DOCSLIB.ORG

Submission Template

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Submission Template Canada Gazette Part I, 10 March 2012 Telecommunications Act Notice No. DGTP-001-12 Petition of Association des Compagnies de Téléphone du Québec inc. (ACTQ) and Ontario Telecommunications Association (OTA) to His Excellency the Governor in Council dated 3 February 2012 Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2011-291 and/or Telecom Decision CRTC 2011-733 RESPONSE OF TELUS COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY 10 April 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................... 1 2.0 THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FRAMEWORK....................................................... 3 3.0 THE ACTQ/OTA PETITION ..........................................................................................................10 3.1. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK WAS CUSTOMIZED FOR THE SILECS BY THE CRTC AND IS THEREFORE NOT A COOKIE-CUTTER NOR A ONE SIZE FITS ALL APPROACH ................................................................................................................................................14 3.2. THE APOCALYPTIC SCENARIOS DESCRIBED BY ACTQ/OTA ARE PURE FANTASY AND HIDE THEIR IMPRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS .........................................................................................................................................................19 4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION .............................................................................27 ii TELUS Response to ACTQ/OTA Petition 1.0 Introduction 1. On 3 February 2012, Association des Compagnies de Téléphone du Québec inc. (“ACTQ”) and Ontario Telecommunications Association (“OTA”) (collectively, the “ACTQ/OTA”), on behalf of 30 small incumbent local exchange carriers (“SILECs”) filed a Petition seeking an order from the Governor in Council to the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (“CRTC”) that would be anti-competitive, anti-consumer and that would ultimately subvert the long awaited introduction of competition in the local exchange telephone markets of the remaining Canadian monopolies. 2. TELUS‟ interest in this Petition is twofold. Firstly, as an advocate for facilities- based competition and as the interconnector company on behalf of Cogeco, TELUS has been trying to help provide customers served by eight SILECs in Quebec1 a competitive alternative for the last four years so that these residents can benefit from the same advantages as the other Canadians. Secondly, TELUS strongly believes that granting the ACTQ/OTA Petition would result in a major departure from fulfilling the Canadian telecommunications policy objectives. 3. ACTQ/OTA‟s Petition is based on misleading and incomplete factual information aimed at painting a series of unfounded apocalyptic outcomes and speculative scenarios. ACTQ/OTA‟s Petition is nothing more than a self-serving attempt to protect its member SILEC companies, not their customers, from competition while the majority of these same SILECs have been operating as competitors themselves for some time in other telephone companies‟ incumbent geographic markets, including TELUS‟. Granting ACTQ/OTA‟s Petition would have the ultimate effect of isolating customers living in these areas and denying them access to a choice of local exchange service provider and all of the well-known benefits that flow from competition. This unfortunate result would clearly be a 1 Guèvremont, Sogetel, CoopTel, Milot, Upton, Lambton, St-Victor and St-Ephrem. 1 major departure from the fundamental objectives of the Telecommunications Act (the “Act”) as well as successive Government policy statements favouring the evolution of Canadian telecommunications markets towards facilities-based competition. This evolution to competition for local telephone services has taken place in every geographic region in Canada except those where the members of the ACTQ/OTA are the incumbents. 4. The threshold question for the Governor in Council in considering this Petition is whether ACTQ/OTA has made its case that the CRTC has stepped outside the telecommunications policy framework set out in the Act and the Government‟s own Direction to the CRTC on Implementing the Canadian Telecommunications Policy Objectives2 (the “Policy Direction”) to rely on market forces to the maximum extent possible as a means of achieving the telecommunications policy objectives set out in section 7 of the Act and when relying on regulation, use measures that are efficient and proportionate to their purpose and that interfere with the operation of competitive market forces to the minimum extent necessary to meet the policy objectives. 5. ACTQ/OTA argues that “the Commission‟s refusal in Decision 2011-733 to review and vary Policy 2011-291 has undermined the Canadian telecommunications policy objectives in several significant ways”. 6. In this response, TELUS demonstrates that such a decision by the Governor in Council would, in fact, represent a clear departure from the telecommunication policy framework. It would strip the Commission of a whole range of powers granted to it by Parliament and that it needs to fulfill its mandate. Granting the Petition would unnecessarily overprotect small carriers to the detriment facilities- based competition and hence to the detriment of consumers living in these areas. 7. In section 2 of this response, TELUS outlines the telecommunications policy framework set out by Parliament in the Telecommunications Act and the Policy Direction. In section 3, TELUS addresses ACTQ/OTA‟s unfounded complaints 2 Canada Gazette, SOR/2006-355, 14 December 2006. 