Hellenistic Philosophies and the Preaching of the Resurrection (Acts 17:18, 32)

HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHIES AND THE PREACHING OF THE RESURRECTION (ACTS 17:18, 32)

N. CLAYTON CROY Decatur, GA

The Acts of the Apostles traces, somewhat sporadically, the advance of Christian missions from Jerusalem through Judea and Samaria, to Syria, Asia Minor, Greece, and ultimately to Rome, the political cen ter of the Mediterranean world. But long before the narrator reaches the great capital city, he describes the Gospel's encounter with certain pagan schools of thought in a Greek polis which in some respects could claim to be the cultural center of the Mediterranean world, Athens. This city's fame as the showpiece of Greek democracy had dimmed by the NT era, but Athens could still claim to be an important center of archi tecture, art, and philosophy. The dimension of philosophy is the chief concern of this paper. In Acts 17:16-34 Luke offers his account of Paul's brief missionary experience in Athens. The centerpiece of this passage is Paul's sermon before the Areopagus (vss. 22-31). This sermon's skilful composition starts with an acknowledgement of pagan piety, moves deftly through natural revelation, faint allusions to Jewish ideas and a quotation of Hellenistic poetry, and culminates with a message of eschatological judg ment highlighting the role of Christ and the significance of his resur rection.1 Such a combination of topoi and technique, along with the perception that Luke is here presenting a paradigm of Paul's mission ary preaching to Gentiles, has rightfully elevated this passage to one of celebrated status. With fame comes the attention of many expositors. "Probably no ten verses in the Acts of the Aposdes have formed the text for such an abundance of commentary as has gathered round Paul's Areopagitica"2

1 For a recent analysis of the structure -of the speeches in Acts, see Marion L. Soards, The Speeches in Acts. Their Content, Context, and Concerns (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1994). For a rhetorical analysis, see Karl Olav Sandnes, "Paul and Socrates: the Aim of Paul's Areopagus Speech," JSNT 50 (1993) 13-26. 2 F.F. Bruce, Commentary on the Book of the Acts (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981) 353.

This study does not attempt to add to the vast scholarship focusing on the sermon itself. I do, however, wish to examine a closely related issue, namely the hearers of the sermon and their responses. A rhetor ical setting has at least three foci: the speaker, the message, and the audience; my primary interest is the audience. The portions of the text which will receive the greatest attention are therefore those which bracket the sermon, vss. 16-21 and 32-34. After examining the general setting and the description of the audience in vss. 16-21, I will con sider two specific questions arising from vss. 32-34. They are: (1) How should we understand the two responses mentioned in vs. 32? and (2) Do these two responses correspond to the two philosophical schools rep resented in the crowd, i.e. the Epicureans and Stoics (vs. 18)?

The Setting and the Audience

Luke devotes a considerable number of words to introducing this important speech. According to his account, Paul had been escorted to Athens from Beroea after Jewish opposition had made further ministry in Beroea impractical; Silas and Timothy had remained behind (vs. 14). While Paul awaited his friends' arrival he became aware of Athen's extensive religious iconography. The idols which filled the city were a source of vexation to the strict, monotheistic apostle. This depiction of Athenian religion anticipates the exordium of Paul's sermon (vss. 22- 23), in which the city's many idols serve as a springboard for the preach ing of the Christian gospel.3 There were two arenas for Paul's preaching in Athens: the syna gogue and the marketplace (vs. 17). The former was Paul's typical, evangelistic strategy upon entering a new city; in the present context, however, the author's concern is the latter. It is not the encounter with Jews and "godfearers" which Luke amplifies in the remainder of Acts 17, but^rather the encounter in the marketplace (αγορά)4 with "those who happened to be present" (τους παρατυγχάνοντας).

Ned Stonehouse [Paul Before the Areopagus and Other New Testament Studies (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957) 1] employs great understatement in calling it "not... a largely neglected field of investigation." 3 On which, see D. Zweck, "The Exordium of the Areopagus Speech, Acts 17.22, 23," NTS 35 (1989) 94-103. 4 Probably the pottery market (Κεραμεικός), the center of public life in Athens. See Ernst Haenchen, Die Apostelgeschichte (MeyerK; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968) 454, η. 8 [ET « The Acts of the Apostles (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971) 517, n. 8]; also BAGD, 12. HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHIES AND RESURRECTION 23

In vs. 18 Luke introduces specific groups in the marketplace crowd, namely Epicurean and Stoic philosophers. Both of these rival schools traced their origins to late fourth century B.C.E. Athens. In 306 Epicurus established the school named after him in what became known as "the Garden," a plot of ground northwest of the city. At about the same time, the foundations of Stoicism were laid by Zeno of Citium, who had come to Athens in 313. Members of these two philosophical schools were present in Paul's audience and engaged him in conversation. Already the reaction seems to take two different forms. Some (τίνες) asked disparagingly,5 "What does this babbler wish to say?"6 Paul is condescendingly referred to as a σπερμολόγος, an idle and worthless character who collects the "scraps" of others' ideas and disseminates them.7 Other people in the audience (οι δε) respond differendy saying, "He seems to be a preacher of for eign divinities." Luke explains this remark by saying that Paul was preaching Jesus and the Resurrection. The causal link (δτι) between the two clauses (18c and d) and the emphatic position of "foreign divini ties" suggests that 'Jesus and the Resurrection" are, in fact, the foreign divinities.8 "Jesus" could easily have been associated with Ίησώ (or Ίασώ), daughter of Aesculapius and goddess of healing.9 Άνάστασις, which would not have conveyed its Christian meaning to Greek philoso phers, might also be construed as the name of a deity. The tone of the second response differs from the first.10 The first is unmistakably negative; it makes light of the apostle and his message. The second response is by no means a rousing commendation of the

