Forecasting Realignment: An Analysis of the 1993 Canadian Federal Election

Michael Rawson Department of Political Science

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Faculty of Graduate Studies The University of Western Ontario August 1997

OMichael Rawson 1997 National Library Bibliothèque nationale I*m of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibiiographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. nie Wellington Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Canada Canada Your fi& Votre reIèrmce

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The 1993 federal election will be rernembered as an extrernely significant event in Canadian political history. The incumbent Conservative government was reduced to two seats, while rwo regionally based and ideologically oriented third parties, the Bloc Québécois and Reform Party, captured Otficial Opposition and third pany status respectively. Focusing on the Reform Party and

Bloc Québécois, this thesis attempts to predict whether the 1993 federai election marked the beginning of a period of electoral realignment or merely a period of temporary dealignment. The consequences of this study are extremely significant for the Canadian pany system, as a realignment would mean that one or both of the Reform Party and Bloc Québécois will continue to attract stable and durable support over the long-tem. Alternatively, a dealignment of the party system would indicate that the success of the two new parties is temporary and traditional patterns of electoral support will reemerge. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis could not have been written without the advice. cnticism, and insight provided throughout its preparation by my advisor, Professor Michael Lusztig. I would like to thank Professor

Sid Noel for his advice and Professor Ian Brodie for his assistance. I would like to acknowledge

Catherine and Ellion Gnidec, whose advice and support proved invaluable. My sincere thanks also go out to my brother and sisters. I alone am responsible for the contents of this thesis, and any errors contained within. This thesis is dedicated to my parents, whose unwavering support throughout my years of study has assisted me tremendously; 1 am extremely grateful. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Certificate of Examination ii Abstract iii Acknowledgments iv Table of Contents v

Chapter One: Theoreticai Foundation Regarding Political Realignments 1 Introduction 1 Voter Alignments in Canada 4 A Canadian Application of the Theones of Key and Bumham 8 The 'High-Risk' Strategy 16 Theory Regarding Third Party Failure and Success 22 Conclusion 28

Chapter Two: Western Canada and the Reform Party 35 The Development of Alienation in Western Canada 36 The Rise of the Reform Party of Canada 43 Realignrnent in Western Canada 46 Conclusion 56

Chapter Three: Quebec and the Bloc Québécois The Development of Alienation in Quebec The Rise of the Bloc Québécois Realignment in Quebec Conclusion

Chapter Four: Realignment of the Canadian Party System- Conclusion 92 Surnrnary of arguments presented in Chapters Two and Three 92 Future Areas of Study 97

Bibliography Vita 1

CHAPTER ONE- Political Alignments: Theoretical Foundation

The 1993 Canadian federal election appears to have been a watershed election that will be, undoubtedly, the subject of intense consideration well into the future. Afler captunng successive majority governments in 1984 and 1988, the Conservative Party was decimated in the 1993 federal election. The Bloc Québécois, with its election to Official Opposition, made history as the first separatist party to capture seats in Parliament, while the Reform

Party rose from Western Canada to capture third party status. The events of 1993 have been reinforced by the 1997 federal election, with the Reform Party and Bloc Québécois exchanging Officia1 Opposition and third party status.

This thesis will attempt to predict whether the 1993 Canadian federal election was a realignment- - whereby the Liberal, Bloc Québécois, and Reform parties cm be expected ?O continue as major political parties- - or a dealignment - - indicating an intemption of the stable party equilibrium From ConMeration. Particular attention will be paid to the Western

Provinces and Quebec in order to assess how these regions, and the central issues of the time, factor into the realignrnent. Presently, there lacks a clear explanation for the events of the

1993 election. It is through this study that an explanation of the dynamics behind the 1 993 electoral realignment will be gained. Once these goals have been achieved, this thesis will offer some insight into the future prospects of the Reform Party and Bloc Québécois and the possibility of a new party system. The topic of political alignments has been well documented in American academic literaîure. In "A Theory of Critical Elections," Key examines the Arnerican electoral realignrnents of 1896, 1928 and 1932 with the intention of providing "an orientation for an attempt to formulate a concept of one type ofelection- based 2 on American experience- which rnight be built into a more general theory of elections."' Key provides the foundation for further audy regarding the electord anomalies that have occurred several times in Amencan history. Burnham's Critical Elections and the Mains~rinesof

American Politics expands on Key's thoughts, providing a comprehensive explanation of electoral realignments and their importance.

The success of the Liberai Party in the 1993 Canadian federai election, afier two successive Progressive Conservative victorig was overshadowed by the unprecedented gains of the regionally based and ideologically oriented Refonn Party and Bloc Québécois. The

Bloc Québécois drew ail of its support from Quebec with the goais of protecting the province's interests in Ottawa and pursuing sovereignty. The Reform Party captured rnost of its support, and al1 but one of its seats, from the Western provinces by advocating a right wing economic platform and O pposing Quebec' s dernand t hat it be granted stnrr~tparticthir within the Canadian federation. Overall, the Liberai Party gained a majority government capturing 177 seats, the Bloc Québécois formed Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition with fifty- four seats and the Reform Party managed to gain fifty-two seats and third party status. The

Conservatives fell from the goveming party with 169 seats to a mere two seats, losing official party status. The New Democratic Party (NDP) suffered a sirnilar fate as it was reduced to nine seats. Forbes recognizes the drarnatic change in the Canadian political landscape when he argues:

The old brokerage politics had clearly broken down. The heart of it had been a tacit agreement arnong the leaders of Canada's federal parties to manage French-English relations outside the electoral arena. The main parties, including the NDP, had always appealed for suppon on both sides of Canada's great national divide. The 1993 election relegated two of these old brokerage parties to the parliarnentary sidelines. Their places have been taken by two more narrowly based parties, and parliament is now clearly divided dong ethnic or national lines. The Liberals still represent old-style brokerage, but the old system of brokerage policies is at least temporarily suspended."

This chapter wiU argue that the 1993 federal election follows the pattern of electoral realignments proposed by Key and Burnham and was the result of a combination of several factors including the severe economic conditions of the 1990s and, more importantly, fatigue and hstration in the electorate fiorn two failed atternpts at constitutional reform: the Meech

Lake and Charlottetown Accords. As a result, feelings of alienation intensified, particularly in the West and Quebec, which escalated to, recalling Bumham's term, a "flash point."

This chapter will begin with a general discussion of voter alignments, followed by an examination of the history of electoral alignments in Canada. The chapter will then apply

Key's and Burnham's discussion of critical etections to the Canadian federal election of 1993.

While the theories of Key and Bumharn are of centrai importance to this thesis, an explmation for the events of the 1 993 federal election is necessary and, therefore, Lusaig's "High-Risk

Strategy" will be exarnined. The "High-Risk Strategy" introduces the notion that Prime

Minister Mulroney attempted to achieve an electoral reaiignment that would ensure the continued electoral success of the Conservative Party. Mulroney's failure to achieve this redignment was a critical factor in the events of 1993. Finally, theory regarding the success and failure of third parties will be examined in order to provide insight for chapters two and three which will examine the Reform Party and Bloc Québécois, and the chances for their long-term survival as established parties. 4

Voter Alignments in Canada

A conventional discussion on voter alignments centers around two main types of alignments; class and temtonai. Class cieavages occur when individuals who are in similar economic situations vote for the same Party, regardless of their territorial location (for example, lower incorne earners generally voting for the New Democratic Party or high incorne earners usually voting for the Progressive Conservatives) . In this case, sorne voters in the same region or community will have conflicting allegiances. On the other hand, a territorial cleavage occurs when individuals in the same region or community vote similarly despite the faa that their economic situations may differ dramatically (for example, the people of Quebec voting for the Bloc Québécois).

Traditionally, neither class nor temtoriai alignments are completely dominant in a given area as deviations occur Eom straight class voting as frequently as straight territorial voting.' This is particularly evident when examining the Canadian situation, as voters in

Canada have not aligned themselves in the past explicitly along class or territorial lines.

Furthemore, it could be suggested that religion also exists as a societal cleavage that directly influences Canadian voting patterns; however, a more prevalant view contends that the electorate in Canada feels no connedion between religion and partisan loyalties.' Discussing the possible existence of a religious cleavage in Canada, Gidengil States that the

"overwhelming majority of (Canadian voters) do not even covertly link religion with politics."'

Voter alignment along class lines has not been a major factor in Canadian elections.

While "social class divisions constitute one of the major fault lines in party systems in many 5

Western countries, Canada is an e~ception."~Authors such as Clarke and Stewart have demonstrateci that the relationship between voting behavior and indicators of social class such as education, income, and occupation are usually quite weak in Canada.'

Temtorial alignments have played a more significant role in Canadian voting. Gibbins argues that "territorial cleavages are not a Iegacy of the past, nor have they have been diminishing over time. niey are very much a part of the contemporary electoral scene and are likely to remain so in the foreseeable future."8 Furthemore, "tenitonai poiitics may assume many different forms because of the complexity of the Canadian party system. Provinces may support parties limited to the region, or they may support the same parties that exist eisewhere, but to a much different degree."9 While it is difficult to dispute the existence of territorial cleavages within Canada, temtorial conflict has not been a dominant issue in federal eldon carnpaigns. This can be attnbuted to the fact that "[wlhen temtorial conflict cornes to the fore it is less likely to be in the campaign interaction of national parties and leaders, al1 of whom are essentially pursuing brokerage strategies, than in the federal-provincial interaction between leaders and go~emrnents."'~While the 1993 federal election was not fought, specifically, on temtorial grounds, two regional parties enjoyed unprecedented success.

Mer examining the existence of temtorial cleavages in Canada, one might conclude that there may be a great deal of electoral instability present; however, Canada's electoral history is characteked by a general appearance of stability. The Conservatives and Liberals have always filled the roles of govemment and official opposition. In attempting to explain electoral stability in the Canadian party system, Lehc argues that there are two logical 6 hypotheses. The fint argues that Canadians hold strong and enduring party allegiances thus

"resulting in a system of strong and enduring partisan alignment ."Il However, "a view of the

Canadian party system as one of stable and enduring alignment based on strong and stable party identification at the individual level is difficult to sustain in the light of established empincal evidence."" This is particularly apparent when exarnining the high leveis of electoral volatility evident at the constituency or provincial level. "

LeDuc's second hypothesis asserts that Canadian voters hold weak. unstable, and inconsistent loyalties to political parties thereby, creating an electorate with the elevated potential for wide electoral swings." Nevertheless, when examining historical records of

Canadian elections, the predominant pattem of political stability emerges. This can be attriiuted, according to LeDuc, to the fact that short-term factors such as party performance, leadership and political events cm only rarely aily themselves across the Canadian electorate in a manner as to support or undermine any individual political Party. This pattem of political stability has been temed one of "stable dealignment" by LeDuc who notes that "the potential for change is high but the actual aggregate fluctuation from one federal election to another is surprisingly IOW."~~

The central problem with LeDuc's argument is that, despite a continued state of dealignment, there has never been a federal election with as dramatic results as in 1993. The fact that no party other than the Liberals or Conservatives has ever formed govemment or the

Official Opposition is significant, as it points to an aligned party system rather than a dealigned system. If voter flexibility exists to the extent that LeDuc argues, than it would be reasonable to assume that experiences iike the 1993 federal election would be more fiequent. 7

Further, Canada's pluraiist electoral system is very responsive to small shifis in the vote, yet

there is dla high degree of electoral stability in Canada. In a dealigned system (even a stable

one) there should be greater volatility than an aligned system; elections in Canada do not

reflect this volatility. Historically, there has been Little daerentiation between the Liberals and

Conservatives; however, now that real choice has been introduced, there is more noticeable

separation on the point of voters.

Assisting in the maintenance of electoral stability in Canada has been the existence of

brokerage poiitics. Historically, the Liberal and Conservative parties have acted as "brokers

of ideas . . . rniddlemen who select 6orn aii the ideas pressing for recognition as public policy

those they think can be shaped to have the widest ap~eal."'~In this systern, the goal of the

two parties is to accommodate the divergent interests of the electorate that have existed

throughout Canadian history, interests such as class, language, et hnicity and region. Gibbins

argues that "[dlespite a pronounced tendency for territorial bloc-voting within the electorate,

the major national parties are genuine brokerage organizations that try, even if unsuccessfully, to span temtonal and other cleavages in the electorate."" McRae furthers this thought by

stating that "although parties rnay f?om time to time alrnost monopolize the representation of one province or region, they oniy rarely appeal to the electorate in specifically regional terms.

Though parties rnay from time to time obtain disproportionate support from one religious or linguistic goup, they alrnost invariably campaign to maximize support from the electorate as a ~hole."'~In an alrnost prophetic article written more than ninety years ago, Andre Siegfhed discusses the necessity of brokerage politics in Canada. Siegfhed states:

Canada, as we know, is a country of violent oppositions. English and French, Protestant and Catholic, are jealous of each other. The lack of ideas, programmes, convictions, is only apparent. Let a question of race or religion be raid, and you will irnmediately see most of the sordid preoccupations of patronage or co~ectiondisappear below the surface. The elections will become stniggles of political principle, sincere and passionate. Now this is exactly what is feared by the prudent and far-sighted men who have been given the responsibility of maintaining the national equilibrium. Aware of the sharpness of certain rivalries, they know that if these are let loose without any counter balance, the unity of the Dominion may be endangered. That is why they persistently apply themselves to prevent the formation of hornogeneous parties, divided according to race, religion, or class- a French party, for instance... The clarity of political life suffers fiom this, but perhaps the existence of the federation cmbe preserved oniy at this price. lg

While the Liberal Party managed to win the 1993 federai election using the traditional

brokerage approach of appealing to a widespread audience, the election saw a breakdown

of brokerage politics and the emergence of two new parties.

Cameron extends this argument and reasons that the abandonment of the

Consewatives and New Democrats and the success of the Bloc Québécois and Refonn Party,

"leads to speculation about a massive realignment of the Canadian party system."" It is at

this point that the arguments made by Key and Burnham become relevant. While Key and

Burnham write about the Amencan expenence, it is apparent that their observations are more

universdly applicable.

A Canadian Application of the Theories of Key and Burnham

Key believes that "[a]n election itself is a fonnai act of collective decision that occurs

in a Stream of connected antecedent and subsequent behavior."" When examining the behavior of the electorate before critical elections, Key recognizes that there are severai differentiating characteristics. These characteristics include a higher proportion of the electorate psychologically involveci, increased "intensity of attitudes associated with campaign 9 cleavages," an awareness of the potential consequences of the vote, a personal sense of connection with comrnunity decision-making, and a stronger affiliation between the impact of objective events and political choice." In sumrnanzing his argument, Key States that

"[plerbaps there cm be no doubt that the impact of the events of any election on many individuais forms lasting pam loyalties; yet not often is the number so af5ected so great as to create a sharp realignrnent. On the other hand. some elections are characterized by large-scale transfer of party affection that is quite short-term, a different sort of phenornenon fi-om that which occurs in elections marked by broad and durable shifis in party strength."" The question that remains, and which this thesis will attempt to answer, is whether Canada is experiencing a durable redignment or a temporary dealignment.

Bumham expands on Key's argument detailing the differences between critical realignments and periods of stability and deviating elections (that is, elections where the outcome differs from the nom but the dominant structure of party-oriented voting remains generally stable) in several ways. First, he notes that the critical redignment is "associated with.. .very intense dismptions of traditional patterns of voting behavior."'" Consequently, parties that traditionally capture the majority of the votes are reduced to minority status; regions that are typically cornpetitive dunng elections become noncornpetitive; regions of one-party dominance become centers of intense party cornpetition; and large blocs of the electorate shift their allegiance.

Second, Bumharn notes that periods of cnticai realignment are charactenzed by very high intensity. This intensity cm often be seen within the parties themselves, as the membership becornes increasingly polarized. lncreased intensity is also evident between the 1O parties as the ideological differences between them widens. Parties, consequently, become more "@id and dogmatic, which itself contributes to the explosive "bursting stress" of realignment."25

Burnham also believes that realignments are direct acts of the constituents. Growing tensions in society, which are not adequately dealt with by the existing political parties, escalate to a *flash point." The result is a significant shift in policy andor a transformation of the party system, and a redefinition of the "broad boundaries of the politicaily p~ssible."'~

In applying Bumham's mode1 of critical realignments to the Canadian election of

1993, the sirnilarities become apparent. The spectacular decline of the Conservatives and, to a lessor degree, the NDP; the dominance of the Reform Party and the Bloc Québécois in the Western provinces and Quebec respectively; and the obvious ideological differences between the parties al1 correspond to Bumharn7smode1 of citical realignments.

As stated, Bumharn dehes the political realignment as very intense disruption of the traditional patterns of voting behavior, citing causal factors such as unusual stress on the socioeconomic system, a rejection of "politics as usual," ideological polarization between parties, the rise of third parties and decline of traditional parties. Once again, Bumharn's argument is applicable to the Canadian experience. The first factor identified by Bumham that is common to a political realignrnent is unusual stress on the socioeconomic system. This factor was indeed an issue in the 1993 election as the overall economic situation was the worst since the Great Depression. For the two years pnor to the election, the unemployment rate was hovering at or above the 1 1 percent mark; there was essentially no economic growth; the wages of many workers were being rolled back; the welfare system was strained by II

unparalleled demands; for every dollar collecteci in taxes the federal government was spending

$1.33; and a federal debt of $500 billion was loorning." In a 1993 survey identifjmg the most

impomt election issues, 34 percent of the respondents cited unemployment and jobs as the

number one issue; 23 percent indicated the economy in general; while 21 percent said that

government spending and the defiàt was the major issue." The 1993 survey results are

dramatically different fiom the results from previous election years. The percentage of those

surveyed in 1974, 1979, 1980, 1984, and 1988 that identified the economy in general as the

mon important election issue varies from a low of 2 percent in 1988 to a high of 17 percent;

welt off the 1993 mark.'g Further, with the exception of the 1984 election. unemployment

and jobs was almost insignificant as a major election issue.3o Identifjing aspects of the

economy as the most important electoral issue is not a new trend in Canada, as the 1988

election centered around the issue of fiee trade and prior elections focused on similar

economic topics (such as govemment spending, inflation and the cost of living, unemployment, etcetera). Forbes argues that "[tlhis "economism" of Canadian voters is far

more striking than their "socialism" (references to housing, health, medicare, pensions or women's issues) or their "nationalisrn" (references to national unity, bilingualism, or separatisrn)."" However, the extreme economic difficulties felt prior to the 1 993 election.