2 and requests and demonstrates that the Commission crafted a sensitive and customized approach to regulating the SILECs that is the result of many years of fact gathering and analyses. TELUS also demonstrates that the apocalyptic scenarios described by ACTQ/OTA in its Petition are pure fantasy and hide the SILECs‟ impressive development and expansion over the last few years. 8. For all of these reasons, and as more fully explained below, TELUS urges the Governor in Council to reject the Petition in its entirety. 2.0 The Telecommunications Policy Framework 9. In order to more fully understand TELUS‟ fundamental objection to the ACTQ/OTA Petition, it is helpful to provide a brief overview of the telecommunications policy framework established by Parliament in the Act and some of the critical judicial decisions and CRTC decisions that have shaped the policy framework. 10. Prior to the introduction of competition, the incumbent telephone companies were regulated as public utilities. Their rates and services were regulated according to three fundamental principles. Rates were to be just and reasonable. Rates and services were not to be unjustly discriminatory or unreasonably or unduly preferential. Carriers had an obligation to serve all customers requesting service, limited only by statutory provisions or the terms of tariffs approved by the regulatory authority. 11. The concept of just and reasonable rates was well understood. Rates had to be just and reasonable for both the company offering the service and the customers receiving the service. To be just and reasonable, rates had to be high enough to allow the company a reasonable opportunity to recover the costs of providing its 3 services, including its cost of capital, and at the same time low enough to ensure that customers did not pay more than the company‟s cost to provide the services.3 12. The relationship between a rate-regulated company and the regulator was straightforward. The company invested its shareholders‟ capital in facilities and incurred other expenses necessary to provide service under the terms and conditions required by the regulator, with the understanding that the company would be provided with a reasonable opportunity to recover its costs. This relationship, often referred to as the regulatory bargain, is established at common law, is recognized in many regulated industries and its principles are embedded in the Telecommunications Act through the requirement that regulated rates be just and reasonable. The only new provision dealing with just and reasonable rates included in the Telecommunications Act permits the CRTC to use any method or technique that it considers appropriate to determine just and reasonable rates.4 Of course, this does not change the fundamental obligation to ensure that rates are sufficient to allow a reasonable opportunity to recover the company‟s costs of providing rate-regulated services. 13. In 1979, the CRTC issued the first in a series of decisions that gradually introduced competition into all telecommunications markets in Canada.5 This decision, which was affirmed by the Governor in Council6, permitted CNCP Telecommunications (now MTS Allstream) to interconnect its network with the switched local distribution network of Bell Canada for the purpose of providing 3 See, for example, Edmonton (City) v. Northwestern Utilities Ltd., (1961), 28 D.L.R. 125 (S.C.C.) at page 132-133, where Locke J. observes “The right of the consumers to require the respondent to supply them with gas, conferred by statute, would, in my opinion, even in the absence of any statutory provision, impose upon them an obligation at common law to pay for the services on the basis of a quantum meruit. In such circumstances, I consider that the position of the utility would be similar to that of a common carrier upon whom is imposed, as a matter of law, the duty of transporting goods tendered to him
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Competition and Price Regulation in the Market for Public Long-Distance Telephone Services
    Competition and Price Regulation in the Market for Public Long-Distance Telephone Services Michael H. Ryan' In 1992, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommu- En 1992, le Conseil de Ia radiodiffusion et des tdecom- nications Commission decided to permit competition in the pro- munications canadiennes a d6cid6 de permettre Ia concurrence vision of public long-distance telephone services. The advent of dans le domaine des services t~l~phoniques interurbains. competition has compelled the Commission to make sweeping L'avnement de cette concurrence a contraint le Conseil Aeffec- changes to the manner in which it regulates the prices charged by tuer des modifications radicales dans sa fagon de r6glementer les the telephone companies and other telecommunications carriers tarifs exigda par les compagnies de tdl~phone et par d'autres under its jurisdiction. transporters en teldcommunications sous sajuridiction. The article begins with a brief overview of the regulatory L'article dbute avec un bref survol du rigime rnglemen- regime as it stood prior to the introduction of competition. The taise en place avant l'introduction de la concurrence. L'auteur author describes the new measures the C.R.T.C. has introduced dderit les nouvelles mesures introduites par le C.RIT.C. afin de to permit the incumbent telephone companies and their rivals in- permettre aux compagnies de t~lphones ainsi qu'A leurs rivales creased flexibility in the pricing of the services they provide to d'augmenter ler flexibilit6 dans la tarification des services the public. qu'elles offrent au public. The author then focuses on the Commission's approach to L'auteur se penche ensuite sur 'approche du Conseil rela- the special issues presented by the pricing of "access".
