Journal of journal of religion in europe 11 (2018) 348-377 Religion in Europe brill.com/jre

Challenging Secularities, Challenging Religion: ‘Secularist Ex-Muslim Voices’ in the British Debate on Islam and Freedom of Expression

Maria Vliek Faculty of Philosophy, Theology & Religious Studies, Radboud University Nijmegen [email protected]

Abstract

This article uses the interpretative device of ‘multiple secularities’ to interrogate the presence of ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ in the British debate on Islam and freedom of expression. By contrasting Britain with the Netherlands, where these voices are currently relatively absent, it will examine ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ as expressed at the International Conference on Freedom of Conscience and Ex- pression in London, July 2017. It argues that these voices have surfaced here due to Britain’s particular history of secularity for the sake of accommodating diversity. They challenge institutionalized levels (state-church relations, multiculturalism, and communitarianism) and social and cultural forms (debate on freedom of ex- pression and Islamophobia). These voices are relatively absent in the Netherlands due to its dominant secularity for the sake of social/national integration. Due to the particular histories of secularity, reference problems that surface in Britain have less bearing on the Dutch situation. These voices have, therefore, been relatively absent.

Keywords secularity – religion – ex-Muslim – Britain – Islam – freedom of expression – multiple secularities

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Challenging Secularities, Challenging Religion 349

1 Introduction

We make no apologies. We will not live on our knees. We are the tsunami that is coming.1

These were the final words with which Maryam Namazie opened the Inter- national Conference on Freedom of Conscience and Expression in London, on 22 July 2017. Her words referred to the growing number of ex-Muslims and atheists from Islamic communities who speak out against Islam. The confer- ence marked the tenth anniversary of the Council of Ex-Muslims in Britain (cemb) and aimed to bring together secularists and freethinkers from all over the world.2 At the conference, panels consisted of people such as Deeyah Khan, film maker of the documentary Islam’s Non-believers (2016), scientist and atheist Richard Dawkins, spokesperson for the campaign One Law for All Gina Khan, co-founder of Ex-Muslims of North America Sarah Haider, lgbt ex-Muslim activist Jimmy Bangash, author and broadcaster Kenan Malik, di- rector of the Centre for Secular Space Gita Sahgal, and many more. Issues such as Islamophobia, apostasy and blasphemy, communalism and multicultural- ism, secularism, and identity politics were discussed. Although many opinions were shared, the general atmosphere and rhetoric is best described by Namaz- ie’s own agenda. Namazie is, among other things, the founder and chair of the Council of Ex- Muslims in Britain. She has criticized Islam and, in particular, what she refers to as ‘Islamism’—political appropriation of Islam. She has frequently referred to apostates and blasphemers in Muslim majority countries who are being persecuted for asserting their right to freedom of conscience. Consequently, she has castigated British left-wing parties and public figures for siding with Islamists by only recognizing values of liberty when it concerns themselves but not when it concerns Muslims.3 This so-called regressive left, according to Namazie, has imposed de facto blasphemy laws in the West by the accusation­

1 Nano GoleSorkh, “Maryam Namazie: Celebrating Apostasy and Blasphemy,” 26 July 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g3Hb38s9jAQ (accessed 13 June 2018). 2 In light of my PhD project focusing on people leaving Islam in Europe, I attended this event. My research project aims to shed light on the experiences of moving out of Islam in Europe, as well as complications of ‘speaking out’ and ‘being out.’ Fieldwork has been conducted over eighteen months, during which forty-four people have been interviewed, twenty-two in the Netherlands, and twenty-two in the uk, on their experiences of leaving faith behind. 3 Maryam Namazie, “Walking a Tightrope: Between the Pro-Islamist Left and the Far Right,” 7 May 2014. http://onelawforall.org.uk/walking-a-tightrope-between-the-pro-islamist-left- and-the-far-right/ (accessed 3 May 2018).

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350 Vliek of Islamophobia when it concerns public criticism of Islamic doctrine. These controversial opinions have led to accusations from Muslims and non- Muslims alike of racism and siding with right-wing populists, which Namazie has refuted.4 During the conference, panelists and speakers stressed time and again the ‘incommensurable divide’ between Islam and secularism.5 They asserted their authority to do so by claiming to be ‘a voice from within’—a voice that as- sumes that since one has been ‘inside’ Islam has thereby the knowledge (often through victimhood) to now speak out against it.6 My larger research project focuses on people who could potentially take up such roles: they have Islamic backgrounds, they are from the Netherlands or Britain, and they no longer be- lieve in God nor have they converted to another religion. I attended the Con- ference mentioned above in the middle of my fieldwork, and I jotted down various occasions that ‘multiculturalism,’ state appropriation, and legal incor- poration of religious sensibilities seemed to be what participants of the Con- ference argued against. I also noted, that these were themes that at the time were not particularly present in the Dutch debate nor were ‘voices from within’ currently contesting such issues. A prominent ‘voice from within’—or what I will now refer to as ‘secular- ist ex-Muslim voices’—did, at one point, surface in the Netherlands, that is Ayaan Hirsi Ali who entered politics in 2002. The Somali-born was the first Dutch politician to confront issues of Islam in the West by stressing her inti- mate knowledge of the ‘darkness’ of her former religion. Islam was, according to her, threatening the ‘Enlightenment values’ of the Netherlands. Although she left the country in 2006, Dutch right-wing politics have since been domi- nated by like-minded politician Geert Wilders who pursues a nationalist, anti- Islam, anti-Europe agenda.7 In this light, my research interlocutors from the Netherlands who I interviewed with regards to their loss of faith often thought that what Namazie calls “the celebration of apostasy and blasphemy” was

4 Idem, “One Law for All Has No Links with Anne Marie Waters and Sharia Watch,” 7 May 2014. http://onelawforall.org.uk/anne-marie-waters-is-leaving-post-of-spokesperson/ (accessed 3 May 2018). 5 Saba Mahmood, “Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?,” Criti- cal Inquiry 35/4 (2009), 836–862. 6 Idem, “Feminism, Democracy, and Empire: Islam and the War on Terror,” in: Hanna Herzog & Ann Braude (eds.), Gendering Religion and Politics: Untangling Modernities (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2009) 193–215. 7 See also Elizabeth Poole, “The Case of Geert Wilders: Multiculturalism, Islam, and Identity in the uk,” Journal of Religion in Europe 5/2 (2012), 162–191.

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Challenging Secularities, Challenging Religion 351 more harmful rather than helpful toward the plight of those that wish to leave Islam.8 Besides not necessarily feeling much resentment towards Islam or Muslims, many of my interlocutors in the Netherlands feared that if they were to speak out then their narratives could be utilized by Geert Wilders or other populist politicians, aiming to exclude Muslims. So why do these particular activist and political voices currently emerge and assemble in Britain, but not in the Netherlands? I argue that ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ have recently emerged in the public debate in Britain and not as much in the Netherlands because of these countries’ respective histories of secularity. The way the state treats its reli- gious minorities as well as the social and cultural meanings that define and contest religious and secular spaces have raised particular problems that ‘secu- larist ex-Muslim voices’ currently contest in Britain. I contend that because of the particular developments of secularities in the Netherlands and the refer- ence problems these produce, this voice has not surfaced there in recent years. Because Britain has been predominantly marked by a secularity that seeks to accommodate religious diversity, ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ criticize both policy as well as the cultural norms it produces, which allegedly accommodate Islamism. In order to shed light on why ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ currently surface in Britain but are relatively absent in the Netherlands, this article will first elab- orate on the theoretical concept of ‘multiple secularities.’9 Second, an analysis will be provided on the particulars of dominant British secularity and its con- testations on institutionalized levels and the policies it has produced. Third, in order to explore the social and cultural domains of secularity in Britain, the reception of the Danish cartoon affair in 2006 and the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015 by the British press and commentators will be elabo- rated on. Last, in order to unpack the ‘secularist ex-Muslim discourse’ and its particular surfacing in Britain, a case study concerning the above-mentioned conference will be presented. Throughout this article, the Dutch situation will be utilized as a contrast against which the British situation becomes particu- larly salient.

