UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY
Over the Edge of Canadian Politics:
Alberta's 1998 Senate Election in the Media
A THESIS
SUBMIllED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN COMMUNICATIONS STUDIES
CALGARY, ALBERTA
FEBRUARY, 200 1 Bibliothèque nationale du Canada Acquisiions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie SeMces seMces bibliographiques
395 wdlhrgdon Çbeet 395. rw WsPingbn OdlewmON KlAW -ON KlAON4 Caneda Canada
The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence aiiowing the exclusive permettant a la NaîionaI Lbrary of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, Ioan, distri'bute or seii reproduire, prêter, ùisûibuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thése sous papa or electronic formats. h forme de microfiche/fïim, de reproduction sur papier ou sm fomt électronique.
The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qyi protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantieIs may be printed or othexwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the anthor's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation, In modem democracies, the media is a site of sluggle for different political actors and movements vying for power. The media is the crucial missing link that political movements need to mobilize public opinion, build coalitions, and attach significance to political issues. When the 1998 Senate election was calleci in Alberta, it was immediately dismisseci in the media as an event lacking legitimacy. The questions in the media surounding the legitimacy of this election resemble the questions and assumptions that undermine most western reform movements, and various other social and political movements. Most research dealing with the relationship between oppositional movements and the media deals with ieft-wing social movements. This thesis addresses the media representation of a challenge to the system of representation staged by political actors from the right of the political spectrum. It is the task of this thesis ta explore the relationship between the media and Senate reform advocates during the 4998 Senate election in order to better understand the means by which the media represents western challenges to the institutional status quo. In order to explore this issue, I conducted intensive interviews with Senate election participants, and used quantitative and qualitative methods to analyse national and Alberta media coverage. This work is crucial to understanding the constnicb'on of political legitimacy in the media, as well as the extent to which media representations are factors in the success of political movements. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis has taken way too long tu complete, but it wauld not have kenpossible without the help and support of my family and friends. 1 am especially grateful for the feedback and commentary of Mavis Jones and Pablo Bose, my 'tag team advisors", who also provided me with invaluable encouragement and moral support during the writing process. I would also Iike to thank Madalena Santos and Angela Blodgett for their friendship and support. Finally, Iwould like to thank David Taras for continuing on as
my advisor long affer mis thesis was a lost cause. TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Approval page...... ii... Abstract...... 111 Acknowledgements ...... iv Table of Contents...... v List of Tables...... vii
CHAPTER1:INTRODUCTION...... 1 Methodology ...... 7 Overview of Thesis...... 8 Endnotes...... 10
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE RNIEW...... Hegemony, Political Coalitions and Movements...... Theones of Social and Political Movements...... Agenda-setting ...... Theories of News Production...... The Practice of Objectivity and News Production...... Organizational Practices...... News Values and News Frames...... Endnotes......
CHAPTER 3: "THE UNBEARABLE LlGHTNESS OF WESTERN BEING" ...... Western Alienation...... Content ...... Economic Grievances...... Political Grievances...... 'French Power in Ottawa" ...... Vehicles for Western Aienation...... Visions. for. Institutional Refom...... Constitutional Discussions...... The Meech Lake Accord...... The 1998 Senate Election...... The Charlottetown Accord ...... Conclusion...... Endnotes ......
CHAPTER 4:WHAT DO THOSE FARMERS WANT NOW?" ...... 66 The Advocates ...... 68 The Reform Party ...... 68 The Campaign...... 70 Ted Morton...... 76 Bert Brown...... The Canada West Foundation...... The Rutherford Show...... The Federal Liberal Party...... Conclusion...... Endnotes...... + CHAPTER 5: THE NON-STORY ABOUT THE NON-ELECTION...... Part 1: Content Anaiysis ...... a Genre...... Location of the Artides...... Topic ...... Sourœs...... Defining Sources ...... Responding Sources...... Frarne ...... Tone ...... Part 2: Qualitative Analysis...... Conclusion...... Appendix of Articles ...... Endnotes......
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION...... 130 Methodoiogical Limitations...... 138 Future Directions...... 140 The Dead End of Senate Reform?...... 140 Endnotes...... 143
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 145
APPENDIX...... 153 The Senate Election Chronology ...... 154 Appendix of Articles Used in the Content Analysis ...... 156 Canada West Foundation Ad vii
LIST OF TABLES
Page
1. Frequency of Publication Cross-tabulated by Medium...... 99
2. Frequency of Topics in the Total Sample...... 107
3 . Defining Source Frequencies...... 112
4 . Frequency of Event and Issue-Oriented Frames...... *.... 114
5 . Frame Cross-tabulated by Medium...... 115
6 . Medium Cmtabulated by Tone...... 117 'There is one great advantage in rushing into an eledion for non-senators this fall. Political science students get a great thesis title out of the deal- Alberta's 1998 Senate Election: Insane or Merely lnane?"
Edmonton Journal, May 2 1998.
'The emerging political axis is, are you a traditionalist defending old systems- constitutional systems, economic systems, social systems, political systems- or are you a system challengefl
Preston Manning on the Newt Gingrich Show, 1995
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The 1998 Senate election was an event that baffied observers bath inside and outside of Aiberta. Ralph Klein, the Premier of Alberta, called the election at the request of the Reform Party and the Canada West Foundation in order to 'send a message to
Ottawawabout the need for Senate reform. The Canada West Foundation devised a plan to elect two Senators-in-waiting to monitor the adivities of the Senate and act as
'Shadow Senators" until another vacancy became available. The Senate election was the last of many events staged since the eariy 198C's by advocates of Senate reform in
Alberta. The Senate reform movement was an attempt to resolve the political and economic grievances that comprise western alienation through the improvement of regional representation in the Senate. The 'Triple E' (Equal, Effednre, Eleded) Senate was based on a vision of federalism that would give the regions a more powerful voice in -3 national policy. While western ahenaüon is a prominent force in Alberta that has given rise to new political parties, protest movements and new visions for federalism, it has not been fecognized as a legitimate or relevant set of concems in central Canada. The political concems of Albertans are generally marginal to the national political culture, and political parties and movements from the province have had ditficulty demonstrating the relevance of their proposais for political reform in the media.
The election was most commonly described by Liberal politicians, political pundits, and joumalists as tidiculous and futile. The circumstances surrounding the Senate election did, however, provide some justification for the dismissive labels used to describe it. There was no vacancy in the Senate, Senate reform and constitutional issues were not prionty agenda items in Alberta or the rest of Canada, levels of western alienation were at a low ebb, and no political parties other than the Reform Party were interested in mnning candidates. While some would argue that these fadors woutd be sufficient grounds to dismiss the election altogether, few protest movements are able to stage events that have the ingredients necessary to generate positive media coverage.
In spite of the deficiencies of the Senate election, Senate reform was an issue that epitomized the aspirations of Aiberta for more than a decade. Senate reform advocates in Alberta have held conferences, staged two Senate elections, brought the issue to two sets of constitutional discussions, and plowed political messages in fields in order to implement this change. ln March of 1998, an Environics poll indicated that 91% of
Aibertans supported the election of Senators.'
The immediate dismissal of the Senate election as an insignificant event by joumalists, pundits, and the federai govemrnent was not aîypical of the reaction that has 3 plagued most western protest movements. A prominent scholar, Roger Gibbins, contends that western aspirations and visions have rarely been accepted as 'legitimate national visions" in the national communrty. As such, generations of western protest have not changed the constitutional or institutional fabric of this country.* The election muid be viewed as a site of struggfe between a diçsenting movement and a dominant political elite to change the institutional status quo and systern of representation. f heories of hegemony explain how the intellectual and political leadership of an alliance of sectors and groups wins or loses the consent of subordinate or alienated social factions through ideological stniggle. The political alliances of central Canada that provide the base of support for the traditional parties have achieved a hegemonic position, both culturally and politically, and political movements from Alberta have been entrenched in positions which challenge this dominant hegernony.
The struggle of political movements in Alberta against the dominant hegemony stems from the perceived injustice of the federal system that concentrates political power in central Canada. Ontario, Quebec, and the corporate and political interests in these provinces have exerted cultural, economic and political dominance over the regions. As the Canadian electoral system is bsed upon representation by population, the national political parties have focussed upon the interests of Ontario and Quebec to the exclusion of the western provinces. Years of feeling marginalized and under- represented in the national cornmunity created a crisis of the dominant hegernony, where alienated social factions in Alberta became detached from the federal govemment The distance of Alberta from the centres of power resulted in differing political and eçonornic interests and the development of a counterculture substantially different hmthat in 4 central Canada. Strong beliefs in individualism rather than collectivism, populism, provincial equality, free market ideology as well as strains of social conservatism have set Aiberta apart from the more œntrist dominant culture. The inability of the goveming coalition in central Canada to integrate these ideologies and the irnpermeability of the political system to change led to the creation of new political parties and proposais for systemic change. lnduded among these changes was radical reform of the Senate. A
Senate with powers equal to the House of Comrnons wth equal representation from each province would re-balance the power in the representation system to give the regions more effective representation. The other desired effeds of the 'Triple E Senaten were to undermine the supremacy of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and loosen the constraints of party discipline.
The challenge to political conventions and established power places the Senate refotm movement in the same marginal position as other social movements that oppose the status quo. In order to have legitimacy in the national public debate, opposition movements need recognition hmthe media. The media is the crucial missing link needed by opposition movements to mobilire public opinion, build coalitions, and compel changes to the policy making agenda. According to hegemonic theories of news production, opposition movements are deprived of this recognition because media institutions reflet3 and perpetuate the perspectives of the ruling elite in society.
The media have beçorne participar!ts in the social construction of political reality to the extent that an issue cm nse or faII in public importance as a result of the play that it receives in the media. In this regard, the news media present a challenge and an obsbcle, for hmthe media's frame seiects, amplifies, or subdues aspects of an issue 5 becorne determinants of the ideolagïcal stniggb that influences the su- or failure of govemrnents, political parties and movements. Stuart Hall (1978) obsewed that media institub'ons give dominant or elite gmps the power of "prirnary definition" of issues and events in news Stones while marginalking the accounts of dissident gmups. Later re-cpnrch confimecl the influence af powerful institutions on the press. Hackett (1991) condudecl that " the role of the press as an agent of political communication... hinges on the press's legai, organizational, emnomic, and ideological relationships with the state and other in~titutions."~The consequence of the enhanced ability of the elite to define events in the media is that these definitions becorne the frameworks within which events are understood by the public, while the views and accounts of other political actors are delegitimized. This thesis wil test these theoretical assumptions through an examination of media representations of the Senate eledion.
The research question aiat will be answeied in mis thesis is: How was the ideological stmggle resolved between the Senate reform advocates and the national media during the Senate Eledion and what does the outcorne indicate about the capacQ of opposition movernents to attain political objectives through the media ?
The purpose of add-ng this researdi question is to challenge the notion that political issues have intrinsic legitimacy and to explore how the media play a role in shaping and defining this legithacy. This expioration is cniciai in explainhg wtiy some politicai stntggies have beW chances of succes ftzan others. The media becorne filters for the policy agenda that uItirnateiy effeds the distribution of pawer and Tesources in society . Much of the research dealing with the reiationship between oppositional movemerits and the mass meûia is ;tbolit leftist margrnal gmpssuch as the -ce 6 movement, the environmental movement and the feminist movement (Goldenberg 1974,
Hackett 1991, Clow 1993 ). Challenges to the establishment come in different foms from groups at both the left and right of the political spectnim. While western reforrn rnovements tend to be right-wing and are not recognired as having the same origins as other protest movements. an examination of the challenges and obstacfes that they face will enhanœ our understanding of how the media treats oppositional ideas.
Many studies have addressed westem alienation, western protest, Senate reform and the rise of the Reform Party [see Gibbins (1979, 1980, 1983, 1995a, 1995b), Elton
(1979, l988), Tupper (198l), Laycock (199O), Flanagan (1995), Hanison (1995) among others]. Harrison (1995) examined the historical events and the construction and deconstruction of political alliances that led to the crumbling of the dominant hegemony and the rise of the Reform Party. While Hamson's historical sociology allowed for a thorough explanation of the emergence of the Reform Party , it did not account for the means by which ideological shifts and intellectual leadership contributed to the delegitimation of the dominant hegemony in the West. This thesis examines the role of the media as a hegemonic apparatus in its representation of a westem challenge to the pariiamentary system. The cultural and ideological obstacles that confront westem political movements in their attempts to get their message across to the national media have not yet been addressed m communication studies. Further, this thesis examines which political actors hold the power of 'primary definition" in Canadian politics. ft seeks to explore questions about whether western opposition movements are able to acquire a credible position in media debate, and whether or not these rnau'ernm'its are limited by
Be same political and atftural barriers as other social rnovements. METHODOLOGY
The case study of the Senate election employed a three part strategy: interviews with eledion participants and journalists, content analysis, and discourse analysis. The advantage of using the case study method was that it drew from different sources of evidenœ to explain the relationship between Senate refomers and the media during the election period. The objective of the three part method was to generate new perspectives about the stniggle for Senate refonn by introducing the media as a variable.
First, intensive interviews were conducted with members of the Reform Party, the candidates, key people at the Canada West Foundation and other participants or people affected by the Senate Eledion. They were asked questions related to their message construction, media strategy and the obstades that they perceived to be impeding their ability to get their message to the media. Interviews with journalists will illuminate the reasons why certain editonal deusions were made and why some aspeds of the Senate election were newsworthy white others were not.
In the second part of the data colfection, a content analysii was conduded in order to arrive at a more objective and quantitative measure of media treatment of the
Senate eldon. Content analysis is a media analysis technique that is used as a
'reality check '.' The media sample was taken from national pnnt and televised media as well as print and televised media in Alberta . Further, the media content was coded for frequency of publication, the topics or focus of news items, the use of defining and 8 responding sources, and the use of frames. Particular emphasis was placed on the national media because of its greater importance to the overall objective of achieving
Senate reform and the difficuities election participants may have encountered in getting their messages to national audiences. Comparisons were then made with press coverage in Alberta in order to determine if there were différences Meennational and provincial media coverage. White content analysis provides information about the basic characteristics of the sample, qualive anasfçis is a more adequate means to detemine the tone and subtleties in the mverage. A discourse analysis was conducteci on news items that appeared in the Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, the Calaaw Sun and the Edmonton Sun. The news items hmthe Globe and Mail and Toronto Star will provide the national perspective on the Senate Election, and the Calaarv Sun and the
Edmonton Sun will illustrate the Alberta perspective. The Suns were selected because they were well-known supporters of the Senate elecfion and it is commonly understood that most of their readers are sympathetic to the Reform Party. The language, argumentation, assignment of agency, and omissions in the artides will reveal the way the story of the Senate election was conveyed through the media.
In Chapter 2, the literature on hegemony, social movements, news production and news framing is reviewed. The ideological and political dimensions of the concept of hegemony are examined in order to provide a more comprehensive expianation of how the theory applies to concrete political situations. The Iiterature on news production and the politics of media institutions are also examined in order to address the implications of media average for opposition movements.
ln Chapter 3, the history of western alienation as a driving force behind western protest is explored as an important factor in the background of the Senate reform movement.
In Chapter 4, the Senate election of 1998 is analyzed from the perspective of
Senate reform adv0Cafe.s. The disjointed efforts of the Refonn Party, the candidates, the Canada West Foundation, the Rutherford Show and the Liberal Party are brought together to provide a ahesive view of the campaign. The objectives, the messages that they constnrcted, and the obstacles they faced are analyzed in some detail.
Chapter 5 examines the ways in which the Senate election was conveyed through both the national and provincial media. The results of the content analysis and discourse analysis of media coverage of the Senate election are analyzed and set against the impressions of journalists.
Chapter 6 discusses the outcame of the ideologicai struggle between Senate election participants and the media, and addresses the question of media treatment of different forms of dissent The theories of hegemony, poI'nical movements and news framing are applied to the case study. The signifcance of the findings of this study are discussed in light of the new political dimate of Alberta, and suggestions for further research are made.
In the chapter that follows, theories of hegemony, social movements and news production will be reviewed to explain the relationship between oppositional movements and the media. 1. Environics Opinion Poll, Refonn Alberta Web Site, March 1998.
2. Roger Gibbins and Sonia Arrison (1995). Western Visions: Perspectives on the Wesf in Canada. Peterborough: Broadview Press, pg 86.
3. Robert Hackett (1991 ).-News and Dissent: The Press and the Politics of Peace in Canada. New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, pg 3.
4. Brian McNair, (1995). An introduction to Polifical Communication. London: Routfedge, pg138.
5. Roger Wimmer and Joseph Dominick (1994). Mass Media Research: An l~uction.Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, pp. 166. CHAPTER 2: UTERANRE REVIN
The news media are a cultural and political force that political parties, govemments and dissenting movements must contend with in modem democracies.
Political movements that oppose or challenge established conventions exist in mntinuous tension with the press. The news media present a challenge, an obstacle, and a source of empowennent for a movement seeking representation in a public forum.
At each stage in the development of -al movements, the media plays a role in decisions made by the movement, the movement's actions and strategies, and in the construction of its political legitimacy.
This chapter will provide an overview of the main theoretical approaches that will be used to explain the relationship between the media and political actors and the media as a political actor. The theory of hegemony is central to this discussion as it explains the posiaoning of the media within configurations of power and the broader relationship between the political, ideological and economic forces that affect the fate of opposition movements. The news media have been said to perfonn a hegemonic role through professional conventions and the selection of stories and hmes that subvert or delegitimate oppositional ideas and movements. Hegemonic theones of news production wiII be emphasized because they provide insight into the relations of power that infiuenœ the of the news praduct and the causes and consequences of the media's treatment of dissent Theorists such as Timothy Cook contend that the newsworthiness of an event is detemined by the reaction, tesponse or legih'mation of 12 official sources. Other îheorists such as Lanœ Bennett, Robert Hadreti, and Gaye
Tuchman emphasize the role of organizatianal practices and journalistic noms such as the practice of objectivity in shaping the charader of the news. This theoretical hrnework provides an analysis of the way political messages are conveyed, pmessed and possibly distorted through the media lem to produœ political outcornes.
HEGEMONY, POLliïCAL COALITIONS AND MOVEMENTS
Hegemony is a mulüdimensional concept that explains how consent is won and
lost for a particular social order. It examines the nature of political struggle, particularly
the interplay between ideology, power and political alliances that underpin the state.
The concept is cornmonIy understood to be the exercise of dominance by an alliance of
political elites. Since hegemony was first conceiveci by ManMarxM Antonio Gramsci,
it has been interpreted and recast in different foms. According to Gramsci, hegernony
is:
'the phase in which previousty geminated ideologies corne into contact and confrontation with one another, until only one of them- or, at least, a single combination of them- tends to prevail, to dominate, to spread across the entire field, bringing about, in addition to economic and political unity, intelledual and moral unity, not on a coprate but on a universal level."'
Few interpretations of hegemony attribute equal importance to both political and
intelleduaI leadership. Hegemony is a process by which a Ieading bloc, formed through
alliances with different groups and fadions, wins the consent of Wety as a whole,
induding that of subordinate gr~ups.~Gramsci, however, emphasized that it was on the
terrain of the ideological that a hegernonic bloc is able to win the consent of other social 13 secton and groups. A leading bloc maintained its power primarily through intellectual leadership and the generation of ideas which capture the imagination of the masses. In fad, Moufk (1 979) interprets the aspect of intellectual leadership and the circulation of ideas as the most important aspect in the achievement of hegernony.' In Gramsci's
Prison Notebooks, intellectuals are the linchpin of hegemony. 'Intellectuals have the function of organizing the social hegemony of a group and that group's domination of the
ldeology is a vehicle or instrument of intellectual leadership. It is conœptualized by Gramsci as the world philosophy that is derived from the cultural expression of a social bloc, rather than the expression of an economic dass, that forge the bonds of political alliances. Furthemore, Gramsci elaborates upon different modes of expressing ideulogy that play a crucial rote in securing the hegemonic bloc as daes political leadership. Mouffe contends that, "This is the key to the indissoluble unrty of the two aspects of Gramscian hegemony, since the formation of collective will and the exercise of political leadership depends on the very existence of intellectual and moral leadershipm5Other readings, Grossberg (1996) and Hall (1988), also stress Bat the achievement of hegemony by a ruling bloc is also contingent upon its ability to establish its emnomic and political power.'
The forces operating on economic, political and ideological domains are central to any understanding of the conœpt of hegemony. Many theorists maintain that the hegemonic bloc does not impose a worid view upon a dominated group but rather it incorporates the ideologies of dirent social groups into its ideology. Moufk (19791,
Hall (19881, and Laclau (1977) daim that hegemony is achieved through the synthesis of ideological elements. The new ideological spthesis emerges as a resuit of a dash 14 between the opposing ideas of difbrent social factions, and is mntinually in a state of struggle. What Gramsci referred to as the "war of positionnis when conflicting alliances
of dominant and subaltem factions struggle along a wide range of social fronts within
political, economic and ideological fields.' They provide an alternative to the widely
adopted reading of hegemony as the 'ideological colonkation" of a dominated bloc to a
ruling bloc. Hegemony is more the capacity of a social bloc "to articulate" or combine
diverse ideological structures from other social blocs to its own discourse.' According to
Stuart Hall, 'an articulation is the form of the connection that can make a untty of two
different elements under certain con di ion^".^ The meaning of a discourse is deflved
from the means by which the different ideological elements are linked or "articulated".
Muenced by Emesto Laclau's deIlnition of 'articulationm,Hall argues that there is "no
necessary connection" between the ideological components that are articulated to a
discourse, or between the discourse and the social forces that produced it. A hegemonic
group is able to 'interpellate" other subordinate groups by absohing ideological
elements of their discourse. The incorporation of subordinate ideological elements in
addition to the inclusion of non-class interpellations can neutralize antagonisms between
different group~.'~Hegemonic alliances acquire power through their ability to unify
diverse ideological elements and reconcile the antagonisms between different visions of
the worid. ''
The articulating or hegemonic prinüple is the axis of a discourse. According to
Mouffe, the hegemonic prinüple is the provision of a 'value system to which the
ideological elements corning from the other groups will be articulated in order to form a
unified ideological system , ..-that is to say an organic ideol~gf-'~This values system 15
is detennined by the hegemonic bloc and is the structure that connects a discourse to a
given class.
Just as easily as a hegemonic bloc can be constnicted, it can unravel through
social, economic, or political change. These changes can precipitate an organic crisis
where the tensions between social groups are escalated, and the political alliances of
the ruling bloc lose legitirnacy and collapd3 The process of delegiümation is dosely
shadowed by the unhinging of old political alliances that is referred to as an organic
aisis. The reform of the &al order occun on the terrain of ideological stniggle and
consists of the disarticulation and re-articulation of the components of ideological
formations. A suçcessful movement will employ a 'counter~deology"to the dominant
ideology in a manner which resonates within the culture where the organic cnsis has
erupted. Counter-ideologies usually account for interpretations of causes and solutions
to the organic cri~is.'~In the wake of an organic crisis, populist movements attribute
blame for the crisis and provide 'a system of narration that allows dominated dasses to
comprehend an otherwise elusive approach to understanding and reforming ~mMy."'~
Gramsci argued that the success of the counter movement that attempts to establish
counter hegemony is contingent upon its ability to cultivate a convincing ideology.
While hegemony offers a rnultidimensional theoretical approach to the rise of
opposition movements, there is a vast literature on social movements that examines the
different aspects of their development using difkrent theoretical assumptions.
THEORIES OF SOCIAL AND POUTICAL MOVEMENTS 16
The point of departure for most theory on social movements is the dissent or discontent of marginalized social factions. Jenkins (1995) defines social movements as
'collective actors who are exduded or marginalized in the political order, either organizing new groups or advancing new political daims that have been previously ignored or e~duded"~Most of the Iiterakire on social movements has focused on the 'new social movements" which indude the peaœ movement, ttie environmental movement, the feminist movement and the civil rights movement. The movement for Senate reform did not anse under the same social circumstances or for the same reasons as the above mentioned rnovements. The Senate reform movement did not advance a radical social critique, nor did it emerge from a resource-poor position. Given these considerations, some of the literature on malmovement theory does not have relevance to this case.
The intent of this brief exploration of social rnovement theory is to elaborate on sorne of the concepts that explain and da@ the dynamics of the movement for Senate reform.
Conventional thinking about protest movements would maintain that there is a gulf between movements and political parties, and that the tadics of movements are limited to visible demonstrations and protests. However, protest movements can be based upon alliances with political parties and can plaœ more emphasis on institutional tactics such as lobbyi~g.'~Sinœ its inœption, the Senate reform movernent made use of institutional strategies and alliances with poliilparties and prominent western institutions.
Numerous theoretical approaches have been applied to social movements to explain their emergence, orientation, their successes and failures, and their relatimship to the state. Resource mobilmtion theory has been wideiy applied to social movements in order to explain 'how' rather than My' groups rnobiiïke for social change (Jessup 17
1997, Freeman 1979, Fireman and Gamson 1979). This theory highlights the ability of groups to mobilize based on their capacity to acquire resources, organize and develop strategies to achieve their goals.'' As a theoretical approach, Rôsource Mobilitation
Theory has limitations because of its relianœ on economic logic and its disregard for the problem of meaning mnstruction. However, as theories of social constnidionism and cultural analysis gained impetus within the study of social rnovements, the focus on the construction of meaning was restored.
The cultural anatysis of social movements examines movements both as products and producers of culture. Movernents emerge at the 'cracks and fissures of the dominant c~lture".'~According to the performative tradition of cuitural analysis, culture is viewed as a 'tool kit of rituals, symbols, stories and world views" (Swidler 1986) that are integrated into the strategy of social movements. The frames, values, institutions and discourse that comprise the dominant culture are subverted and reshaped by movements that create an oppositional culture. The framing approach to culture draws from both systemic and performative traditions. Framing is the means by which patterns or schemes of interpretation are embedded in cultural texts that are used to understand social sit~ations.~In social movement strategy, frames are used, applied and emphasized by movements in ways which will mobilize support for a wuse.