Ieft the vast majority of the population concemed for their futures.

Consequently, the political parties adopted various platfons dealing with the economic situation. The Liberais prornised to implement a $6 billion infrastructure program that would stimulate the economy and create jobs, al1 while maintainhg social programs and reducing the deficit. The New Democrats offered a somewhat similar plan to create jobs, 12 preserve social prograrns and reduce the deficit. The governing Conservative Party, with its new leader Kim Campbell attempted to distance itself' from the troubled past as the party was associated with high unemployment, a huge deficit, the Goods and SeMces Tax, and the

Mulroney years. Initially the Conservatives were vague regarding its plans to improve the economic situation and reduce the deficit; however, the party did eventually offer a pian to the voten outhring their strategy for economic prosperity. The Reform Party circumvented the unernployrnent issue and stressed an aggressive platform of reduced government spending and elimination of the deficit. Finally, the Bloc Québécois advocated deficit reduction and the maintenance of social programs until such time as Quebec's separation from Canada was arranged. The ideological differences between the parties regarding economic issues is apparent with some parties stressing job creation (Liberals), others supponing deficit reduction (Reforrn and Conservatives), and still others supporting the maintenance of social prograrns (NDP and Bloc Québécois). Therefore, the first influentid factor of Bumham's rnodel of aitical realignment, ununial stress on the socioeconomic system, is met by the 1993

Canadian federal eiection.

Nevertheless, "[e]conomic considerations alone... seem insufficient to explain the main shifts in the vote between 1 988 and 1993...Some non-economic issues must also have been iduencing the vote."32 According to Bumharn's model, a rejection of "politics as usual" is commonly a factor in electoral realignments. Again, Bumham's model can be applied to the

Canadian expenence, as it can be argued that Canadians "were fed up with the old-style politics then prevalent and were trying to find something new -or old (the Liberal Party)- and better."" This is clearly evident when exarnining the ability of the three successful parties 13

to attract votes 60m 1988 to the 1993. The Liberals captured 52.9 percent of the total vote

wahin Ontario in the 1993 election, up fiom 38.9 percent in 1988; the Reforrn Party managed

to obtain 20.1 percent of the Ontario popular vote in 1993? In Alberta, Reform increased

its share OFthe vote by thirty-seven percentage points (fiom 15.4 percent in 1988 to 52.3

percent in 1993). British Columbia followed this trend with Reform Party jumping from 4.9

percent of the vote in 1988 to 36.4 percent in 1993; the Liberals experienced over a seven

percentage point gain in British Columbia. In Quebec, a traditionally strong region for the

Liberal Party. the Liberal vote increased three percentage points to 33.0 percent in 1993, while the Bloc Québécois captured 49.3 percent of the provincial vote. Overall. the national statistics support these regionai findings, as the Reform Party saw the largest increase in percentage of the vote, followed closely by the Bloc Québécois. The Liberals gained nine percentage points in the 1993 election, while the New Democrats dropped from 20.4 percent of the national vote in 1988 to 6.9 percent in 1993, and finally the Conservatives piunged twenty-seven percentage points. Therefore, it is clear that a large percentage of the Canadian population was rejecting "politics as usual" and searching for alternatives.

The Reform Party and Bloc Québécois, in particular, offered Canadians an alternative to "politics as usual." With its roots in populism, the Reform Party approached politics differently than the traditional parties. Reform delegates have supported populist measures such as the use of recall petitions for Members of Parliament, the relaxation of party discipline in the House of Commons, and the use of referenda. Similarly, the regionally based Bloc

Québécois offered the people of Quebec an alternative to the traditional parties. The Bloc's election platform was clearly distinct (and regional) as it sought to protect the interests of 14

Quebec and help pave the way to the province's eventual separation fiom Canada. The widespread support for the two newly fomed parties can be directly interpreted as a rejection of "politics as usual" and clearly follows Burnham's second criterion in his theory of critical alignment S.

Bumham's third factor in his theory of critical realignments is the emergence of ideological polarization between parties. The econornic polarization between the Canadian parties has already been examined; however, it should be noted that the economic policy conflict that was apparent in the 1993 federal election campaign was not an absolute ideological polarization, but rather a polarization within the context of contemporary, post- war welfare state politics. Further differences between the vanous parties also emerged dunng the 1993 federal election campaign . In particular, the opposing views arnong the parties regarding constitutional issues becarne evident. The failure of the Meech Lake and

Charlottetown Accords, both of which the traditional brokerage parties supported,

"discredited the major parties."" The Reform Party was opposed to both Accords and was absolutely against special or distinct status for any province. Altematively, the separatist Bloc

Québécois argued that Canadians had refused !O recognize the distinct nature of Quebec and

"that Canada as presently constituted (could not) provide the recognition and protection needed by the Québécois and their culture."36 The ideological polarization between the parties becomes clear when examining the two key issues in the 1993 federal election; the economy and the constitutional situation.

Bumham's final factor that is cornmon to political realignrnents is the rise of third parties and decline of traditional parties. This point has already been discussed and is obvious 15

when examining the results of the 1993 election. Two of Canada's traditional parties (the

Conservatives and NDP), that captured a total of 2 12 seats in the 1988 election, were

reduced to a mere eleven seats, while two newcomers (Reform and Bloc Québécois)

captured 106 seats. In sum, ail of the factors outlined in Bumharn's mode1 of political redignments apply to the 1993 Canadian federal election.

While the factors outlined by Burnham in his theory of political realignments were essential elements in the 1993 Canadian electoral realignment, territorial politics, as previously outlined, also played a critical role. The trend in Canadian elections has been one of increasing regionality which promises to make sweeping national victories by one party quite dficult. This is evident when one examines the 1993 election results as the Liberal majority of 177 seats was based mainly in Ontario and the Atlantic provinces where it won a total of

129 seats. A party that is strong in one region of the country will undoubtedly find it difficult to gain significant support in another region simultaneously, "given the intemal regional contlids that have increasingly characterized the Canadian political system.""

Lipset and Rokkan maintain that the process of nation building will lead to a gradua1 reduction of conflict between the different regions of a country. while also reducing conflict between regional and national intere~ts.~~By contrat, the results of the 1993 election appear to prove that territorial clea.vages have, in fact, grown stronger over time. LeDuc recognizes that "the possibility of securing a national political majority with support from al1 parts of the country appears increasingly remote ...For not only is Canada a more politically volatile country than its national elections and Party system make it appear, but the increasing regionalkation of its politics contains within it the seeds of what is already in the eyes of many 16

observers a senous national pr~blem."'~This lads to the argument that any party expecting

to form a majority govemment must appeal to at least two of the three major electoral regions

of the country, which includes the Western provinces, Ontario, and Quebec. The drarnatic

failure of the Conservative Party and resulting 1993 electorai realignment can be further explained by using this argument.

It appears as though the 1993 Canadian federal election closely follows the criteria of criticai reaiignrnents that Key and Burnharn outline. The question that remains, however, is whether the reaiignment will be durable or temporary (a dealignment).

The theories espoused by Key and Burnharn regarding critical realignments are indispensable when aspiring to interpret the results of the 1993 Canadian federal election; nevertheless, it is important to include additional theories that will assist in the explanation.

When considering the increased role of temtotial politics in Canada, the above argument outlining the necessity that a party capture at least two of the three major electoral regions of the country in order to form a majority govemment, becomes quite significant. In fact,

Lusztig expands on this argument with his "High-Risk Strategy" which assists in explaining the dynamics behind the 1993 federal election. Whle Lusztig uses the high-risk strategy to explain why govemments enact free trade, this theory is relevant when discussing political realignments.

The 'High-Risk Strategy'

Lusztig presents the argument that policy-makers seeking potentially 'high-risk' objectives, such as political redignment or the preservation of an existing alignment, will gain support for their goal by various strategies, including the implementation of various policies (such as trade liberali~ation).~Since failure to achieve these lofty goals has serious consequences, "[ellected policy-makers will chose the high-nsk strategy only if the long-term payoffs promise to exceed the short-tenn costs associated with policy innovation."'"

According to the high risk-strategy, the political entrepreneur must be sure to establish a facilitating coalition which includes al1 actors that could potentially obstmct the entrepreneur's objectives. However, in some situations, where state or societal interests do not endorse an initiative and have the ability to block the political entrepreneur's institutional objectives, side-payments or "logrolling" (such as policy innovation) may be required.*'

Consequently, "[l]ogrolling between advocates of institutional design and policy refom that results in realignment (or alignment preservation) in favor of the political entrepreneur constitutes the core of the high-risk strategy.""

Another central factor in this theory is the existence of crises. Regarding this point,

Lusztig states that:

The breakdown of institutional equilibrium -or crisis- is of great interest and importance. At the extreme, when institutional equilibrium is lost, the rules of the game stand to be rewritten. Less dramatically, periods of disequilibrium allow for fundamental changes in direction within the polity.. .Crises represent those points in the alignment game where exogenous forces detemine the breakdown of institutional homeostasis. On the other hand, institutional innovation need not be held hostage to structural deteminism. Skillfid politicai entrepreneurs may be successfùl in manufàcturing a credible alternative to crisis, by bringing about the perception of crïsi~.~

Crisis, whether real or perceiveci, is an essential aspect of this theory as it presents the political entrepreneur with the opportunity to pursue new possibilities. Nevertheless, there is substantid risk associated with this strategy as a severe cnsis may arise where the 18 entrepreneur is unable to capitalize on the opportunities created, as illustrated by the Canadian

Lusztig proposes that former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney sought to maintain his position as leader of the Conservative majority govemment by securing the long-term support of two of the three major electoral regions in Canada (Quebec, and the Western province^).^

Accordingly, "Mulroney carne to power in 1984, determined to effect a partisan realignrnent that would make the Conservatives the new dominant party. Through a series of policy initiatives, he attempted to create a Quebedwestem axis, while taking advantage of underlying philosophical differences and policy-related contlicts within Confederation."" The establishment of this realignrnent would ultimately involve significant risk.

In the past, any Conservative electorai success was usually based in Western Canada, while the party would typically remain cornpetitive in the Atlantic provinces and Ontario.

However, beîween 191 1 and 1984, there were only three elections ( 1930- twenty-four seats,

1958- fifly seats, and 1962- fourteen seats) where the Conservatives captured more than nine seats in Quebec. In 1980, Mulroney acknowledged the Conservative's consistently disappointing electoral results in Quebec, stating that: "With few if any exceptions, the

Consetvative Party has been consigned to the Opposition benches for one reason alone- its failure to win seats in the French-speaking areas of the nation.""

Thus, Mulroney was dnven to establish a permanent political realignment that would position the Conservatives as the dominant party in Quebec, replacing the Liberals. The

Conservatives won f3y-eight seats in Quebec in the 1984 federal election due, in large part, to Mulroney's campaign promise to satisQ the constitutional goals of Quebec by arnending 19

the recently signed Constitution Act. The objective of this constitutional renewal for Quebec

was "to establish a network of grassroots support in a province where none had existed for

almost a century. With constitutional reconciliation, Mulroney hit upon a popular theme in

Quebec. It was both the glue with which to cernent his Quebec "coalition of '8-1" and the

wedge to drive between Quebeckers and their traditional Liberal representatives in Ottawa."*'>

Inherent in this plan was a potentially dangerous problem regarding the existence of

temtorial politics in Canada, as previously outlined. Mulroney faced the threat of alienating

his traditional Western Canadian supporters who already perceived that their concems were

being compromised at the expense of the interests of Central Canada. Consequently,

Mulroney sought to appease Westemers by offering them "side-payments" such as the

deregdation of energy and foreign investment, the founding of the Westem Diversification

Initiative to assist in the diversification of the Westem economy, and the fiee trade

agreement.

The cleavages that exist between Quebec and the West are wide and extremely

significant. Quebec is a francophone province with an economy historically dependent on

finance and industry, whiie the Westem provinces are anglophone with agrarian and resource based economies. Throughout its history, Quebec has continually attempted to protect its culture by demanding special powers that would allow it to become maîtres chez r~ozis.

Quebec's constitutional view is based on the theory that Canada comprises two nations

(English and French) and, therefore, Confederation should be committed to prese~ngand promoting the welfàre of the two founding cultures. Conversely, the Westem provinces have traditionally supported the theory that al1 provinces are equal and that no single province be given special status or greater constitutional powers.

Despite these differences, there was logic behind Mulroney's attempt to establish a

coalition between Quebec and the Western provinces. Both Quebec and the Western

provinces had developed strong feelings of anirnosity towards the previous Liberal

government led by Trudeau. In particular, both regions were unhappy with, what Srniley

cds the Trudeau govemment's "Third National ~olic~."~'This Third National Policy refers

to the Trudeau govemment's attempt to address three aspects of Canadian federalism, which

1. In relation to the French-Engiish dimension, the objective was that rnembers of the two linguistic commwlities should as individuals have equd rights, including the crucial rights to education and to deal with the public authorities in whichever of the official languages they chose, wherever in Canada this was at al1 practical. Thus, French Canada was not to be confined to Quebec, and Ottawa as well as Quebec City had the right to speak for francophone Canadians. 2. The federal govemment was to play an important and visible role in the western and eastern peripheral regions of Canada, particularly in the economic development of those regions. 3. The federal authonties were to take active steps towards the Canadianization of those elements of the economy deemed central to national autonomy and towards domestic control over the most important aspects of national economic development.'*

Smiley argues that the motivation behind the Third National Policy was to counter the widespread temtorial regionalism in the country by increasing the influence and presence of the federal govemment thereby strengthening the allegiance of the Canadian people to the national political community." Accordingly, this would include such policies as the National

Energy Program (1980), the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, incorporated in the

Constitution Act [ 19821, and the creation of a Western Development Fund ( 198 1 ).

With the Conservative electoral victory in 1984, the centralizing policies of the 2 1

Trudeau govemment were ended. Further, Mulroney sought to strengthen his support in

Western Canada with the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement which would promote econornic diversification and prevent future interventions by the federal govemment, as witnessed in 1980 with the NEP. Mulroney believed that free trade would dso ensure the support of the Western premiers, which was essential in his attempt at institutional reforrn

(through the Meech Lake Accord). However, "the western population harbored a long- standing antipat hy toward what it perceived to be Quebec's preferential treatment wit hin

Confederation;" still, Mulroney was ready to gamble that the institution of free trade would secure westem support of his constitutional initiative." The acceptance of Mulroney's constitutional package, entitled the Meech Lake Accord, would solidi& the support of the

Conservative Party in Quebec and ultirnately achieve the desired electoral reaiignment .

One irnperative aspect of the high risk strategy, the perception of crisis, was used by

Mulroney to ensure that the provincial legislatures ratified the agreement. As the June 23,

1 990 deadline drew near, three provinces had yet to rat@ the deal; including Manitoba, New

Brunswick, and Newfoundland. The first ministers' coderence held between June 3-9, 1990,

"was dedicated to overcoming opposition to the Meech Lake Accord in three provinces,

Mulroney cast the discussion in terms of Canada's su~valas a nation. By the end of the conference, ail three recalcitrant premiers had agreed to seek ratification of the a~cord."'~In spite of Mulroney's efforts, the Meech Lake Accord died on June 23, 1990.

Regarding the high-risk strategy, Mulroney's facilitating coalition consisting of the ten provincial premiers and the business community had weaknesses. Ideally, Mulroney's interest-brokering wouid mean that supporters of constitutional refom and trade liberalization 22

would become ailies. The Prime Minister's "tactics -of brokering interests and buying off

potential opposition with his prowestern initiatives, secretive elite bargaining, and the skillful

creation of a facilitating coalition- dmost suded, at least on the surface. With ratification

in the provincial and federal legislatures apparently at hand, constitutionai entrenchrnent

seemed likely within the three year limit."% However, afler the re-election of Mulroney in

1988 and the passage of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, western support

for Meech Lake and the Conservative Party weakened. This factor, dong with the increased

dissatisfaction for the accord within the population, led to the failure of Mulroney's

facilitating coalition.

As is apparent in the title of Lusztig's 'High-Risk Strategy,' there are consequences

for failure. Mulroney's failure to achieve electoral realignment in the form of a

QuebedWestem axis alienated both of the regions that he was attempting to secure which, in tum, decimateci the Conservative Party and lefi the country with a real and dangerous cnsis that threatens its future (the last Quebec sovereignty referendum provides proof of this).

The high-risk strategy assists in explaining the electoral realignrnent in 1993. The feelings of isolation that persisted in Quebec afler the failure of two constitutional initiatives by Mulroney (this includes the doomed Charlottetown Accord of 1992) led many voters to turn to the Bloc Québécois. While in the West, the electorate grew weary of Mulroney's continued attempts at constitutional reform and the domination of the political agenda by

Quebec, and consequently turned to the regionally based Reform Party.

Theory Regarding Third Party Failure and Success

Since Codederation, no party has ever fonned the Official Opposition without 23

capturing at least forty seats in Parliament. Further, only two times in Canadian electoral

history, prior to 1993, has a Party other than the Liberals and Conservatives managed to

achieve this level of success- the Progressives in 1921 and the New Democratic Party in

1988. The election of forty members to the House of Commons represents a benchmark for

party success, while also increasing a party's status in Parliament and raising its national

standing as a 'contending party' .

In the 1993 federal election, both the Reform Party and the Bloc Québécois reached

this benchmark and rnaintained it in the 1997 federal election; marking the first time in history

that this has been achieved by non-traditional parties. The success of these two parties in

consecutive elections marked the end of the stable party equilibrium and initiated either a

period of realignment or dealignment. Accordhg to Bumham, however, it is not without long

historical perspective that one can determine whether an election marked the beginning of a

period of realignment or dealignrnent. Nevertheless, the examination of available evidence dows for a prediction. If a party cmcapture a minimum of forty seats than it can be viewed as a 'contending party'. If this support proves stable and durable (that is, the retention of forty seats for at least a generation-- five elections), than the 1993 federal election can be considered a realigning election.''

