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Theories of Referendum and the Analysis of Agenda-Setting THEORIES OF REFERENDUM AND THE ANALYSIS OF AGENDA-SETTING Thesis submitted for the PhD-degree Maija Talvikki Setala The London School of Economics and Political Science 1997 UMI Number: U109490 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U109490 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 74 7 Theories of Referendum and the Analysis of Agenda-Setting Abstract The referendum is often considered to be a form of direct democracy, and is often justified in terms of results representing the will of the majority. This view is disputable for three reasons: i) based on the results of social choice theory, it may be argued that the outcomes of referendums may be arbitrary and open to various interpretations; ii) it is debatable what the role of popular majorities should be in decision-making; many theorists of democracy think that unchecked majority rule shouldnot prevail; iii) because of the differences in agenda-setting, there is considerable functional variation between referendums. Different forms of referendums have also been justified by different theoretical arguments: popular initiatives have been promoted by radical democrats, whereas referendums used as a check on legislature have been supported by 'Madisonian' democrats. In the analysis of agenda-setting it is important to distinguish i) how and by whom the referendum is initiated and ii) on what kind of issues they may be held. The influence of the referendum on the political agenda depends on whether the referendum is initiated by representatives{ad hoc or optional referendum); or by a certain number of citizens (popular initiative); or whether it is a check on laws passed by the parliament (mandatory, suspensive and abrogative referendums). Furthermore, these distinctions are important for understanding the strategic character of referendums, ie. the strategic use of optional referendums by the representatives (parliamentary parties, president etc.), or the representatives’ anticipation and reaction to the possibility of the other forms of referendums. Referendum in 22 democracies are classified, and their 'functional properties' (Smith 1976) are analysed. In order to get a more precise picture on how referendums function as a part of political systems and how political actors use the referendum, three cases, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland, are analysed. Although the idea of giving the people a say is the common element of all forms of referendums, the differences between agenda-setting institutions explain why, how and under whose control ‘the people’s voice’ is heard. 2 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 An Overview 6 1.2 Conceptual History and Definitions 9 1.3 Outline of Thesis 11 PART I THEORY OF REFERENDUM 2. REFERENDUM AND THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY 2.1 Arguments for the Majority Rule 21 2.2 Representation and Direct Democracy - Ostrogorski Paradox 28 2.3 Intensities of Preferences in Direct and Representative Democracy 33 2.4 Separation of Issues 36 2.5 The Majority Rule and Other Preference Aggregation Methods 39 2.6 Intransitivity of the Majority Rule 40 2.7 The Theoretical and Practical Significance of Cycles: Single-Peakedness and Multi-Dimensionality 46 2.8 Implications for the Referendum - Agenda-Manipulation 52 2.9 Conclusions 57 3. THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY 3.1. Families of Theories of Democracy 62 3.2 Rousseau’s Theory of Voting 66 3.3 Market or Forum 73 3.4 Representative and Direct Democracy 77 3.5 Democratic Elitism and Classical Theory 83 3.6 Liberal and Participatory Theories of Democracy 87 3.7 Historical and Philosophical Background of Liberal Theory 91 3.8 Liberal Institutions 95 3.8.1 Elections and Democratic Rights 95 3.8.2 Division of Powers and Constitutional Checks and Balances 99 3.9 Participatory Democracy -Man as a Social Being 102 3.10 Public Debate and Reasonableness - Criticism 108 3.11 Conclusions 110 3 PART II ANALYSIS OF AGENDA-SETTING 4. REFERENDUM AS A PART OF DEMOCRATIC DECISION-MAKING 4.1 Classification of Issues 117 4.2 Classification of Institutions 119 4.3 Towards Normative Analysis of the Referendum 132 4.3.1 Governmental Control over Referendums 132 4.3.2 Referendum, Majoritarian and Consensual Democracy 138 4.4 A d Hoc and Optional Referendums 140 4.4.1 Reasons forAd Hoc and Optional Referendums 140 4.4.2 Examples 145 4.4.3 Consequences of Referendums 150 4.5 Mandatory Referendums 153 4.6 Suspensive and Abrogative Referendums 157 4.7 Popular Initiative 163 4.7.1 Institutions of Popular Initiative 163 4.7.2 Normative Theory and Existing Practices 165 4.7.3 Initiative, Referendum and Median Voter Preferences 170 4.8 Conclusions 174 5. PARTY POLITICS AND REFERENDUM - SWEDISH NUCLEAR POWER REFERENDUM Introduction