The Palestinian Refugee Problem Resolved by Shaul Bartal uring the 1948 war, some 600,000 Palestinian Arabs fled their homes to the neighboring Arab states or to parts of mandatory Palestine occupied by Arab Dstates (the West Bank and Gaza).1 Likewise, within a few years after the es- tablishment of the State of Israel, nearly all of the 850,000-strong Jewish population living in Arab states was either expelled or escaped with just their lives. Most made their way to Israel where they were resettled. While these latter facts may not be that well known, neither are they completely unfamiliar to students of the Middle East. What is less acknowledged, however, is the de facto agreement of Arab states to resettle Palestinian refugees in their respective territories, expressed in closed-door discussions at cease-fire committee meetings and other gatherings with Israeli representatives.2 Whether the Arab states properly repre- sented the refugees or treated them and their descendants fairly is a matter for the Pal- estinians and their Arab brothers to adjudicate on their own. The General Assembly. … Resolves that the POPULATION EXCHANGE refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should OF THE 1948 WAR be permitted to do so at the earliest practical date and that compensation should be paid On December 11, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution (3)194 whose paragraph 11 dealt with the problem of the war refugees: 1 Efraim Karsh, “How Many Palestinian Arab Refugees Were There?” Israel Affairs, Apr. 2011, pp. 224-46. For a different estimate see the PLO’s official report submitted to the U.N.: Munazzamat at-Tahrir al-Filastiniya, Dawrat Shu’un al- Mufawadat, “Nazara ala al-Mufawadat,” Ramallah, 2009, p. Shaul Bartal is a lecturer in the Department of 17. Middle Eastern Studies at Bar Ilan University. 2 See, for example, the Lebanese Minister to the Secretary of State, Oct. 1, 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States His most recent book is The Fedayeen Emerge: (FRUS), vol. VI; “Economic Development in the Middle The Palestine–Israel Conflict, 1949-1956 East. British Plans for Social and Economic Development,” British Foreign Office, FO 371/75092, FO Minutes, Events, (Bloomington, 2011). Dec. 21, 1949, British National Archives (Kew), p. 1416. Bartal: Palestinian Refugees / 29 for the property of those choosing not to all recommended the resettling of the Palestin- return and for loss or damage to property ian refugees within their borders.9 Most of these … [and] Instructs the Conciliation Com- states also demanded economic aid from West- mission to facilitate the repatriation, re- ern powers as payback for agreeing to the op- settlement, and economic and social reha- tion.10 But their agreement was kept quiet since bilitation of the refugees.3 they did not see eye-to-eye on this matter with As a General Assembly resolution, the U.N. both the Palestinians and their own populations. decision was in no way a binding recommen- At the 1949 Lausanne Conference con- dation.4 Nonetheless, it put forward the no- vened by the U.N. Conciliation Commission, tions that Arab (and Jewish) refugees (a) should Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon appeared as be allowed to return to their country of origin one bloc to discuss an agreement that also in- within the framework of a comprehensive peace cluded a solution to the refugee problem. While if they could be con- they had previously rejected resolution 194, they strued as peaceable; (b) now demanded that any deal had to be resolved or they could receive on that basis. They also told the U.N. Concilia- Delegations of reparations for damage tion Commission that they, the Arab states, rep- Palestinian to or loss of their prop- resented the Palestinian refugees. Three delega- tions of refugees that tried to reach the confer- refugees tried erty if they decided not to return; and (c) re- ence were treated with contempt by their Arab to reach the brethren and denied access to the discus- settlement was a no less 11 Lausanne reasonable option. sions. When they asked for an interview with conference and While the Arab the Egyptian delegation, they were unceremo- niously removed by force. At a later September were denied states vehemently op- posed resolution 194 1951 Conciliation Commission conference in access to the Paris, only delegations from the Arab states were and voted unanimously 12 discussions. against it (only in the asked to represent the refugees. late 1960s did they be- A critical aspect of these discussions and gin to transform the resolution into the linch- one that has been largely forgotten since that pin of their claim to a “right of return”),5 they time was that recommendations and attempts at did not shirk from quietly entertaining the feasi- resettling the Palestinian Arabs also focused bility of resettling the Palestinian refugees in on issues of compensation to the Arab states their territories. Iraq, Syria,6 Jordan,7 and Egypt8 for the expenses incurred in the absorption of their brethren. Alongside infusions of cash from Western sources, Arab governments viewed 3 “Palestine—Progress Report of the United Nations Media- tor,” U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) res. 194 (III), New York, Dec. 11, 1948. 