Other theoretical approaches involve looking at the relationship of social movements to the state. Jenkins (1995) outlines three main theories that address this issue: neo-pluralism, elitism, state-centred theory and Mamism. Neo-pluralism has specific relevanœ to Viis case because social movements are regardeci as the consequenœ of 'linkage failures or from marginalimtion within the political representation system? While n-pluralism is a limited approach in terms of its analysis of merand ideology, it does shed light on the relationship between a movement and its politicai wntext The two tenets of necqluralism related to protest are the rational choiœ theory of protest and the political process theory of political opportunity. The rational choiœ theory of protest involves analysis of why movement members participate in collective action. Early theorkations explained motivation to becorne involved in collective action as an expression of individual selfi'nterest, but later theories concluded that it was more plausible to attribute protest behaviour to collective goals and social cornmitment. While nepluralist explanations of motivation are rudimentaty, they replaced the notion that collective protest was an irratianal mass behaviour. The polical process theory of political opportunity putains to how social movernents manoeuver within the political system. Protest and opposition movements have the opportunity to achieve their political goals within the system of representation thmugh alliances with other political actors.
Further to the idea ihat movements operate within 'alliance and wnflict systems"
(Kiandermans 1WO), Maguife (1995) argues that the lines between opposition parties and opposition movements are not so dearly delineated.22 Movemts can take on the
new organizational fom of the political party or their issues can be integrated within a
party plaffomt. 23 Adâiially, the relationship between opposition movements and
opposition parties is of strategic importance to both entities in their struggle for power.
Movements provide opposition parties with a link to civil society and opposition parties
provide movements with access to the state. The most favourabie vantage point for
movements is when there are divisions between dies wtiich makes politicai 19 parties more open to their demands." The alliance forged between parties and
movements can benefit both in ternis of achievement of goals, but it can also cause strategic complications for both the movement and the opposition party. In some cases, the goals of the movement conflict with the electorai objectives of the party and constrain the 'political opportunity stnidure" of the political party? The political opportunity
structure involves considerations such as: the access of the opposition party to the state;
the party's curent network of political alliances; the potential of the party to form new
alliances and the relative strength of the goverriment in power? When the alliance of a
movement and a party creates a precarious political opportunity structure in terms of the
ability of the political party to create strategic alliances that will enable the party to
acquire a position of power, a party will frequently discard the movement. The Iinkage
between the Reform Party and the Senate election created an undesirable opportuntty
structure for the Reform Party which meant that the issue of Senate reform became a
liability for it in its attempts to form new afliances.
While the political context is important to understanding movement dynamics, the
relationship between movements and the mas media have become an increasingly
important factor in modem democracies. KiehwÎcz and Scherer (1986) argue that the
mass media have a pmfound efkt on the fate of social movements at every stage in
their development In the initial stages, the agenda-setiing function of the mas media
can create conditions favourable to the rise of the movement. Mas media are the main
channels by which movements cm reach a broad audience, raise consciousness about a
problem, and mobilize citizens to act upon this awareness? Furthermore, the media
spotlight has an impact not only on the pubiic at large, but also on the members' 30 perceptions of their own legitimacy. These theorists further contend that media coverage of a movement conveys the importance of the cause to its mernbers and is aierefore important to both the interna1 operations of the movement and its ability to reach an extemal audience.
Although expure to the media is necessary to the activities and survival of a movement, the need to conforni to news values can drastically alter the strategies and goals of the movement. The presence of the media spotlight can radicalire or co-opt the movement. Movements that suocumb to media logic attract attention by staging dramatic events such as protests mat initiaily create a radical However, in order to maintain the onen fleeting and ficide attention of the media , the movement discovers
that it is necessary to becorne a "tegitirnized news sourcen. Acquiring this tegitimacy
very often means that a movement's issues are adjusted or "conservatized' before they
reach the agenda of policy-makers.
Conventional wisdom and research have proved that political issues that receive
media attention are regarded as both signifiant and pressing by both policy makers and
the public. According to Timothy Cook,'the media help to highlight particular issues and
alternathes, influence perceptions of public moods, and in other ways shape the context
of one legislator asking another krsupport, whether or not the public was involveci, had
chosen sides, or was even aware of the issue.'29 Studies have indicated a strong mrrelation betwéen the media agenda and the issues seen as important by the electorate.
Beginning with the 1968 U.S. Presidential Election, agenda-setting studies have exploreci the relationship between exposure to mediated messages and the political agenda of votes. Kurt and Gladys Lang have noted that people leam about such matters as campaign issues in direct proportion to the emphasis placed on them by the media.30 More recent agenda-setüng studies point to the importance of the framing of issues and conclude that the news media are successful in telling the public not only what to think about but how to think about it3' In addaion to mis, an audience cm be prompted to use certain criteria when exerciçing judgement about political affairs.
According to lyengar and Kinder (1983), priming effect occurs whe~the news media cal1 attention to some matters more than others #us setting the standards by which governments, political leaders and policies are judged. The influence of the media upon public opinion has been studied by political leaders and is widely understood that failure to control the news agenda is often synonymous with political fai~ure.~Although theorists generally contend îhat agenda-setthg is prirnarily about the determination of issues that becorne the focus of the public agenda 33, agenda-setting can also involve the framing of poiihi events and issues within an ideological context The institutional refationships that influence agenda-setting Ml1 be examined in the following sections of this chapter.
THEORIES OF NEWS PRODUCTlON 22 Liberal-pluralist theories of the media stipulate that the media are autonomous institutions that are not bound by their retationship to other institutions, and that power is disperseci amongst various competing interests throughout the whole of society. In accordance with these notions, the news media provide a forum for both mainstream and dissenting opinions and ideas. Within the critical paradigm, however, the media are viewed as an institution that helps to reproduce and perpetuate hierarchical relations of power wtiich favour and pay homage to a hierarchy of niling elites. Some critical perspectives on news production further maintain that the definitions of social issues provided by the govemment and other institutional sources are privileged and reinforced in the media. Robert Hackett illustrates this argument with a metaphor: "The State exerts a gravitational pull... which helps bring the media generally within its ort~it."~~The news media are therefore seen as agents of hegemony.
Critical theorists argue that with respect to the news, hegemony entails the selection of stories and frames which advance and naturalize the ideology of the mer blocs in society while simuttaneously subverting opposiüonal movements and ideas. The subversion or delegitimation of oppositional ideas is not accomplished through their exclusion from the media agenda , but rather through their domestication and integration
into the dominant frarne. 'Objectivity" is an institutional doctrine that is implicated in the
hegemonic process by seMng the dual purpose of legiümizing the system and also
allowing spaœ for the entry of challenges and threats to that system. Dominant
ideological formations are riddled with contradictions that invite resistanœ and challenge,
and they must therefore be perpetually recon~tnicted.~However, Gain maintains that,
given the influence of the political and economic eliiover the news media, they will 23 tend to give expression to and perpetuate dominant ideological currertts that support elite interests. Gitlin further argues that "news values secure this hegemonic boundary due to the fad that the news involves the novel event, not the underlying, enduring condition; the person, not the group; the visible confiict not the deep consensus; the fact that advances the story, not the one that explains or enlarges it"." Thus, the power structures and institutional forces underlying social problems are never questioned or investigated which perpetuates the existenœ of the same hierarchies of power.
Stuart Hall (1978) theorized that the power of elite or officiat sources lies in the power of 'primary definition". The primary definition thesis alleges that while journalistic noms require that both sides of a story are reported, the elite source ultimately defines the story. This definition of the problem then sets the ternis of debate and circumscribes the limits of al1 discussions which follow. According to Hali, 'arguments against a primary definition are forced to insert themselves into its definition of Matis at issue'".37 The framework for the discussion of the topic is difficult to change once it has ben set, which increases the difficulty of launching counter-arguments. Critics of the pBmary definition thesis argue that the theory does not account for occasions when oppositional groups do succeed in setüng the agenda? However, Hall's thesis draws from a theory of
hegemony which explicitly refutes the idea that the dominance of elite groups and ideas
is permanent.
Cook (1998) formulates the argument that the media is an intemediary political
institution. Accordingly, the production of the news must above al1 be considered to have
occurred within the constraints of an institution. rather than the outcome of the
spontamus decisions of individual joumalists. Over time, institutional practices are 24 naturalized, as in the case of the profession of joumalism, where the objectMty nom has come to be seen as synonymous with the profession. Joumalists have intemalized the noms and procedures of the news mmin making decisions about what or what is not
news tu such an extent that they rarely consider that different choices could have been
made if another perspective had been employed. Thus, there is a process of filtration
and exclusion by which issues are selected and around which the public sphere is
constituted that is almost beyond the consciousness of joumalists.
Organizations also extend across space which leads inevitably to the movement
taward homogenization. According to Dimaggio and Powell, three pfocesses occur in
homogeniation: an organization draws from the legitimacy and power of mer
instituti-ons; it duplicates the pradices of other organidons; and finally, it succumbs to
pressures to adopt professional noms .% First, the practice of objectivi, in combination
with the proestablishment bias of the media and its reliance on official sources for
information, has served to solidify the legitimacy and power of the media. With regard to
the second part of the process, media organizations have standardized their practices ,
formats and products resulting in unifomity and mnformity that spans media
organaations. Third, the ethic and practiœ of objecüvity, 'balance" and 'faimessu are the
cumulative response to the pressure to professionalize.
Thus, Cook argues that the media operate within organizational and professional
constraints and further defines the media as an institution of govemance. The argument
that the media is an intermediary govemrnental institution is controverçial in that the
legitirnacy of the media is considered by many to be contingent upon its autonomy.
Daniel Hallin has argued that the autonomy of the media from govemrnental insWkm 35 serves the purpose of buttressing tfieir own legitimacy as well as the capitalist system as a wh~le.~As a political institution the news media are implicated in the process of detemining ' who is authoritative, what the values of politics are, and which allocations
are made"? Cook argues that the media do not just report on the activities of
govemment but they also assist in govemmental processes by mmmunicating policy
matters to the public. The media can be used as a means to create a spotiight for
selacteci issues as well as present those issues in terms that are supportive of the
c;ovemmentYsagenda. The power of policy rnakers lies in their ability to set the terms of
the policy debate and detemine the problerns and solutions that should have media
attention.42
THE PRACTICE OF OWECTiVlW AND NEWS PRODUCTiON
Another Stream of theory about news produdion foaises on the pmblematic
aspects of the nom of objectivity. This cntique of objecüvity is the equivalent of berating
democracy itself, as objectivity is closely ass6ç1-ated with the equilibrium theory of liberal
democracy and is inextricably Iinked to fundamental beliefs about democracy in North
Amenca. The practice of objedMty remains an etfiic and an ideal enshrined in the
profession of joumalism in spite of numsdaims that it is mereiy a quixotic,
unachievabie goal. The concealeci political bias and po(i-l consequences of this
practice have been evaluated exhaustively by Tmothy Cook (1998), Robert Hackett
(1998), and Gaye Tuctirnan among others. 26
As a pracîice, objedMty entails ' deferring to expertise, presenting both sides of the story, providing intuitively persuasive supporting evidence, and generally obscuring the reporters own hand."" ObjectMty as a media practice can be traœd bock to the philosophical traditions of positivism and empincism. Positivism is based upon the contention that events in the real world can be observed without bias or interpretation .*
Knowledge of the worid can be obtained through sensory data in the fonn of indisputable facts. One of the main requirements of the pradice of objectivity is for the joumalist to be able to çonvey facts that are untainted by values, analysis or interpretation. Facts have been defineci as 'pertinent information" acquired through accepteci professional methods that establish what and how something is kno~n.'~Thus, the selection of facts is p~liticizedand laden with the values of the profession of joumalism.
While the epistemological roots of objective joumalism reside on shaky theoretical ground, the manifestation of the philosophy in practice has created a structural bias that has aligned media institutions with official authority. As a practice, objectivity has led to a relianœ on oniaal sources for information and the infiltration of hegemonic ideology
in news stories which endows official political actors and their perspectives with even greater power. According to Robert Hackett, 'the objectivity regime calls on journalisl to
seek out and use 'appropriate sourcesn depending for its credibility on the appearance of fa& reported as king straighfforward, indisputabiy concrete and value-free translations
of the rea1."46 Thus, the reality that is fiitered through the news media is a representation that refieds the views of the powerfui that cornes to be legitimited as 'objedive'. The
publicity accorded to certain events, particulariy under the guise of objectÏvity,has explicit political mnsequences.
One of the principal refutations of the theory of objectivity is based in social mnçtrucüonism. According to this theory, while the news is intended to relay an accurate, factual depiction of reality, it is also a social construction. Citiiens combine seIected details fm news acaxints with mer representations from their past and present expenences in order to construct the meaning of events. Anthropologist
Marshall Sahlins has defined an event as 'not just a happening in the world, but a relation between a certain happening and a given symbolic ~ystern."~'Embedded in news accounts are values and assumptions that colour the events and issues that they describe. In fact, the news is set against a backdrop of idealistic constructions of nation and society? In the process of reporting news stories to the public, the media becorne
participants in the construction of social knowiedge.
ORGANIZATIONAL PRAClïCES
Several studies of television news have examined the organizational, economic
and technical requirements of television news production in explaining the news
produ~t~~News organizations are commercial enterprises engaged in the production of
cheap and efficient news and this results in the usage of recycied formulaic news plots.
Bennett has identifiecl üiree different sorts of pressure experienced by the journalist that
reinforce the tendency to produce formulaic news: pressure from news sources,
pressures frorn news organizations, and pressure from fellow reportersS0News stories
and the angles from which they are covered are frequently the object of editorial smthy. 28
Additionally, news organizations muhially reinforce status quo methods of reporting by
using the news stories of other organizafions as a standard, such that news items that
deviate from the perspectives of the news items of other organizations must be justifiecl
and defended to ediiors. fime constraints and deadlines impose further restrictions on
journalists and the way in which a story is covered. The mandate of the news
organitation is to produce tirnely, newsworthy accounts that are capable of "filling up the
news holeu.
NEWS VALUES AND NEWS FRAMES
The reiationship between the news media and other political institutions influences
the production values of media institutions . How political issues are selected, treated,
prioritized and framed has consequences for the quality of public debate, and therefore
for the vitality of democracy.
The correlation between the media agenda and public opinion renders significant
the specific criteria news organizations use to determine a story's place and prionty on
the media agenda. Stones are selected by their abitity to meet the elusive and intangible
criteria of 'importancea and 'interest" as they pertain to news standards.
ln addition to drawing attention to smcevents, issues and political movements,
the media participate in the construction of political dimurse by reconstmding real
world events and political messages in order to comply with news values . This
empsulation and redefinition of reaiii has been referred to as framing. According to 29
Robert Entman, 'to frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and treatrnent
re~ommendation."~'The seledon of news frames, according to Matthew Mendelsohn, is
Iargely detennined by joumalistic conventions and practices, and their compliance with dominant ideology that corresponds with eiite interestç. While seming to legitimize a narrow range of political pewpedives, frames aie also narratives that are used to reduœ the complexity of an issue and provide a "frame of referencewthat enables the audience to understand the issue.
Media scholars such as Shanto lyengar have broadly constnied television news frames as either belonging to the episodic or thematic genre. These two frames differ in
how they 'cuew the attributions of responsibility for problems in society which ultimately
impacts the decision-making processes of voters. The episodic news frame places
emphasis on discrete events that cm illustrate rather than explain an issue. Shanto
lyengar posits that the predominance of the usage of episodic framing in television is due
to organizational noms and commercial imperatives. Visually compelling stories are
more likely to have a broader audienœ appeal and are less likely to violate the nom of
objectivity. Conversely, thematic framing is more abstract in nature and addresses the
background context and causes of social problems. As the focus rests more with
Iongstanding issues, more indepth reporting and joumalistic analysis is required. Thus,
thematic frames constitute a transgression of the surface level, timely hard news
reporting typical of news organizations. While eepisodic frames tend to elicit individuaf
attributions of responsibiiii from the audience, thematic fiames tend to result in societal 30 attributions of responsibilit-y.52Consequently, the effect of episodic frames is to legitimize institutional authority and reinforce the neoliberal doctrine of individualism.
Lanœ Bennett has identified four commonly used fiames in news organizations which have evolved as a consequence of coprate motives to appeal to the lowest common denominator of the mass audience. These frarnes or formulas include: personalized frames, dramatized frames, fragmented frames, and normalized frames.
The personaiiied frame is illustrated by the proiiferation of human interest stories in the news. Individuals becorne the focus of the news rather than the social or political currents that underlie events. This news frame faciliMes an egocentric interpretation of issues and events, and narrows the lens through wfiich citizens view the world. In general, the consequence of human interest news is a ' can't see the forest for the treesn information biasS3The focus on individual actors consequently can subvert attempts at indepth analysis of an event or issue and inhibit public understanding of the operation of power within the political system.
Subsequently, the dramatized frame is a mainstay of journalism. A story should possess the elements of a plot complete with a narrative thread that holds the elements together. The predisposition toward drama in the ne# is the logical antecedent to the personalized news formula. The drama frequently revolves around the trials and tribulations of compelling personalities and provides an ernotional outlet for the audience.
The actors in the melodrama have more importance in the news story than the issues to which they are conneded. The obvious consequene of the drame news frame, when taken to the extreme, is the redudion of politics to trivia.
The effect of dramatized and personalized frames is fragmentation. The 3 I emphasis on drama and human interest conveys the impression of discontinuQ between events, their causes, and the underiying political thrusts. The news conveys poiitical events and problems as a "jigsaw puzzle that is out of focus and missing many pieces.*
Collections of news stories about an issue are lacking in unity and coherence which further illustrates the inabiiii of the media to organize the public sphere.
ln nomalized frames, news accounts tend to uphold dominant perspectives and values and defend established social institutions. Opposition to these core values and institutions is discredited and portrayed as deviance, and any inefftciencies in the system are attributed to individuals and human faiIure .% Wtiile the news, as a mnsequence of its normalizing tendency, reinforces mainstream views of the worid it also legitimires its own existence. Questioning or holding political institutions up to scrutiny would destroy the credibility of the media which rests upon those institutions.
Additionally, there are some news frames that journalists use specrfically for reporting elections and political events. The conflict frame has been identified by many
scholars as one of the principal conceptual tools in political reporting. Political issues are
presented in news stories as a confiid between two opposing sides. Even complex,
mutüfaceted issues are simplifieci to accommodate the binary structure of the conflict
frame. Elections are political events that meet the criteria of issue polarization, as they
are composeci of competing candidates and a ciariy dramatic binary outcorne.
The media typically uses and reuses specific narratives by which elections and
campaigns can be understood. These naratives or frames include the horse race frame,
the strategic frame, and the confikt frame. According to Thomas Patterson, the news
media have the power to shape and define the poIitica1 agenda to the extent that it can 32 effedively âiipiace attention from substantive poïiissues . Election studies reveal that much more attention is given to how candidates and their campaigns should behave than to the political messages of the candidates. Adherenœ to news values has resulted in increased emphasis in news coverage on carnpaign controversies, scandais, strategies and the position of the candidates in the 'horse race". Issues, when covered, are submerged beneath the drama of the wnflict in which the opposing candidates are engaged?
Related to and often incorpotated into the horse race frame is the " baffle schema" which entails the strategic moves of the pulitid candidates and their power plays.
Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1996), argues that the prominence of political strategy in election coverage has not only diverted attention from policy issues but has triggereâ
audience cynicism. Citizens are perpetually reminded of the self-interest of politicians and their personal quest for power. Every adion of the candidate is interpreted by joumalists as an attempt to manipulate voters or win votes frorn other candidates.
Consequently, politicians are conceptualiked within the strategic frame as self-interested
actors driven by their ambition to win the e~edion.~The political process then becornes
the embodiment of the personalized drama conjured by the press rather than a means to
articulate and implement social goals, new directions for public policy and social change.
The cynicism of citizens about political actors who occupy positions of power in the
political process is then likely to manifest itself in widespread apathy.
This chapter has been prirnariIy mncemed with the theoretical frameworks that
pertain to the factors affecting the reIationship between poliilactors and the media, as
well as the influence that this relaüonship has on produdion values. One Stream of 33 theory identifies political forces and institutions as the primary influence on the mation of news. Included in this brand of theorizing is the study of the impact of journalistic noms, practices, mutines and other institutional mnstraints on the shape of the news. The subsequent theoretical domain that has been outlined provides an overview of news values and frames with a view to their effects on the information environment and voting behaviour. These frameworks will be employed in this thesis to evaluate the factors that influenced the caverage of the Alberta Senate elecüon.
The chapter that follows will focus on the political and historical aspects of the movement for Senate reform. It will explain the ongins of support for Senate reform in
Alberta, and the series of events and gnevances that led up to the 1998 Senate election.
1. Antonio Gramsci, Buttigieg, J(ed). Prison Notebooks: Volume 2. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, pp180.
7. Stuart Hall (1988). 'The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism among the Theorists." In Nelson, C., Grossberg, L. Maniism and the Interpretation of Culture. Chicago: University of Illinois press, p53.
3. Chantal Mouffe (1979). "Hegemony and ideology in Gramsci," In Mouffe, C.(ed) Gramsci and Marxist Theory. London: Kegan Paul, pp183.
4. Antonio Gramsci, pp200.
5. Chantal Mouffe (1979), pl84.
6. Lawrence Grossberg (1996). 'History, politics and postmodemism: Stuart Hall and cultural studies.' ln Morley, D., Chen, Kuan- Hsing. SfuaR Hall: Cntical Dialogues in Cultural Studies. London: Routledge, pl62.
7. Di& Hebdige (1996). 'Postmodemism and 'the other side" In Morley, D., Chen, K Stuart Hall: Cntical Dialogues in Cultural Studim- London: Routiedge, p195. 8. Chantal Mouffe (1979), pl95
9. Lawrence Grossberg (1W6), p53.
10. Emesto Laciau (197ï). Politics and ldeology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascisml PopuIism. London: NLB, pl6l.
11. Ibid.
12. Chantal Mouffe (1979), p193.
13. Trevor Harrison (1995). Of Passionate Intensity: Right- Wing Populism and 1 Refom Party of Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p13.
14. Trevor Harrison(1995), pl5.
15. David Laycock (1990). Populism and democratic thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to f945. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp.18.
16. J. Craig Jenkins (1995). 'Social Movements, Political Representation, and the State: An Agenda and Comparative Framework," In Jenkins, J., Klandemans, B.(&). Tlie Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 15.
17. Ibid. pp16.
18. Michael Jessup.(1997) 'The Legitimacy and Decline of the Ku Klux Klan," Reseanh in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Vol. 20, 1997, pp. 179.
19. Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans. 'The Cultural Analysis of Social Movements.' In Johnston, H., and Klandermans, B.(eds). Social Movements and CuIture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp5.
2 1. J. Craig Jenkins (1995). pp.20.
22. Diarmuid Maguire (f 995), 'Opposition Movements and Opposition Parties: Equal Partnefs or Dependent Relations in the Stniggle for Power and Refom?" In Jenkins, J. Klandermans, B. The PoIitics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
23. Diarmuid Maguire (1995), pg 202
24. J. Craig Jenkins (1995), p21. 25. Diamuid Maguire (1995), p205.
37. Richard Kielbowicz and CIifford Scherer.(1986) 'The Role of the Press in the Dynamics of Social Movements," Research in Social Movements Conflict and Change, Vol. 9, pp.81.
28. Ibid, pg 85.
29. Timothy Cook, (1998). Goveming wifh the News: The News Media as a Political Institution. Chicago: University of Chicaga Press, pg 11.
30. Lowery, S., DeFleur, M (1983). Milestones in Mas Communication Research. New York: Longman Publishers, pg 329.
3 1. Maxwell McCombs. (1997). 'Building Consensus: The News Media's Agenda- Setting Roles.' Politcal Communkation, Vol. 14.
32. W. Lanœ Bennett (1996). News: The Politics of Illusion. White Plains: Longman Publishers.
33. Maxwell McCombs (1997), p433.
34. Robert Hackett. (1991). Pg 71.
35. Robert Hackett. (1991), pg 59.
36. Todd Gitlin. (1980) The Whole WmW is Wafching. Berkley: University of Caiiirnia Press, pg 263.
37. Stuart Hall(1978). 'The Social Production of News." In Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J.,Roberts, B.(&$) Policing the State: Mugging, the State, and Lawa and Oder. London: MacMillan Press Ltd, pg58.
38. Brian McNair (1995). Introduction to Political Communication. London: Routledge.
39. Ibid, pg 69.
4. Michael Schudson (1989). *The Sociology of News Production." Media, Culture, and Socrety.2. pg 270.
3 1. Kmothy Cook. (19981, pg 86.
42. Ibid, pg 127. 43. Timothy Cook (1998), pg 74.
44. Robert Hackett, et al (1998). Sustaining Democracy?: Joumalism and the Politics of ObjectivityectivityToronto: Garamond Press, pg 109.
45. Gaye Tuchman. (1972) Making News: A Study in the Social Constmction of Realify. New York: The Free Press, pg 82.
46. Robert Hackett, et al (1998). Pg 142.
47. Michael Schudson. (1989). Pg 275.
48. Herbert Gans. (1979). Deciding What's News. New York: Pantheon, pg 39.
49. Michael Schudson. (1989), pg 273.
50. W. Lance Bennett (1996).pg 119.
5 1. Joseph Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jarnieson. (1997). Spiral of Cynicism: The Pms and the Public Good. New York: Oxford University Press, pg 45.
