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Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany
Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany Maja Adena, Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, Veronica Santarosa, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya* May 10, 2014 How far can the media protect or undermine democratic institutions in unconsolidated democracies, and how persuasive can they be in ensuring public support for dictator’s policies? We study this question in the context of Germany between 1929 and 1939. Radio slowed down the growth of political support for the Nazis, when Weimar government introduced pro-government political news in 1929, denying access to the radio for the Nazis up till January 1933. This effect was reversed in 5 weeks after the transfer of control over the radio to the Nazis following Hitler’s appointment as chancellor. After full consolidation of power, radio propaganda helped the Nazis to enroll new party members and encouraged denunciations of Jews and other open expressions of anti-Semitism. The effect of Nazi radio propaganda varied depending on the listeners’ predispositions toward the message. Nazi radio was most effective in places where anti-Semitism was historically high and had a negative effect on the support for Nazi messages in places with historically low anti-Semitism. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! * Maja Adena is from Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. Ruben Enikolopov is from Barcelona Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona GSE, and the New Economic School, Moscow. Maria Petrova is from Barcelona Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona GSE, and the New Economic School. Veronica Santarosa is from the Law School of the University of Michigan. Ekaterina Zhuravskaya is from Paris School of Economics (EHESS) and the New Economic School. -
Discrimination and Law in Nazi Germany
Cohen Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies Name:_______________________________ at Keene State College __________________________________________________________________________________________________ “To Remember…and to Teach.” www.keene.edu/cchgs Student Outline: Destroying Democracy From Within (1933-1938) 1. In the November 1932 elections the Nazis received _______ (%) of the vote. 2. Hitler was named Chancellor of a right-wing coalition government on _________________ _____, __________. 3. Hitler’s greatest fear is that he could be dismissed by President ____________________________. 4. Hitler’s greatest unifier of the many conservatives was fear of the _____________. 5. The Reichstag Fire Decree of February 1933 allowed Hitler to use article _______ to suspend the Reichstag and suspend ________________ ____________ for all Germans. 6. In March 5, 1933 election, the Nazi Party had _________ % of the vote. 7. Concentration camps (KL) emerged from below as camps for “__________________ ________________” prisoners. 8. On March 24, 1933, the _______________ Act gave Hitler power to rule as dictator during the declared “state of emergency.” It was the __________________ Center Party that swayed the vote in Hitler’s favor. 9. Franz Schlegelberger became the State Secretary in the German Ministry of ___________________. He believed that the courts role was to maintain ________________ __________________. He based his rulings on the principle of the ____________________ ___________________ order. He endorsed the Enabling Act because the government, in his view, could act with _______________, ________________, and _____________________. 10. One week after the failed April 1, 1933 Boycott, the Nazis passed the “Law for the Restoration of the Professional _________________ ______________________. The April 11 supplement attempted to legally define “non-Aryan” as someone with a non-Aryan ____________________ or ________________________. -
Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi Party Gregori Galofré-Vilà, Christopher M
Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi party Gregori Galofré-Vilà, Christopher M. Meissner, Martin McKee, and David Stuckler NBER Working Paper No. 24106 December 2017, Revised in September 2020 JEL No. E6,N1,N14,N44 ABSTRACT We study the link between fiscal austerity and Nazi electoral success. Voting data from a thousand districts and a hundred cities for four elections between 1930 and 1933 shows that areas more affected by austerity (spending cuts and tax increases) had relatively higher vote shares for the Nazi party. We also find that the localities with relatively high austerity experienced relatively high suffering (measured by mortality rates) and these areas’ electorates were more likely to vote for the Nazi party. Our findings are robust to a range of specifications including an instrumental variable strategy and a border-pair policy discontinuity design. Gregori Galofré-Vilà Martin McKee Department of Sociology Department of Health Services Research University of Oxford and Policy Manor Road Building London School of Hygiene Oxford OX1 3UQ & Tropical Medicine United Kingdom 15-17 Tavistock Place [email protected] London WC1H 9SH United Kingdom Christopher M. Meissner [email protected] Department of Economics University of California, Davis David Stuckler One Shields Avenue Università Bocconi Davis, CA 95616 Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on and NBER Social Dynamics and Public Policy (Dondena) [email protected] Milan, Italy [email protected] Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi party Gregori Galofr´e-Vil`a Christopher M. Meissner Martin McKee David Stuckler Abstract: We study the link between fiscal austerity and Nazi electoral success. -
