Strength and Power

Ideas of Moral Autonomy Within Australian Doctrine:

An analysis informed by the Stoic philosophy of Epictetus

Richard Adams

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts.

University College, the University of New South Wales.

2012 ABSTRACT

Investigating ideas of moral autonomy in Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.6: Leadership in the Australian Defence Force (“doctrine”), the present thesis finds expectations of moral strength subordinated beneath ideas of positional power. For this reason doctrine is not seen to provide a philosophy applicable to the profession of arms.

Recalling the foundations of western military thinking in classical Greece, the thesis investigates the metaphor of the hoplite phalanx. The phalanx defined a physically brutal, philosophically uncompromising approach to conflict. In the phalanx, military service was saturated with moral expectation. Following collapse of the poleis and demise of the phalanx, critical ideas were recaptured by Stoicism, a philosophy resonant with western military ideals.

Stoicism found compelling expression in the philosophy of self-mastery asserted by Epictetus. Harm, argues Epictetus, comes only from the surrender of moral autonomy. This uncompromising credo captured the Socratic conviction that good will alone is significant. Evoking Plato and Aristotle, this idea captures the bequest of classical thinking to modern ethics.

Stoicism articulates a philosophy of morally autonomous and purposeful self-mastery. Resonant with the profession of arms, Stoicism belittles physical harm in relation to the agony of shame endured by those who fail in moral duties. Yet, despite the military timbre, Stoicism is seen in the present study to challenge the dominant ideas of Australian doctrine.

Doctrine detaches ideas of personal integrity from the reality of war. Doing so, doctrine fails to recognise that war has a moral veracity determined by human judgement, and connected to inherited and persistent moral ideas. Moral ideas persist through the advancement and evolution of societies, illuminating philosophical constants and enabling war to be interpreted and understood as more than manoeuvre and strategy.

Recalling the past, this study provokes consideration of a new doctrinal paradigm. The study connects Australian doctrine to ethical concepts which, since September 11th 2001, have reasserted themselves as decisive elements of international affairs and conflict. The study does not argue for the resurrection of classical criterion. Rather, the study tables Stoicism as a lens through which doctrinal principles may be reinterpreted and made relevant.

i DEDICATION

TO ALL WHO HAVE SERVED HONOURABLY IN THE CAUSE OF A BETTER PEACE,

AND TO THOSE WHO HAVE LOVED AND LOST THEM.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I acknowledge a debt to my wife, who afforded unwavering support.

I am grateful to Jack and Beth: inspirational examples and loving friends.

I acknowledge the debt I owe Geoff and Mike: scholars, and gentlemen.

I acknowledge the debt I owe Stephen for his supervision.

I hope I shall be absolved for inevitable omission.

Richard Adams

ii

ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

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iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract p. i Acknowledgements p. ii Originality Statement p. iii Copyright Statement p. iv Annotated Chronological Table p. vii Glossary of Terms and Concepts p. xxv Chapter One: Introduction p. 1 Western Military Thinking p. 6 Aim of the Research p. 9 Doctrine and Moral Thinking p. 10 Conscience and Just War p. 18 Importance of the Research p. 26 Significance of Stoicism p. 32 Structure of the Dissertation p. 35 Future Research p. 45 Chapter Two: Ever to be the Best p. 59 Homer: Ruler of the Greek Imagination p. 60 The Beginning of Freedom for Greece p. 64 Honour: A Common Rivalry to be the Best p. 65 Honour and Hubris p. 71 Honour and Aretê p. 74 Honour and the Polis p. 78 In the Afterglow of Greatness p. 91 Chapter Three: Standing Firm in the Ranks p. 102 Classical Hoplites p. 102 Honour and Duty in the Phalanx p. 107 United in a Just Cause p. 114 Free Citizens: Better Warriors p. 124

v Chapter Four: Seek not Outside Yourself – The Stoic Ideal p. 144 Eclipse of the polis and the Rise of Stoicism p. 144 Stoicism p. 148 Stoic Ethics p. 150 Epictetus p. 151 Epictetus and Moral Autonomy p. 157 Epictetus: His Concept of Prohairesis p. 162 Epictetus and Moral Obligation in Society p. 170 Chapter Five: Australian Doctrine p. 190 Doctrine’s Prevailing Theme p. 191 The Significance of Doctrine p. 192 The Cultural Paradigm p. 193 Positional Power and Moral Strength p. 196 The Bureaucratic Elite p. 197 Beyond “the Ethical Pursuit of Missions” p. 207 The Limit of Force p. 219 The Limit of Blame p. 224 The Limit of Westphalia p. 225 The Limit of Victory p. 230 Chapter Six: Conclusion p. 243 Foundational Concepts p. 244 Importance of the Present research p. 245 The Significance of Doctrine p. 248 Service Among Equals p. 249 Stoic Autonomy p. 254 A Doctrine of Command p. 257 Democratic Ideals p. 262 New Truth p. 263 List of References p. 274

vi Annotated Chronological Table

This table provides historical context for the dissertation.

B.C. c. 1200: End of Mycenaean civilization.

Mycenaean civilization was the pre-Hellenic monarchic Palace civilization, with a well-established government bureaucracy. The collapse of Mycenaean civilization brought about the Greek Dark Age, which persisted until about the eighth century B.C.

When the Greek world re-appeared in history, it was the society of the military aristocracy depicted in Homer, in which the idea of aretê (individual excellence) emerged as central to Greek life. c. 776: Olympic Games.

The competitive festival (reflecting the deep roots of competition in Greek society) conducted at Elis in the western Peloponnese, uninterrupted until 393 A.D when the Emperor Theodosius abolished them. A list of Olympic victors, drawn up by Julius Africanus, has been preserved by Eusebius. c. 800 – 700: Lycurgus, traditionally the founder of the Spartan constitution and most of the institutions of ancient Sparta. Xenophon, writing in the first half of the fourth century, believed Lycurgus founded Sparta’s institutions shortly after the Dorian invasion of Laconia circa 1000, when the native Achaeans were enslaved, to becoming state-owned serfs, and known thereafter as helots.

Lycurgus is more likely to have existed in the second half of the seventh century, devising the drastic and militaristic reforms which followed the helot revolt, and which established Sparta as the most militarised and most militarily capable city in Greece. At this time, Lycurgus probably instituted the Gerousia (senate or council of elders) and appella (assembly). c. 753: Legendary date of the foundation of Rome by Romulus. c. 750 – 650: Probable date of the written composition of the Iliad and the Odyssey by Homer.

Homer’s composition would have relied on oral traditions; the influence of which is evident in the repetitions and inconsistencies of a text, which was originally intended to be heard, rather than read.

vii The Iliad, set around the Trojan War, is an exploration of the heroic ideal. The epic derives its focus and energy from the wrath of Achilles and the nobility of Hector.

The Odyssey describes the journey of Odysseus as he returns home from the war. The two epics were foundational to Greek culture and education in the classical age, communicating ideas of aretê and chivalry, which have evolved but endured since that time. c. 546: Persian Empire extends to the Aegean Sea; Ionian Greek cities captured.

Ionian describes the Greek settlements on the western coast of Anatolia – now Turkey. c. 509: Foundation of the Roman Republic.

Following the period of Roman Kings (circa. 753 – 510 B.C), which ended with the overthrow of Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, the early Republic (510 – 364 B.C) established political institutions which were reinvented in the period of the Imperial Principate. The early republic was marked by struggles between the social orders – the patricians (the patricii or privileged class of Roman citizens – a term likely derived from pater meaning member of the senate”) and the plebeians (the plebs or general body of Roman citizens). Government was by two annually elected consuls who replaced the deposed king. The Senate, which had formerly advised the king, now advised the magistrates and the Roman people. Two popular assemblies, the centuriate assembly and the tribal assembly, represented the people and deliberated respectively on military matters, and matters of domestic government and law. c. 508: Foundation of democratic constitution by Cleisthenes at Athens. c. 499: Revolt of the Ionian Greeks against the Persians. c. 490: Persian Emperor Darius invades Greece; his army is defeated at Marathon.

Darius I:

Born circa 550 B.C, and died circa 486 B.C, Darius I of Persia was noted for administrative genius. He sought to invade Greece on several occasions – until finally defeated at Marathon.

Battle of Marathon:

Fought in September 490 on the Plain of Marathon. Under the command of Miltiades, ten thousand Athenian hoplites, supported by a contingent of one thousand Plataeans, repulsed the first Persian invasion in an afternoon. The victory proved the advantage of the close massed phalanx

viii of heavy infantry armed with long spears, over Persian tactics and weapons. c. 480 – 479: Xerxes, son of Darius, invades Greece. Allied with Thebes he is victorious at Thermopylae, but defeated by Themistocles at Salamis.

Thebes:

Major city of Boeotia and seat of the legendary Oedipus. Thebes, one of the chief cities and major powers of classical Greece, was locale of many ancient Greek tragedies.

Thermopylae:

A narrow pass, six kilometres in length, on the east coast of Greece, 136 kilometres north-west of Athens.

Battle of Thermopylae:

The Greek forces, mostly Spartan, were led by the Spartan King Leonidas. After three days, the Greeks were betrayed and outflanked by the invading Persians of Xerxes.

Themistocles:

Born circa 524 B.C and died circa 460 B.C, an Athenian politician, naval strategist and admiral.

Salamis:

The smaller Greek fleet defeated the larger Persian fleet in the narrow strait between the island of Salamis and the Athenian port-city Piraeus. c. 472: Aeschylus wrote The Persians.

The Persians: Significant as the dramatisation of the recent history of Salamis. The play is set in Persia where a messenger brings news to the Persian Queen of the disaster. The interpretation is that defeat represents the judgement of the gods upon the Persians for straying beyond Asia. c: 472: Athens forms the Delian League, a confederacy of poleis (the polis / pl. poleis was the Greek city-state) under the leadership of Athens, with a treasury and annual meeting at Delos and later at Athens. The Delian League opposed the Peloponnesian League, a confederacy under the leadership of Sparta. c. 443: Pericles dominates Athenian politics. The Parthenon is built. Sophocles wrote Antigone. Herodotus wrote his Histories.

ix Pericles:

Born circa 495 B.C, died circa 429 B.C, Athenian statesman and general, responsible for the full development of Athenian democracy.

Distinguished by intelligence and incorruptibility, Pericles was elected to the generalship unopposed, time and again. He epitomised the democratic ideal which he articulated powerfully in the funeral oration likely written, certainly edited, by Thucydides.

This oration, delivered after the first campaigning season of the Peloponnesian War, acknowledges the fallen who are described as sacrificing themselves in the cause of Athenian democracy. In actuality, Athenian life was shy of this ideal.

As the Peloponnesian War loomed, Pericles had conceived a maritime strategy. He evacuated the Athenian countryside, and brought the population in behind Athens’ defensive walls. His intention was to rely on the fleet to assure food and supplies, and to maintain the wider expanse of empire. The treasury was full, and Pericles was confident that Athens could outlast any Spartan siege.

The strategy, however, failed to account properly for the profound connection of the Athenian population to the land. Great firmness was required to force citizen farmers to abandon their land to the ravages of Spartan invaders without a fight. Displaced citizen soldiers suffered a terrible collapse in morale, as they were corralled behind the long walls. Living conditions deteriorated, and there was a plague due to the over- crowding. Discomfit was made more arduous by the absence of military success. Pericles was deposed, and though recalled, he made no advance before succumbing himself to plague.

Herodotus:

Born c. 484 in Halicarnassus, and died c. 430 – 420, the first author to provide an authoritative historical narrative, his Histories record the Graeco – Persian wars, and delve beyond myth in the search for causes. Herodotus described the customs of many non-Greek peoples with great sensitivity and without prejudice. There is good reason to believe he was in Athens during the early years of the Peloponnesian War c. 431 – 404: Peloponnesian War, with the Peace of Nicias 421 – 415. Euripides wrote The Trojan Women.

Peloponnesian War:

Fought between Athens and Sparta, the leading states in Greece, and the alliances centred on these two powers, the Peloponnesian War might be

x understood as having two parts or phases. The first part was concluded in 445 by treaty pledging the so-called Thirty Years’ Peace.

In the second decisive and more dramatic phase, (431 – 404) recorded by Thucydides, fighting engulfed the Greek world. Athens had the stronger navy, Sparta the stronger army.

The Athenian alliance – the Delian League – was rather more tyrannical empire than democratic alliance. Vassal states, which paid tribute or contributed either soldiers or oarsmen, included most of the island and coastal states around the northern and eastern shores of the Aegean Sea. Sparta headed the Peloponnesian League, an alliance of independent Peloponnesian land powers and the Corinthian fleet.

Events which re-ignited hostilities began in 433 when Athens allied itself with Corcyra, which had been established by Corinthian colonists. Sparta and its allies accused Athens of expansionism in violation of the terms of the Thirty Years’ Truce. Pericles convinced the Athenians not to back down, and accordingly diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute were doomed.

Ultimately, Thebes (allied to Sparta) attacked Plataea (allied to Athens), thus provoking the second phase of the Peloponnesian War. The uneasy six year Peace of Nicias interrupted conflict. When concord collapsed, fighting resumed and continued unabated for eleven years. Hostilities were brought to a close by the defeat in 405 of the Athenian Fleet by the Spartans under Lysander at Aegospotami. Lysander had received significant Persian aid.

Peace of Nicias:

So called, the Peace of Nicias was an uneasy six year period during which diplomatic manoeuvre seeking to end the Peloponnesian War gradually gave way to smaller scale military operations, and a full scale resumption of conflict following the Athenian assault against Sicily in 415.

The Trojan Women:

The play is an indictment of war. Influenced by the atrocity of Melos, and produced in 415 B.C, the play is set immediately after victory over Troy, and treats the suffering of Troy’s defeated leaders and the suffering of their wives and children. Significantly Astyanax – son of Hector – is thrown from the battlements of Troy. c. 429: Death of Pericles. c. 427: Sack of Plataea, Revolt of Mytilene

Sack of Plataea by Sparta:

xi Plataea, a small and ancient city of Boeotia, was positioned so as to exert pressure on the road between Thebes and Corinth. When the Persians invaded in 490, Plataea sent a contingent and fought besides the Athenians. When, in 479 the Persians invaded again, the Plataeans fought under command of the Spartan general Pausanias in the defeat of the Persian army of Mardonios. Pausanias declared the city inviolable on account of her gallantry. Yet the city was attacked by Thebans in 431, and by Sparta in 429, and razed by Sparta in 427.

Revolt of Mytilene and reprieve by Athens:

When Mytilene on the island of Lesbos staged a revolt, Athens imposed a blockade. The city surrendered in 427. Paches, the Athenian commander, despatched the city’s leaders to Athens where they were executed summarily. Wholesale execution and enslavement of the remaining populace was averted only at the last minute following debate in the Assembly. c. 425: Aristophanes writes Acharnians.

Acharnians is a forthright attack on the folly of war. Dicaeopolis secures a private treaty with the Spartans and enjoys a peacetime life of wine, food and sex. The incompetent Athenian general Lamachus is lampooned. c. 421: Scione reduced. Aristophanes wrote Peace.