52. Shanto lyengar. (1991).
53. W.Lanœ Bennett (1996). pg 40.
54. Ibid, pg 58.
55. Ibid, pg 67.
56. Thomas Patterson (1993). Out of Oder. New York: Vtntage Books, pg 137.
57. Kathleen Hall Jarnieson and Joseph Cappella, (1996). News Frames, Politicai Cynicsm, and Media Cyniasm. The Annals of Poiitical Science, Vol. 546, pg 81. CHAPTER 3: THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF WESTERN BElNG "'
For Canadians outside of Alberta, the reasons for holding a "rogue" Senate elecüon in the fall of 1998 were not necessarily easy to grasp. However, within Alberta,
Senate reform was seen as a long awaited solution to what was believed to be an unjust and ineffective parliamentary system. The Senate refom movement became an outlet for the expression of deepseated feelings of alienation from Central Canada and the federal government. 'Westem alienation' has been describecl as a form of 'attitudinal regionalismn' that is based upon the belief that the western provinces have been economically exploiteci and politically neglected by the federal govemment.
This chapter will set the Senate election against the backdrop of western alienation and political protest in Alberta. Westem discontent has been viewed through the scrutiniu'ng lens of the dominant paradigm of mainstream Canadian politics as rnisguided and somewhat unfounded. The grievanœs of western alienation have been also disputed by some economists and scholars on the basis of flawed argumentation and ideological inconsistency. However, the intent of this chapter is to examine the ways in wbich Albertans have understood their political and economic situation and how they have attempted to remedy perceiveci injustices. The purpose is not to provide an extensive history of Alberta politics, but to identify the grievances and arguments as they have evolved in the political Iife of western Canada. These grievances have been invoked on numerous occasions as a provocative cal1 to engage in national politics.
' Edward Greenspon, 'The unbearabie lightness of Western king,' Globe and Mail, Deceinber 19,2000, A16. 3 8
Extensive research and analysis of western alienation and Senate refam has ken undertaken by Roger Gibbins and David Elton, and given the limitations on the diversity of the literature in this field, this chapter will mostly be reliant on their work. Moreover, the literature is flddled with problematic uses of the terms 'the wesr , 'westem alienaüonnand Western perspectives" mich appear to make sweeping generalizations about the region but which primarily refer to Alberta. The first part of the chapter will describe western alienation as a set of attitudes and an ideology. The second part of the chapter will examine some of the political solutions that have been proposecl to alleviate western alienation, including Senate reform.
WESTERN ALlENATiON
According to Roger Gibbins, a political scientist and president of the Canada
West Foundation, 'western alienation embodies a socially shared set of interrelated beliefs with some degree of cultural embodiment and intelledual articulation with a recognized history and constituency, and with recognized spokesmen and camers of the creed."
Roger Gibbins has laid most of the foundational work for the measurement and study of western alienation. Poliilalienaüon, according to one model, has thfee characteristic elements: distrust of govemment, a sense of powerlessness, and frustration with the eledoral process. Western alienation, as it was exhibited by the province of Al berta, did not fit this model. While Albertans have a profound lack of trust in the meral govemment, they have historically klt very dose ties to provincial 39 governments and have believed in their ability to represent the interests of the people in the province- Wrth regard to the component of alienation that addresses citizen perception of the 'meaninglessness of political decisions', it has been argued that westerners subscribe to a 'conspiratorial theory of poli tic^".^ From the perspective of
Albertans, the federal govemment has consistently undermined the political and economic interests of the westem provinces. Finally, Albertans have demonstrated more activism than apathy and have actively engaged in attempts to procure democratic, political and economic reforms.
The subject of western alienation has recently been revisited and re-evaluated by new research. Contrary to ideas that westem alienation is a unique phenomenon to
Western Canada, Henry (1999) has suggested that western alienation is not a unique phenomenon to the region. Instead, he suggests that Schwartz's definition of 'partial political alienation" would be applicable in the case of western alienation. Schwartz
(1973) daimed that it was possible for an individual to be partially politically alienated, particularly in a fedetal system of government. under the following conditions:
"1. The individual perceives that only some of the political institutions, policies or processes are incompatible with his basic political values; or 2. He initially withdtaws from the polity as a whole but is later able to cognitively differentiate between the total polity and some part of the system perœived to require and permit refotm? This definition of partial political alienation may amunt for the attachment of Albertans to provincial polical institutions and their detachment from federal institutions.
In the 1997 federal eledion study, western alienation was measured using four 40 independent variables: antipathy towards Quebec's constitutional demands, ties to the provincial or federal govemment, perceived influence of the federal govemment over the provincial economy and regional favouritism .? The survey indicated that western alienation had decreased significantly on many dimensions, but that some attitudes remained more or less the sarne. Over 50% of respondents from the four western provinces still agreed with the statement that 'the west usualIy gets ignored in national politics because the parties depend mostly on voters in Ontario and Quebec".
Additionally, 53.9% of respondents felt stronger ties to the provincial government than to the federal government, and Alberta respondents demonstrated the highest levels of antipathy towards Quebec's constitutional demands. However, respondents in Alberta did not feel that the federal government had a negative impact on the provincial economy, as previous surveys had indicated. The results of the survey that were not anticipated were syrnptoms of western alienation in provinces outside of the West.
A sunrey conducted in 1976 of a random sample of 502 respondents in Alberta indicated intense feelings of alienation in the province, based upon a diRerent index than that used in 1997. ln 1976, 73.7% of Albertans agreed stmngly or moderately with the statement that the economic policies of the federal government seem to help Quebec and Ontario at the expense of Alberta.' Three quarters of the respondents agreed that
Alberta poiiicians are not taken seriously in the east, and that Alberta usually gets ignored in national p~litics.'~
Western alienation is more than a set of attitudes that charaderite Alberta cuiture, it is an ideology used to understand the social and paliticat situation of the West and a means of organizing and motivating political participation in the province. Stuart 4 1
Hali's definition of an ideology as 'those images, concepts and premises which provide the frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand, and make sense of some aspect of social existence*,'' helps illuminate the significanœ and function of western alienation within the culture. Sinœ it is part of a sub-culture and an oppositional discourse to that of the dominant paradigm, it has been infrequently expressed and often discredited in the national media . The principal intellectual expressions of western alienation were in the speedies of Premiers, the pages of the Alberta Report,
Calgary Herald editorials, and talk radio. '*
At the centre of the ideology of western alienation is a socially and politically constructed antagonism which is rooted in the populist tradition of representing politics as a conflid between a 'people* who are threatened by an outside 'power bloc".13
Albertans are calleci into the discourse as a people whose interests are fundamentally jeopardii by the actions of the federal government that is seen as a 'power bloc" .
The antagonism has been perpetuated by provincial premiers who have had an interest in exaggerating the threat of the federal govemrnent in oder to solidify political alliances and extemalire the cause of provincial problems. Peter Lougheed refuseci to acknowledge the legitimacy of the federal govemment by referring to 'Ottawamin political speeches instead of the "federal govemmen~." The dichotomy of Ottawa versus Alberta was invoked to neutralne provincial opposition and pehaps to divert public focus away from substantive policy issues. As Murray Edelman (1988) has argued, Ytie link between social cohesiveness and fear of enemies is an intriguing dialedical one: division and consensus go hand in hand, with sorne cleavages 42
œmenting others Mile deepening themselve~'.'~The dichotomies embedded in western alienation have helped to forge the regional community, while deepening the divide between the provincial community and the national community.
CONTENT
There are three main categories of grievances which form the template of western alienation: economic grievances, political grievances, and grievanœs about
'French Powef in Ottawa.
ECONOMlC GRIEVANCES
The principal component of western alienation which has been documented
extensively is the belief that the western provinces have been economically exploited by
the federal government acting on behalf of Central Canada. There were two main waves
of grievances: one related to the first set of nation-building policies enacted at
confederation which Ied to the 'quasi-colonization" of western Canada, and one related
to the energy crisis and control over natural tesources in the 1970's and early 1980's.
Very few critics have dard to challenge the uncontested truths of the lexicon of
economic grievances that have become a part of western folklore. This sedion,
however, will for the most part outiine the grievanœs that have provided the impetus for
political actors in Alberta.
Albertans have recognized, and rebelied against the injustices of this economic
system sinœ prior to the creation of the province in 1905. The source of problems in 43 the western economy, according to the disaurse of the protest tradition, has rested either with exploitive eastem business interests or discriminatory federal policies. When the federal govemment was not seen to be responsible for an economic crisis, it was seen as being insensitive to the crisis and uninterested in solving it. An example that could be used to illustrate the extent to which economic victimization by the federal govemment was a part of the operating logic of the region was 'The Case for Alberta" study commissioned by William Aberhart in 1937. William Aberhart, Social Credit
Premier of Alberta, wanted to document the detrimental effects that federal policies were having on the province.16Decades later, these arguments and grievanœs would be re- iterated at various points by Hany Strom and Peter Lougheed. The economic grievances documented by Aberhart revolved around fwe key issues that remained controversial for more than thirty years after the publication of the study. The areas of contention were disaiminatory freight rates, federal tariff policy, econornic nationalism, monetary policy, and the marketing of Alberta products.
The daim that faimers in Alberta have paid unreasonably high freight rates for the transportation of their agricultural products as well as the irnport of manufactured products hmthe East has been made since the 1880's.'' Western producers paid higher freight rates to transport wheat than Eastern Canadians paid for comparable commodiies. FreigM rates in the 1880's arnounted to half of a famer's gross incorne.''
As recentiy as 1974, a survey revealed that high freight rates were still the rnost commonly expressed grievanœ against the federal government l9Subsequentiy, the report presented evidenœ that Albertans paid excessively high Meral tariffs which did not delier correspondingiy high ben&. It has aiso been argued, perhaps 54 paradoxically, that while the federal govemment had not implemented a monetary policy that would protect the farmers from the volatility of international markets, the farrners did not have suffident access to international markets through ftee trade agreementsz0
The second wave of economic grievances occurred dunng the 'energy wars" of the 1970's and early 1980's. After the Westem Economic Opportunity Conference held in Calgary in 1973, the federal govemment reçponded to the demands of Canadian consumers and provincial premiers by freezing the prieof oil and levying an export tax on al1 shipments to the United State~.~'This policy was seen by Alberta politicians as a prime example of the priontization of eastem interests at the expense of the West.
Albertans felt that they were not getting fair value for their resources (Tupper 1982), and were not sympathetic to the plight of the Canadian consumer. The extent of westem sympathy was exhibited on bumper stickers which read, "Let the eastem bastards freeze in the dark'.22 Further, the policy was denouncecl as an intolerable enmachment on provincial jurisdiction that prevented the province from managing its economy.
While politicians in Alberta charactenred the energy wars as an East versus
West or Ottawa versus Alberta issue, Kenneth Nome (1979) argued that the federal govemment's handling of the issue was justifiable, The interests at stake were not those of the provincial govemment juxtaposed against the interests of the federal govemment but rather what was at stake was a choie between the profit of mostly foreign-awned oil companies and the rights of Canadian consumer~.~Additionally, for a num ber of years pfior to the oil uisis. national policies favoured westem oil companies by ensuring a market for Western Canadian oil even when it translated into higher costs 45 for the Canadian consumer. " The climax of the energy wars was the implementation of the National Energy
Program (NEP) in October of 1980. The Trudeau government had conceptualized an economic plan whose main thrust once again contradicted the policy directions undertaken in the province of Alberta. While the Alberta govemment was fmsed on provincebuilding initiatives, the Trudeau govemment was attempting to restore a unified concept of nationhood? The National Energy Program was guided by three objectives: the reduction of foreign ownership of the oil industry, the reduction in the prie of oil for
Canadian consumes, and the redistribution of resource rents between the province, the federal govemment and the oil industry. The federal govemment gained considerable revenue from its increased share of resource rerits and the provinœ lost an estimateci fi@ billion in revenue as a result of the policy? Consequently, the NEP assumed mythologieal proportions in tems of the destruction that it caused the provinœ and served as evidence of the malice that the Trudeau govemment had for the Western provinces. It became an enduring symbol of distrust and anger.
PoLlncAL GRIEVANCES
At the heart of the belief system of western alienation lies a widely recognized theory of why the West is systematically negleded and marginalid in Canadian politics. fhe first premise of the theory is that aie parliamentary system is designed to comply with the interests of Central Canada- The second premise that follows from the first is that the interests of Central Canada run contrary to the interests of the West. 46
While western alienation is charaderùed by a string of specific grievances, the cause of the grievances has aiways been understwd in Alberta to be systemic in nature.
Westerners identified two principal aspeds of the parliamentary system that have perpetuated Central Canadian hegemony: the party system and the restrictions imposed by party discipline.
Because most of the population of Canada resides in Ontario and Quebec, the electoml strategies of the traditional parties have been directeci towards Ontario and
Quebec. The rules of party discipline ensure that Members of Parliament uphold the party position whether or not this conflicts with the interests of their constituents. The problem for westerners is that the party position is inevitably determined by the interests of Central Canada. Aside from the glaring la& of western representatives in the federal
Cabinet from 1972 to 1984, Albertans have complained about the secrecy of cabinet discussions and the inability of the public to know whether their Members of Parliament are lobbying for their interests so they cm be held accountable for their a~tions.~
Most efforts of provincial governments have focused on the retrieval of powers from the federal govemment and the extension of control over the economy of the province. The first contentious battle was over resource ownership which was tumed over to the provinces in1930 afler a 25 year battle with the federal govemment. In fact, the demand for greater provincial autonomy is the wntinuous thread that wns through
Alberta's history, particularly dunng the Aberhart and Manning years. During the Social
Credii regimes, the revolutionary vision that the party had for a new social and political order necessitateci the enlargement of provincial jurisdidion. No other province had been as vocal or active in its pursuit of expandeci provincial powers. Between 1923 and 1943, 47 the Supreme Court deciared 12 provincial statutes ultra vires. Ail of the propused legislation originated in Alberta.28 During the 1970's, the baffle for control was once again renewed between the federal govemment and the provincial govemment with the fiare up of the energy crisis. The atternpts of the federal govemment to set an energy policy to address drastic reductions in the world supply of oil were seen by Alberta as an infringement of provincial juridiction and a Matant attempt to undermine the econornic prospenty of the province. According to Roger Gibbins, the province's use of the mechanisms of interstate fkderalisrn as dernonstrated in its attempts to rebalartce power between the federal and provincial govemments was destined to faiLa The problem was that the areas of federal policy-making that have been considered to have deleterious efWson the west, such as tarifi policy and policies for international Vade, were areas that would naturally and logically be the jurisdiction of the federal govemrnent
Milethe inability of Aiberta to gamer enough power to mntrol its own destiny was a source of cornplaint, so too were the 'leftist" leanings of the federal govemment
Survey evidence taken frorn Aberta in the 7970's indicated a strong relationship between support for the national Consewative Party and feelings of alienati~n.~~Thus, western alienation was specufated to be parkially caused by the long succession of
Liberal govemments Mohave governed the country since Confederation and who have marginalized the largely conservative electoral base of the prairies. The Energy Wars of the eariy 1970's and the 'IeftiSr tendencies of the Trudeau LiMsdrew the attention of alienated Westerners to the biases of the etectoral systern that was tiited in favour of
Ontario and Quebec, In the federal ektions of 1972,1974,1979, and 1980, the Liberal 48
Party won majority govemments wiai iiie or no support from the West. Nevertheless, after the election of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1984 with substantive support hmthe west, western alienation continued to thrive, proving that western alienation had more deeply rooted origins.
"FRENCH POWER IN OTTAWA*
The animosity toward Quebec that is ffequently expressed in Western Canada is viewed by many in the rest of Canada as a display of ignorance and intolerance towards other cultures. Criticisms of Quebec's power in the federation are not seen by others in the country as reasoned, constructive of the Canadian polity, but as divisive threats to national ~nity.~'
Some scholars, however, have explained the logic of this perspective within the larger framework of westem alienatiun and the other political grievances which comprise the western belief system. Roger Gibbins and Allan Tupper have argued that the facet of western alienation that gives expression to resentment of Quebec is derived not from bigotry, but with the desire of Alberta to have greater power in national politics and federal institutions. While Albertans have typically felt under-represented in the federal govemment, they have also felt that the interests and concems of Quebec have been over-represented in Ottawa. Not surpnsingly, western animosity toward Quebec reactied its peak during the Trudeau years. The combination of a Prime Minister hm
Quebec, a liberal caucus with a large number of Quebec MP's and the greater visibility of francophones in prominent positions in Ottawa led many to the conclusion that 49 Quebec enjoyed extraordinary powers in Ottawa.32 Moreover, the Trudeau govemment's obsession with official bilingualism and multiculturalism was espedally resented in the West The Premiers of both Alberta and Briüsh Columbia felt that this policy did not resolve the crisis with Quebec, as Quebec's demands were not related solely to linguistic rights. Instead, the Onidal Languages Act created problems for
Canadians in unilingual provinces and further rnarginalized the Westn
Subsequently, there was hostiiii in Alberta toward what was perceived to be a continuous and endless constitutional debate surrounding the status of Quebec in confederation, as well as the paramount importance that was placed on the deteren- of separatist movements? Not only did Quebec's constitutional demands have a destructive impact on the Canadian state and the cause of national unrty, but they have paradoxically been given more legitimacy and attention than constitutionai proposais originating from other provinces. Furthmore, it was felt that the excessive attention that was given to the demands of Quebec has resulted in the neglect of problems in other regions of the country.
While the unsympathetic position that many Albertans had towards Quebec is undeniable, there were similarities ktween the policy objecüves of the provincial govemments of Alberta and Quebec. They both share an antagonistic relationship with the federal government. There was also ironically a relationship of syrnbiosis and conflict between Alberta and Quebec. The extended debate over the status of Quebec in confederation presented a stage upon whidi Alberta politiaans could articulate their visions for the federal system. However, because of Alberta's cornmitment to provincial equality and Quebec's cornmitment to special status, success for Quebec ensured that 50
Alberta would never actually achieve its goais for the reform of the federal system and
its vision of more effective regional representation. As Roger Gibbins has observed,
'The West aS a contemporary political region exists in large part as a counter-point to
Quebec and to the challenge that Quebec has posed to the Canadian community and its
institutions.' j5
VEHICLES FOR WESTERN ALIENAllON
While the grievances of western atienation have changed little since
confederation, the attempts that have been made to address these grievances have
changed dramatically. The numerous protest rnovements and political parties that have
wme out of Alberta became adept at articulating western dissatisfaction, but not at
proposing viable institutional reforrns that woutd overcome the opposition of other
wmpeting interests. It has been suggested that the attachment that Westerners have
felt toward British Parliamentary trad'tions has prevented thern from systematicalIy
fighting for the reform of Canadian institutions =, but it could be argued that the clash
between political and economic forces operating inside and outside of the province
preduded that possibility. Western protest is also characterized by a tension between
the desire for inclusion in the political status quo and the desire to transfomi it. Further ,
protest movements have been either facilitatecl by, or hindered by clashes between
provincial elites, and have had tendencies to gravitate toward extremism rather than
constnictive engagement in problem-çolving.
American populism of the 1890's was probably the most important influence on 5 1 westem protest. Populist critiques diverged from the left to the right of the political spectrum, but it was right-wing populism that gained wrrency in Aiberta. The right-wing populists were preoccupied with 'big govemment', the growth of the weffire state, the arbitrary use of state power, and deployment of the mechanisrns of direct demo~racy.~
From these ideological mots, sprung the most influential of the protest parties that emerged within the province. The United Farmers of Alberta, Social Credit, the
Progressives, the separatist party referred to as "West-Fedw,and finally the Refonn
Party have based their piatforms on right populist ideas. The power of these parties rose and fell with the tides of political and economic aisis. Preston Manning has sbted that these parties have a "natural Iife cyclewwhere "they live, they die, the seeds go into the ground and they corne up again, perhaps in a diirent f~rm".~~
The nature of western protest underwent a dramatic change in the 1970's. As diçcussed in the previous seetions of this diapter, the continued re+lection of the
Trudeau Liberals pr0~0kedan intense reaction from the burgeoning western elite who became more extremist in their expression of discontent and more radical in their proposais for change. In June of 1980, the Western Canada Federation or West-Fed was formed in Alberta and the Western Canada Concept Party was formed in British
Columbia. Western separatisrn was the convergence of the confidence brought by
Alberta's new economic power, and the "acute ideological awieties in Conservative
Albertawcaused by Pierre Trudeau's nation-building po~icies.~Unlike Quebec separatism, Western separatism* or Alberta separatism was a movement by the new bourgeoisie based primarily on economic arguments to oppose unions, immigration,
"French power' and govemment intervention. Mdnyk describeci this phase of protest as 52
'disenchanted consewatism' rising against the 'bilingualisrn, national social policy standards and socialism" of the Liberal Party in Ottawa. Separatism was primarily the result of the mal of the new western bourgeoisie, but it did revolutionize western protest and brought with it a new way of understanding the western predicament Separatism was never considered a viable pursuit, as only one Western Canada Concept MLA was elected in Alberta in 1982, but it paved the way for a reconsideration of the role of the
West in confederaüon.
VISIONS FOR INSTlTüTlONAL REFORM
While separatist rallies gave expression to the more extrernist voices in Alberta, the Canada West Foundation emerged as a 'moderate" federalist voie for the business community and political elites. The Canada West Foundation, a research institute that was fonned as a result of the 'One Prairie Province" Conference in 1971, became the onginator of strategies for the advanœment of western interests. The foundation was originally formed to examine the sacial and ecunomic characteristics of the West and the North, but began to becorne politically active as the constitutional questions surrounding the status of Quebec in confederation moved to the forefront of the national agenda after the election of the Parti Quebecois in 1976 .4' The Canada West
Foundation became the organizing force ûehind a series of conferences and funded research studies attempting to solve the problem that has been a Mure in Alberta politics since confederation: the unresponsiveness of the federal government to regional conœms. The CWF began by holding a series of public meetings to disais 53 consthüonal amendments that had been proposed by the federal govemment and
brought the findings of the public consultation to the Task Force on National UnW. In
1977, the foundation commissioned Frederick Engelmann, David Eiton and Peter
McCormick to study federal systems of govemment in other countries in order to
detemine more effective ways of addressing regional conœms that would not entirely
dismantie the federal system. Subsequently, CWF decided to hold a national
conference entitled the "Alternatives Canada" conference in 1978. The CWF gathered
legal experts, academics and members of the business community to debate the merits
of a proposed constitutional amendment that dealt with the Supreme Court, the
entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and reform of the Ser~ate.~*
The idea of reforming the Senate was first circulated at these conferences, along
with several different models of Senate reforrn, such as the "Council of Provinces" the
'House of Provincesw,and a popularly elected Senate. The objective of the reformed
Senate was to change the efitism of executive federalism and to allow citizens in the
regions more direct involvement in the national decision-making process. It was agreed
by canference delegates that there was a need to implement a mechanism for provincial
cdnsultaüon in the national decision-making process, but the first two models did nothing
to enhanœ the democracy of the process and tipped the balance of power too far over
to the pmvincial side. The delegates were aware that Senate reform posed a threat not
only to the supremacy of the House of Commons, but also to the supremacy of the
premiers as champions of regional interests. The 'Councii of Provinces" was modeled
on the German upper house. The second chamber would be composed of delegations of
provinaal cabinet ministers led by the premiers who would vote on national poli~y.~~The 54 disadvantage of this option, in the opinion of the conference participants, was that it gave premiers an even more prominent mie as regional spokesmen. Meanwhile, an eleded Senate was not likely to be approved by the premiers because it diminished their power. Consequently, these amferences were not able to bnng the idea of Senate reform to fruition until it was compatible with the ambitions Premier Don Ghetty in 1985.
CONSTiTUTiONAL DISCUSSIONS
In the wake of the 1980 Federal Election and the NEP, the wnstitutional discussions prior to the repatnation of the Constitution Act in 1982 were viewed in
Alberta with considerable skepticism and suspicion. The Constitution Act and the
National Energy Progrôm were seen as being inextricably linked which provoked paranoid reactions amongst separatists ahut the pawers of the federal govemment and the 'threar that this posed to western Canadians. Accurding to Gibbins (1983), separatist speakers ranted at public meetings that:
Ottawa intended to move Calgarians out of their homes and replace them with unemployed miners from northern Ontano that Ottawa was buying land in northem Aiberta for concentration camps that once the Constitution Act was in place the federal govemment would never have to cal1 another election.
In actual fact, the objectives that Trudeau had for the constitutional discussions were the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the advanœment of a fom of renewed federalism amenable to Quebec, which had as much appeal to westemers as the National Energy Program. Thus, AIberta did not effectively articulate its constitutional demands and recognition and the reformeci Senate did not appear on the 5 5 constitutional agenda until the Meech Lake constitutional discussions.
In 1982, the Premier of Alberta finally agreed to support a version of Senate reform which would expand the power of the premiers with the creation of a provinciaIly appointed Senate. Public hearings across the province, however, provided mounting evidence to the provincial govemment îhat the public wanted Senate reform to indude the popular election of Senators. In 1985, the Alberta Legislature unanimously approved the proposal for an Equal, Elected, Enective or 'Triple E" Senate? By the time the second set of constitutional discussions took place in 1987, the Alberta govemment had organized a coherent platform for institutional reform.
The "Triple E" Senate had tremendous appeal in Alberta at a time when the federal govemment was advancing the unpopuiar legislation of the Goods and Senrices
Tax. The Senate became a likely target for reform not only because of its patronage scandals and democratic inefficacy, but because it was the most viable means to acquire power within the federal govemment. The Triple E Senate concept was compatible with the populist values in Alberta that emphasize direct political representation, the western cornmitment to improved federalism and the 'western visionn for national unity based on provincial equality. The consensus of the Canada West Foundation's roundtable discussions was that the Triple E Senate should enshrine the principles of equality of
&kens and provinces, and have powers equal ta the House of Commons. In order to enhance the power of the regions over national poticy, the Senate would have the power to veto ail House of Commons bills and taxation bills. Ten Senators would be eleded in each province in fixed stand alone eledions for six year While these stipulations for a refotmed Senate pleased its supporters in Alberta, they met strong 56 opposition from Quebec and Ontario in the two sets of constitutional discussions that would follow.