5 Not only does the following epithet involve disparagement, but the demonstrative ούτος is contemptuous (cf. Latin iste). See BDF, §290 (6). 6 This response is stylistically shaped for its cultured Athenian speakers by means of a potential optative. See BDF, §385 (1). 7 See Haenchen, Apostelgeschichte, 455, n. 3 [ET « 517, n. 11], and BAG, 762. 8 Haenchen, Apostelgeschichte, 455, n. 5 [ET « 518, n. 1], notes that this interpreta tion appears first with Chrysostom, and has been adopted by a number of modern scholars. See, for example, J.H. Maclean, "St. Paul at Athens," ET 44 (1932-33) 550. For the contrary argument that only Jesus is in view and the plural "deities" is merely stylistic, see K.L. McKay, "Foreign Gods Identified in Acts 17:18?" TynBul 45.2 (1994) 411-12. McKay's argument depends, however, on his view of what would have been plausible language for Paul's actual speech rather than the language that Luke has man ifestly used in portraying the scene. 9 Bruce, Commentary, 351, n. 21. See LSJ, 816. 10 Bruce, Commentary, 351, writes, "Stoics and Epicureans alike, much as they might differ from each other, agreed at least in this, that the new-fangled message brought by this Jew of Tarsus was not one that could appeal to reasonable men." But this com ment blurs the distinction between the two reactions and may be too negative with respect to the second. 24 Ν. CLAYTON CROY

Gospel, but neither does it have a scoffing tone. It reveals perplexity at this new proclamation and may even betray a touch of curiosity.11 The correlation of the clauses (και τίνες... οι δέ) also implies that the responses are different (without, of course, requiring them to be opposite). In either case the sermon was provocative. The crowd is not con tent with a little verbal repartee; they take hold of12 Paul and escort him to the Areopagus for a more careful hearing. Two closely related issues in this passage which have occasioned much discussion are the exact character of this hearing and the very meaning of the word "Areopagus" in this context. The hearing is thought by some13 to be virtually a trial, but the language in vss. 19f. favors something less for mal. The motivation is the desire "to know" or "understand" (γνώναι, twice) the "new teaching," the "surprising things" which Paul is pro claiming. There is no reference to a legal accusation. Furthermore, Luke's editorial remark in vs. 21 clearly understands the scene as stem ming from the Athenians' proverbial curiosity, not their litigiousness. "At issue here is not a legal problem, but an epistemological one."14 The second issue concerns the term "Αρειος πάγος. Literally "the hill of Ares," this term referred first to the rocky outcropping northwest of the Acropolis, but also denoted the Council which met there.15 But the Council also met in other locations, such as the Stoa Basileios.16 Certain

11 Granted, any interest at this point is latent, but the following verses will bear out this interpretation. Furthermore, the charge of proclaiming "foreign deities" surely must eau to mind the trial of Socrates. If so, an allusion to such a character in the mouth of first century Greek philosophers could hardly have been contemptuous. See Soards, Speeches, 96, and Sandnes, "Paul and Socrates," 20-24, especially 20, n. 16. 12 The verb έπιλαβόμενοι probably involves no hostility here, though it certainly may in other contexts. Cf. Acts 16:19. 13 See those listed in Haenchen, Apostelgeschichte, 456, η. 3 [ET * 518, η. 5]. 14 Hans Conzelmann, Die Apostelgeschichte (TüMngen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1972) 106; [ET - Acts of the Apostles (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 140]. Conzelmann remarks [106; ET - 139] that "Luke makes it very clear when he is describing a trial." λνΐΐη^ηι Ramsay [SL Paul the Traveller and the Roman Citizen (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980) 243] agrees that it is not a trial: "In the proceedings there is nothing of a judicial type, no accuser, no accusation, and no defensive character in Paul's speech." See also Bertil Gartner, The Areopagus Speech and Natural Revelation (Uppsala: Gleerup, 1955) 52-65. 15 See Cicero, Ad Atticum 1.14.5; and De Natura Deorum 2.29.74. 16 [Ps.] Demosthenes, 25.23, 'The Council of the Areopagus, when it sits roped off in the King's Portico, enjoys complete freedom from disturbance, and all men hold aloof." Excavations in the Agora had originally suggested the possibility that the Stoa Basileios was not an independent structure, but ought to be identified with the Stoa of Zeus. But a new phase of excavation begun in 1970 yielded as its first fruits, the dis covery of the architectural remains of the Stoa Basileios. See Homer A. Thompson and R.E. Wycherley, The Athenian Agora, ΧΠ] The Agora of Athens (Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1972) 83-90. HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHIES AND RESURRECTION 25 linguistic factors in the present passage favor interpreting "Αρειος πάγος as the Council rather than the hill.17 Luke frequently uses επί with the accusative to denote the person(s) before whom someone is brought (Luke 12:58; 21:12; 23:1; Acts 9:21; 17:6; 25:12; and especially 16:19).18 Hence, the language of 19a by no means requires "the Hill of Ares" to be understood. Secondly, the language of vs. 22, σταθείς δε [ό] Παύλος εν μέσφ του Αρείου Πάγου, favors the "Council" rather than the "hill."19 "In the midst of the Counar is more sensible Greek and cor relates better with the similar expression in vs. 33, οΰτως ό Παύλος έξήλθεν εκ μέσου αυτών, which clearly refers to the people. Certainty in this matter is unattainable, but the Royal Stoa seems to be a more likely setting for the speech than Mars Hill.20 The final verse of the introduction (vs. 21) is an aside by the author in which he portrays the "hearing" underway as highly typical of Athenian life. Eduard Norden described this verse as "the most Attic thing in the New Testament."21 Indeed, the curiosity of the Athenians was proverbial. Among others, Thucydides in the 5th century B.C.E. and Demosthenes in the 4th refer to the Athenian fondness for gos sip.22 This element in Luke's description may derive from a literary knowledge of the city rather than personal experience. It is only nat ural that his description would gather up "features which were known to be characteristic of Athens."23 It does not follow, however, that the entire event is a literary composition.24 But the purpose of this study

