DOCSLIB.ORG

Field Service Regulations Operations

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Field Service Regulations Operations pM loo-«' ffjCopy’ï * Fl 100-5 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY * FEBRUARY 1962 ,4 . A L *FM 100-5 FIELD MANUAL HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY No. 100-5 WASHINGTON 25, D.C., 19 February 196S FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS—OPERATIONS Paragraphs Page CHAPTER 1. STRATEGY AND MILITARY FORCE Section I. General - 1-5 3 II. Nature of conflict 6-10 4 III. The nature of military power, 11-14 6 IV. The nature and role of land forces 15, 16 10 CHAPTER 2. THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Section I. General 17 15 II. Elements of the operational environment and their effect 18-22 15 CHAPTER 3. COMMAND Section I. The commander 23-29 19 II. Chain of command 30-33 20 III. Command and staff relations 34-36 21 IV. Decision making 37-43 22 V. Planning and execution 44, 45 24 VI. Command in joint and combined operations 46-49 24 CHAPTER 4. ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF FIELD FORCES. Section I. General 50-54 26 II. Theater (area) of operations., 55-62 27 III. Organization of army forces 63-75 29 IV. Close combat elements 76-80 33 V. Fire support elements 81-84 35 Vi. Combat support elements 85-97 38 ii VII. Air defense elements 98-100 40 O VIII. Administrative support elements 101-103 42 ? IX. Mutual support 104-107 44 X. Support from other Government agencies 108, 109 45 CHAPTER 5. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND '■] OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS. J Section I. Principles of war 110-119 46 í, II. Combat power 120 48 1 q III. Related factors 121-127 48 IV. Intelligence 128-137 52 V. Subsidiary and supporting operations 138-142 55 CHAPTER 6. CONDUCT OF BATTLE Section I. General 143-147 59 II. Offensive operations 148-158 63 III. Defensive operations 159-167 73 IV. Retrograde movements 168-172 83 V. Special defensive considerations 173-176 86 VI. Battle under special conditions 177-184 89 VII. .-Relief of combat units 185-188 95 *Thl> manual, tuperaeda* FM 100-5, 27 September 1954, Including C 1, 16 December 1^54, C 2, 27 July 1956, and C 3, 24 January 1958. ^ TACO 461SB—February 1ÂV■ aï? 1 cvteS0*1 •D.C- Paragraphs Page VIII. Operations during unrestricted scale of use of nuclear weapons 189-192 96 CHAPTER 7. AIRBORNE AND AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS Section I. General 193-195 99 II. Basic considerations/ 196-200 100 III. Airborne operations 201-213 101 IV. Airmobile operations 214-218 104 V. Planning and conduct of airmobile and airborne operations 219-230 106 VI. Air traffic regulation 231,232 110 CHAPTER 8. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS Section I. General 233-237 111 II. Organization and command 238-243 113 III. Intelligence 244,245 114 IV. Plans and operations 246-252 115 V. Administrative support -, 253-256 119 CHAPTER 9. COMMAND OF THE AIR Section I. General 257-261 120 II. Army capabilities for command of the air operations. 262-266 122 III. Air defense organization 267-271 123 IV. Air defense planning 272-275 125 CHAPTER 10. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE Section I. General 276-280 127 II. Basic considerations of unconventional warfare dur- ing military operations 281-286 128 III. Guerrilla warfare 287-297 130 IV. Evasion and escape 298 134 V. Subversion 299 135 CHAPTER 11. MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST IRREGU- LAR FORCES. ü Section I. General 300-307 136 II. Command and staff relationships 308,309 143 III. Training 310-314 144 IV. Intelligence 315 147 V. Logistics 316-320 148 VI. Civil affairs 321-323 152 CHAPTER 12. SITUATIONS SHORT OF WAR Section I. General 324-328 155 II. Basic considerations 329-332 156 III. Intelligence and security 333-335 158 IV. Employment of forces 336-338 159 V. Discipline and training 339-341 161 CHAPTER 13. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT Section I. General 342-343 163 II. Environmental considerations 344-346 164 III. Command and control 347-349 165 IV. Functions of logistical support 350-357 168 ■■ V. Rear area security and area damage control 358-360 „ 173 VI. Joint and combined operations 361 175 2 AGO 4513B CHAPTER 1 STRATEGY AND MILITARY FORCE Section I. GENERAL 1. Terms a. National Objectives. Those aims or goals whose attainment will further national interests or produce effects conducive to national security and well-being.. b. National Policies. Broad but definite courses of action adopted and followed by governments. National policies serve as guidelines which control and establish limits for all actions directed toward the attainment of national objectives. c. National Strategy. The sum of the national policies, plans, and programs designed to support the national interests. National strategy, as the aggregate of national policies, provides for devel- opment and use of the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces during peace and during war, to secure national objectives. - d. Elements of National Power. All the means (political, eco- nomic, military, and psychological) which are available for em- ployment in the pursuit of national objectives. 2. National Objectives a. Each nation establishes broad objectives whose attainment will further its national interests, and formulates policies under which it pursues those objectives. These objectives and policies determine and control the governmental actions of the nation, its internal functions and its external relations alike. b. No two nations have precisely thé same objectives; in a given set of circumstances, each will react according to its own needs. National objectives may bring a nation into conflict with others whose goals differ ; they may lead to alliances with nations whose aims are similar. 