Determiring whether the 1993 federai election is a durable realignment or a temporary dealignment of the Canadian party system will, ultimately, depend on the futures of the two new parties. Ifsupport for the Refonn Party and Bloc Québécois is merely temporary, and the parties' support base is characterized by flexibiliîy and instability, then the 1993 and 1997 elections will be known as a period of dealignment. Furthemore, t here is the possibility that 24 only one of these parties wili sud.This would also represent a durable realignment of the party system.

The 192 1 election marked the first major breakthrough of a third party in Canadian federal politics as the Progressive Party captured sixty-five seats. Since 192 1, third parties have enjoyed a relatively high level of support in Canada, as most countries with a single- member pluraiity electoral system are dominated, stnctly, by two parties." Recent elections have seen the number of parties seeking electoral support reach double digits; less popular parties include the Christian Heritage Party, Green Party, Marxisî-Leninist Party, Natural Law

Party, Abolitionist Party, as well as several others. Support for third parties in Canada has varied from 1 2 percent of the national vote in 1 95 8 to 32 percent in 1945 to a high of 43 percent in 1993.'~These numbers are easily contrasted to the Arnerican experience, as third parties in the United States have been "epherneral," usually gaining limited support and fading aAer one electi~n.~

The success of third parties is difEcult to masure as the various parties have different goals; that is, some parties enter the political arena simply to influence policy while, others seek as much power as possible and aspire to, eventually, form govemment. Nevertheless, a cornmon element among al1 parties, including third parties, is the goal of gaining enough popular support to ensure a strong voice in Parlia~nent.~'

Several third parties have achieved success in influencing national policy. For example, the Liberal Party adopted several policies of the Progressive Party and also recruited a number of its members, while the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation's platfonn regarding the creation of the Canadian welfare state was also borrowed by the ~iberals.~' 25

These accomplishrnents corne with a price, however, as third parties often lose support when the electorate realizes that they can vote for an established party that supports their goals and has a very good chance of forrning g~vernrnent.~~Furthermore. many third parties base their entire platform on one issue or a very limited number of issues which may, initially, attract a portion of the electorate that has a high level of interest in that particular issue, but leaves the party susceptible should the voters decide that the issue is no longer as important as other mattersa

Electorally, new parties often achieve greater levels of success at the provincial level, with many forming governments. This includes several parties that are considered third parties at the federal level, such as the Social Credit Party, and the CCFMDP. In addition to these parties, the United Famiers of Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario, the Union Nationale, and the Parti Québécois have al1 formed provincial governrnents. The existence of a functioning provincial branch of a federal party greatly enhances the latter's chances for survival and future success." This is especially true for national third parties who are more dependent on their provincial allies? Winn argues that "[wlhen the future of a federal party is seen to be bleak, the existence of a provincial party in power cari be a great source of morale and resources. Incumbent parties at the provincial level are able to ernploy at public expense party organizers as well as public relations experts? who proclaim the achievements of their govemment and hence of the incumbent art^.''^' Furthermore, "[a] successful provincial party helps maintain the allegiance of party workers at the federal le~el.'~~~The financial assistance provided by the provincial Social Credit parties in Alberta and British

Columbia to the national party helped them continue, while the provincial CCF-NDP in 26

British Columbia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan provided invaluable finances, rnembership, and organizational assistance to the national ~arty.~~

In "Falling From Grace: Non-Established Brokerage Parties and the Weight of

Predominance in Canadian Provinces and Australian States," James, Lusztig, and Moon develop a typology of phes and argue that there are three central factors that contribute to party persistence: stable ascriptive foundations, psychologically based party identification, and incumben~y.'~While the authors apply their theory to the provincial level, several aspects of their argument can be employed at the national level in Canada.

A stable ascnptive foundation provides a basis for long-term party support which emerges fiom societal divisions based on ascriptive characteristics such as social class, religion, and language." A party can count on entrenched support from voters if it is able to represent effectively the electorate dong a dominant cleavage line." Once established, these cleavages can remain in place for generations thus leading to "socialized patterns of electoral behavior," an4 ultimately, to "trans-generational attachment to, and support for, a political party" (James, Lusztig, and Moon refer to this as "Socialized Party Identification" or PU))."

Similarly, Lipset and Rokkan believe that the socialization of the electorate is essential in establishing patterns of voting behavior." The argument advanced by Lipset and Rokkan

States that those parties existing at the institution of universal suffrage have a cornpetitive advantage over parties that emerge later. A party that exists at the introduction of cornpetitive elections is able to attract members of the electorate with no prior partisan identlfcations, while parties that aise subsequently must "demobiize" voters who support the original parties in order to mobilize support for thern~elves.~~Lipset and Rokkan refer to this 27 as the "fieezing of the electorate.""

A third factor that contributes to party persistence, according to James, Lusztig, and

Moon, is incumbency. Rose and Macke argue that incumbency grants a distinct advantage in elections; they note that the incurnbent party has been victorious in 6 1 percent of Anglo-

American national elections since 1948." A party that relies on incumbency alone, and has no stable socid foundation, is prone to electorai failure."

Party formation is one option that populist movements usudly consider when developing strategies to achieve change (Social Credit, the CCF-NDP, and the Refonn Party are examples of movements that chose to form political parties). Many members of these movements are apprehensive about entenng electoral politics, as they fear the loss of the

"ideological zeal" that drives the rn~vernent.~Consequently, many of these parties are

"Milnerable to both electoral success and electoral failure."" If the party fails to achieve its electoral objectives, the ideologues wüi argue that the movement should remain faithfùl to its doctrine and will question the validity of pursuing the electoral option." Alternately, the pragmatists in the party will desire political power to fulfill the movement's objectives, especially if some electoral success is achieved." The Progressives experienced a similar problem as this which eventually led to its failure.

Roger Levy expands on this discussion in his article entitled "Third Party Decline in the UK: The SNP and SDP in Comparative Perspective." In examining third party decline in the United Kingdom, Levy argues that poor electoral performance, coupled with factionalisrn and codict within a Party, will often lead to its fail~re.'~As electoral decline sets in, initial dihisions within the party deepen and members focus more on interna1 rather 28

than extemal factors, eroding electoral support further.u Unless this downward spiral cm be

reversed, the party is likely to fail.

The Progressive Party was the first third party to prosper at the federal level. while

the Bloc and Refom are the latest in a string of third parties to emerge successfùlly. This

examination of various theories behind party success and failure provides the necessary

context for the next two chapters which will examine the Reforrn Party and Bloc Québécois,

respectively, and evaluate the chances for their su~val.

Conclusion

Key and Bumham established a foundation for the study of electoral anomalies in the

United States; however, the observations of these two authors are more universally

applicable. The surprising results of the 1993 federal election provide an opportunity to apply

the theories of Key and Burnharn to a Canadian case which, as previously illustrated, closely

follows their guidelines of critical electoral realignrnents.

In addition to the explanations for electoral realignments provided by Key and

Burnham, the existence of temtorial politics in Canada also played a role in the 1993

Canadian federal election. While the maintenance of brokerage politics in Canada has

generaily managed to placate the territorial cleavages in the country, two regionally based and

ideologically oriented parties -the Reform Party and Bloc Québécois- enjoyed unprecedented

success in the 1993 election. Lusztig's 'High-Risk Strategy' assists in explaining the success of these protest parties by examining Mulroney's failed attempt to achieve electoral realignrnent in Canada.

The future success of the Reform Party and Bloc Québécois, to be discussed in 29

Chapters Two and Three respectively, will determine whether the 1993 election was, in fact, a realignment or a deaiignrnent. Several scenarios could ultimately emerge and shape the

Canadian party system: both parties could fail, one could suMve while the other fades away, or both could succeed. Applying the various theories examined in this chapter will aid in determining the fate of these two parties. Endnotes

1 .V.O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections," The Journal of Politics, (17) 1955. p. 1.

2.H.D. Forbes, "Interpreting the 1993 Election," in H. Thorbum, ed., Party Politics in Canada- Th ed. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1 996.p. 558.

3.S.M. Lipset & S. Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alienments. New York: The Free Press, 1967. p. 13.

4.For a discussion on the existence of a religious cleavage in Canada see: J. Meisel, "Religious Affiliation and Electoral Behaviour: A Case Study," in J. Courtney, ed., Voting -. -. Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1967. pp. 144- 16 1 ., J. Meisel, "Bizarre Aspects of a Vanishing Act: The Religious Cleavage and Voting in Canada," in J. Meisel, Working &pers on Canadian Politics. 2nded. Montreal: McGilI-Queen's University Press, 1975. pp. 253-284. And W. P. I~ne,"Explaining the Religious Basis of the Canadian Partisan Identity: Success on the Third Try," in Canadian Journal of Political Science. 1974.

5.E. Gidengil, "A Quarter Century of Canadian national Election Studies," in Canadian Journal of Political Science. June, 1992. pp.2 19-248.

6.H.D. Clarke, J. Jenson, L. LeDuc and J.H.Parnmett, Absent Mandate: Canadian Electoral Politics in an Era of Restnicturinq. 3d ed. Toronto: Gage, 1996. p.94.

7.See H.D.Clarke et al., Absent Mandate & H.D.Clarke and M.C. Stewart, "Canada," in M. Franklin, T. Mackie, and H. Valen, eds., Electoral Chanee: Responses to Evolvinq Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. And R. Alford, Partv and Societv: - The Aneio Arne rican Democracies. Chicago : Rand McNaIly, 1 963.

8.R. Gibbins, RePionalism: Temtonal Politics in Canada and the United States. Toronto: Buttenvorths, 1982. p. 158.

1O.Ibid. pp. 164-165.

1 1 .L. LeDuc, "Canada: The Politics of Stable Dealignment," in R.J. Dalton, S.C. Flanagan, and P. A. Beck eds., Electoral Chanee in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realienment or Dealipment? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. p. 403.

1 3. See Clarke et al., Absent Mandate.3rd ed. & Appendix A, H. Thorbum, ed., Party Politics in Canada. 7' ed. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1996. 14.LeDuc. "Canada: The Politics of Stable Dealignment," p.403.

16s. Brooks, Canadian Democracy: An Introduction. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993. p.211.

1 ï.Gibbins, &jonaiism: Temtorial Politics in Canada and the United States. p. 163.

18.K.D. McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in K.D.McRae ed., Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Semented Societies. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974. Pp.247-248.

19.A. Siegfhed, The Race Ouestion in Canad~Underhill, ed., Toronto: McCIelland and Stewart (Carleton University Edition), 1966. pp. 1 13- 1 14.

20.D. Cameron, "The Beginning of the Endgame: Canada's Recent General Election," in H. Thorbum, ed., mPoliticsinCanada.ed. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1996. p.55 1.

2 t Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections," p. 3.

22.Ibid. While the percentage of voter tumout in the 1993 federal election dropped fiom the level reached in the 1988 election, it is in line with voter tumout over the last twenty years. Clarke et al., Absent Mandate.3rd ed. p. 191.

23 .Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections," p.8.

24.W.D. Burnham. Critical Elections and the Mainsprines of Amencan Politics. New York: Norton & Company. 1970. p.6.

27.Forbes, "Interpreting the 1993 Election," p. 559.

ZSClarke, et al., Absent Mandate. 3" ed. p.29.

3 1 .Forbes, "Interpreting the 1993 Election," p.559. 33 .Cameron, "The Beginning of the Endgame: Canada's Recent General Election," p.549.

34.AiI electorai statistics in this paragraph from: Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Re~oa of the Chief Electoral Officer: Thirt-fourth General Election 1988. ûttawa: Chief Electoral Officer, 1988. And Chief Electord Officer of Canada, Officia1 Votin~:Resuits: S-mopsis- Thirtv-fifth General Election 1993. ûttawa: Chief Electoral Officer, 1993.

35.Clarke, et al, Absent Mandate. p.47.

36.Forbes. "Interpreting the 1993 Election," p.563.

37.LeDuc. "Canada: The Politics of Stable Dealignrnent," p. 424.

38.Lipset and Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Ali-ments. Chapter 1.

39.LeDuc, "Canada: The Politics of Stable Dealignment," p. 424.

40.Lusztig Risking Free Trade: The Politics of Trade in Britain. Canada Mexico. and the United States. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996. p. 15.

44. Ibid. pp.2 1-22.

46.Ibid. Chapters 1 and 4.

48.8. Mulroney, Where 1 Stand. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1983. p.90.

49.Lusztig9 Riskine Free Trade: The Politics of Trade in Britain. Canada. Mexico. and the United States. p.78.

5 1 .D.V. Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987. Chapter 7. 53. Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada. p. 1 8 1.

54.Lusztig Risking Free Trade: The Poiitics of Trade in Britain. Canada Mexico. and the United States. p.82.

57.This standard eliminates 'peripheral parties' such as the CCF-NDP, the Progressives, and the Social Credit .

58.M.Duverger, Political Parties. (Trans. B. North and R. North) New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963. An acceptable definition of third parties is established by Pinard as "any nontraditional party which has not yet been in power. It thus remains in the eyes of the voters as an untried alternative.'' M. Pinard, "Third Parties in Canada Revisited," in Canadian Journal of Political Sciene. 6,3 September, 1973. p.455.

59.A.G.Gagnon and A.B. Tanguay, "Minor Parties in the Canadian Political System: Origins, Functions, Impact," in A.G. Gagnon and A.B. Tanguay, eds., canadian Parties in Transition. 2""ed. Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1996. p. 106.

60.A.G. Gagnon and A.B. Tanguay, "Minor Parties of Protest in Canada: Origins, Impact, and Prospects," in A.G. Gagnon and A.B. Tanguay, eds., Canadian Parties in Transition. Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1989. p.22 1.

6 1.See C. Winn and J. McMenemy, eds. Political Parties in Canada. Toronto: McGraw- Hill Ryerson, 1976. Chapter One., F.C. Engelmann and M.A. Schwartz, Canadian Political Parties: Orimn. Character. Impact. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1975, Chapers One, Two, and Nine., And H. Bakvis, ed. Representation. Intemation. and Political Parties inCanada.Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991. Chapters One through Six.

62,Bakvis, Representation. Intemation. and Political Parties in Canada. p. 101

64.M.Covell, Parties as Institutions of National Govemance," in H. Bakvis, ed. Representation. Inte~rationand Political Parties in Canada. p.96.

65.C. Winn, "Elections," in Wim and McMenemy, eds., Political Parties in Canada. p. 122. 69.ibid.

70.P. James, M. Lusztig, and J. Moon, "Failing From Grace: Non-Established Brokerage Parties and the Weight of Predominance in Canadian Provinces and Australian States," in forthcoming Publius.

73. ibid. See also Lipset and Rokkan, Party Svstems and Voter Alienments.

74.Lipset and Rokkan, Party Sptems and Voter Alignments. pp. 1-64.

75.R. Rose and T. Mackie, "Do Parties Persist or Fail? The Big Trade-off Facing Organizations," in K. Lawson and P.H.Merkl, eds., When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. p.547.

76.Lipset and Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments. p.50.

77.R. Rose and T. Mackie, "Incurnbency in Government: Asset or Liability?" in H. Daalder and P. Mair, eds., Western European Party Svstems. Sage: London, 1983.

78.James et al., "Failing From Grace: Non-Established Brokerage Parties and the Weight of Predominance in Canadian Provinces and Australian States," p.5.

79.Gagnon and Tanguay, "Minor Parties in the Canadian Politicai System," p. 109.

80.Covell, "Parties as Institutions of Governance," p.96.

8 1 .See ibid. p.96. and Gagnon and Tanguay, "Minor Parties in the Canadian Political System," p. 109.

82.Ibid.

83.R. Levy, "Third Party Decline in the UK: The SNP and SDP in Comparative Perspective," in West European Politics 1 1 (3)- 1988.

84.Ibid. See also M. Pinard, The Rise of a Third Party: A S~dyin Crisis Politics. Toronto: Prentice-Hall. Chapter 6. CHAPTER TWO- Western Canada and the Reform Party

The concept of alienation is a central component of political life in Canada. The 1993 federal election provided an outlet for the expression of these feelings of alienation throughout Canada. This was particularly apparent in the Western provinces and Quebec where the relatively new Reform Party and Bloc Québécois, respectively, enjoyed unprecedented success by reinforcing regional cleavages and political orientations. As a consequence of the 1993 federal election, there has been speculation about the future of the

Canadian party system.'

The Canadian party system wili be considered to be in a period of realignment if the voting patterns that have emerged from the 1993 and 1997 federal elections become stable and durable. This chapter makes the prediction that the Western electorate has aligned itself behind the Reform Party and, as a consequence, the Canadian party system is in a period of realignment. The criteria for political realignments established by Burnharn and Key will be applied to the Westem provinces to assist in advancing the argument that the 1993 federal election was a realigning election. Further, an analysis of the voting results fiorn several successive federal elections, including the recent 1997 election, will provide additional support for the prediction that the 1993 federal election will corne to be seen as a realigning election. Attention will aiso be paid to the circurnstances that led to the breakdown of traditional electoral aliegiances in the West and, ultimately, to the widespread support of the

Refom Party in 1993 and 1997. in addition, the various theories regarding party success and failure established in the previous chapter will be applied to the Reform Party to assist in establishg the argument presented in this chapter. However, the chapter will begin with a 36 bnef examination of the West's regional political consciousness, which provides the context necessary to aid in determining the factors behind the emergence of the Reform Party.