17 BAG, 105, also 288, HE, 1, a, γ. 18 Less often επί occurs with the accusative of the place to which one is brought (Luke 12:11, Acts 18:12). 19 Ramsay, St. Paul, 245. 20 George A. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1984) 129. Also Gerhard ArKrodel, Acts—Augsburg Commentary on the New Testament (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1986) 326-7. Although A.D. Nock ["The Book of Acts," in Essays on Religion and the Ancient World, ed. Ζ. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972) 831; or Gnomon 25 (1953) 506] thinks the question of place may be theoretical, he nevertheless finds the image of the Athenians escorting Paul to Mars' Hill to be odd: "Why on earth should men take Paul to this hill? Any Stoa was more convenient." Stonehouse, Paul Before the Areopagus, 9, n. 7, mentions a further argu ment: "The designation of Dionysius the Areopagite, that is, as a member of the coun cil, is most intelligible on the understanding that the council has been referred to in the preceding context." 21 Eduard Norden, Agnostos Theos (Berlin, 1913) 333, cited in Bruce, Commentary, 352. 22 Thucydides, 3.38.5; Demosthenes, Oratio 4.10. 23 Haenchen, Apostelgeschichte, 457 [ET - 520]. 24 Conzelmann [Apostelgeschichte, 105-6; ET « 139] writes, "The scene is supplied with local color; for that reason it should be seen as a literary creation In general, the whole scene—as a redactional creation—should not be interpreted as a supposedly 26 Ν. CLAYTON CROY is not to re-investigate the historicity of the scene or the authenticity of the speech, both of which have been discussed at length.25 My con cerns, as stated above, are the reactions to Paul's address and the rela tionship of those reactions to the schools of Hellenistic philosophy men tioned in vs. 18.

The Reactions to Paul's Address

The apostle's sermon begins with an attempt to secure the good will of his hearers, in this case by acknowledging the Athenians' religious scruples. From this initial point of contact the sermon moves slowly but deliberately toward a specifically Jewish/Christian concept of God.26 After touching on divine creativity, self-sufficiency, and sovereignty, the sermon reaches its final and critical affirmation: that God has authen ticated the judicial role of Christ, άναστήσας αυτόν έκ νεκρών. These words conclude the speech. The mention of "raising from the dead" elicits a response from the audience. The grammar of vs. 32 demands a two-fold response in some sense, but the precise nature of the second half, and hence of the con trast, is debated. Haenchen's interpretation represents a common point of view: "both groups ... react differently: one with open scoffing..., the other courteously requesting a deferment of further instruction ad Kalendas Graecas"27 By this reckoning the contrast between the two historical event, but should rather be read according to the Lukan intention." But to infer non-historicity from local color is a non sequitur. Indeed, Ramsay [St. Paul, 238] regards the appropriateness of the local detail to be "the conclusive proof that it is a picture of real life." (On this point, see abo Gärtner, Areopagus Speech, 45. Ultimately, neither historicity nor non-historicity can be deduced from the appropriateness of a nar rative's description since such description is characteristic of both good historiography and good fiction.) Moreover, while Conzelmaim is surely right to say that an author's work should be interpreted in accordance with the author's intention, it may be the case that Luke intends to relate a historical event in this passage. 25 For a negative verdict on the authenticity of the speech see Martin Dibelius, Aufsätze &tr Apostelgeschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1951) 120-62. For a critique of Dibelius and a more positive view, see Stonehouse, Paul Before the Areopagus, 1-40; Gärtner, Areopagus Speech, 248-52; and G. Schrenk, Studien zu Paulus (Zürich, 1954) 131. 26 Dibelius understands the speech as Hellenistic right up to the mention of Jesus, but Nock ["Book of Acts," 831] calls attention to the Jewish framework and the non- Greek idea of a "First Man" which is alluded to in vs. 26. In effect, the speech is as accommodating as possible to the thinking of Hellenistic philosophy .without compro mising a Jewish/Christian belief system. 27 Haenchen, Apostelgeschichte, 464 [ET * 526]. Since there was no "Kalends" in the Greek calendar, this clever Latin phrase means "to postpone indefinitely so as never to do the thing mentioned." Suetonius credited Augustus with this coinage {Augustus, §87). See also Maclean, "St. Paul," 550. HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHIES AND RESURRECTION 27

responses is not one of rejection vs. genuine interest, but of open rejec tion vs. polite dismissal. There would not be a fundamental difference in the intent, but only in the harshness or civility of their expression. But is this understanding correct? Several arguments can be adduced against Haenchen's view. First, the two reactions are set off by a μεν... δε, a classical construction, somewhat less frequent in the NT.28 The use of μεν... δε does not by itself answer the question of how the verse is to be interpreted, but it must be admitted that Haenchen's interpretation makes the distinction between the clauses rather subtle, unlike Luke's use of the construction elsewhere. Haenchen may be quoted against himself here. In his remarks on 17:18 he says, "[Luke] is fond of contrasting two groups in the audience, one of which shows an interest while the other sharply denies the Christian proclamation."29 Sometimes such a contrast involves clauses correlated with μεν ... δέ, but other constructions are also used. Examples include: Acts 2:12, έξίσταντο δε πάντες... έτεροι δε διαχλευάζοντες; Acts 14:4, έσχίσθη δέ το πλήθος της πόλεως, καΐ οι μεν ήσαν συν τοις Ίουδαίοις οι δέ συν τοις άποστόλοις; Acts 23:7-8, έσχίσθη το πλήθος... Σαδδουκαΐοι μέν γαρ... Φαρισαΐοι δέ ... (where the primary issue is the resurrection); and Acts 28:24, και oi μεν έπείθοντο τοις λεγομένοις, οι δέ ήπίστουν. Acts 17:32 is in full accord with this characteristic of Luke's narrative art. Secondly, Haenchen's interpretation is not the most natural reading of the text. The first response (32a) is unambiguous; έχλευαζον is clearly derisive: "they [began to] scoff, or jeer." But 32b is equally straight forward. Nothing in the context suggests sarcasm or insincerity on the part of the speakers.30 tcWe shall hear you again regarding this" need not be an oblique statement at all. If Haenchen's interpretation is sup ported by similar language in other passages of scripture or Greco- Roman literature, none has been adduced. Lastly, there is some positive evidence in the context that favors the