THE MEECH LAKE ACCORD
At the Meech Lake negotiations in 1987, Premier Don Getty had endorsed and
agreed to push for the Triple E Senate. Although the indusion of Senate refom in the
Meech Lake Accord was a victory, it was overshadowed by concems about the
shortcomings of the type of reform that w3s proposed. The outcome of the discussions,
and of Getty's advocacy, met with dissatisfaction from Senate reform visionaries on
many levels. First, the Meech Lake Accord did not guarantee Senate refon. it
guaranteed that Senate reform would be discussed annually at a First Ministers
Conference." Second, the agreement included a temporary procedure for the
appointment of Senators from lists of nominations submitted to the Prime Minister by the
Premier of the province in q~estion.~Advocates of the TripleE-Senate were outrageci
at a proposai which would perpetuate the patrorage system and extend its benefits to
the Premiers when patronage was cleariy seen to be one of the most appalling and
offensive attributes of the curent Senate. Additionally, the proposed constitutional
amendment procedure agreed to at Meech Lake required unanimity among al1 eleven
governments. Given the variances in regional dispositions and the antagonistic stance
of Quebec toward constitutional discussions, Senate reform advocates such as David
Elton argued that this 'condemned [Senate refonn proponents] to the etemal task of
rolling a huge stone up a hill which, once reaching the top, will aIways roll back dowr~".~~
In short, the compromises contained within the Meech Lake Accord undermined, rather 57 than advanced, the particular vision of Senate refonn developed in Alberta. However,
the controversy over the appointment of Senators was used to set the stage for the first Senate eldon in Alberta in 1989.
THE 1989 SENATE ELECTION
By 1989, the Senate refonn movement had overcome some of the obstacles that
had previously impeded the achievement of its objectives. In the mid 1980'~~the cause
of Senate reform lacked a strong spokesperson, an agreed upon model of refom, and
regional consensus but by 1987, these urcumstanœs had changed. The Reform
Party, headed by Preston Manning, had emerged as a political force in the province and
had incorporated a model for a Triple E Senate (Equal, Elected and Effective) into its
policy platform. Public opposition to the federal govemment was strong, in spite of the
fact that the Progressive Conservatives had won the majonty of seats in the West, and
Albertans were increasingly convinced about the benefits of an Elected Senate. Prime
Minister Mulroney was under the obligation established at Me& Lake to take advice
from Premier Getty about new Senate appointments, and Premier Getty decided to base
his recommendation on the outcome of an eledion- The Senate election became the
stage upon which westem grievances and opposition to federal policy, which were still
perceived to be 'eastem-biased", were expressed. The Reform Party candidate, Stan
Waters, won the election with 260 000 votes5', but was not immediately appointed to the
Senate by the Prime Minister. The refusa1 of Prime Minister Mulroney to appoint Waters
was used by Refonn as a symbolic representation of what was wrong with Canadian
democracy. CHARLOllETOWN ACCORD
After the Mure of the Meech Lake Accord, the Mulroney govemment made a second attempt at constitutional reconaliation which culrninated in the Charlottetown
Accord of 1992. In this agreement, a provision for a Triple E Senate was included which improved upon the proposal in the Meech Lake Accord, but which involved compromises that did not match the constitutional vision of the West. ln spite of this, the Reform
Party entered the constitutional debate as a reludant regional voice. The party at first seemed more concemed with 'surfing the tide of public opinion" than with remaining faithful to its constituüonal principles. The dauses pertaining to Aboriginal Seif-
Govemment, the Distinct Society Clause, the social charter, and even the proposal for the Triple-E-Senate would logically have placed the party on the 'No" side of the debate, but a decision to oppose the accord was not made until it bewme clear that public opinion was against the accord. 53
The Senate proposeci in the Accord would allocate six Senators to each province and one Senator to each temitory, thereby fufilling the requirement of equality. However, there was no mention of a method for electing Senators. Section 7 of the Accord placed the onus on the premiers to deade upon the means of choosing Senator~.~"Wth regard to the "ewveness" of the new Senate, the Reform Party and the Canada West
Foundation argued that the dispute resolution mechanism between the House of
Commons and the Senate delineated in the Accord would not accomplish the intended objective of rebalancing the regional distribution of power. House-Senate disputes would be resolved by the simple majority of a joint sitting 55 and considering that there would be 337 Members of Parliament and only 62 Senators, the new arrangement would only 59 sewe to ressert the supremacy of the House of Commons? Furthemore, the proposed changes to the Senate were accompanied by changes to the representation system in the House of Commons. in the Charlottetown Accord, Quebec was guaranteed 25% of seats in the House of Commons" which was not acceptable to alienated westerners who wanted to munter-balance 'French Power in Ottawa".
Public criticisms about the la& of transparency of the constitutional discussions and pressure exerted by the Reform Party prompted the federal government to allow the public to vote on the agreement in a nation-wide referendum. The result of the process was that 54% of Canadians voted against the A~~ord.~~The new Senate proposed in the Amrd was as controversial and as diff~cultto negotiate as the distinct çociety dause. Johnston et al (1996) conducted a survey to determine the support of
Canadians for various aspects of the Accord. In the survey, voters were asked three questions about the proposed Senate, its new powers and the issue of equal representation. Only 24% of voters outside of Quebec supported the new Senate." As might have been predicted, the majority of respondents in the Atlantic provinces and the prairie provinces favoured quai repmentation while the majofity of respondents in
Ontario favoured unequal representation in the Senate. Where the survey results becorne perplexing, however, was in the response to the question about the powers that would be given to the new Senate proposed in the Charlottetown Accord. WNi the exception of those in Alberta, the majority of respondents indicated that they thought the proposed Senate was given 'too much power'. Johnston et a1, therefore concluded that 'voters never really had much use for Senate refomi"?'
The findimgs of the sumy raise interesting questions about support for Senate 60 refom in the West. Support for Senate refonn across the western provinces has been inconsistent and enatic, and most of it has been concentrated in the province of Alberta.
The 1998 Canada West-Environics Survey revealed that while 61% of Albertans were in favour of a reformed Senate, only 50% of people across the western provinces were in favour of reforming the Senate! In the mid to late 1980's, 60 -70% of Albertans supportecl Senate refom, but in 1993, support for Senate refon dropped to 46%.
Senate rehis, of course, an abstrad concept requiring high levels of knowledge about federalisrn that most citizens would find difficult to grasp. Nevertheless, the lack of public endorsement for the Senate of the Charlottetown Accord did have the effect of
'placing Senate reform on the shelf. In 1993, after the Charlottetown referendum, another survey indicated that more people in Alberta wanted to abolish the Senate rather than reform it6' The constitutional fatigue in the province left only the Canada West
Foundation and the Canadian Cornmittee for a Triple E Senate prepared to continue the fight for Senate refon.
CONCLUSION
Western alienation has provided the interpretive framework through which
Albertans have understood their social situation. While the daims of this ideology rnay or rnay not be valid, western alienation and its template of grievances have achieved permanence as a cultural resource. The search for a means for the expression of western alienation ranged from the extremism of separatist rallies to academic conferences assessing constitutional refoms. Yet it was not until the emergence of the
Canada West Foundation that western protest became inteliectually and politically 6 l organized to the extent that it could direct the populace toward viable solutions that would alter the national decision-making process. The Canada West Foundation was instrumental in creaüng the linkage in western consciousness between perennial economic and political discontent and the need for Senate reform.
As a movement, Senate reform has pusesed the unusual characteristic of king supported by relatively powerful political actors, yet it has confronted the seemingly insurnountable obstacles of more powerfid vested interests who have blocked the proposed reform. Three sets of constitutional discussions left a traii of rejected or overlooked opportunities to advance Senate refonn . Some political factions were vehemently opposed to the 'friple i? Senate, and the political factions that supported
Senate refom were probundly disappointeci in the compromises that were made at the constitutional discussions. Thus, Senate reform advocates have been condemned to fighting an uphill battle.
Chapter 4 will examine the 1998 Senate election from the perspective of Reform
Party members, the Canada West Foundation and the Rutherford Show in order to assess the struggle of the rnovernent for media recognition.
1. Roger Gibbins. (1980). Prairie Politics in Socretyr Regionalism in Decline. Toronto: Butterworths Ltd, pp 167. 2. Roger Gibbins(1992) liAlberta in the National Communitf, in Tupper,A, Gibbins, R. Govemment and Politics in Alberta. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press.
9 2. Roger Gibbins, (1979). "Western Alienation and the Alberta Political Culture" in Caldarola, C. Society and Polifics in Alberta: Research fapers. Toronto: Methuen.
4. lbid pp 143.
5. Shawn Henry(l999). Revisiting Western Aliention: Towards a Better Understanding of Political Alienation and Behaviour in Western Canada (Revised Version). Calgary Conference Paper, April1999.
6. David Schwartz (1973). Political Alienation and Political Behaviour. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, ppl5.
7. Shawn Henry( 1999). Revisiting Western Alienation: Towards a Better Understanding of Political Alienation and Behaviour in Western Canada (First Draft). Calgary Conferenœ Paper, April 1999.
8. Shawn Henry (1999), pgl .
9. Gibbins, R. (1980), pp 170-171.
10. Ibid, pp. 171.
1 1. Stuart Hall (1981 a). 'The Mites of ttteir eyes: racist ideologies and the mediaw,in G.Bridges and R. Brunt (eds), SiIverLinings, London: Lawrence &Wishart, pp. 31.
12. Roger Gibbins (1979). 'Western Alienation and the Alberta Political Culture", in Caldarola, C. Society and Po~csin Alberfa: Reseach Papes. Toronto: Methuen, pp. 145.
13. Steve Patten. (1996). 'Preston Manning's Populism: Constmcting the Common Sense of the Common People," StudLes in Political Emnomy, Volume 50, Summer, ~~95-133.
14. Allan Tupper. (1981). 'Mr.Tnideau and the West." In Pratt, L, Stevenson, G.(ed). Westem Separatism: Myths, Realifies, and Dangers. Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers.
15. Murray Edelman. (1988). Constnrctrng the Politi'cal SSpedacle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 70.
16. David Eiton (1979). "Alberta and the Federai Government in Historical Perspective, 1905 - 1977'. In Caldarola, C.(ed) Society and Politics in Alberta: Research Papers. Toronto: Methuen,pp. 113.
17. Ibid, pp. Ill.
18. Janine Brodie(l990). The Political Economy of Canadian Regionalism. Toronto: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, pp. 1 15.
19. Roger Gibbins (1980), pp. 173.
20. David Elton(1979). pp. 1 14.
2 1. David Eiton (1979), pp. 124.
22. Roger Gibbins (198O), pp. 187.
23. Ken Nome(1979). "Some Comments on Prairie Economic Alienation", in Caldarola, C. (Ed). Society and Politics in Alberta: Research fapers. Toronto: Methuen, pp. 139.
24. Ibid.
35. Janine Brodie(l990).
26. Roger Gibbins et al (1995 a). Western Visions: Perspectives on the West in Canada. Peterborough: Broadview Press.
27. Roger Gibbins et al (1995 a).
28. Peter Meekison. 'Alberta and the Constitution". In Tupper, A, Gibbins, R. Govemment and Politics in Alberta. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, pp.248.
29. Roger Gibbins (1995 b). Western Canada: "The West Wants In." In McRoberts, K. (Ed). Beyond Quebec: Taking Stock of Canada. Montreal: McGill- Queen's University Press, pp.51.
30. Roger Gibbins (1980). pp 184.
3 1. Roger Gibbins,. (1995 a).
32. Allan Tupper. (198l), pp. 96.
33. David Elton(1979)., pp. 122.
34. Roger. Gibbins (1995 a), pp. 130
35. Roger Gibbins. (1995 a ). pp. 115.
36. Roger Gibbins (1995 b), pp. 50. 37. John Richards. (1981). ' Populisrn and the WestwIn Pratt, L., Stevenson, G.(ed). Western Separatism: Myals, Rearis, and Dangers. London: Hurtig Publishers.
38. Tom Flanagan(1995) Waiting br the Wave. Toronto: Stoddart, pp23.
39. John Barr (1971). "Beyond Bittemess.' In Ban, J., Anderson, O.(eds) The Unfinished Revoff: Some Wews on Western Independence. Toronto: McClelland 8 Stewart Ltd.
40. George Melnyk. "Region and Reaction: The Westem Right." ln Melnyk, (G)(ed) Riel to Refom: a History of Protest in Western Canada. Saskatoon, Fifth House.
41. Trevor Harrison. (1995).
42. Stan Roberts and David Elton.(1978) A Summary Report on the Proceedings of the ColIoquia on Constitutional Change. Calgary: Canada West Foundation.
43. Peter McCormick and David. Elton(1980) Aitematives 7980: Basic Issues in Constitutional Refom. Calgary: Canada West Foundation, , p. 13.
44. Roger Gibbins (1983), pp.123.
45. Canada West Foundation. Senate '99: Expanding the Blueprint for Senate Refom. Calgary: Canada West Foundation, Aprif 1999.
46. David Eiton and Peter McConnick. A Bluepttnt for Senate Refom. Calgary: Canada West Foundation. December 1990.
47. Peter McComick (1988). 'Senate Refom: Forward Step or Dead End?" In Gibbins, R., Palmer, H., Rusted, B., Taras, D. Meech Lake and the Wesf. Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing.
48. Ibid, pp.34.
49. David Elton (1988). "The Enigrna of Me@ Lake for Senate Reforma In Gibbins, R., Palmer, H., Rusted, B., Taras, D. Meech Lake and the West. Edmonton: Academic Pnnting and Publishing, pp. 23.
50. Roger Gibbins. (1995 b). Pp. 53.
5 1. Trevor Harrison, (1995), pp. 142.
52. Ibid, pp. 143.
53. Tom Fianagan (1995). 54. Draft Legal Text, Charlottetown Accord, Section 7, August 28,1992.
55. Johnston et al (1996). p56.
56. Johnston, R., Blais, A, Gidengil, E.. Nevitte, N.(eds) (1996). The Challenge of Dired Democracy: 77?e 1992 Canadian Referendum. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 82-
57. Draft Legal Text, Charlottetown Accord, Section 21 (a), August 28, 1992.
58. Hamson,T. (1995). Of Passionate Intensity: Right-Wing Populism and the Rem Party of Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp.232.
59. Richard Johnston. et al (1996), pp. 83.
60. Richard Johnston et al (1996), pg 87.
6 1. Casey Vander Ploeg, Peter McComick, and Glenn Blackett. Taking a Look: Public Opinion in Alberta and Canada on Senate refonn. Calgary: Canada West Foundation, September 1998, p7. CHAPTER 4: THE Senate ELECTlON CAMPAIGN 'WHAT DO THOSE FARMERS WANT NOW?"'
While western alienation was not the driving force behind Alberta politics in 1998, it was still a compelling set of doctrines for a western political elite who continued to see
Senate reforrn as an important policy issue. In the last chapter. I described the evolution of western alienation and the emerging consensus that the 'Triple E Senate" was the solution to this problem. This chapter wil explain the dynamics of the Senate election of
1998 and the des played by various interests.
As an opposition movement on the margins of national politics. Senate reform advocates had to make use of unorthodox or unconventional tactics that could draw public attention to their cause. One such tactic was to organize a spectacular event, namely the second Senate election which took place in the spring of 1998. The Senate election that was organized was referred to in the media as a 'Refonn Party Show", but it was in adual fact the combined effort of the Canada West Foundation, the Refom
Party and the Dave Rutherford Radio Show. Their objective was to re-initiate a discussion about Senate refom and to force the federal govemment to take steps toward institutional change. The challenge then for the Canada West Foundation, the
Reform Party and the Rutherford show was tu take a relatively dormant issue and create a social and political spaœ to explain its importance.
The election was to provide this space for a discussion about Senate refonn, but the Senate reformers did not have the ingredients or resources to give it credibility.
' Dave Rutherford quoting Loal Green, an Ottawa Talk-Radio Host There was no vacancy in the Senate, no other political parties were interested in running in the election, and Senate refomi had not been a public prionty in AIberta since the
Charlottetown Referendum in 1992. They were thus confronted with a legitimacy crisis that cnppled the election hma number of difierent angles. According to Jessup
(1997):
"A movement is legitimate when its leaders and purpose refled the values of its audiences' experiences and orientations, hinction in accordance with the audiences' expliut and implicit values and ideologies.. .. Extemal legitirnacy is achieved by ideological congruence - when the audiences' ideologies and values coincide with the ideologies and values espoused by the movement."'
The Senate refomi movement no longer reffeeted the purpajes and values of the
Alberta audience, and was therefore Iosing its base of support. As a conwuence of the loss of extemal legitimacy, the movement sufkred from a losof intemal legitirnacy as its members began to lose interest in the cause. Thus, according to Jessup ( 1997) such a loss of legitimacy signals the dedine of a movement.
ln order to advance the cause of Senate reform, the campaign needed to constmct a message and a rationale that would overcome this legitimacy crisis. In addition to this, the carnpaign needed a message that would bridge the gap between the political culture of Alberta and the poIrtical culture of central Canada. Although western alienation can be considered a defining feature of Alberta's political culture, it is poorly undefstood and is consequently viewed unsympathetically in central Canada.
Western feelings about the 'injusticeu of federalism and the complaints of westerners that the 'country is run from the ea# ring tiollaw in central Canada. Since arguments for
Senate refom are based upon western alienatian, the success of the Senate campaign 68 hinged on their abiiii to acquire the power to get a convincing message to the public and policy-makers through the media.
This chapter will assesç and evaluate the media campaign framed by Senate reformers. The four sections of the chapter will outline the strategies employed by the different actors who contributed to the Senate campaign: The Reform Party, the candidates, the Canada West Foundation, the Calgary talk-show host Dave Rutherford, and the Federal Liberal Party. Each political actor played a difFerent role in the campaign and consequently interpreted events, challenges and obstacles differently.
THE ADVOCATES
THE REFORM PARTY
The Reforrn Party had been an important vehicle for Senate reformers since its inœption, however, during the 1998 Senate Election, it was not the vehicle that it once had ben. ln the first Senate Election in 1989, the party was able to harness the forces of western discontent which were mobilized around the issue of Senate reforrn. In !998, there was Iiiediscontent to hamess and Senate reform did not cany the same importance in the context of western politics Western alienation had decreased as the feâeral government became less interventionist and adopted neo-liberal policies.
Furthemore, as Refom Party aspirations to form the next govemment grew, it realiied
that greater emphasis needed to be placed upon issues that would win votes in Ontario.
Thus, in 1998, Refom's participation in the Senate eledion confiided with itç desire to
fom a conservative goveming coalition that was originally referred to as the 'United 69
Atternative'. The United Aitemative was the movement to form a new party which would combine support from Reform in the west and Conservatives in Ontario in order to undermine the hegemony of the Liberal party. This process of forming the new party involved the removal of "irritants" from the Reform Party platform. These 'irritants" induded Senate reform and calls to eliminate official bilinguali~m.~As one political pundit noted:
"From my vantage point of looking at national politics, this was one of the incidents which hurt Reform in its desire to become a national party. The Senate Election was not an exercise to be engageâ in by anyone who wanted to govem, because the first document that you want to read if you are going to govern is the c~nstitution."~
Thus, the Reform Party suffered a loss of status with some journalists in the Ottawa press gallery who believed that the eldon was an attempt ta circumvent the constitutional process. The constitution contains an amendment formula that requires the consent of 7 out of 10 provinces with 50% of the population for any changes to
Although a party strategist insisted that the objective of the campaign was, "to further the cause of Senate reforma,he admitted that there were other spin&. These included ' rewing up the troops, implernenting a great election-readiness exercise, and putting the Liberals on the defensive.'
However, another observer noted, "This time around the Reform Party did not have any stake in this. The Reform Party did not need this electi~n.'~It was also speculated that the purpose of the campaign was to convinœ the core supporters of the
Refbnri Party that the party leadership had not been 'Ottawashed'? These charges were made because the Reform Party had been functioning as an Opposition Party in Ottawa and had not been advancing traditional western concerns.
As the party began to realize that there was Iittle enthusiasm for this election among the general public, the strategy for the eledion became haphazard. The Refonn
Party has ahays been able to use marginal positions to its advantage, however in this case the political will appears to have been absent According to a member of the
Canada West Foundation:
'1 just know that they didn't put much effort into the election. We hosted 7 or 8 tom hall meetings and the Refonn Party did nothing to get people out to them. Usually, parties make sure that there are people attending. They could have used their own interna1 communication, and there is no evidence they did that It does seem that the election was orphaned close to the beginning."'
The following &on will ouüine the Reform Party's role in the campaign and their impression of events.
THE CAMPAIGN
The Reform Party's Senate campaign message was not dissimilar from the brand of populist rhetoric typically used by the party. Populist messages tend to rely on resentrnent that can be summoned for some personification of evil, extemal enemy or scapegoat. There were two political scapegoats that would be targeted in the Senate reform message: the Prime Minister and the senators thernsetves. The formulation of the message of the campaign was problematic in Iight of the new United Aiternative initiative, because most of the messages associated with Senate refonn would recast
Refom as a regional protest party . The Seriate election brought them into direct contact with the emerging crisis over the future direction of the party. The result of the 71 crisis was the abandonment of a platform roof& in the creed of western alienation.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the ideology of western alienation is based on the construction of an alien. insensitive federal government that acts against western interests. The idea of Senate reform is deeply rwted in this ideology, and as a consequence, the Senate Elections of 1989 and 1998 used messages which spoke to this antagonism with the federal government. 'Send a message to Ottawa" was the prominent slogan of the campaigns in both 1989 and 1998. The message was framed as a choice between two sides of a %ght versus wrongn dichotomy. Campaign strategists described it as a simple good versus evil issue which entaileci a choice between Alberta or Ottawa, democracy or patronage. While it was stated in intewiews that the principal message of the carnpaign was that 'the Senate is broken and it needs to be fixedna,the villification of the federal govemment was the more powerful message that came through in the candidate forums. The Reform Party, whether deliberately or not, used Mat Laciau refers to as 'popular traditionswsuch as the National Energy
Program and anti-Quebec antipathy to revive western alienation and the drive for
Senate refonn. According to Ladau, 'Popular traditions are crystallized in symbols or values in which the subjeds interpellated by them find a principle of ide~~tity".~Thus, one could argue that Albertans had found in Senate reform and the tenets of western alienation symbols that constitute their identity.
While the popular traditions associated with western alienation have powerful resonanœ in Alberta, this message was not as well suited to the national audience.
Consequently, another message was construded for the national audienœ that targeted the appointed Senators and their la& of efficacy was used to promote Senate 72 refom. Refom highlighted Senate scandals which induded Michael Coggets conviction and Andrew Thompson's poor Senate attendance with a krvor that was not shared by the rnajority of the population. In spite of the fact that the Senate did not have popular support and that most Canadians believed that it was an obsolete, undemocratic institution, the solution presented by the Reform Party was simpiy not appealing. A politid observer noted that: "Even people who were thoroughly disgusted with the exisüng Senate were not convinced that this was a way of moving Senate refonn a10ng."'~
In addition to this, the Refonn Party was not able to bridge the values gap with the national media. Skepticism about the Reform Party's motives and their historj as a regional protest movement certainly hampered its ability to influence the national media.
One Reform Party supporter stated that, 'The Ontario media views the Reform Party as
Nazi brown shirts."ll lt was additionally noted by another party strategist that Alberta, not unlike provinces in other regions, is viewed through a distorting media lem.
'We are a bunch of bigoted, redneck, racist, misogynist, uneducated people who are bom into wealth. That is what the Ottawa staff think of Alberta."'*
Beyond the friction be-n joumalists and the originatorç of this eldon, the Senate was not perceived as a newsworthy issue that would have an impact on the quality of life of Canadians. Moreover, joumalists could not be convinced that the rnajority of
Canadians were interested in discussing such a dusty constitutional issue.
WhiIe the story was a diicult seil to joumalists in Central Canada, the party needed to reach a broader national audience in order to move the issue forward. Yet, in spite of the importance of an expanded national audience for Senate reform, it was not a focus of the campaign. A party insider stated that the main national thrust of the
Senate election was the attempt to get a federal court injunction against the Prime
Minister after a vacancy had opened mid-campaign. Aithough it was stated that the
purpose of the injunction was ostensibly to prevent him from filling the vamncy in the
Senate, it was primarily orchestrated for publicity pu-. According to a campaign
manager:
*The only actual national event we had was when we hired the biggest meanest law fim we could find, and we took the Prime Minister to wurt that day. The neat thing about this was that it coincided with APEC, it was al1 about showing the Prime Minister as an out of touch, arrogant power-hungry man.'13
As soon as Jean Forest resigned from the Senate, the Reform Party went to Federal
Court to ask the court to grant an injunction against the Prime Minister to prevent hirn
from appointing a new senator until afier the election. Given that the constitution has a
cleariy delineated amendment clause, party insiders were aware that the law suit
against the Prime Minister had no legal grounds. Although Reform Party lawyers told
campaign insiders that there was a 1 in 100 chance that the judge would hear the case,
the case was in fact heard . The point of the federal court injunction, however, was not
to win the case but to attract media attention. The carnpaign managers were 'thrilled"
with the coverage in the Central Canadian media, particularly when the federal court
injunction brought the Senate election to the front page of the Globe and Mail.