The Development of Alienation in Western Canada

While an argument to the contrary could be made, it is a cornmon belief that the

Westem provinces have shared a common history as seen in their fiontier experience, geographic situation, and demographic growth. It is these factors that uni5 the Westem provinces and gant the region its distinctiveness. The result has been the development of a regional political consciousness.' This regional consciousness has seen the rejection of the traditional party system and the widespread growth of several third parties or populist movements. Further, the Western provinces have acquired a "threatened regional self interest," and consequently developed a political awareness which "stands apart fiom the broader political culture of English Canada."' This view is supported by Pammet, who reasons that Westerners are more inclined to view Canada in regional terms and place more importance on provincial govemments than are other Canadians.*

The early settlers of the Western provinces came in the hope of achieving prospenty and independence. A common element among these people was their dependence on agriculture (wheat in particular) and natural resources. This dependence was plagued by uncertainty due to environmental and economic conditions. Immigrants to the Western provinces were quickly introduced to the harsh realities of the Canadian climate and landscape, while isolation from the econornic centers was a growing concem. Over time these concems were reaiized, as Westernen found that they lacked control of their fate since power rested with the owners of the land companies and those who ran the Grain Exchange.' 37

The national political parties were largely controlled by the Eastem business elites with whom Westernen dealt. Thus, it made little difference to the West which party held power, as both the Liberals and Consenatives seemed equally unsympathetic. Subsequently, one could contend that Canada was controlled and run by Ontario and Quebec for their own benefit, while Western Canada remained an economic colony of the country's central heartland.%aving been developed as a region for the profitable investment of Eastem capital and as a market for rnanufaaured goods, the Westem provinces were repeatedly plagued by economic and political decisions originating in Eastern Canada.'

The discontent that arose out of ths situation seemed like a natural consequence, settlement patterns would later reflect this discontent. The immigrants that settled in

Canada's West during the boom years (1 896-1 9 1 1 ) came mainly fiom four regions: Ontario. generally settling in Manitoba; the United States, largely settling in Alberta; Great Bntain, largely settling in Saskatchewan and British Columbia; and continental Europe, settling throughout the West. While the immigrants from Ontario were not generally radical in nature, those that came from the United States and Great Britain had experienced radical political rnovements before leaving for Canada.* Due to the diverse origins of settlers frorn continental Europe, their ideological impact was relatively minor (an exception was the

Eastern European influence in the Communist Party); nevertheless, this group represented a large "swing factor," helping to elect and defeat partie^.^

The British settlers would have been familiar with the Labour party and its agenda, while the Amencan immigrants would likely have been part of one of the farm or political movements, such as the American Progressive party or the Non-Partisan ~eague." 38

Accordingly, many Amencan and British settlers would be more inclined to act in order to express their discontent. using their past experience to guide them. This could, at least in part, explain the West's initial support of third parties.

An argument could also be made that western alienation has been "reinforced by historia1 patterns of economic developrnent."" The National Policy of 1879 is an example of legislation passed by the federal govenunent which promoted feelings of alienation in the

Western provinces. Consequently, these feelings of alienation have been expressed through the support of populist movements or parties of protest.

The National Policy placed the West in a subordinate position to Ontario and Quebec.

There were three major components of this policy: the encouragement of immigration through the development of national land-settlement patterns; the development of a national transportation system to facilitate the development of the West and aid eastem industrial development; and the establishment OF high tariffs to encourage the development of industry that would provide jobs for Canadian entrepreneurs. "

The second component of the National Policy, the national transportation policy. demonstrates this spatial bias. The rail companies, with the consent of the national government, charged separate freight rates for different commodities while the distances traveled remained similar. Both the governent and rail companies referred to this as 'fair discrimination'. The rationalization for this practice was that the Canadian Pacific Railway

(CPR) had to charge lower rates in the rest of Canada in order to compete with the other modes of transportation. The CPR also successfûlly argued that the West should be charged higher rates to pay for the construction and maintenance of the new transcontinental line. The 39 practice of Eiir discrimination was supported by successive federal administrations and used as an instrument to establish and maintain the West as a market for Central Canada. As a consequence, fieight rates consumeci roughiy 50 percent of the farmers' gross income during the 1880s." In addition, these inflated freight rates discouraged the development of local rnanufacturing because of the high costs of transportation to eastern markets. By 1929, 20 percent of the Canadian population lived in the prairie provinces while only IO percent of the country's manufacturing sector was iocated in this region."

The National Policy also sought to establish high tariffs to aid in the development of the Canadian manufacturing sector. Settlement in the West would provide a market for these manufacturers who were largely located in Ontario and Quebec. Prime Minister Wilfnd

Laurier stated that the "best way to help the manufacturers of Canada is to fil1 up the prairie regions of Manitoba and the Northwest with a prosperous and contented people who will be consumers of manufacturing goods of the East."15

The tariff policy had a negative impact on the prairie region. Most importantly, the high tariff increased the cost of fimachinery, thus making it difficult for Canadian farmers to afford the necessary equipment and, accordingly, more difficult to compete with the

Americans. Furthemore, the high cost of machinery reduced the Pace of western development as marginal land could not be farmed profitably. The high tariff also diverted income to the manufacturers away fiom the fmers and discouraged the mechanization of agriculture. These are factors that would have advanced the position of the Canadian producer in the international commodities market?

As a consequence of spatial policies such as the National Policy, the alienation and 40

subsequent organization of the fmers began soon fier the prairies had been opened to

settlers. The Western farmers looked to the United States where farmers had united to

safeguard their interests, the insecurity and relative powerlessness of the single fmer was

overcorne by united action. l7 Subsequently, grain growers' associations were formed in al1

three prairie provinces by 1905. Their purpose was to provide farmers with information

regarding their legal and political rights teach them the importance of collective action, and

reinforce the significance and dignity of being a fmer." In general the grain growers'

associations united the farmers and imbued them with a sense of political efficacy.lg

This discontent could also be seen in the growing number of labor or socialist parties.

These presented much the same critique of the roots of dienation as the fmers did, but they

proposed more radical solutions that reflected the ide& of socialism. These groups were

generdy willing to support other movements whose goai it was to improve the situation of the workers. Accordingly, they shared similar interests with the fmers' movement. In

addition to reinforcing the significance and dignity of being a fmer, the farm groups also argued that through a united movement, the farmer would gain recognition and politicai influence. This was also the case for the socialist and labor parties, as they looked to praise the integrity of the cornmon worker while calling for united action to achieve recognition and influence. Both fmand labor groups "provided a social center for people who felt themselves cut off or alienated" and reinforced "the importance of study and self improvement ."20

Before the onset of the Great Depression, many Westemers began to feel that they were achieving some economic and political success. Provincially, the United Farmen of 4 1

Alberta and the United Parmers of Manitoba captured power, while the Westem based

Progressive Party had successfùly emerged at the federal level. However, the Depression had

devastating effects in the West and led to an increase in feelings of dienation. The Depression

acted as a catalyst in the growth of parties such as the Cooperative Commonwealth

Federation and the Social Credit Party. These Western-based parties provided altemate solutions to the prevailing economic and politicai problems. The National Policy and the

Great Depression were critical in the political development of the West, providing proof that

"the West, if too much tried, would and could resort to independent political action.""

The period after World War II marked a tuming point for Westem Canada as the population in this region became increasingly urbanized, while the economy became more diversified and less dependent on agiculture." This region dso experienced political change during the post-war years, with federal politics returning to a more conventional style. The traditional parties managed to regain the support of a majority of the Western electorate after experiments with the Progressive Party and Social Credit. The Conservative Party, in particular, managed to attract substantial and durable electoral support in the Westem provinces during the 1958 federal election; retaining the majority of this support for more than three decades. Further, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, after experiencing declining support in successive elections, was transformed into the New Democratic Party in

196 1 -- resulting in an increase in the party's percentage of the popular vote and number of seats (rnainiy in British Columbia and Saskatchewan). The survival of the NDP is significant, as it represents the only third party to consistently capture a significant percentage of the popular vote in Canada and elect members to Parliament. 42

Regionalisrn appeared to be in decline in the period afier World War II, and was reduced fùrther with the election of Diefenbaker and the Conservative Party in 1958.

Diefenbaker, a Westemer himself, appeared more sympathetic to western grievances than previous Liberal governments.D Furthemore, the Conservatives offered an "open-door io fmers, leading directly to the Prime Minister," which satisfied the West's desire for influence and recognition." However, relations between the West and Ottawa deteriorated der the re-election of the Libeds in the 1963 federal election (with minimal Western support). The

Liberal govement's release of the National Energy Program (NEP), led to a drarnatic increase in feelings of dienation and regionalism in the West.

Federd-provincial relations regardmg natural resources in the West have, histoncally, been quite hostile. This hostility reached a peak in 1980 with the release of the Trudeau govement's National Energy Pmgram. It is argued that the NEP was a "centralist, nationalist and interventionist political and policy initiative which at its core was intended to substantially restructure the key relationships of power and the sectorai and regional distribution of wealth in Canadian energy poli tic^."^' There were four main components of the NEP: unilateral imposition of a new four-year pricing regime for oil and natural gas; the establishment of a new revenue-sharing scheme which would increase Ottawa's share of petroleum revenues by levying several new taxes, including a new tax on natural gas sold in

Canada or exported; the launching of a massive energy substitution program to reduce oil exports; and the creation of a program to increase Canadian ownership in the petroleum industryz6

For Westernen the NEP provided a prime example of a national policy that aimed to 43 redistribute westem wealth. In addition, the NEP demonstrated the relative inability of national institutions to provide effective regional representation and protection. Western

Canadians believed that it was not a coïncidence that the NEP was released soon fier the defeat of the Conservatives and election of a Liberai government with only two members fiom the est." Estimates of the total cost of the NEP on the Westem economy approxirnate a loss of $ i 00 billion and thousands of jobs in Alberta al~ne.'~Gibbins States that "there is liale question that the NEP, although now dismantled, will live on into the indefinite future as a symbol of western discontent, playing the same role in the years ahead that fieight rates and the Canadian Pacific Railway played in the past."'g In the federal election held four years after the release of the NEP, Mulroney and the Conservative Party captured an overwhelming majority of the country's seats.

The Füse of the Reform Party of Canada

As illustrated in Chapter One, Mulroney's attempt to establish a permanent political realignrnent that wouid position his Conservative Party as the dominant force in Quebec and the Westem provinces failed, alienating both regions. This granted the Reform Party an excellent opportunity to advance its platform, as many Westerns were looking for an alternative to the Conservatives. The Mulroney government's fixation with Quebec and its place in the Canadian federation, the extension of official bilingualism to the provincial level, the awarding of appointments based on patronage, and rumon of corruption appeared to represent little change from the Trudeau-led Liberals (unpopular in the West for policies such as the NEP and its preoccupation with the Quebec iss~e).'~These policies, and Mulroney's failed attempt at realignment, resulted in an increase in feelings of discontent and allowed the 44

Reform Party the opportunity it needed to capitalize on this discontent.

In 1987, the Western Refonn Association was established by Edmonton consultant

Preston Manning (son of the former Alberta Social Credit premier, Emest Manning), Calgary

lawyer John Muir, and Vancouver investment counselor Stan Roberts after the Conservative

government announced that a major Canadian aerospace contract (to build CF- 18 fighters)

would be assigned to Quebec regardless of a more cost effective and technically superior bid

from a Manitoba-based group." Under the slogan 'The West Wants In,' the Association

voiced concems regarding the irresponsible spending of the national government, the

preoccupation with issues centenng around Quebec and the indifference shown to western

interests. Soon aAer the Association was formed, the decision was made to transform it into

a political party with Preston Manning as the leader. The newly established Reform Party

constructeci a platform that supported the principle of a Triple E Senate (equal, elected, and

effective), rejected official bilingualism, support ed measures of direct democracy (such as the referendurn and recall), and opposed the Meech Lake Accord, which it claimed gave special status to Quebec while not revising the ~enate.~'There is little doubt that Reform was "born out of the discontents and hstrated aspirations of Western Canada," as there was a growing feeling that the federal Liberals and Conservaives were not addressing the needs of the West, with the NEP and official bilingualism as prime examples of policies that favored Central

Canada over other regions. The Reform Party provided an alternative to the traditional

partie^.'^

The rnembership of the Reform Party is largely made up of older, conservative,

"traditionally-rninded" Canadians, most of whom were supporters of the Progressive 45

Conservative Party federally." Many Reform supporters have been drawn to the party due,

in large part, to its distinctive position, in relation to the traditionai parties, on numerous

political issues, such as concem over govemment spending, the welfare state, special rights

for minorities, and the role of Quebec in Canada."

In 1988, Reform entered electoral politics fielding seventy-two candidates (al1 in the

Western provinces) and, while the party won no seats, it did capture 15 percent of the popular

vote in Alberta? The party won its first seat in a 1989 Alberta by-election which, in hind-

sight, could be viewed as an indication of the events to corne in the 1993 election.

Pnor to the 1993 election, Manning was given an excellent opportunity to attract national exposure for his party by opposing the Liberals, Conservatives, and New Democrats and their support for the Charlottetown Accord. Manning was able to articulate a central component of his party's platform; that is, the rejection of special status for minorities and

Quebec. Furthemore, Manning was able to capitalize on a prevaient feeling among

Canadians; that the political leaders were not properly representing the interests of their constituents and were more interested in maintaining national electoral coalition^.'^

More recently, the Reform party fought the 1993 federal election on a platform of fiscal restraint, deficit reduction, and decentralization. The Reform Party adopted stances on these national issues in an attempt to broaden its support and become a national party rather than limit itself to regional issues and the Western provinces. In addition, the party's traditional policies supporthg a Triple E Senate, better representation, and direct democracy were upheld, while t continued to reject special status for Quebec The election of fi*-two

Reform candidates to the House of Cornmons in 1993 was a stunning turn of events, as the 46

West had previously supported Mulroney's Conservatives. Reform's electoral support was

centered in Western Canada; however. the party placed second in fifty-eight Ontario

constituencies and recorded the second highest percentage of the vote in the province.''

Despite these high numbers, Manning's party only captured one seat; nevertheless, Reform

was the only party other than the Liberals to win a seat in Ontario.

Since 1993, the Reform Party has maintained its efforts to broaden its support

nationaily and continued to advocate a right-wing economic platform, while upholding its

support for populist measues and the equality of al1 Canadians. In the 1997 federal election.

the Reform Party managed to increase its number of seats in the House of Cornrnons to sixty

and gain Official Opposition status, but did not succeed in capturing any seats east of

Manitoba, thus retaining its status as a regionally based Party. Reform's lack of success in

Ontario is largely blarned on the hard-line stance the party took regarding Quebec and Quebec

politician~.~~

Realignment in Western Canada

In a realigning party system, a significant percentage of the electorate (enough to elect

forty members to Parliament) believe that the issues of concem to them (and other people like

them) are best addressed. in the long-term, by one specific party that offers "something different than its ~ompetitom."~Further, the voters (within a region or an entire country) in a realigning party system support one particular party that advances the cause of their specific

social group and "espouses readily identifiable ideological positions."" The Canadian party

system will be considered to be in a period of realignrnent ifthe support that the Refonn Party received in the 1993 federal election continues and proves to be long-lived. 47

The Reform Party has achieved the required benchmark of forty seats and cm, consequently, be considered a 'contendhg party7. In the 1993 federal election, Reform captured 34 percent of the popular vote in the West and fifty-one seats. Refom increased its popular support in Western Canada in the 1997 federal election, obtauiing 39.4 percent of the popuiar vote and sixty of the region7seighty-eight seats. The Reform Party (and Bloc

Québécois in Quebec) successfully emerged as regionally based and ideologically oriented

Party, ofering the electorate in the West an alternative to the traditional parties. As stated, a political realignrnent is characterized by a stable and durable shif? in voting patterns.

Reform is presently in a position to achieve the standard of stable and durable support established in Chapter One.

The altenative Mew suggests that the Canadian party system is not in a period of realignrnent but, rather, it is in a period of temporary dealignment. In this case, the 1993 federal election marked the begùuiing of a period of deaiignment where the traditionai parties were replaced, temporady, by new third parties. The central difference between a period of realignment and dealignment is that, in a dealigned party system, the outcome of an election differs fiom the nom but the dominant structure of party oriented support is not permanently altered. If Canada were experiencing a period of temporaiy dealignment, then support for the new third parties would not be stable or durable as in a reaiigned party system; instead, voter flexibility would be extensive and electoral volatility paramount."

Expanding on Key's argument, Burnham details the differences between critical realignments and periods of stability. As outlined in Chapter One, realigning elections are charact erized by the ideological polarkation of political parties, a rejection of politics as 48

usual, and intense disruptions of traditional voting behavior. These factors must be applied

to the Western provinces to assist in determining whether this region has realigned itself

behind the Reform Party, or if this support in the West is merely temporary.

The ideological differences between the parties became apparent in the West during

the 1993 federal election campaign, as the Refom Party emerged with its nght-wing

economic plaâorm and opposition to special status for any province." The electorate's loss

of confidence in the perceiveci ability of any of the traditional politicai parties to competently

manage the economy, undoubtedly benefitted the Reform Party whose hard-line stance on

reducing the federai deficit and dramatic cuts in government spending contrasted with the

economic platforms of the other partiesu In relation, Sigurdson States t hat the "transition

to a postindustrial economy has led to a climate of uncertainty, weakened the national

governrnent, impaired prirnary and secondary industries and thereby threatened the viability

of many established jobs and the credibility of political partie^."^' Further, Refonds stance

on Canadian unity stood in opposition to the Conservatives (who had initiated the Meech

Lake and Charlottetown Accords) and the Bloc Québécois.

In addition, an Angus Reid/Southam NewsKTV News poll done prior to the 1997

federal election identifies unis and regional tensions as central elements in the recent federal election carnpaign. When asked which party would be best at "representing the interests of their province in Ottawa," the respondents fiom each Western provinces strongly identified the Reform Party (with 46 percent identifjmg Reform in B.C.,55 percent in Alberta, and 29 percent in Saskatchewan and Manitoba). This signalai a rejection of the traditional brokerage parties and acceptance of the regionally based Reform Party. These factors, coupled with 49

Refom's comrnitment to reduce taxes and rejection of special interest groups, led to the

widespread support of the ideologically oriented Reform Party in the Western provinces and,

to a [essor degree, throughout English Canada.