Capturing Scione, Athens put all the adult males to death, and enslaved the women and children.

Peace: Staged for the first time seven months after the death of the Spartan General Brasidas and the Athenian General Cleon, and only some weeks before ratification of the Peace of Nicias. In the play, war-weary farmer Trygaeus discovers “Peace” buried by “War” in a pit. He rescues her, and the play concludes with a joyful celebration of marriage and fertility. c. 418: Battle of Mantinea.

An alliance of Athens, Argos, Elis and Mantinea was defeated by Sparta in the territory of Mantinea. c. 417: Hysiae captured.

Sparta captures Hysiae, killing all the freemen and dispersing the remainder to their native cities. c. 415: Athenian expedition to Sicily.

Commanded by Alcibiades, Nicias and Lamachus, the expedition was conceived initially as a force of 60 ships to support Ionians against the

xii rising power of Syracuse. But ambition overpowered common sense. Eventually 140 ships were sent. Things went irreversibly awry when Alcibiades was recalled to stand trial for impiety. Alcibiades immediately defected to Sparta, which sent assistance to the Syracusans against the Athenians. c. 405: Spartan victory at Aegospotami.

Aegospotami: The naval victory of Sparta over Athens followed four days of manoeuvring by the Spartan admiral, Lysander. Surprised in their anchorage off Aegospotami, the Athenians under Conon escaped with twenty of 180 ships. c. 406 – 396: Roman siege and capture of Etruscan city of Veii. c. 405 – 367: Tyranny of Dionysius I in Syracuse. c. 404: Athens sues for peace, and the Peloponnesian War is concluded. Sparta imposes government by the Thirty Tyrants.

The Thirty Tyrants:

Between 404 and 403, following Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War, Athens was governed by a Spartan-imposed oligarchy. Sparta appointed thirty so-called commissioners to the oligarchy, led by Critias. The regime prosecuted a bloody purge in which 1500 moderate Athenians were murdered. Many citizens fled the city. They mustered their forces and returned to overthrow the tyranny and restore democracy at the Battle of Piraeus in 403. The tyrannical inter-regnum had lasted a year. c. 399: Socrates is condemned to death in Athens.

Socrates:

Born circa 470 B.C, died circa 399 B.C, Socrates was a philosopher and teacher who wrote nothing. His personality and doctrine are illustrated in Plato’s dialogues, in which Socrates is rendered as a man of insight, integrity and argumentative skill.

At the age of 70, Socrates was brought to trial on a charge of impiety and sentenced to death by poisoning by a jury of his fellow citizens. He was sentenced, most likely because he exposed the ignorance of powerful people.

Plato’s Apology purports to be the speech Socrates gave in response to accusations made against him.

Among the convictions Socrates held with confidence was that virtue is the only thing of true importance and that subsequently a good person can

xiii never be harmed, because his virtue will remain intact. This idea is central to Stoicism.

Socrates was widely recognised in his native Athens, where he was frequently mocked in drama – The Clouds by Aristophanes being the most notable example. c. 387: Plato founds The Academy.

Plato, born circa 427-428 B.C, died circa 348 – 347 B.C, was student of Socrates and teacher of Aristotle.

His family was highly distinguished, his father descended from the last King of Athens. His mother was related to Critias and Charmides who were among the Thirty Tyrants who ruled briefly after the Athenian collapse, and until the restoration of democracy in 403 B.C. When Socrates was put to death, Plato fled to Megara. On his return, he founded the Academy. c. 371: Thebes, led by Epaminondas, defeats Sparta, led by Cleombrotus, at Leuctra in southern Boeotia. The battle established the reputation of the Theban phalanx who introduced the innovative oblique order, and concentrated their force against the Spartan command. Cleombrotus was killed.

Epaminondas:

Born 410 B.C, Epaminondas was a Theban statesman and general who died on operations at Mantinea in 362. His tactical innovations were responsible for unseating Sparta from her position of military dominance, and thus for changing the balance of power in Greece.

At Leuctra he abandoned the convention of an infantry advance by soldiers drawn up in equal ranks and over an even front. Instead, he massed his strongest troops in great depth and opposed the strong Spartan right flank. Attacking the enemy at their strongest point and with unsurmountable force, Epaminondas inflicted such loss on the Spartan army that the foundation of the Spartan state was shaken. Epaminondas followed his victory with an unprecedented invasion of the Peloponnese – being the first invader to reach the Eurotas valley for at least two centuries. c. 338: Defeat of Athens by Philip II of Macedon at Chaeronea.

Chaeronea:

In Boeotia, central Greece, a battle in which Philip’s son, Alexander (the Great), commanded the left wing and contributed significantly to the

xiv victory, following which Macedon established a foothold in Greece, thus representing the start of Alexander’s eventual empire.

Philip II of Macedon:

Born in 382, Philip II was King of Macedon 359 – 336 B.C. He forged peace and political stability in Macedon and gained dominion over Greece by military and diplomatic means, thus establishing the foundations of the Empire conquered by his son, Alexander.

The advances Philip made by diplomatic means were considerable. Over the years 346 – 343 he bought many allies, and made many enemies. Significant among his opponents was Demosthenes, who saw Philip’s diplomatic influence (underlined by military power) as a bar to an Athenian resurgence. Philip tried to conciliate the Athenians, but came to see Demosthenes as implacable. In 340, inspirited by Demosthenes’ rhetoric, Athens declared war against Philip. In 338 Philip won a decisive victory at Chaeronea but left Athens untouched, seeking to win an ally rather than suppress an adversary. In 337 he established the League of Corinth. Reinforced by Macedonian garrisons, the League was inaugurated by delegates from all the Greek states except Sparta. The delegates acknowledged Philip as hegemon and pledged to perpetuate peace.

Preferring diplomacy to war, Philip was yet a general of high order. He built the army with which Alexander conquered an empire. Notably, the sarissa – a pike half as long again as the Greek spear – was his innovation, as was the combined arms tactics which gave terrific expression to cavalry power. His administration appeared philhellenic, and preserved significant cultural associations – notably with Plato’s Academy and with Aristotle – whose father had been physician to Philip’s father Amyntas and who spent important years as Alexander’s tutor. c. 336 – 323: Alexander the Great.

Alexander was King of Macedonia. As a very young man, Aristotle taught him. Alexander overthrew the Persian Empire and laid the foundation for the Hellenistic world which spread Greek culture and ideas.

Born in 356, Alexander acceded to the throne in 336 on the murder of his father, Philip II. Acclaimed by the army, Alexander faced no opposition, but nevertheless he executed the princess Lyncesits, who was alleged to be behind the murder, along with all possible rivals and oppositional factions.

Early in his reign, Alexander faced the revolt of Thebes, to whom the Athenians (urged on by Demosthenes) had voted help. Sparing the

xv temples and Pindar’s house (Pindar: 518 – 438; lyric poet, widely admired but very difficult): Alexander razed Thebes, where his father had once been imprisoned under Epaminondas. Six thousand were killed, the remainder sold as slaves. The other Greek states were intimidated by this severity. Athens was treated leniently. The example demonstrates Alexander’s great affection for Athens and for Hellenism, as well as the ruthlessness with which he was prepared to impose his will.

As a general, Alexander stands among the greatest. Strategically skilful, tactically flexible and imaginative, he was intrepid and audacious. His career led to the spread of Greek civilisation, and initiated the Hellenic successor kingdoms which followed his death. c. 335: Aristotle founds The Lyceum.

Aristotle: Born circa 384 B.C, died circa 322 B.C, philosopher who has exerted a decisive influence on western thought. A student of Plato for twenty years, his eudaimonic theory of human flourishing continues to exert profound influence. c. 335 / 331: Birth of Cleanthes

Cleanthes, head of the Stoic school after Zeno is known for fragments and for the hymn to Zeus which is reproduced in Cicero and Seneca. c. 300: Zeno founds the Stoa in Athens.

Inspired by Socrates and Diogenes, Zeno of Citium established the Stoic school of philosophy. The philosophy stressed ideas of duty and moral autonomy. c. 280: Birth of Chrysippus.

Chrysippus, who died around 206, exerted decisive influence on Stoicism, particularly insofar as he systematized Stoic logic and doctrine. c. 264 – 241: First Punic War. c. 218 – 201: Second Punic War.

Punic Wars: Wars between the Roman Republic and Carthage. (See c. 149: Third Punic War) c. 212: Capture of Syracuse by Rome. c. 185: Birth of Scipio.

(In full) Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus, a Roman general famed for his exploits in the Third Punic War (149 – 146) for which he

xvi was awarded a triumph and the name “Africanus,” and for his subjugation of Spain. Died 129 in Rome. c. 180: Birth of Panaetius.

Founder of Roman Stoicism and friend to many Roman grand seigneurs, Panaetius studied under Diogenes of Seleucia and Antipater of Tarsus. An admirer of Plato and Aristotle, he tempered the austerity of the ancient Stoa, whilst maintaining Stoic fundamentals. He passed the last twenty years of his life in Athens and died c. 109. c. 168: Final defeat of Macedon by Rome.

Macedon: Geographically, Macedonia forms the connection between the Balkans and the Greek peninsula. In the fourth century, Macedon achieved hegemony over Greece and established the short-lived empire, which stimulated the Hellenistic Age. c. 149 – 146: Third Punic War

Last of three wars between the Roman Republic and the Carthaginian Empire, resulting in the ultimate destruction of Carthage, the enslavement of the population and Roman hegemony over the western Mediterranean. c. 146: Sack of Corinth and Carthage by Rome.

Corinth, a city in south, central Greece 80 kilometres west of Athens at the eastern end of the Gulf of Corinth. The city was of great strategic and commercial importance.

Victory over Carthage and Corinth gave to Rome an inexorable military momentum. Thus martial energy turned swiftly and inevitably toward the East and the decaying Hellenistic empire. The Romans organised conquered territory into provinces under control of Roman governors backed up by garrisons. c. 135: Birth of Posidonius.

Pupil of Panaetius, Posidonius was known to many influential men, including Cicero, who studied under him in 78-77, and Pompey. He was influential in spreading Stoicism through the Roman world. He died c. 51. c. 106: Birth of Cicero.

Marcus Tullius Cicero, famous as a lawyer, statesman, orator and scholar who tried to uphold Republican principles in the civil war. Died c. 43.

Cicero was the son of a wealthy family without noble ancestry. Seen thus as a “new man,” he was never accepted by the Optimates’ political clique.

xvii Cicero initiated his public career as quaestor in Sicily. He later filled the office of praetor and formed a close relationship with Pompey. He was elected Consul in 63 against his great rival, the seditionist Catiline. Following the assassination of Caesar in 44, Cicero made an enemy of Antony, whom he attacked savagely in the Philippics after the assassination of Caesar. He died violently in the proscriptions of 43. The head and hands were displayed at the speakers’ platform in the Forum.

Notes:

Consul: The senior military and civil magistrate in Rome

Optimates: following the example of the Greek upper classes, those who regarded themselves as the best men, combining moral and social superiority.

Praetor: senior magistrate

Quaestor: lowest of the regular magistracies c. 102 – 101: Marius defeats the Teutons and Cimbri.

Elected consul seven times, Gaius Marius was the first Roman to illustrate the political support that a successful general could derive from the votes of the army. Marrying Julia, the aunt of Julius Caesar, Marius made a good marriage into a patrician family. c. 58 – 51: Caesar in Gaul. c. 44: Assassination of Caesar. c. 43: Second Triumvirate.

After the assassination of Caesar, Octavian (Later Augustus), (Mark) Antony and (Marcus) Lepidus obtained (by the Lex Titia 27 Nov. 43) a five-year dictatorial appointment as triumvirs. They formed the Second Triumvirate, after the First, which had been informal and between Pompey, Crassus and Julius Caesar.

The Triumvirs divided the west among themselves. (Gaius) Cassius and (Marcus Junius, also called Quintus Caepio) Brutus – assassins of Caesar – occupied the east. Defeated by Antony and Octavian in two battles at Philippi, each of the assassins took his own life.

The Triumvirs drew up a list of “proscribed” political enemies. The consequent executions included 300 senators (including Cicero) and 2,000 members of the class below the senators, the equites or knights.

The Triumvirate continued until 33, but the balance of power was insecure. Following the forced retirement of Lepidus, Octavian pursued a

xviii deliberate rivalry with Antony, eventually defeating him at the Battle of Actium. c. 31: Battle of Actium gives Octavian (Former Triumvir and the adopted son of Julius Caesar) sole power. He took the name Augustus.

Initiating the Principate, Augustus was Princeps, the first Roman Emperor following the Republic, which had been destroyed by civil war and the eventual dictatorship of Julius Caesar.

Civil War

The Roman economy (like those of the Greek poleis) was fuelled by slavery – which had the effect of enriching the rich and impoverishing the poor. Inevitable social tension erupted into several years of civil disquiet and conflict, as Rome transitioned from a republic into an empire.

In its later stages, the civil war was defined by Julius Caesar who established the dictatorship and with it, the model for the autocratic principate. This was government by an autocratic emperor derived from the term princeps - first citizen – which was intended to disguise the emperor’s dictatorial powers behind seeming revived republican institutions.

In 49 B.C, Caesar, when a general, led his troops across the border of Cisalpine Gaul into Italy. Crossing the little river Rubicon, Caesar committed an act of war against Rome. Caesar was convinced that misgovernment of the Greco-Roman world by the Roman nobility should not continue. He sought to replace the corrupt ancien régime with his own dictatorship.

The forces of Caesar were opposed by those of Pompey, who was murdered on campaign in Egypt by an officer of Ptolemy. (Ptolemy XIII, brother of Cleopatra VII. He married his sister in 51 and later expelled her. He declared war against Caesar, and was defeated).

Ultimately victorious, Caesar was distinguished by the clemency he showed his contestants. Affording amnesty to opponents, and investing many with responsible positions in his administration, Caesar sowed the seed of his own murder in the Senate on March 15, 44 B.C. Civil war and unrest persisted after Caesar’s murder and continued (during the Second Triumvirate) for another twelve years. The eventual recuperation of the Greco-Roman world under the autocratic Principate owes much to the administrative genius of Augustus.

Pax Romana

The gigantic work of reorganization that Augustus carried out in every field of Roman life and throughout entire empire transformed the

xix decaying republic and created a durable Roman peace, based on easy communications and flourishing trade. This was the Pax Romana, and it ensured the survival and eventual transmission of the classical Graeco- Roman heritage, and provided the means for the diffusion of Judaism and Christianity.

The continuation of Greco-Roman civilisation had important historical effects, enabling European culture to be impregnated with Hellenism for another six centuries. Hellenism, which exerted a decisive influence upon Christianity – and a significant impact upon Islam, has established definitive traditions in western philosophy, among them the ideas of Stoicism. c. 4: Birth of Seneca.

Lucius Annaeus Seneca, a Roman Stoic, statesman, orator and tragedian, died 65 A.D in Rome.

