members of the New Guard would have infiltrated the organisation.669 Likewise, Chris Coulthard-Clark points out that the largest of the People’s Army formations was in the North Shore area of Sydney, once a bastion of the right-wing New Guard in the 1930s. Indeed, the centre of support for the People’s Army appears to have mainly centred on Sydney’s North Shore suburbs.670 Likewise, in Victoria, the Federal parliamentarian for Bendigo, Major- General George Rankin, was publicly supporting the formation of a civilian guerrilla detachment though little came of it.671 Generally speaking though, all rural areas and the capital cities seemed unsupportive of any non-military controlled force. In any case, the Government persisted with its strategy that all civilian forces could be organised within the existing framework, preferring to invite those who wished to participate in home defence to join the VDC.

666 Idriess and Street were office bearers of the Australian People’s Defence Auxiliary, President and Vice- President respectively. Interestingly, , Jessie’s husband, sat on the Supreme Court from 1931 till 1949. 667 Letter from the Hon. Secretary W.A. Wood to all organisations inviting them to a Congress 5 March 1942, MP508/1, 286/701/1106. 668 Letter to Director of Military intelligence from the Director-General of Security, William John MacKay, 19 May 1942, MP508/1, 286/701/1106. MacKay had been appointed by the Curtin government in April 1942 to head the revamped Security Service which worked with the army to maintain surveillance of enemy aliens and communists and carry out security clearances. H resigned to return to the Police Force in September 1942, Frank Cain, ‘MacKay, William John (1885-1948), Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mackay-william-john- 7381/text12829, accessed online 16 June 2016. 669 McKernan, All In!, p.124. 670 Coulthard-Clark, Soldiers in Politics, p.179. 671 Common Cause, 14 February 1942, p.1, AWM 68, 3DRL 8052/117A.

146

Although various groups championed the concept of a People’s Army, that in itself did not diminish the public recognition and acceptance of the VDC as the officially sanctioned home defence organisation. As an example, the Political Rights Committee, a group associated with the left wing of politics, promoted the formation of a People’s Army and maintained that Australia was now waging ‘a people’s war against fascism’ but added that ‘the People’s army…is the AIF, the Militia and the VDC, in short the armed forces of the people.’ 672 In a pamphlet, aptly titled No Surrender!, the People’s Army Congress listed one of the reasons for its formation was ‘to stimulate enrolment in the VDC, National Emergency Services and all other organisations concerned with the defence of Australia’.673 Furthermore, the pamphlet urged ‘all civilians who can fight, and want to, to join the Volunteer Defence Corps’ and its ‘own branches were functioning as adjuncts or auxiliaries to the VDC.’674 In short, the People’s Army was advocated as an extension of the VDC, not a replacement or alternative to it, to cover all those sections of the population excluded from joining the government authorised VDC. The Political Rights Committee, at least, had the expectation of the People’s Army operating in conjunction, rather than independently, with the Army and, interestingly, with the VDC in any offensive or defensive tasks they were called upon to do.675 In fact, such was the success of the government’s campaign promoting the VDC that the Director-General of Security wrote to the Director of Military Intelligence in November 1942 informing him the People’s Army was no longer active in NSW.676 For it to have continued there would have to been a degree of Government support. However, as a matter of policy, none was ever forthcoming, thus ensuring that the VDC remained the only politically acceptable part-time, voluntary civilian defence force.

672 Richard Dixon, “Knock out Japan”, Challenge Press, Melbourne, 1942, p.4. This pamphlet is a copy of a speech titled ‘A People’s Defence of Australia’, given in early 1942 by the Secretary of the Political Rights Committee, well known communist activist Jack D. Blake, and emphasizes the arming and training of the people. Another pamphlet championing the formation of a people’s defence for a people’s war was, They Shall Not Pass, published in Sydney in 1942 by Current Book Distributors. 673 No Surrender!, Premier Printers, Sydney, 1942, p.1 Accessed at http://www.nal.gov.au/nla.aud-vn4740599, 3 September 2015. The National Emergency Services was organised to educate, protect, rescue, clothe, feed, render first aid, evacuate people, train and equip rescuers and report and repair damaged infrastructure, NSW Parliamentary Papers 1940-41, Vol.3, p.816. 674 No Surrender!, p.1. 675 A report on various newspaper clippings, quoted in the Daily Telegraph 1 February 1942, p.18, 3DRL 8052, 117A. 676 Letter to Director of Military Intelligence from the Director-General of Security, W. B. Simpson, 24 November 1942, MP508/1, 286/701/1106.

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The increases in establishment of the VDC throughout 1942 were, in part, a matter of political pragmatism. First, in a step taken to counter a public campaign to raise a People’s Army, the government had initiated a policy of not rejecting volunteers in excess of the approved establishment, which had been raised to 80,000 in February.677 The size of the increase was dictated largely by the difficulty, at the time, of providing sufficient weapons, uniforms and equipment.678 In light of the non-rejection policy, by October the actual strength of the VDC had risen to roughly 95,000, made up of the 80,000 establishment and 15,000 supernumeraries. In response to the over-establishment, Forde sought and received approval to raise the establishment to 100,000 in December 1942, in order to absorb the supernumeraries into the VDC.679 There had been mounting dissatisfaction within the supernumeraries due to the fact, that even though they were regularly attending training, they were being deprived of VDC membership and, therefore, not issued with a uniform or equipment. As part of Forde’s submission to the War Cabinet for the increase, Blamey’s report had expressed the view that there was no military reason justifying any increase in the size, or expense, of the VDC but if establishment was increased, it should not be exceeded beyond the enlistment of supernumeraries.680

Secondly, Australian ‘morale’, or rather public sentiment, was under great strain in 1942 with the fighting advancing nearer to the home shores with the fall of Singapore, the Philippines and Java. The Australian towns of Darwin, Broome, Katherine, Wyndham and Townsville were bombed and the long held nightmare of invasion from an ‘Asiatic Horde’ seemed likely to come true. The under-populated northern regions of Australia appeared particularly vulnerable. The extent of the concern of residents about the vulnerability of various strategic points to sabotage around Australia was illustrated by the large number of letters written to the Prime Minister and the presentation of signed petitions.681 Communities, principally in rural areas, needed to have at least a sense that they might have

677 War Cabinet Agendum 2 December 1942, No. 491/1942, NAA A2671, 491/1942. 678 War Cabinet Agendum 2 December 1942, No. 491/1942, NAA A2671, 491/1942. 679 War Cabinet Agendum 2 December 1942, No. 491/1942, NAA A2671, 491/1942. Approval for the increase was given on the 14 December 1942. 680 Blamey wrote to the Minister of the Army outlining his views on any increase in establishment of the VDC on 13 October 1942, NAA B6680, 491/1942. 681 Margaret Bevege, Behind Barbed Wire: Internment in Australia during World War II, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1993, p.155.

148 some degree of defence against an enemy. The presence of the VDC and its role in this regard is addressed later in the chapter.