Inflation Expectations and Recovery from the Depression in the Spring of 1933: Evidence from the Narrative Record
Inflation Expectations and Recovery from the Depression in the Spring of 1933: Evidence from the Narrative Record Andrew J. Jalil and Gisela Rua* January 2016 Abstract This paper uses the historical narrative record to determine whether inflation expectations shifted during the second quarter of 1933, precisely as the recovery from the Great Depression took hold. First, by examining the historical news record and the forecasts of contemporary business analysts, we show that inflation expectations increased dramatically. Second, using an event- studies approach, we identify the impact on financial markets of the key events that shifted inflation expectations. Third, we gather new evidence—both quantitative and narrative—that indicates that the shift in inflation expectations played a causal role in stimulating the recovery. JEL Classification: E31, E32, E12, N42 Keywords: inflation expectations, Great Depression, narrative evidence, liquidity trap, regime change * Andrew Jalil: Department of Economics, Occidental College, 1600 Campus Road, Los Angeles, CA 90041 (email: [email protected]). Gisela Rua: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mail Stop 82, 20th St. and Constitution Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20551 (email: [email protected]). We are grateful to Pamfila Antipa, Alan Blinder, Michael Bryan, Chia-Ying Chang, Tracy Dennison, Barry Eichengreen, Joshua Hausman, Philip Hoffman, John Leahy, David Lopez-Salido, Christopher Meissner, Edward Nelson, Marty Olney, Jonathan Rose, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Jeremy Rudd, Eugene White, our discussants Carola Binder and Hugh Rockoff, and seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the California Institute of Technology, American University, and Occidental College for thoughtful comments. -
The Frontier, May 1933
University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana The Frontier and The Frontier and Midland Literary Magazines, 1920-1939 University of Montana Publications 5-1933 The Frontier, May 1933 Harold G. Merriam Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/frontier Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Merriam, Harold G., "The Frontier, May 1933" (1933). The Frontier and The Frontier and Midland Literary Magazines, 1920-1939. 44. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/frontier/44 This Journal is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Montana Publications at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Frontier and The Frontier and Midland Literary Magazines, 1920-1939 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ■ MAY, 1933 ■ H R 9 MAGAZINE O f THE NORTHWE ST BLACK ■ | M O T H ER A Story by Elma Godchaux RING-TAILED R fA R ER S H f i ■ V. L. O, CKittick ! ■ !-------------- , WE TALK ABOUT REGIONALISM: NORTH, EAST, SOUTH, AND WEST I Ben A . Botkin FORTY CENTS WESTERN MONTANA t f S R t f i e Scenic Empire ^ Sitoated approximately midway between tbe two great National Glacier, Missoula literally may be said to b e m me heart of tbe Scenic Empire of theNorfchwest In H directions out of B Garden City of Montana are places of marvelous. beauty. Entering Missoula from the Bast, tbe pas- s e ^ e r on either of the two great transconiahental lines/ Milwaukee R B Pacific, or the automobile, tourist winds "for miles through Hellgate Oanypu. -
The Great Depression: an Overview by David C
Introduction The Great Depression: An Overview by David C. Wheelock Why should students learn about the Great Depression? Our grandparents and great-grandparents lived through these tough times, but you may think that you should focus on more recent episodes in Ameri- can life. In this essay, I hope to convince you that the Great Depression is worthy of your interest and deserves attention in economics, social studies and history courses. One reason to study the Great Depression is that it was by far the worst economic catastrophe of the 20th century and, perhaps, the worst in our nation’s history. Between 1929 and 1933, the quantity of goods and services produced in the United States fell by one-third, the unemployment rate soared to 25 percent of the labor force, the stock market lost 80 percent of its value and some 7,000 banks failed. At the store, the price of chicken fell from 38 cents a pound to 12 cents, the price of eggs dropped from 50 cents a dozen to just over 13 cents, and the price of gasoline fell from 10 cents a gallon to less than a nickel. Still, many families went hungry, and few could afford to own a car. Another reason to study the Great Depression is that the sheer magnitude of the economic collapse— and the fact that it involved every aspect of our economy and every region of our country—makes this event a great vehicle for teaching important economic concepts. You can learn about inflation and defla- tion, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and unemployment by comparing the Depression with more recent experiences. -