Seneca was the second son of a wealthy family. He was trained as an orator. Seneca began a career in politics and law, but fell foul of Caligula who almost had him murdered.

Claudius banished Seneca to Corsica on a charge of adultery with the princess Julia Livilla, the emperor’s niece. Recalled to Rome, he became praetor and married a wealthy woman, Pompeia Paulina. Seneca became connected with the Praetorian Prefect, Burrus, and tutor to the future emperor, Nero.

The murder of Claudius pushed Seneca to the top and Nero’s first public speech was drafted by Seneca. But, in the politically treacherous atmosphere of Nero’s court, favour was uncertain. Seneca was denounced by his opponents who convinced Nero that he had conspired to murder the emperor. Nero forced Seneca to suicide, an end which was greeted with Stoic fortitude and composure.

A.D c. 9: Disaster of Varus in the Teutoburg forest, Germany.

Three Roman legions under Publius Quintilius Varus were ambushed and annihilated utterly by German tribes led by Arminius, chief of the Cherusci. This rout prevented the Romanization of Germany between the Rhine and the Elbe. c. 14: Death of Augustus.

xx c. 14 – 37: Principate of Tiberius.

(In full: Tiberius Caesar Augustus). Known chiefly for his last years as a tyrannical recluse, inflicting a reign of terror against the major personages of Rome, Tiberius was the adopted son of Augustus. Despite the decay and dread which scarred his last years, Tiberius strengthened and enriched the Empire. When he died, he left Rome prosperous and the Principate stable, so that for a long time it was able to survive the excesses of his successors. c. 37: Birth of Nero. c. 37 – 41: Principate of Caligula.

(In full: Gaius Caesar Germanicus). Famously debauched, Caligula is synonymic for cruelty, despotic caprice and for the extortion to which he was reduced, having squandered the vast sums Tiberius had accumulated in the state treasury. He made pretensions to divinity, and revealed extravagant affection for his sister Drusilla, who was consecrated as divine upon her death in 38. Cassius Chaera, tribune of the Praetorian Guard, murdered Caligula at the Palatine games. c. 41 – 54: Principate of Claudius

(In full: Tiberius Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus). The son of Nero Claudius Drusus, a popular general, and nephew of Tiberius, Claudius was ruthless, occasionally cruel, unattractive and efficient. He brought many efficiencies to the public administration of the Empire. Claudius married his niece Agrippina and adopted her son, Nero. When fatally poisoned by Agrippina, Nero succeeded him. c. 43 – 44: Conquest of Britain. c. 51: Birth of Domitian. c. 55: Birth of Epictetus in Hierapolis. c. 54 – 68: Principate of Nero.

(In full: Nero Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus). Stepson and heir of the emperor Claudius, Nero is known chiefly for his cruelty, debaucheries and extravagances. c. 68 – 69: Principate of Galba.

(In full: Servius Galba Caesar Augustus). Roman emperor for seven months, Galba came to power forcefully. He was dismissed with similar violence – murdered by the Praetorians in the Forum.

xxi c. 69: Principate of Otho.

(In full: Marcus Otho Caesar Augustus). Emperor from January to April 69, Otho had organised a conspiracy among the Praetorian Guard, who murdered Galba in the Forum, and proclaimed Otho to be Emperor.

However, the legions in Germany had declared their allegiance to Vitellius, and were marching to Rome with the intention of installing him. Otho mounted an expedition to defeat the German legions, but was himself defeated. He committed suicide. c. 69: Principate of Vitellius.

Aulus Vitellius, last of Nero’s short-lived successors, was proclaimed Emperor by the armies from Germany. But he did nothing to conciliate the soldiers of his former opponent, who joined with troops from other parts of the Empire to depose him. Vitellius abdicated, and was murdered with great brutality. c. 69 – 79: Principate of Vespasian.

(In full: Caesar Vespasianus Augustus). In the wake of the civil strife which followed Nero’s death, Vespasian initiated the Flavian dynasty, which ended with Domitian. He introduced fiscal and political reform which, besides a significant programme of public works, helped to consolidate the Empire. c. 79 – 81: Principate of Titus.

(In full: Titus Vespasianus Augustus). The conqueror of Jerusalem in 70, Titus succeeded his father promptly and peacefully. His short and popular rule is illustrated by Suetonius, who called him “the darling of the human race.” His death at 41 was likely hastened by his brother Domitian, with whom he had poor relations, and who succeeded him as Emperor.c. 81 – 96: Principate of Domitian.

(In full: Caesar Domitianus Augustus). Known chiefly for his purge of the Senate, Domitian courted the army and was popular with them. But he was broadly unpopular on account of his cruelty and ostentation. He wore triumphal dress in the Senate, and presided over four-yearly games wearing Greek dress and a golden crown, whilst his fellow judges wore crowns bearing his own effigy among effigies of the gods. According to Suetonius, a grave source of affront was Domitian’s insistence on being addressed as dominus et deus (“master and god”).

Domitian was opposed by a senatorial clique headed by Helvidius Priscus, whose father, executed by Vespasian, had borne the same name. Likely, the Stoic views of this clique provoked Domitian and encouraged him to expel philosophers from Rome.

xxii c. 96 – 98: Principate of Nerva.

(In full: Nerva Caesar Augustus), the first of a succession known traditionally as the “five good emperors.” Nerva, related by marriage to the Julio-Claudian house, had been consul twice, in 71 and 90. On the assassination of Domitian, he became emperor. His premiership is known chiefly for his renunciation of the tyrannical means by which Domitian had imposed his rule.

The Five Good Emperors:

The imperial succession of Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian (117 – 138) Antonius Pius (138 – 161) and Marcus Aurelius (161 – 180). This was not a bloodline, but a succession of adopted heirs, each related only distantly - if at all, to his predecessor. The period witnessed expansion of the empire, accompanied by the Romanizing of the peoples in language and culture. c. 98 – 117: Principate of Trajan.

(In full: Caesar Divi Nervae Filius Nerva Traianus Optimus Augustus). Born in what is now Spain, Trajan was the son of a legion commander and the first Emperor to be born outside Italy. Trajan is known chiefly for his expansion of the Empire, notably in Dacia, Arabia, Armenia, and Mesopotamia, for his programme of building and public works and for his programme of social welfare. c. 117 – 138: Principate of Hadrian.

(In full: Caesar Traianus Hadrianus Augustus). The nephew of Trajan, Hadrian was an admirer of Greek civilization known chiefly for the consolidation of the Empire, and for the Panhellenion. This was a federation of Greek cities which redefined the politics of Roman Greece.

Between 121 and 125, Hadrian toured the empire to inspect troops and examine frontier defenses. Famously, in northern Britain, he initiated construction (circa. 122) of the military wall which bears his name, and which continued to serve the legions until the Roman withdrawal from Britain in 410. c. 121: Birth of Aurelius

(In full: Caesar Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus). Aurelius served as Emperor 161 – 180. He is best known for his Stoic treatise, The Meditations.

Aurelius embraced the Discourses of Epictetus, and found his chief intellectual and spiritual nourishment in the Stoicism Epictetus proclaimed. Written in Greek, The Meditations reveals the interlacing of cultural forms, and the profound effect of Greek culture. Fragmentary and

xxiii discursive, The Meditations is not a formal argument, but rather a significant and revealing glimpse of daily thoughts which are profoundly evocative of Epictetus. c. 135: Death of Epictetus in Nicoplis.

Epictetus: Born at Hierapolis in Phrygia (now Pammukale, Turkey) died at Nicopolis, in Epirus, Greece. Born into slavery he was, for a time, the slave of Epaphroditus, bureaucrat in the court of Nero. Epaphroditus fled Rome on the accession of Domitian, at which point it is likely Epictetus was freed.

Epictetus studied for a time under Musonius Rufus. Until expelled from Rome in 95 by Domitian, he taught on his own account. Epictetus wrote nothing. His works were recorded by his pupil, Arrian, as The Discourses and The Enchiridion or Handbook.

Interested primarily in ethics, the philosophy of Epictetus reveals the strong influences of Socrates, and the Cynic Diogenes. A dominant theme in his philosophy is the idea of prohairesis; understood to mean “integrity,” or “will”. The significance of this idea is in the imperative for moral autonomy, or self-control.

xxiv Glossary of Terms and Concepts

This glossary outlines and consolidates terms and ideas which offer logical context to the dissertation.

Aporthetos: In classical Greece, the determination that ancestral land should remain inviolate. Infringement upon the land of another was seen to provide just cause for hoplite citizen-farmers to take up arms, and to fight chivalrously in accord with the strict jus in bello conventions and rituals of phalanx conflict.

Aretê: The concept of aretê, or “individual excellence,” evolved in the Homeric age to exert a profound effect on classical culture and philosophy. The concept exerts a persistent influence in western thinking and culture.

Ideas of aretê dominate the Iliad and the Odyssey where the aristoi, or “best” exemplify ideas of human distinction and superiority. The virtues of the aristoi which were intrinsic to Homer came to perfuse Greek culture. The concepts were heroic; ideas of prowess and distinction as a soldier in war or an athlete in peace, which resonated with the contention for kudos (honour) and kleos (glory) which was ubiquitous throughout Greece.

As the meaning of aretê came to be enlarged, the sense became an ideal of self- mastery. This is the Stoic construal of the term. The thinking is less about competition for superiority over others, and more about mastery of the self.

Athens: Alongside Sparta, Athens is emblematic of the classical age. Associated with the intellectual and artistic cornerstones of western civilisation, Athens is notable for the fifth century B.C. innovation of democracy, and distinguished by classical age architectural ruins. Financed by silver mines in the Laurium Hills and the tribute of allied states, Pericles commenced a significant programme of works in the fifth century. His political intent was to provide employment and to keep currency in circulation. Over a period of some forty years, the Acropolis was rebuilt in marble quarried from Mt. Pentelicus. The Parthenon, commenced in 447 B.C, was completed around 438 B.C. Defeat in the Peloponnesian War meant that in later centuries, building works were never again so ambitious, and apart from military works, little was accomplished in the fourth century.

The city is noted particularly for the philosophy schools of Plato, who founded the Academy, Aristotle who established the Lyceum, Antisthenes and the Cynics and Zeno who established the Stoic school in the Stoa Poikile in the agora (forum or civic centre of a polis).

Classical (Period in Greece): Emerging from the Greek Dark Age was the archaic period, which found its full maturity in the classical age. The classical period th th corresponds roughly – certainly most vibrantly - to the 5 and 4 centuries B.C. During this time, Greece was not a country but rather several hundred independent city-states, each known as a polis (pl. poleis) with surrounding countryside under agricultural cultivation. The period is recognised most notably

xxv for the foundation of democratic government, but only male citizens could vote and hold office.

In approximately 508 B.C, Cleisthenes initiated the democratic constitution of Athens. The conventions which evolved at this time – and which resonate in modern democracies - saw men of eighteen years able to participate and vote in weekly meetings of the Assembly (known as the Ecclesia), which was famously held on the Pnyx. This was a hill not far from the Acropolis. Debate was open, and voting was by a show of hands. The Council of Five Hundred determined the agenda of the Assembly. This was a representative body elected from the Athenian demes (which were like municipal councils).

Underlining popular democracy in Athens was a system of people’s courts with jurors chosen from among the male citizenry over thirty years of age. The overall picture is of a polis in which the citizens were expected to bear extensive civic obligations.

Classical Greece is known also for the Peloponnesian War, the fruitless endless conflict with poleis aligned to Sparta.

Dark Ages (in Greece) With the collapse of Mycenaean Greece, which thrived from around 1600 B.C. until around 1200 B.C, came the Greek Dark Ages, a period which began to end around 900 B.C. The Dark Ages ended with a great period of resettlement or colonisation. The best understood was the Dorian invasion. Ideas about this period are confused, but for the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to understand that with colonisation came the beginning of the city-state movement, and the foundations of the religious and language traditions of later Greece.

Eudaimonia: The term eudaimonia means a state of human “flourishing.” The decisive point for Epictetus is that eudaimonia requires virtuous character, nothing else. The significance of this position is illuminated by brief comparison with the attitude of Aristotle who, in the Eudemian and in the Nichomachean Ethics presents the first cohesive treatment of eudaimonia as an idea connected to concepts of aretê or virtue. Aristotle holds that eudaimonia is endangered if one lacks certain advantages. He argues that to some extent, good living and human flourishing require good fortune – in other words, that the advantages of wealth, power, physical beauty and the like help people to live virtuously. For Epictetus, well-being is connected to nothing but mind and reason. Here is the hard edge of Stoicism, a doctrine of self-mastery which proclaims virtue as its own reward.

Geneva Conventions: The Geneva Conventions are a series of treaties concluded between 1864 – 1949 in association with the Red Cross and for the purposes of ameliorating the effects of war on soldiers and civilians. Two additional protocols to the Conventions were approved in 1977.

The first treaty was initiated by Henri Dunant, founder of the Red Cross who was horrified by the carnage of Solferino, as the Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded in Time of War. This convention provided, among other things, for

xxvi the impartial reception and treatment of wounded combatants, the protection of civilians providing aid and recognition of the Red Cross symbol. Ratified within three years by all the major European powers and by many other states, the First Convention was extended in 1906, by the second Geneva Convention, which seeks to ameliorate the awfulness of conflict at sea.

Following the First World War, the Third Geneva Convention in 1929 required belligerents to treat prisoners humanely, and to permit visits by the representatives of neutral states. Following the Second War, a 1948 conference in Stockholm redrafted existing provisions, which were approved in Geneva in 1949. These conventions offered clarified and cohesive address regarding:

1. The Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and Wounded in the Field,

2. The Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea,

3. The Treatment of Prisoners of War, and

4. The Protection of Civilian persons in Time of War.

After four years’ negotiation, two additional protocols to the Convention were signed in 1977. Protocol 1 established fact finding commissions to investigate breaches of the Convention and extended the protection offered by the Convention to those engaged in wars of self-determination. Protocol II extended human rights protections, prohibiting collective punishments, torture, the taking of hostages, terrorism, slavery and humiliating treatment such as rape or enforced prostitution.

Ratified by some 180 states, the Geneva Conventions have underpinned the establishment of war crimes tribunals for Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994), and by the International Criminal Court, which was created by the Rome Statute in 1998.

Hague Conventions: The international treaties drafted at The Hague in 1899 and 1907. The result of the 1899 conference were conventions defining states and customs of war on land and at sea, banning expanding (“dum dum”) bullets and asphyxiating gas, and establishing the Permanent Court of Arbitration for the pacific settlement of international disputes. The second conference in 1907 adopted conventions relating to the rights and duties of neutral powers, submarine mines and the status of enemy merchant ships.

Hellenistic (Period): Following the political subjugation of classical Greece, Greek culture and thinking continued to exert an enormous influence, attributed in large part to the conquests of Alexander the Great. Hellenic influence continued in the period of the successor kingdoms, when the generals who had served Alexander divided conquered territory into separate dominions. The former

xxvii generals, who ruled, came to establish dynastic control. The Attalids ruled in Asia Minor, the Seleucids in Persia and the Ptolemies in Egypt. The great cities of Greece declined in importance, with the exception of Athens, which continued to excite imaginations for the role and prominence of the city during the classical period. The Hellenistic period came to an end with the rise of Rome, which itself continued to propagate significant elements of the Greek universe.