However, the newsworthiness of the story in the eyes of Globe and Mail reporters
pertained to the controversial ruling by the Supreme Court on Quebec secession, and
not the Reform Party's argument for Senate ebm. The Reform Party had argued that
on the basis of paragraph 88 of the Quebec Secession ruling, there wuld be a 74
'reciprocal obligation on al1 parties to Confederation to negotiate constitutional changes to respond to that desire."" The amflict between highly placed officiai actors over jurisdidional power made it a newsworthy item. In addition to this, there was a dear tie- in between the Federal Court injuncüon and other news events of the day that put the
PM on the defensive. While the Refonn Party was able to create a newsworthy story through attacks on the Prime Minister, these attadts did not succeed in explaining the necessity of a Senate eldon.
After the federal court injunction was refuseci, the Prime Minister appointed Doug
Roche to the Senate on Septernber t 7,1998. Roche's appointment triggered a conflict
between Jean Chretien and Alberta Premier Ralph Klein which precipitated another wave of media interest in the campaign. Klein wrote a letter to the Prime Minister
stating that the appointment of Doug Roche was a "slap in the facewto Albertans which
revived the much-loved western tradition of Otbwa-bashing. Campaign managers felt
that the Prime Minister's appointment of Doug Roche injected 'a jolt of energy" into the
campaign that would not have been there othefwise.
The Reform Party developed a generic television ad which ran for the first and
only time on the night that Doug Roche was appointed. The Nspot showed an
unflattering black and white image of the Prime Minister with a voice-over for the ad that
said, 'Today the Prime Minister slapped Albertans in the face and that is just not fair."
In other words, they used an attack ad of the same caliber as the infamous 'No more
politicians from Quebet ad used in the 1997 federal eledion. According to a campaign
manager: 'We had the ad, we muid have released the ad at random, but why? No! We waited until the news was in the air and boom! TV and newspaper need an excibng visual so why not give them an exciting, well-produced partisan efhWi5
Party strategists twk advantage of the media spotlight and released the ad at a time that would mm'mize its impact on public opinion. The ad was dropped after only one night because the party was not willing to devote any more advertising money to the campaign. As the ad was only on television for a single night there was not suffiCient time for its message to drown out competing messages that had already dubbed the election as a waste of time.
O bsfacles
Party insiders believed that obstacles to getting the story into the media varied according to the media organization and the biases of individual joumalists.
Some rnembers of the Reform Party who were involved with the Senate campaign felt that the Edmonton Journal allowed its lefi-wing, liberal bias and distaste for Reforrn Party politics to interfere with the reporting of the campaign. Evidenœ of this can be found in ediiorials and columns of the Edmonton Joumal which were laden with scathing cnticism of the positions that the candidates had taken on family values, national unity, gay rights, and women's rights. Additionally, the Edmonton Joumal was responsible for the 'spoil your ballot" campaign as well as an article leveling allegations of misconduct against No rnernbers of the Reforrn Party, Eua Levant and Logan Day. Even though some Refom
Party rnembers had venomous remarks about the Edmonton Journal's treatment of the
Senate election, they did not feel that the Edmonton Joumal represented the majority of 76
public opinion in Aiberta and were therefore undauntecl by its treatment of the Senate
election.
Despite the conviction of the strategists that there was unfair reporting, there appeared to be very few attempts to defend the election campaign against these
'defiberaie attacks" by the press. In fact, the efforts of the Reform Party seemed negligible when compared to those of the other actors in the Senate election. Short of a few cursory statements by Preston Manning, few aggressive attempts were made to change the minds of joumalists about the election. At the mid-point of the campaign, the focus of party efforts had shifted over to the United Altemative. One obsemer reported that the candidates were left 'high and dry".
The two sections that follow will describe the perspectives of two of the Reform
Party candidates, Ted Morton and Bert Brown.
TED MORTON
The first problem for the Refom Party was to get credible candidates to run in the election. Mr. Morton was approached by the Reform Party specifically because of his reputation as a constitutional expert and his views about the social liberalism of the courts, the need for fiscal responsibility in govemment, the position of Quebec in
Confederation, and pnsoner voting rights. The candidate decided to fun in the election in order to put his philosophy into pracüce. His interest in Senate remwas a produd of his activism on these issues. According to Morton:
"There was an interesting connection between the Senate and the Supreme Court, because they are both not elected. The differenœ of course is that one does a lot and the other doesn't do a thing. There was a tie in there."16
Morton's campaign messages attracted more attention than the messages of the other candidates. They were entrenched in the Ottawa versus Alberta wnflict that has characterized most of the poliücal discourse in the province. He also drew attention to the record of the Liberal Party and tied this record to western alienation. Consequently, his message fit under the larger umbrella of the Reform Party message. The three pillars of this candidate's platform were the need for Senate reform, attacks against judicial activism and opposition to special status for Quebec. His vision for Senate refom differed from the Triple E Mode1 in that he had some misgivings about equal representation in the
Senate.
'There is a fair amount of anxiety in Alberta toward provincial equality because it would give the seven have-not provinces 70% of the seats in the Triple E Senate, and it could collide with the fiscal objectives of the Refomi Party and small "cmconservatives in the West Part of what people want to see happen in the next decade is a dramatic reduction in so-calleci equaliion payments and national standards. It will be difficult to get those changes through a second chamber where seventy percent of the members are from recipient provin~es."'~
His ideas about the nature of a reformed Senate aside, the aspect of his platform that received the most attention was national unity. By focusing on national unity, the media was provided with the 'hot button poIib'css that make good news stories and the public was provided with an element of western alienation that has driven support for
Senate reform since the first days of the movement It was also a message which had been tested in the previous Federal Elecüon. The Reform Party gained notonety during the 1997 Election for its hardline stance on national unity. Although its position on national unity caused the Reform Party to lose support in Ontario, Reform succeeded in manipulating the media agenda in a way that difierentiated the party from the traditional political parties.
Some members of the press had an adverse reaction to some of the statements of this candidate on national unity, which were describeci by one journalist as 'intellectually corrupt and di~isive".'~Arnong these comments was the widely quoted, 'We don't need another thirty years of French-kissing." While these comments were roundly criticized, they were alço used as high profile quotes in news stories and were made the subject of columns and editorials, particularly in the Edmonton Journal . When asked about the
backlash created by his position on some of these issues. the candidate respondeâ that,
'Publicity is publicity. Part of the reason people get upset when you say something Iike
that is because they al1 know it is tnie. "19
There is some merit to the argument that there is no such thing as bad publicity.
Marginal or oppositional groups do not ahmys have the ingredients or 'cultural capital"
required for news stories and sornetimes suffer a loss of aedibility in order to enter the
public debate. It has been argued that newsworthiness increases the more a group's
noms differ hmthe main~trearn.~As the Refom Party had the dubious distinction of
arguably king both a recognized and nationally ostracized political party, they were able
to benefit from this law of publicity. According to Mr. Morton:
'Right amss the board, economic policy, tax policy, Reform is at odds with what 1 csill mainstream media political culture. There are aiways lots of people in the media that are bking for an opportunity to stick it to the Refonn Pat?y. Suddenly, you have one of their Senate candidates in an Alberta campaign talking about French-kissing and they are going to seize upon mat and say see we told you, those Reformers can't be tnisted. AI1 of that was quite predidable."2'
Once it was clear that there was an uncontesteci race, Mr. Morton did not see the point in continuing in vain to try to get media coverage. He consequently did not employ a specific media strategy and did not see the nonaverage or lack of favourable coverage as something that could be controlled. Less than ten percent of press releases sent to the media became news stories, and most of the participants seemed to feel a sense of resignation about the extemal factors which seemed to direct the campaign.
'What was newsworthy about drinking coffee and eating pancakes with Reformers? I could not blame the media because there was not any drama or cornpetition that the media pretty much demands for a story [sic]."
According to Morton, the high point of the campaign was the appointment of Doug
Roche on September IF, mostly because it was perceived as an autocratic move by the
Prime Minister. At this point, it was felt that the empathy of the public began to shift toward the Senate campaign. However, this candidate reported that the imrnediate consequence of this appointment was confusion among the voters who began to think the election was futile now that the position had been filled.
Mr. Morton's assessment of the campaign as a whoie was that media coverage was not an important fador in its failure. The major obstade that limiteâ the success of the carnpaign was the pursuit of partisan interests by individual political actors. The consequenœ was a reversal of Adam Smith's theory of the invisible hand, where each party pursued its own self-interest and minimized, rather than maximized, the interests of 80 the whote. a The partisan calwlations that resutted in the modtfication of the original
plan for the elecüon of Stand-by Senators, and the decision of the Klein govemment not to nin candidates, were the major obstacles that the mmpaign sirnply could not
overcome.
BERT BROWN
The second candidate began as an average citizen who feit the adverse effects of
federal policy and believed that the only solution was meaningful institutional reform.
According to Brown:
'1 started as an amateur lobbyist for agricuItura1 issues in 1977. 1 reaked that lobbying efforts were only successful to the degree of urgency of demand at the tirne. I realized any further help for agricufture or any other rninority interest was superficial and passing and could be changed by any other government or party in power and so Ibegan to think of what we wuid do that would be more long term than just lobbying and rallying and having meetings. Ithen began to focus in on the Senate."2'
Brown's betief in the importance of Senate reform led to the formation of the Canadian
Cornmittee for a Triple E Senate in 1983. Its mernbership was drawn fmm the
Progressive Conservatbe Party of Aiberta, the Canada West Foundation, and Canadians
from every province.
Since the inception of the Senate refonn movement, media average had akvays
been a problern. Brown believed that steps taken by Senate reform advocates such as
Senate elections which occurred outside of the constitutional amendment process, were
perceived by membrs of the press as unorttiodox, 'unconstitutional' and 'ilkgal' and
the press reporteci them as such. Brown then concluded that
7he national media loves to oppose any changes to the st;ttus quo. They did Ït the time before in the first Senate etecti~n.~~
This candidate describeci the first arguments and attempts at getting media coverage as amateurish and unsophisticated, but emphasized that in order to participate effectively in politics Senate refom advocates knew they had to leam the 'media game".
He then discovered that an image can have a more powerkil impact than a verbal argument.
'1 can tell you the biggest thing in media in impact is visual. Of al1 the things that I am known for in this country it is not my speeches, it is the cultivation in my field^."^
Brown plowed poliilmessages in the fields on his fam that were too visually striking to ignore. The first sign which was plowed at the time of the Meech Lake Accord was two miles long and read: 'EEE OR ELSF . The second sign said, 'TRIPLE E SENATE
NOW, JOE!" The third sign was plowed at the time of the Charlottetown Accord and it said 'VOTE WHOUT FEAR'. According to this candidate, these signs were the largest political signs in the history of the world. White he daims that he did this 'more out of fmstration than anything dse", he had implemented an innovative and profoundly effective media strategy that few wuld forget.
In terms of audience effects, an audience is Mce as likely to remember a visual theme than a verbal one.n Moreover, in today's news environment, exciting or dramatic visuals are a prerequisite for leading news stories?
As Bert Brown ran in the first Senate election of 1989, and was a champion of
Senate refom in two sets of constitutional negotiations, his decision to fun as a candidate in the 1998 Senate Election was not a surprise. His campaign platforni was 82 based on an agenda that generally dealt with the democratization of the Senate. While some of the other candidates ernphasized their social conservathe views, this candidate conveyed very simple, direct ideas about the necessrty for reform of the Senate. Brown's most prominent message was that the Senate is the 'longest standing system of legalued bribery". This message translateci into a usable soundbyte that he hoped would cause the audience to reconstnrct and reconsider the ills of patronage.
According to Brown, there was no campaign in 1998. During the first Alberta
Senate Election, the Alberta Progressive Conservative Party spent $500 000 on his campaign. Dunng the 1998 campaign, he spent a total of $4923. Since Brown was extensively known throughout the province for his activism and promotion of the Triple E
Senate, he did not see the necessity of spending excessive amounts of money on promotion. The 4000 dollars was what was required to enter the race as a candidate.
'1 will tell you hmto successfuIIy sel1 this idea. 1 teamed it again last Saturday, you seIl it with passion. You get angry, you speak witti emotion, and you tell people that if they want to do samettiing for their country and they want their country to survive, we need balance in our parliamentnB
The Refom Party requested that Brown write press releases and send them to the media as pertinent issues arme. He also spoke at debates and forums sponsor& by the
Reform Party and the Canada West Foundation and made guest appearances on radio shows such as the Rutherford Show. Merthan that, there appears to have ken no strategy.
According to this candidate, the most signifiant obstacle in the 1998 Senate election was the la& of a rallying cry.
"They discredited both eIections. lt's just that they were more effective with this one because we didn't have a rallying cry. It is pretty hard to rally the nation in outrage to the actions of one ~enator."~~
Brown recounted that the situation was different in the first Senate Election. In 1989, they drew the strength of public opinion behind them on hm core issues: the Meecti Lake
Accord and the GST. In this election, they attempted to focus on the poor attendance of
An- Ttiornpson, but making Thompwn into a symbol and cause celebre was not suffident motivation for the public to want a change in the system of govemment. Brown believed that a well-publicized rallying ay might have answered the question of why
Senate reform was necessary. However, with regard to the overall impact of the Senate elections, he added that
'Despite the attempts by the federal government and the national press to discredit and deletigimize the Senate eledions, 650 000 Aibertans voted in the first one and 880 000 votes were cast in the second one."31
THE CANADA WEST FOUNDATlON
The Canada West Foundation (CWF) is a westem think tank whose primary wncem has been the social and economic deveiopment of the West, and it is from this vantage point that it became a champion of Senate reform. The CWF is a behind the scenes player in western politics, but it has had a visible impact on the political agenda in western Canada. The CWF is committed to the improvement of federalism and has argued for aimost twenty years that a refomed Senate would achieve this end as well as enhance national unity. The movement for a Triple E Senate emerged in part from 84 research done by the Canada West Foundation which also took an active interest in organizing conferenœs and lobbying the provincial govemment to advance the cause of
Senate teform. The importance of an equal, effective, elected Senate lies in its implications for the parliamentary systern as a whoIe and the increase in transparency and accriuntability that would result hmthis refon. According to a representative of the CWF:
'We can't see regional representation in action, which is one of the appeals of the elected Senate because it mates people who have the public rote of regional representatives. An elected Senate would weaken party discipline in the House of Commons, it would make the whole legislative process more combative and les certain, and Ithink MP's would be a little more independent and more assertive simply because they would judge themselves against the behaviour of Senator~."~~
In spite of many apparently sound arguments in favour of Senate reform, there have been few political actors outside of Alberta who could be convinced of its merits.
Consequently, the foundation discovered that the only way to gain ground on the issue was through unconventional methods involving incremental constitutional changes.
The CWF has conceived, and participated in the execution of, hosenator-in-waiting elecüons that were meant to draw public attention to an issue which muld not survive the political wrangling and compromise of constitutional discussions. The original strategy behind the election of stand-by Senators was the creation of a 'parallel Senate structure" which would place a spotlight upon the ineniciencies and lack of legitimacy of the existing
Senate. According to the Triple E Model, Alberta should have 10 senators and in the existing Senate it only has 6 senators. The plan was to hold a province-wide election for four senators with positions and salaries who wouId critically assess Meral legislation 85 and Ïts implications for Alberta. Ideally, the Senators would perform a greater public service than the appointed senators and by assuming a more visible role, the public would becume aware of the ludicrous state of the current Senate. David Efton, Peter
McCormack and Bert Brown approached Premier Ralph Klein with this plan, but he rejected this proposal in favour of a smaller scale, less extravagant version of the
Senate election plan. It was modified such that only two senators in waiting were to be selected by popular vote, without positions and salaries as originally intended. The shift in Klein's support for this proposal was thought by some observers to be related to the controversy in Klein's caucus that had kencreated by the Vriend decision. Ralph Klein was facing pressure from Reform supporters in his cabinet to use the Notwithstanding
Clause of the Charter to ovemde the Supreme Court niling on a gay rights issue. The
CWF's plan was also undercut by the decision of the Alberta Conservative Party not to run candidates in the election . As Bert Brown stated, ' Ralph took a thoroughbred race horse into the meeting and his caucus cut off its hind legs."
Although the momentum for the election came from the CWF's interest in the issue, the foundation did not expect to be performing the role of a political party. The duties and responsibilitieç normally petfortneci by political parties, such as media strategy and advertising, were performed by the Canada West Foundation because the Reform
Party had abandoned the cause in order to pursue other initiatives. The Canada West
Foundation had been hired by the Alberta Department of Federal and lntergovemmental
Afbirs for the first time to do a contract mat invoived raising public awareness about the
Senate election which started in June and ended in August The second contract that 86 was finalized in early September involved doing the media work for the election began three and a half weeks before the vote. Not only was the foundation in an awkward position because of its non-partisan status but it was also too late to salvage the already delegitimi2ed campaign only twenty-six days before the vote. By the time they were hired for the second contrad the eledon was abandoned by both the provincial govemment and the Reform Party. To reiterate what was said earlier by the CWF staff.
'ft did seem that the eledion was orphaned close to the beginning. No one cornes, no one runs candidates and no one shows any interest in it. We were left holding the
The CWF organized five principal components of the campaign: the candidates' forums, the TV debate, the ad campaign, meetings with newspaper editorial boards and a day of discussion. Because the CWF is a non-partisan foundation, there were constraints placed on the type of promotion that it couid undertake for the eledion.
Pn'rnariiy seen as a research instiiute, it did not have the media profile that was needed to attrad a media spotlight for the eledion, particularly when popular wisdom represented the election as both 'insane and inanen?
The CWF organized meetings in the form of "seminar luncheons" with the editorial boards of the Cakanr Herald and the Edmonton Journal in order to reason with them about the political importance of the election. The staff of the Canada West Foundation, attempted .to convince joumalists and editors that the election had important political implications. Appeals were made to the dernomtic responsibiiii that the joumalists had to cover an issue that may not have met the criteria of newsworthiness but still camed signficance for the citizens of Alberta. 'The argument we made was iargeiy that aithough this was not the ideal Senate election there were arguments for keeping Senate reform alive. There are reasons for Senate refonn that make sense, and the eiedion was one way of doing ttiat The response that we got was that it was probably a good idea, but we are not convinced fhat the election ma kes sense. "35
From the perspective of the editorial boards, the Senate election was simpiy not a significant event and Senate reform was not associated with any other items on the public agenda in the province or in the country. Because stones in the news need to have a strong human interest or dramatic component, stories about Senate reform were not seen as particulariy newsworthy. Abstract issues in the news must be tied to concrete examples that illustrate the issue, but this could not be done with the Senate
'My sense of the editoriat board was not that they were hostile or wng to subvert the election but they simply did not see this as a serious undertaking...... All of the attacks on the existing Senate could not convinœ people that this eldon made sense. Even people who are thoroughly disgusted with the existing Senate were not convinced that this was a way of moving Senate reform along because it was attacked on so many fronts."
The mandate of the CWF was to raise awareness in Alberta about the significanœ of
Senate reform which rendered brgeting the national media a step byond what its contract required it to do. In addition to this, it was the responsibility of other prominent
Alberta spokesmen to command national attention for this election. According to a representative of the CWF:
'The premier himself pulled back from this election. The premier has to push it ont0 the national stage. He didn't thmw his weight behind it, nor did anyone else."
Furtherrnore, the dallenges of educating Aibertans about the purpose of the elecüon were dicult enough without the addiional pmblem of having to contend with a disintereçted national audience.
Mile most political carnpaigns, particularly election campaigns, tend to be reliant on advertising, the Senate election carnpaign used virtually no advertising. Advertising expenditures constitute a large part of election budgets for the reason that advertising is a way of getting a message amss tu an audience without the obstacle of journalistic interpretation of the message. The CWF designed a simple ad campaign that ran in the
Calaarv Herald and the Edmonton Journal, and it alsa did the advertising for the candidate forums. The foundation did not, however, buy any television or radio spots to promote the eledion. One testimonial advertisement was devised that refiected the public education mandate of the organization that fan in the Calgary Herald and Edmonton
Journal under the slogan 'Alberta cares, Alberta Leads, Alberta Votes" . The most important objective of the ad campaign was to constnict a simple way for people to conceptualize the incrementalist approach to Senate reform. The CWF chose the testimonial "question and answer" format for the ad, which was intended to tend source credibility ta an election that was very much Iacking in endorsements. In testimmials, the authonty and status of the witness is transferred to the candidate or prod~d.~
Quotes taken ftom John A Mac Donald, Wilfnd Laurier, and other influential Canadians endorsed â more democratic role for the upper house. The ad was designed to subvert the popular perception or 'cornmon sensen that the eledion was a ludimus Reform
Party stunt and replace it with the idea that there were influential Canadians who supporteci Senate mf6mi. Furtfier, the ad al= gave reasuns why the 'standby senator electionmwas the best way of achieving Senate refomi, and rebuUed the dominant 89 perception that the Senate election lacked legitimate endorsement
The decision to run the ad in print media was appropriate because the case for
Senate refonn involved a very cornpiex argument A full page ad was needed to explain and justify the Senate election, hile it could be discredited and undermined by the opposition in just a few sentences. The ad attempted to appeal to provincial pride but did not use the appropriate wes or 'popular democratic interpellations* which would make it a compelling cal1 to support the issue. Additionally, while the ad addressed the problem of official endorsement, it did not answer the more important question of why Canadians should care about Senate refom. Demonstrable proof needed to be provided for why the current Senate was a pressing problem and the Triple E Senate was the solution.
The testimonials explained the rationaie behind having an upper house, but they did not sufficiently explain the philosophy of incremental constitutional change or why the election could be considered legal. The selected quotes did not demonstrate the historical significance of the issue in the province or explain why Alberta has been a political innovator on this issue. * The CWF organized most of the events for the Senate election, which induded: a
'day of discussion and debate', a televiseci debate, and candidate forums across the province. The day of discussion allowed high xhool students to debate the question of whether or not 'the Mure of Canadian Federation depends on Senate reform" in the presence of a panel of experts. While high schwl students wre not a part of the voting population, this event was compatible with the public education mandate of the CWF and
'A copy of the advercisement is in the appendiu. 90
the organizational objective of inib'ating public discussion about policy issues.
The televised debate twk plaœ on the day More the election, October 18, 1998
on local television Wons across the province. Roger Gibbins moderatecl the debate
between the four candidates who were given their first prolonged exposure to a broad
provincial audience. While there was not much money in the budget for televised events
or advertising, it was important to ensure wide public access to information about the
candidates before the eldon. The CWF also organized seven or eight al1 candidates'
forums which were held amthe province and did the advertising for these events. In
this and other aspects of the campaign, the Refbm Party was of liile help.
THE RUTHERFORD SHOW
Talk-show host Dave Rutherford is a well-known advocstte of Senate refonn who
played an active role in promoting the election. Rutherford's involvement began when he
was approached by Reform campaign managers to run as a candidate and it continued with his endorsement and participation in campaign events and forums as well as his
promotion of the issue on his show. Rutherford hosted candidate forums and events
such as the 'Red Meat, Red Necks, Red Chamber' BarBQ in July of 1998 and he made
Senate reform an agenda item on his show whenever possible. However, Rutherford's
most dramatic public relations contribution to the campaign occurred aiter the
appointment of Doug Roche on Septernber 17,1998, when the producers of the show
decided to stage a protest
'As soon as Roche was appointed, we went on the air in absolute outrage. We just could not believe it. It was 8 O dock in the moming, we were on the air at 8:40, we were really shoclced. We thought Chretien would let the process go. He ridiculed it al1 the way, said it was a joke, let it go. But no, he has to make it warse by appointing Doug Roche. So, we decideci to start a campaign.' 37
The campaign consisted of e-mails, faxes and letters that were collected over the course of a week. The purpose of the Mers was to voice the fury of Albertans over the appointment of Doug Roche, and then personally hand them to the Prime Minister .
Rutfierforci's outrage was infectious and seven thousand responses were elicited from listeners who wanted to voiœ their resentment over the PM'S dismissal of the election.
When Rutherford took his show and set it up in the front foyer of the House of Commons, he made a point of making an appearance on a popular radio show in Ottawa where he discovered the bamers of perception which prevented the issue of Senate refomi from reaching public opinion in Centrat Canada. He discovered that Senate refom was assodateci with regional stereotypes and western protest and was not seen as having
national significance.
' It is not just an Alberta issue. lt is a national issue, portrayed as, 'What do those farmers want? This is Matthe talk show host in Ottawa asked me. What do those famers want? What is going to make those famers happy in Aiberta? What you are talking about is not a fam issue. We have Mes with millions of people in them. Hello!! I thought, My God, I have to get over this hurdle More I can even start to talk about deep meaningful issues."38
Further, Rutherford felt that efforts in the campaign that were intended to bridge
the communication gap were not successful.
"Su here we are now, coming off of this elecüon that was given scant notice in the rest of Canada. 1 was in Ottawa, shofly after it, and ttiey haven't got a due what this is about. They don? want to know, they don't cm,they don't need to know. Central Canadians are so myopic it is ~nbelievable."~
Rutherford's enthusiasm for Senate nefom became the personification of western protest
and cameci the cam paign which had Iost its priority placement on the Reform Party's 92 agenda. The most eamest attempts to explain Senate reform to a larger audienœ were by Rutherford.
In contrast to Rutherford's mal, the Federal Liberal Party played a rofe in subverting the efforts of Senate refom advocates.
Mile it may seem unusual to consider the Liberal Party as a participant in this eledion, its strategy for dealing with the campaign had a signifimnt impact on the course of events. The Senate candidates and Reform Party insiders have clairneci that there was a consistent campaign by the Librals to disadit and undemine the Senate election. Prime Minister Chretien referred to the election as 'one third baked" and a njoke" and appointed a Senator in the middle of the Senate eledion campaign. According to
Ted Morton, the most damaging consequence of the 'anti-election campaign" was that its centrai messages were echoed by anti-Klein, anü-Reform journalists in Edmonton and
Calgary.
The suggestion that the Liberals had an interest in undennining the eledion is not
unfounded. The Liberals woutd have had nothing to gain by succumbing to an item on
the Reforrn Party agenda which could force volatile constitutional:issues to resurface.