28 BDF, §447 (1), (2). It is entirely absent from some books, rare in others, but some what better represented in Matthew, Acts, Romans, the Corinthian letters, and Hebrews. See the statistical charts in Nigel Turner, A Grammar of New Testament Greek, Vol. HI, Syntax (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963) 332, and AT. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research (Nashville: Broadman, 1934) 1394. 29 Haenchen, Apostelgeschichte, 455 [ET - 517]. See also CK. Barrett, "Paul's Speech on the Areopagus," in New Testament Christianity for Africa and the World, ed. by Mark E. Glasswell and Edward W. Fasholé-Luke (London: SPCK, 1974) 71. 30 The motive for the suggested adjournment could very well have been the fact that the jeering from some members of the audience had made further discourse impossi ble. See Pascal Parente, "St. Paul's Address Before the Areopagus," CBQll (1949) 149. 28 Ν. CLAYTON CROY natural interpretation. Prior to the apostle's speech the author indicated that some members of the crowd were genuinely interested in the message, even though it struck them as unusual. Luke apparently wants to give this point some emphasis since 19b, Δυνάμεθα γνώναι τίς ή καινή αΰτη ή υπό σου λαλουμένη διδαχή; is virtually a doublet of 20b, βουλόμεθα ουν γνώναι τίνα θέλει ταΰτα είναι. Furthermore, although Paul's work in Athens was short-lived and did not result in a significant congregation, it should not be regarded as a total failure. The final verse of the chap ter informs us that a few persons did believe, among them "Dionysius the Areopagite and a woman by the name of Damans." Whether Luke meant these persons to be included among the οι δέ of 32b, or whether their conversions occurred on a later occasion is uncertain, but in either case it is clear that Paul met with at least limited success in Athens.31 The natural understanding of 32b coincides with this. The contrast of vs. 32 should therefore be understood as open rejec tion versus sincere, if still somewhat hesitating, interest. The latter group is not pleading, "What must I do to be saved?" But neither are they summarily rejecting the message. There is openness; a final judgment has not been made. The reactions to the sermon are, in effect, reactions to the idea of the resurrection. Luke makes this clear by prefacing the μεν ... δέ with the participial clause άκούσαντες δέ άνάστασιν νεκρών. The objective genitive νεκρών removes the ambiguity of vs. 18. No longer could Paul be mistaken for a polytheist proclaiming the deities 'Jesus and Anastasis." It was now clear that he was prodaiming the bodily resurrection of dead people.32 This was what triggered the responses. The question remains: Do these responses correspond to the philosophical schools represented in the crowd, Epicureans and Stoics? What would an Epicurean or Stoic have thought of such an idea?

Greco-Roman Views of the Aflerlife

Before examining the Stoic and Epicurean doctrines of the soul and the afterlife, it may be helpful to consider the diversity of views on

31 See Maclean, "St. Paul," 551-3, for a critique of the view that Paul's strategy in Athens was a disappointing failure which led him to reject any sort of philosophical appeal in the proclamation of the gospel (cf. 1 Cor. 1:17-2:5). 32 Birger Pearson [The Pneumatikos-Psyckikos Terminology in I Corinthians (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1973) 15 and 94, n. 3] notes that νεκρός basically means "corpse" and therefore άνάστασις νεκρών would have been understood accordingly. HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHIES AND RESURRECTION 29 these matters which existed in antiquity. Greek and Roman thought, unlike the Christian church, was not bound by any received tradition or revelation, and therefore "numerous and often contradictory con cepts of the afterlife existed side by side."33 The earliest view was that the dead live on in the tomb. A related idea, found especially in Homer's Odyssey (book 11) which became "the popular eschatology of all antiq uity," was that the good and the evil dead live on in the gloomy, sub terranean realm of Hades. But Homer, along with Hesiod, also speaks of "the Isles of the Blessed," located at the ends of the Earth, to which divinely favored heroes are translated. The Eleusinian mysteries promised their initiates a happy afterlife, apparendy one of continual celebration of the mysteries in the Underworld. The idea of the immortality of the soul apparendy stems from the archaic age movement, Orphism. It is credited with the saying, "The body is the tomb of the soul." The divine soul was freed from the fetter of the body at death. Plato sup plied this notion with a philosophical foundation. Aristode limited im mortality to the intellectual part of the human tripartite soul, and even it would lack sensibility in the afterlife. All these views form the back drop of the Hellenistic age. Despite their diversity it is clear that none was identical to the Christian concept of the άνάστασις των νεκρών. But now we must investigate specifically the views of Epicureans and Stoics. Do these schools have an analogue of the Christian understanding of immortality or resurrection?

Epicureanism and the Afterlife

The Epicurean view of the afterlife was uniform and unambiguous.34 An important value of this school was αταραξία, utter freedom from disturbing thoughts and influences. One of the greatest sources of dis turbing thoughts was fear of the gods, particularly of punishment in the afterlife. The person who was troubled by thoughts of the afterlife could not achieve the Epicurean ideal. Accordingly Epicurus categori-

33 Francis R. Walton, "After-life," OCD, 2nd ed. 1970, 23-24. See also Franz Cumont, Afler-life in Roman Paganism (New York: Dover, 1959) 1-43, and AJ.M. Wedderburn, Baptism and Resurrection. Studies in Pauline Theology against its Greco-Roman Background (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1987), especially 181-210. 34 Jerome H. Neyrey has shown that the Epicurean view of the afterlife is part of the topos of "theodicy." This topos involved three elements: God as judge, the survival of death, and post-mortem judgment by God. All of these tenets were denied by the Epicureans. See Jerome H. Neyrey, "Acts 17, Epicureans, and Theodicy. A Study in Stereotypes," in Greeks, Romans, and Christians, ed. by David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, and Wayne A. Meeks (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990) 118-34, esp. 124-5. 30 Ν. CLAYTON GROY cally denied amy kind of existence after death. In Epicurus' "Letter to Menoeceus," he writes,

Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not.35

Again, in the Sovereign Maxims (Κύριαι δόξαι) he says,

Death is nothing to us; for the body, when it has been resolved into its elements, has no feeling, and that which has no feeling is nothing to us.36

This view of the afterlife was related to Epicurean physics. For Epicurus the soul, like the body, was composed of atoms and, hence, was corporeal.