The Japanese Economy During the Interwar Period
20092009--JE--21 The Japanese Economy during the Interwar Period: 両大戦間期Instabilityの日本における恐慌と政策対応 in the Financial System and ― 金融システム問題と世界恐慌への対応を中心にthe Impact of the World Depression ― Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies 金融研究所 鎮目雅人 Masato Shizume 2009 年 4 月 May 2009 The Japanese economy during the interwar period faced chronic crises. Among them, the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927 and the Showa Depression of 1930-31 marked turning points. The Showa Financial Crisis of 1927 was the consequence of persistent financial instability because of the incomplete restructuring in the business sector and postponements in the disposal of bad loans by financial institutions. The crisis brought reforms in the financial sector through large-scale injections of public funds and the amalgamation of banks. The Showa Depression of 1930-31 was caused by the Great Depression, a worldwide economic collapse, which had been intensified in Japan by the return to the Gold Standard at the old parity. Japan escaped from the Great Depression earlier than most other countries through a series of macroeconomic stimulus measures initiated by Korekiyo Takahashi, a veteran Finance Minister who resumed office in December 1931. Takahashi instituted comprehensive macroeconomic policy measures, including exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary adjustments. At the same time, the Gold Standard, which had been governing Japan’s fiscal policy, collapsed in the wake of the British departure from it in September 1931. Then, Japan introduced a mechanism by which the government could receive easy credit from the central bank without establishing other institutional measures to govern its fiscal policy. This course of events resulted in an eventual loss of fiscal discipline. -
Nber Working Paper Series
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES HIGHWAY TO HITLER Nico Voigtlaender Hans-Joachim Voth Working Paper 20150 http://www.nber.org/papers/w20150 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 May 2014 For helpful comments, we thank Sascha Becker, Tim Besley, Leonardo Bursztyn, Davide Cantoni, Bruno Caprettini, Melissa Dell, Ruben Enikolopov, Rick Hornbeck, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Torsten Persson, Diego Puga, Giacomo Ponzetto, Jim Snyder, David Strömberg, and Noam Yuchtman. Seminar audiences at Basel University, Bonn University, CREI, King’s College London, the Juan March Institute, LSE, Warwick, Yale, Zurich, and at the Barcelona Summer Forum offered useful suggestions. We are grateful to Hans-Christian Boy, Vicky Fouka, Cathrin Mohr, Casey Petroff, Colin Spear and Inken Töwe for outstanding research assistance. Ruben Enikolopov kindly shared data on radio signal strength in Nazi Germany. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2014 by Nico Voigtlaender and Hans-Joachim Voth. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Highway to Hitler Nico Voigtlaender and Hans-Joachim Voth NBER Working Paper No. 20150 May 2014, Revised April 2016 JEL No. H54,N44,N94,P16 ABSTRACT When does infrastructure investment win “hearts and minds”? We analyze a famous case – the building of the highway network in Nazi Germany. -
4. the Nazis Take Power
4. The Nazis Take Power Anyone who interprets National Socialism as merely a political movement knows almost nothing about it. It is more than a religion. It is the determination to create the new man. ADOLF HITLER OVERVIEW Within weeks of taking office, Adolf Hitler was altering German life. Within a year, Joseph Goebbels, one of his top aides, could boast: The revolution that we have made is a total revolution. It encompasses every aspect of public life from the bottom up… We have replaced individuality with collective racial consciousness and the individual with the community… We must develop the organizations in which every individual’s entire life will be regulated by the Volk community, as represented by the Party. There is no longer arbitrary will. There are no longer any free realms in which the individual belongs to himself… The time of personal happiness is over.1 How did Hitler do it? How did he destroy the Weimar Republic and replace it with a totalitarian government – one that controls every part of a person’s life? Many people have pointed out that he did not destroy democracy all at once. Instead, he moved gradually, with one seemingly small compromise leading to another and yet another. By the time many were aware of the danger, they were isolated and alone. This chapter details those steps. It also explores why few Germans protested the loss of their freedom and many even applauded the changes the Nazis brought to the nation. Historian Fritz Stern offers one answer. “The great appeal of National Socialism – and perhaps of every totalitarian dictatorship in this century – was the promise of absolute authority. -
The First U.S. Quantitative Easing: the 1930S Richard G