    [Show full text]
  • Competition and Canadian Wireless Telecommunications
    University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies Master of Public Policy Capstone Projects 2013-09 Competition and Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Lo, Justin Lo, Justin. (2013). Competition and Canadian Wireless Telecommunications ( Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/51617 report Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY CAPSTONE PROJECT Competition and Canadian Wireless Telecommunications: Evaluating the Government of Canada’s Wireless Policies following the 2008 Wireless Spectrum Auction for Advanced Wireless Services Submitted by: Justin Lo - Approved by Supervisor: Dr. David Bercuson Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of PPOL 623 and completion of the requirements for the Master of Public Policy degree September 9, 2013 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my capstone supervisor, Dr. Bercuson for encouraging me to pursue my interest and providing me the ability to freely explore the topic to its fullest extent. I also thank family and friends who pushed me to pursue my ambitions with enthusiasm. Finally, this effort could not have been possible without the longstanding support and encouragement of my amazing fiancée, Jennifer. 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The following report looks at the Government of Canada’s policies regarding competition in the Canadian wireless telecommunications sector, and the transition of the Government of Canada’s approach in telecommunications from regulation to increased competition. Specifically, this report looks at the impact of Wind Mobile and the other new wireless entrants on Canadian wireless telecommunications since their entry into the market following the 2008 wireless auction for advanced wireless services.
    [Show full text]
  • Review of the Canadian Communications Legislative Framework, Responding to the New Environment: a Call for Comments
    Review of the Canadian Communications Legislative Framework, Responding to the New Environment: A Call for Comments Written Submission of the Public Interest Advocacy Centre 11 January 2019 Broadcasting and Telecommunications Legislative Review Panel Review of the Canadian Communications Legislative Framework, Responding to the New Environment: A Call for Comments PIAC Written Submission 11 January 2019 Table of Contents Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 3 PIAC: Representing the Public Interest in Telecommunications and Broadcasting for over 40 Years .......................................................................................................................................... 4 Telecommunications Act and Radiocommunication Act ............................................................... 5 1. Universal Access and Deployment ...................................................................................... 6 1.1 Are the right legislative tools in place to further the objective of affordable high quality access for all Canadians, including those in rural, remote and Indigenous communities? ..... 6 Writing a USO (universal service obligation) into the Telecommunications Act................. 13 1.2 Given the importance of passive infrastructure for network deployment and the expected growth of 5G wireless, are the right provisions in place for governance of these assets? ........ 14 2. Competition, Innovation, and Affordability
    [Show full text]
  • The “Affordable Access Coalition”
    Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2015-134 Phase 1 Intervention of the Affordable Access Coalition 14 July 2015 The “Affordable Access Coalition” Phase 1 Intervention Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2015-134 Review of basic telecommunications services 14 July 2015 Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2015-134 Phase 1 Intervention of the Affordable Access Coalition 14 July 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 3 Glossary & List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................... 13 Tables and Figures ........................................................................................................... 14 1. Introduction and key positions ................................................................................... 1 2. Responses to consultation questions ...................................................................... 19 Canadians’ evolving needs for telecommunications service (Q1 – Q2) ........................ 19 The Commission’s role regarding access to basic telecom services (Q3 – Q7)............ 68 Regulatory measures for basic telecommunications services (Q8 – Q13) .................. 114 3. The Need for Ongoing Monitoring .......................................................................... 129 4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 131 Appendices: Appendix “A”:
    [Show full text]