Helot: The helots are understood to have been the state-owned slaves of Sparta. State ownership is the point which defines helotage. This meant that whilst the slaves were assigned to individual Spartans, they could not be bought, sold or liberated and remained the property of the state.

Though the ethnicity of the helots is uncertain, they were likely the original Laconian and Messenian inhabitants of the land around Sparta, who were reduced to servility after invasion and colonisation by the Dorian people – who became known as Spartans.

The helots outnumbered their Spartan masters, who were constantly watchful and on guard against a helot revolt. One of the ways in which the helots were subjugated, was by a policy of state-sanctioned murder.

Entering office each year, the ephors (magistrates) declared war on the helots. This declaration enabled a helot to be killed at any time, without violating legal principle or religious scruple. Murder was the responsibility of the krypteia or secret police. The krypteia were enrolled from those in the final year of the agoge. These young men would then patrol the Spartan countryside and murder any supposedly dangerous or especially courageous helot.

Note 1: At various times other states may have employed helots, but they are understood primarily as a Spartan institution.

Note 2: The institution of slavery was common. Even Athens, recalled through rose coloured spectacles as democratic, exploited slaves. Besides slaves, metics were non-resident aliens who were denied citizen’s rights and liberties, though they contributed much to the economies of the poleis in which they were resident.

Heroic / Homeric: Ideas derived from Mycenaean Greece, which thrived from around 1600 B.C. until around 1200 B.C. Mycenae was the seat of Agamemnon, brother of Menelaus, and leader of the Greek expedition to Troy.

The Mycenaean age was dominated by the palaces of aristocratic élites, a ruling class responsible for generalship in war and justice in peace. This was the heroic age (or the Homeric age), a chivalric patriarchal culture embodied in the epics of Homer. Traditionally the end of this civilisation is attributed to the invasion of the Doric people from northern Greece. The collapse of Mycenaean civilisation prefaced the Greek Dark Ages, which concluded with the rise of classical civilisation.

xxviii The political and economic systems of Mycenaean Greece were far less developed than in the later classical period. Societies were essentially dissimilar and tribal, centred decisively on individual poleis. This reasoning is demonstrated by reference in Homer, not to Greeks, but to distinct peoples such as to the Achaeans, Argives, and Danaans. These people were only linked to each other by dialects of the same language and by religious similarity.

Homer did not live in the age which is named for him. Rather, Homer recorded in epic verse the stories which had been preserved for perhaps six hundred years by means of an oral tradition.

International Criminal Court: A permanent judicial body established by the Rome Statute of the United Nations in 1998 to prosecute individuals accused of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The Court is headquartered in The Hague. The Court prosecutes individuals as a court of last resort, operating when national courts fail to act. Though some 140 states have ratified the Rome Statute, the United States, China and Russia are notable exceptions.

International Humanitarian Law: Principles articulated in the Geneva Conventions applicable in armed conflict and requiring parties to conflict to distinguish between civilian populations and combatants, and to spare civilian populations and property. Additionally, humanitarian principles are to be found in the United Nations Conventional Weapons Convention (1981) which prohibits mines, booby traps and incendiary weapons directed against the civilian population or used indiscriminately. The First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (1977) imposes detailed targeting restraints in order to protect civilians. The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property (and two protocols) aim to protect the cultural heritage of peoples from the effects of conflict. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1997 Ottawa Convention prohibiting anti-personnel mines also articulate humanitarian principles.

Jus ad Bellum: (Justice of War) The idea that resort to armed force is justified under only certain conditions. Rooted in classical culture and thinking, and containing religious and secular elements, concepts of just war coalesced as a coherent body of thought and practice during the middle ages. At this time, ideas of jus naturale (natural law) and jus gentium (the Roman idea of the law of nations) were informed by emerging chivalric codes and by Christian thinking on the justification of war and non-combatant immunity.

Significant Christian rationales for war can be found in St. Augustine (354 – 430) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274). Secular thinking can trace its origins to Cicero who argued that wars must be declared openly, in the name of a just cause and fought in a particular fashion. This thinking reflects the aporthetos idea which was a central feature of phalanx warfare between the poleis. The same ideas are conspicuous in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace) by Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645). Grotius articulated the rationale for defensive war, holding that war is justifiable only when a nation faces imminent danger and the use of

xxix force is necessary and proportionate to the threat.

The arguments of modern scholarship emphasise that war must meet specific jus ad bellum requirements:

1. War must be declared by a proper authority

2. War must have a just cause, such as defence of the common good or a response to grave injustice

3. The warring state must have just intentions, that is to say, war must be waged for justice rather than for self interest and

4. The aim of war must be for the establishment of a just peace.

The following conditions have emerged since the end of the Second War to be considered equally foundational:

1. There must be a reasonable chance of success

2. Force must be used as a last resort and

3. The anticipated benefit of war must outweigh the inevitable cost.

Jus in Bello: (Justice in War) The ideas and laws of just conduct in war are embodied within the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the Protocols to the Geneva Convention. Significant jus in bello concepts are the ideas of lawful combatants, the status of prisoners of war, the ideas of proportionality which restrain the means by which war might be made and which aim to spare the civilian population, and ideas about the status and obligations of neutral states and war crimes.

1. A just war is conducted by lawful combatants who are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, not criminals, when captured. Lawful combatants are distinguished from mercenaries. Special provisions are made under the 1977 First Protocol to the Geneva Convention with regards to guerrilla operations.

2. Prisoners of war are accorded special protections in a just war. They may not be coerced to perform acts or to provide information, and they are required to offer only their name, rank and serial number. At the conclusion of hostilities, prisoners of war are to be repatriated.

3. There are limits on the means and methods by which a just war is conducted. Article 22 of the Regulations affixed to the 1907 Hague Convention provides that “the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.” This principle is illustrated in Article

xxx 23 of the same Convention which prohibits poison gas, the use of arms designed to cause unnecessary suffering, killing those who have surrendered and declaring that no mercy or quarter shall be given.

4. Justice in war demands belligerents spare the civilian population and property.

5. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable in just war. Neutral states are expected to do nothing to aid or impede any party to a conflict. Soldiers of a belligerent state who enter a neutral state are typically interned. Neutral shipping may be inspected by the warships of belligerent states.

6. The idea of war crimes is a significant entailment of jus in bello thinking. The term has no definite meaning, but finds its most evocative and vivid expression in the Nuremburg trial of the Nazi war criminals following the Second World War. These tribunals have exerted a profound effect, establishing that individual men are liable for offences against international law.

Laconia: (see Sparta) Peace of Westphalia: In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War and established the international system of states.

Peloponnesian War: (431 B.C. - 404 B.C.) The Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta broke out following the collapse of a truce which had endured for thirty years. Fighting, which concluded in Athenian defeat, had embroiled the entire Greek world; since Athens and Sparta had forged extensive diplomatic leagues and fought at the head of separate military alliances.

Polemarch: A senior Spartan officer, commander of a regiment (morai) roughly equivalent to a modern colonel.

Polis (pl. Poleis): The ancient Greek city-state, typically centred on a walled urban area and inclusive of surrounding land under agricultural cultivation. Characteristically, the poleis featured an acropolis or citadel, and open forum / marketplace (agora). The decisive feature was the active participation of citizens in the political and religious functions of society. Thus, it was a civic obligation to participate in military defence, religious rites, the courts and in political debate and decision. The nature of poleis government was not uniform; typical forms were oligarchic, democratic, tyrannical or aristocratic.

Soldiers: Used in this thesis to describe the men and women who serve in any of the three armed services. The term is used for it’s concision and gender equality.

Sparta: Sparta was capital of the district known as Laconia, (historically Lacedaemon). Situated in the fertile Eurotas valley, the Spartan city-state was, and remains, renowned for the austere and uncompromising military oligarchy

xxxi th which ruled from the 9 century B.C. Sparta devoted itself to war with a single- mindedness which ensured the decay of Spartan art, philosophy and literature. Even more, the dedication to military rule by the Spartan oligarchs precluded hope of political unification in Greece.

West / western: The idea of the “west” describes the culture of classical antiquity that arose in Greece and Rome; survived the collapse of the Roman Empire; spread to western and northern Europe; then during the periods of exploration and colonization of the fifteenth through nineteenth centuries expanded to the Americas, Australia, and areas of Asia and Africa; and now exercises global political, economic, cultural and military power. Huntington (2003: p. 151) argues; “Australia has, from its origins, been a Western society”.

xxxii CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Background

Accepting that “there is no substitute for honour as a medium for enforcing decency on the battlefield, never has been, and never will be,”1 this thesis is interested in the ethical principles contained within

Australian military doctrine (Australian Defence Doctrine Publication

00.6: Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, hereafter “doctrine”).

Doctrine is the formal expression of military philosophy and culture.

Mindful of Socrates’ thinking in the Crito, this thesis acknowledges ethics as a matter of rational decision and conscience. Ethical decisions, aimed toward ideas of justice, seek to avoid shame and injustice.2 In the

Crito, Socrates illustrates “a basic ethical principle which runs through virtually all treatments of ethics, (this) is that one ought always to do what is morally right and never what is morally wrong”.3

Interested in the doctrinal arguments which inform soldiers as human beings and as moral agents, this thesis construes the terms “ethics” and

“morals” without technical nuance. The meaning of these terms is seen to be parallel with ideas of rationality and choice, duty, obligation, virtue, good and right. In general, the thesis understands that:

1 It is the task of the human being as a moral agent, as it is the task of the soldier as a member of his profession, through the use of his reason and (guided by) ethical principles, to decide and to understand why under a given set of circumstances he must do something or not do something. It is in the solution to such problems that ethical action is found.4

Resonant with the “constellation of independent and nonspecific virtues”5 which informs our understanding of martial honour, decisive ethical concepts involve “personal virtue (or) individual excellence based on personal conviction”.6 These ideas are synonymic with integrity, conscience and character, which are foundational to western ideas of citizenship and military service.7 The ideas entail that “the mere compliance with specified precepts or obligations is not an ethical act unless one is aware that one is observing an obligation and knows why”.8

Doctrine fails to acknowledge that, “in a free society the soldier who functions best is the soldier who is guided by a quiet but active conscience”.9 In doctrine, expectations of moral strength and autonomous conscience are subordinated to ideas of positional power known as command.10 The overstatement of command construes soldiers as compliant and ethically passive, and thus diminishes and disfigures the honourable ideals of service. In doctrine, soldiers are not seen to be moral agents and members of the profession of arms who bear an ethical responsibility to decide what ought to be done.

2 Doctrine fails to recognise that the ideals of professional military service are connected to the ideals of society in a way which bureaucratic concepts of command and notions of positional power are not.11 Asserting the primacy of command, Australian doctrine emphasises the pragmatic exercise of positional power. Doing so, doctrine ignores what Ignatieff called the “modern moral imagination” and the “impalpable moral ideals” which perfuse international affairs.12 These are moral ideals in which societies place trust and confidence. Since Mathew Brady photographed the horrors of Gettysburg and thus collapsed the “moral distance which had separated civilians from the reality of slaughter,”13 they are moral ideas which societies recognise as crucially important. The Royal

Australian Navy acknowledges the connection between military service and national ideals, holding naval service to be:

Connected to notions of human dignity, not to ideas of worldly power or authority…as people we are moral equals, each equally deserving the respect which promotes trust and confidence. This ethic is in tune with Australian society, and internationally recognised humanitarian principles, according to which the profession of arms serves in defence of ideals and human rights, as well as in defence of political territory.14

More than the legalist and bureaucratic philosophy of command, the ethos of military service resonates with notions of individual merit and moral responsibility. These ideas are connected intimately with the concepts of commitment and just cause which populate jus ad bellum debate apropos the justice of war. In the present study, the adjectival ad bellum

3 discussion is seen to be interlaced with adverbial jus in bello debate which concerns justice in war. The fusion of these logically distinct arguments frames what Hackett called the “unlimited liability”15 of the profession of arms. Pace Osiel, this is much more than a soldier’s commitment to “risk death for his country,”16 and more than “the individual commitment to almost unlimited service”.17 Hackett identifies the individual and professional moral responsibility, which is asphyxiated by Australian doctrine. Hackett defines an unlimited moral liability. He expects soldiers to be totally and unwaveringly responsible. He expects granite integrity and moral purpose and argues powerfully that:

A man can be selfish, cowardly, disloyal, false, fleeting, perjured and morally corrupt in a wide variety of other ways and still be outstandingly good in pursuits…. He can be a superb creative artist, for example, or a scientist in the very top flight, and still be a bad man. What the bad man cannot be is a good sailor, or soldier or airman.18

Hackett plainly expects soldiers to be morally responsible for what they do. Yet, Australian doctrine expects soldiers to be alert only to the

“ethical pursuit of missions”.19 Doctrine assumes that soldiers “have had little say in the Government’s decision to go to war,” and argues that for this reason “(soldiers are) required to subjugate (their) will to that of the

Government” which is understood to mean that “once a military superior has decided on a legal course of action there is little (that soldiers) can do but obey and comply”.20 The argument is narrow and repressive, equating ideas of ethics with ideas of law and denying soldiers access to arguments

4 concerning the justice of the cause. Soldiers are expected to do as they are told and comply with traditional and positive rules of engagement. In this way, doctrinal argument obliterates the moral agency of soldiers and underlines a military culture which is “totalitarian, authoritarian, anti- individualistic (and) hierarchical”21 and military training which:

Works by deliberately reinforcing pre-existing dispositions towards unreflective obedience…eradicating the moral and emotional distress associated with obedience to destructive authority.22

Stanley Milgram explained the peril of this innate disposition toward obedience. Recognising obedience as the most significant psychological phenomena of modern times, Milgram wrote:

It has been reliably established that from 1933 to 1945 millions of innocent people were systematically slaughtered on command. Gas chambers were built, death camps were guarded, daily quotas of corpses were produced with the same efficiency as the manufacture of appliances. These inhumane policies may have originated in the mind of a single person, but they could only have been carried out on a massive scale if a very large number of people obeyed orders.23

In contrast, Epictetus articulates an uncompromising philosophy of moral autonomy and self-mastery. Though his argument challenges Australian doctrine, Epictetus “provides a philosophy applicable to (the) profession

(of arms)”.24

Epictetus exemplifies Stoicism, which emerged from the disintegration of the poleis to enrich the Hellenistic age. His philosophy resonates with

5 ideas of integrity; a notion “more or less on the same plane as conscience, and (which) presupposes moral autonomy”.25 Integrity entails commitment to higher interests, rather than to self-interest. The Stoic ideal holds “any action motivated by self-interest, honour included, does not deserve to be called moral”.26 In this way, Stoicism affirms ideas emblematic of the phalanx. Stoicism coincides too, with western martial ideals grounded in cultural notions of individualism, obligation and self- discipline:

Autonomy is the ideal, the way we want to be, other-directedness is seen as the regrettable reality, and the way too many people are. Most of us believe in a free subject who chooses his or her own way through life…we have put our faith in conscience…Westerners are supposedly less concerned by how their behaviour looks in the eyes of others; instead they are primarily motivated by how it looks in their own eyes. Face and reputation are no longer of overriding importance.27

Western Military Thinking

“For as long as men and women have talked about war, they have talked about it in terms of right and wrong”.28 War - more than a physical fight or base slaughter - is a moral concept. Thus, the ideals of military service are saturated with moral expectation. These are expectations which owe much to the foundation of western29 military thinking in classical

30 Greece; a period broadly understood to be from 508B.C, when

Cleisthenes established the democratic constitution in Athens, until the defeat of Sparta by Thebes at Leuctra in 371B.C.