Second, in the absence of a cn'sis of representation. there was no Iogical reason to
discuss an issue which called for a radical alteration of the balance of power in the
parliameritary system. According to a riepresentative of the CWF:
'1 can't imagine a Prime Minister endorsing Senate reform. Mile Ït rnay make the govemment as a whole more pawerful, power within that govemment becornes more di&sed. Al1 of the adors lose a bit. The House of Comrnons loses its dominance, the Prime Minister and Cabinet lose their control over the legislative agenda. It is a tough thing to move on because none of the actors that can make the pmsswork are interestedU4
Thus, for the above reasons, the Liberal strategy was to ignore the election. As long as the federal govemrnent did not rnake a statement about the elecüon, the Senate reform carnpaign was deprived of the conflict that would have made it a newsworthy story.
Ciaims were made that the Liberals' message was supported by the ûttawa press gallery who had still not come to tenns with the presenœ of the Reform Party.
The main attack against the Senate carnpaign by the Liberals was the appointment of Doug Roche during the election campaign. The effectsof the appointment, acçording to the candidates, was confusion amongst the voters about the point of the election and a brief flash of anger wtiich died by the time vote was held on
October 19, 1998. Had the political climate kendifferent, the appointment of Doug
Roche could have been a severe miscalculation of the same vanety that allowed the first
elected senator, Stan Waters, to rise to the status of martyr.
The effediveness of the Liberal strategy illustrates the changing political dimate of
the West. The Progressive Conservative govemment was also confronted with a similar
spedade in 1989, but it did not have nearly as much success as the Liberals in
containing the "Senate Revoit". The incteased sense of economic power in the west and
the new global policy context had significantly reduced animosity toward tfie federal
govemment and public insistenœ about the need for institutional refonn. The resuit was
that the Liberal party emerged unscafhed from its battle with the Refwm Party over This chapter has provided an overview of the efforts expended by the Reform
Party, the Canada West Foundation, and the Rutherford Show to promote the Senate election and place the issue of Senate refonn on the national agenda once again. At the
partiwlar moment in western history that the election occumd, eledion efforts were
splintered and uncoordinated, very unlike the more broad-based, strongly-rooted
movement of the mideightîes. Additionally, the political actors came from the margins of
national political life without a sophisticated media strategy and without the brute force of
public discontent. As for the impact of the election, the election results indicated that
542000 Albertans went out to vote in an election that was widely discredited. However,
according to reports by the Canada West Foundation, more people voted on the issue of
Video Lottery Terminais than for Senate candidates. Although, the campaign managers
touted the election resuits as a victory, the issue failed to be reasserted as a prionty wiîhin
the Reform Party, within the province, and within national consuousness.
The Senate campaign was destined for failure because of its structural flaws and
because of fis placement within hierarchies of power in Canadian politics. Any political
movement which proposes changes to the organization of established power can only
acquire a media presenœ with effort, innovativeness and 'culturat capitav .There was a
dash of values between mainstream media and the Senate refom advocates who did not have the 'trappings of offiaaldom" that were necessary to meet the criteria of newsworthiness. The lack of political or economic crisis did not open the discursive space for dis~wssionsof constihnionai refonns, particularly when they originated from voices on the rnargins.
Within the campaign itseif, what the Reform Party and the Canada West
Foundation failed to do was construct a dear, simple message that provided demonstrable proof about why an elected Senate would improve the parliamentary system. First, Senate reform was a complex concept that could be explained effedively only to citiiens with extensive knowledge of the parliamentary system. Second, Senate reformers needed to provide tangible proof that the current systern of govemment was ineffective or undesirable and in need of reform. The Canada West Foundation was not able to implement a campaign through the media until Mer the dominant media frame was determined. Consequentiy, it did not have favourable circumstances or resources to develop a message that couid drown out the message that the Senate Election was a waste of time. The Canada West Foundation could not acquire the discursive power to change the way the public and policy-makers thought about Senate refom.
A consistent theme in the narrative of Senate reform proponents is that they were unable to get the campaign off the ground and capture media attention. Chapter Five wili
examine the Senate election hmthe perspective of journalists in order to verify these
daims and expose the tensions between the media agenda and the agenda of Senate
reformem. Additionally, quantitative and qualitative analysis of average of the eledion
in both the provincial and national media will provide a more phse pidure of how ttie
media relayed the story. ENDNOTES
1. Michael Jessup, (1997). *Legitimacy and the Dedine of the 1920's Ku Klux Man.' Research in Social Movements, Conflictand Change,Volume 20, pp. 180.
7. Laghi, B. "UA adopts Reforrn pflnciples.' Globe and Mail, January 29,2000, Al.
2. Interview, December 18, 1998.
S. Interview, February 12, 1998.
7. Interview, February 12, t 999.
8. Interview, Oecember 14, 1998.
9. Emesto Ladau. (1977). Politics and ldeology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascisrn, Populism. London: NLB, p. 166.
10. Interview, February 12. 1999.
I 1. Interview, February 17, 1999.
12. Interview, Oecember 14, 1998.
13. Interview, December 14, 1998.
14. Graham Fraser. 'Reform Takes on Ottawa in bid to EIed Senators. Globe and Mail, Sept 1, 1998, A3.
15. Interview, December 14, 1998.
16. Intewiew, Decernber 15, 1998.
17- Interview, December 15, 1998.
18. Personai communication, December, 1998.
19. Interview, December 4 5, 1998. 20. Brian McNair, (1995). An /ntmduct!on to Po/itical Communication. London: Rouüeâge, p. 142.
21. Interview, December 15, 1998.
22. Intewiew, December 15. 1998.
23. Morton, F.L The 1998 Senate Election: A Post-Morion. Lecture, November 25, 1998.
24. Interview, February 10, 1999.
75. Interview, February 10, 1999.
26. Intewiew, February 10, 1999.
27. David Taras,(1990). The Newsmakers: The Media's Influence on Canadian Polfiics. Scarborough: Nelson, p. 110.
28. ibid, p.109.
39. Interview, February 10, 1999.
30. InteMew, February 10, 1999.
3 1. Personal communication, April2001.
32. Interview, Febniary 12, 1999.
33. InteMew, February 12, 1999.
34. Marc Lisac, Edmonton Journa/, May 2, 1998.
35. Ibid.
36. Bnan McNair,(l995), p.96.
37. Interview, February 17, 1999.
38, lbid
39. lbid.
40. Interview, Febmary 12, 1999. CHAPTER 5: THE NONSTORY ABOUT THE NON-ELECTION
PART 1: CONTENT ANALYSlS
A content analysis was conducted on a sample of national and Alberta print and televised media that was published and aired from August 1, 1998 to October 22 ,1998.
This monitoring perd was chosen because the "Senate race" officially began in August of 1998 and ended with the vote on October 19,1998. News items were collected from the Alberta Rewrt, the Calaarv Sun, the Edmonton Sun, the Calcjarv Herald, the
Edmonton Journal. the Globe and Mail, CBC local and national television average and
CTV local and national tefevision coverage. The media sample allows a comparison of how the ideas of Senate reform proponents were represented in the national media and the media in Alberta. ' The coding categories for the content analysis were tested and refined in a pilot test eonduded on ten articles from the sarnpte. The coding protocol was tested for intercoder reliability, and the protocol was found to be 90% reliable.
In Chapter 3, it was asserted that western reform movements had few vehides for their intellectual expression. The results of the content analysis should generally indicate how much coverage was given to the Senate elecüon, the focus of the stories in the media, and wtiich sources were used to define the issue. The discourse analysis will further clarify the extent to which Senate reform proponents were able to define their message in the media, and which aspects of their arguments were given attention, if any. Camparisons will made in the data analysis between Alberta and
'Radio news storîes will not be covered in this study because of the lack of availability of transcripts. 99 national wverage in order to gage the diffkrence between the access of Senate election proponents to the national and the Alberta media.
A total of 126 news items were caded from The Globe and Mail, the Calaary
Heraid, the Edmonton Journal, the Calaay Sun, the Edmonton Sun, the Alberta Rewrt and CBC Nand CFCN Calgary news. Of these 126 stories, 42% of those stories coflectedabout the Senate election were in openly partisan Pro-Refom Party publications such as the Alberta Remrt, the Edmonton Sun, and the Calaarv Sun.
As for the broadsheet press in Alberta, 20% of news items were in the Caiaary
Herald, 18% of news items were in the Edmonton Journal. Concurrentiy, 23% of stories were in the Edmonton Sun and 15% of stories were in the Calaarv Sun. The articles in the Alberta Rewrt anstituted 4 % of the total wverage of the Senate election in this time period. Considering that the Senate eledion was an event with historical and poiÏtical significanœ in Alberta, 100 articies in 5 publications across 83 days does not constitute a great deal of coverage. The eledion campaign received scant media attention both nationally and locally during its first month. When it did receive media average, it was a low priority news item.
Table 1: Freauencv of Publication Cross-tabulated bv Medium
Medium Globe and Mail Maclean's Toronto Star 1 5% 1 CBC 1 1% p.1 Calgary Herald 25 20% Edmonton Journal 22 18% Alberta Report 5 4% Calgary Sun 19 15% Edmonton Sun Local CN Total 126 100%
The Globe only ran 6 news stories and 5 opinion pieces on the Senate election during this 83 day period. CBC-Ws 'The National" ran one story, and the CTV National
News did not nin any stories on the Senate election. The CFCN Calaarv news coverage, however, amounted to 6% of stones on the Senate election. These resuits clearly indicate that the Senate election did not penetrate the national media agenda, in spite of its national devance. Joumalists with national media organizations explained the paucity of coverage by stating simply that it did not meet the criteria of newsworthiness. The Senate election was for the most part lacking the human drama, highly placed public officiais, news pegs and tangible events needed to make the cut on the newsroom flwr. In the words of one national correspondent, "Ifs an academic issue, its dusty and constitutional. It doesn't have any immediate impact on people's
Iives."'
For journalists at the Globe, the issue of Senate reforrn was regarded as insignificant, and the Senate election itself was regarded skeptically as a publicity tacüc.
When the story managed to capture the interest of the Globe it was usually for reasons 10 1 other than the importance of the issue of Senate reform. One of the principal news stories in the Globe about the Senate eIection was covered because it was piggy- backed with another newsworthy issue. According to one reporter.
'The reason l was dminto this is that it was in the wake of the Supreme Court reference to Quebec secession and it was the first example of anybody using the referen~e.'~
The second time that it becarne a newsworthy item in the Globe was when the Prime
Ministets appointment of Doug Roche coincideci with the APEC Inquiry, which was another attack against the credibility of the Prime Minister.
The one story that aired on CBC's "The National* was about the reaction of
Senate election supporters to Jean Chretien's appointment of a new senator. According to a CBC reporter, 'The reason I did a story then was busewe were interested in the reaction of the people ninning in this mysterious election." Connotations of the
'mysterious' are familiar to most westerners who would see this as the common thread binding stories about westem politics. Calgary reporters noted that western ideas about political reforrns have frequentiy been framed as the backdrop to a western freak show.
Campaign participants fully anticipated these preconceptions about western politics and used them in order to promote the campaign. A good example of this re-appropriation of westem, rural labels in the campaign was the 'Red Meat, Red Necks, Red Charnbef barbeque event
The CBC, generally thought to have more of a public interest mandate than the private television networks, &en covers the less sensational stories in order to refieci the national character. Those involved with the Senate election, however, could not propel themselves onto the CBC's radar screen. One CBC reporter recalls that '1 did suggest a couple of times that we do the story and there was not much interest in Toronto. tt was just that on a day when there was other competing news, it just did not make the CU^'^
The lack of interest was mostly due to the fact that the producers did not perceive it to be an issue of importanœ to Canadians. According to a CBC bureau chief:
'1 don? think the issue of Senate reform is one that you can rally enough people around to advocate that you should go through the process. I can't see thousands of people having marches anywhere in Canada. You'll get them out to stop their hospitals ciosing, you get them out there about changes to the educational system , or any number of other things that have an impact on people's Iives. But the Senate itseif, 1 think it is hard to argue that it has an impact on anyone's iiW4
While the Senate election did not have the ingredients for a good news story, it was also not regarded as a politically legitimate action. It was seen as an attempt to circumvent the systern derived from a blatant misunderstanding of constitutional politics.
Consequently, it was treated with a certain amount of disdain. As one national reporter
"That Senate election was not an exercise to be engaged in by anyone who wanted to govern, because the first document that ycru want to read if you are going to govem is the constitution .... Matthis elecüon was saying was ...'We are not prepared to engage in the process of constitutional refom. We are not prepared to go that route. We are going to go in an extra-legal route.' I thought it was a refusal to engage seri~usly."~
The la& of newsworthiness of the Senate eledion did not just relate to its la& of human face but also its devianœ as an act of protest. It can be argued that the political aciors in the Senate eledion did not have the cultural capital to win in a confrontation with the
Central Canadian establishment. The members of the Reform Party were, until recently, still viewed by some in the Ottawa Press Gallery as 'akns from the West? 1O3
Most joumalists in the Ottawa press gallery generally shared the perception that Refonn
was out of touch with the sensibilities of the rnajority of Canadians. In the words of one joumalist:
'The party has kenfunctioning as an Opposition party not an ideological party, and every now and then along would corne an issue which would drag it back into king an Alberta party. The whole issue on Stomoway was basicaliy an Alberta issue. The rest of the country thinks that we have a house for the Leader of the Opposition and they ought to Ike there. And then you have these Senate eledions..."7
In addition to the perception of a values gap, the reporters were concerned with
rnaking predidions about the probability that the Senate candidates would be appointed.
The candidates and the issue of Senate reform were judged by some journalists as too
marginal to be taken seriously. According to one joumalist:
'Most people in an election do not pay attention to the Green Party or the Natural Law Party. The Natural Law Party can have the most amazing platforms on anything, but people don? think they are going to win. 1 think there is a degree to which that was true for the Senate eletion as we11."~
One could argue that through labelling certain polbladors as 'marginal", and by
creating negative expectations about their success, joumalists created a self-fulfilling
GENRE
Wthin the total media sample, about 64% of coverage during the monitoring
period was hard news and 35% were opinion pieces. The only feature on the Senate
election during this monitoring modappeared in the Alberta Remrt, The Calaary Io4
Herald had the most hard news items with f 8 in the sample of 126, which was followed dosely by the Edmonton Sun which ran 17 hard news stories. The Edmonton Journal had 14 hard news stories. In an intewiew conducted for this thesis, Dave Rutherford shrugged off the small number of news stories in Alberta by stating, 'The media, particularly the broadsheet newspapers, do not reflect the rnajority of public opinion in
Alberta." This sentiment was echdby other participants in the campaign.
Because the ideology of newspaper owners often saturate op4pieces and columns, the quantity and tone of editorialiung on the Senate election are worthy of examination. Both of the editorials in the Globe and Mail had a negative tone, while al1 three of the columns on the subject had a positive tone. The clash in tone between the columns and the negative editorials may be attributed to the fact that there were three
'Western Columns" that ran regulariy in the Globe and Mail at the time of the Senate election. There were no editorials in the Toronto Star and both wlumns were highly critical of the Senate election.
Eariier in Chapter 4, I quoted Reform Party members and Senate election proponents who ciaimed that the Edmonton Journal 'campaigned against" them.
Evidence from the columns would indicate that this daim is not without ment. Three out of four columns had a negative tone aileonly one had a positive tone. The editorials, however, revealed a mixture of viewpoints about the Senate elecüon. Two were positive, one was negative, and the fourth ediiorial did not direcüy relate to the Senate election.
Ail five of the editorials in the Calaarv Herald were in favour of the Senate eledion. Needless to say, 100 % of the wlumns and editorials in the Alberta Rewrt, the Calaaw Sun, and the Edmonton Sun, were unabashedly in support of the Senate elecüon .
LOCAllON OF THE ARTICLES
Story location is a crucial indicator of the importance that the media placed on the
Senate election. The story was generally buried in the inside pages exœpt when the
Senate election produced a direct conflict between Ralph Klein and the Prime Minister.
The only time that the story was in the Globe and Mail and the only time it made the front page was when the Refonn Party sued the Prime Minister.
In ternis of placement, the priorib'zation of news in the national newspapers was mirrored in the broadsheet papers in Alberta. Thus, the story remained for the most part at the bottom of the news agenda as it was in the national papers. 63% of the news stories in the Calaarv Herald were inside the newspaper and 57% of the news stories on the Senate election in the Edmonton Journal appeared on the inside pages. Although the Suns were advocates of the Senate eledion, the story was also buried in the inside of the tabloid. Since the Suns do not generally give high priority to political news stories, this finding may not cany much meaning.
TOPlC
The 'topic" was defined as the principal focus af the news item. Six topic categofles were delineated in this content analysis: federal-provincial conflict, the
Reform Party and its strategy, campaign related stories, election legitimacy, Senate 1O6 reform, and other.
By far, the most frequently occurring topic in the sample was the federaVprovincial conflid that became a side show to the Senate election. This topic category refers specifically to the clashes between Ralph Klein and the Prime Minister over Senate appointrnents, the Refom Party's law suit against the Prime Minister, and stories which engaged in "Ottawa-bashingn. In a sample of 126 news items, 41% of stories were about federal-provincial conflict. The second most wmmon topic for the articles was the legitimacy of the elecüon campaign which constituted (33)26% of the articles.
These artides were primarily concemed with attacking or defending the legitimacy of the election. They focussed on its legality, the lack of competition and the absence of public support for the eledion. Subsequently, 23% of the articles were campaign related. This category included stories about election events. candidate platforrns, the nomination or election process, and the resuits of the vote. Only 8% of stories in the sample were about Senate refonn. This category included articles that discussed the issue of Senate reform, the efficiency or inefkiency of the existing Senate, or indepth analyses of the functions of the institution and constitutional refom. A measure of the success of the election was the extent to which campaign participants were able to ignite discussion about Senate reform. The very small number of stories in this category indicates that they failed to achieve this goal.
Once the sample is divided according to national or regional coverage, the data reveals the different foci of news organizations. 45% of the articles in the Globe and
-Mail were about the federal-provincial conflict, and 36% of stories were about the Iegitimacy of the campaign. The oniy story on the CBC-Ws 'The Nationai" was about 1O7 federal -provincial confîict The one story in Madean's magazine was about the issue of
Senate refom. In the Toronto Star, however, 33% of stories attacked the legitimacy of the eledion and the rest of the stories were evenly distn'buted amss the topic categories. Thus, with a few exceptions, the national news media was primarily interested in federal-provincial conflict, and not mate refom or election events.
The most commonly occumng topic category in the Edmonton Journal and
Cabarv Herald was the legitimacy of the eledion. The Caiaarv Herald gave the most attention to campaign forums and election events. The Edmonton Journal had the highest number of articles on the subjed of Senate refonn in the sample, but this topic category still accounted for only a small percentage of its stories. As for the Calaary -Sun and the Edmonton Sun, 74% of articles in the Calaarv Sun were about federal- provincial conflict as well as 66% of articles that ran in the Edmonton Sun. However, the primary diirence between these artides and the articles in the national media, was that these articles were couched in the discourse of western alienation of which 'Ottawa v. Alberta" conflict is a centrepiece.
Table 2 : Frequency of Tooics in the Total Sam~le
Topic Category Frequency Percent FedlPmvConflict 52 41?h Reform Party 3 2% Campaign 23 18% Legitimacy 33 26% Senate Reform 10 8% 1 Other 1 Total 1 126 I100% 1
SOURCES
The purpose of examining sources in news items is to determine whose
perspective, argument or definition is used to explain policy issues or problems. The
examination of sources will reveat who has been given the power of 'primary definitionn
in the press. The standard modei of a news story is 'A asserts and B responds to A" '.
The daim from the defining source is reflected in the story lead and determines what
will be discussed in the story, and the responding source challenges or refutes the
daims of the defining source.10The defining sources are usually, but not always, the
first quotes of the sto~-ym3In this sample of artides, there were usually multiple defining
and responding sources. Source categories were then established based on the stance
of the individual or group for or against the Senate election and the Senate reform
movement. There were four presenate election source categories: Reform Party
Members, candidates, the Alberta Govemment, the Canada West Foundation, and
Other pro-Senate election sources. The Reform Party category inciuded the party
leader, Members of Parliament, campaign strategists, and party spokespersons; the
candidate category induded both Reform Party candidates and independent candidates;
See Chapter 2 for more detail.
Defining sources were those which corresponded with the statement, or argument of the lead in the story and the responding sources were those which supported the counter-argument. Some studies identify only one defining murce in a story, but this method seemed more appropriate for the analysis of this issue. 109 the Alberta govemment category consisted of the Premier and other members of his cabinet; the Canada West Foundation category included al1 academics and representatives of the foundation; and the ûther pro-Senate eledion category induded individual Citizens, celebrities, academics or other sources in favour of the eledion.
Subsequently there were two anü4enate election source categories: Liberal Party members, and Other anti-Senate election source^.^ The Liberal Party category included the Prime Minister, federal rnembers of parliament, party spokespersons and representatives and the Other anti-Senate elechn category consisted of Senators, acadernics and other sources that were not in favaur of the eldon. Finally, the 'Not
Applicablebtegor-ywas designated for sources that were not identifiably in favour of or against the Senate dedion.
OfFlNlNG SOURCES
The expected result for this category was for there to be a significant differenœ between national and provincial media in ternis of how often pro- Senate election sources were used. However, the results indicate that there was not a significant diÏmbetween news organizations in ternis of usage of defining soum.
60th news stories in the Alberta Rdused preSenate elecüon defining sources. Ho;wevef, in the Cakiary Sun 50% of news stories were defined by pro-ekcüon sources and 50% were defined by anti-elecüon sources. In the Edmonton Sun, 41% of news stem were defined by antdeledion sources and 47% were defined by pm
'' Opinion pieces were excluded from this part of the analysis due to inability to estabfish intercoder reliability. 110 ekction sources. By far, the Cabarv Herald used the highest frequency of pro-eledion sources. About 72% of stories had pro-eledion defining sources while only 11% used anti-eledion defining sources. Additionally, in spite of allegations made against the
Edmonton Journal that it demonstrated an overt anti-election bias, there was not a great difkrence between the frequencies of pmSenate efection and anti-Senate election sources used. In the Edmonton Journal, 36% of stories were defined by pro-election sources and 43% were defined by anti-eledion sources.
Of the 6 news stories in the Globe and Mail, 4 stork~(67%) used pro-election defining sources and 2 stories us4 anti4ection defining sources. However, in the stories that used pr~lectiondefining sources, one containeci no direct quotes, and one countered the daims of the defining sources with twice as many anti-election responding sources. The use of proleledion defining sources did not effect the tone of the average. The tom of the stories was still neutral or negative in spite of the pro-Senate election defining sources. In the Toronto Star, 50% of stories were defined by pro- election sources and 50% of stories were defined by anti-eledion sources. The use of pro-election sources also did not impact the tone of the stories, which were neutral.
Another important factor in this analysis is which pro-Senate eledion or anti-
Senate election actors were defining sources in the news. Within the 67% of stories that used pro-election sources in the Globe and Mail, the Reform Party and the Premier of Alberta were used as defining sources in 50% of these stories, while the candidates
(Ted Morton and Deborah Hanley) were quoted to support the defining sources in 33% of stories. In the one news story on CBCs The National", citizens in favour of the
Senate election, candidates Ted Morton and 8ert Brown, and Ralph Klein were the Ill defining sources.
The candidates were quoted as defining sources in the Caigarv HmU in 61% of stories htused pru-eledion sources. The next matmrnonly used pro-election defining source in the Calaarv Heraid were Reform Party members (39% of stories).
The Edmonton Journal used members of the Refonn and Liberal parties as defining sources with equal frequency, wdh each used as a defining source in 35% of stories. In the Calaaw Sun, a Liberal Party member was used with the most frequency as a defining source. This occurred in 33% of stories. In the Edmonton Sun, Reform Party mernbers were used as defining sources in 35% of stories, but so were anti-Senate election sources, who were also mentioned as defining sources in 35% of stories.
On the local Calgary CFCN news program, ail seven news stories used pro-
Senate eledion defining sources. The two Senate candidates Ted Morton and Bert
Brown, Refom Party mmbers, and Ralph Klein were each used as defining sources in
43% of news stories. Ted Morton was quoted as a defining source mare often than any of the other candidates (43% of stories), while Bert Brown was quoted oniy once. One story was defined by citiiens in favour of the Senate eledion and one story was defined by the Canada West Foundation after the release of a survey. Table 3 : Definina Source Freauencies
Medium Pro-Election Sources Anti-Election Sources Globe and Mail 67% 33% Maclean's Toronto Star CBC Calgary Herald Edmonton Journal Alberta Report Edmonton Sun Calgary Sun
RESPONDING SOURCES
While most news stories follow a clairnixiunterclairn rnodel with defining and
responding sources in each story, there are instances when only one side of the story is
reported. A significant number of stories on the Senate eledion did not have responding
sources. The low priority of the Senate election as a news item may have discouraged
reporters from further investigating or diversifymg the angle of the story.
In the Calaarv Sun, 42% of responding sources were pro-election, 8% were anti-
election and 50% of stories did not use any responding sources. In the Edmonton Sun,
35% of responding sources were pm-election, 35% of sources were anti-election and
29% of stories did not use any responding sources. In one of the two news stories in the
Alberta Rewrt, anti-election responding sources were used, but the other story did not 113 use responding sources. On CFCN, 57% of stories did not use counterciaims hm responding sources. In two of their seven stories, the Prime Minister was used as a responding source and Doug Roche was the responding source in another story.