8 GoleSorkh, “Maryam.” On injury and blasphemy, see also Christoph Baumgartner, “Blasphe- my as Violence: Trying to Understand the Kind of Injury that Can Be Inflicted by Acts and Artefacts that Are Construed as Blasphemy,” Journal of Religion in Europe 6/1 (2013), 35–63. 9 Monika Wohlrab-Sahr & Marian Burchardt, “Multiple Secularities: Toward a Cultural Soci- ology of Secular Modernities,” Comparative Sociology 11/6 (2012), 875–909; idem, Revisiting the Secular: Multiple Secularities and Pathways to Modernity, working paper (Leipzig: Leipzig University, 2017).

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2 Multiple Secularities

Over the past decades, academic discussion over sociological processes, such as ‘modernization’ and ‘secularization,’ have spread worldwide. Their assump- tions of universality and natural occurrence as a result of a liberal market economy and social welfare have been questioned. While an extensive over- view of these debates is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that out of the discussions over the universality of modernization theory, came a new orientation which has found positive reception: the idea of ‘multiple modernities.’10 Shmuel N. Eisenstadt suggested that the idea of a unifying con- cept of modernity is required and should be maintained, however, diversity of ‘developmental paths’ within the concept is accepted and even assumed.11 Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Marian Burchardt argued that a similar debate has developed over the assumed universality and inevitability of ‘secularization.’12 Initially, attempts were made primarily to design a general model.13 These dif- ferent attempts suggested that there could be various paths to ‘secularization.’ However, opponents of secularization theory argued that, like with modern- ization theory, it was based in Western bias, assumed universalism, and was perceived as an inevitable civilizational process. Recent critiques of secular- ization theory were thereby often sympathetic towards religion to counter the ‘secularization theory’ to the extent to what Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt have analyzed as a risk towards inversion.14 As a contribution to these debates, they have therefore introduced the concept of ‘multiple secularities.’15 Before expanding on this further, a word on terminology is warranted. Like Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, I will follow José Casanova and Talal Asad in their definitions of ‘secularism,’ ‘secularity,’ and ‘secularization.’16 The term ‘secular- ization’ refers to the ‘process of differentiation,’ which includes the decline of religious belief and participation, as well as the dwindling mutual influences of the social and the religious. The term ‘secularism’ refers to the ideological

10 Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus 129/1 (2000), 1–29. 11 Ibid.; Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, “Multiple.” 12 Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, “Multiple.” 13 E.g., David Martin, A General Theory of Secularization (New York: Harper and Row, 1978). 14 Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, Revisiting, 11. 15 Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, “Multiple.” 16 José Casanova, “The Secular and Secularisms,” Social Research 76/4 (2009), 1049–1066; idem, “The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms,” in: Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmey- er, & Jonathan VanAntwerpen (eds.), Rethinking Secularism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 54–74; Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

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Challenging Secularities, Challenging Religion 353 program that strives to complete separation of religious and secular domains as well as their co-constitution; ‘secularists,’ then, are its advocates. Further- more, recent work on secularism has considered a variety of European ‘secu- larisms,’ depending on specific (national) historic and religious trajectories. Various scholars compared these different types of secularism.17 Secularism, then, is defined by its political ideology that attempts to differentiate between religious and secular spheres, which is often conflated with the social practices and institutions that abide by these ideologies. ‘Secularity’ denotes both the institutional anchored forms as well as the social and cultural arrangements, such as public debate that defines religious and secular demarcations.18 This distinct definition of ‘secularity’ is aimed to not only capture official demarcations of religious and secular spheres—i.e., ‘secularism’—but also specifically the cultural and implicit forms of ‘demarcat- ing religion.’ It goes beyond previous analyses of ‘the secular’ and ‘secularism’ as mere institutionalized relations or an ideological project.19 This definition of ‘secularity’ thereby recognizes both institutionalized forms of distinction between what is religious and what is deemed non-religious, as well as the guiding ideas legitimizing them in society.20 Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt have argued that secularity is considered a social construction that is “the outcome of contestations over the ways in which religion is culturally defined, socially and legally delimited, politically regulated and spatially as well as temporally

17 Anders Berg-Sørensen, Contesting Secularism: Comparative Perspectives (London: Rout- ledge, 2013); Linell E. Cady & Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “Comparative Secularisms and the Politics of Modernity: An Introduction,” in: idem (eds.), Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 3–24; J. Christopher Soper & Joel S. Fetzer, “Religious Institutions, Church-state History, and Muslim Mobilization in Britain, France, and Germany,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33/6 (2007), 933–944. 18 Marian Burchardt & Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, “Multiple Secularities: Religion and Moder- nity in the Global Age. Introduction,” International Sociology 28/6 (2013), 605–611; Cora Schuh, Marian Burchardt, & Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, “Contested Secularities: Religious Minorities and Secular Progressivism in the Netherlands,” Journal of Religion in Europe 5/3 (2012), 349–383; Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, “Multiple”; Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, Revisiting. 19 E.g., Yahya Birt, Dilwar Hussain, & Ataullah Siddiqui, British Secularism and Religion: Is- lam, Society, and the State (Markfield: Kube Publishing, 2011); Mark D. Chapman, “Church and State in England: A Fragile Establishment,” in: Leo D. Lefebure (ed.), Religion, Author- ity, and the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Iain McLean & Scot M. Peterson, “Secularity and Secularism in the United Kingdom: On the Way to the First Amendment,” Brigham Young University Law Review 2011/4 (2011), 637–656. 20 Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, “Multiple,” 886–887.

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354 Vliek arranged.”21 Inspired by Eisenstadt’s ‘multiple modernities’ and this particu- lar understanding of secularity, they have coined the concept of ‘multiple secularities.’22 The approach of ‘multiple secularities’ assumes that secularity takes different shapes at different times in different contexts. Furthermore, these secularities may respond to a range of societal problems that arise from them, as well as offer solutions. Such societal problems arise at different frequencies at different times. Wohl- rab-Sahr and Burchardt have identified four types of such ‘reference problems’: (1) the problem of individual freedom vs. dominant social units, such as groups or the state; (2) the problem of religious diversity and potential or actual con- flict; (3) the problem of social or national integration and development; and (4) the problem of independent development of institutional domains.23 When a problem arises, processes of interpretations of these problems, as well as their potential solutions, are negotiated from specific power relations and historical experience in a given society and its religious and political tradition. These problems provide motives for institutionalizing religious and non-religious de- marcation. They can coexist and compete with one another, however, one of them may become dominant and, thereby, push the other motives to the back- ground.24 By ‘dominant’ I mean, following Sipco Vellenga’s definition of domi- nance in public debate, “when the representatives of a particular discourse are able to set the agenda of the debate, and other participants in the debate are compelled to respond to their contributions.”25 As Wohlrab-Sahr and Bur- chardt noted, dominance, then, depends on specific histories of both the in- stitutionalized forms of distinction as well as the social and cultural forms.26 The above types of reference problems provide the motives for ideal-types of secularity or logics from which people argue.27 They uncover four types of ‘secularity for the sake of,’ which have a particular focus, as well as definitions of what the social ought to look like. Type 1 is secularity for the sake of individual liberties, with the guiding principles of freedom and individuality. Type 2 is secularity for the sake of balancing/accommodating religious or ethnic diversity, with the guiding ideas of toleration, respect, and non-interference. Type 3 is

21 Idem, Revisiting, 6. 22 Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, “Multiple.” See also Eisenstadt, “Multiple.” 23 Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, “Multiple,” 887. 24 Ibid., 888. 25 Sipco J. Vellenga, “The Dutch and British Public Debate on Islam: Responses to the Killing of Theo van Gogh and the London Bombings Compared,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 19/4 (2008), 449–471. 26 Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, “Multiple,” 892. 27 Ibid., passim; Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, Revisiting.