A second characteristic identified by Burnham as essential to political realignments,

is the electorate's rejection of politics as usual. The breakdown of traditional brokerage style

politics in the 1993 federal election demonstrates the rejection of politics as usuai by

Canadians. The Conservative Party, a representative of old-style brokerage politics. lost

support throughout al1 of Canada, as the feeling emerged (in the West and Quebec

specifically) that the old parties were "unwiliing or incapable" of deaiing with contemporary

economic and political issues.' The 1997 Angus ReicUSouthadCTV poll examines the

electorate's motivations for backing particular parties. Conservative supporters identify

leadership as the main factor behind their support for the party (25 percent), while those backing the Liberals cite the party's overall record (14 percent) and their deficit reduction strategies (1 5 percent). The motivations for Reform's support appear more diversified, with respondents singhg out the party's 'generai platform,' its deficit fighting strategies, its stance on tax reduction, and its position on Canadian unity. These figures demonstrate the electorate's rejection of brokerage politics and, consequently, politics as usual.

Furthemore, the 1993 National Election Survey asked Canadian voters how much confidence they had in the federal govemment generaiiy; alrnost 70 percent of the respondents stated that they had very little or no confidence in the federal govemrnent." The survey also asked voters if they felt that Members of Parliament, once elected, soon lost touch with the people; 82.9 percent either 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed? These survey results demonstrate 50 the electorate's growing hstration with the federai govemment and contrast with the results fiom the 1988 National Election Survey, where 7 1.1 percent of respondents 'agreed' or

'strongly agreed' that the politicians, once elected, mon lose touch wit h the people. A fùrt her

85.1 percent of the 1988 National Election Survey respondents stated that their Prime

Minister was a strong? knowledgeable, intelligent Additionally, voters were asked in 1988 (and in 1984) if they could tmst the federal govemment to do 'what is right;' 46.8 percent (34.6 percent in 1984) of the respondents stated that they could only trust the govemment 'some of the tirne? The same question was asked in 1993, with 62.4 percent stating that they could only trust the govenunent 'some of the tirne' (an increase of nearly 16 percent in five years and 28 percent in nine years).5' Finally, Canadians were asked in 1986, and again in 1993, if their faith in federal politicians had changed in recent years." In 1986. only 22 percent of respondents stated that their faith in politicians had 'decreased' in recent years, while 73 percent (an increase of 5 1 percent) of those surveyed in 1993 stated that their faith in potiticians had 'decreased' in the past few yead3 The growing feeling of alienation and mistration within the electorate would lead to the rejection of politics as mua1 in the 1993 election.

A large percentage of Western voters (34.6 percent) tumed away fiom the traditional parties in the 1993 election and supported Reform. Not ody did the Reform Party represent a new choice for the electorate in the West (and, to a lessor degree? the rest of English

Canada), but it also supported a number of populist masures that were not advocated by any other major party. Growing mistration in the electorate with elite accommodation and executive federalism enabled Manning's Reform Party to emerge as a representative of a 5 1 considerably different style ofpolitics." Once again, the National Election Survey data kom

1993 is relevant, as voten were asked ifthey believed that most significant national problems could be solved if brought "back to the people at the grassroots;" a strong majority (66 percent) either 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with this statement." This contrasts with polling information frorn 1988, where only 26.9 percent of respondents believed that giving the people more say in governent decisions was important.56The populist measures supported by Reform, such as recdl petitions for Members of Parliament, the relaxation of party discipline in the House of Comrnons, and the use of referenda, if implemented, would alter the mode of goveming in Canada. It is argued that Manning, through his promotion of direct democracy, offers Canadians (Westerners especiaily) a Say in national &airs and. since

Manning is an "outsider," he is more credible "because he is unconnected to the systems of power and patronage set up by the old-Iine goveming parties."" The combination of his support for direct democracy, and his "droll sincerity" and lack of charisma has led to

Manning's title as the "antipolitician"?

The third factor in Bumham's mode1 of cntical realignrnents is the intense disruption of traditional voting patterns, as parties once cornpetitive become uncompetitive and third parties ernerge. Once again, this situation was clearly applicable to the 1993 federal election and reinforceci by the 1997 federai election. in the thirty year period between 1958 and 1988, during which eleven federal elections were held, the Conservative Party captured 62.9 percent of the available seats in Manitobq 7 1.2 percent of the seats in Saskatchewan, 94.4 percent of the seats in Alberta, and 43.2 percent of the seats in British ~olurnbia.'~The decline in

Conservative support in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections is unmistakable, as the party 52 failed to capture a single seat in Western Canada in 1993 and managed only one in 1997 (in

Manitoba). Moreover, the Conservatives averaged 43.9 percent of the popular vote in the

Western provinces from 1958 to 1988; this support fell to an average of 13 percent in the

1993 federal election and an even more dismal 11.8 percent in the 1997 election? It is apparent from these statistics that the Conservative Party has enjoyed a long history of success in the West, as compared to the other parties, and it could be concluded that support for the Conservatives has been relatively stable and durable in this region. Furthemore, no other third party in the history of electord politics in the West has achieved the success in consecutive elections (in dl four provinces) that the Reform Party has in the 1993 and 1997 federal ele~tions.~'Thus, the third factor in Burnham's mode1 of political realignments has been satisfied; there has been an intense dismption of traditional voting patterns in Western

Canada, the dominant Conservative Party has become uncornpetitive and a third party, the

Reform Party, rose to prominent status.

The Angus Reid/Southam/CTV poll establishes a retention rate analysis; that is, an examination of the parties' 1 993 supporters' current party preferences. This category illustrates the shifts in voter allegiance since the 1993 federal election. At the time of the study, the Liberal Party was retaining 61 percent of their 1993 supporters, but were losing voters to the Conservative Party (18 percent) and Reform (10 percent). The Conservatives had a lower retention rate than the Liberals, 58 percent, but were attracting a significant percentage of 1993 Liberal and Bloc Québécois voters (18 percent and 20 percent respedvely). The Refom Party recorded the highest voter retention rate, holding on to 74 percent of their 1993 supporters. The only significant loss of Reform's 1993 supporters ( 14 53

percent) was to the Conservatives; however, this loss was more than offset as Refom was

attracting significant support fiom the other parties ( 1 5 percent of the 1993 Conservatives,

10 percent of the 1993 Liberals, and 12 percent of the NDP supporters from 1993). These

numbers indicate that Reform has a stable base of support that is, at least, as cornpetitive as

the other parties.

It is apparent that Bumharn's mode1 of political realignments is applicable to the

Western provinces in the 1993 federal election, as the various political parties became

increasingly polarized, the Western eledorate rejected politics as usual, and there was an

intense disruption of the traditional voting behavior. If the West has realigned itself behind

the Refom Party, statistics fkom the 1997 federal election must demonstrate that this support

has been stable and durable.

The Reform Party captured fi@-one seats in Western Canada in the 1993 federal

election. Of these fie-one seats, Refom retained forty-nine, losing two of it s original seats

in Saskatchewan, while gaining nine new seats in the 1997 federal election (two in Manitoba,

four in Saskatchewan, two in Alberta, and one in B.C.). Thus, an overwhelming majority of

Reform incumbents in the West held their seats. As outlined in Chapter One, Rose and

Mackie state that incumbency is a central fmor that contributes to party persi~tence.~'While

Rose and Mackie refer to incumbent governrnents, this argument can, logicdly, be extended, as the Conservatives persisted as the incumbent Party for thirty years in the majority of

Western Canadian constituencies (1 958- 1988)- until Reform's successful emergence in 1993.

The Reform Party's ability to re-elect its incumbents, demonstrated in the 1997 federal election, wiU as& in the party's persistence and provides further evidence of a realignment. 54

Further, Refiorm managed to increase its percentage of the vote in the 1997 election

in all of the Western provinces: climbing fiom 22.4 percent to 23 -7 percent in Manitoba, from

27.2 percent to 36.0 percent in Saskatchewan, from 53.3 percent to 54.7 in Albena, and from

36.4 percent to 43.0 percent in British Col~mbia.~~The importance of these statistics would be questionable if the Conservative Party, which dorninated federal politics in the West for thirty years pnor to the 1993 election, had also secured significant electoral gains from this region. However, the Conservative Party's popular support in the Western provinces fell a combined total of 4.2 percent in 1997 from the levels it achieved in the 1993 federal election

(the Liberals also expenenced a significant loss of support in the West in 1997)? These figures demonstrate both durability and stability regarding the Reform Party's support.

The durable and stable nature of Reform's support can also be reinforced by exarnining the information provided by opinion polls conducted during the 1997 federal election. The national Angus ReicUSoutharn NewsKTV News Poll, released on May 29,

1997 (four days pnor to the election), is perhaps one of the most comprehensive studies of

Canadian voters done during the 1997 election campaign that is available presently?

The poll surveys the cornmitment of the parties' support bases and suggests that

Reform has an advantage over the other parties in this area. A total of 51 percent of

Refom's supporters stated that they were 'very certain' that they would support this party; the highest percentage among al1 parties. This stable foundation is essential to party persistence, as those parties lacking in this area are prone to failure. The poll also questions the possibility of a respondent changing hidher mind and Reform faired very well once again, with 67 percent of the party's supporters stating that they had 'definitely made up their mind' 55

(second to the Bloc Québécois) The Reform Party and Bloc Québécois also finished significantly higher than the other parties in the eiectorate's actual cornmitment to vote.

These statistics demonstrate that the Reform Party has a commined support base that has a pronounced interest in the success of the Party.

The Reform Party has attempted to broaden its support base in the other regions of

Canada (particuiarly Ontario); however, Reform does not have to expand into other regions of Canada for the 1993 federal election to be considered a realigning election. Reform invested $6 million and a great deal of tirne during the 1997 election carnpaign laying the foundation for a major breakthrough in Ontario, but ultimately lost support and their oniy seat in the province? The party's support fell fiom 20.1 percent in the i 993 federal election to

19.1 percent in the 1997 election; not a drastic decrease, but a set-back nonetheless."

However, Reform did increase its support substantially in Ontario dunng the months leading up to the election, as it only had the support of 10 percent of the province's voters in January,

1997.' Further, the Reform party managed to elevate its support in Newfoundland Prince

Edward Island, and New Brunswick and accomplish its primary objective for the 1997 election, becoming the Official Opposition, which will elevate its national profile and expos~re.~~

Reform's Iack of success in Ontario has led to speculation that the party has peaked in this province and has no real room to grow and, as a result, Reform's chances of becoming the party that represents English Canada are slim." This assumption (while it may be valid) is not grounded in fact and, consequentiy, appears to be prernahire. Regardless of the Reform

Parîy's performance in other regions of Canada, the figures established in polls such as the 56

National Election Survey and the Angus ReidISouthamKTV News poll, in addition to the party's electoral successes in 1993 and 1997, lend credence to the prediction that the Reform

Party has become the political voice of Western Canada.

Conclusion

The concept of western alienation involves a distinct regional political culture or a

"politicai ideology of regional discontent."" From this, westem alienation cm be descnbed as a cornmon set of political beliefs held by Westerners that include a sense of political. economic and cultural estrangement from Central Canada? A prirnary component of the theory of western alienation is the idea that the Canadian political system focuses primarily on the interests of Centrai Canada at the expense of the West, the National Policy of 1879 and the National Energy program of 1980 are two of the best examples of this.

The Reform Party successfÙ1ly capitalized on these feelings of alienation, capturing fi@-two seats in the 1993 federal election and sixty seats in the 1997 federal election. An analysis of the voting results from several successive federai elections, statistics provided by

Canadian polls, and the application of Burnharn and Key's mode1 of cri tical realignment s leads to the prediction that the Canadian party system is in a period of realignment. Reform's support has proven itseifto be both stable and durable through the 1993 and 1997 Canadian federal elections; two criteria absent from a dealigned party system.

The Bloc Québécois is also a major component of the current multiple party system that exists in Canada. An examination of the Bloc Québécois is necessary to determine if it wili be a fàctor in the realignment of the party system in Canada. Therefore, the next chapter will further examine the other new party in Canada; the Bloc Québécois. Endnotes

1.For example, see: D. Carneron, "The Beginning of the Endgame: Canada's Recent Generai Electio~"in H. Thorburn, ed., Pa* Politics in Canada. 7"' ed. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1996. pp. 549-556.

2.D. Elton and R. Gibbins, "Western Alienation and Political Culture," in O.M. Knilak, R. Schultz, and J-C. Teny, eds., The Canadian Political Proces, 3d ed. Toronto: Hok, Reinhart and Winston, 1979.

3,J.H. Parnrnett, "Public Orientation to Regions and Provinces" in D.J. Bellarny, J.H. Pammett, D.C. Rowat, eds., The Provincial Political Systems. Toronto: Methuen, 1976. p. 87. Many authors argue that dienation is a central factor in western political culture; however, one might wish to question the use of the word alienation as it is applied here. Traditionally, the alienation of a group or region entails indifference, dissociation or withdrawal fiom the political scene. This has not been the case in the prairie provinces as numerous political parties have been widely supponed. In addition, it is ofien the lower classes who express feelings of alienation. This, again, has not been the case in the West, as people fiom ail classes have expressed feelings of alienation. Furthemore, there is otlen a sense of inefficacy that is associated with political aiienation. Westerners, on the other hand, generaily feel as though the national govemment actively pursues an agenda that operates contrary to their interests. R. Gibbins, "Western Alienation and the Alberta Political Culture" in C. Cddorola, ed., Society and Politics in Alberta. Toronto: Methuen, 1979.

5.G. Skogstad, "Farmers and FmUnions in the Society and Politics of Alberta" in C. Caldarola, ed., Society and Politics in Alberta. pp. 223-224.

6.Gibbins, "Western Alienation and the Alberta Political Culture," pp. 145-146.

7.C.B. Macpherson, Democraçy in Alberta. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962. p.7.

8.Ibid. And N. Wiseman, "The Pattern of Prairie Politics," in H. Thorbum, ed., Party Politics in Canada. ed. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1996. pp.428-445.

9. Wiseman, "The Pattern of Prairie Politics," p.430.

10.2. KulchycSiJ, "Subfiagmentation and the Political Culture of the Canadian West", anadian Political Science Association, May 198 1. And D. Laycock, "Populism and Democratic Thought in the Prairies, 19 10- 1945", Canadian Political Science Association, June 1981. 1 1 .M. Lusztig, "Federalism and Institutional Design: The Perils of a Triple-E Senate in Canada" Publius. Winter, 19%. p3.

12.Elton and Gibbins, "Western Alienation and Political Culture," p. 85.

1 3.W. J. Blackman, "A Western Perspective on the Economics of Confederatioq" an Public Policy. 1977.

14.General Information: D. Regehr, "Western Canada and the Burden of National Transportation Policies", in B. Bercuson, ed., Canada and the Burden of Unie. Toronto: Macmillan, 1977. pp. 1 16- 1 17. Stats fiom Blackman, "A Western Perspective on the Econornics of Confederation." Prairie wheat fmers did see a substantial reduction in freight rates with the Crow's Nest Pass Agreement of 1897. However, rates were also reduced on manufactured goods that were being shipped to the West.

15.J.F. Conway, The West: The History of a Reaon in Confederation. Toronto: Lorimer, 1983. p.28

16.R. Pomfret. TheEconomicToronto: Methuen, 1 98 1 . p.86.

17.J.F. Conway, "Populism in the United States, Russia, and Canada: Explaining the Roots of Canada's Third Parties", Çanadian Journal of Political Science, March 1978. pp. 120- 122.

18.D.Smith, "The Prairie Pro~inces"~in D.J. Bellarny, J.H. Pammett, D.C. Rowat, eds., The Provincial Political Svstems. Toronto: Methuen, 1 976. p.48.

19. Ibid.

20.E.T. O'Doherty, "Regional Differences in Party Support", in D.C. Rowat. ed., Provincial Govemment and poli tic^. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1974. p.472.

21 .W.L. Morton, "The Progressive Tradition in Canadian Politics," in H. Thorbum, ed., Party Politics in Canada 7" ed. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1996. p.3 13.

22.R. Gibbins, Prairie Politics and Society: Remonalism in Decline. Toronto: Buttenvorths, 1980. Chapter 3.

23.D. Smith, "Party Struggies to Win the Prairies," in H. Thorbum, ed., Party Politics in Canada 7'" ed. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1996. p.453.

24. Ibid.

25.F. Bregha and G. Toner, "The Political Ecmomy of Energy", in M. Whittington and G. Williams, eds., Canadian Politics in the 1980s. Scarborough: Nelson Canada. p. 105. 28.R. Gibbins, "The Prairie Provinces", in M. Whittington and G. Williams, eds., Canadian Politics in the 1990s. Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1989. p. 66.

29. Ibid.

30.P. McCormick, "The Reform Party of Canada: New Beginning or Dead End?," in H. Thorbum, ed., Party Politics in Canada ed. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1996. p.353.

33 .Constitution of the Reform Party of Canada. 1992. p. 1.

34.K. Archer and F. Ellis, "Adivists in the Reform Party of Canada," in H. Thorbum, ed., Partv Politics in Canada 7&ed. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1996. p.348.

3 5.Ibid.

37.R. Sigurdson, "Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodemisrn in Canada," in an Journal of Political Science. June, 1994. p.264.

38.McComick, "The Reform Parîy of Canada: New Begi~ingor Dead End?," p.3 57.

39.See D. Ferguson, "Now Reform is the Official Opposition," in the Toronto Star, June 3, 1997. Al.

40.H.D.Clarke, .i.Jenson, L. LeDuc, and J. H. Pammett, Absent Mandate: Canadian Electoral Politics In an Era of Restruaurhq. Toronto: Gage, 1996. p. 183-

43.For a discussion on the ideological position of the Reform Party see: D. Laycock, "Reforming Canadian Dernocracy? Institutions and Ideology in the Reform Party Project," in Canadian Journal of Political Science. June, 1994. And: Sigurdson, "Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodemism in Canadl" pp.249-276.

44.Sigurdsoq "Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodemism in Canada," p.263. 45. ibid.

47.Canadian National Election Survey, 1993

49.Canadian National Election Survey, 1988

5 1.Canadian National Election Survey, 1993.

52.R. MacGregor, "A Government on Trial," in Maclean's, Vo1.99, No.01, January 6, 1986. And A. Wilson-Smith, "Time to Listen," in Maclean's. Vol. 105, No.0 1, January 4, 1993.

54.Sigurdson, "Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodernism in Canada," pp.264- 265.

55 .Canadian National Election Sunrey, 1993.

56.Canadian National Election Survey, 1988.

57.Sigurdson, "Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodernism in Canada," p.265.