3. National Strategy National strategy is the long range plan through which a nation applies its strength toward the attainment of its objectives. A national strategy in its broadest sense is applicable to either peace or war. It will encompass, and employ, all the elements of national power: policical, economic, psychological, and military and will exploit other national assets such as geographic location and spiritual attitudes. Although it is flexible and adaptable to the AGO 4613B 3 contingencies of the moment, a national strategy is basically stable, its character changing rarely, so long as it results in progress toward the ultimate objectives of the nation concerned. 4. U.S. National Objectives and National Strategy In brief, the national objectives of the United States are to insure its own security and freedom, and to establish and maintain worldwide conditions of peace, security, and justice. U.S. national strategy is designed to attain these objectives through peaceful measures ; it rejects aggression as an acceptable course of action. The United States emphasizes deterrence of war; however, it is prepared to wage war at any level of intensity should deterrence fail. 5. Military Strategy a. Military strategy directs the development and use of the military means which further national strategy through the direct or indirect application of military power. Military strategy is derived from, and is an integral part of, national strategy in either peace or war. b. Because the purpose of war is the attainment of national objectives, military strategy must be geared to these objectives. Although military considerations enter into the development of national strategy, in the final analysis national objectives shape both national and military strategy. In consequence, a nation’s military operations must be subordinated to, and be compatible with, its national objectives. Section II. NATURE OF CONFLICT 6. Categories and Characteristics of Conflict Conflicts between nations may vary from mere disagreements and conflicts of interest to basic and irreconcilable differences in national ideologies and objectives. The former are often subject to resolution by arbitration or concession and do not necessarily result in a state of war—declared or undeclared—^between the nations concerned. The latter type of conflict may be considered a form of war whether characterized by the employment of mili- tary force or by the application of national power short of military force. 7. The Spectrum of War The full range of forms which conflict can take may be con- sidered as a spectrum of war which reflects the degree and magni- tude of violence involved in each form. At one end of the spectrum 4 AGO 4513B are those conflicts in which the application of national power short of military force is applied. This type of war is termed cold war. The other end of the spectrum represents the unre- stricted application of military force termed general war. The center portion of the spectrum is defined as limited war and repre- sents the wide range of conflicts between cold war and general war. 8. Cold War Cold war includes the complete scope of actions, other than limited or general war, which can be used in a power struggle between contending nations or coalitions. The contending powers may seek an advantage in many ways, employing not only political, economic, and psychological strengths, but military strengths as well. Military forces have important cold war functions and can directly or indirectly contribute to the attainment of national ob- jectives. Reserves may be mobilized or active forces deployed to deter another nation from use of force. Military forces may be used to encourage a friendly government in difficulty, to stabilize an unsettled area, to maintain or restore order, or to protect per- sonnel and property. Although the basic characteristic of cold war is the absence of overt armed conflict between the military forces of the contending nations, the dividing line between cold war and limited war is neither distinct nor absolute. Regular military forces may be required, therefore, to conduct cold war operations which are to all intents and purposes combat actions.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ranger Handbook) Is Mainly Written for U.S
    SH 21-76 UNITED STATES ARMY HANDBOOK Not for the weak or fainthearted “Let the enemy come till he's almost close enough to touch. Then let him have it and jump out and finish him with your hatchet.” Major Robert Rogers, 1759 RANGER TRAINING BRIGADE United States Army Infantry School Fort Benning, Georgia FEBRUARY 2011 RANGER CREED Recognizing that I volunteered as a Ranger, fully knowing the hazards of my chosen profession, I will always endeavor to uphold the prestige, honor, and high esprit de corps of the Rangers. Acknowledging the fact that a Ranger is a more elite Soldier who arrives at the cutting edge of battle by land, sea, or air, I accept the fact that as a Ranger my country expects me to move further, faster, and fight harder than any other Soldier. Never shall I fail my comrades I will always keep myself mentally alert, physically strong, and morally straight and I will shoulder more than my share of the task whatever it may be, one hundred percent and then some. Gallantly will I show the world that I am a specially selected and well trained Soldier. My courtesy to superior officers, neatness of dress, and care of equipment shall set the example for others to follow. Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country. I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might. Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country.