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Curtin had been informed by General Douglas MacArthur, the recently appointed Commander-in-Chief South-West Pacific Area, in April 1942 of the unlikelihood of an invasion.682 MacArthur had taken over operational control of the Australian forces in the South-west Pacific area on 18 April 1942.683 Even taking into consideration the prudence of not ruling out any possibility of an invasion, the degree to which the VDC was ill-equipped and undertrained at this time, the raising of the establishment can reasonably be only attributed to political factors Indeed, Forde, in his submission to the War Cabinet seeking the increase in establishment, concluded that the increase was not for any ‘immediate military necessity’.684 Rather, Forde stated his reasons were social and political: ‘the VDC is playing a role which has had, and is having, an important effect upon the morale of the community, and is setting an example of service which stiffens to a very great extent the general public’s determination to get on with its war-time job.’685 Furthermore, Forde wished to eliminate any negative impression the public might gain by seeing the unwanted spectacle of thousands of men, classed as supernumeraries, training without uniforms or equipment thereby downgrading the importance of the VDC to the defence of their community.686 Although the Government had publicly promoted its support for the VDC, the promised weapons and uniforms failed to materialise with any great urgency. It could ill-afford any comparison between the perceived military expectations of the local VDC unit by the public and the realistic military capabilities of that unit. This was politically unacceptable, particularly at the very time the Government was conducting a nationwide campaign urging sacrifice and an increase in the general war effort. The inadequacies of the VDC, in terms of military readiness and supply of equipment at this stage of the war has led to several historians to conclude rightly that the political

682 Stanley, Invading Australia, p.158. Stanley MacArthur had arrived in Australia in mid-March 1942 from the Philippines and had been informed of the unlikelihood of the Japanese forces mounting an invasion through the efforts of the Allied code breakers in April 1942. Stanley suggests Shedden and Blamey might also have been informed of the unlikelihood of an invasion. 683 Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, p.115. 684 War Cabinet Agendum 2 December 1942, No, 491, NAA A2671, 491/1942. 685 War Cabinet Agendum 2 December 1942, No, 491, NAA A2671, 491/1942. 686 War Cabinet Agendum 2 December 1942, No, 491, NAA A2671, 491/1942.

149 consideration for increasing the VDC establishment was more to do with political concerns than any military requirement.687 Whatever the justification, there was clearly a desire from many parts of the community to be able to contribute to home defence on some scale, even if only in a voluntary, part-time manner.

One of the important keystones in the appeal of the People’s Army had been their endorsement of all sections of the community to undertake militarily training to defend their country.688 While the government’s attention focussed on the promotion of the VDC as the civilian home defence force, the VDC was not open to all Australians. There were three political and social exclusions. First of all, as great as the increase in VDC numbers was in early 1942, women were still excluded from joining the Corps, regardless of their desire to make some military contribution to home defence. Significantly though, the People’s Army Provisional Committee had embraced women being instructed in the use of weapons and military tactics. The Committee’s Chairman, Mr W.A. Wood, sent a telegram to Forde, urging him to allow the VDC to be expanded to include all able-bodied people, particularly women, who wanted some means to defend themselves in light of the Japanese atrocities on women in the occupation of Nanking in 1937.689 Disappointingly for women who wished to contribute to defence, the government was not willing to countenance such a proposition. Forde had dismissed any force that would consider using women in combatant roles, reasoning that ‘our manhood would feel insulted if the Government allowed women to take up arms’.690 Only eighteen months earlier, a body of women had formed themselves into the Home Defence Reserve, with the objective to be trained in the use of firearms and as instructors in rifle shooting.691 The spokeswoman for the body believed ‘it to be vitally important that a woman should be given the opportunity of learning to take part in the defence of herself, her home and her country.’692 By early 1942, women were still calling for

687 See McKernan, All In!, p.124, Coulthard-Clark, Soldiers in Politics, p.179 and Palazzo, The Australian Army, p.187. 688 Australian People’s Defence Auxiliary pamphlet, No Surrender!, p.1. 689 Daily Telegraph 5 February 1942, p.2, AWM 68, 3DRL 8052/117A. 690 Daily Telegraph, 8 February 1942, p.5, AWM 68, 3DRL 8052/117A. 691 Newspaper cutting from The Sun 26 July 1940, AWM 61, 411/5/195. 692 Newspaper cutting from The Sun 26 July 1940, AWM 61, 411/5/195. Mrs Jessie Street was the spokeswoman for the body and was to be on the People’s Army Committee.

150 the government to offer training to them in order to defend themselves against the Japanese.693

A number of attempts were initiated over several years by various women’s groups to support the workings of the VDC. In December 1940, in anticipation of collaboration, the North Shore division of the Women’s Australian National Services (WANS) had approached the local RSL-VDC unit to investigate whether a level of co-operation could be formed between the two groups. The WANS were willing to supply approximately 120 female ambulance drivers, signallers and dispatch riders to assist the RSL-VDC Battalion but the offer of assistance was politely refused.694 Again, two years later, proposals for WANS part- time service clerical personnel to be attached to NSW VDC units could not be approved, due to bureaucratic difficulties, despite the clear need for these personnel in the units.695 Interestingly, limited approval for members of Australian Women’s Army Service (AWAS) to be posted to the VDC was eventually issued in late 1942, but solely on the condition that any such placement would result in releasing existing male personnel for more active duty.696

In this regard, the British Home Guard had a very similar policy. The rationale behind the British Government’s decision barring women from joining the Home Guard was the lack of available resources such as helmets and rifles and demand for their efforts in civil defence, factories and nursing.697 Unlike Australia where there was no allowance made for women to undertake any degree of military training, however, by 1943, there were 250

693 Daily Telegraph 6 February 1942, p.2, AWM 68, 3DRL 8052/117A. At this time, Street was President of the United Association of Women and Vice-President of the People’s Army. 694 Letter to Major Leckie from M. Hutton Whitelaw, 18 December 1940, AWM 54, 1008/3/3, 419/105/4. The WANS organisation was formed to train women in various skills such as truck driving, motor mechanics, first aid and making camouflage netting. The first president of the organisation was Lady Margaret Wakehurst, wife of the Governor of New South Wales, Jane Dietrich, ‘Women’s Australian National Service (WANS) in Wagga Wagga’, Archives Outside, 11 March 2010, http:// archivesoutside.records.nsw.gov.au/womens-australian- national-service-wans-in-wagga-wagga/, accessed 16 June 2016. 695 Letter to the Secretary, Women’s Australian National Services from the Secretary Department of the Army 14 January 1943, MP508/1, 339/701/603. 696 Memorandum from Adjutant-General 18 December 1942, NAA MP742/1, 339/1/199. 697 Penny Summerfield and Corinna Peniston-Bird, Contesting Home Defence, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2007, p.65.

151 unofficial Women’s Home Defence units training women in the use of firearms.698 In April 1943, a limited number of women, termed ‘nominated women’, were allowed to become members of the Home Guard but were limited to only performing non-combatant roles such as driving and clerical work.699

Racism was a basis for exclusion as well. Though a small number of Aboriginals were enlisted, most were not permitted to join. These exclusions suggest Australia, even in a national crisis, was unable to overcome traditional, deeply entrenched gender and racial boundaries, though pressing military need meant expediency partial overcame the racial boundary. The structure of the VDC was such that the volunteers lived or worked in the locality in which their unit was based. For many units, this meant they were anchored in compact communities such as small country towns. In this regard, they tended to reflect their community’s attitude towards Aborigines and other racial groups within their community. The Defence Act initially placed no restrictions against the enlistment of Aborigines into the armed forces.700 It should be noted that as early as 1940, government policy changed and plainly stated there would be no enlistment of non-white into the army or navy.701 In fact, Menzies had written to the Departments of the Army and Navy declaring that ‘allowing the enlistment of aliens or British subjects of non-European descent into the Australian military forces was undesirable in principle’.702 Menzies’ reasons for not desiring the enlistment of non-white personnel can only be guessed but, as Noah Riseman implies, the shadow of the White Australia policy was hovering over the enlistment of non-white volunteers.703 The more malleable enlistment standards of the VDC, however, led Robert Hall to suggest the VDC should have been the ideal organisation for Aboriginal men to join if they wished to serve; but he concluded that, in reality, VDC units usually permitted only white men to join and were ‘generally the bastions’ of pre-war civilian values concerning the

698 Summerfield and Peniston-Bird, Contesting Home Defence, p.73. 699 Summerfield and Peniston-Bird, Contesting Home Defence, p.83. 700 Noah Riseman, Defending Whose Country? Indigenous Soldiers in the Pacific War, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2012, p.10. 701 Riseman, Defending Whose Country? Indigenous Soldiers in the Pacific War,p.10. 702 Riseman, Defending Whose Country? Indigenous Soldiers in the Pacific War, p.10. 703 Riseman, Defending Whose Country? Indigenous Soldiers in the Pacific War, p.10.