58.Ibid. and McCormick, "The Reform Party of Canada: New Beginning or Dead End?' p.344.

59.Percentages calculated frorn Appendix A in H. Thorbum, ed., Party Politics in Canada. 7h ed. p.623.

62.R. Rose and T. Mackie, "tncumbency in Govemment: Asset or Liability?" in H. Daalder and P. Mair, eds., Western European Partv Systems. Sage: London, 1983.

63.Statistics fkom: Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Official Voting Resu lts: S-ylo's- 1s- Thirty-Fifih General Election 1993. Ottawa: Chief Electoral Officer, 1993. pp.30-3 1. And: Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Results of the Thim-Sixth General Election 1997. www.elections.ca 64.Calculated fiom %id.

65.Angus ReidISoutham NewdCTV News, The '97 Election: Late Campa@. www. angusreid.corn This poll surveyed a cross-section of 3,220 Canadian voters between May 22ndand 276, 1997. The sample included sub-samples in al1 regions major regions of the country (B.C., Alberta, Manitoba/ Saskatchewan, Ontario (with a representative section from Metro Toronto), Quebec, and Atlantic Canada). In addition, the data was "statistically weighted to ensure the sample's regional representation and agdsex composition reflects that of actual Canadian population according to the 199 1 and 1 996 Census data, and were aiso adjusted for respondents' past voting behavior." (p.8) The poll has an accuracy rate within 2.25 percentage points, 95 percent of the time.

66.Ferguson, "Now Reform is the Official Opposition," p. Al 1

67.Statistics from Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, 1993. Officia1 Votin~Results: Synopsis- Thirty-Fifih General Election 1993. p. 3 1. And: Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Results of the Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997.

68. Ibid.

71 Gibbins, Prairie Politics and Society: Regionalism in Declinp. p. 169. CHAPTER THREE- Quebec and the Bloc Québécois

In a similar marner as the Western electorate, Quebec voters rejected the Progressive

Conservatives, whom they had supported in two successive elections, and voted for a new

third party in the 1993 federal election. The Bloc Québécois, representing Quebec only,

achieved Officiai Opposition status after the 1993 election while promoting a separatist

platform. This chapter predicts that the Quebec electorate has realigned itself behind the newly formed Bloc Québécois and, therefore, the Canadian party system is in a penod of realignrnent. Information from severai federai elections, in addition to data colleaed fiorn various polls conducted during the 1997 federal election campaign, will assist in demonstrating that the 1993 election was a realigning election. Further, the theories regarding party persistence established in Chapter One, will be applied to the Bloc to aid in assessing the future of this Party.

While there are numerous differences between the West and Quebec, sirnilarities do exist and are refleded in the two new parties that have emerged from these regions. In particular, both regions express feelings ofalienation and desire more control of their destiny; however, nationalists in Quebec take this view to a fùrther extreme and express a desire to separate from Canada. As illustrated in Chapter Two, feelings of alienation and hstration wit h the established parties were of central importance in the rise of the Reform Party. A brkf examination OF the history of alienation, which has been expressed largely at the provincial level, in Quebec is necessary to determine the factors that eventually led to the emergence of the Bloc Québécois in 1990 and the electorate's support of this party in the

1993 and 1997 federal elections. 63

The Development of Alienation in Quebec

The maintenance of Quebec's cultural identity in a continent dominated by

anglophones, has been referred to as "the French-Canadian miracle."' Throughout history, the people of Quebec have displayed unwavering determination to maintain their French-

Catholic culture. Conquered by the British in 1759, the French population fell under an

English govemment that had, historically, seen the French as enernies and "hated and despised" the Catholic religion.' While the colonial govemment was not characterized by cmelty, the French were subject to contentious policies such as those suggested in the

Durham Report in 1840. Sent by the British government to investigate the unrest in Upper and Lower Canada, Durham recornrnended the union of the two colonies and the exclusive use of English in government to assist in the assimilation of the francophone population.

Durham stated that: "1 should indeed be surprised if the more reflecting part of the French

Canadians entertain at present any hope of continuing to preserve their nationality. Much as they struggle against it, it is obvious that the process of assimilation to English is already comrnen~ing."~As a consequence of the Durham Report, francophones were more concerned with the preservation of their culture than the pursuit of independence. This ideology of preservation, or la sicnivame, was strengthened with Codederation as French Canadians became a distinct rninority.

The preservation of the french culture remained the primary objective of the

Québécois for an entire century; preservation was focused on transmitting the Québécois heritage, which included the french language, Catholic faith, and the countless customs and traditions.' However, the ideology of preservation becarne "anachronistic in the face of the 64 demographic, economic, and social changes that Quebec went through between 1939 to

1945" and was widely criticized and eventually replaced by an ideology of "contestation and recoupment" (1945- 1960) that would lead to the Quiet Revolution.

The Quiet Revolution constituted a cultural, economic, and sociai transformation of the attitudes, behavior, and values of the Québécois. This transition, fiom an old order to a new order, included greater involvement of the Quebec people in the modem industriai economy, and a reaffrmation of the authenticity of the Quebec cult~re.~Further, the traditional defensive attitude of la nrntivmce was replaced by rattrapage, reflecting the new confidence of the Québécois. The Quiet Revolution also marked a change in the attitude towards govemment, as the provincial level became the central focus for social and economic developrnent .6

Nationalist feelings also changed durhg this period, reflecting the growing confidence and assertiveness of the Québécois. Pelletier argues that Quebec expenenced two "ruptures" that transformeci the province's society- with one occurring in 1960 and the other in 1968.'

The Quiet Revolution that began in 1960 with the election of Jean Lesage's Liberals provincially, rnarked the first of these mptures. The widespread changes experienced dunng the Quiet Revolution included the emergence of several third parties, including the

Rassemblement pour l'hdependance Nationale (RIN) and the Ralliement National (RN) both espousing independence for Quebec. The appearance of these parties "opened the way for a new rupture, which materialized during the pivotal year of 1968."'

In 1968, the emerging middle class in Quebec divided over two competing visions of the province's hture; federaiism and sovereignty. This division could be seen in the political 65 realignment of the provincial party system, with federaiists supporting the Liberals or the

Union Nationale and separatists supporting the newly established Parti Québécois (PQ). With parties defining themselves dong the "federalism-independentism axis," sovereigntists desired a single party to present thek views and, thus, the Mouvement Souveraintee-Association, the

RN, and the RIN merged to form the Parti ~uébécois.~From this point, the primary focus of the Quebec people and poiiticians centered on the place of Quebec, if any, in the Canadian federation.

The new-found obsession with the future of Quebec in Canada plagued Robert

Bourassa's f~stLiberai govemrnent ( 1 970- 1976). Bourassa was under pressure to increase provincial autonorny for his province, but ran into difficulty and appeared weak after the federal govemment enacted the War Measures Act during the October Crisis of 1970 (when the extreme separatist group, the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) bombed a number of buildings and kidnaped two politicians). Bourassa again appeared indecisive after he approved, then quickly withdrew his support for the Victoria Charter in 1971 after facing strong nationdistic opposition in Quebec to the Charter. Further, Bourassa's French language act (Bill 22), in which french became the officiai language of the province and gained preferential status over english in many areas, was seen as too harsh by many anglophones and too weak by many francophones.'' The unpopularity of the Liberal govemrnent and dissatisfaction with Premier Bourassa reached highs in the spnng of 1976, while the Rene

Levesque led PQ continued to gain support."

In the Quebec provincial election of 1976, the sovereignty debate reached new heights with the election of the PQ. The PQ's pledge to hold a referendum on separation pnor to any 66

declaration of sovereignty allowed many members of the electorate who were weary of this

aspect of the party's platform, to vote for the Party. While feelings of alienation were high

in Quebec, Levesque's referendum on sovereignty (held on May 20, 1980) failed with the

Yes side receiving ody 40.4 percent of the vote and the No side capturing 59.6 percent. With

the defeat of the referendum on sovereignty, the re-election of the PQ in 198 1, and Quebec's

rejection of the Constitution Act, (1982) the political situation in Quebec was unclear. " The

isolation of Quebec during the negotiations leading to the Constitution Act, (1 982) increased

feelings of alienation in ~uebec." However, with no referendum on the horizon and the PQ governrnent's increased focus on internai economic and social problems, the separation debate entered a rather brief period of quiescence.''

The relative political calm in Quebec was agitated by Brian Mulroney in the 1984 federal election campaign, with the promise to address the constitutional demands of Quebec.

The election of Mulroney (with fifty-eight seats from Quebec) and defeat of the Parti

Québécois provincially, made constitutional agreement appear more likely." Indeed. a constitutional amendment, entitled the Meech Lake Accord, was agreed upon in 1987 and would grant Quebec distinct society status provide the provinces with greater freedorn to opt out of federal prograrns, increase the number of constitutional amendments requiring unanimous provincial consent (effectively granting Quebec a veto), entrench Quebec's role in the immigration process (granting the other provinces sirnilar powers), and authorize the provinces the power to nominate candidates for Supreme Court and Senate appointments.

Nevertheless, despite Mulroney's attempts to save it, the Accord died on June 23, 1990.

Debate over whether Quebec had achieved its minimum demands in the Meech Lake 67

Accord became moot at this point and support for sovereignty increased dramatically. An

Angus Reid poll conducted for the newspaper Le Soleil, demonstrated that support for

independence stood at 47 percent? A separate poll conducted by Multi Reso for Le Devoir

and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, illustrated that up to 67 percent were in favor

of sovereignty-association, and 47 percent supported complete independence. l7 Reflecting

the depth of resentment felt in Quebec at this time, the provincial federaiist party (the

Liberals) appeared ready to accept the PQ's position on sovereignty unless proposals that met

al1 their demands were accepted by the rest of the country.18 Reflecting these feelings,

Bourassa declared that "Quebecers are free to assume their own destiny, to determine their

political status and to assure their econornic, social and cultural devel~pment."'~

These feelings of dienation and mistration rose to the federal level, where nine

Conservative and Liberal Members of Parliament abandoned their parties to form the

separatist Bloc Québécois (BQ). Support for the Bloc was bolstered by the failure of

Mulroney's second attempt to arnend the constitution and its ovenvhelming rejection by

Canadians; the population of seven of the ten provinces and one of the two temtones rejected the Charlottetown Accord (with Ontario essentially splitting down the middle- 49.8 percent in support of the Accord and 49.6 against it).

The Rise of the Bioc Québécois

Similar to the expenence in the Western provinces, parties other than the traditional

Liberals and Conservatives have enjoyed a great deal of support in Quebec. However, a vast majority of the support for third parties in Quebec has been limited to the provincial level, with the Bloc Populaire, Rassemblement pour I'Independence National, Ralliement National, 68

and the Equality Party as exarnples of less successful third parties. The Union Nationale (a

coalition of the Conservative Party and the Action Liberale Nationale), like the Social Credit

in Alberta and British Columbia, rose fiom third party status to form the provincial

government in Quebec but, like Social Credit, has since faded away. The Parti Québécois is

another example of a Quebec party that shed the third Party label and achieved a high level

of success, forming provincial govemments in 1976. 198 1, and 1994. Unlike the Westem

provinces however, Quebec has generally supported one of the Liberals or Conservatives

federally, and has been reluctant to support third parties at this level until the 1993 election;

making the success of the Bloc Québécois in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections even more

surprising and worthy of serious consideration.

One party that did achieve a moderate arnount of support from Quebec federally is the

Westem based Social Credit Party. In several federal elections (specifically 1962, 1972,

1974, and 1979) Social Credit rnanaged to capture a modest percentage of the provincial vote

and a number of seats; the party's greatest success came in the 1962 federal election when it

captured 26 percent of Quebec's popular vote and twenty-six seats." Pinard's theory

explaining the nse of Social Credit in Quebec, proposes that the electorai weakness of the

Conservatives and the resulting Liberal dominance, created a situation conducive to the nse of a third party." In federal elections held from 1891 to 1980, the Conservative Party rnanaged to capture the rnajority of seats in Quebec only once (in 1958); the dominance of the Liberal Party is clearly evident. These political factors, and Social Credit's daim that it could quickly improve the conditions of ail those who were econornically dissatisfied, led to the relative success of this third party in ~uebec? However, Social Credit was plagued by 69 interna1 conflict, a cornmon problern that many third parties expenence once they are confkonted with electorai loses. The regional nature of the Social Credit Party (support in the

West had severely dropped off by the time the party expenenced gains in Quebec) also became a factor in the party's failure, as Quebec voters were unwilling to "exchange their vote for nothing" and felt that there was little to gain in voting for a party that could not form the govemment."

Pnor to the formation of the Bloc Québécois in 1990, there was debate among separatists regarding the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a federal party to represent their V~WSin ûttawa Initiaiiy, Guy Bertrand (a Quebec lawyer) attempted to form a party called the Bloc Québécois with the hope of campaigning in the 1 972 federal election.

The PQ, however, did not support the idea of a federd separatist party at this time, as party executives were concemed about the image of a separatist party campaigning under federal regulations and felt that there was nothing Quebec could gain from this venture."

Furthemore, the PQ had only elected seven members in the 1970 provincial election. with membership in the party fdling fkom 80,000 to 30,000 and, consequently, was near banknipt~y.'~

Nevertheles, many of those supponing sovereignty for Quebec continued to believe that a federal party representing their interests had ment. These supporters argued that a federal separatist party could end the rein of Pierre Trudeau, protect the independence of

Quebec, and create a new "fiont" in ûttawa that could assist in preserving goal of independence for Quebec." The most popular name for this new party was "Le Bloc

Populaire du Quebec" or "Bloc PQ," representing a division between the two parties while 70 also refleauig its ties to the provincial Parti Québéc~is.'~Still, Levesque believed that "[tlhe road to independence (went) by Quebec City not by Ottawa."->

The PQ did become involved in the 1972 and 1974 federal elections but did not run candidates, instead it attempted to convey to the electorate the advantages of independence and suggested that Quebec voters spoil their ballots; the results were notable as 165,136 ballots were spoiled in the 1972 election and 134,126 in 1974." Eventually, the PQ reversed its stance, registering the Parti Québécois name federally in 1982 and voting, afler extensive debate, to participate in the 1984 election. However, a federal branch of the PQ would draw votes from Mulroney and the Conservative Party, thus, allowing the Liberals a better chance of re-ele~tion.~'Since the PQ's primary goai was to see the defeat of the federal Liberals, the party chose to support the ~onservatives." The failure of Mulroney's Meech Lake Accord, however, lefi many in Quebec feeling alienated and Ied to the resignation of Lucien Bouchard fiom the Conservative cabinet and, ultimately, to the formation of the Bloc Québécois.

Shortly der the resignation of Bouchard from the Conservative Party, he and severd other MPs, who had also quit their parties, released their mission statement. The shon document announced that the group (they were not yet a formal political party) planned to represent the interests of the Quebec people in Ottawa and in English Canada; provide assurance that the Quebec people will have the ability to "fieely exercise their right to self- determination, and strive to have this right understood throughout Canada and respected by federal institutions;" "promote the emergence of power relationships that would favor Quebec in the implementation of a new political arrangement with its Canadian partner;" "consolidate the Quebec people's political strength and authority at the federal level around Quebec's 71 interests aione;" and, until Quebec's independence became a reality, they would demand the share of investment that the province was entitled to expea fiom the federal go~emrnent.~'

The announcement of these intentions marked the emergence of the Bloc Québécois.

Oniy a few weeks afler the party's formation, the Bloc chose to nin a candidate in the federal by-election to be held in the riding of Laurier-Sainte Mane on August 13, 1990.

Bouchard chose Gilles Duceppe (a trade union negotiator and now the Bloc's leader) to iun in Laurier-Sainte Marie which, according to polls done by the Parti Québécois, he would easily win. Caphiring almost 67 percent of the vote, Duceppe becarne the first openly separatist candidate from Quebec to be elected to the House of C~rnrnons.~

In accepting the leadership of the Bloc Québécois, Lucien Bouchard headed an organization that existed as a member "Quebec nationalist farnily," but was not simply a federal branch of the PQ." Bouchard was leader of a group that sought greater devolution of powers from the federal govemment to Quebec; however, for some members of the party this meant a new federalism and to others it meant complete independen~e?~The popularity of Bouchard was unquestionable in Quebec, surpassing that of Mulroney and Chretien;

Bouchard appeared strong and trustworthy for following his beliefs and resigning from the

Conservative ~arty."In reflecting on the character and intelligence of the Bloc's leader, it has been observed that: "In Bouchard Québécois have found a leader who combines the passion of Levesque with the cool logic of nide eau."'^ However, Bouchard did not corne fiom a family that was involved in politics, as Preston Manning did, and was extremely reluctant to enter electoral politics. Before Mulroney convinced him to run for the federal

Conservative Party in 1988, Bouchard worked to help elect Pierre Trudeau in 1968, and was 72 vice-president of the policy commission of the federal Liberal Party's Quebec wing prior to working for Bourassa and the provincial Liberal Party in 1970. After the October Crisis,

Bouchard became disillusioned with the federal system and joined the PQ, working in various capacities (Martin-Bouchard Commission, chef governent negotiator in public service negotiations for example) until he began working for Mulroney fier his election as leader of the Conservative Party (initially as a speech writer and, in 1985, as Mulroney's choice for

Canadian Ambassador in Paris).39

Understanding that the party could not forrn the government, the Bloc Québécois entered the 1993 federal eiection campaign with a relatively vague platform and appeared satisfied with advancing the broad principles that it would foiiow when in Ottawa. The Bloc's econornic program included a reduction in military and public expenditures, with savings to be used to create jobs and cut the deficit, and opposed spending cuts to social prograrns, provincial tramfers, and unemployrnent insurance. The Bloc offered very little substance in its platform regarding aboriginal affairs, the environment, immigration, justice, and transportation; instead, the party's platfom focused on Quebec sovereignty and argued for the withdrawal of the federal government from areas of provincial jurisdiction and an end to duplication between federal and provincial progrrn~.~~

The Bloc experienced the same unique opportunity as the Reform Party in the 1993 federal election, as Mulroney's attempt at politicai realignment failed leaving the Conservative

Party vulnerable to a severe drop in electoral support. The failure of Mulroney to appease the constitutional demands of Quebec led to a signifiant increase in feelings of alienation and a renewed interest in separation. The Bloc successfully emerged in the 1993 election, 73 capitalking on these feelings of discontent, capturing fifty-four of Quebec's seventy-five seats and Official Opposition status.