In 50% of the stories in the Calaarv Herald and the Edmonton Journal, there were no responding sources. When responding sources were used in the Calaarv Herald, it was most likely a Liberal Party member or another anti-election responding source. with each quoted in 22% of stories. In the Edmonton Journal, a Refom Party rnember or a
Senate candidate was most Iikely to be quoted as a responding source. A Reform Party member was a responding source in 29% of stories and the candidates were also quoted as responding sources in 29% of stories.
In the Globe and Mail, the Federal Likrals were used with the highest frequency as responding sources (50% of stories). Other anti-election responding saurces and the
Reform Party were quoted as responding sources in 33% of stories. In the one CBC story, the one responding source that was used was the appointed Senator, Doug
Roche.
News frames provide the nanative thread by which the viewer or reader is able to understand or interpret a story. The irnporbnœ of the news frame, açcording to Shanto
lyengar (1991), is that it contributes to the way in wtiich individuals attribute responsibility for social problems. lyengar contends that two types of frames 114 predominate in television news: episodic and thematic frames.ll The episodic frarne tends to be event-oriented and addresses public problems through the examination of
specmc events or by personalking the issue. The thematic frame is issue-oriented and focuses on the social, political or historical causes of a problem rather than a specific event or person.
The framing of news stories has relevance for the media analysis of the Senate
election. Thematic stories were necessary to bring forward the idea of regional
representation as a structural problern and not a problem that can be solved by changing
the government White event-onented stories are common in television news and
tabloids, they inhibit public understanding of policy issues by disconnecting events and
political problems frorn their causes. The way a story is frarned influences the ability of
pressure groups and social movements to relay a convincing message that explains
their objectives.
Table 4: Freauencv of Event and Issue-oriented Frames
Frame F~enc~ % of Total Event-oriented 49 60 Issue-oriented 7 9 Mixed 26 32
The predominanœ of event-orientecl dorieson the Senate election in the news
could be in part due to the journalistic nomof aie Suns wtiich together constituted 115 almost haif of the arüdes in the sample. However. it is important to note that only 9% of stories in the sample had an issue oriented frame. One could argue that because of the abstrad and complex nature of Senate reform, a much higher number of issueaiented stories wuld have been necessary to get the point across to an uninteresteci public.
Tabie 5: Frame cross-tabulated bv Medium
Medium Event Issue Mixed 17% 17% 67% O 100% Toronto Star 25% 25% 50% CBC O Calgary Herald 56% Ed- Journal 43% Alberta Report O Calgary Sun 100% Edmonton Sun 82% CFCN 71 %
The highest proportion of stories in the Alberta media were event-oriented, white most of the stories in the national media had a mixed frame. The Calaay Herald, the
CaIaarv Sun, the Edmonton Sun, and the Edmonton Journal and CFCN ran stories that were primarily concerned with the events of the Senate election and not the underlying issues. The Globe, the Toronto Star, and Ss'The NationaP ran stories that were based on concrete events, but also addresseci their significanœ. Il6
TON€
Tone has been defined as the general impression that the coder is left with when hdshe is finished reading the news item. In this study, tone was defined in ternis of whether or not the item left the coder with a feeling that the Senate election was portrayeci in a positive, negative, or neutral fashion. An article with a positive tone about the Senate election used language to indicate its support of the participants and the process or it used language that was criücal of the actions of the federal government and attacked the daims of anti-election sources. An article with a negative tone about the Senate eledion used language that woutd indicate a bias against the Senate eledion and its actors or questioned the validity of the daims of pro-election sources. A neutral article about the Senate election demonstrated no clear bias in favour of, or against the
Senate election in ternis of language usage. While these categories were an attempt to quantify tone, the assessment of language and style requires subjective judgements and does not easily lend itself to quantification.
in ternis of national media, the Globe and Mail had a higher proportion of negative stories (45%) than positive or neutral stories, but the mverage in Maclean's and on the
CBC had a positive tone. A possible expianation for the positive tone of the Madean's artide could be that the favourabte slant was produceci by the article's effort to provide the background and history of Alberta's support for Senate reform. Given the Toronto -Star's reputation as a Liberai newspaper, it is not surprising that 67% of its articles were negative.
Half of al1 news items in the Edmonion Journal had a negative tone and only 18% of articles were positive. This data may bu#ess the Refom Party's daim that the t 17
Edmonton Journal mrnpaigned against them. 36% of the news items in the Calaaw
Herald were positive, but the majority wre neutral(48%). The Calsarv Sun and the
Edmonton Sun had by far the most positive coverage of the Senate election. 89% of the artides in the Caloaw Sun and 79% of the articles in the Edmonton Sun exhibited a positive bias toward the Senate eledion.
Table 6: Medium Cross-tabulated bv Tone
Medium % Positive % Negative % Neutra1 Globe 27 45 27 Maciean's 1O0 O O Toronto Star O 67 33 CBC 1O0 O O Calgary Heratd 36 16 48 Edmonton Journal 18 50 27 Alberta Report 1O0 O O Calgary Sun 89 O 11 - Edmonton Sun 79 3 17 Local CN 86 O 14
PART 2: QUAilTATiM ANALYSIS
The content analysis was intended to provide an ovewiew of the basic characteristics of the sample. In this section, a more detailed evaluation of how the II8
Senate debate took place in the media was exploreci through diiurse analysis. A sarnple of articles was taken from the Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, the Calaarv Sun and the Edmonton m.The Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star are both wnsidered 'Toronto-centricn newspapers, and therefore provide a gmd sample of central Canadian media and its attitudes towards western initiaüv~s.Alternately, the news dismurse in the Calaarv Sun and the Edmonton Sun has a reputation for king sympathetic to the views associatecl with western alienation.
This discourse analysis ernployed aspects of a mode1 created by Van Dijk (1991) and deGoede (1 996) in order to examine local and global text sernantics. Topic, transitivtty, association, negative lexicalization, and implication were conceptual aids used in this discourse analysis. The topic of a news item is usually mntained within the headtine. It provides a surnmary of the most important concepts of a text and cues the reaâer about which information is significant12 Transitivity is a discourse analytical tml that describes the way in which the desof agent, patient, or object are assigned in a
~entence.'~Subsequently, "association" refers to the characteristics and adivities with which different political actors are associatecl and "negative lexicalization" refers to the terrns used to describe these adors that can have negative or ideological ~nnotations.'~
The purpose of the discourse analysis was to determine what the tems of the debate were, who set the tems of the debate and how much explanation was gken to the respective arguments of the different political actors.
The topics of the Globe and Mail artides communicate the most important fa& about the Senate eledion that readers will use to summarize it. Four topics were analyseâ: Onk Reformem mnning for seaf in the Senate, 01II]9/98 (A)
Rehtm Takes On Ottawa in &id to elect Senators, 01/09/98 (6)
She's a Metis actiw'st, a feminist, and a Refomr Party candidate, 04/0&98 (C) Sense and Sensibility ,07/1û48 (D)
The first example points to the lack of candidates ninning as the most important information about it and not the objective of the eledion. The second example highlights the Reform Party's challenge to the powers of the Prime Minister. The headline 'Refonn takes on ûttawa" implies that the Reform Party is still an Alberta Party that is an outsider to politics in Ottawa. The third example focuses on the paradox of a feminist and a native rights candidate running as a Reform candidate. The 'topic' of the story is slanted such that the Reform Party is associated with intolerant, conventional views and anti-feminist, anti-minority attitudes. The implications of bigotry were consistent with dominant stereotypes about western politics in central Canada. These stereotypes invalidated any other arguments which were presented. Moreover , the story was a soff news. human interest piece in which the main thrust had nothing to do with Senate refonn or the Senate election. In example Dl the contradictions ofQuebec separatism as they are perceiveci in English Canada were juxtaposed against the constitutional aspirations of Alberta. The headline, 'Sense and Sensibility', was ironie in
its intent and insinuated that the Senate election was not sensible.
From the topics of these Globe stories, one would assume that the only actors
supporting the election were members of the Reform Party. Other partiapants and
supporters were ignored. What was intedng about average of the Senate dedion
was that events afFecüng the credibiiii of the Prime Minister resulted in incfeased 120 newsworthiness for the Senate eledion. In some cases, intervening events that affect the credibility of prominent political actors increases the credibility of more marginal actors by defa~lt.'~At the time of the APEC inquiry into the handting of the 1997 protest and the law suit against the Prime Minister, pruponents of the Senate election were portrayed as agents rather than objeds of action. The challenge to the Prime Minister's power was momentarily given higher prionty than the Prime Minister's rejection of the dedon. After the law suit was lost by the Reform Party, however, participants in the
Senate carnpaign were one again portrayed as objects of action, rather than agents of action.
A cursory examination of the sample substantiates claims that the focus of the
Globe and Mail is the acüvities of officialdom, but the style and hetoric of the articles did not reveal overt ideologicai bias agsinst Senate reform proponents. The subtleties and omissions were perhaps more significant For the Globe and Mai!, the story of the
Senate election began with the law suit against the Prime Minister and ended when the
Senate vacancy was filled by the Prime Minister. The facts reported about the Senate election in example A pointed to the ridicutousness of Chretien being forced to choose
Senators from among a cast of charaders in a western cims. The biographic details selected for each candidate highlighted their oddity rather than their qualifications. In example B, the Reform Party was asked to defend the legitimacy of the eledion. The claims were countered by constitutional sdiolars who reduced them to absurdity. The
Refom Party's daim was analyzed in tenns of the applicability of the Quebec Secession ruling, rather than the other para-constituüonal iniüatives that were made since the 1995
Quebec referendum. In example C, the Refonn candidate for Senate &rm had to 121 defend her mernkrship to the Refon Party. In botti examples, the charges against the legitimacy of their position prefaced any journalistic efforts to account for the Refom
Party's side of the story. The preliminary assumption or 'cornmon sensewupon which B and C were based was that the argument for Senate reform and western attempts to achieve it had questionable legitimacy, and as such, the debate in most of the news stories did not progress beyond the attempt of the Senate election participants to establish credibility. Subsequently, example O assodateci Quebec's drive for separatism with Alberta's drive for Senate refomi. The association of the Senate election with wtiat was perceiveci in English Canada to be the extremisrn and destmctiveness of Lucien Boudtard's separatist agenda gave it a radical image.
The Toronto Star was more openly criücal of the Senate election than the Globe and Mail. Three artides were analysed and are listed below
Unofficial Senate Derby a yawner; 19/1&98 (E)
Chretjen mocks Senate vote. Albertan asked to explain comments about Gays and French, 24/r]9/98(F)
Chretien shouid not give up the right to pi& Senators, 23AI9198 (G)
In example E, the stylistic and rhetorical choices of the author were exhibited by the descriptors munonicial', 'derby' and 'yawnef, delegitimized the election. These disqualifying terms in the headline provide a summary Nat conveyed the lack of significance of the Senate elecüon. In example El the emphasis on the percentages of spoiled ballots in the vote further ernphasized that this was not an event worthy of attention. In the two folWng examples, F and G, Chtetien has been given agency and this allowed for a definition of the Senate eledion determined by Chretien's 172 statements and actions.
In example FI the reader is led to assume that the most important aspects of the story of the Senate election were the anti-French, anti-Gay comments of the candidates.
At the level of the local wherenœ of the text, the two propositions 'Chretien mds
Senate voten and *Albertan asked to explain comments about Gays and French" have a causal relationship. It is implied mat the justfied cause of Chretien's mockery was the
ad-Gay and anti-fnencti attitudes of the candidates. The effect of these propositions
was to associate the Senate election with bigotry and intoleranœ. In example G, an
argument was constructed that defended the powers of the Prime Minister and the
estabtished methoâ of making Senate appointments. The story's lead questioned the
daim that Aibertans felt jilted by the appointment of hugRoche by prefacing the
sentence with a disqualifying clause. 'Presumably, everyone in AIberta is hot under the
collar because the Prime Minister appointed Douglas Roche to the Senate.' The
selecüon of facts began with the contention that Jean Chretien had a constitutional nght
to appoint Doug Roche, and moreover, it was a good appointment. The Stats reporting
omitted the history of the sûuggle for Senate refom, why it is an important issue in the
province, and any analysis of the possible benefits and dmwt>a&s that Senate reforrn
could bring.
Very unlike the news discourse in the 'Toronto press", the Edmonton Sun and
the Ca@w Sun engageci in a discussion about the Senate eiection that was imbued
with powerfui rhetoric abut Alberta's relationship with the federal government. The
fremied Ottawa-bashing of the news tabloids illustrateci the extent to which Senate
feform was oepicted as a symboi of salvation for Albertans when they were wnfranted 123 with the excessive powers of the House of Commons. As evidenced in the following examples, the recumng themes were the abuse of power by Ottawa.
...Prime Minister's virtual monopoiy on power , 1 1/1CW8 (H) ...domination that Ontarb and Quebec en@y , I l/lMl8 (H) .. .nrle by imposition hmOttawa, 2Wr98 (4 ... bullying powers of Ottawa, 2OAl9198 (K)
The negative lexical ternis 'bullying power', 'rule by imposition", 'monopoly on power' were severe adjectives used to describe what was seen by Albertans to be a parliamentary system with an unfair distribution of power. Moreover, while the articles engaged in more general systemic critiques, there was also a belief wrnrnunicated about the victimization of Alberta by the federal govemment This "victimization" was proven by the appointment of Doug Roche. matis perceiveci to be a perpetually oppressive relationship with the federal govemment is also ingrained in the political identity of Albertans. In examples J and M, the comments indicated that a rejection of the Senate election was the equivalent of a rejection of Alberta. In example L, the Prime
Ministets disdain for the Senate eldon%as a symbol of what they think of the West".
The Senate election was describeci using the pronoun 'out, reinforcing Aibertans' ownership of the election. This characterimtion of the federal govemment as an oppressive force drew upon social knowtedge about widely known incidents in westem history when the federal govemment appeared insensitive to the social and economic problems of the West Memories of the imposition of tie National Energy Program against the will of the Alberta govemment were invoked in the Suns with plaintive questions such as, 'Who will stand up for Alberta at the Kyoto Energy Conference?" In article H, the tenets of western alienation that pertain to 'French power in Ottawa" were 128 reinvoked with a reference to '35 years of Quebec Prime Ministers in Ottawa". These grievances were effortiessly projeded onto the curent govemment regardless of its economic or constitutional record.
In addition to being integral aspects of westem alienation, these representations were populist constructions which use a 'people versus the power blocnantagonism to interpret political situations. Most of the artides in the Suns featured the Prime Minister as an antidemocratic agent representing a power bloc that vidimired the people of
Alberta.
...He says his inaction is betfer than Refom's ha#-baked ideas.. , 27/09&8. (1)
.. . . Chretien stuck if to Albertans.. .2M9B8 (J) .. . Chretien told Alberians their opinions are worthless.. 2MJglg8.(J) .. . Chretien set out to rile Albertans.. .2MNA8.(4
... Chretien spit in the face of evety Albertan.. lMI9Al8.(M) ...Albertans should be afraid of the PM's apparent hate-on for us, 1&WB8 (M) .. . He called our Senate election nüiculous.... 1 W9A8 (M)
It should be noted that in these examples, the Prime Minister was always depicted as the agent of negative action, with Albertans king the 'patientsnafFected by his actions.
The assignment of roles refleded a deepseafed belief that the hierarchy of power was irreversibly stacked against Alberta.
The rhetoric of the Suns illustrated the basic method of populism wtiich is to personify the cause of social and political problern~.'~The Prime Minister became the personificaüon of the annihilation of western aspirations. Jean Chretien, however, was not the first example of the scapegoafing of a Prime Minister. Prime Ministers have been vilified throughout western Canadian history because of policies Iike the National 125 Energy Program, and one of the musi notable examples is Pierre Trudeau.
Comparisons were made in two arb'cfes between Jean Chretien's appointment of Doug
Roche and Pierre Trudeau's 'one-finger saluteDto Westerners in Salmon Arm, B.C. The infiammatory rhetoric of the tabloids went so far as to demonize Jean Chretien in almost conspiratorial tones.
"Chmtien's strategy is to scare the rest of Canada into voting the Grits into power by continually pmvoking Alberfa and Quebec into sending regionalired pmtest parties to Ottawa." 23109198 (J)
Further, negative lexical ternis were used throughout the news items to condemn
Chretien without explaining the logic behind his actions. Chretien was described as having 'thick-headed arrogance*(J), making a 'bullheaded chargen(J)and 'sabotaging democracy". While these articles did not explain the logic of Senate refom with much more detail than the national media, they did express the alienation and disconnection that gave nse to the issue in the first place .
CONCLUSION
The comments of joumalists in national media organizations reveal that neither the Senate eledion nor its participants were considered newsworthy. The Senate elecüon was considered a deviant and futile publicity stunt, and its actors were too marginal to be taken seriousiy. These judgments resulted in the publication of relaüvely few stories throughout the campaign.
The data from the content analysis revealed that most of the stories on the
Senate eledion appeared in the Alberta media. The rnost common focus of the stories 126 was the conflid between the Refonn Party and the Prime Minister, and between Premier
Ralph Klein and the Prime Minister. The federal-provincial conflict provoked by the
Senate election was not unrelated to the constituüonal issues surrounding Senate reform, but the focus of the media coverage was generally on the dramatic showdown between highly placed public officiais. The second highest number of stories questioned the legitimacy of the election. Very few of the stories focussed on the issue of Senate reform itself. The significanœ of this result is that the media were focussed on subjects that did not facilitate public debate about possible changes to the Senate.
The framing of the stories was primarily event-oriented, which further exacerbatecl the effects of the lack of issue focus in stories.
As for the tone of the news items, there were notable differences between the
Alberta press and the national press. The national media were far more likely to be critical of the Senate election than the Aiberta press. The exception to this trend was the Edmonton Journal in which 50% of stories had a negative tone. However, the highest proportion of articles in the Toronto (67%) and the Globe and Mail (45%) were critical of the Senate election.
The analysis of the use of defining and responding sources did not confirm the primary definition hypothesis. As I rnentioned in Chapter 2, the primary definition hypothesis asserts that marginal or oppositional groups are seldom used as defining sources in news articles. The Senate reform proponents were frequently used as defining sources of news stories, regardless of medium. Even in the Edmonton Sun and the Calaarv Sun, the Liberals were used as defining sources 50% of the time. A few of the actors in the Senate elecüon existed on the peripheries of power in Alberta and the 127 fad that the elecb'on was endorsed at various points by the Premier and the Onicial
Opposition gave it more credibility in the eyes of the media than other pressure groups.
However, use of Senate reform advocates as defining sources did not necessanly result in positive mverage of the eledion. This leads to the possible conclusion that the
power of 'pn'mary definition" does not carry as much significance as expected.
In terms of the discourse analysis of the national news, the significance lies in the selection of fa& and the omission of crucial elements of the story. The arguments of
the Senate election participants were not covered in much depth and were usually
discredited by joumalists for their extremism. The participants of the Senate election
were featured in news articles in a defensive position, responding to attacks against the
legitimacy of their cause. As a consequence, they were not Myable to explain the
ments of their ideas. The discourse of the Edmonton Sun and Calnaw Sun also did not
explain the rationale behind the Senate election, but instead expressed the feelings of
alienation and frustration that drove the Senate refonn movement.
The chapter that fdlows will wnclude the thesis by summarizing the findings of
the case study and discussing these findings in light of the theory and history explored
A) 'Only Reformers running for seat in the Senatea, Globe and Mail, News, Sept 1,1998, A3 B) "Refom takes on Otbwa in bid to elect Senators*, Globe and Mail, News, Sept 1, 1998, A3 C) She's a Metis acüvist, a feminist, and a Reform Party candidate", Glbbe and Mail, News, August 4,1998, A2 D) 'Sense and Sensibilii, Globe and Mail, Editorial, October 7.1 998, A16. E)" Undficial Senate Derby a Yawner', Toronto Star, News, A6, October 19, 1998. F)"Chretim Mocks Senate Vote. Albertan asked to explain comments about Gays and French.' Toronto Star, News, A6, September 24, 1998. G) 'Chretien should not give up the right to pick Senators." Toronto Star, Opinion, A21, September 23,1998. H) 'Democracy no joke; Albertans' vote in Senate election will show we're not going to give up. Calgav Sun, Editorial, October 11, 1998, C6. ltem 10, 1) PM blittles Senate elections; Reformers Grill Chretien on Inaction. Calgary Sun, News, Sept27, C3. ltem 14 J) Divide and Conquer Theory has Jean Chretien Scaring the Rest of Canada into Voting Liberal. Calgary Sun, Editorial, Sept. 23, 1998, pl5. ltem 15 K) Senate Cheek; Chretien Crudely Demonstrates the Buliying Powers of Ottawa. Calgary Sun, Editorial, Sept 20, 1998, C6. ltem 19. 1) 'Chretien's Senate Move a Provocation." Edmonton Sun, Editorial, September 18, 1998, pl1. M) 'Ifs De-mock-racy." Edmonton Sun, EditoriallOpinion, September 18, pl0. N) "A Slap in the FacewOutrage greets PM'S Senate appointment. Edmonton Sun, News, Sept 18, p.3
1. Interview, December 1, 1998.
2. Interview, December 18, 1998.
3. Inteiview, December 1, 1998.
4. Intenriew, December 15, 1998.
5. Interview, December 18, 1998.
6. Inte~kw,December 18, 1998.
7. Interview, December 18, 1998.
8. Intewiew, December 15, 1998.
9. Michael CIow and Susan Machum.(1993) Stifhg Debate: Canadian Newspapers and Nuclear Power. Hal-rfax: Femwood.
10. Michael CIow et al (1993), pg40. 11. Shanto lyengar. 1s Aqmne Responsible? How Television Frames Polifical Issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 12.
12. Teun Van Dijk (1991). The tnterdisciplinary Study of News as Discourse," In Jenson, K, Jan kowski, N. (eds) A Handbook of Qualitative Methodologies for Mass Communl'cation Research. New York: Routledge, pgll4.
13. Marieke De Goede. 'tdeoiogy in the U.S. Welfare debate: neo-liberal representations of poverty." Discourse and Society, Vol. 7 (3), 1996, p.331.
14. lbid, pp331- 332.
15. Michael Clow, p. 59.
16. Ken Vincent 'Tb Limits of Populisrn: Building an Ecological Society. Canadian Dimension, May 2000, p. 29. CWER6: CONCLUSION "THE WEST WANTS IN - TO WHAT?" '
The Senate election was a challenge to the dominant hegemony that was undermined by shifüng political alliances and idecilogies. At the time of the 1998 Senate election, the political alliances that underpinnecl western opposition to the dominant hegemony were in the process of rwnfiguration. The social and political forces in
Alberta had shifted and the base of support for the Reform Paity was divided between those who wanted to form a goveming coalition to defeat the Liberals and those who wanted the party to continue to represent regional interests. The Reform Party was contemplating the rearrangement of ideological elements in order to construct an ideology capable of achieving a hegemonic position for the party.
This rearrangement involved the removal of the more 'radical" western elements from the platforrn, such as the Triple E Senate, opposition to official bilingualism, and some elements of the -al conservative plaffom. Thus, the Senate election was sacrificeci in the struggle for a hegemonic position. While ideological shifts were occumng within the western dite in Alberta, the Liberal Party had also readjusted its ideological domain. The Liberal govemment had reinforceci its hegemonic position by articulating the ideological elements of the Refom Party's platforni to its own discourse.
These elements included fiscal conservatism, deficit reduction, tax teduction and a hard
Iine stance on national unity. The repositioning of the Liberal Party to incorporate the
'Roger Gibbins, Interview, Febniary, 1998. 131 grievances of the disenchanteci rigM reduced the force of the Refonn Party as a munter- movement
The Senate reform movement was a counter-hegemonic movement without the strength or support needed to pose a threat to the dominant hegemony. The govemment was well entrenched in a dominant position that enabled it to subvert and domestkate challenges to its legitimacy. In the absence of an organic crisis, the counter-movement was not in a position to develop a convincing ideology to challenge the hegemony of the Liberal Party and esbblished poiitïcal institutions. In addition to this, the social antaganism expressed by the Senate reform movement no longer had political relevance. In the political discourse of Alberta, western alienation had been disarticulated from Senate reform, and the ideological cornponents of westem aiienation itseff were sepamting into their constituent parts. Political leaders in the Refom Party were abandoning the antagonisms with the east express& by western alienation in favour of a new discourse that wuld capture central Canada. While there was stilI an antagonisrn with the federal govemment and mentment about exclusion from positions of merin Ottawa, the divide between the west and the east had becorne smaller ideologically. As a consequenœ, the demand for irnpruved regional representation was not as pronouncd as it had ken in times of economic and political crisis.
This Senate election illustrates the uneasy political alliances forged between
poktical parties and movements in a hegemonic tvar of position'. A signifiant
argument in the Iiterature on social and political movements contends that movements
operate within political opportunity structures cfeated by aliiances and conflicts with
other political adors, political parties and governments. The Senate election created a 137 very unfavourable 'pdical opportunity structureu that undemineci the ability of the
Refom Party to reposition itseif nationally and led the provincial govemment to approve of an eledion in Midi it had no interest. Thes8 unpredided conflicts of interest among the vanous political factions that participated in the Senate election contributed ta the disintegration of the campaign.
The campaign was negatively irnpacted by a number of confounding variables.