6 Discussing war, language is laced with moral meaning. Words like faithfulness, devotion, atrocity, honour and shame, expose the centuries of moral argument which have been an entailment of conflict.31 The scrutiny, understanding and articulation of moral claims and principles is thus crucial.

Yet Australian doctrine lacks the philosophic power and acuity requisite of the military ideal. Blunted by a bureaucratic tonality, philosophic ambiguity, conjecture and contradiction, the doctrine fails to articulate a cogent moral position. Doctrine thus fails to establish an ethical keystone for the Australian profession of arms. Doctrine presents a philosophically callow argument, overburdened with ideas of command and positional power. Recalling the classical ideal, this thesis challenges doctrinal thinking.

The hoplite is a formidable moral metaphor. Through him, moral philosophy found meaningful embodiment in the social world.32 He was the ethical quintessence of his culture. Accepting the different military traditions which evolved throughout the Greek world,33 this study illuminates the hoplite phalanx as a metaphor for ideals which are foundational to, and tacit within, the western military tradition. The hoplite metaphor integrates competing themes of collective duty and individual reputation. These themes contextualise persistent significant ideas, and inform analysis of Australian doctrine in the present thesis.

7 Founded upon the tenebrous Homeric proto-phalanx, the classical phalanx was a distinctive but not universal military structure which retained the essence of élitist heroic ideals.34 “The ideology of the hoplite remained the heroic ethos of Homer”.35 The aristocratic individualistic ideals of the Homeric champion36 blended into the anonymous mass of equals which was the phalanx. Through him, classically élitist ideas of merit and responsibility have been perpetuated; because, as chapter two explains, classical thinking is foundational to the Western military tradition.

Yet, lacking any basis in moral philosophy and failing to interpret classical concepts which give meaning to its cultural inheritance, contemporary Australian doctrine articulates little more than authoritarianism found upon conceited belief in the commissioned class.

This is unsafe because:

Once an officer is established, in his own view, as a member of a superior and order-giving class, he never loses this sense; but he can and often does, lose all awareness of the moral basis of this superiority and all the qualities which constitute this basis. He just becomes superior, as it were, in vaccuo…he has…sloughed off his sense of moral obligation; but has retained an unassailable sense of his own superiority…and absolute right to give orders.37

Overstressing the power of one over others, doctrine overlooks moral strength; being the power which one must have over oneself.

Foundational to Stoicism and characteristic of the hoplite tradition, the idea of autonomous self-mastery is resonant in notions of conscience or

8 integrity, and crucial to the honourable example, which is imperative to military service in a just cause.

Aim of the Present Research

The present thesis investigates the ideas of moral autonomy in Australian

Defence Doctrine Publication 00.6; Leadership in the Australian Defence

Force.

This study informs ideas of professional military service. The study interprets service as a morally rich idea, interwoven with the ideals of society, and morally responsible in a way that subservience to command is not. The thesis recalls the Stoicism of Epictetus as a lens through which doctrinal ideas may be interrogated.

This thesis examines foundational concepts which, in doctrine, are often tacit beneath the overt lexis. Interrogating deeper forms crucial to a proper understanding of ideas, the study illuminates the “from-to” structure Polanyi identified as fundamental,38 because disconnected from the ancestry of moral thought, moral argument is reduced to superficial rhetoric. As MacIntyre explains:

Those various concepts which inform our moral discourse were originally at home in larger totalities of theory and practice in which they enjoyed a role and function supplied by contexts of which they have now been deprived…. The evaluative expressions we use have changed their meaning. In the transition from the variety of contexts in which they were originally at home to our

9 own contemporary culture; “virtue,” and “justice,” and piety” and “duty”…. have become other than once they were….39

Within Australian doctrine, such moral ideas as these are abstracted from the cultural milieu in which they were formed. Thus, offering a purposive reading informed by Epictetus, this study acknowledges the larger philosophic perspective, without which doctrine is merely the expressive assertion of artificially independent, and insubstantial ideas.

Stoicism, which prefigured ubiquitous Kantian concepts of duty and responsibility,40 “claimed the allegiance of a large number of educated men in the Graeco-Roman world”.41 Focused on integrity and holding

“the virtuous will alone (to be) good, and the virtuous will (to be) independent of outside causes,”42 Stoicism provides a cogent and compelling framework within which doctrinal claims might be examined, and connected to larger ideas of culture and morality.

Doctrine and Moral Thinking

The present study recognises doctrine as a body of thought containing, among other things, the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives.43 Doctrine occupies a profound position as the formal articulation of a military philosophy.

Doctrine is foundational to the “normative self-understandings which…define the profession’s corporate identity (and) its code of conduct”.44 Doctrine “is taught within a group as its corporate beliefs, principles or faith”45 to establish the “rules of the game” which are

10 foundational to a military culture, identity or ethos.46 Much more than an irrelevant service manual disconnected from military culture,47 doctrine is an intrinsic element within a wider culture, “imparted by corporate ambience as much as by explicit teaching”.48

This is an ambience which, in the case of Australian doctrine, is not attuned to evolving moral conversation. Whilst moral argument which surrounds conflict has become increasingly sophisticated, Australian doctrine perpetuates superannuated thinking inapplicable either to modern society or to contemporary conflict. Questions of moral purpose and religio-cultural identity have emerged as significant components of international relations and conflict.49 Yet, Australian doctrine has not responded to moral imperatives which have become more conspicuous since September 11th, 2001. Though long before this tragedy, there was disconnection between entrenched patterns of military thinking and the formulaic lexis of military doctrine, and the universal moral stakes of societies in conflict.50 Thus, unraveling the moral ideas in doctrine, the present thesis affords significant insight.

The moral ideas which informed classical thinking owed much to élitist and heroic ideals. Underlining the impregnation of classical society by heroic idealism, “the main theme of the epic poet was ‘the fighting where men win glory’”.51 This thinking was modulated when the classical poleis, found upon an ideology of community,52 cultivated a broader and more sophisticated perspective. Hence, in the fifth century, views of

11 honour qua merit and moral responsibility came to involve less selfish ideas of mutual obligation, restraint, moderation, and personal integrity.

Investigating these ideas, the present work offers complementary insight to the research of Hanson who, in his influential work, Why the West Has

Won, avoids scrutiny of the moral ideas which textured classical life and continue to inform western military culture.53 Hanson passes over the moral ideas which informed Greek military power. He explains how classical military practice informs western military tradition – but he does not explore the equal significance of classical philosophy. Yet, the Greeks fought differently, because they thought differently.54 Moral thinking was profoundly important in the Greek world, and classical ideas of military service reflected moral concepts which are not so very far below the surface of the western military ideal.

In The Trojan Women (415B.C), Euripides demonstrates the significance and complexity of the moral ideas which texture the profession of arms.

Following the capitulation and slaughter of Melos, and butchery at

Plataea, Scione, Hysiae and (almost) Mytilene (where the decree to murder the populace was rescinded at the last minute) Euripides was heartsick at “simple barbarity”55 justified in the name of honour and glory. When he has Hecuba exclaim: “Achaeans! All your strength is in your spears, not in the mind,”56 Euripides illustrates the ethical perspective which should distinguish soldiers from murderers. When

Poseidon curses the victorious Greeks:

12 That mortal who sacks fallen cities is a fool,

Who gives the temples and the tombs and hallowed places

Of the dead to desolation. His own turn must come.57

Euripides points out a fundamental truth – soldiers should fight in the cause of a better peace. Such an end can be accomplished only when soldiers conduct themselves with ethical measure and restraint. Those who behave barbarously and with realist disregard for ideals will earn resentment and inspire revenge. As Euripides cautions, their own turn will come.

The moral ideas acknowledged by Euripides find superficial and peripheral observance in doctrine, where they are overshadowed by the morally undemanding spirit of compliance. Australian doctrine tranquilises the ideals of personal excellence and the imperative of moral autonomy which pervaded classical thought. So whilst the “ethical” accomplishment of missions58 is acknowledged by doctrine as the ambition of Australian arms, the idea lacks gravity and meaning. Doctrine neither explores, nor explains the meaning of the term “ethical”. In consequence, the idea is philosophically void. In doctrine, the connotation of “ethical” is unthinking adherence to prescriptive codes, following rules, compliance to the laws. Doctrine argues that “(t)he mission to defend one’s country requires the maintenance of operationally capable forces with high levels of fitness, commitment, efficiency and discipline,”59 and that allows soldiers no scope to disobey legal yet morally intolerable orders.60 Focused on capability, efficiency and

13 discipline, doctrine mounts a pragmatic argument, nothing more. Doctrine expects compliance from soldiers “lawfully ordered into harm’s way under conditions that could lead to the loss of their lives”.61 Doctrine expects soldiers to die defending territory, not ideals and principles.

Speaking to conformance, ethical is used in doctrine as a legal term. But licit compliance or conformity to rules does not entail conformity to ideas of ethics in the sense that this term entails ideas of good.62

The significance of this research is grounded therefore, in the hallucinatory discussion of moral responsibility sustained in doctrine published by Australian Defence Headquarters in 2007. Though war is an intrinsically and profoundly moral endeavour, the ethical discussion which should inform military service is omitted from Australian doctrine.

Hence, doctrine fails to provide a basis for even elemental moral deliberation and decision.

Dealing less with moral strength than with positional power, Australian doctrine connects responsibility - not to moral principles binding on rational beings63 - but to morally complaisant notions of adherence to legal prescript. Asserting the ultimate imperative of acquiescence with command direction,64 doctrine enfeebles and diminishes the moral ideals of service. Doctrine supports and reflects a military culture in which soldiers are “treated like automatons or irresponsible adolescents”.65 In doctrine, expectations of moral autonomy and prudential judgement are subordinated to ideas of positional power. Ideas of leadership are attached

14 to artificial ideas of authority qua command, to celebrity without distinction and acclaim without virtue. In consequence, the ideal of military service is construed wrongly as morally vapid, and soldiers are turned into mere instruments of the state. They are denied their moral voice, and expected to suppress their conscience to the will of

Government in a way which is antithetical to the western liberal and democratic tradition.66

This reading is entrenched within the Defence Leadership Framework – a model, embedded within doctrine, which defines service in terms of bureaucratic hierarchy and relative precedence disconnected from merit and moral responsibility.67 This is a model which asserts that “Defence espouses a philosophy of values-based behaviour,”68 whilst prescribing

“the core leadership proficiencies and capabilities that people are expected to demonstrate” in order to meet “opportunities” for

“development and assessment” and “to allow skilling”.69 Detailing more than four hundred performance criteria over umpteen unvarying pages, this model catalogues the bureaucratic trivialities of managerial habit, supposing that this “provides guidance to supervisors and employees in relation to staff management and performance”.70

The Defence Leadership Framework is an anti-individualistic and

Stalinist inventory of minutiae, which supports and reflects a bureaucratic culture of rules and blame. The purpose of the framework is not to develop and encourage ethically responsive and principled service, but to

15 preserve established hierarchies and to protect officialdom. Criterion, so numerous and so detailed that they are like rules, do not outline service ideals. Rather, these measures serve the bureaucratic purpose of “butt protection”.71 The framework reflects the sort of bureaucratic “charlatanry and puffery,”72 which should have no place in the military.

Gabriel explains why the bureaucratic model is antithetic to the military ideal:

The only way to make an officer (or soldier) ethical is to give him the opportunity to act ethically, and this implies the opportunity to act unethically as well. To continue to suggest that an officer’s word is his bond is nonsense when…institutional conditions attempt to substitute bureaucratic procedures for ethical judgement and responsibility. The existence and use of these institutional conditions leads to a reliance upon bureaucratic rules and mechanisms of control, while undercutting the soldier’s opportunities to exercise ethical judgement.73

Arguing similarly against the over prominence of legalistic and bureaucratic thinking, Vice Admiral James Stockdale argued against

“officers’ ticket punching (focus on) organizational efficiency at the expense of honour”. He argued that “wars cannot be fought the same way bureaucrats haggle over apportionments. The toll of human life in battle does not lend itself to cost / benefit analysis”.74 Stockdale pursued this forthright line of reasoning consistently in the Naval War College

Review. He wrote that:

16 Today’s ranks are filled with officers who have been weaned on slogans and fads of the sort preached in the better business schools of the country. That is to say, that rational managerial concepts will cure all evils. We must regain our (ethical) bearings.

It is certainly convenient to adopt the mores of the bureaucracy. However, if anything has power to sustain an individual in peace or war, regardless of occupation, it is one’s conviction and commitment to defined standards of right and wrong.

Regardless of the fairness of our (bureaucratic or) judicial system it must not be allowed to take the place of moral obligation to ourselves, to our Service, to our country. Each man must bring himself to some stage of ethical resolution.

In the Naval Service we have no place for amoral gnomes lost in narrow orbits; we need to keep our gaze fixed on the high-minded principles standing above the law.75

Underlining this logic, Jonathan Shay argues “bureaucratically structured measures of ‘productivity’ derived from industrial processes (operated to) destroy the social contract binding soldiers to each other, to their commanders and to the society that raised them. The most fundamental incompetence in the Vietnam War was the misapplication of the social and mental model of an industrial process to human warfare”.76

Investigating the philosophical keystones of Australian leadership doctrine, the present research explicates classical ideas and informs understanding of moral responsibility and merit. These are fundamental concepts, yet in doctrine they are obscure, and overshadowed by the conspicuous bureaucratic imperative of command.

17 Conscience and Just War

Establishing the basis upon which soldiers join conflict, Australian doctrine speaks in address of jus in bello (justice in war) compliance, but fails to acknowledge jus ad bellum considerations regarding justice of the cause.

Concerned only with the “ethical pursuit of missions”77 whilst ignoring the pursuit of ethical missions, doctrine articulates an inhibited and partial moral reasoning. Absorbed by essentially legalist ideas of justice in war, doctrine fails to consider significant other perspectives of justice, and fails to contemplate questions involving the justice of war. In this way, doctrine denies soldiers the proper expression of their conscience.

Doctrine presumes soldiers to be uninterested in the moral justice of acts, which are contextualised by the justice of the cause. Neglecting to assimilate in bello and ad bellum ideas, and failing to contemplate notions beyond adherence to licit rules of engagement, doctrine articulates a rudimentary argument. Doctrine takes soldiers for granted, supposing any fight is the same and that soldiers will take life and risk their own lives just because they are told to.