We must recognize generally that me soul is a corporeal thing, composed of fine particles, dispersed all over the frame, most nearly resembling wind with an admix ture of heat, in some respects like wind, in others like heat.... Empty space can not itself either act or be acted upon, but simply allows body to move through it. Hence those who call soul incorporeal speak foolishly. For if it were so, it could neither act nor be acted upon. But, as it is, both these properties, you see, plainly belong to soul.37

Lucretius, a first century B.C.E. writer who wrote a didactic Epicurean poem, is in full agreement with the founder of the school. The soul (anima) has no power of sensation when separated from the body, and hence no existence.

Besides, if the nature of the spirit is immortal and it can have sensation when sep arated from our body, we must presumably equip it with the five senses. There is no other way in which we can imagine souls wandering below in Acheron. That is why painters and earlier generations of writers have presented souls as equipped with senses in this way. But neither eyes nor nose nor even hand can exist for the spirit in separation. Nor can tongue or ears.^Therefore spirits cannot by themselves have sensation or exist.38

53 Diogenes Laertius, 10.124-5. (Translations, unless otherwise indicated, are from the Loeb Classical library.) The saying, "Death is nothing to us," became virtually a motto of Epicureanism. Cicero cites a version of it (mortem nihil ad nos pertinere) in De finibus 2.31.100. It is likewise the theme of Lucretius's De rerum natura 3.830-1094. On the latter, see Traudel Stork, Ml Igitur Alors Est ad Nos, Der Schlussteil des dritten Lukrezbuches und sein Verhältnis zur Konsolationsliteratur (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt, 1970); and Barbara P. Wallach, Lucretius and the Diatrìbe against Fear of Death, De Rerum Natura III 830-1094 (Leiden: Brill, 1976). 36 Diogenes Laertius, 10.139. 37 Diogenes Laertius, 10.63-67. 38 Lucretius, De rerum Natura, 3.624-33. Translation from A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1987) I, 70. HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHIES AND RESURRECTION 31

Long and Sedley, after a careful analysis of "the soul" in Epicurus and Lucretius, conclude that the foundational principle is "that the soul cannot survive the body's death."39 Soul and body are so interdepend ent that they are dissolved together at the point of death. Death is complete extinction.40 Epicureanism had its golden era in the decades following the career of its founder, but declined somewhat thereafter due to the popular perception of its "hedonism" and, perhaps, the excesses of some of its students.41 But the Epicurean view of death was still popular in the first century B.C.E. and the first century C.E. The Roman historian, Sallust, portrays Caesar as claiming that "death is a relief from woes, not a punishment;... it puts an end to all mortal ills and leaves no room either for sorrow or for joy."42 Pliny the Elder, in an oft-quoted pas sage, speaks plainly on the nature of death,

Similar also is the vanity about preserving men's bodies, and about Democritus's promise of our coming to life again—who did not come to life again himself! Plague take it, what is this mad idea that life is renewed by death? What repose are the generations ever to have if the soul retains permanent sensation in the upper world and the ghost in the lower? Assuredly this sweet but credulous fancy ruins nature's chief blessing, death, and doubles the sorrow of one about to die by the thought of sorrow to come hereafter also.43

Epicureanism was not only popular with the upper class, but also spread "in the lowest strata of the population, as is proved by epitaphs expressing unbelief in an afterlife."44 An epitaph so common that it assumed the form of an acronym (cf. our R.I.P. « Rest in Peace) was Non fili, fia, non sum, non desidero.*0 Whether such sentiments were con sciously connected with Epicureanism cannot be determined, but they illustrate the extent to which some aspects of the philosophy had per meated popular thinking. To return to Paul's sermon before the Areopagus, what conclusions, then, can be drawn about the likely reaction of first century C.E.

39 Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, I, 71. 40 Long and Sedley, Hellenistic PhUosophers, I, 153. 41 Neyrey ("Acts 17," 129-33) notes that Epicureanism and other philosophical and religious groups were often known by their stereotypes. Atheism and hedonism were commonly (though falsely) ascribed to Epicureans, but the stereotype of denying the afterlife and judgment was accurate. 42 Sallust, Catiline, 51.20. 43 Püny, Natural History, 7.189-90. 44 Cumont, After-life, 9. 45 H. Dessau, ed. Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae (1955) Vol. 2, 883, (no. 8162). See Joel Marcus, "Paul at the Areopagus: Window on the Hellenistic World," BTB 18 (4, 1988) 148. 32 Ν. CLAYTON CROY

Epicureans to the preaching of the resurrection? Epicurean teaching on the subject, as we have seen, was unequivocal. There was no possibility whatsoever of Epicureans accepting such an idea; it would have been incredible to them. This is precisely the reaction of the τίνες in Acts 17:18 and the οι μέν in 17:32. Whether it was the intent of Luke to make this connection is a question I will postpone until later. First, we must consider Stoic traditions.

Stoicism and the Afterlife

The first observation which should be made about Stoic views of the afterlife is the very fact that there were multiple views.46 Zeno cre ated a system which, unlike the school of Epicurus, spawned a num ber of influential and independent teachers. The representatives of early, middle, and late Stoicism felt free to enlarge upon, modify and occa sionally reject the teachings of their predecessors. One of the difficulties is assessing the early stages of any Stoic doc trine is the lack of source materials. No complete work by any Stoic philosopher of the early or middle period has survived; we are restricted to quotations and summaries found in later authors. When examining the Stoic understanding of the soul's destiny, we are further limited by the fact that most statements about the soul concern its origin, its com ponents and its faculties. A relatively small number of the fragments deal with the soul's survival of death.47 To these we must now turn. The Stoics understood the human soul as a "warm breath" (πνεύμα ενθερμον).48 Each person's soul is "a portion of the vital, intelligent, warm breath which permeates the entire cosmos."49 That is, the indi vidual soul that pervades one's body, is part of the "world soul" that pervades all matter. Still, the soul is not incorporeal; it is itself a "body." Nemesius, the Christian bishop of about 400 C.E., makes this clear in his essay, De natura hominis.