8 Ibid.; Nachmias, “UNRWA Betrays Its Mission.” 4 Yafa Zilbershatz and Nimra Goren-Amitai, The Return of 9 Lex Takkenberg, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees the Palestinian Refugees to the Territory of the State of Is- after Sixty Years: Some Reflections,” Refugee Survey Quar- rael, Ruth Gavison, series ed. (Jerusalem: The Metzilah Cen- terly, no. 2-3 (2009), pp. 254-5; Jacob Tovy, Al Miftan Beita, ter for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought, 2010), Hitgabshut Mediniyuta shel Israel Be-Sugiyat Ha-Plitim Ha- pp. 38-42. Palestinim1948-1956 (Jerusalem: Herzl Institute for the Study of Zionism and History and Ben Gurion Research Institute, 5 Efraim Karsh, “The Palestinians and the ‘Right of Re- 2008), pp. 90-4, 159-71. turn,’” Commentary, May 2001, pp. 25-31. 10 Nachmias, “UNRWA Betrays Its Mission.” 6 Report of the director, UNRWA, Sept. 28, 1951, UNGA A/ 1905, para. 79; Nitza Nachmias, “UNRWA Betrays Its Mis- 11 Walter Eitan, Bein Israel La-Amim (Tel-Aviv: Massada, sion,” Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2012, pp. 27-35. 1958), pp. 50-1, 61; Mordechai Lahav, Hamishim Shnot Ha- Plitim Ha-Palestinim 1948-1999 (Tel Aviv: Rosh Tov, 2000), 7 “Summary Record, a Meeting between the Conciliation pp. 432-3; Benny Morris, Ledata shel Ba’ayyat Haplitim Commission and the Relief and Works Agency,” U.N. Con- Haplestinim 1948-1949 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1991), p. 352. ciliation Commission for Palestine, Feb. 6, 1951, A/AC.25/ SR.204. 12 Lahav, Hamishim Shnot, pp. 431-42. 30 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2013 with equanimity the confisca- tion of Jewish property to help offset costs, property that was coming into their hands as a result of a massive population transfer out of their borders occurring at the same time. Many Jewish communi- ties in the Arab states predated the Muslim conquest of the Middle East by hundreds of years. Many of their mem- bers had grown prosperous, served in their host nations’ law courts, military, and where such existed, parliaments and A Palestinian delegation from the Jericho conference presents considered themselves full- Jordan’s King Abdullah (center, in white turban) with the fledged citizens. Many more conference resolution for unity of the West Bank with Jordan eked out a livelihood as best under the Hashemite crown. The king was the architect of a they could, aware of a precari- policy to assimilate Palestinian refugees into the kingdom. ous situation in which today’s In June 1950, there were 506,200 Palestinian refugees listed good Muslim neighbor might by UNRWA in the Jordanian kingdom. turn out to be tomorrow’s op- pressor. Whatever their mate- rial circumstances, within a few years of the establishment of the State of Israel, done in a halfhearted fashion, the international the bulk of this population was forced out of community, alongside the Arab governments, their homes, leaving behind the vast majority of put in place practicable, if not perfect, solutions. their possessions.13 A closer look at that population exchange and Contemporary Palestinian spokesmen and the accompanying transfer of billions of dol- advocates are largely silent about the effective lars’ worth of Jewish property and holdings to population exchange carried out at that time. the Palestinian refugees is in order. While they may argue that the Arab states were not empowered to represent them or claim (falsely) that Jews who emigrated did so be- HASHEMITE KINGDOMS cause of Zionist manipulation rather than per- secution and harassment, the fact is that part of At the time, both Jordan and Iraq were con- the stipulations of U.N. resolution 194 were ac- stitutional monarchies ruled by members of the tualized in that compensation for relocation was Hashemite family. Their approaches to the refu- obtained—albeit through the forcible divest- gee and resettlement problem differed markedly, ment of Jewish citizenry—and resettlement oc- largely due to geographical and ethnic factors curred. Whether that compensation went to the as well as the absence of a Jewish community in proper recipients or whether resettlement was Jordan versus the well-established one of Iraq. It must be remembered that up to 1974, Jor- dan considered itself the representative of Pal- estinian rights since most of its citizens (ap- proximately 60-70 percent) were of Palestinian 13 Yaakov Meron, “Why Jews Fled the Arab Countries,” origin. This perception was formalized in a 1962 Middle East Quarterly, Sept.