  • The Consumer Case for Telecom Reform and Results-Based Regulation
    Waiting for the Dream: The Consumer Case for Telecom Reform and Results-Based Regulation By: Michael Janigan Public Interest Advocacy Centre 1204 - ONE Nicholas St. Ottawa, ON K1N 7B7 December 2010 1 Copyright 2010 PIAC Contents may not be commercially reproduced. Any other reproduction with acknowledgment is encouraged. The Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) Suite 1204 ONE Nicholas Street Ottawa, ON K1N 7B7 Canadian Cataloguing and Publication Data Waiting for the Dream: The Consumer Case for Telecom Reform and Results-Based Regulation ISBN 1-895060-96-6 2 Acknowledgement The Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) received funding from Industry Canada’s Contributions Program for Non-profit Consumer and Voluntary Organizations. The views expressed in this report are not necessarily those of Industry Canada or of the Government of Canada. The assistance with research and editing of this report provided by Michael DeSantis, Laman Meshadiyeva, Eden Maher, Amy Zhao and Janet Lo is also gratefully acknowledged. 3 Table of Contents Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................................................ 3 Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 5 Summary of Recommendations .................................................................................................................. 10 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Telecommunication Policies in Seventeen Countries
    DOCUMENT RESUME ED 258 558 IR 011 713 AUTHOR/ Eward, Ronald S. TITLE Telecommunication Policies in SeventeenCountries: Propocts for Future CompetitiveAccess. INSTITUTION MarTech Strategies, Inc. SPONS AGENCY National Telecommunications andInformation Administration (DOC), Washington,D.C. PUB DATE May 83 CONTRACT NTIA-CR-83-24 NOTE 225p. PUB TYPE Information Analyses (070) Reports - Evaluative /Feasibility (142) EDRS PRICE MF01/PC09 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS Competition; Foreign Countries;*Information Networks; Information Services; *International Cooperation; International Relations;Marketing; *Policy; *Telecommunications;Teleconferencing IDENTIFIERS *Data Transmission ABSTRACT This document isa review and study of current and prospective telecommunication policiesin 17 countries with regard to the competitive marketaccess those policies foster or promise. It explores the policies of eachcountry toward information flow that will also have an impacton international competition. The aim of the study is to identify the degree ofcompetitive access allowed U.S. companies in the provision of telecommunicationsand information products and services. The study profileseach of the selected countries with main attention givento the following: (1) organizational structures; (2) servicesstructure and policies; (3) data and telephone services; (4) internationalservices structure and policies; (5 new services; and (6) future competitiveaccess. The 17 countries profiledare Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany,France,
    [Show full text]
  • Cotflmunications 617 Ritories, Parts of Newfoundland and in Northern Sections of British Columbia; in All, It Has About 48,275 Subscribers
    COtflMUNICATIONS 617 ritories, parts of Newfoundland and in northern sections of British Columbia; in all, it has about 48,275 subscribers. The TCTS members are continuing to automate their systems and rates for customer- diallbd calls on the inter-company network have been steadily decreasing. Since 1972 TCTS has offered a one-minute minimum charge that allows more economical long distance calling. Each member company is responsible for providing good quality service within its own territory and for integrating its facilities with those of all other telephone companies in Canada in order to provide connections with telephones elsewhere in North America and overseas. Collectively these companies operate the world's longest single microwave system carrying telephone conversations, radio and television programs and computer data from coast to coast. Services have been developed to meet specialized needs across Canada for voice-only communications. These range from aids to the handicapped to services such as Wide area telephone service and Voicecom for business firms. Wide area telephone service (WATS), provided by the TCTS companies, is for customers who make or receive many long distance calls to or from many points. WATS allows a customer to call, or to receive calls from, any­ where within one of seven zones for a flat monthly rate. These areas range in size from part of a province to all of Canada. Single digit dialling is the main feature of Voicecom service. It provides voice-only com­ munications between specified locations via the public telephone network on a pay-as-you-use basip. By dialling a single telephone number, a Voicecom customer can reach as many as 10 telephones subscribing to the same service.