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Challenging Secularities, Challenging Religion 355 secularity for the sake of social integration/national development, and its guid- ing ideas are progress, enlightenment, and modernity. Type 4 is secularity for the sake of the independent development of institutional domains, with the guid- ing ideas of rationality, efficiency, and autonomy.28 These ideal-types were designed as a ‘guide to empirical work,’ and it is my intention to analyze ‘secu- larist ex-Muslim voices’ and their emergence in Britain.29 These theoretic concepts are designed to analyze empirical situations, like, for example, Cora Schuh, Burchardt, and Wohlrab-Sahr have done for the Neth- erlands.30 I will provide a brief summary of their query, the reasons for which are twofold. First, it will illustrate the concepts outlined above. Second, the particular Dutch emergence and transformations of secularities may provide clues as to why ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ are currently relatively absent from the public debate there, which will provide the contrast against which the British situation becomes particularly salient.

3 Multiple Secularities in the Netherlands

Reference problems regarding secularity have been present in the Republic of the Netherlands since its conception in 1581. The Dutch rebellion against the Spanish Crown was largely provoked by the problems of power claims by the Spanish monarchs as well as the Catholic inquisition. After the rebellion, bridging confessional divides was prioritized, an effort complicated by new (Reformational) strands of philosophy. The management of this confessional diversity was geared towards ensuring individual intellectual liberties, while maintaining group order and pacifying conflict, that is, type 2, secularity for the sake of accommodating diversity. After the Second World War, the steady secularization of the nation as well as the liberalization of cultural values, such as homosexuality, resulted in an intermittent period of dominant type 1, secu- larity for the sake of individual liberties. This was first geared towards orthodox Christianity and later towards what was seen as ‘outside religion’ or Islam.31

28 Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, “Multiple,” 890. 29 Ibid., 905. 30 Schuh, Burchardt, & Wohlrab-Sahr, “Contested.” For other examples of empirical applica- tions of ‘multiple secularities,’ see Marian Burchardt, Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, & Matthias Middel (eds.), Multiple Secularities beyond the West: Religion and Modernity in the Global Age (Boston: De Gruyter, 2015). 31 Schuh, Burchardt, & Wohlrab-Sahr, “Contested.”

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The Netherlands have often been described as frontrunners of the ‘true multiculturalist model’ especially in the 80s and 90s of the twentieth century. These presumed multiculturalist policies have also been fiercely criticized on a national level in public and political debate. Jan Willem Duyvendak and Peter Scholten have proposed to deconstruct the existence of such models by interro- gating the various frames through which these models are viewed.32 They have shown that, in fact, there has been very little continuity in the development of integration policy since the 1970s in the Netherlands. The contestations in both debate as well as active policy have centered around two concerns: the socio- economic participation of migrants and the social-cultural distinctiveness of such groups. While in the 80s, official policy was to accommodate cultural di- versity for the sake of social integration, during the 90s, policies were geared towards the economic independence of individuals: participation would lead to social integration. On the local and more practical level, group specific measures have been driven by pragmatism rather than ideological concerns over multiculturalism: “recognizing cultural groups is often more a means for conducting effective integration policies than an attempt to institutionalize diversity.”33 Since the turn of the century, however, social cultural distinction has become increasingly contested again, especially in light of a turn towards the importance of national unity and Dutch identity, in line with secularity for the sake of social integration/national development. Assimilation has become the spear point of discursive and political debate: socio-cultural distinctiveness on the basis of ethnicity, or, increasingly, religion, has become perceived as an obstacle for socio-economic participation. In recent years, the public debate that evolved after the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 has awoken the old themes of religious plurality and tolerance in opposition to individual liberty. This reference problem, according to Schuh, Burchardt, and Wohlrab-Sahr, was viewed through three different frames: the pluralist frame, the secular frame, and the secular progressivist frame.34 The pluralist frame was only supported by Christian political parties and argued for tolerance and secularity for the sake of accommodating diversity. Schuh, Burchardt, and Wohlrab-Sahr noted that there has been a considerable shift in dominance of the ‘secular progressivist’ frame since this debate, which is most prominently represented by politician Geert Wilders. This frame drives

32 Jan Willem Duyvendak & Peter Scholten, “Deconstructing the Dutch Multicultural Mod- el: A Frame Perspective on Dutch Immigrant Integration Policymaking,” Comparative Eu- ropean Politics 10/3 (2012), 266–282. 33 Ibid., 279. 34 Schuh, Burchardt, & Wohlrab-Sahr, “Contested.”

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Challenging Secularities, Challenging Religion 357 on the dualism of Enlightenment, progress, and the West versus the darkness of religion, more specifically Islam. Currently, the aspiration of national unity is dominant in both Dutch politics as well as in law making and public debate, which constitutes type 3, secularity for the sake of social integration/national development. Of course, as Schuh, Burchardt, and Wohlrab-Sahr noted, this secularity remains highly contested.35 My Dutch interlocutors who I interviewed in light of their loss of faith often referenced the current political climate and public debate as a reason not to speak out against Islam or to testify to their religious trajectories of leaving their religion. They told me that they did not feel begrudged towards Islam per se, and, more significantly, they did not want their narratives to be utilized by ‘the likes of Geert Wilders’ or, in more theoretical terms, by secularity for the sake of social integration/national development often combined with motives from secularity for the sake of individual liberties, when ‘freedom of speech’ is invoked in order to exclude or offend Muslims. Furthermore, I will show that, due to these different histories of secularity, certain reference problems that are addressed by ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ in Britain have less bearing on the Dutch situation. I wish to contrast the British situation with these particular Dutch contesta- tions, which will shed light on why ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ have surfaced in Britain and what they aim to unsettle. I will argue that ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ are contesting multiple motives for secularity and desire to challenge (and alter) the dominant status quo. According to Schuh, Burchardt, and Wohlrab- Sahr, the purpose of such analytical work is to understand and uncover why nations differ from one another. As they have tried to understand the specific Dutch case, my goal is to understand how Britain is different from that of the Dutch situation and to explore the unique conditions in which ‘secularist ex- Muslim voices’ emerge as well as how they challenge dominant secularities.

4 British Secularities: The Origins of Church-State Relations and Religious Pluralism

Linda Woodhead has defined the current British situation as ‘neither religious nor secular.’36 Gladys Ganiel and Peter Jones have similarly argued that due to

35 Ibid. 36 Linda Woodhead, “Neither Religious nor Secular: The British Situation and Its Implica- tions for Religion-state Relations,” in: Anders Berg-Sørensen (ed.), Contesting Secularism: Comparative Perspectives (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), 137–161.