    [Show full text]
  • Ranger Handbook
    SH 21-76 UNITED STATES ARMY RANGER HANDBOOK "NOT FOR THE WEAK OR FAINTHEARTED” RANGER TRAINING BRIGADE UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL FORT BENNING, GEORGIA APRIL 2000 TABLE OF CONTENTS I RANGER CREED II STANDING ORDERS ROGER’S RANGERS III RANGER HISTORY IV RANGER TRAINING BRIGADE HISTORY CHAPTER 1 – LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP 1-1 DUTIES/RESPONSIBILITIES 1-2 ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND 1-7 CHAPTER 2 – OPERATIONS TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES 2-1 COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 2-7 WARNING ORDER 2-8 OPERATIONS ORDER 2-11 FRAGMENTARY ORDER 2-17 ANNEXES 2-22 COORDINATION CHECKLISTS 2-29 DOCTRINAL TERMS 2-34 CHAPTER 3 – FIRE SUPPORT CAPABILITIES 3-2 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 3-4 CALL FOR FIRE 3-5 CHAPTER 4 – MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES 4-2 TACTICAL MARCHES 4-6 DANGER AREAS 4-9 CHAPTER 5 – PATROLLING PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 5-1 RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS 5-6 COMBAT PATROLS 5-13 AMBUSH 5-14 RAID 5-16 DEPARTURE/RE-ENTRY 5-25 LINK-UP 5-27 PATROL BASE 5-30 MOVEMENT TO CONTACT 5-34 CHAPTER 6 – BATTLE DRILLS PLATOON ATTACK 6-1 SQUAD ATTACK 6-5 REACT TO CONTACT 6-8 BREAK CONTACT 6-9 REACT TO AMBUSH 6-11 KNOCK OUT BUNKERS 6-12 ENTER/CLEAR A TRENCH 6-14 BREACH 6-19 CHAPTER 7 – COMMUNICATIONS AN/PRC-119 7-1 AN/PRC-126 7-3 CHAPTER 8 – ARMY AVIATION AIR ASSAULT 8-1 AIR ASSAULT FORMATIONS 8-3 PZ OPERATIONS 8-5 SAFETY 8-8 CHAPTER 9 – WATERBORNE OPERATIONS ONE ROPE BRIDGE 9-1 BOAT POSITIONS 9-8 EMBARKING/DEBARKING 9-11 LANDING SITE 9-11 RIVER MOVEMENT 9-13 FORMATIONS 9-14 CHAPTER 10 – MILITARY MOUNTAINEERING SPECIAL EQUIPMENT 10-1 KNOTS 10-2 BELAYS 10-8 TIGHTENING SYSTEMS 10-10 ROCK
    [Show full text]
  • Vanderkloet.Pdf
    MANNING AND THE FUTURE OF THE CANADIAN INFANTRY Maj G.P. Vander Kloet JCSP 42 PCEMI 42 Service Paper Étude militaire Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs do not represent Department of National Defence or et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces without written permission. canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2016. le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2016. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 42 – PCEMI 42 2015 – 2016 JCSP SERVICE PAPER – PCEMI ÉTUDE MILITAIRE MANNING AND THE FUTURE OF THE CANADIAN INFANTRY Maj G.P. Vander Kloet “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion opinion of any agency, including the d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the gouvernement du Canada et le ministère Canadian Department of National de la Défense nationale du Canada.