46 The most complete treatment of this theme is René Hoven, Stoïcisme et Stoïciens face au problème de l'au-delà (Paris, 1971). In his introduction (pp. 9-11), Hoven shows how the complexity of the material has given rise to contradictory modern assessments of the Stoic doctrine of the afterlife. 47 In the standard reference [J. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta {SVF), 1903], of 139 fragments collected under De anima hominis, only 14 pertain to the soul and death. 48 Diogenes Laertius, 7.157. 49 A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics. 2nd ed. (Duckworth, 1986) 171. HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHIES AND RESURRECTION 33

He [Cleanthes, an early Stoic] also says: no incorporeal interacts with a body, and no body with an incorporeal, but one body interacts with another body. Now the soul interacts with the body when it is sick and being cut, and the body with the soul; thus when the soul feels shame and fear the body turns red and pale respec tively. Therefore the soul is a body.50 Chrysippus [another early Stoic] says that death is the separation of soul from body. Now nothing incorporeal is separated from a body. For an incorporeal does not even make contact with a body. But the soul both makes contact with and is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is a body.51

The question remains: What happens to the soul when it is sepa rated from the body at death? Cicero gives a succinct answer: Stoid... diu mansuros aiunt ánimos, semper negant.52 Both halves of this testimony seem to be borne out by the data. It is sometimes said that Panaetius, a middle Stoic, denied any survival of the soul after death,53 but the evidence is not clear, and one prominent scholar suggests that "Panaetius may have adhered to the orthodox view of survival for a limited dura- don."54 The second half of Cicero's remark is unassailable. "No Stoic pos tulated unlimited survival or immortality."55 Diogenes Laertius confirms this: δοκεΐ δ' αύτοΐς [the Stoics] . .. την δέ ψυχήν ... μετά τον θάνατον έπιμένειν φθαρτην δ' ύπάρχειν.56 The next question is "Whose souls remain, and for how long?" A common Stoic doctrine was that periodically a cosmic conflagration (έκπύρωσις) would occur, in which all things, including the souls of indi vidual persons, would be dissolved into the elements from which they came. Human souls would be absorbed into the universal soul, and although the latter was indestructible, human beings would have no individual, personal existence thereafter. But exactly which souls sur vive until the conflagration was a matter of dispute. Eusebius provides the following testimony:

They [the Stoics] say that the soul is subject to generation and destruction. When separated from the body, however, it does not perish at once but survives on its

50 Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Phüosophers, I, 272 C {SVF I, 518). 51 Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, I, 272 D (SVF II, 790). 52 "The Stoics say that souls will endure for awhile; they deny that they will endure forever." Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.31.7. 53 Walton, "After-life," OCD, 23-24. 54 Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 213, n. 2. Cicero says that Panaetius denies the Platonic teaching of the immortality of the soul (Tuse. Disp. 1.32.79), but this does not exclude a limited survival beyond death. Strictly speaking "immortal" means "not subject to death," i.e. "living forever." No Stoic predicated this of the soul. 55 Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 213, n. 2. 56 Diogenes Laertius, 7.156. 34 Ν. CLAYTON CROY

own for certain times, the soul of the virtuous up to the dissolution of everything into fire, that of fools only for certain definite times.57

But there was no Stoic "orthodoxy" on this issue. Diogenes Laertius informs us that Cleanthes and Chrysippus had different views: Κλεάνθης [says] μεν ουν πάσας [sc. ψυχας] έπιδιαμένειν μέχρι της έκπυρώσεως, Χρύσιπ πος δέ τας των σοφών μόνον.58 In any case it is clear that the universal conflagration was a terminus ad quern; no individual soul survived the έκπυρωσις. Apparendy, then, early and middle Stoicism affirmed a lim ited survival of the soul beyond death, but not immortality: anima non immortalis, sed morti superstes.59 This position has been described as "mid way between Plato and Epicurus,"60 the former affirming immortality, the latter denying any afterlife. The later Stoics, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, were pre occupied with ethics much more than with physics, but they too offer some reflections about the afterlife. Seneca presents an especially com plex picture.61 On the one hand, he affirms the Stoic "orthodoxy" of a (limited) survival beyond death. In ad Marciam 26.1-6, he consoles a bereaved mother by imagining her deceased father addressing her from the citadel of heaven and describing the blessedness her recendy departed son now enjoys. But the father also speaks of the coming conflagration in which all things will be consumed, and even "we whose souls are blessed and who have shared in eternity... will be changed into our former elements."62 Elsewhere, in a splendid simile, Seneca likens earthly life to the period of gestation in a mother's womb. Both prepare us for birth into a new condition, a new state of affairs. Alia origo nos expec- taty alius rerum status (Epist 102.23). The day of one's death is not the end of all things, but the birthday of eternity (aeterni natalis, 102.26). The abode of the blessed is portrayed as celestial; they journey among the stars.63 Hercules, the Stoic paradigm par excellence, is regarded as having been exalted to the heavens after his death, to assume a bcum ...