The Bloc targeted fi-ancophone adults between the ages of eighteen and forty-nine who had obtained a post-secondary education as its core of potential support in the 1993 election? Heading into the election, the Bloc's campaign organizers were confident that

Parti Québécois supporters, and a1 those favoring sovereignty in general, would vote for the

Blo~.'~Polk done prior to the election demonstrated that 40 percent of the Quebec population supported sovereignty; assuming that the vast majonty of sovereigntists would vote for the Bloc, the Party could, therefore, reiy on roughly 40 percent of the vote?' The

Bloc managed to capture 49.3 percent of the Quebec vote in 1993, with the majonty of support coming fiom sovereigntists as predicted? The additional 10 percent came from

Young, "non-sovereigntist hcophone" voters in the eighteen to twenty-nine range and other

"non-sovereigntists" who felt more attacheci to Quebec than to Canada." However, the Bloc could not duplicate this success in the 1997 federal election, as the party's share of the popular vote fell dmost I I percentage points to 38.5 percent, which translated to forty-five seats."

Reaiignment in Quebec

The most essential characteristic necessary for a party system to be considered in a period of political realignment is a stable and durable shift in voting patterns. The Bloc

Québécois has, to this point, achieved the standards of stable and durable support outlined in Chapter One and can be considered a 'contending party7. In the 1993 federal election, the

Bloc captured 49.3 percent of the provincial popular vote and fi@-four of the seventy-five 74 seats (enough for Officiai Opposition status). While in the 1997 federal election, the Bloc obtained 37.9 percent of the popular vote in Quebec (a loss of 1 1.4 percent, but still above the 30 percent threshold) and forty-four of the province's seats. ParaIlel to the Reform Party in Western Canada, the Bloc Québécois successfblly emerged as a regionally based and ideologically onented Party, offering the Quebec electorate an alternative to the traditional

Conservative and Liberal parties.

Altematively, one might argue that the Canadian party system is in a period of dealignment, whereby the results of the 1993 federal election have not permanently altered the traditional party structure. In this case, if the Bloc Québécois is merely a component of a temporas, dealignment then support for this party will not be stable or durable and voting patterns in Quebec will revert to a more traditional pattern.

Once again, the arguments proposed by Key and Bumham, regarding political realignments, rnust be examined to assist in detemiinhg if the Quebec electorate has reaiigned itself behind the Bloc Québécois. This includes the ideological polarization of political parties, a rejection of politics as usual, and intense dismptions of traditional voting behavior.

Information from various polls is incorporated in this section to assist in demonstrating the stable and durable nature of the Bloc's support.

As in Western Canada, the ideological polarization between the parties became increasingly pronounced in Quebec during the 1993 federal election campaign. For the first time, an openly separatist federal party campaigned for the support of the Quebec voters, while the Liberals and Conservatives continued to advocate a federalist platform. The inability of the traditional political parties to satis$ Quebec's constitutional aspirations led to 75

a loss of confidence in these parties and a renewed interest for sovereignty." A Macleans-

Decima poll revealed that 4 1 percent of Quebec citizens blarne the ongoing unity crisis on

"the failure of politicians to devise a solution that satisfies al1 Canadians" and 32 percent point

to the public's "lack of faith in any solution offered by any politicians."" The Bloc Québécois

offered the vota an option not previously available to them; a party whose central objective would be to protect the interests of Quebec in the House of Commons.

The results &om the 1997 pre-election Angus Reid/Southam NewdCTV News poli, regarding the electorate's main motivations for party support, indicated that the Bloc's position on the national unity question is the most popular aspect of the party's platform. A total of 48 percent of Bloc Québécois supporters highlighted the party's position regarding the political future of Quebec as their primary motivation for backing the party. This concentration of support around one centrai aspect of the Bloc's platfonn could pose a problem for the Party. As outlined in Chapter One, a party that bases its platform on a very lirnited number of issues often fails to remain competitive, as the party becomes vulnerable to issue shifis in the electorate. Nevertheless, the poil also indicates that 16 percent identie the Bloc's representation of the general interests of Quebec as their main motivation for support, which wii allow for some diversity within the party's support base. Further, a 1993

Gallop poll, done pnor to the 1993 federal election, illustrates the Quebec electorate's growing hstration with the traditional parties. Those surveyed were asked which party would best represent the interests of their province in Ottawa; 21 percent identified the goveming Conservatives, 14 percent indicated the Liberal Party (a combined total of 35 percent for the two traditional parties), white 39 percent of those surveyed chose the 76

separatist Bloc Québéc~is.~~These statistics were reinforced in a 1997 pre-election poll

which asked the same question; 48 percent of the respondents identified the Bloc Québécois

as the party that would best represent the interests of Quebec in Ottawa (24 percent higher

than the Conservatives and 28 percent higher than the ~iberals).~~For the first time in

Quebec's electoral history, neither of the two traditionai parties were identified by the voters' as the party best able to represent the province's interests at the federal level. These statistics indicate the Quebec electorate' s rejection of the traditional (federalist) brokerage parties.

Burnham7ssecond characteristic comrnon to realigning elections is the electorate's rejeaion of politics as usuai. Provincially, many Quebec voten rejected 'politics as usuai' in the early 1WOs, realigning behind the separatist Parti Québécois; however, t his realignment was not demonstrated at the federal level, as there lacked a federal party to represent the separatist position and, consequently, the Liberals continued to attract a majority of support in Quebec. Throughout the electoral history of Quebec, one of the federalist parties (the

Liberals or Conservatives) has aiways captured the majority of the province's seats (prior to

1993); however, with the emergence of a separatist party federally (the Bloc Québécois), the

Quebec electorate was presented with an alternative to the traditional federalist parties. The

Bloc's capture of a majority of Quebec's seats in the i 993 federal election (and again in the

1997 federal election) represented a rejection of federalist brokerage parties and politics as usual. Gagnon and Tanguay support this argument by stating that "the rise of the BQ (and

Reform for that matter) spelled the end of "politics as usuai" in Canada and underscored the exhaustion of the traditional pattern of elite accommodation, whereby bargaining between

French and English leaders within one of the two major parties served to reduce ethnic tensions and reinforce national unity.""

The electoral failure of the goveming Conservative Party in 1993, and the breakdown

of brokerage politics in general, contributed to the successful emergence of the ideologically

distinct Bloc Québécois, ailowing the people of Quebec a strong voice in Ottawa. The 1993

National Election Survey, done pnor to the 1993 federal election, illustrates the Canadian

electorate's growing dissatisfaction with existing politicians; 74.6 percent of the respondents stated that they felt 'very negatively' about the politicians presently representing them."

Demonstrating the rejection of politics as usual, the survey ais0 asked Quebec voters if they felt that the Bloc Québécois, if elected, would do more or less than the traditional parties for the french language and Quebec in general; 67.9 percent of the respondents indicated that the separatist Bloc would do 'much more' or 'somewhat more' than the federalist Liberal and

Conservative parties. These sentiments contrast with polling data fiom 1986, as the

Conservative govemment scored high approvai ratings in Quebec (41 percent of those surveyed in Quebec approved of govemment's actions)." These statistics indicate that the

Quebec electorate had a poor image of the politicians representing them in 1993 and the Bloc offered them an alternative to politics as usual.

The success of the Bloc Québécois in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections will prove to be more long-lived than the Conservative Party's success in Quebec in the 1984 and 1988 federal elections because of the fact that the Bloc is a regional party that offers sovereignty as its main platform. The Bloc Québécois appeals to the separatists in Quebec who, prior to

1993, were without a federal party that expressed the separatist vision? As discussed, the

Parti Québécois had seriously considered forrning a federal branch of the party as early as 78

1972. While the idea was rejected at that time, support for a federaf branch of the PQ was

examined again at a Parti Québécois conference in 1982, at which time a motion was passed

to participate in the next federal election; although the terms of this participation were not

detailed. Pohg data done by the Pmi Québécois in 1982 revealed that a federai branch of the party ddcapture more than 35 percent of the francophone vote in Quebec (12 percent

more than Liberal ~arty)."However, rather than enter a federal wing of the Parti Québécois,

Premier Levesque decided to take a beau risque and lend the support of the PQ to the

Conservative Party in the 1984 federal election." A major reason behind this decision was the fact that many Conservative candidates had supported sovereignty in the 1980 referendum, while others had been members of the Parti Québécois."

In the 1984 and 1988 federal elections, a large percentage of Parti Québécois supporters did vote for the Conservative Party- a CROP poll indicates that 56.4 percent of the Conservative supporters in 1988 were Parti Québécois supporters pro~inciall~.'~In federal elections held during the 1WOs, provincial Parti Québécois supporters abstained, spoiled their ballots, voted for Conservatives, the NDP, or other third parties, while sorne even voted for the ~iberals." As stated, the volatile nature of the separatist federal vote was due, largely, to the lack of a federal party espousing the separatist vie~point.~Despite the

Parti Québécois' support of the federal Conservative Party, the emergence of the Bloc

Québécois provided separatists a natural ally at the federal level. The dominant federalist- separatist cleavage in Quebec that has been demonstrated provincially, with the federalist

Liberal Party and separatist Parti Québécois, is now visible in federal politics (with the federalist Liberal Party and separatist Bloc Québécois). Nevitte presents the argument that 79 many voters in Quebec support the sarne party federaily as they do pr~vincially.~'Nevitte's argument is applicabie, particularly, to Liberai voters who have consistently supported the party both federally and provincially; however, Parti Québécois supporters now have a counterpart at the federal level in the Bloc Québécois.

The ttiird factor identified in Bumharn's mode1 of critical realignments is the intense disniption of traditional voting patterns, as parties once cornpetitive become uncornpetitive and third parties become prominent. Prior to the 1984 election, the Liberal Party dominated federal politics in Quebec, capturing 77.2 percent (80.5 percent if the 1958 election is excluded) of the province's seats in the fi@ year period between 1935 and 1984.~' The

Conservative Party managed to capture the majority of Quebec's seats in 1984 (fifty-eight seats) and 1988 (sixty-three seats), rnarking only the second and third time that the

Conservatives were able to accomplish this task in over one hundred ~ears!' In the 1993 federal election, the Conservatives lost dl but one of its sixty-three seats (with the Bloc taking f3y-two seats from the Conservatives), while the Liberals managed to retain ten of its twelve seats (losing only two to the Bloc) and gain seven additional seats at the expense of the

Conservatives. In addition, the Conservatives fell from 52.7 percent of the popular vote in

1988 to 13.5 percent in the 1993 election, whereas the Liberals rnanaged to increase their percentage of the popular vote in Quebec from 30.3 percent in 1988 to 33 -0 percent in the

1993 election? Further, the Conservatives managed to capture only five seats and 22.2 percent of Quebec's popular vote in the 1997 federal election, while the Liberais gained seven additional seats and 36.7 percent of the popular vote?'

The traditional pattern of voting in Quebec has included the two established parties 80 almost exclusively, with the Liberals capturing the rnajority of support (the Social Credit Party did gain modest support in Quebec during the 1960s and 1970s). Thus, the success of the

Bloc Québécois marked a radical departure from traditionai voting patterns, as the 1993 federal election marked the fkst tirne in Quebec's electoral history that a party other than the

Liberals or the Conservatives was able to capture a majority of the province's seats. This departure from the nom was reuiforced in the 1997 federal election, as the traditionai parties were unable to re-capture a majority of support and surpass the Bloc Québécois.

One can differentiate between the electoral dealignment in 1984 and the predicted realignrnent of 1993 by cornparhg the support patterns of the Conservative Party during the

198 1 - 1989 penod and the Bloc Québécois in the 1990- 1997 period. These time periods include critical elections for both parties, as the Conservatives enjoyed success in the 1984 and 1988 federal elections, while the Bloc captureci the majority of Quebec's seats in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections. The Conservatives aniggled to maintain support in Quebec during the twenty year period leading up to the 1984 federal election, capturing a high of eight seats, and twenty percent of the provincial popular vote, in the 1965 federal election and one seat, representing 13 percent of the provincial vote, in the 1980 federd election. The election of Brian Mulroney (fiom Quebec) as leader of the federal Conservative Party in 1983 and Premier Levesque7sdecision to support the Conservatives in the 1984 federai election. were central factors in the rapid nse of the party's popularity within Quebec. However, this support began to fade in 1989, promptly reverting to the levels that the party experienced before its success in the 1984 and 1988 federal elections. Mer capturing 52.7 percent of the popular vote in Quebec in the 1988 federal election, suppon for the Conservatives fell to an 8 1 average of 39.7 percent in 1989, 25.5 percent in 1990, 16.4 percent in 1991, 15.9 percent in

1992. and, finally, 13.5 percent in the 1993 federal election?

Conversely, the Bloc received support imrnediateiy upon its formation in 1990, winning a federal by-election in the Quebec riding of Laurier- Sainte Marie only a few weeks after the party's formation. This support has remained extrernely stable over seven years, which includes the 1993 and 1997 federal eleaions. In polls measuring the support of the federal parties, the Bloc averaged 23 -2percent support within Quebec in 1990, 34.1 percent in 199 1, 34.1 percent in 1992, 35 -3 percent in 1993 (49.3 percent in the 1993 federal election), 46.4 percent in 1994,43.1 percent in 1995, 44.4 percent in 1996, and 43.4 percent in 1997 (37.9 percent in the 1997 federal ele~tion).~'

The dserence between the Conservative Party's success in 1984 and 1988, and the

Bloc's success in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections is apparent. The Conservatives experienced a rapid and, ultirnately, temporary increase in support within Quebec prior to the

1984 federal election. As stated, the rapid increase in the Conservative Party's support could be attnbuted to its leadership and the backing of the provincial Parti Québécois.

Alternatively, the Bloc Québécois has demonstrated a consistent 1evel of support since its formation, while drawing this support fkom a societal division (francophone separatists).

Therefore, it is evident that the support upon which the Conservative Party's electoral success was based, lacked the stable foundation that the Bloc Québécois maintains.

The drop in support that the Bloc experienced in the 1997 federal election could be expected, as the party attracted voters in 1993 who were not separatists and were protesting against the previous governrnent." Mulroney's failed constitutional treaties, the Meech Lake 82

and Charlottetown Accords, and the Goods and SeMces Tax are examples of unpopular

initiatives that alienated Conservative supporters.

The retention rate analysis provided in the Angus Reid/Southam/CTV poll illustrates

the durability of the shift in voter allegiances since the 1993 federai election. The Bloc

Québécois recorded the second highest voter retention rate of al1 federal parties, retaining 73

percent of its supporters f?om 1993 (1 percent behind the Reforrn Party, 13 percent more than the Liberals, and 1 5 percent more than the Conservatives). Further, the Bloc Québécois finished a close second to the Reform Party in the poll's 'certainty of choice' category, with

49 percent of the its supporters stating that they were 'vety certain' that they would vote for the Party. These figures demonstrate the durable and stable nature of the Bloc's support base.

It is evident that Bumham's mode1 of political realignments is applicable to Quebec in the 1993 federal election. First, the ideological polarization between the parties intensified, as the federalist parties (the Liberals and Conservatives) campaigned against the separatist

Bloc Québécois. In addition, the electorate's poor image of the politicians representing them and the perceived legitimacy of the Bloc in Quebec, led to the rejection of the traditional parties and politics as usud. Finally, there was an intense disruption of the traditional voting pattern, with the Conservatives becoming uncornpetitive, the Liberals unable to regain their status as the province's prominent Party, and a third party, the Bloc, capturing the majority of seats for the first time in Quebec's history.

Nevertheless, there are concerns regarding the future of the Bloc Québécois, as the party lost ten seats and 1 1.4 percent of Quebec's popular vote in the 1997 ele~tion.~~A contnbuting &or in the Bloc's decrease in support is the party's leadership question. There 83 is little doubt that Lucien Bouchard played a major role in the success of the Bloc, with sorne authors stating that "the Bloc is Bouchard" and without him the party will fade." The Bloc did experience difficulty during the 1997 federai election campaign under the party's new leader, Gilles hceppe, suffering a leadership disapprovai rating of 57 percent in Quebec."

The concern also exists that Quebec voters, who have assisted in fonning the government for decades (supporting the Conservatives in 1 958, the Liberals from 1962 to 1984, and the

Conservatives again in 1984 and 1988), may become reluctant to "exchange their vote for nothing" since there is little retum if a party has no chance of forming a govemment."

However, the 1997 Angus Reid/Southam/CTV poll further demonstrates that the Bloc

Québécois has a durable and stable support base.

In the category surveying the possibility of a respondent changing hidher rnind before election day, the Bloc Québécois scored the highest support of any party, with 70 percent of the Bloc's 1993 supporters stating that they had 'definitely made up their mind' to vote for the party again. As a result, ody 29 percent of the Bloc's 1993 supporters stated that they could possibly change their rnind, while 49 percent of the NDP's previous supporters, 42 percent of those who backed the Conservative's in 1993, and 37 percent of the Liberals 1993 supporters stated the they 'could change their mind'. In addition, the Bloc Québécois also recorded the highest percentage of respondents who were 'absolutely certain to vote' in the

1997 election (86 percent). A 1993 pre-election Gallup poll reinforces these statistics, as decided respondents were asked how strongly they felt about their choice; 65 percent of Bloc

Québécois supporters felt 'very strongly' about their choice (compared to 33 percent of

Conservative and 38 percent of Liberal supporters), while only 9 percent of Bioc supporters 84

did not feel at all strongiy (compareci to 20 percent of Conservative and 22 percent of Liberal

supporters)." Overali, these statistics indicate that the Bloc Québécois has a dedicated base

of support that displays a cornmitment to the party's success.