The Senate eleâion campaign was an event staged by a movernent in decline with participants who had liffle investrnent Additionally, the Senate election was called because of the expiry of the Senatorial Seledion Ad of 1989, not because of a crisis of representation or a resurgence of western alienation. Unlike the previous events staged to forward the cause of Senate reform, this election seemed arbitrarily pulled together by the Reform Party, the provincial govemment and the Canada West
Foundation. A careful analysis of the interviews with Reform Party members suggests that the Refom Party's objective in participating in the Senate eiection campaign was not to democratize the Senate, but to gain a vantage point from which to discredit the
'Teflon Liberals". White the Senate election appeased the party's are supporters in
Alberta, it dearly interfered with the party's abilÎty to gain the acœptance in Ontario that
was necessary to fom a governing coalition. Thus, the message that was constiucted
for the campaign focussed on the anti-demcmatic qualities of ttie Liberals ramer than the
advantages of reforming the Senate. It was also apparent that the party did not develop
a strategy to alter the message for the national audience and the Alberta audience, and
they also did not target specific media organizations outside of Alberta. The
msequenœ of the la& of consideration given to media mverage was that they were 133 unable to broaden the base of support for the 'Triple E Senate". Because seven out of ten provinces with over 50% of the population would be necessary to implement a constitutional amendment, more exposure in the national media would have been required for coalition-building. However, the haphazard strategy displayed in the election was due to the incompatibility of the eledion with the ambitions of the Reform
Party to advance the United Alternative initiative. The Senate election was subsequently
'orphaned" at a relatively early phase.
After the Reform Party's departure, the Canada West Foundation was left with the task of publicking an election that was already mndemned in the court of public opinion. In contrast with the Reform Party's campaign strategy, the Canada West
Foundation developed a strategy that sought to explain the philoçophy behind the
Senate election and the advantages of a reformed Senate. The two different messages conveyed ttirough the media by the Reform Party and the Canada West Foundation gave the campaign inconsistency and violated the golden rule of mnçttucting campaign messages. Effective political campaigns require the repetiüon of a single, simple message that will drown out competing messages. The Canada West Foundation consequently could not dispel the 'mmmon sense" that the election was not a legitimate cause.
According to Senate reformers who have been behind the Senate reforrn movement since its inœption, Senate reform has ahmys been a dificult sel1 to the media regardles of timing, strategy or endorsement Even during the first Senate election that featured the participation of al1 political parties, the press reacted adversely to attempts to change the institutional status quo. The major strategic flaw of the 1998 Senate eledion was sbging the carnpaign in absence of public discontent or a crisis of representation. Preston Manning once said that his strategy amounted to 'waiting for a wave of public discontent? Senate reform proponents were not riding a wave of public discontent when they decidecl to cal1 the eledion, and as a consequenœ, they conducted a campaign that presented a solution without there being a cornmon perception that there was a problem.
WNi regard to the media analysis of the Senate election, the media coverage confimis the premises of hegemonic theories of news production. Hegemonic theories of news production have stipulated that journalistic noms and news frames inhibit the widespread circulation of oppositional ideas that threaten entrenched systems of power.
Thus, as the Senate election was an event staged by a counter-hegernonic movement, it would not be able to penetrate the news net. While the Senate eledh did generate sorne news, the resufts of the intetviews conducted for this thesis indicate that joumalists in the national media were tesistant to the Senate election initiative.
Journalists reacted to the unorthodox institutional tactic of the Senate election as an attempt to circumvent the legal system. They also did not perceive Senate refom to be an important issue that was likely to receive attention from the governing Liberals.
Further, the participants in the Senate election did not have the necessary placement in the hierarchy of source credibility to bring this unpopular issue to centre stage.
Stuart Hall's primary definition hypothesis addresses the implications of the placement of political actors within hierarchies of credibility. The power of 'primary 135 definition' enabies an insular group of dite pol&cal actors to determine how a political problern is interpreted and defined in subsequent discussions. PreSenate election sources were the defining sources in at least 50% of news stories in both the national and Alberta media. Indeed, Ralph Klein was one of the main pro-Senate eledion defining sources used in these stories. Stones that were defined by prc4enate eIedion sources, however, were not framed using the ternis or arguments of Senate eIection
participants, and their account of the issues was not presented in much depth. Further,
the use of pro-Senate election defining sources did not necessarily result in positive
news stories about the event This finding could suggest that 'primary definition" does
not carry as rnuch weight as the theory contends. The act of "making news" did not give
the Senate election credibility and did not set the course for a public debate on the issues
that it raised.
The connedion between the Senate election and politicians in power was an
important determinant of the newsworthiness of the campaign. While Ralph Klein was a
peripheral actor in the campaign and did not make many statements to support it, he
was quoted as a defining source with greater frequency than any of the other campaign
participants. A disproportionate amount of attention was given to Ralph Klein as
opposed to the candidates, the Canada West Foundation and other supporters. Not only
were Ralph Klein, Stockwell Day and Preston Manning 'defining sources", their public
statements gave the Senate election eligibility as 'news". This finding confirms the
cntical theories advanced by Hackett (1Wl,l W8), Bennett (1996) and Cook (1 998) that
contend that the fundion af news is to publicire the adivities of officialdom. Stories,
events or opinions had to be sanctioned by official actors in order to be deemed newsworthy.
As for the media sample, the content analysis revealed that only 126 items were published or aired in eight media outlets that were surveyed during the course of the campaign. 16% of stories in the entire sample appeared in the national media, while 84% were featured in the Alberta media . These results mnfinned that the issue of Senate
reform did nat penetrate either the national media agenda or the national political
agenda. Fumer, the range of topic categories, which were for the most part irrelevant
to the question of Senate refom, indicates that the message of the campaign
participants did not pass through media filters. The stories in the national media about
the Senate election focussed on the more "newsworthy" aspects of the federal-provincial
confîict between Ralph Klein and Jean Chretien that were unrelated to Senate reform.
This finding confirms the findings of Hackett's examination of the peace movement, and
Clow's examination of the antiiiudear power movement, wtiich argue that the media
reduces political issues to pariiamentary conflicts. Grassroots movements, activists,
and citizens are marginalized Mile political adivity is circum~c~bedto an elite circie of
politicians. In this particular case, however, the legitirnacy of the movement for Senate
reform was directiy challenged by the media. The questions surrounding the fegitimacy
of the election were so prevalent in the media that the 'legitimacf of the election became
its own topic categary. Neither the issue of Senate refom nor campaign events were the
main focus of news items.
With regard to theories of news framing, the eledion clearly sufkred from the
inapplicabiiii of the more cornmon news frames to the event The conventions of
election reporting often provide a limited scope within which to examine political events 137 and policy issues. The story of the Senate election did not have a human interest angle, and it did not comply with the requirements of the "home racenframe or 'personaliredm frame which are typically applied to political stories. Media coverage in most eldons is priman'ly devoted to assessments of which candidate is winning or losing and which strategies have been effectively deployed to defeat opponents. However, the 'Ottawa versus Alberta" antagonism that edipsed the campaign at the time of the appointment of Doug Roche did conform to the 'conflict' frame. The conflict between Ralph Klein and the Prime Minister and the Reform Party and the Prime Minister propelled the storj to the front pages of the Globe and Mail, the Calgarv Herald and the Edmonton Journal .
Sinœ the Senate election could not fit into the more dramatic news frarnes, it lost its value to the press, and as a consequence it lost some of its political value. Addiionally, the preponderance of the use of eventdriented Frames in news stories was a signifiant obstacle to the explanation of a complex constitutional issue and an unorthodox political strategy to the public. These findings point to the increasing importance of journalistic values over political values in the determination of issues of public importance. Since journalistic values undervalue and sometimes curtail the reporting of the more complex
political questions, this trend could have a negative impact on the organization of politics.
The resuits of the discourse analysis reveal a focus on topics that did not
enhanœ the image of the Senate election or validate the cause of Senate reform. The
high points of media coverage during the law suit against the Prime Minister and the
appointment of Doug Rodie drew attention to the conflid between high profile politial
personalities, but drowned out the message of the campaign. The debate about Senate
rehin the national media did not progress beyond the contested legib'macy of the 138 political adors in the Senate eledion and their unorthodox methods. The Senate election was denounced on the basis of the authonty of politicians in Ottawa without acknowiedgement of the grievances that gave rise to it in the first place. The news discourse did not illustrate a stniggle between opposing visions of federalism, but rather a defenœ of the constitubonal powers of the PrÏme Minister and the instituüonal status quo. Joumalists began with the assumption that the ideas or proposais that emerged ftom the dedion were from the 'fringesw of national political Me and were not worthy of attention. The onus was upon Senate refonn advocates to justify their methods, their rationale, and their adversarial stance toward the federal government
The ways in which reporters spoke in interviews about the campaign participants reveal similarities with the stniggles of a number of other political movements.
Journalists frequently stated that Alberta protest movements and Reform Party members did not understand Canadian values, the constituüonal process, or what it means to be a part of a goveming coalition. It is frequently charged that opposition movements do not understand the political and economic systems, and policies that they challenge.
These findings suggest that joumalists report from the perspective of the political actors that hold power. The vision of -ety that infiltrates journalistic accounts is coloured by the networks of power in which they operate, but that is nonetheless understood to be the taken-for-granteci, common sense reality.
METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS 139 While there are advantages tu the tnangulah employed in this case study, the methodology had some limitations. The intensive interviews were dependent upon the memory and knowiedge levels of the participants. There were some questions that study participants could not answer, and there were a number of different wayç that the data from the interviews could be interpreted. Further, sorne data was not available for analysis. The transcripts of local radio coverage were ndavailable, and the five stories aired on C8C tocat tetevision were aiso inaccessible. In al1 three parts of the data coilection, subjective judgernents were involved in the categorization and interpretation of the data. However. a degree of subjectivity is inherent in these methodologies and is difficult to avoid.
The 1998 Senate election was not as appropriate for the examination of the relationship belmen Alberta's Senate refom movement and the media as the Senate elecüon of 1989 had been. The movement for Senate reform was gaining rnomentum in
1989, and it was in a state of dedine in 1998. White the recency of the 1998 Senate election allowed for detailed observations of the relationship ôe-n a movement and the media at a pivotal stage in its trajectory, the political actors who supported Senate refom had tess conviction than they did in 1989, and the force of public opinion was flot behind the issue. Adâiially, sine the Senate election lacked the trappings of a 'ml" election, it was difficult to establish the guidelines for how the media should have dealt with it The prorganization of the campaign, the lack of participation of other political parties in the election, and the dedine of interest in the campaign by its managers were intervening variables in the analysis of the treafment of the story in botti the national and the Alberta media. - f UTURE DIRECTIONS
A fumer area of inquiry might be the portmyal of the 'United Alternativem movement in the Ontario media. and the stniggle of the Canadian Alliance Party with the media in Ontario. The number of stories menabout the formation of the Canadian
Alliance was referred to by one joumalist as the 'Great Tree Sacrifi~e".~Hawever, in spite of the proliferation of stories in the national media and the media in central Canada, most of the coverage was highly ctitical of the movement. Another research direction might be a comparative study of political movements on the left and right of the political spectrum to analyse the difference between the way in which the media covers the actors from both margins. A direct cornparison between movements with different ideological orientations and their iNeractic?nswith the media would add to Our knowledge about how political values and biases shape press coverage and filter issues of public importance.
THE OEAD END OF SENATE REFORM?
AIthough 542 000 Albertans voted for Senators-in-waiting Ted Morton and Bert
Brown, they still have not been appointed. This outcorne owes as much perhaps to the dimate of the New Wesf as it does to the mistance of vested interests to Senate reform. The consensus that Senate refonn was the solution to the political probtems in
Alberta was broken by the political and ecxznomic changes brought by globalkation.
The regulatory fiamework esbblished under international trade agreements in the new global economy asserts the supremacy of market forces and mtrids government intervention in the national economy that has been a cuntentious issue with western protest movements for decades. Addinally. the Refotm Party had becorne a more powerfut vehide for the representation of western interests after it became the Official
Opposition Party in the House of Commons. The "Triple E' Senate had significanœ as an historic syrnbol in Alberta but not as a political direction for the future. The new vehicies designateci for western ambitions are devolution of federal powers to provincial govemments and the election of a Canadian Alliance govemment federally. The failure of the Canadian Alliance to win more than hm seats east of the Manitoba border in the
Federal Election Campaign in 2000 demonstrates that in spite of the altered party platform. the party has not succeeded in bridging the cultural and political divide with the test of Canada. The defeat of yet another western party has brought westem dienation to the forefront of Alberta politics once again and has opened an avenue for new political strategies.
The adverse reaction in central Canada to the Canadian AIliance Party and its predecessor, the Reform Party, has some reiationship to the readion to the Senate election. Joe Clark stated in an editorial in the Globe and Mail that:
'At its are, the Alliance party is way over the edge of Canadian politics. Their confusion about health Gare, oid age security, referendums, immigration, federalism, and the equaiiity of Canadians reaffirmed their reputation as a party that cannot be tnrsted wiîh basic Canadian values. Mr. Day took the rap - but the real problem is that this party's vision is too narrow for this big country.n4
The idea that western political reforms are " way over the edge" has been commonly expressed by national joumalists and other members of the central Canadian 142 establishment When the Refm Party emerged on the national scene, it raidpolitical probtems and solutions 'foreign" to Canadians outside of Alberta. The gap in consciousness between Alberta political movements and central Canada is produceci as much by distance, culture, and history as by ideological diierences. A recent survey indicated that westerners do nat necessarily hold more right-wing views than their counterparts in Ontario. The political culture of Alberta develuped and evolved in isolation from the dominant culture of central Canada which resulted in a different understanding of the Canadian political situation. Political movements from Alberta continue to reject the status quo and are rejeded in turn by the eiiiand the electorate in central Canada.
This thesis illustrates the extent to which 'political opportunity structures" created by political alliances, and ideologies with the capacity to span difierent social factions, are major factors in the sucœss of political movernents. The aversion of the national political elite to political, economic and constitutional refomis proposed by movements ftom Alberta is not derived from 'misoommunicatÏonWin the media. Rather, the movement for Senate reform, among other Alberta protest movements, has simply not been able bridge the gap in consciousness with the national culture. They have not constmcted a dimurse that can demonstrate the relevance of their 'big, bold ideas for how the country should be rttnn.8
The unwillingness or inability of the western opposition to incorporate ideological elernents in their discourses that have relevanœ in central Canada constitutes a bamer to the acceptance of their ideas. The la& of comrnonality in ideological constructs only exacerbates the estrangement of these movements from Ottawa and their friction with 143 the 'common serise' of prevaient ideologies. Even with finanaal backing and the endorsement of the Premier of Aiberta and the Official Opposition, the Senate election was still not able to acquire credibility. This may point to the increased importance of the role of ideological positioning over access to economic or political resources in the success of counter-movements.
This thesis confimis the findings of other research on the relationship between social movements and the media, and suggests that media openness to oppositional ideas is contingent upon the challenge that movements pose to dominant political values, the tadics they employ, and their associations with power. In contrast to the findings of studies of lefi-wing political movements, the Senate reform movement was more visible in the media. While Senate reform advocates did not acquire agenda- setting power and failed to assert the importance of their cause, left-wing movements are much more inffequently quoted in the media whidi renders them invisible in prominent political circles. However, the visibility of the Senate election came at the phce of credibiiii. Regardless of the origin of political movements, the media is a 'site of contestationw7that tends to resist challenges to the political system.
ENDNOTES
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6. Preston Manning on CBC's 'The Nationalw,Febnrary 8,2001.
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The 1998 Senate Election Chronoloay
With knowledge that the Senatonal Selection Act of 1989 was about to expire, Bert Brown, David Elton and Peter McCormack apprrzached Premier Ralph Klein in the winter of 1998 with a plan for the second Senate election in Alberta. The plan was originally devised to el& 4 Senatokin-waiting who would have offices, support staff, and salaries in order to monitor the activities of the Senate until a vacancy became available.
On March 5, 1998, Ralph Klein received consent from his caucus to proceed with a modified, less extravagant plan for the Senate election. Premier Klein agreed to the elecüon of 2 Senators-in-waiting in a province-wide vote on October 19, 1998, but he decided that the Senators4n-waiting would not have salaries and offices. Further, Klein decided not to run candidates in the election.
The Reform Party was the only political party in the province to field candidates in the Senate election. There were 8 candidates running for Senator-in-waiting positions on the Reform Party ballot:
Betty Unger: a nurse from Northem Alberta. Ms. Unger started a nursing service company that had offices in Edmonton and Calgary, and continued on as a management and marketing consultant for the company after it was sald.
Bruce Blumell: held an L.L.B. and a Phu. Mr. Blumell was a prominent anti-gambling activist and a vocal opponent of Video Lottery Teminals.
Bert Brown: was a candidate in both the Senate election of 1989 and 1998. Mr. Brown operates a family farm near Kathryn and was the founder of the Canadian Cornmittee for a Triple E Senate in 1983. He has actively promoted the 'Triple E" concept sinœ that time.
Vance Gogh: had an MBA from the University of Calgary, and was a Senior Development Officer for the Entrepreneurship and Management Project Centre at the University of Calgary.
Wayne Bourke: a construction worker in favour of abolishing the Senate.
Ted Morton: Professor of Political Science at the University of Calgary. Dr. Morton was a constitutional expert and critic of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Exeudive Diredor of Alberta Cikens against Prisoner Voting, the Alberta Civil Society Association, and the Director of Civitas in 1998.
Deborah Hanly: Metis, fminist and tax lawyer from Syivan Lake, Alberta. Ms. Hanly was in favour of tax redudion, state recognition of property rigMs and increased transparency in govemment.
Barbara Waters: widow of Stan Waters, Canada's first elected Senator. Mrs. Waters dropped out of the Senate race on August 20, 1998, due to pwr health.
On August 28, 1998, Alberta Senator Jean Forest injected a jolt of energy into the Senate campaign when she resigned her seat in the Senate. On the same day, the Refotm Party asked the Federal Court to grant an injunction to prevent the Prime Minister hmappointing a Senator until after the election. On September la,1998, the Federal Court ruled against the injuncüon.
On September 12,1998, two Refom Senate candidates, Ted Morton and Bert Brown, were selected at the Refom Party Nomination Meeting in Red Deer, Afberta.
The two independent candidates who ran in the Senate race were Guy Desrosiers and Vance Gogh. Guy Desrosiers was a self-employed computer consultant from Edmonton with a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Alberta.
Vance Gogh entered the race as an independent candidate after tfie two Refotm candidates were seleded on September 12m, 1998. Guy Desrosiers contested Mr. Gogh's status as an independent candidate in court, but lost on September 30, 1998.
On September 17,1998, Prime Minister Jean Chretien induced outrage when he appointed Doug Roche to the Senate, approximately one month More the Senate vote. Premier Ralph Klein wrote a letter to the Prime Minister, and the story was propelled to the front page of the Globe and Mail and most Alberta newspapers.
On October 19, 1998, 542 000 Albertans voted in the Senate election, which was held in conjunction with the municipal elections and the Video Lottery Terminal piebiscite. Bert Brown was elected with 332,985 votes and Ted Morton was elected with 274 190 votes.
Neither Bert Brown nor Ted Morton have been appointed to the Senate. mdixof Artides used in the Content Analvsis
Alberta Rewrt 1. Editorial, Sept 14, 1998, p4. 2. "My, My, Nancy Macbeth, how you've changed, but watch out, busemaybe Nick hasn'tw Colurnn, Sept 14. 1998, p44. 3. 'A Growing Appetite for Democracy', News, Oct, 5,1998, p.9. 4. 'Why Jean Chretien genuinely fears Alberta's curious Senate Election." News, Od 19, 1998, p. 52. 5. 'Jean Chretien's Forest Fire," News, Sept 14, 1998, p.6.
Calaarv Sun 6. 'Senator Suing Reform Mernbers," Oct 21,98, News, p. 22. 7. 'PM dismises Seriate Vote; Calgary MP demands apology." News, Oct 21, 98, p. 1O 8. 'Reformers lead vote for Senate; Future Uncertain,' News, Oct 20, 98, p42. 9. 'Grit brushes off Senate Vote; Eledion Called Waste of Tirne,"News, Oct 18, p20. 10. 'Democracy no joke; Albertans' Vote in Senate election will show we're not going to give up." Editorial, Oct 11, 98, C6. 11. 'Elected Senate Drive Headed for the Hill." News, Oct 08, 98, p.27. 12. 'Senate gets in its digs; Alberta Reform Candidates find there is no room at the Inn," Editorial, p 15, Sept 29, 98. 13. 'No Friend of the Dawntrodden if Chretien had been Prime Minister in the 80's. Mandela Might Still Be in Jail." Editorieal, Sept 27, 98, C3. 14. 'PM Beliies Senate Elections; Reformes Grill Chretien on inaction." News, Sept. 24, 98, p5. 15. 'Divide and Conquer Theory Has Jean Chretien Scanng Rest of Canada into Voting Liberal." Editorial, Sept 23,98, pl5. 16. 'Newest Senator Snubbed Manning Not Impressed." News, Sept 23.98, p4. 17. 'Reform Says Appointment Gutless." News, Sept 22, 98, p7. 18. 'People Have Spoken Albertans Hope To Force PM'S Hand on Upper Chamber." News, Sept 21,98, p4. 19. 'Senate Cheek Chretien Crudely Demonstrates the Bullying Powers of Ottawa." Editorial, Sept 20, 98, C6. 20. 'Campaign Gains Stem Support Grows for Sun's Call for Senate Reform." News, Sept 20, 98, p5. 21. 'Last laugh Reformers want to see who is the biggest joke." News, Sept 18.98, p.5. 22. 'Summit Hit New Law.* Opinion Editorial, Sept 15, 98, P.14. 23. 'Senate Slate Chosen.' News, Sept 13, p.7. 24. Promises, promises Chretien set to flipfiop on vow to Rebm Charnber of slumbering sops." Opinion-Editorial,Sept 6, Cl.
Edmonton Sun 25. 'Senate reform dogged by disgraœ." EditonaUopinion, The Province, ûct 22, pg 11. 26. ' Klein calls on Chretien to Honour Senate Vote." News, Oct 21, p22. 27. "Senator files suit against Reformer,"News, Oct 21, p16. 28. "Senate Vote : It's no about vuho wins, but who cares." News, Oct 18, p32. 29. 'Senate Vote 'Waste'. News, ûcî 18, p4. 30. 'Reform needs to reforrn itself." EdÎtorial, Od 14, pl1. 31. 'One man died, one man survived, and ... ,' Editorial, Oct 12, pl1 32. 'Gray doesn't know what he is talking about." Ediiorial, Oct 05, p. Il. 33. "Joe Mum on Senate Vote." News, Oct. 05, p.9, 34. "Socreds stir separatist pot" Editorial, Oct 04, Cl8. 35. 'Repugnant Roche." Editorial, ûct 3, p10. 36. ' Ralph raps R&e Premier respcmds to new Senator's criticisrn with Stinging Rebutta!." News, Oct 03, p5. 37. *MF Slarnmed for Senate Silence." News, Sept 29, 98, p9. 38. "Look out Ralph, Refom wants a Change.* Editorial, Sept 28, pl1. 39. 'Senate Candidates were in Ottawa." Editorial, Sept 28, pi1 . 40. ' PM Defends Senate Inadion." News, Sept 24, p30. 41. ' Preston Shuns Senator." News, Sept 23, p5. 42. 'Chretien called mardfor appointing senator." News, Sept 22, p24. 43. '"Four Eyeing Senate Posts." News, Sept 22, p24. 44. 'Where's PM'S Planr" Editorial, Sept 22, p10. 45. 'Roche makes an offer we cm refuse." News, Sept 22, p3. 46. 'Chreüen's Senate Move a Provodon." Ediorial, Sept 18, pl1. 47. 'It's Demock-racy." EditonaVOpinion, Sept 18, pl0. 48. 'A Slap in the Face" Outrage greets PM'Ssenate appointment." News, Sept 18, p3. 49. 'Appointed Advantag* Senator." News, Sept 15, pl6. 50. 'PM Gets Peppered," EditoriaVOpinion, Sept 14, p10. 51. 'Reform not giving up Senate Fight News, Sept 03, p26. 52. 'Brown touted for Senate." News, August 31, p15. 53. ' Battle over Senate Spot Reformers in Court to block PM from appointing Alberta Senator.' News, August 29, p3.
Broadsheets 54. 'Chretien mocks senate vote as candidate looks on Aibertan asked to explain comments about gays, French." Toronto Star, News, A6, Sept 24. 55. 'Reform plays hardball." Toronto Star, News, A30, Od 3. 56. ' Unofficial Senate derby a yawner,' Toronto Star, News, A6, Oct 19. 57. ' Senate joke will bad National 107. CBC 'The National", September 18, 1998. Senate refonns. 108. "She's a Metis activist, a feminist, and a Reform candidate," Globe and Mail, Cornpass, August 4,1998, A2 109. "The logic behind and elected Senate,' Globe and Mail, column, August 8, 1998, 02 110. Wallace, Bruce, ' Red Chamber Showdown." Madean's, September 21, 1998, p.24. 111. 'One day we may eiect our SenatorslmGlobe and Mail, column, August 13,1998, Al 9. 112. "Reform tried to block PM Senate Pick," Globe and Mail, News, August 29, 1998, Al. 113. ' Only Reformers running for Senate seat," Globe and Mail, News, September 1, 1998, A3. 114. 'Reform takes on Ottawa,' Gkbe and Mail, News, Septernber 1,1998, A3. 115. 'No Shortcuts to a new Senate," Globe and Mail, ediio~l,September 1, 1998, Ai4 116. 'PM can ignore vote of Senators,' Gkbe and Mail, News, Septernber 2, 1998, A3. 117. 'Klein angry as Chretien appoints Senators," Globe and Mail, News, September 18, 1998, Al. 11 8. 'Roche: Consummate Appeaser,' Globe and Mail. Column, ûctober 1, 1998, A19. 119. 'Sense and Sensibilii,' Globe and Mail, edhiaf, ûcfober 7, 1998, A16. 120. CFCN Local News, September 2,1998. 121. CFCN Local News, September 12,1998. 122. CFCN Local News, September 13,1998. 123. CFCN Local News, September 17,1998. 124. CFCN Local News, September 24,1998. 125. CFCN Local News, ûctober 16,1998. 126. CFCN Local News, Odober 20, 1998. Aktd~cam~IIi.Ss~, Macdbnakd and Sk WhW lautier- ALBERTA Cures.