57 Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica, 15.20.6 (tmnslation by Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, I, 318). Also SVF Π, 809. A fragment in the Greek doxographer Aetius makes a similar distinction between the souls of the uneducated (απαίδευτοι) and the souls of the sages (σοφοί), see SVF Π, 810. 58 Diogenes Laertius, 7.157. 59 This is the heading of the relevant section in Von Arnim, SVF, Π, 223. 60 Giovanni Reale, A History of Ancient Phihsopky, III, The Systems of the Hellenistic Age (Albany: SUNY, 1985) 258. 61 See Hoven, Stoïcisme, 103-26, who describes four different "currents" in Seneca's writings. 62 Ad Marciam 26.6; also 25.1-3. On the conflagration, see also Epist. 9.16. 63 Ad Marciam 23.2; Ad Polybium 9.8; Ad Hebiam 6.8. HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHIES AND RESURRECTION 35 inter astra.6* The popular fears of the underworld and its tortures are rejected by Seneca as summarily as by Epicurus.65 On the other hand, Seneca seems to express doubt in some pas sages. At the end of Epistle 65 he asks, Mors quid est? and responds, Aut finis aut transitus. While neither alternative is to be feared according to Seneca, the inclusion οι finis suggests the possibility that the soul may not enjoy even a limited survival beyond death.66 It is possible that this remark and similar ones may simply be shaped by the rhetorical needs of the act of consoling. That is, Seneca may be trying to anticipate and respond to various ways grieving persons might be thinking, in order to reassure them that, even if death is the end, there is no need to grieve for the deceased. But it also may be that Seneca himself enter tains occasional doubt. In Epistle 54 he reflects on a recent attack of asthma, noting how physicians call the malady "practicing to die." Seneca comments that as death was testing him, he had tested death before he was born, for "death is not being.... What was the case before me, this will be the case after me" (Mors est non esse;... Hoc erit post me> quod ante me fiat. 54.4). This pessimistic denial of the afterlife is difficult to reconcile with Seneca's more hopeful statements elsewhere. But given the many passages in which he affirms the divine origin and/or post-mortem survival of the soul,67 a comment like mors est non esse in Epistle 54 may simply be an expression of his more pessimistic side, exacerbated by his own ill health and recent brush with death. Seneca's more considered judgments on the alternatives of limited sur vival vs. annihilation express the hope of survival, sometimes wistfully, sometimes confidently, and regard annihilation as a less likely, though tolerable possibility. For Epictetus, death is likewise the separation of the soul from the body. But what happens to the soul after death? Epictetus affirms that death involves a transformation (μεταβολή), not into non-being (το μη δν), but into a new being, something that does not now exist (το νυν μήδν).68 This transformation is not a continuation of personal, individual

64 Seneca, Hercules Oetaeus, 1564; see also 1942-3. The doubt that exists about the authorship of this tragedy does not necessarily disqualify this idea as belonging to Seneca. In De TranquiUitate 16.4, Seneca writes that Hercules, Regulus, and M. Cato attained to immortality by bravely enduring death: Omnes isti levi temporis impensa uwenerunt, quo- modo aeterni fièrent, et ad immortaìitatem moriendo venerunt. 65 Epist. 24.18; Ad Marciam 19.4-5. 66 See also Epist. 63.16; 99.30; Ad Polybium 5.1. 67 See Epist. 41.5; 65.16; 79.12; 86.1; 92.29-35; 120.15-18, as well as nn. 62-64 above. 68 Discourses 3.24.92-95. 36 Ν. CLAYTON CROY

existence, but a restoration into one's original elements.69 What remains unclear is whether the soul exists for any length of time between death and the return to the elements, and whether this is true for all per sons or only the sapientes. Marcus Aurelius is perhaps the most ambiguous of the later Stoics with regard to the afterlife. In one important passage he seems to affirm Stoic "orthodoxy." Just as the bodies of the deceased remain in the earth for a while before decomposing, so their souls, iCbeing transferred into the air, enduring for a certain time, undergo change and are dis persed and turned into fire, being taken up into the generative princi ple of the whole" (αϊ εις τον αέρα μεθιστάμεναι ψυχαί, επί ποσόν συμμείνασαι, μεταβάλλουσι καί χέονται και έξάπτονται εις τον των όλων σπερματικών λόγον άναλαμβανόμεναι, 4.21). But this affirmation is immediately qualified as a hypothesis or assumption (ύπόθεσις). Moreover, in virtually every other passage in which Marcus addresses the afterlife, he poses two or three alternatives without committing himself to any.70 Death is either dispersion, if the soul is composed of atoms, or extinction or a change of state, if the soul is a unity. The first alternative is based on Epicurean physics, the second and third on more Stoic notions. But it is never clear which alternative he favors; the statement of a preference seems to be studiously avoided. What is clear is that he cannot affirm unequiv ocally the immortality of the soul. Indeed, he laments that when noble, devout persons die, they never come into being again but are extin guished entirely.71 Such a statement may betray his preference after all. Thus among the later Stoics, the hope of an afterlife seems to peak with Seneca and decline thereafter. Whereas Seneca could wax elo quent about a blissful future existence, even if one limited by the έκπυρωσις, Epictetus is hazy and Marcus Aurelius is non-committal and seemingly resigned to the non-survival of the soul.72 If Seneca is rep resentative of Stoicism around the middle of the first century, could it be that the Stoic hope of an afterlife was at its pinnacle at about the time that Paul, according to Acts 17, proclaimed the resurrection of Jesus in Athens?

69 Discourses 3.13.14-15; 4.7.15. 70 Meditations 5.33; 6.24; 7.32; 8.25, 58; 11.3. 71 Meditations 12.5. 72 See C.R. Haines, The Cornmunings with Himself of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (Cambridge, NIA: Harvard University, 1930) xxvi. HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHIES AND RESURRECTION 37

Epicureans, Stows and Acts 17:32

In view of this study of Epicurean and Stoic thought on the after life, what conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between these groups and the reactions to Paul's preaching of the resurrection of the dead? Scholars have expressed different opinions. Some tenta tively suggest what seems like a reasonable correspondence: "Some— presumably the Epicureans—mocked, while others—Stoics—said that they would listen to him at another time."73 This correlation has a cer tain plausibility to it, especially the first half. We have seen how Epicu reans ruled out the afterlife entirely. For them there was no survival of death, limited or unlimited, conscious or unconscious, individual or universal, of body or of soul. It is not difficult to imagine Epicureans jeering at the mention of άνάστασις των νεκρών. The second half of the correspondence is also plausible but more complex, as the above sur vey of Stoic views would suggest. Sometimes the affinity between Stoic and early Christian thought on the afterlife has been over-stated. It is not quite correct to say that "the Stoics believed in the immortality of the soul as taught by Plato."74 Even such a statement as, "There was one philosophical school [the Old Stoa] which found something like resurrection comprehensible,"75 can only stand if a generous qualification is understood by the words "something like." As far as we know, no Stoic ever entertained the notion of the resurrection of the body.76 Still, this is reconcilable with Luke's narrative, for he portrays the more sympathetic members of the