    [Show full text]
  • Supporting Training Strategies for Brigade Combat Teams Using Future Combat Systems (FCS) Technologies
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Arroyo Center View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Supporting Training Strategies for Brigade Combat Teams Using Future Combat Systems (FCS) Technologies Michael G.
    [Show full text]
  • The U.S. Army Between World Wars I and Ii
    AUSA BACKGROUND BRIEF ( No. 38 March 1992 THE U.S. ARMY BETWEEN WORLD WARS I AND II The material that follows was extractedfrom official history of the U.S. Army; see sources listed below. It is repeated here to remind the reader of the events following the allied victoryin World War I which led to the transformation of the U.S. Army from a modern-day military force to one of obsolescence. The reader should reflect on these historical events and lessons learned, and relate them to the course the Army may be forced to take in this period after the allied victory in the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm. Deja vu? Part One: U.S. Military Policy and the Army ( Demobilization and Reorganization Soon after the armistice of November 1918 the War Department urged Congress to authorize the establishment of a permanent Regular Army of nearly 600,000 and a three-month universal training system that would permit a quick expansion of this force to meet the requirements of a new major war. Congress and American public opinion rejected these proposals. In the first full month of demobilization the Army released about 650,000 officers and men, and within nine months it demobilized nearly 3,250,000 without seriously disturbing the American economy. A demobilization of war industry and disposal of surplus materiel paralleled the release of men, but the War Department kept a large reserve of weapons for peacetime or new emergency use. A law of February 28, 1919, permitted enlistments in the Regular Army for either one or three years; and by the end of the year the active Army, reduced to a strength of about 19,000 officers and 205,000 enlisted men, was again a Regular volunteer force.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Article (PDF)
    MGZ 75/1 (2016): 94–122 OLDENBOURG Aufsatz Gaj Trifković Carnage in the Land of Three Rivers: The Syrmian Front 1944–1945 DOI 10.1515/mgzs-2016-0004 Abstract: The aim of this article will be to examine the operations of the Yugoslav Partisans and German armed forces in northern parts of Yugoslavia in late 1944 and early 1945. Since the summer of 1941, the communist-led guerrilla movement had conducted a massive guerrilla campaign against Axis forces, at the same time striving to build a regular army and thus gain recognition as a full-time member of the anti-Hitler coalition. The arrival of the Red Army and liberation of country’s eastern parts in September and October 1944 secured material foundations for a creation of a regular field force. Whether this nascent army would be capable of defeating its retreating, but still dangerous German foe remained to be seen. Keywords: Yugoslavia, Syrmia, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Second World War, Parti- sans, Wehrmacht, front, operations, NOVJ The fierce fighting in the flat, open terrain of the province of Syrmia1 counted among the bloodiest of the whole war and left a lasting controversy about whether the Yugoslav Partisans should have pursued an active campaign on the so-called »Syrmian Front« in the first place. In the socialist Yugoslavia prior to the late 1970s, descriptions of operations on the Syrmian Front could usually be found in either general war histories or in unit histories; relevant Partisan docu- ments were published in several volumes of the massive »Zbornik dokumenata i 1 Syrmia (Serbian: Srem; Croatian: Srijem) is the geographical region between the rivers Danube and Sava, stretching from Belgrade in the east to the line north of Vukovar-Bosna estuary in the west.