Economic SYNOPSES short essays and reports on the economic issues of the day 2010 ■ Number 17 The First U.S. Quantitative Easing: The 1930s Richard G. Anderson, Vice President and Economist* he term “quantitative easing” became popular jar- During the summer of 1933, as excess reserves reached gon in 2009. After setting the target for the federal $500 million, Fed officials’ reluctance increased. Never the - T funds rate at a range of zero to 25 basis points on less, as Meltzer (2003) reports, President Roosevelt wished December 28, 2008, the Federal Open Market Committee purchases to continue. On October 10, 1933, hoping to announced its intent to purchase up to approximately $1.7 avoid a political confrontation, Fed officials decided to con- trillion of agency debt, agency-guaranteed mortgage-backed tinue purchases. Yet, on October 12, these officials unani- securities, and Treasury securities. The Treasury collabo- mously approved a statement to the president noting that rated, buying for its own account approximately $220 billion (i) the System’s holdings of government securities exceeded in agency mortgage-backed securities during 2009. This $2 billion, (ii) bank reserves had reached a record high, and policy was labeled quantitative easing. (iii) short-term money rates had dipped to record lows. Few analysts recall, however, that this is the second, not They halted purchases in November 1933. Quantitative the first, quantitative easing by U.S. monetary authorities.1 easing did not end there, however: It instead shifted to the During 1932, with congressional support, the Fed purchased Treasury and the White House through gold purchases. -
The Enabling Act of 23 March 1933 the Political Situation in the Final Stages of the Weimar Republic Was Confusing and Unstable
HISTORICAL EXHIBITION PRESENTED BY THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ The Enabling Act of 23 March 1933 The political situation in the final stages of the Weimar Republic was confusing and unstable. Changing cabinets and coalitions and political, social and economic crises were the order of the day. Paul von Hindenburg, President of the Reich, was resorting more and more frequently to emergency decrees and dissolved the Reichstag twice in 1932. The prevailing political conditions facilitated the transition of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) from a radical splinter group to a party of government. In the two elections to the Reichstag in 1932 and in the election of 1933, which was free only on paper, the NSDAP won the largest share of the vote by far. On 30 January 1933, Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of the Reich by President Hindenburg. Hitler was thus placed at the head of a cabinet comprising non-attached Conservative ministers, members of the NSDAP and representatives of the German National People’s Party (DNVP). The direction in which the political situation would develop under Hitler became clear only shortly after he took office. The Reichstag Fire Decree (Reichstagsbrandverordnung), enacted only one day after the fire in the Reichstag building on 27 February 1933, severely curtailed fundamental rights, subjected the police largely to the control of the national government and thereby created all sorts of opportunities for the persecution and elimination of political opponents, which the police and the so- called auxiliary police forces formed by SA and SS troops exploited to the full. The next step towards the ‘Führer state’ was the abolition of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. -
Historical Article Sir Ludwig Guttmann's Publications Under the Nazis
Spinal Cord (2001) 39, 602 ± 608 ã 2001 International Medical Society of Paraplegia All rights reserved 1362 ± 4393/01 $15.00 www.nature.com/sc Historical Article Sir Ludwig Guttmann's publications under the Nazis JR Silver*,1 1Wendover, Bucks, UK Spinal Cord (2001) 39, 602 ± 608 Keywords: Guttmann; publications; Nazi Germany Introduction I wrote a historical review (Spinal Cord (2000) 38, haus in Breslau, he received a notice informing him 581 ± 596) on the history of Guttmann's and Whitter- that under Nazi laws his hospital appointment would idge's discovery of autonomic dysre¯exia which was cease on 30 June 1933. based on an application by Ludwig Guttman in 1943 This was deeply shocking to Guttmann who regarded to the Medical Research Council for a research grant. himself as `a German who happened to be a Jew'.1 As part of the application, there was a list of his Foerster appealed to the authorities to try and get publications while he was working in Germany. After them to withdraw the dismissal. As a result it was the rise of the Nazis to power, Jews were persecuted agreed that the notice of dismissal would be and not allowed to practise medicine or to publish temporarily suspended until a replacement for Gutt- scienti®c papers in Germany and the fact that these mann could be found. were published at all is remarkable. Guttmann was furious and absolutely refused to In view of the fact that Guttmann is such a accept this humiliation but he agreed to stay until the dominant in¯uence on the formation of ideas on the ocial leaving date of 30 June 1933.1 treatment of spinal injuries and was the founder of this On 10 July 1933 he started work at the Jewish journal, how these papers came to be published is of Hospital in Breslau.