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A Narrative Strategy from Aristophanes to Plato

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A Narrative Strategy from Aristophanes to Plato Protagorean Socrates, Socratic Protagoras: A Narrative Strategy from Aristophanes to Plato Michele Corradi Aix-Marseille Univ, ihp, Aix-en-Provence, France 1 Introduction In the Sophist, in the long quest for the definition of sophist—where Plato makes some of his most complex statements on being1—the Eleatic Stranger proposes an image of a nobler form of the sophistic art. He depicts it as the art of purifying someone, through dialectic, of his false opinions and his presumptions of knowing. Critics have correctly read this image as a very problematic presentation of Socrates’ elenchus.2 The Eleatic Stranger himself observes that there is a certain similarity between sophists and philosophers: as the wolf resembles the dog, the fiercest resembles the tamest. He also sets the elenchus within the sophistic art, as one of its noblest (γενναία) forms, very similar to philosophy (229e1–231b8). Certainly, since the early dialogues, one of Plato’s main goals was to clarify the relation between Socrates and the sophists. Such a goal was probably related to the apologetic intent of rehabilitating Socrates’ figure, whose memory was still at the center of disputes many years after his death, as proven both by the evidence concerning Polycrates’ 393 accusation (κατηγορία) and by the reaction of Socrates’ students.3 According to Plato, the popular contempt surrounding Socrates’ tragic death may be mostly ascribed to a confusion of the Socratic paideia with that of other contemporary figures considered responsible for the profound crisis of Athens at the end of the fifth century.4 In particular, Plato holds that this confusion is due largely to Socrates’ portrait in Aristophanes’ Clouds. Nevertheless, as the Sophist shows, Plato comes to a surprising conclusion: the experience of Socrates, as historical figure, has to be seen within the context of the sophistikê.5 Yet this is not a real 1 See at least Prior 1985, 127–167; Fronterotta 2007, 65–134; Solana 2013. 2 Cf. Centrone 2008, xvii–xxi. 3 Cf. Bandini and Dorion 2000, 79–81 n. 77. 4 On this specifically Platonic strategy to defend Socrates, see Notomi 2010; on Plato’s hostility towards the sophists see Kerferd 1981, 4–5, who correctly refers to Gorgias (462b3–465e1) and Sophist (221d1–236d4, 264c4–268d5) as “set-piece treatments.” 5 Cf. Taylor 2006. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi: 10.1163/9789004341227_005 protagorean socrates, socratic protagoras 85 surprise, if we focus on the relation, established by Plato, between Socrates and the most important sophist, Protagoras. Among Socrates’ antagonists in Plato’s dialogues, Protagoras is one of the most important indeed. In the eponymous dialogue, Protagoras’ speech occu- pies almost nine Stephanus pages, singularly long in the Platonic dialogues (320c8–328d2 = 80 c 1 dk). The whole first part of the Theaetetus (151d7–187a6) is dedicated to the discussion of the man-measure doctrine (80 b 1 dk). We find explicit references to Protagoras in yet other works, including Cratylus (385e4– 386e5 = 80 a 13 dk; 391b9–c9 = 80 a 24 dk), Euthydemus (286b8–c4 = 80 a 19 dk), Hippias Major (282d3–e6 = 80 a 9 dk), Meno (91d2–92a2 = 80 a 8 dk), Phaedrus (267b10–c7 = 80 a 26 dk), Republic (10.600c3–e2), and Sophist (232b1– 233a7 = 80 b 8 dk).6 In his pages, Plato underlines the striking differences between Protagoras and Socrates, as many scholars have often noticed. Think alone of the opposition between Protagoras’ long speeches (μακρολογία) and Socrates’ dialectic in the Protagoras,7 or of Socrates’ inability to accept the rel- ativity of values consequent to the man-measure principle in the Theaetetus,8 or of compensation for the sophist’s doctrines (μαθήματα)(Cratylus, Hippias Major, Meno, Protagoras, Republic, Theaetetus).9 Despite these oppositions, Plato makes use of refined narrative strategies that aim at revealing unexpected points of convergence between the two figures.10 I refer principally to the over- turning of Socrates’ and Protagoras’ positions at the end of the Protagoras, fol- lowed by the sophist’s praise-prophecy speech about Socrates (361a3–e6), and to the curious image of the Theaetetus, where, as a ventriloquist, Socrates gives voice to a Protagoras redivivus, back from Hades to defend his own positions (166a2–168c2 = 80 a 21a dk). Through these strategies, Plato seems to make allusion to the possible overlapping of the two figures, discerning the Socratic aspects in Protagoras and the Protagorean aspects in Socrates. In this chapter, I shall concentrate mostly on these narrative strategies, on the converging role of 6 Cf. Nails 2002, 256–257. 7 The most careful analysis of this opposition in the dialogue is that by Giannantoni 2005, 48–74. 8 Cf. Sedley 2004, 62–65. 9 Cf. Tell 2011, 39–59; Schriefl 2013, 102–141. The polemic against the sophists’ earning money from teaching is not limited to Plato. For example, Xenophon’s Socrates considers taking fees for teaching to be an infringement of one’s freedom (cf. Mem. 1.2.6, 1.6.5). For a useful survey of ancient sources on the problem, see Blank 1985. 10 On the similarities between Socrates and Protagoras in Plato’s dialogues, see the recent study concerning the Platonic presentation of sophists by Corey 2015, at 39–66, 165–200..
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