152 mixing of white Australians and Aborigines.704 Hall suggested the reason for the discrimination was the difficulty in sharing ‘the comradeship of VDC training … while daily practising the exploitation of Aboriginal labour.’705

Outside the general threat posed by Japan, there was a widespread fear among the white population of northern Australia that the Aborigines, who had traded with Japanese pearlers for many years, would be prepared to assist the Japanese if they landed – a claim never substantiated with evidence.706 The baseless fear of Aboriginal disloyalty flowed through to the VDC. Early in 1943, part-Aboriginal members of the 11 (NW) Battalion VDC, were disarmed and discharged because it was believed by their battalion commander that it was ‘the considered opinion of the North West populace…that half-castes and quarter castes were thoroughly unreliable, and not to be trusted, especially when they are in possession of arms’.707 Although such discrimination was widespread, several towns did attempt to allow the enlistment of Aboriginal men into their local VDC units. For example, VDC units located in Babinda and Cardwell in northern Queensland endeavoured to enlist up to ten Aboriginal men as they were ‘expert in guide work and conversant with all the topographic features of the country.’708 Despite the fact that these volunteers would have made ideal members for engaging in guerrilla warfare, the VDC high command found their enlistment ‘undesirable’ and, ignoring the applicants’ good records and enthusiasm to join, disallowed it.709

Even at the height of the threat to the Australian mainland, a reassessment on the eligibility and acceptance of Aborigines into the VDC was not readily forthcoming. In early 1942, an AIF guerrilla warfare instructor, Major George Mitchell, was sent to northern

704 Robert Hall, The Black Diggers : Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in the Second World War, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 1997, p.77. 705 Hall, The Black Diggers, p.77. 706 Kaye Saunders, and Lynette Finch,’ Northern Australians Fear of Invasion’, in Gavin Fry et al (eds.), The Battle of the Coral Sea 1942 Conference Proceedings,7-10 May 1992, Australian Maritime Museum, Sydney, 1993, p.113. 707 Alan Powell, The Shadow’s Edge: Australia’s Northern War, p.255. The men were serving in the Onslow and Port Hedland units in Western Australia. 708 Hall, The Black Diggers, p.77. 709 Hall, The Black Diggers, p.77.

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Western Australia to instruct local men in guerrilla warfare. Ignoring his orders to instruct whites only, Mitchell commenced instructing small groups of Aborigines.710 Mitchell was aided by Cyril Longmore, a journalist from The West Australian newspaper and veteran of the First World War, who was on assignment to observe the aftermath of the bombing raids in the north-west of Western Australia. Being seconded into helping with the establishment of a guerrilla force in the Kimberley region, Longmore sought to form two squads of Aboriginal men and conduct training in guerrilla warfare. The Aboriginal men were skilled bushmen and Longmore believed they would be of great assistance in the event of a Japanese invasion. Such was the enthusiastic response from the participants, Longmore even suggested the formation of a Native Auxiliary Corps to be attached to the army in the Kimberley.711 During this time, he wrote to the Prime Minister John Curtin, advocating the utilisation of the Aborigines willing to serve in the war. Longmore drew particular attention to the shortage of white VDC members in this sparsely populated region. Any guerrilla force would require a combination of both white and Aboriginal recruits, at least 1000 Aborigines, to join the proposed 750 white VDC members.712 The notion of arming and training of Aborigines in guerrilla warfare was rejected, however, after ‘full consideration’ and thereby ignoring their valuable local knowledge of the country which would have proved indispensable in the event of an invasion. It was thought that their ‘allegiances could be readily transferred, in response to small gifts, to an invading army.’713

Nevertheless, Aboriginal recruitment did occur and can be best explained in terms of their perceived usefulness to the army. If military pragmatism demanded it, the services of the Aborigines were quickly accepted. For example, in the North Australia Observer Unit, where Aboriginal enlistment accounted for around ten per cent of the force, the Aboriginal men undertook assignments as trackers and guides but were generally involved in labouring

710 Hall, The Black Diggers, p.106. Cyril Longmore was in the Kimberley reporting on the war for a Perth newspaper at the time and was enlisted to assist in the training of the Aborigines. For a more detailed study of the efforts of Mitchell and Longmore see Peter Bridge, Fighting the Kimberley: The 3 Australian Corps Kimberley Guerrilla Warfare Group, 1942-1943, Hesperian Press, Carlisle, 2012. 711 Lynette Finch, ‘Dying to Belong: Recruiting Civilian Soldiers’, Social Alternatives, Vol. 23, No. 3, Third Quarter, 2004, p.11. 712 Kay Saunders, ‘The dark shadow of white Australia: Racial anxieties in Australia in World War II’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 1994, p.329. 713 Saunders, ‘The dark shadow of white Australia: Racial anxieties in Australia in World War II’, p.329.

154 jobs such as horse breaking and tailing and clearing air strips.714 Aboriginal labour had long been exploited in the Northern Territory.715 Hall accurately concluded that in northern Australia, at least, ‘Aborigines could be recruited contrary to official policy so long as they remained out of the public eye and so long as they contributed to the defence of a strategically important area where other manpower was scarce.’716 Previously, as Menzies had noted in his letter to the Departments of the Army and Navy written in 1940, any exception to the undesirability of non-white, non-European in the forces could only be warranted in order to provide for the specific needs of any of the Services during the war.717

In this regard, Australia was not alone in racial discrimination against home guard volunteers. In Britain, for example, in August 1944, the Liverpool Police Court fined a Home Guard member five pounds due to his non-attendance at compulsory parades of the local Home Guard. In his defence, he stated he had been denied entry to the local dance hall due to his West Indian origin. Returning later dressed in his Home Guard uniform, he was again denied entry because of his colour. He considered he had been insulted while in uniform and thereafter could see no reason to continue attending Home Guard meetings and ceased to do so. Upon appeal, the fine was reduced to a farthing.718

The third group facing exclusion from the VDC arose partly as a result of the perceived communist leanings of the People’s Army. Doubts were being raised concerning the political views and possible political agendas of new VDC volunteers who were, as a matter of official policy, increasingly those who might otherwise have joined the People’s Army. There was concern expressed in some units that men with communist sympathies were joining, perhaps to gain control of the unit or, at some later date, use the military

714 Walker and Walker, Curtin’s Cowboys, pp.138-139. 715 For more detail in the exploitation of Aboriginal labour in the Northern Territory see Noah Riseman, ‘Colonising Yolngu Defence: Arnhem Land in the Second World War and Transnational Uses of Indigenous People in the Second World War’, PhD Thesis, University of Melbourne, 2008, pp.29-68. 716 Robert Hall, ‘Aborigines, The Army and the Second World War in Northern Australia’, Aboriginal History, Vol.4, Part 1, June 1980, p.93. 717 Riseman, Defending Whose Country?, p.10. 718 Summerfield and Peniston-Bird, Contesting Home Defence, p.51.