Despite the cornmon goal of the separatist Bloc Québécois supporters, internai

conflict has been an ongoing problem for the party. The argument espoused by Levy

regarding third party decline may become applicable to the Bloc if it is unable to conquer these problems successfully. Levy argues that factionalism and conflict within a party, coupled with poor electoral performance, will ofien lead to its failure. Confiid has been present within the Bloc since its inception; however, personality clashes arnong the diverse members of the Bloc appeared inevitable considering that the party was comprised, initially, of former Liberal and Conservative Members of ~arliarnent? The only element comrnon to al1 members was their support for sovereignty and, even here, there existed differences, as some members were "soft sovereigntists" while others took a hard-line stance.75 Conflict wihthe Bloc continued during a particularly divisive leadership campaign, which Duceppe eventually won. However, the Bloc's ability to retain over 80 percent of its seats in the 1997 federal election will assist in solidifjmg Duceppe's leadership, while the party's forty-four seats, ultimately, amounts to an "imposing nwnber of MPs" from which "the voice of Quebec will be he~d."'~

Chapter One presents the view that parties that can rely on a stable ascnptive foundation are likely to persist, as their support is based on societal divisions; such as francophone separatists in the case of the Bloc Québécois. While the Bloc itself has no socidized party identification (PID), the provincial Parti Québécois has existed for nearly 85 thirty years and has established a degree of trans-generational attachment, which, in the two previous fideral elections, has transferred easily to the BIOC." Thus, it is logical that Quebec separatists will continue to provide the Bloc with a stable base of support.

Furthemore, the existence of a provincial aily in the Parti Québécois has assisted the

Bloc in past elections and will, undoubtedly, provide fùrther assistance in the future.

Although the Bloc Québécois is more than a federai wing of the Parti Québécois, it has sought and received a great deal of support fiom the PQ. As outlined, the existence of a provincial branch of a party can provide both morale and resources to the federal level.

Jacques Parizeau, the former leader of the Parti Québécois, provided the Bloc with key personnel and performed the Bloc's polling in the 1993 federal election; both are indispensable when ru~ingan election ca~npaign.'~

Similar to the Reforrn Party, the Bloc Québécois benefits from the single-member plurality system. The Bloc's regional concentration of support allows the party a greater opportunity to capture a majority of Quebec's seats. The 1993 federai election can be considered a realigning election if the Bloc continues to attract stable and durable support.

Conclusion

The nse of the Bloc Québécois to OEcid Opposition status in the 1993 election was surprising; however, the fact that no party fiom Quebec has ever attempted to elect candidates to protect the province's interests and pursue sovereignty at the federai level is equally startling. Quebec experienced a political realignment of the provincial party system after the separatist Parti Québécois emerged in 1968. Provincially, the separatist Parti

Québécois has remained cornpetitive, capturing the rnajority of seats three times since 1968. 86

Similar to the PQ, the Bloc Québécois has a stable eiectoral base (Quebec separatists) fiom

which to draw support. This fact, coupled with the statistics from prior elections and polis,

leads to the prediction that a significant proportion of the Quebec eiectorate has rdigned

behind the Bloc Québécois. Despite the politid events within the province, the Quebec

electorate continued to support the Liberal Party federally, until 1984, when Mulroney and the Conservatives captured the province's support.

As in the Western provinces, increased feelings of alienation in Quebec have been a major factor in the support of third parties in the 1993 and 1997 elections. The failure of

Mulroney's two constitutional initiatives, the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, increased feelings of alienation in Quebec and provided an excellent opportunity for the emergence of a Quebec based party. The Bloc's successful emergence marked the first time that members of an openly separatist party were elected to the House of Commons. Endnotes

1 .H.F. Quinn, The Union Nationale: A Studv in Ouebec Nationalism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1 963. p -3.

3.M. Wade, The French Canadians. 1760- 1945 Vol. 1. London: Macmillan, 1967. p.212.

4.M. Rioux, "The Development of Ideologies in Quebec," in H. Thorbum, ed.. Party Politics in Canada 7& ed. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1996. p.386.

5.F.P. Gingras and N. Nevitte, "The Evolution of Quebec Nationaiism," in A.G. Gagnon, ed., Ouebec State and Society. Toronto: Methuen, 1984. p.8.

6.R.Dyck, Provincial Politics inad2nd ed. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 199 1. p.239.

7.R.Pelletier, "Political Parties and the Quebec State Since 1960," in A.G. Gagnon, ed., uebec State and Societv. Toronto: Methuen, 1984. Chapter 18.

IO.Dyck, Provincial Politics in Canada. 2nd ed. pp.248-253.

I I .Saywell, The Rise of the Parti Québécois: 1967- 1976. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977. p. 124.

12.R. Hudon, "Quebec: Elusive Subject, Unpredictable Future," in H. Thorbum, ed., Party Politics in Canada 7"' ed. Scarborough: Prentice-Hail, 1996. p.398.

13.M. Lusztig, Riskin~Free Trade. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996. p.82. l4.Dyck, Provincial Politics in Cana&. 2" ed. pp.-253-263.

1 S.Hudon, "Quebec: Elusive Subject, Unpredictable Future," p.399.

17.Ibid. 20.P. Russell, Constitutional Odyssev: Can Canadians Becorne a Sovereimi People?. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993. p.227.

21 .Appendix A. Thorbum, ed., Party Politics in Canada. 7

22.M. Pinard, fiseof.Th Ri A New Jersey: Prentice- Hall, 1971, p. 25.

25.J. Crete and G. Lachapelle, "The Bloc Québécois," in H. Thorburn, ed., Party Politics in Canada. p ed. p.4 19.

26.Saywell, The Rise of the Parti Québécois: 1 967- 1 976. p.66.

27.Crete and Lachapelle, "The Bloc Québécois," p.420.

32. Ibid. p.423.

33.Comellier, The Bloc. (Translated by Chodos, Hom, and Taylor) Toronto: Lonmer and Company, 1995. p.3 1.

3 5 .Crete and Lachapelle, "The Bloc Québécois," p.4 18.

3 8.A. Wilson-Smith, "The Spoiler," in Macleans, June 13, 1994. pp. 18- 19.

39.Comellier, The Bloc. pp. 18-2 1.

40.lbid. pp. 1 15- 1 16. 42.Crete and Lachapelle, "The Bloc Québécois," p.425.

43. Ibid.

46.Mackenzie, "Separatist Bloc Loses Ground to Liberals," in Toronto Star, June 3, 1997. B5.

47. See Hudon, "Quebec: Elusive Subject, Unpredictable Future," pp. 3 96-3 97. And Crete and Lachapelle, "The Bloc Québécois," pp.4 1 7-426.

48.See Dwyer, "In Search of Unity," Maclean's, Vol. 107, No.27, July 1, 1994. pp. 16- 19.

49.Gallup Canada, "Les Interests Du Quebec," in The Gallup Poli. May 7, 1993.

SO-Angus Reid/Southam NewdCTV News, The '97 Election: Late Campaiga- www-angusreid.corn. p. 7.

5 1.A.G. Gagnon and A.B. Tanguay, "Minor Parties in the Canadian Political System: Origins, Functions, Impact," in A.G. Gagnon and A.B. Tanguay, eds., Canadian Parties in Transition. 2nded. Toronto: Nelson, 1996.

52. Canadian National Election Survey, 1993.

5 3. R. MacGregor, "A Governrnent on Trial," in Maclean's, Vol. 99, No. O 1, January 6, 1986.

54.Crete and Lachapelle, "The Bloc Québécois," p.419-423.

59.N. Nevitte, "Le Realignment federai-provincial et l'interaction electorale au Quebec, 1962- 1979," in J. Crete, ed., Le Comportement electoral au Ouebe~.Chicoutimi: Gaetan Morin, 1984. pp. 243-277. 6 1.Ibid.

62.Numbers calculated fi-om statistics in Appendix A. H. Thorburn, ed., Party Politics in Canada. ? ed.

64.Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer: Thirty-Fourth General Election 1988. Ottawa: Chief Electoral Officet of Canada, 1988. And: Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, OfTicial Vofing Re~lts:Sywsis- Thirty-Fifih General Etection 1993. Ottawa: Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, 1993.

65.Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Officia1 Votine Results of the Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997. www.elections.ca

66.Statistics fiom: Gallup Canada, Monthly opinion polls 1989- 1993, The Cmllup Report/ The Galluo Poll. And: Appendix A. H. Thorburn, ed., Party Politics in Canada. 7' ed.

67.Statistics frorn: Gallup Canada, Monthly opinion polls 1990- 1996, The Wlup Report The Galluo Poll., Angus Reid, The 1997 Election: Late Campaien. May 29, 1997. www.angusreid.com. p. 1 1. And: Appendix A. H. Thorbum, ed., Party Politics in Canada. ed.

68.Crete and Lachapelle, "The Bloc Québécois," p.426.

69.Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Officiai Voting Results of the Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997.

7O.Cornellier, The Bloc. p. 157.

7 1 Statistics from: Angus Reid, The 1997 Election: Late Campais. May 29, 1997. www.angusreid.com p.23.

72.Pinard, The Rise of a Third Party: A Stu in Crisis Politics. p.253.

73.Gallup Canada, "Major Parties Lose Ground," in The Cmllu? Poll. September 25. 1993.

74.Comellier, The Bloc. pp.3 6-46.

75.ibid. pp.28 and 149.

76.S. Contenta, "Bloc rebounds from dismal launch," in Toronto Star, June 3, 1997. B2.

77.Crete and Lachapelle, "The Bloc Québécois," pp.424-426. 78.Cornellier, The Bloc. pp.69. CHAPTER FOUR- Realignment of the Canadian Party System: Conclusion

Never in Canadian electoral history has the party system experienced as dramatic an overhaul as that in the 1993 federal election. The goveming Conservative Party was decirnated, while two regionally baseci and ideologically oriented parties successfùlly emerged.

Undoubtedly, it will take several additional elections to deterrnine, conclusively, whether the

1993 federal election marked the beginning of a period of reaiignment or dealignment of the

Canadian party system; however, enough information on the Refonn Party and Bloc

Québécois and theory on party persistence presently exists to make an informed prediction.

After reviewing the arguments presented by authors such as Key and Bumham, the data provided by several polls, as well as the results from several federal elections, this thesis contends that the Canadian party system is in a period of realignment.

Lusztig's 'high-risk strate& provides a notable explanation for the dynamics behind the 1993 federai election. Seeking to strengthen the Conservative Party's electoral position and secure the long-tem support of the West and Quebec, Mulroney attempted to institute a political realignment . Achieving this goal would secure the Conservative Party's electoral support and ensure Mulroney's place in history, but would also entai1 significant political risk.

Ultimately, Mulroney's attempt at reaiignment failed, alienating both the West and Quebec whde pemiitting the Refom Party and the Bloc Québécois an excellent political opportunity.

In assessing the current state of the Canadian party system, one might conclude that

Canada is expaiencing a period of dealignment. That is, the success of the Refonn Party and

Bloc Québécois in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections is merely temporary and the pattern of electoral support will retum to a more traditional configuration (with the Liberal and 93

Conservative parties re-establishing electoral dominance and the Reform Party and Bloc

Québécois fading away). Altematively, it could be argued as in this thesis, that Canada is in a period of realignment. In this case, the support for the Reform Party and Bloc Québécois will prove to be stable and durable (that is. the retention of forty seats for a generation), as a substantial portion of the electorate continues to believe that these parties address their concerns better than the traditional parties. As outlined in Chapter One, a party will be viewed as a 'contending party' if it captures at least forty seats in the House of Commons.

Both the Reform Party and Bloc Québécois met this standard in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections and, consequently, cm be considered 'contending parties'. Refonn and the Bloc marked only the third and fourth parties (other than the Liberais and Conservatives) to achieve this benchmark in Canadian histos, and the first two parties (other than the traditional parties) to replicate this standard. If support for these two parties continues to be stable and durable, as it has to this point, then the 1993 federal election cm be considered a realigning election.

An essential cornponent of the analysis presented in this thesis is Bumham's mode1 of electoral realignments. According to Bumham's rnodel, a realigning election includes several key factors, such as the ideological polarization of political parties, a rejection of politics as usual, and the disruption of traditional voting patterns. An application of these factors, in addition to an examination of the information provided by polls and election results, foms the core of this thesis.

The 1993 federal election saw the rejection of the Conservative Party in Western

Canada and the emergence of the Reform Party. The 1997 federal election reinforced the 94

1993 results, as Reform managed to increase its popular support and number of seats, while also fomiing the Official Opposition. When applied to the West, each aspect of Bumham's mode1 of electoral realignments proves relevant. The Refom Party's right-wing economic platform and its stance of Canadian unity stood in contrat to the positions presented by the traditionai parties. The electorate's refusa1 to accept politics as usual in the 1993 federal election amse from growing feelings of alienation and haration, primarily due to the domination of the political agenda by Quebec and constitutional reform. Finally, the

Conservative Party's electoral cornrnand of the Western provinces ended in 1993, as the traditional pattern of party support coilapsed. In addition, the National EIection Survey results and the findings fiom the Angus Reid/Southam NewdCTV News poil (in addition to others) indicate that the Reform Party has a stable and comrnitted base of support that has grown since the 1993 federal election. Further, the Reform Party has been able to retain its supporters better than any other federal party . The various theones on third party persistence also indicate that Reform should continue to be successfU1.

Many parties fd to remain cornpetitive because their platfonns are based on a limited number of issues which leaves the party vulnerable to a shifl in the electorate's focus; however, Reform has adopted a distinctive right-wing economic platform and fonned a unique position regarding the Canadian unity issue. This contrasts with single-issue parties

(the Green Party for example) and, at the opposite extreme, the broadly based brokerage platforms of the traditional Conservative and Liberal Parties.

Despite Reform's success in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections, the party failed in its attempt to expand into other regions of the country. Nevertheless, the Reform Party need 95

not become a national party for the Canadian Party system to be in a period of realignment.

The Quebec electorate also rejected the Comavatives in the 1993 federal election and

supported the newly fonned Bloc Québécois. Once again, al1 of Bumham's criteria for

political realignments are met in Quebec. First, the ideological differences between the parties

became apparent when the separatist Bloc entered politics to compete with the federalist

Liberal and Conservative parties. Further, after Mulroney's failure to achieve constitutional

settlement with the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, an aiienated Quebec electorate

rqected politics as usual and elected a majority of separatist Bloc candidates. The rejection

of the federalist parties marked a vast departure from traditional voting patterns, as no third

party has ever captured a majority of seats in Quebec. Although the Bloc Québécois lost

several seats and a percentage of its popular support in the 1997 federal election, polling

information demonstrates that the party has a stable base of support in Quebec separatists.

The fact that the Bloc can consistently draw on a stable ascriptive foundation (francophone separatists) will greatly assist it in future elections. Additionally. the Bloc benefits from the existence of the provincial Parti Québécois, from which it draws a substantial degree of support.

Pnor to the emergence of the Reform Pany and Bloc Québécois in the 1993 federal election, many authors had predicted the "decay and demise" of third parties in Canadian politics, with some arguing that third parties have become "m~ribund."~In an article written several years before the 1993 federal election exarnining the prospects for third parties in

Canada, Gagnon and Tanguay recognize that oniy one third party, the New Democratic Party, has consistently carnpaigned in al1 federai elections since its inception.? Still, the NDP has 96 been unsuccessfùl in its attempts to capture more than 20 percent of the popular vote.

Additionally, Gagnon and Tanguay argue that no significant third parties had been created in the 1970s or 1980s.) Despite a lack of concrete evidence and the arguments of authors proclairring the death ofthird parties, Gagnon and Tanguay correctly concluded that "reports of the death of Canada's minor parties of protest have been greatly exaggerated."' The 1993 federal election would vindicate the authors, as the Reform Party and the Bloc Québécois successfùlly emerged in drarnatic fashion.

Mulroney's failure to achieve electoral realignment and the dienation of the Western and Quebec electorates, ultimately, led to the emergence of the Reform Party and Bloc

Québécois. Since the 1993 federai election, Reform and the Bloc have been bound in a "kind of perverse syrnbiotic relationship, with each feeding off the other."' This was particularly evident dunng the 1997 federal election campaign, with Preston Manning reiterating the

Reform Party's position regarding the unity question. Manning's rejection of the old federalism espoused by the Liberal and Conservative Parties and promotion of a "new federalism," whereby each province within Canada is equai to the others, assists the Bloc

Québécois in illustrating the infiexibility of English politicians and the unworkable nature of

Canadian federalism. This, unquestionably, aids the Bloc Québécois in the promotion of its separatist platform. In relation, Quebec Deputy Premier Bernard Landry stated, after the

1997 federal election, that with Reform as the Otncial Opposition, the people of Quebec must face a party that is "most hostile to the national project of Quebec?

The 1993 federal election results were extremely significant, as Canadian citizens experienced the breakdown of traditional brokerage politics, the electoral collapse of the 97 incumbent Conservative Party, and the election of the Western based Refom Party and the separatist Bloc Québécois as the country's third party and Official Opposition respectively.

The 1997 federal election reinfiorceci the results from 1993, as the Reform Party increased its percentage of the popular vote in seven provinces and captured Official Opposition status, while the Bloc Québécois again captured a majority of the popular vote and number of seats in Quebec. Ultimately, it will take several additional federal elections to conclusively determine the impact of the 1993 federal election on the party system; however, there can be little doubt that the federal election held on October 25, 1993 was tmly an hi~toncmoment in Canadian politics.

Presentiy, there lacks a definitive explanation as to whether the 1993 federal election was a realigning or dealigning election. This thesis provides an explanation for the events of the 1993 federal election, while attempting to establish whether the 1993 Canadian federal election rnarked the beginning of a period of realignment or temporary deaiignment. In addition, this thesis contributes to the established literature regarding critical elections by presenting a Canadian application of the work of Key and Bumharn. Further, this thesis provides a foundation that will assist in the future analysis of critical elections, whether they be realigning or dealigning elections. Endnotes

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2.Gagnon and Tanguay, "Minor Parties of Protest in Canada: Ongins, Impact, and Prospects," pp -241-242.

5.A.G. Gagnon and A.B. Tanguay, "Minor Parties in the Canadian Political System: Origin. Functions, Impact," in A.G. Gagnon and A.B. Tanguay, eds. Canadian Parties in Transition 2"ded. Nelson, 1996. p 118.

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