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Initiative and Referendum: the Role of Direct Democracy in State Government

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Initiative and Referendum: the Role of Direct Democracy in State Government INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM: THE ROLE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN STATE GOVERNMENT Prepared by the Iowa Legislative Service Bureau November, 1978 Initiative and referendum are two forms of direct 1egis1a­ tion whose or~g~ns in the United States can be found in the populist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Both concepts stem from a common philosophy--that of in­ volving the people directly in the public decision-making process. The initiative allows the people to propose a law or, in most states, a constitutional amendment. There are two types of initiative. The direct initiative completely bypasses the legislature and allows a qualifying measure proposed by the people to be placed directly on the ballot for approval or rejection. Thirteen states allow the direct initiative. The indirect initiative requires the proposed law or constitutional amendment to be submitted first to the legislative body. The legislature, in most cases, is required to act on all indirect initiative proposals within a given period of time. Under the indirect initiative, if the legislature rejects or fails to act upon the proposal, or proposes a substitute bill, the initiated measure (and the legislative substitute) are placed on the ballot for voter consideration. In some states additional signatures must be obtained in order to place the initiated measure on the ballot at this stage. Two states provide for the indirect initiative while six states allow both the direct and the indirect initiative. In one state the petitioners may choose between the two procedures; in the remaining five the procedure used depends on whether the initiative measure is a statute or a constitutional amendment. The word "referendum" is often used incorrectly to describe an initiated measure that 16 placed on the ballot for voter consideration. Referendum actually provides a mechanism for the electorate to approve or reject legislation that has already been approved by the legislature. There are three types of referenda. Nineteen state constitutions allow the optional referendum. Under this system the state leqislature may choose to submit measures it has enacted to the voters in a referendum. Some state constitutions require referenda upon particular categories of legislation, most commonly proposed amendments to the state constitution. This type of referendum is described as an obligatory referendum on subject matter. The third type of referendum and the type that this report will focus upon is the referendum upon petition by the people, sometimes referred to as the "popular referendum". -2- Twenty-four states allow the popular referendum. All require that the petition with the required number of signatures be filed within a prescribed period of time, in most cases ninety days, after the adjournment of the legislative session wh~,ch enacted the law that is the subject of the petition. Recent political events across the country have generated a renewed interest in the concepts of initiative and referendum. This report is intended to assist legislators in identifying and analyzing the issues associated with direct legislation. It will first describe various features of initiative and referendum provisions in the twenty-four states that allow on~ or both types of direct legislation. A tabulation of the fre~lency with which the electorate invokes its legislative powers in t~\ese states will follow. Finally the report discusses common ·!rguments for and against initiative and referendum. It should be G,;ted that this report addresses initiative and referendum at th~ state level only and does not attempt tu describe similar po~eLs available to citizens of local units of government. INITIATIVE--FEATDRES All states that allow the initiative 0·. so in the state constitution. Most constitutional provisions are self-executing, that is they are effective without supplementary enabling legis­ lation. Constitutional provisions in the twenty-one states vary considerably in length and detail. Idaho and Utah are the only two initiative states whose constitutions contain a bare minimum--a statement reserving to the people the power to propose and enact laws. Generally, the state constitution also sets the signature requirement for petitions, sets time limits for filing petitions, specifies those elections at which initiated measures may appear on the ballot and the vote totals required to enact an initiated measure, clarifies gubernatorial veto powers and the legislature's power to amend or repeal an initiated law, and in more than fifty percent of initiative states, specifies a procedure for dealing with the adoption of conflicting measures. Only two state constitutions stray substantially beyond these requirements by addressing publicity requirements for initiated measures (Washington) and verification of signatures on petitions (Ohio). In the remaining states these areas are addressed in the statutes. All state statutes also include penalty provisions. Table I de­ scribes in detail key provisions of state constitutions and statutes relating to the power of initiative. TA8!.