    [Show full text]
  • History of the 745Th Tank Battalion, August 1942 to June 1945 Harold D
    Bangor Public Library Bangor Community: Digital Commons@bpl World War Regimental Histories World War Collections 1945 History of the 745th Tank Battalion, August 1942 to June 1945 Harold D. Howenstine Follow this and additional works at: http://digicom.bpl.lib.me.us/ww_reg_his Recommended Citation Howenstine, Harold D., "History of the 745th Tank Battalion, August 1942 to June 1945" (1945). World War Regimental Histories. 21. http://digicom.bpl.lib.me.us/ww_reg_his/21 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the World War Collections at Bangor Community: Digital Commons@bpl. It has been accepted for inclusion in World War Regimental Histories by an authorized administrator of Bangor Community: Digital Commons@bpl. For more information, please contact [email protected]. L HISTORY- of the 745th TANK BATTALION ........ ... "·- ... " ..... .., to ~ ..... • ~ J ~ .... ,. - .. ~ ~ ~ .. .., -.. .. ... .. ., .. - .., .., J .............. " .. ... J J ... ... PRINTED IN NORNBERG, GERMANY • ...... .. ....... • -~ r,. ......... .,., . : . ..... ·.; . ..·· .... ' .. ; . .... ee-"U . "' "'"" . ,. " ; .... ... ....... ,, ~ .. .,• ! ~ .....·= w :.. To Sgt. Charles N. Donoghue, the first member of the 7 450. Tank Battalion to lose his life in combat, this history is humbly dedicated. - ' l'able of Contents Dedication Foreword Tribute by Lt. Col. Nichols Coat-of-Arms Col. Evans 1 Lt. Col. Nichols . 2 Major Heard and Major Patterson . 3 Battalion Headquarters . 5 Headquarters Company 7 Service Company 10 Company "A" 13 Company "B" 17 Company "C" 21 Company "D" 25 ~ Awards 29 Tribute to Battalion's Dead . 32 Battlefield Commissions 35 Chapters: I. Activation and Training II. The Normandy Beachhead III. The St. Lo Breakthrough IV. The Falaise Pocket V . Northern France VI. The Battle of Mons VII. The Siegfried Line VIII.
    [Show full text]
  • Field Force Operations
    Center for Domestic Preparedness Field Force Operations The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is responsible for enhancing the capabilities of jurisdictions to prevent, deter, respond to, and recover from all-hazards incidents. A part of this mission is to increase these jurisdictional abilities by providing training opportunities. The Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP), a federal training facility located in Anniston, Alabama, is dedicated to the mission of training and preparing America’s emergency responders by offering programs that are nationally recognized for providing progressive training that enhances the capability of the emergency response community. Contents Field Force Operations Student Guide Admin 1: Course Introduction and Overview .................................................................... 2 Module 1: Overview of Civil Actions ................................................................................. 7 Module 2: Mass Arrest ................................................................................................... 17 Module 3: Team Tactics ................................................................................................ 28 Module 4: Legal Considerations .................................................................................... 58 Module 5: Protester Tactics ........................................................................................... 85 Module 6: Crowd Dynamics ........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Army Field Manual Volume 2
    D/HQDT/18/34/48 Army Code No 71584 (Pt 1) THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME II GENERIC ENEMY (MOBILE FORCES) PA RT 1 OPERATIONAL ART & TACTICAL DOCTRINE PRESS HERE TO RETURN TO MAIN CONTENTS PAGE 1996 Prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff CONDITIONS OF RELEASE (Applicable to copies supplied with Ministry of Defence approval to Common­ wealth and Foreign Governments). 1. This information is released by the United Kingdom Government to the recipient Government for Defence purposes only. 2. This information must be accorded the same degree of security protection as that accorded thereto by the United Kingdom Government. 3. This information may be disclosed only within the Defence Department of the recipient Government, except as otherwise authorized by the Ministry of Defence (Army). AMENDMENTS Amendment Number By whom amended Date amended DISTRIBUTION (see Catalogue of Army publications, Part II) Regular Army (other than those mentioned below) ..................................... Scale C TA ............................................................................................................... Scale C Joint Services Defence College ................................................................. 100 Staff College ............................................................................................... 350 JDSC .......................................................................................................... 100 RMCS ........................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Register of Graduates & Former Cadets Glossary of Abbreviations