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358 Vliek the intrinsic intertwinement of religion in law in Britain “it is simply mislead- ing to conceive of the uk as a straightforwardly secular state.”37 Woodhead’s analysis covered both social and ethical identification as being simultaneously religious and secular, a status that she called “a complex post-Christendom, partially plural situation.”38 While identification as Christian remains strong, belief and practice have thoroughly declined. Secondly, she addressed the in- stitutionalized forms: the state’s links with religiosity as well as the continuing importance of religion in social and political spheres. The establishment of the Church of England by Henry viii in 1534 created autonomy of the state from religious institutions, but religious institutions, in turn, have limited autonomy from the state, a situation the Church is rather content with.39 Woodhead ob- served that many formal linkages remain today, such as the Anglican bishops in the House of Lords and prayers before Parliament.40 Other intertwinements extend into public life and concern primarily education and social welfare. For example, there are thousands of state-funded faith schools, the majority of which are Christian, but there are Jewish and Muslim faith schools too. Fur- thermore, faith-based organizations hold particular sway over public funds through service provision and grant-making, which the government actively engages for service-delivery and the promotion of social cohesion.41 Woodhead noted that, as a result of such a ‘neither religious nor secular’ situation, many minority religions have been able to win concessions and privileges from the state.42 As J. Christopher Soper and Joel S. Fetzer also ob- served, Britain’s church-state model has served as an important institutional and ideological resource for religious minorities: “Far from opposing state ac- commodation for religious groups, British Church-State policy makes signifi- cant allowances for it.”43 Initial calls for minority religions’ equality were not a binary contestation over religion vs. secularity, but one of pluralism and of the accommodation of plural religions in public life, i.e., type 2, secularity for the sake of accommodating diversity. Like Woodhead, Paul Weller and Sariya Cheruvallil-Contractor noted that this quest for not only recognition of the minority religions (and, in particular, the Muslim community and its desires),

37 Gladys Ganiel & Peter Jones, “Religion, Politics, and Law,” in: Linda Woodhead & Rebecca Catto (eds.), Religion & Change in Modern Britain (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 299–321, at 299. 38 Woodhead, “Neither,” 155. 39 See also Ganiel & Jones, “Religion.” 40 See also ibid., 300. 41 Woodhead, “Neither,” 149. 42 Ibid., passim. 43 Soper & Fetzer, “Religious,” 936.

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Challenging Secularities, Challenging Religion 359 but also for equality, has been very much an active mission from below as well as a bottom-down policy implementation.44 They further argued, that while the Muslim community has carved out a significant piece in a plural and ‘mul- ticultural’ Britain, especially since Tony Blair’s Labour government from 1997 onwards, anti-Muslim sentiments, which will be outlined below, have also in- creased over the past decades.45 These more recent developments should also be considered in light of so- called ‘multiculturalism’ and its implications for religious minorities as well as its contestations. Multiculturalism has had many meanings over the years in Britain. During the 1960s and 70s, it was largely seen as a way of either de- mographically describing a new migrant reality or as a cultural way of living, which was considered a manifestation of post-war anti-fascism.46 Rita Chin traces the bedrock of ‘multiculturalism’ in Britain back to the 1965 Race Rela- tions Act, which was the first of its kind in Europe to outlaw discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity. It was also the first piece of legislation to overtly accept race and ethnicity as valid categories. This act was not recognized as ‘multiculturalism,’ but it was designed to both control immigration, as well as combat discrimination. Critically, Chin noted, a follow up to the 1965 bill, the Local Government Act of 1966, “extended the possibility of central government funds to local authorities,” especially aimed at those local authorities dealing with substantial numbers of “immigrants from the Commonwealth.”47 Furthermore, large scale urban disturbances in the 1980s prompted the government to design new policies to manage the new multi-ethnic realities rather than merely observing them. In the course of the 80s and 90s, govern- ment policy provided considerable autonomy to and support for minority groups, passed anti-racism laws, and allowed for education programs to pro- vide sensitivity to cultural diversity. “While never officially formalized by the British government, multiculturalism became, in the words of one specialist,

44 Paul Weller & Sariya Cheruvallil-Contractor, “Muslims in the uk,” in: Marian Burchardt & Ines Michalowski (eds.), After Integration: Islam, Conviviality, and Contentious Politics in Europe (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2015), 303–325. 45 See also Ganiel & Jones, “Religion.” 46 Rita Chin, The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); Arun Kundnani, “Multiculturalism and Its Discontents: Left, Right, and Liberal,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 15/2 (2012), 155–166. 47 See, respectively, Chin, The Crisis; Local Government Act 1966 (London: hmso, 1966). www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1966/42/pdfs/ukpga_19660042_en.pdf (accessed on 25 Oct 2018).

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‘an ­unwritten constitution,’” for dealing with diversity.48 The Conservative gov- ernment under Margaret Thatcher took an approach of differential treatment to ethnic minorities, as these were presumed to present their own challenges to British society that would require different government response. In the 80s, resources were specifically allocated to poor urban communities where most ethnic minorities resided.49 These funds were not distributed by the central government directly but channeled through local pre-existing agencies that were, in turn, administered by local and city governments. Chin noted, that even though the Tories were in power, it was actually Labour who had a major role in the development of urban renewal since they held most local offices in the poor urban communities: “it was precisely these localized programs, espe- cially the ones that relied on ethnic leaders to represent their communities, that would later be described as the first state-sponsored forms of ‘multicul- turalism’ in Britain.”50 This is a marked difference with the Dutch situation of multiculturalism described above: in the Netherlands, despite critics claim- ing otherwise, throughout the past four decades, policy has never specifically implemented preferential (financial) treatment to cultural, ethnic, or religious minorities. While initially multiculturalism was conceived as a plight for racial, cul- tural, and ethnic equality, in contemporary society in Britain, it has become primarily linked to government policy towards the British Muslim. Central and symbolic for this shift was the Rushdie Affair.51 Although multicultural poli- cies had already come under scrutiny before, it was not until the publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in 1988 that the subsequent Muslim reac- tion came to be in the form of worldwide protests, culminating in the Bradford book-burning in 1989, and, finally, the fatwa pronounced by Iranian leader Aya- tollah Khomeini, that prominent members of parliament and commentators collectively attacked Muslims as a minority. They criticized multiculturalism for allowing ‘fundamentally different anti-liberal’ people (i.e., Muslims) to live and thrive in Britain.52 Other events that led to further scrutiny of both ‘the British Muslims’ and multiculturalism were the various terrorist attacks in the United States and

48 Ziv Orenstein & Itzchak Weismann, “Neither Muslim nor Other: British Secular Muslims,” Islam and Christian Muslim Relations 27/4 (2016), 1–17, at 4. 49 Chin, The Crisis, 99–100. 50 Ibid., 101. 51 Nicole Falkenhayner, Making the British Muslim: Representations of the Rushdie Affair and Figures of the War on Terror Decade (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 52 See Chin, The Crisis, 185–187.