The present thesis recognises the distinct lines of reasoning which separate the arguments of ad bellum and in bello:

Jus ad bellum requires us to make judgments about aggression and self-defence; jus in bello about the observance or violation of the customary and positive rules of engagement. These two sorts of

18 judgement are logically independent. It is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules.78

Yet, despite this logical dualism, there is a theoretical wholeness to war, which has:

A recognizable and relatively stable shape…its parts are connected and disconnected in recognizable and relatively stable ways. We have made it so, not arbitrarily, but for good reasons. It reflects our understanding of states and soldiers, the protagonists of war, and of combat, its central experience.79

This theoretical syndesis is illustrated by the idea of aporthetos. In classical Greece, this was the determination that ancestral land should remain inviolate.80 Infringement upon the land of another was seen to provide just cause for hoplite citizen-farmers to take up arms, and to fight chivalrously in accord with the strict in bello conventions and rituals of phalanx conflict.81 But more than resistance against incursion – which affords a purely practical reason for fighting, just cause was entwined tightly with ideals: notions of honour which “played an important element in impelling men…to participate in wars,”82 and an equally decisive part in the conduct of battle.83 Pritchett describes how, before Plataea,

Achidamus:

First made a protestation to the gods and heroes of the country, saying thus: you gods and heroes who protect the land of Plataiai, be witness that we did no wrong in the beginning, but only after these people had first broken their oath did we come against this land, where our fathers, invoking you in their prayers, conquered

19 the Persians and which you made a place of good omen for the warfare of the Hellenes; nor in our actions now shall we be acting aggressively…Grant us therefore your aid and see to it that the punishment for what has been done wrong may fall on those who were first to do evil, and that we may be successful in our aim, which is a just revenge.84

Pritchett goes on to cite Xenophon who offered that “it should be evident to all that one fights on the side of justice. For then, the gods…become comrades in arms to the soldiers, and men are more eager to take their stand against the foe… (because) an unjust war is displeasing to heaven”.85 Thus demonstrating the effort made to afford spiritual justification to soldiers, Pritchett illustrates the way in which adjectival ad bellum thinking informed in bello ideas.

The present study accepts the logical division between war itself, for which soldiers are not responsible, and the conduct of war for which soldiers are responsible. But, the present study also recognises the theoretical whole, the amalgam of perspectives which informs the overall justice of warfare, and to which doctrine is oblivious.86 The connection between jus ad bellum and in bello thinking is illustrated by Rawls who argued that the justice of the cause affects the means with which war can be prosecuted.87

This does not mean, as Walzer suggests somewhat facetiously, that “the greater the justice of (the) cause the more rules (can be) violated for the sake of the cause,”88 because some principles are inviolable.89 But, it does

20 mean that soldiers must be allowed the freedom of conscience, which is denied, in Australian doctrine. A soldier should refuse if he conscientiously believes principles requisite for just conduct of war are violated.90 Choosing to fight, soldiers assert chivalric ideas of moral equality, acknowledging themselves and their adversary as people engaged in activity that was freely chosen.91

The argument is an argument for individual moral rights and equality.

Addressing where these rights fit in the overarching morality of war, the present thesis does not concur with the argument of McMahan that soldiers cannot fight justly in technically unjust war.92 The present thesis believes soldiers fight justly, not only when their acts are just (in the adverbial in bello sense), but also when fighting in furtherance of a cause to which they commit in good conscience. Fighting in an unjust war,

Orend argues soldiers are “like minor accomplices in a major crime”.93

The present thesis suggests the idea of an “unwitting accomplice” is perhaps a better metaphor. This is because soldiers are unlikely to be deliberately complicit, and very likely to follow the commands and directions of superiors, whom they are entitled to trust. Acting thus in good conscience, soldiers attempt to use their energies for good, not evil.

Acting in good conscience, soldiers do not attempt to take part in mischief – even to a small degree. But the minor accomplice to a crime may likely have a mind to his part in waywardness, and may likely limit his involvement in order to limit his exposure to consequences, which may follow in courts.

21 In short, the relationship between ad bellum and in bello arguments is intricate and multifaceted. The present thesis does not pretend to resolve this theoretical complexity. Nevertheless, the present thesis does see relationship between ad bellum and in bello perspectives. Evident in ancient thinking, the importance of this theoretical attachment is demonstrated by Walzer in the example of General Sherman. Evacuating

Atlanta before burning, Sherman aroused the protests of the Confederate,

General Hood: “‘now, Sir,’ wrote Hood, ‘permit me to say that the unprecedented measure you propose transcends in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever before brought to my attention in the dark history of war’”. Sherman, a realist, agreed. War, he argued famously, was hell.

And, “those who brought war into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out”.94 Connected only to the remote moral margins of conflict, Sherman’s consequentialism betrayed his failure to recognise interests and questions beyond the jus ad bellum boundary.

Sherman’s inhibited appreciation enabled only insubstantial moral decision. He failed to understand the interconnectedness of jus ad bellum and jus in bello argument. Whilst these ideas are logically autonomous, they are not – as Australian doctrine presumes - unrelated. Appreciating the logical inter-dependence between ad bellum and in bello positions is essential to appreciate the moral obligations of the soldiers who prosecute acts of war on the behalf of nations.

22 The realist position, illustrated by Sherman, is articulated distinctively by

Hans Morgenthau, who describes it as a perspective holding that:

Man’s aspiration for power over other men, which is of the very essence of politics, implies the denial of what is the very core of Judeo-Christian morality—respect for man as an end in himself. The power relation is the very denial of that respect; for it seeks to use man as a means to the end of another man. This denial is particularly flagrant in foreign policy; for the civilizing influence of law, morality, and mores are less effective here than they are in the domestic political scene.95

Morgenthau’s Machiavellian expedience96 presumes that in time of war,

“morality and law have no place. Inter arma silent leges: in time of war the law is silent”.97 As Machiavelli argued:

The prince is the only judge and the only locus of value in his nation. The interest of the prince, the regime, is the only binding appeal, whether we argue that it is moral, immoral or amoral. Moral language can still be used in a subordinate way as one of the tools of politics, sometimes to get people to keep their promises to the prince and to make them think that he is a good man. Yet obligations to tell the truth or to keep promises or to respect the sanctity of life are never absolutes; if the welfare of the ruling house can be served, those values may be sacrificed….98

Following the same track, Morgenthau argues that states exist to promote and protect their own interests and those of their citizens. Resonant with

Thucydides’ proverbial assertion that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,”99 Morgenthau proclaims a secular

Enlightenment ideal; hard-headed political rationalism is his only

23 criterion, there is no other standard. Morgenthau’s argument is one of strictly limited moral liability. “The political realist,” he argues,

“distinguishes between his moral sympathies and the political interests which he must defend. He will distinguish with Lincoln between his

‘official duty’, which is to protect the national interest, and his ‘personal wish’ which is to see universal moral values realised throughout the world”.100

Underlining this thinking, Martin Wight argues that in the international system the “chief duty of each set of rulers is to preserve the interests of the people they rule against the competing interests of other peoples,

(thus) a foreign minister is chosen and paid to look after the interests of his country, and not to be a delegate for the human race”.101 This, the undisguised reasoning of power politics, frames a hard-edged perspective which takes for granted that “no ethical standards are applicable between states”.102 Realism, focussed on “the national interest,”103 is “at once unhelpfully opaque and morally undernourished”.104 Realism imposes no moral requirements on the military.105

Hedley Bull describes the Grotian via media which accommodates the complexity of international relations.106 This is rationalism. Recalling the aspiration of Wilson who, taking the United States to war in 1917, argued: “we are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and responsibility for wrong shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among

24 the individual citizens of civilized states,”107 rationalist ideas of just war are a compromise between the Machiavellian realist idea of war qua ultima ratio regum and the Kantian revolutionists.108

According with precepts of natural law, rationalism spells out the rights and duties of people everywhere: principles recognised as compelling even in the absence of God.109 Rationalism resonates with modern concepts of positive international law110 and marks the “broad middle road of European (jus ad bellum) thinking, on one side lie the ideas of revolutionism, on the other (the ideas of) realism”.111 These are rationalist ideas which originated “with the Greeks and especially the Stoics. (The thinking has been perpetuated) by the Catholic Church, but

(rationalism’s) great merit has been that it has never been exclusive to

Catholics”.112 In the Middle Ages, Jewish and Arab thinkers sustained a rationalist body of thought, which “is potentially universal to mankind”.113 As a jus ad bellum doctrine, rationalism evokes the morally unlimited in bello obligations Hackett described as elemental to the military profession,114 because it is an “unreal kind of realism which ignores the element of morality in any world order”.115

Inhumanity, argues the realist, is merely humanity under pressure.

Couched characteristically in the language of apology, the argument is invoked in defence of misconduct: “yes, our soldiers committed atrocities in the course of battle, but that’s what war does to people, that’s what war

25 is like”.116 Such reasoning is merely a realist pretense, and affords no justification for wrongdoing.

Opposed to realism, the present research agrees with Robert Bolt who, in his play, A Man for all Seasons, has Sir Thomas More say: “when statesmen forsake their own private conscience for the sake of their public duties…they lead their country by a short route to chaos”.117 More articulates aspirations of Epictetan moral autonomy. But in doctrine, this idea is suppressed by the positional influence of command, and confined by in bello focus on mission accomplishment. In doctrine, soldiers are denied a proper concern regarding the justice of the cause, and they are denied proper expression of their conscience. Doctrinal argument presumes soldiers to be mere instruments of the state. Arguing against this position, the present thesis holds military action to be justified only by wholly informed ethical intent, which distinguishes professional military service from barbarism.118

Importance of the Present Research

The importance of this study is seen to lie in the nature of war as a purposeful and deliberately destructive endeavour; a human undertaking for which people are responsible.119 This responsibility, borne by many people in the societies involved, is borne immediately by those engaged in military service. This responsibility is enunciated in doctrine. Yet, doctrine does not give authoritative voice to the obligation to disobey

26 morally intolerable orders,120 and overplays the stipulation of obedience to command direction.

Asserting that obedience is required unless orders are manifestly illegal,121 doctrine “does not reflect the kind of obedience supported by military rhetoric,”122 which articulates a morally autonomous and stoic self-sufficingness. Jessica Wolfendale argues, “obedience and responsibility in the military today requires considerable maturity, good judgement and reflective preparation for challenging situations”.123 Yet doctrine argues for the bridling of individuals who “must obey orders when all their own instincts cry out for them not to be obeyed”.124

Doctrine thus fails to establish morally sentient limits to obedience. Yet, such a limit is crucial. As Jessica Wolfendale argues, a sense of morally autonomous and honourable judgement is a foil to the problem of “crimes of obedience,” those “atrocities (which) occur when ‘authorities give orders that exceed the bounds of morality or law,’” and morally repressed soldiers can discern no option but to do as they are told.125 Mark Osiel notes similarly that “soldiers are soldiers, and not lawyers,”126 who might be expected to wrangle legal fine-points. Osiel points out that

“articulating a satisfactory statement of current international law (is) quite difficult. The pertinent sources are numerous, but offer disparate solutions. Thus, one must conclude that international law on the matter of due obedience is not fully settled”.127 Osiel observes that morality in war thus depends upon the moral judgement of individual soldiers. He argues:

27 Where the illegality of a superior’s order is not manifest, (then the sense of) martial honour (will) help the soldier identify the proper course of action. (Honour) will help (soldiers) exercise practical judgement in circumstances where bright-line rules do not provide clear guidance.128

Osiel illuminates the power and significance of honourable ideals which

Ignatieff observes to be among the oldest artefacts of human morality.129

Yet Australian doctrine asphyxiates the rational moral autonomy which, more than anesthetized conformance, capacitates high-minded ideals.

Noting the moral disorientation of conflict, these ideals may be honoured as often in the breach as in the observance. Yet there must be moral belief to war, precisely because war is devastating. Without a sense of moral responsibility, without a personal sense of idealism, war is merely chaotic indiscriminate violence, and soldiers are the mere instruments of the state.

Systemized by the Hague and Geneva Conventions which seek, in the words of the Martens Clause, to govern war by “the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience,”130 the moral potency of these ideals lies in their ubiquity, not their codification. These beliefs are pivotal to western democracies where shared principles and convictions cement a bond between the military and society, and unite those citizens who bear the burdens of military service.131

These ideals are not decisive in doctrine. To explore them is important because they enable an understanding of war which eludes wholly positivist debate. War is a legal condition.132 More importantly, war is a

28 moral condition. The formal legal rules governing war are significant, and

“grounded in moral principles,”133 yet even without rules the morality of war would not be radically different.134 Set forth in the lexis of international law and military doctrine, the moral propriety of war is established, “not by the existence of the handbooks but by the moral arguments that everywhere accompany the practice of war”.135 By itself and oblivious to moral ideals, positivism perpetuates a sort of “utopian quibbling”136 over morally incoherent technicalities. Similarly, explicit doctrinal tenets by themselves enable a morally fractional understanding, and compliance with doctrinal principles is not necessarily an ethical act.137

The present thesis does not reinvent a moral system. Rather, the study recalls the Stoicism of Epictetus as a lens through which doctrinal principles may be interrogated and interpreted. The study illuminates underpinning principles and asserts the imperative of personal integrity, which is a decisive feature of Epictetus’ thinking. In this way, the study challenges doctrinal argument, which asserts the primacy of command power and nullifies the call of the individual’s conscience.

This discussion may seem disconnected from the reality or violence of war. But the present thesis is important precisely because the “moral reality of war is not fixed by the actual activities of soldiers but by the opinions of mankind”.138 The arguments of this study will inform

29 perspectives of military service, which is a moral concept connected to society’s ideals.

Just as the murderous sack intended for Mytilene was not repented by a minority of unusual Athenian citizens but by all the citizens who shared a sense of moral repugnance,139 so martial ideals embody the aspirations of society. Societies share a sense of what is meritorious and morally responsible. These moral ideas are persistent and operate, even with the evolution of societies and culture, “to give stability and coherence to our moral lives and to our military lives”.140

This is important because moral interpretation is not quantitative, unqualified and exhaustive. Moral interpretation is not definitive or empirical in the way of scientific facts and experiment. Moral interpretation depends upon abstract principles and underlying agreement about shared meaning. In this way, the observed acts of war are insignificant without connection to the ideas of war.

