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Voter Privacy: a Transatlantic Comparison of Electoral Systems

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Voter Privacy: a Transatlantic Comparison of Electoral Systems VOTER PRIVACY: A TRANSATLANTIC COMPARISON OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Communication, Culture, and Technology By Catherine Jones Boardman, B.A. Washington, D.C. April 22, 2019 Copyright 2019 by Catherine Jones Boardman All Rights Reserved ii VOTER PRIVACY: A TRANSATLANTIC COMPARISON OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS Catherine Jones Boardman, B.A. Thesis Advisor: Meg Leta Jones , Ph.D. ABSTRACT Protecting voter privacy in modern democratic elections involves a highly complex sociotechnical system made up of interconnected people, technologies, legal frameworks, political cultures, and procedural practices. Elections in the United States stand out among all other Western democracies not only for their recent controversies, but also for their decentralized system of voting technologies, electoral administrations, and electoral laws. This paper will compare national elections in Estonia, Finland, Spain, and the United Kingdom to expose the strengths and weaknesses of the United States voting system and to show how voter privacy is an integral ingredient to democratic elections. Each of the selected countries implement different structures of electoral authority, utilize different voting technologies, follow different procedures, and operate within different legal frameworks and political cultures. Unlike in European democracies, the experience of voting in the United States differs depending on which state the voter is from. Although the U.S.’s patchwork system of electoral practices obstructs the voting process from adequately and equally protecting voter privacy, the system fits the unique circumstances of the American political system. The goal of this paper is to illustrate how voter privacy is of constitutive and instrumental use to the puzzle that is democracy. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis would not have been possible without the help and inspiration of Dr. Jones. Working with you on this project has been such an honor. I never thought a first day of class homework assignment would evolve into a one-hundred-page thesis, but here we are! Thank you for forcing me to overcome my fear of emailing strangers, for cold calling us in 505, for constantly encouraging me to think across disciplines, and for opening me up to the world of privacy. Thank you, Dr. Koliska, not only for being my second reader, but also for pushing me to become a better writer. Each of your classes pushed me to reconsider my conceptions of truth and reality, and to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions. Thank you for your constant encouragement and for inspiring me to think critically and thoughtfully! To my Mom, thank you for not helping me with my science projects for me when I was a kid. This paper, I hope, shows you it was worth it. To my Dad, thank you for the long phone calls, for reading every one of my papers, and for encouraging me to read everything and anything. To my brother and sister, sorry for bringing up elections and voting at every family holiday. I can’t promise I’ll stop, but I love you! Lastly, thank you to all my family, friends, and everyone at CCT who had to hear me rant about voting machines. Many thanks, Catherine Jones Boardman iv TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 II. Literature Review........................................................................................... 6 History of the Secret Ballot........................................................................ 6 Arguments Against Secrecy in Elections ................................................... 8 Arguments in Favor of The Secret Ballot .................................................. 9 A Sociological Perspective ........................................................................ 9 Voter Privacy ........................................................................................... 11 Threats to Voter Privacy .......................................................................... 14 Arguments Against Electronic Voting ..................................................... 16 Postal Voting ............................................................................................ 18 Effects of Electoral Reform ..................................................................... 20 Voting as a System................................................................................... 23 III. Method ......................................................................................................... 25 Why Compare Transatlantically .............................................................. 26 Selected Case Studies .............................................................................. 28 IV. Analysis........................................................................................................ 33 Estonia...................................................................................................... 33 Context ....................................................................................... 33 e-Estonia .................................................................................... 33 i-Voting ...................................................................................... 36 v Secrecy ....................................................................................... 38 Legal Framework ....................................................................... 40 Election Administration ............................................................. 42 Conclusion ................................................................................. 44 Finland ..................................................................................................... 44 Context ....................................................................................... 44 Election Administration ............................................................. 45 Legal Framework ....................................................................... 47 Voting Technologies .................................................................. 47 Secrecy ....................................................................................... 49 Conclusion ................................................................................. 51 Spain ........................................................................................................ 52 Context ....................................................................................... 52 Legal Framework ....................................................................... 52 Electoral Management ............................................................... 53 Secrecy ....................................................................................... 55 Voting Technology .................................................................... 58 Conclusion ................................................................................. 59 United Kingdom....................................................................................... 59 Context ....................................................................................... 59 Legal Framework ....................................................................... 61 Electoral Commission ................................................................ 62 vi Secrecy ....................................................................................... 63 Electronic Voting ....................................................................... 66 Conclusion ................................................................................. 68 United States ............................................................................................ 69 Political System ......................................................................... 69 Context ....................................................................................... 70 Legal Framework of the United States ...................................... 71 The Secret Ballot in the Law ..................................................... 72 The 2000 United States Presidential Election ............................ 74 Electoral Administrations .......................................................... 76 Voting Technologies .................................................................. 79 The Decentralizing Effect .......................................................... 82 Conclusion ................................................................................. 84 V. Discussion .................................................................................................... 87 Figures............................................................................................................................ 92 References .................................................................................................................... 101 vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Optical Scan Voting Machine ........................................................................ 92 Figure 2. Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machine ................................................ 92 Figure 3. Model of a Voting System .............................................................................. 93 Figure 4. Summary of Each Country’s Voting System ................................................
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