}: I 1.n Lruto taOLe are 'Ull('lW~CI 0'1 ----- <to (8). All other provIsions .:lre con:;.t1tut1onnl S T .~~_~.~.~.T LT_~!..t 0 N ~.!-_~ ~ ._~ T~} !.' .~.O ~'!. _f_~Q_\' I S 19!!.:'i __ !5~_~...l1! ~. .!}. ~I.! Y.F. Veto, Direct Restric- Arnendn:.(mt I Resolvi.ng , (D) tiona on Number of 'Iitt.e iim1ts ~lect1on Vote. Required aed Repeal Conflicting or Subjcci S1cnatures For At \JlLicr: 'to Approve Po\..'ers Measures o THE R 5 TAT E nd1rec Hatter Required 2 Filing Vote He!.! (I) Petition is 10:'( from 213 of W!1. one year of F1rnt statc'Jide Majority of votes No veto pO\ler - Alaska D Ye. void if legj..s- certificatlon of.. election held core ca~t on mea8ure. Cannot repeal for election dis- lature enacts t ricts 1n the peti.tion appl1ca- than 120 days afte 2 years - Can subsean t lally atate. tlon by Lt.Gov. legislative ad- amend any t 1ne. journment and the same following filing measure. of pet It ion. --------- -------~-------tio veto power - One with most Arizona 0 No - ~~ Law, At has-t- -4 months Regular general Miljority of vote;-- 15% :... Canst. prl.or to elect Ion elect ton. cast on measure. COlnnot amend or affirmative votes Amendment. at which In"iat1ve repeal. prevails. 1TIcasu(eti ro.'y be voted upon. One with highest 8X - LawtJ Not lesli than .. Regular general Majorlty of votes No veto. May be Arkansas 0 No number of affirma lOX - C<:lnst. raonths before election. cast on measure. amended or re- Amendment. elect1.('In at pealed only by a tlve votes becomes .... bleh rne.asure 213 vote of la.... I will be voted on. gpneral assembly. Can amend or California 1;- Yes 50% - 1.aw8 T,l/1 1SO days of Next general elec MaJorlty(s) • S% - Const. date the summJtry tlon held at leas repeal but shall Amendaient. is rece ivcd by 131 days after be subject to Attorney General petition qUollllfie_ re f ereodum. and at least 131 or at any special I days before elect Ion held . clectlon(s) • before general election or at th , - - call of the governor. , Colorado D No 8X of number \'ot- At least 4 mo. Biennial regular Majorlty of votes No veto pover. One wlth most ing for secretary prior to general general elect ion. caRt on measure. affirmative votes of state in last elect ion whea prevails. (8) general election. measure Is to be voted upoa. I. See !.ble II - list of restrictions on subject ~tter. general electlon. 2. Unless otherwise indicated percentage In this column 18 a percent of the total numb~r of votes cast for governor In last pr~ced1ng . .... , ,- .. --- -- Dlroct Rcstr1c- Voto l (0) cio(\s on Number of Tillie Lilllit. Election Vote AAcndrOleo.t I Resolving or Sub] cct Slgn.ltures 1-'0"[' At Which Required ~nd Repc~l Conflictl"& S , ~ T E tndir~c' HOlttCr Rcquired Filing Vote Held 'To Approve Povers Y.c:!sctes o THE R (t) "'- .. --~-.-. IdAho D No 10% (.j At least t. ttlOntbs Regular general t1,'Ijolit·y votc and May be repealed Measure receiving before electlon(s election. (8) eqlli1l to 0 r grca tel (court cue). greatest number of than a TTl3j ori ty of affirmative votes vetes cast {or is paramount 1n governor at the area.s where con- s:lIne election. fUct occurs. (s) tl11nol& 0 Ye. 8% At least & tr,onths .Ceneral election. 3/> of vote on Applies only before electi9n. amendlo,~nt or maj or- to const itu- ity of votes cast t ional amend. to in election. legis. art ic:le. - Florida D Yeo SX of votes cast AppUes only on la9t pres i- to const itu- dential election tional amend- in 1/2 Con~res- mentS. sional districts. - - - -- ... - - . :-":"-:-:-:-.:;. - ~ - ---~ -- ------ If tnitlated rneas When a legislative )o1~'lIe I Yes lOX Pile with legislature not lat~r tlla~ ~Olh day art~r con- \Irc .1s passed by al ternat ive is pro veni~!; of r~gulAr session. t.:nlc:~s tnea~;l.lre is enacted It'~isla.ture, posed, must be ""tUtOla: change it shall be subl'littc.d· at next general vetoed and SU5- able to cha()se election along w1th any alt~rnatives. Election must be tain('.d. it shall between measures not less than 60 days after adjournment. If no election be submitted to a or reject both. within 6 months .'Itld petition re(lU(~sts, governor may call referendum. S')(~Ci81 electi.)n Tlot less than 4 or ("lore than 6 months later. - - One recelving eM'IOot be ~ .... b- Ka8sachu.ett8 I Ye. lX Filed with legislat .... le no later than 1st Wed. in Of!c. greatest numbel· of stant 1all)' prior tu convening ()f s(>ss10n. ,\n initiative measure affirlI:iltlve votes sart.e a~ ... meas- for a con!l.tltutional amendment arust be considered and prevails.
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