It’s not what people do, the physical motions they go through, that are crucial, but the institutions, practices, conventions. Hence the social and institutional conditions that ‘modify’ war are not to be considered as accidental or external to war itself, for war is a social creation…. What is war and what is not war is in fact something that people decide.141

Without the syndesis of underlying moral ideas, acts of war are nothing but violent. Yet in military doctrine, ideas of moral decision and

30 responsiveness are quashed by command; the coercive expression of positional power which is:

The authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions…the essence of command is the legal authority to order subordinates toward assigned tasks. Command requires structure, can only be applied down the chain of command and requires compliance.142

Attached to military discipline and obedience structures, command wields the bureaucratic authority of rank or assignment and demands

“compliance” and “unconditional obedience”143 from subordinates.144

Fundamental to military organisation, command provides:

The means by which the wishes of the government are translated into military outcomes. Ultimately, command is concerned with making decisions and giving orders. A military commander gives orders with the force of law (via the Defence Act 1903). If service personnel fail to obey a lawful order they can be punished and, in certain circumstances, imprisoned.145

Command is functional, task focused, morally unconscious and defined by positional power. Australian doctrine holds that, “with command comes all the power and authority over subordinates that the leader needs to achieve tasks”.146 Such prevailing authority construes soldiers as subordinate, voiceless, and inevitably compliant.

31 The present study however, asserts that soldiers are very far from unvoiced machines without capacity for responsible decision. Soldiers take part in war, a deliberate human endeavour, for which they are responsible.147 Connected to notions of personal excellence and moral responsibility, their service is saturated with martial idealism in a way that the legal and bureaucratic figment of command is not. Yet, command enjoys primacy in doctrine, where ideas of conscience and character are subordinated to it.

Reflecting upon the Stoicism of Epictetus the present thesis illuminates the moral philosophy of Australian doctrine, and thus contributes to the professional discourse of Australian arms. Acknowledging war as a deliberate endeavour for which people are responsible, the thesis illuminates ideas of personal merit and moral responsibility which are fundamental to military service.

The Significance of Stoicism

Interrogating ideas of moral agency within Australian doctrine, the present study is informed by Epictetus, who was “central to Stoicism, no less for his life experience than for his teachings”.148 Noted for his dictum, “bear and forebear,” Epictetus articulates a philosophy which resonates with the military mind. He argues that:

There are two vices which are far more severe and more atrocious than all the others, want of endurance and want of self-control, when we do not endure or bear the wrongs which we have to bear,

32 or do not abstain from, or forebear, those matters and pleasures which we ought to forebear.149

This position dovetails with Nancy Sherman, inaugural Distinguished

Professor of Ethics at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis.

Recalling her tenure at the Naval Academy, Professor Sherman observes that:

Most military men and women do not think of themselves in Epictetan terms. Yet, they do think of themselves, or at least they have idealized notions of military character, as stoic in the vernacular sense of the term. The traits that go with that stoicism are familiar: control, discipline, endurance, a sense of ‘can-do’ agency, and a stiff upper lip, as the Brits would say.150

Similarly, Michael Evans from the Australian Command and Staff

College argues that:

Stoicism may seem redundant; yet to believe this is an illusion. Human nature is unchanging and it is hubris to suggest that any generation can somehow escape the long shadow cast by history.

(Thus) Stoic philosophy has much to offer today’s Western military professionals. Nowhere is this truer than in the Stoic teaching that courage is endurance of the human spirit based on a resilience and steadfastness in which individuality is embedded within a larger community of comradeship that upholds a balance between the principles of public duty and private excellence.151

But, Epictetus argues also that “no man is free who is not master of himself”.152 He thus reveals Stoicism to be far richer than clichéd ideas of

“‘sucking it up,’ (and) being stoic,”153 making plain the real value of

33 Stoicism in uncompromising ideas of integrity or independent moral agency. In this way, Epictetus presents a Stoicism which resonates with military ideals, whilst challenging doctrinal argument that soldiers are

“required to subjugate their will”.154

Epictetus’s Stoicism reveals that “our opinions, desires and emotions are within our power, they are ‘up to us’ in a way that external events themselves are not…. Ultimately, what affects us for good or ill are our own judgements about (things). We undermine our own autonomy and dignity if we make material and external things responsible for our happiness”.155 Illustrating this idea, Nancy Sherman refers to the example of James Stockdale who relied upon Epictetus to help him survive years of brutal imprisonment during the Vietnam War. For Stockdale, Epictetus inspired self-mastery and awareness that real harm comes not from torture but from underestimating the authority of the self, from the surrender of moral autonomy.156

In the present study, focus on Epictetus acknowledges the importance of individual integrity. In military service, individual soldiers do not have to be passive, just ‘sucking it up’. Soldiers, for Epictetus, are not without volition. The example offered by Nancy Sherman of the F-14 Tomcat

Radar Intercept Officer is illustrative. The RIO is not the pilot: “he may not be able to control where the plane goes. But he can control ejecting when the airplane gets hit by a missile. He can control how he acts when he’s on the ground…”.157 Soldiers similarly, may not control the

34 government’s decision to go to war, but they control their own volition, they control “how they are subordinate,”158 and ultimately they control their commitment to serve or to resign honourably.

Enunciating these ideas, Epictetus, offers a profound alternative to doctrine. True, soldiers should follow rightful direction, but they need not surrender moral autonomy. Epictetus tells us autonomy lies in self-control

– in discernment, decision and determination.159 He tells us we have control over ourselves alone, and thus vice is found only in the failure of individual character, and virtue only in its flourishing.

Where doctrine stipulates submission, Epictetus argues that we should keep on asserting our moral agency. In address “to those who fail to achieve their purposes,” Epictetus holds “…it is a contest for good and happiness itself. What follows? Why here, even if we give in for the time being, no one prevents us from struggling again…”.160

Structure of the Dissertation

This thesis explores ideas of merit and moral agency in Australian doctrine. Recognising these to be ideas which owe much to the foundation of western military thinking in classical Greece, chapters two and three explore the intricate and sometimes contrastive ideas which inspired the phalanx. These chapters consider Homer’s heroic and individualist chivalry, and demonstrate how these ideas informed the collective ideals of character and civic obligation, which came to prominence in the classical period.

35 In chapter two, Greece is seen to be infatuated by contention for honour161 and the pervasive dread of disgrace.162 Suffused with heroes questing for acclaim, Homeric myth is seen as a cultural staple, entwined inextricably with the competitive concepts of honour which reverberated throughout the Greek world.163 Honour was seen to follow from individual excellence or aretê.164 Among the most powerful words of commendation in the Greek world,165 aretê attached to qualities most valued by society. Offering a “decisive account,”166 Aristotle believed aretê was rewarded with honour,167 which he acknowledged as “the greatest of external goods”.168

Appreciating honour as the competitive idea depicted by Homer,

Aristotle perceived the relationship to notions of “ambition,”169 and argued that honour, being “the token of man’s being famous,”170 was won by courage..171 Yet, chapter two explains that the evolved social context of classical Greece, decoupled ideas of aretê from the particularities of social role.172

Thus, the chapter explains, classical hoplites fought less for personal or private acclaim, than “to defend and enhance the intangible honour of the community”.173 Fighting as free men and for political independence,174 the hoplite’s aretê became associated with civic duty and patriotism.175

Yet, though embracing classical principles of public purpose, the hoplite did not fail to remember his epic past, and “the ideology of the hoplite remained the heroic ethos of Homer”.176

36 Chapter three explores the juxtaposed ideas which operate to refine and enrich the metaphor of the hoplite phalanx. In this chapter, the phalanx is seen to have been saturated with the moral ideals of the poleis. The hoplite himself is explored as a metaphor of beliefs in personal freedom, individualism and civic obligation in pursuit of a just cause.

As exemplars of Hellenic life, hoplites are seen to have fought as equals to defend the honour of the polis. The decisive notion was aporthetos, a conviction that honour and land, being essentially the same, should be preserved. Aporthetos, which inspired courage in the phalanx and revealed moral commitment to the “common good,”177 has conspicuous resonance with the ideas of civic duty and just cause foundational in the

Western military canon, Attached to the ritualized friendship ubiquitous in Greek society,178 the thinking coincides as well, with significant ideas of citizenship. The same ideas are pivotal to western armies which, like hoplites, “fight with and for a sense of legal freedom (as) the products of constitutional governments”.179 Thus, the hoplite is seen in chapter three to exemplify the western soldier who is committed to a common cause.180

The idea is enunciated by Xenophon who, in Hellenika, describes service in the phalanx as the honourable way to preserve “country, homes, freedom and honours”.181 Herodotus underlines this reasoning: “free citizens are better warriors, since they fight for themselves, their families and property, not for kings, aristocrats or priests”.182

37 The hoplite emerges from chapters two and three therefore, as an intricate and sophisticated metaphor. Discussion in these chapters illuminates a complex amalgam of civic duty and individual autonomy. These ideas are foundational to the western military tradition. Emerging from the disintegration of the poleis, Stoicism is considered in chapter four as a philosophy which preserved and evolved these classical concepts.

Chapter four argues that within poleis society, ideas of virtue reflected a tradition embodied by the Homeric hero and attached to social rules and status. When this world disintegrated, there came a sense, not merely of political insecurity, but of ethical ambiguity. Stoicism is explained as a philosophic response to this state of affairs. The philosophy is seen, rising from the collapse of the poleis, to fill the void filled once by the hoplite who formerly embodied a social and moral ideal.

Holding virtue to be “a rational disposition to be desired in and for itself and not for the sake of any hope fear or ulterior motive,”183 Stoicism is seen, above all things, to be a philosophy of self-discipline.184

In chapter four, Epictetus is seen to have expressed philosophical creativity in the expression of these characteristic Stoic ideas.185 His moral vision, “consistent with earlier Stoic thinking, is distinctively his own,”186 focused distinctively on the idea of freedom, qua autonomous moral purpose.187 For Epictetus, freedom is a moral concept,188 a matter of self-mastery189 or “unimpeded volition”.190 Such an idea is rendered by

38 the term prohairesis, which connects to integrity191 and to ideas of

“rational decisions about how it is appropriate to act”.192

Epictetus is thus seen in chapter four to articulate a prudential, pragmatic,193 autarchic doctrine of self-restraint.194 Found upon the premise that there is “no quality more sovereign than moral choice…everything else (is) subordinate, and this moral choice is itself free from slavery and subjection,”195 Epictetus presents an adamant, intellectually uncompromising position.

Yet, he is revealed in chapter four to acknowledge moral obligation extends beyond our obligations to ourselves. Besides “respect, cooperation, justice and kindliness,”196 Epictetus argues that we must discharge the obligations and duties which attach to us as people in society – even if they are unpleasant.197 Recognising the duty attached to social roles,198 Epictetus argues that the Stoic does not choose to be a member of society, but chooses to be a Stoic member of society.199 He argues that “we cannot be anything worthwhile unless we consistently act in accordance with the standards pertaining to the roles of our choice”.200

The logic resonates with the earliest Stoic doctrines where the wise man was compared to “a good actor who, if called upon to take the part of a

Thersites or of an Agamemnon, will impersonate them both becomingly”.201 The logic also resonates with military life, where obligation is defined powerfully by rank and assignment.

39 Epictetus illuminates ideals, elemental to the western military tradition,

and foundational in counter-insurgent, asymmetric conflict. He articulates

a doctrine of uncompromising integrity without which the moral high

ground identified as imperative in counter-insurgent conflict202 and

“multilateral peace enforcement missions”203 will be forfeit, because this

is high ground which depends upon the merit and moral responsibility of

individual soldiers. This logic acknowledges war as “a vast social

phenomenon with an infinite number of variables”.204 This logic

acknowledges too, that whereas the conventional objects of war are “the

conquest of the enemy’s territory and the destruction of his forces,”205

modern, post-Cold War campaigns are contests for the support of the

population.206 Such battles will not be won by kinetic effects. Neither will

such contests be won by the machine like armies, which reigned over the

battlefields of the First and Second World Wars.a Such contests will be

won only by the principled example of morally autonomous and

responsible soldiers, not by the unthinking application of technological

power and repressive force.207 Victory, more than military dominion, is

the accomplishment of a moral purpose.

Discussion in chapter five explores the moral claims and principles of

Australian Doctrine. The chapter contends that Australian doctrine fails to

a Keijzer, (1978) pp. 34 – 35: These armies stood upon the foundations of Prince Maurice of Orange, Gustavus Adolphus and Oliver Cromwell. These men prosecuted innovations, which transformed feudal troops into well-organised armies in the hands of the state. Operations were in lines, not masses, and importance was attached to prompt obedience, and systematic weapons drills and field manoeuvre. Technological innovation and specialisation prompted the coordination of several ‘arms’. Military officers schools were founded and officers’ authority over men was reinforced by superior knowledge.

40 interpret the ideals of public duty and private excellence embodied in the hoplite. The hoplite’s was an ethical motif, rejuvenated by Stoicism following disintegration of the poleis, and illuminated vibrantly by

Epictetus.

In doctrine; the power of one over others prevails over the power

Epictetus argues people must have over themselves. Doctrine is focused on the power of command, the “formalized pattern of subordination”208 or

“suppression”209 characteristic of military culture. Concerned, more about

“compliance from followers”210 than with individual excellence or integrity, command entails individuals “subjugate (their) will”.211 Hence, doctrine asserts that soldiers must obey their superiors without demurral.212

In chapter five, ideas of command are seen to perfuse Australian doctrine where leadership is defined as a “process of influence” over others in order to exact “consent” from others.213 Leaving “unstated how coercive influence can be…before the process is no longer leadership but rather management or command,”214 doctrine presumes the power of leadership and command to be the same, differentiated not in kind but in degree. The decisive idea is the character of influence, which is construed without relation to human potential or moral strength, and presumed to be found upon the positional power intrinsic to military bureaucracy.

Bureaucracy is explained in chapter five as a Kuhnian cultural gestalt215 within which distinctive habits of thought and action derive from, and

41 epitomise, a body of belief. The military bureaucracy is a structured community where commanders, like Homeric champions, play roles with determinate form. Thus, “leaders and led (are seen to) have labels on them”.216 But these are the labels, not of leadership, character or moral example, but of command. These labels are nothing but badges of rank.

They are icons, not of moral autonomy or integrity, but of positional influence.

Command is a trope. The imputation is connected with ideas of individual merit, but the denotation is positional dominance. Underlining this reading, chapter five observes doctrinal argument that; “authority in the military is based upon rank”217 and that “rank, uniform and medals give those in leadership positions a ‘jump start’”.218 The reasoning is sophistic yet disquieting, because the inescapable thrust of command operates to suppress the moral autonomy of individual soldiers. In doctrine, leaders are presumed to apply influence to the led. Despite placid and genial phraseology, this influence is nothing but the hard- edged bureaucratic power of command. In doctrine, the word leadership is nothing but command in disguise, a matter of precedence and ascendancy, or power over others who are subordinate and out-shone.