155 training they received as members of the VDC to undermine the nation.719 Security checks were carried out on applicants suspected of having questionable loyalties. In northern Queensland in March 1942, the Vice-President of the local RSL branch complained that the proposed formation of a VDC unit in the town was in danger of being headed by a communist cell in the town and requested that the formation of the unit be delayed until a thorough investigation into the matter had been conducted.720 An investigation was carried out and completed in four months concluding that the ringleaders had left the area and the remaining men who were alleged to have communist leanings were harmless.721 The VDC unit was controlled ‘by tried and trustworthy men’ and, consequently, the Corps Commander VDC Queensland approved the formation on the condition it excluded ‘any personnel suspected of adverse activities’.722

Similarly, the appointment of leaders of VDC factory defence units came under the scrutiny of the security forces. These units had been quickly organised in industrial areas for the internal protection of the factory against sabotage from fifth columnists and paratroopers after the entry of Japan into the war. The requests to form factory units were remarkable, with New South Wales alone receiving 560 applications from separate workshops.723 Military Intelligence expressed security concerns at the formation of VDC factory units in industrial areas. The Director believed there was the possibility of these units coming under control of communists who, in the future, might use their military training to undermine the nation.724 The army wanted the selections of leaders for these units to be conducted in accordance to Army principles and not be appointed by the employer or employees, minimising the chances of any manipulation by people who had ulterior motives. Army Headquarters directed that leaders for these units would only be decided upon only after a period of training and to men who had shown a ‘definite capacity

719 Appendix “E”, Volunteer Defence Corps W.A. L. of C. Area, AWM 52, 36/1/9 May to July 1942. 720 Letter to Chief Secretary’s Department from H.H. Bieke Vice-President of the RSL sub-branch of Chillagoe, 29 March 1942, AWM 60, 266. 721 Letter to Intelligence Service Northern Command from A. Clarke Intelligence Officer Cairns, 2 June 1942, AWM 60, 266. 722 Letter to Allied Land Forces from Administration Queensland L. of C. Area concerning the formation of a VCD unit at Chillagoe, 17 July 1942, AWM 60, 266. 723 General Report on the Formation of Factory Units – VDC for N.S.W. L. of C Area, May 1942, NAA SP459/1, 507/1/1203. 724 Appendix “E”, Volunteer Defence Corps W.A. L. of C. Area, AWM 52, 36/1/9, May to July 1942.

156 for leadership’.725 All appointments of Officers and NCOs were to be made by VDC Headquarters as the units needed to be under ‘proper control’, particularly around the highly unionised Newcastle area.726 Thus, steps were taken to ensure there would be no evolution of a trained, armed civilian group, under the influence of communists existing after the war.

Generally speaking, the VDC provided an optimal vehicle for the government to accommodate any man wishing to make a greater contribution to the war effort. The prevailing mindset of making a contribution to home defence in the first half of 1942 created an overwhelming number of offers to help with home defence. Numerous small rural communities wanted to form a VDC unit, sometimes with as few as fifteen members, in order to provide some degree of defence for their community.727 As one former VDC volunteer stated, ‘[We] never considered the VDC was near professional soldiering’ but insisted it was ‘just a community effort to assist wherever we can in anything at all.’728 Even the mundane task of guarding bridges at night was dutifully carried out, since they were engaged in ‘real serious business’, especially after the attacks on Darwin and Broome.729 Though many men were willing to provide their own equipment, requiring only weapons from the government, all enquiries about forming a unit were forwarded to the local VDC Battalion Commanders for approval. As well, some country towns wished to organise and train their own armed defence units, though not necessarily under the VDC umbrella, requiring the Minister for the Army to explain that it was not the policy of the Government to equip and trained any unauthorised personnel for defence purposes since the VDC were the official civilian defence organisation.730 By directing the people advocating the formation

725 General Report on the Formation of Factory Units – VDC for N.S.W. L. of C Area, May 1942, NAA SP459/1, 507/1/1203. 726 Instructions for the Formation and Control of Factory Picquets or Inlying Guard 30 March 1942, NAA SP459/1, 507/1/1203. 727 Letter VDC Headquarters from the United Citizens Organisation of Woodford 31 December 1941, AWM 193, 268 Part 2. 728 Transcript of Oral Recording of Lawrence Stuart Turnbull (W48012) interviewed by Susan Green, 17 January 1990, Accession No. S00783. 729 Transcript of Oral Recording of Lawrence Stuart Turnbull (W48012) interviewed by Susan Green, 17 January 1990, Accession No. S00783. 730 Correspondence between the Texas RSL sub-branch and the Minister for the Army, 21-24 March 1942, AWM 60, 1465. Letter to the Shire Clerk, Balonne Shire, St. George, 24 April 1942, AWM 60, 1467.

157 of a civilian defence unit to their nearest VDC unit, the government provided the nexus between citizens determined to contribute to home defence and the means through which they could. More importantly, it retained control over the process.

For example, the Waterside Workers Federation wrote to the Minister of the Army requesting that anti-aircraft guns be placed at their disposal after securing assurances from an American Army officer he would conduct the necessary training in their use.731 The standard reply from the government was sent, confirming they had forwarded the letter to the local VDC Battalion Commander, who would be in contact with them.732 As usual, the VDC would be pleased to have them if the establishment allowed, or as supernumerary members, if they wished to enlist.733

The political usefulness of the VDC from 1942 was not limited to ensuring no unauthorised civilian defence groups such as the People’s Army gained any traction with the public. After initially concentrating on supplying men and munitions, the government’s focus was directed to the nation’s most valuable contribution to the Allied war effort, the supply of agricultural produce. Throughout the war, Australia supplied produce to New Zealand, several Pacific islands, the Australian armed forces, American forces stationed in Australia and the South-West Pacific, Britain and, of course, its domestic market but, by 1942, there was a shortage in most products with the exception of wheat and wool.734 While factors such as climatic conditions impacted on agricultural production, shortage of labour was the most challenging problem to solve. An acute manpower shortage had emerged at the end of 1941. At this time, the manpower requirements for the military forces and the munitions industry had been estimated at 31,000 and 81,000 extra men

731 Letter to Corps Headquarters VDC (Q) from Lieutenant-Colonel L. R. Ferguson “A” Group VDC 28 April 1942, AWM 60, 1470. 732 Letter to E. C. Englart Secretary of the Waterside Workers Federation Brisbane from the Minister for the Army, 29 April 1942, AWM 60, 1470. 733 Letter to Corps Headquarters VDC (Q) from Lieutenant-Colonel L. R. Ferguson “A” Group VDC 28 April 1942, AWM 60, 1470. 734 Marnie Haig-Muir and Roy Hay, ‘The Economy at War’, in Joan Beaumont (ed.) Australia’s War 1939-45, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996, p.116.