    Register of Graduates & Former Cadets Glossary of Abbreviations & Codes Indicates a direct ancestor or a direct descendent, or both, of another graduate * Indicates a Distinguished Cadet (order of merit) A–age/aged ABMC–American Battle Monuments Commission A–Appointed Abn–Airborne A–Armored AC–Army Air Corps A–Army AcadAffrs–Academic Affairs A–Assistant ACC–Army Communications Command A–Attaché Acct–Account/Accounting AA–Additional Appointee ACDA–Arms Control & Disarmament Agency AA–Anti-Aircraft (Artillery) ACDC–Army Combat Developments Command AA–Army Attaché ACE–Analysis and Control Element A&A–Astronomy & Astrophysics ACEMLF–Allied Command Europe Mobile Land Force AAA–Anti-Aircraft Artillery ACERT–Army Computer Emergency Response Team AAC–Anti-Aircraft Command ACJCS–Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff AAC–Army Acquisition Corps ACLC–Aviation Center Logistics Command AAC&GMC–Anti-Aircraft and Guided Missile Center ACM–Afghanistan Campaign Medal AAC&GMS–Anti-Aircraft and Guided Missile School AcqPolDiv–Acquisition Policy Division AACS–Airways and Air Communications Service ACR–Armored Cavalry Regiment AAD–Air Assault Division AC/RC–Active Component/Reserve Component AADAC–Army Air Defense Artillery Center ACS–Air Commando Squadron AADC–Army Armament Development Center ACS–Assistant Chief of Staff AADC–Army Armament Development Command ACSAC–Assistant Chief of Staff for Automation & AAE–Aeronautical & Astronautics Engineer Communications AAF–Army Air Forces ACSC–Air Command & Staff College AAF–Army Airfield ACSCCIM–Assistant
    [Show full text]
  • Field Operations Guide ICS 420-1 June 2016 TEN STANDARD FIRE ORDERS
    U.S. Fire Administration/National Fire Academy Field Operations Guide ICS 420-1 June 2016 TEN STANDARD FIRE ORDERS FIRE BEHAVIOR 1. Keep informed on fire weather conditions and forecasts. 2. Know what your fire is doing at all times. 3. Base all actions on current and expected behavior of the fire. FIRELINE SAFETY 4. Identify Escape Routes and Safety Zones and make them known. 5. Post Lookouts when there is possible danger. 6. Be alert. Keep calm. Think clearly. Act decisively. ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL 7. Maintain prompt communication with your forces, your supervisor, and adjoining forces. 8. Give clear instructions and ensure they are understood. 9. Maintain control of your forces at all times. IF YOU CONSIDERED 1 THROUGH 9, THEN 10. Fight fire aggressively, having provided for safety first. Common Denominators of Fire Behavior on Tragedy Fires • Most incidents happen on the smaller fires or on isolated portions of larger fires. • Most fires are innocent in appearance before the “flare- ups” or “blow-ups.” In some cases, tragedies occur in the mop-up stage. • Flare-ups generally occur in deceptively light fuels. • Fires run uphill surprisingly fast in chimneys, gullies, and on steep slopes. • Some suppression tools, such as helicopters or air tankers, can adversely affect fire behavior. The blasts of air from low flying helicopters and air tankers have been known to cause flare-ups. U.S. Fire Administration Mission Statement We provide National leadership to foster a solid foundation for our fire and emer- gency services stakeholders in prevention, preparedness, and response. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The National Fire Academy would like to thank FIRESCOPE for the use of the Field Operations Guide (ICS 420-1) as a template for this document.
    [Show full text]
  • Army Ranger Handbook
    SH 21-76 UNITED STATES ARMY RANGER HANDBOOK Not for the weak or fainthearted RANGER TRAINING BRIGADE UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL FORT BENNING, GEORGIA JULY 2006 RANGER CREED Recognizing that I volunteered as a Ranger, fully knowing the hazards of my chosen profession, I will always endeavor to uphold the prestige, honor, and high esprit de corps of the Rangers. Acknowledging the fact that a Ranger is a more elite Soldier who arrives at the cutting edge of battle by land, sea, or air, I accept the fact that as a Ranger my country expects me to move further, faster, and fight harder than any other soldier. Never shall I fail my comrades I will always keep myself mentally alert, physically strong, and morally straight and I will shoulder more than my share of the task whatever it may be, one hundred percent and then some. Gallantly will I show the world that I am a specially selected and well trained Soldier. My courtesy to superior officers, neatness of dress, and care of equipment shall set the example for others to follow. Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country. I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might. Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country. Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission, though I be the lone survivor.
    [Show full text]