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Europe from 2001 on. Despite increased criticism on multiculturalism, Blair’s and Gordon Brown’s New Labour governments, which were in power from 1997 until 2010, remained convinced, in both speeches and policy, that the multicul- turalist approach was the right way forward.53 During this time, the strongest opposition to Blair and other pro- multiculturalists came from the far-right British National Party (bnp) led by Nick Griffin, which had a nationalist and anti-Islam focus. However, during the ruling of the Labour party, so-called political correctness was still considered a virtue in the uk “and kept alive by prominent figures in British society.”54 Although criticism of multiculturalism increased after the London bombings in July 2005, it was not acknowledged by the government until the new Conser- vative Prime Minister David Cameron won the elections in 2010. He announced that “multiculturalism ha[d] failed.”55 In order to counter segregation, highly contested new policies were to be implemented, which were supposed to pro- mote ‘British’ values in all sectors of society, now on a national level rather than the previous local approach. It should be noted that although it has been declared by prominent ruling party members that ‘multiculturalism has failed,’ and that the current government is certainly less preoccupied with accommo- dating religious plurality, it is often the institutionalized forms of type 2—secu- larity for the sake of accommodating diversity—that are still in effect. At the time of writing, political nationalist party ukip most prominently challenged the institutionalized forms of secularity for the sake of accommodat- ing diversity. After their successful lobby for the uk to leave the eu by means of the Brexit referendum in 2016, they found themselves without a cause. However, leading up to the elections in 2017, they actively and distinctly po- sitioned themselves against multiculturalism and as anti-Islam.56 They have defined their program in terms of type 3—secularity for the sake of social inte- gration and national development—challenging the state policies for religious

53 Orenstein & Weismann, “Neither”; Vellenga, “The Dutch.” 54 Vellenga, “The Dutch,” 462. 55 Laura Kuenssberg, “State Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says David Cameron,” bbc, 5 Feb- ruary 2011. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12371994 (accessed 21 November 2018). 56 The relative success of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, as well as the ukip and bnp in Britain, was partially made possible by the respective electoral systems in each country. While the Netherlands has a history of electing coalition governments, which opens up unlimited spaces for new political parties, in Britain the electoral system is effectively bipartisan (Labour and Conservative) and generally rules by majority vote, leaving less space for the success of other political parties.

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­accommodation.57 They have argued for a total ban on (Islamic) veiling, a mor- atorium on new Islamic faith schools, and higher priority of prosecution when ‘honor’ is involved.58 Their significance currently in British politics is debated considering the heavy losses in English local elections in May 2018. The ‘secu- larist ex-Muslim voices’ claim to contest both what they call ‘the regressive left,’ as well as ‘anti-Muslim bigotry.’

5 Contestations over Religious Accommodation: The Danish Cartoon Affair and Free Speech

While the previous section has concerned itself chiefly with the institutional- ized demarcations of what are deemed religious and secular spaces, the fol- lowing will address the social and cultural forms that secularity has taken in Britain by discussing the public debates that erupted after the cartoon affairs. First of all, the Danish cartoon affair raised reference problems that highlighted presumed differences between Islam and the West, especially expressed in the alleged opposition of freedom of expression vs. blasphemy, sometimes under- stood as the restriction of free speech. In Britain, the affair uniquely followed a controversy surrounding the amendments of the Public Order Act on incit- ing religious hatred in late 2005.59 The amendments were designed to provide protection for religious minorities but were scrutinized for their far-reaching effects on, for example, satirists and comedians. The bill was passed eventually, stating that ‘intent’ was required (and not just the possibility) for “threatening words or behaviour, or displays any written material which is threatening.”60 Only months after the passing of the bill, the Danish cartoon affair unfolded. In Britain, media coverage was concentrated around February 2006, and the cartoons were published in neither the tabloids nor the broadsheets. Yet, “no- ticeable cleavages […] were apparent between the center-right Daily Telegraph, which emphasized the ‘unreasonable’ reaction of Muslims, and liberal-left

57 ukip, “Our Bold New Integration Agenda Aims to Bring Communities Together,” 24 April 2017. http://www.ukip.org/our_integration_agenda_aims_to_bring_communities_togeth- er (accessed 13 June 2018). 58 Ibid. 59 Lord Hansard, “Lords Hansard Text for 51025–04,” in: House of Commons: Transport, Lo- cal Government, and the Regions. Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence (Authority of the House of Lords), 25 October 2005. publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/ vo051025/text/51025-04.htm (accessed 13 June 2018). 60 See Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, uk. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/ 1/pdfs/ukpga_20060001_en.pdf (accessed 13 June 2018), 1–18, at 3.

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Guardian, which problematized the ‘provocative’ nature of the Cartoons.”61 By not publishing the cartoons though, the press tried to strike a balance between freedom of press and freedom of expression, while considering the sensibili- ties of a minority group. Nasar Meer and Per Mouritsen noted that even the tabloids, such as The Sun, refrained from publishing them, which was unprec- edented for a newspaper that historically thrived on sensationalism.62 In discussing the affair, the British press generally spoke out in solidarity with its Muslim minority, castigating the European mainland press for their provocations, which they saw as a failure of integration. In the Netherlands, the debate on freedom of expression had commenced years before the cartoon affair and reached new heights over the publication of the film Submission by Hirsi Ali and Theo van Gogh in 2004 and the consecutive murder of the latter by Mohammed Bouyeri. Prominent Liberal politician Jozias van Aartsen stated illustratively in 2004, “the attack on van Gogh touches the heart of our national identity, the freedom of speech.”63 Furthermore, a dominant secularist frame championing the freedom of expression had been dominant for some time, as exemplified by the populist politics of Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and later Geert Wilders. As Schuh, Burchardt, and Wohlrab-Sahr noted, previous assumptions of Dutch type 1, secularity for the sake of individual liberties, were challenged by the recent increased visibility of the Muslim immigrant and what was perceived to be its plight for religious sensibilities at the cost of indi- vidual freedom of expression. Therefore, it was almost natural for the Danish cartoons to be published by most newspapers, since they wished to defend the formerly implicit values of Dutch secularity for the sake of individual liberties.64 Contrastively in Britain, Meer and Mouritsen quoted Jonathan Steele from the Guardian who asked: “why should a progressive paper in Britain feel ‘solidarity’ with anti-immigrant Danish editors who made a major error of judgment rather than with British Muslims who universally deplored the cartoons?”65 Furthermore, the British press alluded to the fact that perhaps the uk’s long history of immigration and multiculturalism meant that one was more tolerant and accepting of one’s minorities in Britain. Meer and Mouritsen­

61 Nasar Meer & Per Mouritsen, “Political Cultures Compared: The Muhammad Cartoons in the Danish and British Press,” Ethnicities 9/3 (2009), 334–360, at 339. 62 Ibid, 342. 63 Schuh, Burchardt, & Wohlrab-Sahr, “Contested,” 372. 64 See also Svenning Dalgaard & Klaus Dalgaard, “The Right to Offend,” The rusi Journal 151/2 (2006), 28–33. 65 Meer & Mouritsen, “Political,” 345; Jonathan Steele, “Europe’s Cartoon Battle Lines Are Drawn in Shades of Grey, Not Black and White,” The Guardian, 11 February 2006, 32.