158 respectively.735 Three months after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, the number of men in the military forces, through call-up and volunteering, had grown by over 170,000.736 In an attempt to curb the flow of volunteers into the armed forces, Forde as Minister for the Army, announced on 14 March 1942, authorisation to allow men employed in protected industries to enlist in the VDC on the proviso, in response to a request from the manpower authorities, that they would not be called upon for full-time service without the consent of the manpower authorities.737 Keeping in mind that approximately seventy-five per cent of the total strength of the Corps was raised outside the metropolitan area and the majority of VDC volunteers in rural units were farmers or farm hands, it could be concluded that this announcement was aimed at those men employed in the agricultural sector.738 Such was the the labour shortage, the government had approved the formation of the Australian Women’s Land Army (AWLA) on 27 July 1942, but only made limited use of this organisation in rural production.739 Although at its peak in October 1944, permanent membership reached only 2,565 personnel.740 Nonetheless, it was anticipated that the VDC would supply the political solution required by the government to accommodate men wishing to serve while, at the same time, keeping them working in their respective essential occupations, especially agriculture.

Just as important as its role in curbing the People’s Army and assisting in a manpower shortage, the VDC also provided the government with an ideal organisation to maintain popular morale. The fact that volunteers lived and worked in their local area meant that the VDC became part of the social fabric of the community. In general, this afforded the VDC an increased degree of influence on the general morale of the local community and, correspondingly, its war effort.741 In rural communities, by far the largest constituent of the VDC, local townspeople endeavoured to accommodate, as much as

735 Gavin Long, The Six Years War: a concise history of Australia in the 1939-45 war, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1973, p.113. 736 Butlin and Schedvin, War Economy 1942-1945, p.6 737 Sydney Morning Herald, 16 March, 1942, p.7. 738 Minute Paper War Cabinet Agendum 23 October 1943, p.2-3, NAA MP742/1, 286/1/102. 739 Dennis et. al., ‘Australian Women’s Land Army’, The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, pp.79-80. 740 Dennis et. al., ‘Australian Women’s Land Army’, p.80. 741 Minute Paper War Cabinet Agendum 23 October 1943, p.2-3, NAA MP742/1, 286/1/102.

159 possible, the VDC activities in their area. For example, in the town of Wyalkatchem in Western Australia, the shops stayed open on Saturday afternoon so the farming families could combine their weekly shopping with the men’s VDC commitments. The men were required to guard the Post Office and man roadblocks on the lookout for abuses of petrol rationing regulations.742 The commitment some VDC members placed on the defence of the community, however banal the duty might be, was taken very seriously. One historian observed that joining of the VDC was ‘a sign of community attachment perhaps as much patriotism’ in small rural communities, and illustrated a commitment to the community since they ‘wished to do something to defend it’.743 In this regard, the unit’s value to the community was not limited to just defence. They were embraced as a vital part of the community, and as one AIF officer remarked, ‘while the VDC did not make much difference to Australia’s military war effort, its existence helped to remind civilians that they were at war and their contribution counted.744 Moreover, support for the VDC was not restricted to only country areas. In Perth, the Salvation Army sent its Red Shield van to various VDC posts throughout the metropolitan area to supply the men with ‘steaming cups of hot cocoa accompanied with biscuits.’ 745

Indeed, the effect of the VDC on the public morale was recognised by General Blamey, who wrote to all VDC commanders on the third anniversary of the formation of the VDC expressing ‘…my desire that you will communicate to all ranks my true appreciation of the great part they have played towards maintaining the morale and determination to win of the community in general. This they have done by the steady increase in their fighting efficiency, by their commendable standard of self-discipline and, most of all, by their example of unselfish service.’746 In addition, in a War Cabinet meeting in October 1942, Forde stated he had been ‘assured by leading citizens and have seen for myself that the VDC

742 de Pierres, Wheatbelt Warriors, p.15. 743 Peter Stanley, ‘The Soldiers on the Hill: the defence of Whyalla 1939-45, How much more entertaining this is?’, p.29. 744 Stanley, ‘The Soldiers on the Hill: the defence of Whyalla 1939-45, How much more entertaining this is’, p.29. The remark is attributed to Captain Moorfoot, commanding officer at the AA battery in Whyalla. 745 Walter Hull, Salvos with the Forces, The Salvation Army, Melbourne, 1995, p.288. This activity was carried out under the care of Harry Carroll, sometimes covering fifty miles. This was quite an undertaking when considering the shortage of petrol, tyres and continual wear and tear on the vehicle. 746 Letter to Volunteer Defence Corps Commanders from General T. Blamey, 8 July 1943, MP742/1, 286/1/102.

160 is playing a role which has had … an important effect on the morale of the community, and is setting an example of service which stiffens to a very great extent the general public’s determination to get on with its war-time job.’747 By all accounts, the VDC was generally well received by the population as a whole. A recurring theme in the experiences of VDC volunteers was the social aspect of enjoying other men’s company. Many members stated this was one of the best aspects in joining the VDC and many units continued to meet regularly on a weekly basis after the war.748 As a consequence, there were calls from the public for the VDC to be a permanent part of the Australian Military Force, especially in country areas, believing it would be a ‘grave mistake’ to decrease the activities of such a ‘splendid organisation’.749

A further and useful insight to the reasons for the social value of home defence volunteers is put forward by Penny Summerfield and Corinna Peniston-Bird in their examination of the British Home Guard. They suggest the Home Guard was culturally constructed, ‘not only as a force that would defend localities against invasion, but also as a response to the vulnerability and value of home and nation in a total war, contending the word ‘Home’ represented what the country was fighting for.’750 Notwithstanding the absence of the word ‘home’ in its title, the VDC did represent a clearly visible sign of the spirit of Australian communities in response to a perceived threat of attack.

When a nation goes to war, it is necessary to maintain morale and enthusiasm for the war effort and equally important to create a sense of solidarity in the community in order to convince the public to undertake such an effort.751 At the time, the written and spoken arms of the media co-operated with the government publicising positive news and provide uplift to the public awareness of the nation’s war effort. The VDC was a ‘good news’

747 War Cabinet Agendum 2 December 1942, NAA A2671, 491/1942. 748 See de Pierres, Wheatbelt Warriors, p.29-30, Transcript of Oral Recording of Kenneth Bussell (V366968) interviewed by Daniel Connell, 9 August 1990, Accession No. S00955. For a different perspective, see Transcript of Oral Recording of Christopher Johnson (Q215294) interviewed by Daniel Connell, 5 September 1989, Accession No. S00725. 749 de Pierres, Wheatbelt Warriors, p.29-30. 750 Summerfield and Peniston, Contesting Home Defence, p.11. 751 Darian-Smith, On the Home Front: Melbourne in Wartime 1939-1945, p.76.

161 story exemplifying the sacrifices required, if Australia’s war effort was to be increased or maintained. In February 1942, the Government authorised the Department of Information to promote the activities of the VDC through a documentary story format.752 The documentary story was to be covered by Fox and Cinesound Newsreel Companies and VDC Headquarters was formally requested that the ‘fullest co-operation’ be extended to the Newsreel Companies.753 The documentary story was, in part, a matter of countering publicity of the People’s Army but also maintaining public morale and sense of safety.

In seeking to achieve these aims, good news stories of the VDC appeared in local newspapers extolling its attributes and values while usually emphasising the self-reliance and whole-hearted enthusiasm of the Corps. For example, one story entailed a volunteer who, at his own expense, supplied accommodation for battalion headquarters, quartermaster’s stores and housing for the ambulance section.754 In another article concerning the importance of the VDC, ironically under the heading of ‘The People’s Army’, details of the activities of the local VDC unit were cheerfully portrayed and continued on to further informed readers that members readily ‘plugged miles through the mulga’ on map reading exercises and still ‘returned the next day eager to learn more.’755 The article continued stating the ‘men were training in order to defend their homes and loved ones if called upon’ but also alluded to the fact that ‘so many men, who were in a position to do so, were not taking advantage of the opportunity to prepare themselves’.756 A newspaper report in June 1943 wrote, ‘…the VDC are now armed… and the training is such that our womenfolk, who naturally are somewhat perturbed at the proximity of the enemy, will be pleased to see and know that there is a valuable, efficient fighting force right at their back door, ready to defend them when and if the necessity arrives.’757 It was envisaged that the presence and resolution of the VDC would engender confidence and reassurance into the local population in the event of an emergency.