    [Show full text]
  • Competition in Telecommunications: Refusal to Supply Facilities by Regulated Common Carriers
    COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: REFUSAL TO SUPPLY FACILITIES BY REGULATED COMMON CARRIERS Gordon Kaiser* I. INTRODUCTION Traditionally, telephone companies have regarded their mandate as rendering a universal or end to end service to all subscribers. This universality presumed carrier ownership of transmission, switching, terminals and local loops. It also implied a lack of access and a refusal to supply facilities to competing forms of transmission and equipment. New technology has caused regulators to re-evaluate monopoly in both the equipment and service sectors. In the case of equipment, the growth of the computer industry and semi-conductor technology has increased both the demand for customer ownership of terminal equipment and the ability of new firms to develop products not available from the telephone company. In the service sector, new technology, such as microwaves in the 1950s and satellite transmission in the 1960s, has resulted in similar pressures as new firms seek to offer services which compete with the telephone company's local and long distance services. Over the past decade, regulators have been forced to reconsider the policies of telephone companies to refuse to supply facilities in five principal areas: access to cable television companies:' 1. Pole 2 2. Access to satellite facilities:- 3. Access for customer-owned terminal equipment:' Of the Bar of Ontario. I Ottawa Cablevision Ltd. and Bell Canada. [ 19731 C.T.C. 522 (Telecommunica- tion Committee), leave to appeal refused 11974] 1 F.C. 373 (C.A.); Transvision (Magog) Inc. and Bell Canada, [19751 C.T.C. 463 (Telecommunication Committee); Bell Canada, Tariff for Use of Support Structures by Cable Television Licensees, Telecom.
    [Show full text]
  • TELUS Floor 8, 215 Slater St
    TELUS Floor 8, 215 Slater St. Ottawa, Ontario Canada K1P 0A6 www.telus.com Johanne Senécal (613) 597-8400 Telephone Senior Vice-President (613) 597-8422 Facsimile Government & Regulatory Affairs [email protected] January 11, 2019 Ms. Janet Yale Chair The Broadcasting and Telecommunications Legislative Review Panel c/o Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada 235 Queen Street, 1st Floor Ottawa, ON K1A 0H5 Dear Ms. Yale: Re: Review of the Canadian Communications Legislative Framework – Submission of TELUS Communications Inc. 1. TELUS Communications Inc. (“TELUS”) is pleased to provide its submission to the Broadcasting and Telecommunications Legislative Review Panel (the “Panel”) in response to the issues raised in the Panel’s call for comments issued on September 25, 2018. 2. We trust that this submission will be of assistance to the Panel in formulating its recommendations to the Government of Canada. 3. TELUS wishes to express its appreciation to the Panel for the opportunity to provide these comments. Yours truly, {Original signed by Johanne Senécal} Johanne Senécal Senior Vice-President Government & Regulatory Affairs AH/io cc. James Nicholson, Executive Director, Broadcasting and Telecommunications Legislative Review Panel Secretariat Attachments Broadcasting and Telecommunications Legislative Review Panel Review of the Canadian Communications Legislative Framework Submission of TELUS Communications Inc. January 11, 2019 TELUS Communications Inc. Review of the Canadian January 11, 2019 Communications Legislative
    [Show full text]
  • APPLICATION PURSUANT to SECTIONS 24, 24.1, 36, and 70(1)(A) of the TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT, 1993 to DISABLE ON-LINE ACCESS to PIRACY SITES
    APPLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 24, 24.1, 36, and 70(1)(a) OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT, 1993 TO DISABLE ON-LINE ACCESS TO PIRACY SITES Academy of Canadian Cinema and Television, Alliance of Canadian Cinema, Television and Radio Artists (ACTRA), Association québecoise de l’industrie du disque, du spectacle, et de la video (ADISQ), Asian Television Network (ATN), Association québécoise de la production médiatique (AQPM), Bell Canada, Bell Expressvu, Bell Media, Canadian Association of Film Distributors and Exporters (CAFDE), CBC / Radio-Canada, Les Cinémas Ciné Entreprise Inc., Cinémas Guzzo, Cineplex, Canadian Media Producers Association (CMPA), Cogeco Connexion, Corus, Directors Guild of Canada (DGC), DHX Media, Entertainment One, Ethnic Channels Group, Fairchild Media Group, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE), Landmark Cinemas, Maple Leaf Sports and Entertainment (MLSE), Movie Theatre Association of Canada (MTAC), Québecor Média Inc., Rogers Media, Television Broadcasts Limited (TVB), TIFF, and Union des artistes (UDA). 2018 01 29 Table of Contents A. OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................. 1 B. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................... 2 C. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE ........................................................................ 8 (a) The Widespread Problem of Internet Piracy ................................................ 8 (b) The Harm Caused by Internet
    [Show full text]
  • Competition in Telecommunications: Who Polices the Transition?
    COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: WHO POLICES THE TRANSITION? Bohdan S. Romaniuk* and Hudson N. Janisch** 1. THE PROBLEM DEFINED ................................ 563 II. ORGANIZATION OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 566 A. TraditionalNatural Monopoly Model ............. 566 B. The Advent of Competition ..................... 572 III. STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS ............................ 582 A. Conduct in Regulated Markets and the Statutory Mandate of the CRTC ......................... 583 1 The CRTC Act ........................... 584 2. The Railway Act ......................... 584 (a) Mandate of the CRTC ................. 585 (b) The Jurisdictionof the CRTC ........... 586 (c) The CRTC's Authority to Regulate Market Conduct ........................... 587 (d) The Role of Competition Law in TelecommunicationsMarkets ........... 589 3. The National TransportationAct ............ 592 B. Statutory Mandate of the Competition Law Authorities ................................. 597 C. The Statutory Powers and Responsibilities of the Federal Cabinet and the Minister of Communications 601 1. Control Over Entry ....................... 601 2. The Cabinet Review Power ................. 602 3. The Government OrganizationAct .......... 603 Regulatory Economist. LL.B. University of Toronto, 1986. Currently student-at- law, Blake, Cassels & Graydon, Toronto. :* Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. The authors wish to thank the Connaught Foundation Programme on Legal Theory and Public Policy at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, for financial
    [Show full text]
  • Alberta Government Telephones V. CRTC
    Osgoode Hall Law School of York University Osgoode Digital Commons Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 1990 Jurisdiction Over Telecommunications: Alberta Government Telephones v. CRTC Peter W. Hogg Osgoode Hall Law School of York University Source Publication: McGill Law Journal/Revue de Droit de McGill. Volume 35, Number 2 (1990), p. 480-489. Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works Part of the Communications Law Commons This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Recommended Citation Hogg, Peter W. "Jurisdiction Over Telecommunications: Alberta Government Telephones v. CRTC." McGill Law Journal 35.2 (1990): 480-489. This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons. COMMENTS CHRONIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE Jurisdiction Over Telecommunications: Alberta Government Telephones v. CRTC Peter W. Hogg* In Alberta Government Telephones v. Dans Alberta Government Telephones c. Canadian Radio-television and Conseil canadien de la radiodiffitsion et des Telecommunications Commission, the t06communications canadiennes, la Cour Supreme Court of Canada held that AGT was supreme 6tablit qu'AGT est une entreprise a federal undertaking, but that as an agent of frddrale. Toutefois, en tant qu'agent de la the provincial Crown, it was not bound by reg- Couronne provinciale, AGT n'est pas soumis ulations of the CRTC, made under the author- aux r~glements du CRTC 6tablis sous la juri- ity of the federal Railway Act. AGT is there- diction de la Loi sur les chemins defer (fdd& fore presently unregulated.
    [Show full text]