73 Robert M Grant, Mtracle and Natural Law m Graeco-Roman and Early Christum Thought (Amsterdam North-Holland, 1952) 235 See also O Michel; TDNT 9 (1974) 187, Τ Zahn, Du Apostelgeschichte des Lucas, 628 (cited m Gartner, Areopagus Speech, 49), Parente, "St Paul's Address," 149, and Dean W Zweck, "The Areopagus Speech of Acts," Lutheran Theological Journal 21 (3, Dec '87) 119 Most recently, Jerome Neyrey has defended the correspondence theory based on Luke's narrative technique of contrastive responses to the preaching of the gospel and on the ancient practice of stereotyping religious and philosophical groups See Neyrey "Acts 17," 128 74 Gartner, Areopagus Speech, 49 Actually, Gartner does not argue for the above cor respondence, but this statement of his illustrates the tendency to see more similarity between Stoic and Christian thought than actually existed 75 Grant, Miracle and Natural Law, 235 See also Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation, 131 "The concept [of resurrection] is not necessarily impossible for a Stoic" since "Heracles was a stoic hero who had descended mto the underworld and returned " 76 Nevertheless, since Stoic (and Epicurean) physics sometimes referred to the soul m somatic terms, e g as a σώμα of fine particles, philosophical language about the immor tality of the soul sometimes bore affinities to that of bodily resurrection See Wedderburn, Baptism and Resurrection, 187, and the texts cited in E Schweizer, "ψυχή," 721/VT9 614, n 23, and Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism (Philadelphia Fortress, 1974) 2 133, n 595 38 Ν. CLAYTON GROY crowd only as curious and perplexed, not as wholeheartedly in agree ment with Paul. Other interpreters have denied or downplayed any correspondence between the philosophical schools and the reactions. Bromiley states it rather matter-of-factly: "There is no real support for the theory that the division ran along party lines, the Epicureans being the mockers and the Stoics the ones who showed more interest."77 Bromiley's next sentence concedes, however, that "Stoicism undoubtedly has a greater affinity to biblical teaching than Epicureanism." But in fact, there is "real support" for the correspondence theory, as the above investiga tion strongly suggests. Contrasting reactions to the preaching of the Gospel, indeed, to the preaching of the resurrection, is clearly Lukan style. Epicurean and Stoic doctrines would certainly predispose their adherents to react in the respective manners Luke describes. The issues and potential qualifications yet to be considered are (1) the level at which the correspondence is suggested, and (2) the ques tion of how much knowledge can be presupposed in Luke and in his readers. At the literary level, I think it is probable that Luke intended the contrasting responses of derision and curiosity to refer to the Epicureans and Stoics respectively. The mention of the two schools in close juxtaposition with the correlative language in Acts 17:18 (καί τίνες... οι δέ) favors this. It is quite plausible that Luke knew enough about these philosophical schools to make such a contrast. This would not have required a firsthand acquaintance with their philosophical writings; a knowledge of stereotypes would have sufficed.78 Moreover, the content of the Areopagus speech suggests that Luke may have had more than a stereotypical knowledge of Stoic (and perhaps even Epicurean) doctrine.79 On the historical level, it is at least possible that Paul preached a ser mon somewhat like this one to an Athenian audience. I do not maintain here that Luke's composition is anything like a transcript.80 I do,

77 G.W. Bromüey, "Stoics," ISBE (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988) IV, 621. 78 See Neyrey, "Acts 17," 129-34. 79 Several interpreters have found elements of Stoic thinking in the Areopagus address, the most explicit example being the quotation (vs. 28) from Aratus, a poet who learned Stoicism under Zeno. See Barrett, "Paul's Speech," 72 and 76, n. 16; Gärtner, Areopagus Speech, 144-69; Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation, 129; and Zweck, "The Areopagus Speech of Acts," 119. Dibelius, Aufsätze, 53-54, has shown a number of parallels to the Areopagus speech in the writings of Seneca in particular. On the possibility of Epicurean connections, see F.F. Bruce, The Acts of àie Apostles, Greek Text with Introduction and Commentary, 3rd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990) 382. 80 See Soards's cautious remarks in Speeches, 16-17, n. 53. HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHIES AND RESURRECTION 39 however, regard the general scene and the tenor of the speech as con ceivable. Stoicism and Epicureanism were active during this period, and Athens was the center of philosophy.81 Paul's own writing confirms his presence in Athens (1 Thess. 3:1), and the same letter associates his ministry among non-Jews with the preaching ofJesus ' resurrection from the dead (1 Thess. 1:9-10, cf. 4:14). If Paul did address a non Jewish audience in Athens, his message surely would have included so central an issue as Jesus' resurrection. The more difficult question is whether Luke could presuppose in his readers a sufficient knowledge of either Epicurean or Stoic philosophy for them to recognize a correspondence that is only implicit. The fact that the two groups are introduced in the narrative without explana tion presupposes that they were widely known. Since the Epicurean rejection of the after-life was doctrinaire, even a stereotypical knowl edge of that group would have been enough to grasp Luke's implied association. Stoic views on the after-life were admittedly complex, but the above study suggests that if Christians living in the late first cen tury had any knowledge of that philosophical group, they would have recognized a way of thinking about the transcendence of human nature that at least approached their own. A sophisticated reader of Acts might very well have inferred the correspondence. The scene Luke sketches, then, is plausible. As the Christian mes sage of the resurrection spread throughout the Mediterranean world, it would surely have met the disdain of Epicureans, whereas Stoic hear ers might very well have said, "We will hear you again about this."

81 W.W. Tarn, Hellenistic Cwiäsation, 3rd ed. (New York: New American Library, 1975) 325-6. ^s

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