752 Letter to VDC Headquarters from the Department of Information, 12 February 1942, AWM 193, 268 Part 2 753 Letter to VDC Headquarters from the Department of Information, 12 February 1942, AWM 193, 268 Part 2. The Australian War Memorial has seven newsreels in its collection relating to the VDC see F00567, F07040, F04084, F04089, F00601, F00350 and F00356. 754 The Queensland Times, 14 April, 1942, p.4. 755 Kalgoorlie Miner, 14 February 1942, p.7. 756 Kalgoorlie Miner, 14 February 1942, p.7. 757 de Pierres, Wheatbelt Warriors, p.20

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Not all stories dealing with the VDC were glowing accounts. As with any large organisation, there are always transgressions committed. In December 1942, in a newspaper article dealing with the misappropriation of money, a Queensland VDC Major managed to escape imprisonment after admitting to stealing money solely to keep his unit together. His defence claimed in the early years of the Corps, due to the lack of any financial help or recognition of the VDC, he was ‘forced to do unorthodox things or let the unit go.758 As well, a number of full-time duty VDC men, coming under military law since the inauguration of the VDC in May 1941, faced court-martial for various offences from going absent without leave, altering a leave pass to stealing. The sentences for the various offences ranged from being reprimanded for being absent without leave to being fined and summarily discharged from the Corps for stealing. In the case dealing with being absent without leave, it is notable that the judgement had taken into account the man’s age of 50 years, previous good conduct and being shortly due for discharge after nearly four years of service.759 On the other hand, after serving for less than one month, a VDC member was charged with theft of money from the VDC Orderly Room. After being fined, he was summarily discharged from the Corps.760 The adverse press was not just limited to serving members. In mid-1943, a former major in the VDC, credited with the initial organising of the VDC in Queensland, faced charges of false pretences regarding the presenting of cheques.761 On the whole, any reasonable assessment would conclude that the offences committed by VDC members remained insignificant considering the size of the organisation, nearly 100,000 members, and the press, with the full backing of the government, consistently emphasised positive news in regards to the Corps.

After the war, the majority of VDC volunteers firmly believed their service had been a worthwhile and valuable contribution and had willingly given their time and effort. As one VDC member asserted, ‘our blokes were doing it because they loved the damn job. They

758 The Courier-Mail, 11 December 1943, p.4. 759 Record of the Court-Martial of Warrant Officer II F. Claridge for neglecting to return after leave, 24 September 1943, NAA A471, 44291. 760 Record of the Court-Martial of S/Sgt C. D. Smith on the 5 August 1943, NAA A471, 45779. Smith was charged with stealing money from the Orderly Room after having joined the Corps only one month previously. 761 The Cairns Post, 11 June 1943, p.4.

163 were doing it for the country.’762 Nonetheless, complaints arose within many units about the difficulties concerning the qualification of VDC members for the Australian Service Medal in recognition of their services. To qualify, members had to complete three years part-time service and have performed defence duty on at least sixty days during such service.763 Many VDC members did not complete the requirement of three years part-time service for a variety of reasons. Some members were forced to resign from the Corps for medical reasons while others had to resign from the Corps due to occupational commitments in reserved industries such as communication employees. As well, the manpower shortage from early 1943 directly contributed to many members, who had joined in early 1942 at the height of the invasion threat, not serving the full three years. It is necessary, however, to remember the government fully supported the men, particularly those employed in the agricultural occupations, in spending more time working, on the understanding this would be of greater benefit to the war effort. Additionally, as increasingly more units were placed on reserve, many members did not regularly attend parades, since these were reduced to a reserve setting of one per month, and viewed their job had been done.764 Indeed, in the beginning of 1944, after discussions within the hierarchy of the VDC in the Eastern States, the obligation of attending training parades was further lessened due to transport difficulties and the demands of the civil occupations of members.765 The VDC was not alone in members wishing to return to normal life, as likewise, the ARP and other organisations were experiencing similar manpower issues.766 In this environment, many members did not satisfy the three year part-time service requirement, arguably because the government had re-assigned their primary role and recalibrated their national priority.

Similarly, the qualifying period for the Defence Medal for members of the British Home Guard, was three years’ service in non-operational areas that were subject to air

762 Saunders and Finch, ‘Northern Australians Fear of Invasion’, p.110. 763 de Pierres, Wheatbelt Warriors, p.35. 764 All inland and coastal units south of 20° Latitude not involved in anti-aircraft, coastal artillery or searchlight duties or close protection of Fortress areas were placed on reserve status. As a result, roughly 40,000 VDC personnel were placed on a reserve footing: Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-45, p.379. 765 Letter from Chief of the General Staff to Corps commander VDC Queensland on VDC Future Policy 13 March 1944, AWM 52, 36/1/5 January to March 1944. 766 McKernan, All In!, p.118.

164 attack or closely threatened between 14 May 1940 and 31 December 1944, when the Home Guard was stood down.767 The Defence Medal was also award to members of the Auxiliary Fire Service and Civil Defence. The compulsory nature of service in the British Home Guard ensured many men qualified for the Defence Medal. In comparison, the New Zealand War Service Medal was awarded for 28 days' full time service or six months' part time service in the New Zealand Home Guard and eligible part time personnel must have completed their six months' part time service between 16 August 1940 and 1 January 1944, as the New Zealand Home Guard was disbanded in December 1943.768 Again, the compulsory requirement to enlist in the New Zealand Home Guard meant many men received the Service Medal. Compulsory service was never required in Australia unlike Britain and New Zealand. To be fair, some full-time duty VDC members qualified for the Australian Service Medal but the overwhelming majority of VDC members served on a voluntary and part-time basis.769 Nonetheless, after the war ceased, the lack of awards to the VDC, for services voluntarily rendered, prompted questions to be raised in Parliament but ultimately only a Certificate of Service was issued.770 As one Queensland VDC member, in summing up his feelings at the end of the war, remarked, ‘what we have done has never been recognised by the army or anybody for that matter and … you feel a little bit of resentment at times that you put in quite a lot of your life you might say to do your bit as well as you were able and no recognition has been given to you for it.’771

Any reasonable assessment of the VDC reveals they played a valuable role as the Government sought to combat politically the emergence of civilian defence groups as the Japanese approached the Australian mainland. In the VDC, the Government had a ready prepared organisation capable of accommodating men wishing to contribute to home defence. The success of this strategy forced the government to raise the establishment

767 British Medals of World War Two: The Defence Medal website http://www.northeastmedals.co.uk/britishguide/defence.htm, accessed 26 January 2016. 768 New Zealand Campaign Medals of the New Zealand Defence Force website http://medals.nzdf.mil.nz/category/c/c1.html, accessed 26 January 2016. 769 Letter to W.J. Powell, Treasurer of the 9 Battalion VDC Association from the Minister for the Army, 28 June 1957, NAA MT1131/1, A81/1/465. For example, de Pierres could only uncover eight members of the 15th Battalion VDC (WA) to have been awarded the Australian Service Medal, Wheatbelt Warriors, p.35. 770 Parliamentary Question (CS.3606) asked by Senator Collett, 17 September 1945, NAA MP742/1, 286/1/242. 771 Transcript of Oral Recording of Christopher Robert Johnson (Q215294) interviewed by Daniel Connell, 5 September 1989, Accession No. S00725.