to the Case Studies 181 5.1 Constitutional and Historical Background 186 5.2 Energy Policy Issue in the 1970s 189 5.3 The Nuclear Power Referendum 197 6. DANISH REFERENDUMS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 6.1 History of Danish Referendums 207 6.2 Preceding Referendums on European Integration 214 6.3 Referendums in 1992 and 1993 220 7. POPULAR INITIATIVE IN SWITZERLAND 7.1 Historical Background of Swiss Direct Democracy 230 7.2 Current Direct-Democratic Institutions 232 7.3 Role of the Direct-Democratic Institutions in Swiss Politics 239 7.4 Law-Controlling Referendums 245 7.5 Constitutional Initiative 249 7.5.1 Institutional Development 249 7.5.2 Issues and Impact on Political Organization 255 7.6 Conclusions 261 4 8. CONCLUSIONS 8.1 Referendum and Theories of Democracy 266 8.2 Referendum and the Will of the Majority 272 8.3 Institutional Analysis and Normative Theories 276 APPENDIXES Appendix I: Institutions of Nation-Wide Referendum in 22 Democracies 287 Appendix II: Nation-wide Referendums in 22 Western Democracies 1944-96 300 Appendix III: Referendums in Switzerland 1945-96 305 BIBLIOGRAPHY 312 TABLES 2.1 The Ostrogorski paradox 30 2.2 The Anscombe Paradox 32 2.3 Representation and Intensities of Preferences 34 2.4 Contradiction between Plurality Rule and Simple Majority Rule 39 2.5 Cyclical Majority Preference Relation 41 3.1 Families of Theories of Democracy 62 4.1 Classification of Issues 117 4.2 Categories of Referendums 122 4.3 Classification of Institutions 129 4.4 Number of Referendums 22 Democracies 1945-1996 131 4.5 Properties of Referendums 177 5.1 Motivations for Raising the Referendum Option 197 6.1 Danish Referendums since 1945 213 7.1. Number of Referendums in Switzerland 1881 -96 240 7.2 Popular Initiatives by Issue Type 256 FIGURES 2.1 Optimal Decision-Making Rule by External Decision-Making Costs 25 2.2 Single-Peaked and Non-Single-Peaked Preference Profile 48 5.1 The Five Main Parties’ Positions in the Left/Right and Pro/Anti-Nuclear Power Axis 190 7.1 Number of Referendums in Switzerland 1881-1996 240 7.2 Turnout in Elections and Referendums in Electoral Years 242 5 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 An Overview The historical experience of referendums may be characterized by certain dualism. There are some successful practices of direct democracy in stable democracies, for example in Switzerland, Denmark and Ireland, but also many examples of manipulative abuse of referendums by authoritarian rulers. Also, often the political calculations behind the referendums initiated by democratic governments are too obvious to avoid cynicism about the institution. Furthermore, the fact that the referendum seems to represent purely a majoritarian form of democracy and thus can be perceived as a threat against minorities is an often repeated argument against the referendum. On the other hand, the referendum has been seen as an excellent way of increasing citizens’ participation and deliberation on public issues, and the increase of popular participation due to referendums and other direct-democratic institutions has been seen as a step towards further democratisation of societies. Referendums have become an important part of political life in many parts of the world, both in democratic and in non-democratic countries. After the First World War, and especially after the establishment of the League of Nations, the referendum has been used to solve various territorial disputes. Also during the decolonization process in the 1950s and 1960s, the referendum has been used to legitimize the declarations of 6 \ independence and the constitutions of the newly independent states (See for example Butler and Ranney 1994). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a parallel phenomenon has been experienced in Eastern Europe, where referendums have been used to legitimize the declarations of independence and the new constitutions, and also to settle the most disputable constitutional issues. In West Europe the use of referendums has recently become more frequent because of the European integration process. Referendums have been used as a means to legitimize the transfers of national powers to European organisations. The referendums held by authoritarian governments tend to bring about outcomes which are almost unexceptionally supportive for the governmental policies. In this kind of a situation, a referendum may be considered as "a handy tool in the hands of dictators to boost their legitimacy" (Smith 1976). Hitler used the referendum in this manner to establish the Nazi regime: in the referendum held in November 1933, the National Socialist government was approved by 93.4% of the voters with 92.2% turnout, and in March 1936, the Reichstag list and the Fuhrer were approved by the majority of 98.1% of Germans, with the turnout of 98.9%.
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