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364 Vliek additionally noted that the cartoons were seen as potentially disrupting so- cial cohesion between Britain and its Muslim minorities.66 This idea, in turn, was criticized by, for example, the Daily Telegraph, which claimed that it was problematic that newspapers would restrain from publishing certain images out of fear for a small minority who could become violent.67 Readers in letters and commenters on websites castigated the papers for their restraint; there was a significant backlash on the controversy that (re)opened the debate on the compatibility of Islam with British values, as well as the limits of freedom of expression. Meer and Mouritsen alluded to the fact that the media’s and political elite’s restraint may have been merely a successful attempt to put the lid on a controversy that could have provoked populist reactions from across the nation.68 This resonates with British tradition of ‘let’s not offend,’ or, type 2, secularity for the sake of accommodating diversity. In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015, British newspapers again did not print the cartoons as published by the satire magazine. Although the newspapers and other media outlets were hesitant in publishing the car- toons, either out of fear for violent retaliation from the Muslim community or out of concern for attracting populist commentary, they did attract public backlash. In addition, the Tory government, which was in power by this time, sent out a letter to all Muslim leaders asking them to take responsibility in ad- dressing issues of radicalization. The public debate on free speech has since taken a turn towards whether or not extreme right-wing politicians and opinion makers may publicly speak out. This was exemplified by the controversy over Geert Wilders being denied access to Britain in 2009. Should hateful speech still be allowed under the guise of free speech? Newspapers and the public alike castigated the British authori- ties for the ban heavily, claiming free speech should always be championed over the fear of hate.69 One commenter noted that the debate was rather a battle over the values that define the public sphere (i.e., religious and secular sensibilities) rather than one on freedom of speech.70

66 Meer & Mouritsen, “Political,” 348. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Poole, “The Case.” 70 Ellie Mae O’Hagan, “The ‘Free Speech Debate’ Is Nothing of the Sort, Whatever the Far Right Says,” The Guardian, 27 February 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/commentis- free/2017/feb/27/free-speech-debate-milo-yiannopoulos-alt-right-censorship (accessed 3 May 2018).

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6 The Celebration of Blasphemy, Apostasy, and Free Speech

This section will outline the particulars of the aforementioned International Conference on Freedom of Conscience and Expression in London, and the var- ious ways in which ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ addressed reference problems, as well as the various solutions they offered. As the name implies, it was an international conference, platforming many international human rights and lgbtq activists, ex-Muslims, commentators, feminists, and so forth. There were about sixty speakers and panelists, of which half would self-identify as ‘ex- Muslim’ and about half of those ‘ex-Muslims’ were British. It could therefore be argued that (1) this conference was not in response to the British national con- text per se, but rather it was in response to international human rights issues surrounding Islam, apostasy, blasphemy, and free speech; and (2) that it arose in Britain simply because of its international connections and Namazie’s resi- dency there. These issues may have contributed to the broad contents of the conference, however, many elements that echoed throughout the conference were most certainly aimed at and resonated with the specific British situation, and it will be these elements and voices I will focus on. Namazie—host and organizer—opened the conference with the following words:

I think it is important for us to remind the world: rights do not only be- long to the religious. The freedom of conscience includes, of course, the right to religion, but it also includes the right to reject religion. Freedom of expression is not just for believers, it includes the right to criticize re- ligion, to make fun at it, and unmercifully. Expressing these beliefs is not a crime. It is a crime, though, to incite hatred, against apostates and blas- phemers and lgbt, as [the] East London Mosque does in this country. And it is a crime to punish people with the death penalty, for leaving Is- lam, for criticizing it. That is the crime. Not the demand to live and think and love as one chooses. And, of course, we all know it is not bigotry. Islamophobia is a term that is being used in order to silence criticism, in order to impose de facto blasphemy laws, where none exist. Thank you very much, but we don’t need a lesson in racism. We live racism every day. For those of you who say—and I’m talking to the world outside—who say our criticisms are Islamophobic and racism [sic], you need a lesson in racism. […] This week, we want to tell the world that it is possible to fight on several fronts. We fight against racism, we fight against Muslim profiling, we can fight for the rights of refugees, we can fight for the right to leave and criticize religion, especially Islam, without fear, without

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threats, without intimidation. We call on the world to join us, to support us or step aside. Let us do our work.71

Namazie identified the messengers, the message, and the intended receivers of those messages professed at the conference. First of all, ‘we’ refers to “apostates and blasphemers and lgbt,” those who ‘live and love’ as they choose. By stat- ing “we all know,” she implied a shared knowledge, with the attendees, of the message she was about to spread to the rest of the world: to criticize Islam is not bigotry but a right, and ‘Islamophobia’ is a term which imposes “de facto blasphemy laws” by accusations of racism. Furthermore, Namazie wished to “tell the world,” but her plight seemed more specific. The fact that ‘we’ fight for the right to leave religion implies a message and declaration of intent towards religious (i.e., Islamic) institutions, individuals, or communities. She further called ‘on the world to join us,’ which was specifically directed at those who were not part of the previous us/them message, rather, it was aimed at ‘the secular.’ “[S]upport us or step aside” was a direct critique aimed at those whom the attendees would have expected to join forces with them in the fight against inequality and for the freedom of speech, that is the political ‘left’ which, in their view, has let them down. Namazie’s positioning of both her own arguments as well as those of the broader conference through this opening speech claimed a unique authority and positionality. Marc de Leeuw and Sonja van Wichelen analyzed a similar positionality in Hirsi Ali’s popular rise in Dutch politics and public debate dur- ing the 2000s.72 They argued that through two frames of mediated selves, that is as ‘one of us’ and as ‘other,’ Hirsi Ali presented a linear narrative of becom- ing. Through victimhood and intimate knowledge of the terrors of Islam, she had now chosen to be liberated and be part of the enlightened West and could thereby claim authority.

Strategically she and others can use these selves to legitimate certain positions or to ward off criticism. In this respect the authoritative voice of the mediated self as “other” tends to close off dialogue and turn the viewer into a passive spectator. In speaking on behalf of Muslim women through her self [sic] as “other” (especially as victim “other”) she creates a moral closure for critical opponents.73

71 GoleSorkh, “Maryam.” 72 Marc de Leeuw & Sonja van Wichelen, “Please, Go Wake Up!,” Feminist Media Studies 5/3 (2005), 325–340. 73 Ibid., 331. Emphasis original.

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Either explicitly, such as Namazie did in her opening speech, or more implic- itly by other speakers throughout the panels, it is through this mechanism of intimate knowledge of Islam, as well as their linear move to the dominant ‘secular,’ that ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ claim authority to challenge secular- ity for the sake of accommodating diversity that, in their view, had, to a certain extent, enabled or ignored their suffering by the hands of Islam. Participants of the conference claimed a third basis for authority, namely, their resistance to what they call anti-Muslim bigotry. Not all the panelists that I will discuss here would identify as ‘ex-Muslim’ per se. However, it is their simultaneous intimate knowledge of Islam, current identification as secular, and distancing oneself from anti-Muslim bigotry that provides them with the authoritative positionality that I call ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices.’ Furthermore, it could be argued that this was simply ‘a secular conference’ that was not unique to ‘ex- Muslims’ per se, yet it was framed as being ‘the largest gathering of ex-Muslims in history’ in celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Council of Ex-Muslims in Britain.74 I will therefore analyze two panels to illustrate two elements of secularity that have been addressed: firstly, the institutionalized forms and, secondly, the social and cultural meanings that are given to the demarcation of ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ spaces. The first panel primarily addressed institutionalized forms of the demar- cation of religious and secular boundaries, titled “Identity Politics, Commu- nalism and Multiculturalism.”75 Kenan Malik, British author and broadcaster, opened the panel by discussing the history of multiculturalism and identity politics and his opposition to both. In his view, while identity politics started out as activism for equal rights from the bottom up, it has now morphed into policy that devises unequal rights for different groups, with the parameters based on ethnicity, race, or religion from the bottom down. “Therefore,” he said, “if we believe in universal rights, then we should take a strong opposition to identity politics.”76 According to Malik, the attempt to recognize minority struggles and broader struggles for social transformation have been ignored in Britain, and certain identities have become privileged. But this has only hap- pened for certain institutions and their gate-keepers, specifically those who are often the loud, self-appointed fundamentalists. By denying all groups equal rights and instead providing different rights based on ethnic, religious, or racial

74 cemb, “Largest Gathering of Ex-Muslims in History,” 25 July 2017. https://www.ex-muslim .org.uk/2017/07/largest-gathering-of-ex-muslims-in-history/ (accessed 13 June 2018). 75 Nano GoleSorkh, “Identity Politics, Communalism, and Multiculturalism,” 31 July 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cbL_EEccr3o (accessed 13 June 2018). 76 Ibid. Emphasis original.