165 twice but, just as significantly, spotlighted some of the inadequacies of the Corps. Women were excluded from joining while Aborigines were actively discouraged from becoming members. In the attempt to increase economic production in the light of a manpower shortage, the VDC was promoted by the government as the organisation to join while remaining employed and play a role in home defence. On the whole, the Corps proved to be highly effective in maintaining the morale of their communities and strengthening their commitment to the war effort. They assisted the government in its political strategies of extracting greater war efforts from the population, through sacrifice and service, and became a recognisable part of the social fabric of communities during the war years.

166

Conclusion

During the Second World War, Australia faced a threat that the country had feared for many decades, the possibility of an invasion of the mainland from its Asian north. There had been numerous calls, the most vocal coming from the RSL, of forming a home defence force for this contingency and increased further with the outbreak of war. However, little, if any scholarship has been directed towards the organisation formed during the Second World War, the Volunteer Defence Corps, which peaked at approximately 100,000 members, and the role the organisation played in the home defence of Australia. This sizable voluntary force consisted of civilian men, ineligible for full-time service, who wished to actively participate in the defence of the nation and readily contributed their spare time to become involved in the defence of their local communities and loved ones in the event of an invasion. They would spend the majority of their non-working days, in addition to one night a week as well, attending parades to become proficient in the use of firearms, military equipment and infantry tactics.

Throughout its existence, the Corps was not a static organisation. From its initial government authorisation, the organisation came under the auspices of the RSL. This proved to be an impediment for the Corps to deliver any significant military, political or social value. The unsatisfactory role of providing a supply of reserves to militia and garrison battalions, compounded by the lack of any government assistance, soon began to take its toll on the enthusiasm of members. Seeking to realise the organisation’s ambition to contribute on a military level, and acknowledging that the RSL could not provide it, the VDC was incorporated into the army in May 1941. This afforded a defined role, of providing static defence, in the structure of home defence though it is arguable at this stage whether it was fit for purpose due to the lack of equipment and training. As a result of Japan entering the war and their rapid advance through south-east Asia, many people wished to participate in the defence of their homes and communities. At this stage of the war, the beginning of 1942, the VDC provided the government with an ideal body to accommodate the political problem of patriotic civilians wanting to form civilian defence groups. More

167 significantly, the VDC was progressively becoming better equipped and trained. In this regard, a certain degree of military value could be attributed to the VDC but, however, any emphasis on the military strength or weakness of the VDC should not diminish its contribution to the morale of the population, at a time, when it was widely perceived that Australia was under an imminent threat of invasion from the Japanese.

The VDC assumed a different role in response to a reassessment of Australia’s role within the Allies in the Pacific region in 1943. The coastal metropolitan units of the VDC were assigned greater military tasks thereby releasing soldiers for more active duty. The new tasks included the manning of anti-aircraft, coastal defence and searchlight batteries. Afforded adequate resources in training, time and equipment, the VDC reached an acceptable degree of proficiency in manning the batteries despite the onerous burden it placed on the units. On the other hand, virtually all rural VDC units were placed on a reserve basis. The new tasks and the placing on reserve for various VDC units was, in part, a matter of fulfilling two goals of the government. Due diminishing commitment to regularly attend parades, volunteers in rural units could devote greater efforts to increasing agricultural production, an area greatly handicapped by the manpower shortage and where growth was needed if Australia was to meet its commitments to the Allies. The second goal was to release full-time soldiers from duty at the various batteries and allow these soldiers to be better utilised on more active duty. These soldiers would be a much welcomed addition to the army for the upcoming military offensives, offensives that were becoming a political necessity for any Australian role in a post-war settlement.

Despite the perception that the VDC’s value lay in its military and political roles, its societal role as a public morale booster, particularly as the war front retreated from Australian shores after 1943, should not be overlooked. The need to defend the mainland was waning but other requirements, such as the population continuing to keep up their commitment to the war effort, began being given greater relevance by the government. Australia’s war effort needed to be maintained. The extent of the social value placed on the VDC by the rural communities, even communities far distant from any threat such as those

168 in South Australia, was illustrated by the willingness of the members, even after their respective units were placed on reserve in 1943, to remain as a unit and continue to parade regularly till the end of the war. Putting aside the gradual decline in numbers over this period, it is still significant that the majority of these country units maintained over half their membership.

Nonetheless, the temptation to draw any sweeping conclusions concerning the VDC is unwise as no two units were the quite the same. In fact, so diverse geographically and socially was the VDC that the location of the unit, city or rural, north or south, east or west and coastal or inland, shaped each member’s experience of their time in the Corps. Each metropolitan and rural unit tended to reflect their separate social environment. In other words, a VDC member located in Hobart would have different assigned roles and tasks in comparison to a unit situated in northern Queensland, an area far more likely to have been attacked. Likewise, the members of the Kalgoorlie VDC unit, a mining town situated six hundred kilometres east of Perth, would have experienced a different community atmosphere, as well as assigned tasks, than VDC members located in a capital city and manning the coastal defence artillery. The public, by and large, did not view the tasks of the VDC as a waste of time and the majority of members definitely did not consider their service unimportant. Morale in the Corps, particularly in the rural units, remained high even when the invasion threat had passed.

This thesis has conducted an examination of the VDC using the political, military and social roles placed on the organisation as a constituent of the home defence forces of Australia. This has been achieved by examining and analysing the major factors influencing the various roles played by the VDC, from its authorisation by a reluctant government to achieving a military role of manning coastal batteries and ultimately disbandment at the end of the war. The factors impacted on the VDC included membership restrictions, level of material and financial government support, training, organisational and administrative structure and its role in the home defence forces. The organisation had to adapt to the evolving needs of the government and the military in response to the Allied strategic

169 situation and government domestic policies. Through the discussion of the key military, political and social roles carried out by the Corps during its six year existence, the issues that impacted on the administration and structure of the organisation are identified and examined.

It is easy to dismiss the VDC as a force that was used by the government for its own political purpose and had little military significance but that would belittle the military role played by the VDC during the war. With the passage of time, it might appear on the surface that the government used the VDC as a tool to give civilian men a sense that they were contributing to the defence of their country. Once the VDC came under military control and with the advent of equipment and the receipt of effective training, however, the Corps achieved a large degree of proficiency. Certainly, after 1943 the organisation gained the capability of filling a number of ancillary roles. The extent of proficiency was such that there was little hesitation, in 1943, allowing the VDC to replace a large number of army personnel of the strategic defensive functions in the major Australian cities and coastal towns. In an ironic twist, soon after reaching this level, much of the Corps was placed on a reserve basis.

In addition to the increasing military value of the Corps, its political value should not be ignored. Its political justification comes as a propaganda exercise designed to reassure the Australian population and allow patriotic men an avenue to contribute to Australia’s defence. Arguably, in 1942, the VDC symbolised the Australian need for resistance and social solidarity. The government used the establishment of the VDC to solve a number of political hurdles as they emerged, from meeting the emergence of civilian defence groups to promoting an increase in, or at least maintaining, the war effort by everyone ‘doing their bit’. Such was the concern, that The Army War Effort, in 1944, called upon the Prime Minister to issue an explicit statement making it quite clear to members of the Corps, and the public generally, that the war is not yet won, that there is too much complacency.772 It would be a mistake to believe that the diminished threat of invasion inferred the VDC had

772 The Army War Effort, 27 February, 1944, p.35, AWM 113, MH1/167. The Army War Effort report was produce by the Department of the Army detailing the state of the Army at a given time.