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368 Vliek difference, communities and individuals suffer, and social cohesion is lost. He concluded:

The trouble with multiculturalism is that it puts people into boxes. You are black, Muslim, and it defines public policy according to the boxes in which you have been put [applause]. What multiculturalism has done is given institutional form to identity politics. That’s why I oppose it. I am for diversity, for immigration but I am opposed to multiculturalism and opposed to identity politics.77

The reference problem Malik identified with the accommodation of religious diversity was the disintegration of social cohesion. By accommodating differ- ent groups according to their own desires, rather than those of the state, uni- formity and thereby citizens’ equality under the law evaporates. Furthermore, people are judged by their ethnicity, religion, or culture rather than as equal individuals, which causes rupture and legitimizes inequality. His criticism fo- cused on Britain’s history of communitarianism (localized funds for racial and ethnic minorities) and multiculturalist policies, as described above. While Malik castigated the discriminatory institutionalized differential treatment of ethnic and religious groups by the government, commentary in the Dutch context has predominantly centered around the discontents of ‘a failed multicultural state,’ referring to the ‘failed generations of immigrants,’ ‘incompatibility of Islam with the Christian religions in the Netherlands,’ and the ‘political culture of allowing.’78 Commentary has centered less so on par- ticular public policies of multiculturalism and communitarianism, which Malik referenced, since such policies in the Netherlands were never in the form of preferential (monetary) treatment of religious or ethnic minorities. Additionally, in recent years, ‘identity politics’ in the Netherlands has referred more so to the problematizing of minority groups by right-wing politicians, as well as the critique of these nationalist politicians and commentators ad- dressing equality activists and anti-discriminatory groups, rather than the sys- tematic differential treatment of religious and ethnic minorities by (localized) government policies.

77 Ibid. Emphasis original. 78 Paul Scheffer, “Het Multiculturele Drama,” nrc Handelsblad, 29 January 2000. Scheffer’s essay was one of the first explicit commentaries addressing issues of immigration, Islam, and the failure of state policy. His rhetoric has been frequently echoed in public debate by the dominant discourse.

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In her opening thoughts, Sahgal, the aforementioned director of the Cen- tre for Secular Space, criticized the British state’s involvement in promoting and protecting Islamists. She primarily saw evidence for this in Saudi Ara- bia’s influence in British mosques and schools and, additionally, in the gov- ernment’s active support of these Islamist institutions in Britain, such as the East London Mosque that is run by the Pakistani founded conservative Jamaat-e-Islami or “the South-Asian brother organization of the Muslim Brotherhood.”79 Her criticism of the British state and its policies did not end here. In answer to the question whether the empowerment of Islamism in Brit- ain is perhaps an issue of ‘the deep state,’ she answered by elaborating on the British state apparatus and its overt involvement in supporting religious fun- damentalism. She argued: “Britain, in terms of its society, is one of the most irreligious societies in the world, but it is a Christian state.”80 An example she gave was of unequal treatment of groups concerned with same-sex marriage, which is allowed under state law, but, at the same time, the Anglican Church is allowed to deny same-sex marriage under religious law. In Sahgal’s view, allow- ing the “fundamentalist gate-keepers” of certain minority communities such as the Anglican Church or Islam to set a different set of rules for a minority, “is not only abusing [those] minorities, but [the state] is actually aligning itself with the worst of the fundamentalists.”81 The reference problem that Sahgal identified—the life-world related ideas and policies of multiculturalism stemming from the secularity of accommo- dating diversity—is causing tensions within type 4, secularity for the sake of independent development of institutional domains, which has the guiding ideas of rationality, efficiency, and autonomy.82 Sahgal exemplified these tensions by elaborating on the involvement of the state with religious institutions and its willingness to allow for different legal systems for different groups. She took this one step further: allowing for religious institutions to have parallel legal systems naturally attracts the fundamentalists to become gate-keepers of these institutions. She viewed this as a direct result of a policy of an un-secular state which supports type 2, secularity for the sake of accommodating diversity. As Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt noted, certain constellations may restrict devel- opment of secularity: “problems in question are not ‘resolved’ in terms of secu- larity but through the imposition of religious authority.”83 This is the process

79 GoleSorkh, “Identity.” 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, “Multiple,” 890. 83 Ibid., 889.

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370 Vliek that is well underway in Britain, according to Sahgal. The solution she offered, is based in the guiding ideas of secularity for the sake of independent develop- ment of institutional domains: the complete dissolution of the state church. In comparison, the Netherlands has no state church. Although the Dutch consti- tution does not explicate the separation of church and state, state neutrality is derived from Articles 1 and 6 of the Basic Law that guarantee the right to non-discrimination and the freedom of religion respectively.84 Therefore, this particular reference problem with regard to the state’s leniency towards reli- gious institutions, which Sahgal traces back to the presence of a church-state in Britain, is less likely to surface in the Netherlands where neither the church nor any other religious institutions enjoy political or legal authority.85 The second panel, “Blasphemy, Islamophobia, and Freedom of Expression,” concerned itself with the other element of secularity: the social and cultural meanings of the demarcation of religious and secular spaces.86 This panel fo- cused primarily on freedom of expression and the ‘charge’ of Islamophobia. Richard Dawkins, one of the panelists, problematized his experience of be- ing denied the opportunity to speak at the University of California, Berkeley, in June 2017, because he had ‘hurt and offended’ many Muslims in his recent comments on Islam. The local community powered radio station, kpfa, host- ing the event claimed that while it supports free speech, it does not support hurtful speech. Dawkins stated that by commenting on Islam and more specifi- cally Islamism, he does not utter ‘hurtful speech’: “I have always been critical of Christianity, but I have never been de-platformed for that. Why do you give Islam a free pass?” He further referenced British commentator Maajid Nawaz who has called this ‘the racism of lowered expectations’: liberals claim to be “militantly and correctly feminist, but when it comes to someone with brown skin who is misogynistic or homophobic, you give them a free pass. […] What a patronizing, condescending thing to say.”87 Benjamin David, Conatus News editor in chief, argued that the greatest lim- iter of free speech in the modern world are the accusations of Islamophobia. He asked, “But what really is Islamophobia?” “I have this definition: it is a word,

84 Schuh, Burchardt, & Wohlrab-Sahr, “Contested,” 373. 85 In the Netherlands, controversy arose in the wake of a list that was leaked on the funding of Dutch mosques by alleged ‘Islamic non-free nation states’ by the government in April 2018. However, this did not problematize preferential treatment of religious institutions, but rather criticized limited control of intelligence services over foreign funding for social organizations and institutions. 86 Nano GoleSorkh, “Blasphemy, Islamophobia, Free Expression Panel,” 27 July 2017. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=seJkIGV8urc (accessed 13 June 2018). 87 Ibid.