170 outlived their usefulness. National morale, in short, was a vital role for the VDC. In any assessment of the VDC, all three roles need to be taken into consideration.

The story of the VDC in Australia has some similarities with comparable Commonwealth countries, such as Britain and New Zealand, which raised Home Guards during the Second World War but retained a uniqueness not seen in other Commonwealth countries. The VDC remained a voluntary organisation throughout the war. In fact, unlike the British and New Zealand Home Guards, it was not completely disbanded until after the end of the war. However, unlike the other Home Guards, Australia’s home Guard, the Volunteer Defence Corps, has received limited scholastic research.773 Unfortunately, as a consequence of never being called upon to defend Australia, the VDC has been largely neglected by military historians. It is hoped this thesis will initiate an increase in scholastic research in this area and secure the legacy of these committed volunteers in the historiography of Australian military during the Second World War.

Several British Home Guard units selected the following passage as their unit’s motto; ‘They also serve who only stand and wait’.774 Likewise, the passage could equally apply to the Volunteer Defence Corps in Australia.

773 For Britain, see S.P. Mackenzie, The Home Guard, Norman, Longmate, The Real Dad’s Army: the story of the home guard, Penny Summerfield and Corina Peniston-Bird, Contesting Home Defence. For New Zealand, see Nancy Margaret Taylor, The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War: The Home Front Vol.1 and Vol.2. 774 MacKenzie, The Home Guard, p.184. This is the last line in John Milton’s, Sonnet XVI, On His Blindness. Milton, who was blind at the time of writing the poem, questions a person worthiness and usefulness to God as they are hampered from performing the deeds they used to do. God answered ‘They also serve who only stand and wait’.

171

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PAMPHLETS

Japanese Parachute Troops, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, 1945, pp.23-33.

Them Was the Days –VDC Recollections, Unofficial History of “A” company, 10 Infantry Battalion VDC, 1940-1945.

No Surrender! Premier Printers, Sydney, 1942.

ARTICLES

Alder, B., ‘The Ideology of the New Guard Movement’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 82, No. 2, December 1996, pp.192-209.

Carment, D., ‘Australian Communism and National Security September 1939-June 1941’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 65, No. 4, March 1980.

Coulthard-Clark, C., ‘The Legion of Frontiersmen in Australia’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 75, No. 2, October 1987, pp.135-140.

Dedman, J., ‘Defence Policy Decisions Before Pearl Harbor’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 13 Issue 3, December, 1967, pp.331-345.

Fadden, Sir A., ’Forty days and forty nights: Memoir of a war-time Prime Minister’, Australian Outlook, Vol. 27, Issue 1, pp.3-11.

Finch, L., ‘Dying to Belong: Recruiting Civilian Soldiers’, Social Alternatives, Vol. 23, No. 3, Third Quarter, 2004, pp.11-14.

Hall, R., ‘Aborigines, The Army and the Second World War in Northern Australia’, Aboriginal History, Vol.4, Part 1, June 1980, pp.73-93.

Horner, D., ‘Defending Australia in 1942’, War & Society, Vol. 11, Issue 1, May 1993, pp.1-20.

Huggonson, D, ‘The Dark Diggers of the AIF’, The Australian Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 3, 1989, pp.352-357.

Inglis, K., ‘The Anzac Tradition’, Meanjin Quarterly, No. 24, Issue 1, March 1965, pp.25-44.

McCarthy, J., ‘Australia and Imperial Defence: Co-operation and Conflict 1918-1939’, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 1971, pp.19-32.

Meaney, N., ‘Britishness and Australian Identity: The problem of nationalism in Australian history and historiography’ Australian Historical Studies, Vol. 32 No. 116, 2001, pp.76-90.

Millar, T. B., ‘Citizen Army, Reserve or Saturday Soldiers?’, Quadrant, Vol. 19, No. 5, August 1975, p.35-39.

Oliver, P., ‘Interpreting Japanese Activities in Australia 1888-1945’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, No. 36, May, 2002.

Primrose, B. N., ‘Equipment and Naval Policy 1919-42’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol.23, Issue 2, 1977, pp.163-168.

Rawson, D. W., ‘Political Violence in Australia’ Dissent, Autumn, 1968, pp.18-27.

Searle, G., ‘The Digger Tradition and Australian Nationalism’, Meanjin Quarterly, Vol. 24, Issue 2, June 1965, pp.1-11.

Saunders, K., ‘The dark shadow of white Australia: Racial anxieties in Australia in World War II’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 1994, pp.325-341.

Simington, M., ‘The Southwest Pacific Islands in Australian Interwar Defence Planning’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 1977, pp.173-177.

Stanley, P., ‘The Soldiers on the Hill: the defence of Whyalla 1939/45 Part 8: 1943: How much more entertaining this is?', Sabretache, Vol. 28, No. 2 April/June 1987, pp.28-31.

Thornton, R., ‘Invaluable ally or imminent aggressor? Australia and Japanese Naval Assistance, 1914-18’, Journal of Australian Studies, Vol.12, 1983, pp.5-20.

White, J., ‘The Port Kembla Pig Iron Strike of 1938’, Labour History, Issue 37, November 1979, pp.63-77.

Yelton, D., ‘British Public Opinion, the Home Guard and the defence of Great Britain, 1940- 44’, The Journal of Military History, vol. 58, No. 3, 1944, pp.461-480.

CONFERENCES

Crotty, M., ‘The Rise, Fall and Rise of the RSL, 1916-1946’, When Soldiers Return, Conference Proceedings, November 2007.

Fry, G. et al (eds.), The Battle of the Coral Sea 1942 Conference Proceedings,7-10 May 1992, Australian Maritime Museum, Sydney, 1993.

Moore, A., ‘Retreads or Reactionaries?’ The ideological terrain of the Volunteer Defence Corps, 1940-1945’, presented at the Australian War Memorial History Conference, 9-13 July, 1990.

ORAL RECORDINGS

The Keith Murdoch Sound Archive of Australia in the War of 1939-45

Christopher Robert “Bob” Johnson (Q215294) by Daniel Connell, 5 September 1989, Accession No. S00725.

Edward Alfred Keating (Q215374) interviewed by Daniel Connell, 4 September 1989, Accession No. S00724.

Carl Otto Alfred Lennig (Q215495) interviewed by Daniel Connell, 6 September 1989, Accession No. S00723.

Derek Jack Sampson (WX26823) interviewed by Susan Green, 23 February 1990,Accession No. S00918.

Lawrence Stuart Turnbull (W48012) interviewed by Susan Green, 17 January 1990, Accession No. S00783.

NEWSPAPERS and PERIODICALS

The Advertiser, 1940.

Age (Melbourne), 1899-1904.

The Bulletin (Sydney), 1893-1905.

The Cairns Post, 1943.

The Canberra Times, 1936-1940.

The Courier-Mail, 1943.

Daily Telegraph, 1942.

Goulburn Evening Post, 1942.

Kalgoorlie Miner,1942.

Morning Bulletin, 1942.

The Newcastle Morning Herald & Miners’ Advocate, 1943.

The Queensland Times, 1942.

The Sun, 1940.

Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 1940.

Sydney Morning Herald, 1937 -1940.

The Sunday Times, (Perth), 1940.

The Listening Post, 1940-1941.

Mufti, 1942.