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Challenging Secularities, Challenging Religion 371 created by fascists and used by cowards, to manipulate morons [laughter and applause].”88 He firstly blamed the media for perpetuating such a word mere- ly out of ‘pure laziness’ and commercial interest. Secondly, he pointed to the effects of identity politics: “culture has become seen as a highly abstractive form of practices of daily life, it is merely an ascription of certain values on [a] certain group. What this means in effect: Islamophobia has become the new racism.” But, according to David, Islam is not a race, ethnicity, or nation- ality, it is a set of ideas, “such as stoning adulterers, death for apostasy, ideas of paradise and martyrdom, which should never be confused, nor conflicted, with a unanimous people […] it is being used as a means of shutting down sig- nificant and important topics.” “[B]ut we will not be shut down!,” he added.89 Haider, founder of Ex-Muslims of North America, commented:

It is extremely racist, to assume that Muslims are in some way tied down to a set of beliefs. That it is inherent in them, that it is a quality that they just catch of. […] And in that way, it dehumanizes them. Because it de- nies that they are thinking people, that they are rational people.90

The panel did not deny that racism, or ‘anti-Muslim bigotry,’ is rife and should be addressed. As an appropriate response, she suggested to fight and protect civil liberties across the board when the situation calls for it. Her final words of the panel were:

Progress is not inevitable. We are not destined to a future where we will have greater liberties, or even the liberties that we have today. They re- quire champions, who are willing to be in the trenches, are willing to fight, to make it happen.91

The societal reference problems outlined above pertain to the domains of in- dividual free speech (freedom) and the curbing of free speech for the sake of preventing potential conflict resulting from religious heterogeneity.92 It was perceived by Dawkins that ‘the liberal community’ values the avoidance of po- tential conflict (a potential clash over Islamic and secularist sensibilities) over

88 GoleSorkh, “Blasphemy.” Conatus News is a popular publication platform for ‘ex-Muslims’ and secularists. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, “Multiple,” 887.

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372 Vliek the perceived rights of the individual to speak and critique. But they took it one step further: ‘liberal institutions’ are successful in curbing critique by charges of ‘Islamophobia,’ a term that implies irrationality. Dawkins, however, turned the argument around and claimed that the assumption that one group needs ‘special protection’ under the secularity for the sake of accommodating diver- sity in order to avoid potential conflict is actually ‘racist’ and ‘condescending.’ This was primarily an argument for type 1, secularity for the sake of individual freedom, i.e., freedom of expression, which was considered more important than tolerating or respecting religious sensibilities. But Haider, in her final comments, took it even further, arguing not only that individual freedoms are curbed by concerns over religious sensibilities but also that ‘we’ are re- quired to fight for greater liberties. This implied a greater fight than that of the individual—it suggested a vision for national and international development. Her solution to the conflicts she saw arising from accommodating (religious) diversity was that by pushing the values of the Enlightenment, modernity, and progress through our individual freedom of expression type 3, secularity for the sake of social integration/national (and international) development, may be achieved. It is a goal that transcends the individual and his/her desire for free- dom; individual freedom is a tool to fight for the recognition of human rights on a global scale. As outlined above, in the Netherlands secularity for the sake of individual freedom has been dominant since the rise of prominent politicians Fortuyn, Hirsi Ali, and Wilders. Therefore, this reference problem of the curbing of ‘free speech by the charge of Islamophobia’ has mainly been employed by this dominant (right-wing) discourse when accused of hate speech or racism. The British situation regarding contesting secularities sketched in the earlier sec- tions of this article described not only secularity for the sake of accommodating diversity but also outlined the most prominent political (ukip) and social (rac- ism and anti-Muslim bigotry) challengers of this secularity. In the media, ‘secu- larist ex-Muslim voices’ have been accused of racism and aligning with these challengers by both Muslim and non-Muslims alike. This accusation has been denied, claiming that they wish to challenge both the regressive left as well as right-wing extremism. At the conference however, while right-wing extremism was mentioned as a spear point during Namazie’s opening speech, none of the panels specifically or critically addressed this issue.

7 Conclusion

The concept of ‘multiple secularities’ assumes that the complex matter of how religious spheres are linked to other social, political, and cultural spheres are

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Challenging Secularities, Challenging Religion 373 determined by situatedness in time and space. The concept recognizes beyond ‘secularism’ not only institutionalized forms of drawing boundaries between what is deemed religious and other spheres of practice but also that the so- cial and cultural ways in which these contestations play out are part of the formation of secularity. Within the concept of multiple secularities, although spatial and temporary situations are always divergent, these situations do draw on specific ways of demarcating social spheres, ways which Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt have identified in the form of four ideal types of secularity. In this article, the concept has been utilized to explore the surfacing of ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ in the public debate concerning religion and free speech in Britain, which has been contrasted with the relative absence of such voices in the Netherlands. I have tried to show that since in the Nether- lands currently the dominant secularity is for the sake of social integration and national development with motives and also arguments taken from secular- ity for the sake of individual liberties, in recent years, this particular ‘secularist ex-Muslim voice’ criticizing religious plurality and multiculturalist policy has been less likely to emerge. Prominent Dutch politicians such as Wilders, but also other liberal politicians, argue for less religious plurality, thereby challeng- ing individual freedom of religion and the accommodation of diversity. My interlocutors in the Netherlands repeatedly stated that they did not necessarily wish to contribute to such narratives by openly criticizing Islam, as demon- strated at the conference, since dominant Dutch secularity not only argues for less religious freedom for the sake of integration but simultaneously stigma- tizes Muslim people in the name of ‘freedom of expression.’ By contrast, I have argued that in Britain, due to its development of church-state relations, the introduction of multiculturalist policy and iden- tity politics—as well as various legal and social contestations over religious diversity and secular demarcations, as illustrated by the debate on the Danish cartoons—has been marked by a version of type 2, secularity for the sake of accommodating diversity. I have further suggested that ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ are articulated as a response to secularity for the sake of accommodating diversity and to its reference problems on both institutional and social levels, as well as the ‘Islamism’ that type 2 allegedly accommodates. I have illustrated this with a case study on the international conference, during which various participants adopted motives, arguments, and solutions from the other three types of secularity when discussing various reference problems. I have also shown that these reference problems surface differently in the Netherlands due to its different history of secularities. Speakers of the panels, for example, problematized British church-state relations, which allegedly allowed for the inclusion of (extremist) religion in law and institutions. Furthermore, oth- ers pointed to the problematics of accommodating diversity as policy when

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374 Vliek

­multiculturalism and identity politics undercut the equality it aspires to. The social and cultural problematics of the demarcation of religious and other so- cial spheres were illustrated by the effects of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, as well as the problems these may bring to freedom of expression, which was signified by the ‘charge of Islamophobia.’ As a final note, the arguments presented by ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ as described above are, naturally, contested too. My interlocutors from both Britain and the Netherlands found that social integration of Muslims and the particulars of Islam were particularly salient issues to them, since they them- selves have had to negotiate these boundaries on both societal as well as per- sonal levels. However, during my fieldwork I encountered many people with Islamic backgrounds who no longer believed, in both the Netherlands and Britain, who disagreed with the arguments or rhetoric of prominent ‘secularist ex-Muslim voices’ as outlined here.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the anonymous peer-reviewers for their in- sightful comments. She would also like to thank Karin van Nieuwkerk, Gert- Jan van der Heiden, and Marian Burchardt for commenting on earlier versions of this article.

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