The hoplites who stood fast were committed not merely compliant. To the hoplite, notions of civic duty and Homeric martial etiquette were elemental to their ideas of individual aretê. They fought in order, not repressed by the power of command, but as morally self-directed

42 individuals dedicated to ideas of a just cause. Thus the hoplite exemplifies the moral “purpose”219 or autonomy220 which Epictetus commends as “internal goodness, independent of outward contingencies,”221 to which everything should be “subordinate”.222

For these reasons, assertion by doctrine that people “must allow themselves to be ordered to do something that they may not normally be inclined to do”223 even, “when all their instincts cry out for them not to be obeyed,”224 is described in chapter five as impossible cant. The doctrinal argument takes soldiers to be nothing but “small human pawns,” and their battle a “circus of slaughter”.225

Chapter five holds that the hazard of doctrinal argument is amplified by doctrine’s in bello focus on “the ethical pursuit of missions”.226 The implication is that no-one can cavil, no matter how repugnant the pretext for action. Doctrine is seen in discussion to deny soldiers the proper expression of conscience and free will,227 which should be encouraged, less for the quality of the conviction,” than for “the quality of the state within which such a conviction can be freely acquired”.228

Circumscribing the moral reckoning available to soldiers, the doctrine is purblind to ideals of civic duty and just cause. Enclosed by classical notions of aporthetos, these ideas inform the jus ad bellum perspective without which moral thinking about war is partial and cursory. Confident in the rightness of their cause, hoplites fought freely and in good

43 conscience to preserve political ideals to which they were committed, not because they were dragooned.229

Epictetus reveals soldiers as individuals with volition, enabling us to connect classical ideas of aporthetos to the imperative that soldiers interpret the ad bellum rightness of their cause and fight well, with moral autonomy and perspective.

Doctrine eschews such a moral perspective. For this reason, doctrine is revealed in chapter five to be at odds with conceptions of war as a moral activity where the atrocities soldiers commit are their own.230 War demands individual soldiers assert their individual conscience in the way

Epictetus commends. Yielding to orders in the way doctrine prescribes does not alleviate the moral burden borne by individuals. Individuals are not excused moral responsibility in order to maintain or strengthen the discipline system.231 Thus, doctrine is seen in chapter five to be unworkable, oblivious to the reality that, “to be tough enough to carry out policies that (though legal) are literally unmentionable is either to be very cowardly or very wicked”.232

Concluding discussion underlines this point. Notions of integrity and individual excellence are moral ideas, foundational to the western military tradition. Yet, the concepts are imperceptible in Australian military doctrine. Overstating command power and glossing over the imperative of individual conscience, Australian doctrine articulates a repressive and bureaucratic philosophy, oppugnant to western democratic

44 ideals. These are ideals articulated powerfully by Locke who acknowledges the “perfect freedom” and “equality of men by nature”233 and who, discussing the beginning of political society, holds:

Men being…by nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community, for their comfortable, safe and peaceable living one amongst another.234

This thinking, which remains reverberant within modern political thought,235 is described in American Society by Robin Williams as:

A culturally standardized way of thought and evaluation – a tendency to think of rights rather than duties, a suspicion of established (especially personal) authority, a distrust of central government, a deep aversion to acceptance of obviously coercive restraint.236

This point is significant because, fighting for moral high ground against an ideologically inspired adversary, the character of western arms should reflect the character and aspiration of western ideals which, in the case of democracy is an ideology, more than merely a system of government.237

Future Research

Informed by the Stoicism of Epictetus, the present study illuminates the failure of Australian doctrine to express the ideals of personal excellence which are foundational to western arms.

45 Doing this, the present study also illuminates possibilities of future research. The study acknowledges the evolution of world affairs and suggests that, in an age where military victory is unlikely to depend upon military domination, moral ideals and example will be crucial to military success which follows from justice and peace. Future research will be constructive, therefore, were attention to be given to exploring the relationship between ideas of command, and the imperative to preserve and to empower the moral autonomy of individual soldiers.

In conclusion, the study acknowledges the public obligation identified by

Jonathan Shay, to “care about the conditions that create psychological injury”238 and undo the character of soldiers exposed to the trauma of conflict. The study suggests therefore, that further research would profitably explore the ways in which doctrine could better articulate and fortify collective ideals and enable the virtues and moral autonomy of the soldiers who must bear the physical and moral-psychological burdens of conflict.

46 ENDNOTES: CHAPTER ONE

1 Anderson, (2009) p. 342 Osiel, (2002) p. 23: Argues similarly, “the best prospects for minimizing war crimes derive from creating a personal identity based on the virtues of chivalry and martial honour”. French, (2003) p. 3: French observes analogously that warriors must behave honourably lest “they become indistinguishable from murderers”. She adds significantly, that such honourable codes “define not only how (a soldier) should interact with his own warrior comrades but also how he should treat other members of his society, his enemies and the people he conquers”. 2 Plato, Crito, 47b - 48 3 Gabriel, (1982) p. 27 4 Gabriel, (1982) p. 27 5 Osiel, (1982) p. 18: At p. 21 Osiel explains how ideas of martial honour are informed by narrative, rather than definition. 6 Super, (1908) p. 83 7 Stockdale, (1995) p. 24 Toner, (2000) p. 57 8 Gabriel, (1982) p. 29 Osiel, (2002) pp. 16, 17: The Aristotelian idea of habituation is not mindless or uncritical. 9 Cerjan, General P.J. (1993) Forward to Gaston and Hietala. 10 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 11 Hartle, (1989) pp. 23, 56, 85 Hogan, (1988): Hogan agrees with this idea noting (pp. 45, 46) that the Australian military profession cannot maintain an unreal “splendid isolation from social and political realities” and observing later (p. 48) that “the profession of arms in Australia is moving (toward) the state of social integration detailed by Janowitz”. 12 Ignatieff, (1997) p. 5 13 Ignatieff, (1997) p. 112 Watts, (1988) p. 50: A similar reference to Brady’s photography. 14 Royal Australian Navy Leadership Ethic, p. 19 15 Hackett (1962) p. 63 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.4: Doctrine recites the phrase with neither proper acknowledgement nor philosophical acumen, holding; “(c)ertain inherent requirements which apply to servicemen distinguish the profession of arms from civilian employment. The Canadian Armed Forces refer to this distinction as ‘accepting unlimited liability.’” 16 Osiel, (2002) p. 65 17 Keijzer, (1978) p. 32: Keijzer describes the restrictions upon social freedom. 18 Hackett, (1988) p. 523 Royal Australian Navy Leadership Ethic, (2010) p. 25: With reference to Hackett holds: “the bad person cannot be a good sailor, soldier or airman”. The same reference to Hackett is noted in: Wakin, (1979) pp. 124 – 125 Pfaff, (2005) p. 153 19 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 20 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 21 Wolfendale, (2007) p. 128: Wolfendale here describes the militaries of both America and Australia. 22 Wolfendale, (2007) p. 128 23 Milgram, (2009) p. 1: Milgram’s seminal text explains the failure or inability of most people to resist unjust, unreasonable or irrational authority, and to follow their conscience.

47

Zimbardo, (2007): The predilection to obey authority, which Milgram revealed and explained, was illuminated powerfully by Philip Zimbardo. In the influential 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment, Zimbardo revealed the power of situations. He revealed and explained how organisational systems can dominate and overcome individual choice and conscience. Zimbardo is significant, because he demonstrates how the military culture, which Wolfendale describes as totalitarian, will operate to amplify the human proneness toward obedience. 24 Stockdale, (1995) p. 21 Stockdale, (1993) pp. 3, 6 Shay, (2002) pp. 108-109: Shay describes Stoicism as a philosophy accorded “enormous prestige” in the years following World War II. He describes General George C. Marshall, “possibly the most admired American of his generation,” as an exemplum of Stoicism, which “ruled the imagination of American elites of that period”. 25 Olsthoorn, (2005) p. 184 26 Olsthoorn, (2005) p. 189 27 Olsthoorn, (2005) p. 189 Fukuyama, (2006) p. 4: Similarly, Fukuyama describes “The ‘Spirit of 1776’ or the ideals of the French Revolution”. These ideals were seen to have vanquished “the world’s tyrants, autocrats and superstitious priests”. Thus, “blind obedience to authority was replaced by rational self-government in which all men, free and equal, (have) no masters but themselves”. Huntington, (2003) p. 71: Western civilization, argues Huntington, is distinguished by “a sense of individualism and a tradition of individual rights and liberties unique among civilized societies…. Individualism (is) a distinguishing mark of the West among twentieth-century civilizations”. Williams, (1960) p. 440: Expresses a similar view. 28 Walzer, (2000) p. 3 29 Hanson, (2002) p. xv: “The term ‘western’ refers to the culture of classical antiquity that arose in Greece and Rome; survived the collapse of the Roman Empire; spread to western and northern Europe; then during the periods of exploration and colonization of the fifteenth through nineteenth centuries expanded to the Americas, Australia, and areas of Asia and Africa; and now exercises global political, economic, cultural and military power…” Huntington, (2003) p. 49 and at p. 69: “The West inherited much from previous civilization, including most notably Classical civilization. The legacies of the West from Classical civilization are many, including Greek philosophy and rationalism…” 30 Hanson, (2002) p.5 Walzer, (2000) p. 16 Toner, (2000) p. xi 31 Walzer, (2000) p. 3 32 MacIntyre, (1984) pp. 23, 28, 29, 30 33 Wheeler, (2007) pp. 187, 188, 199 34 Wheeler, (2007) pp. 187, 193, 194, 195 35 Wheeler, (1991) p. 123 Pritchett, (1985) p. 7:”It was always thus, that men fought, before the invention of modern projectiles”. Adcock, (1957) p. 2: Describes “Epic” as the “unforgotten common heritage of the Greeks,” the consistent theme of which was “the glorious deeds of men”. 36 Dawson, (1996) p. 53 37 Dixon, N. (1994) p. 232: Dixon cites Raven, S. (1959) “Perish by the Sword,” Encounter, May, XII pp. 37-49 at p.48. 38 Polanyi, (1966) p. x 39 MacIntyre, (1984) p. 10 Walzer, (2000) p. 16: “Even fundamental social and political transformation…may well leave the moral world intact or at least sufficiently intact that we can still be said to share it with our ancestors. It is rare indeed that we do not share it with our

48 contemporaries, and by and large we learn how to act among our contemporaries by studying the actions of those who have preceded us”. 40 Adkins, (1975) p. 2 Russell, (1995) pp. 263, 274 Long, (1974) pp. 107, 165-166, 185, 208 Olsthoorn, (2005) p. 189 41 Long, (1974) p. 107 42 Russell, (1995) p. 274 43 Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine: ADDP-D p. 1 44 Snider, (1999) p. 16 45 Hughes, (1995) p. 14 46 Downes, (1998) p. 67: Downes understands the “spirit of a community” which pervades and “lies at the heart of an effective army” (or navy). Rousseau, (1998) p. 217: Rousseau illuminates “identity” as a state wherein individuals attach to a larger whole. Scott, Corman, and Cheney, (1998) p. 303: Scott et al suggest that a sense of identity is impelled by central, enduring attributes such as ethos or ideology. 47 Johnston, (2000) passim 48 Gordon, (1997) p. 580: Emphasis in the original Schein describes the influence of tacit or ambient cultural metaphors and the process of socialisation. His ideas are explored at: Schein, (2004) pp. 3, 7, 8, 11-23 Schein, (1990) p. 110. English, (2004) p. 68: “Military culture is based on not only the nature of a specific armed force but also the society from which it springs…The relationship between military culture and ethos is complex and as yet unresolved”. 49 Huntington, (2003) pp. 54, 66 – 67, 95 – 102, 110, 125, 126, 128 Durnwood, R., Marsden L. (2009) p. 1 Ignatieff, (1997) pp. 4, 8 50 Ignatieff, (1997) pp. 6, 18, 19, 125 51 Dawson, (1996) p. 53: Citing Iliad 4.225 52 Gallant, (1991) p. 170 53 Hanson, (2002) pp. xv, 4, 6: Hanson writes, that his “interests are in the military power, not the morality of the West”. 54 Carey, (2007) p. 37 55 Euripides, Trojan Women, Line 764: Andromache as she kisses and relinquishes Astyanax. 56 Euripides, Trojan Women: Line 1158-59 57 Euripides, Trojan Women: Line 95-97 58 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 59 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.4 60 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7: Once a military superior decides on a legal course of action, there is little (the soldier) can do but obey and comply”. 61 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.4 62 Yoder, (2001) p. 11 63 Osiel, (2002) pp. 14: “Our moral duties to one another on the battlefield no less than anywhere else, derive from our status as human beings, not from our occupation or social role”. This argument is restated on p. 137. Osiel refers to Kant, and to ideas referenced at: Kant, (1965) pp. 4, 5 Kant, (1996) p. xi Aune, (1979) p. 35 Sullivan, (1989) pp. 46, 47, 48 Walker, (1982) pp. 148, 158

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64 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para. 2.7: “Once a military superior decides on a legal course of action, there is little their team can do but obey and comply”. At para. 2.8: “Men must learn to obey orders when all their own instincts cry out for them not to be obeyed”. At para. 2.10: “(command directions) require compliance and obedience”. At para. 2.11: “Command (is) a practice where subordinates – wrongly called followers – are compelled to obey lawful orders”. At para. 2,12: “With command comes all the power and authority over subordinates that the ‘leader’ needs to achieve tasks…command takes away the need to use persuasion and personal influence to get things done. In theory, the military could turn its back on ‘leadership’ as a practice and rely solely on command to achieve military objectives”. 65 Osiel, (2002) p.5 66 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7: “…the member is required to subjugate his / her will to that of the Government. A person in the military must allow themselves to be ordered to do something that they may not normally be inclined to do”. 67 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, para. 3.26-3.27: “The Defence Leadership Framework (DLF) provides a structured listing of the skills, capabilities and knowledge for Defence personnel to perform at eleven identified levels…The DLF is constructed around five capability areas which are further broken down into proficiencies for each classification. Against each of these proficiencies there are a number of behaviours…”. Executive Summary, chapter 6: Doctrine acknowledges, “the ADF trains toward the Defence Leadership Framework which outlines the behaviours expected of leaders and managers…” 68 Defence Leadership Framework, p. 2 69 Defence Leadership Framework, p. 5: Emphasis added 70 Defence Leadership Framework, p. 5 71 Hopkins, (2005) p. 37 72 Toner, (2009) p. 17 73 Gabriel, (1982) p. 13 74 Stockdale, (1979) p. 1 75 Stockdale, (1978) p. 2: Order of paragraphs changed 76 Shay, (2003) p. 17: Edited slightly 77 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 78 Walzer, (2000) p. 21 Harries, (2005) p. 609: Harries describes “the Catholic tradition of just-war theory, which stretches from Augustine in the fifth century, through Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, to the present. It is a tradition based on the assumption that it is futile to assume (war) can be abolished, and concerned with the more modest goal of making war less frequent, by laying down conditions for when it is and is not legitimate to resort to it (jus ad bellum); and making it less savage, by establishing rules governing what it is right to do when conducting warfare (jus in bello). The theory holds that resorting to force must have a just cause. This has been understood to entail that going to war is in response to injustice, authorized by a competent authority, and is motivated by right intention. Resort to war must meet four prudential tests: it must be expected to produce a preponderance of good over evil, to have a reasonable chance of success, be a last resort, and be expected to result in a state of peace. Jus in bello requires that when force is used, it must be discriminate and proportional”. 79 Walzer, (2000) p. 22 80 Hanson, (2000) p. 4 Hanson, (1998) pp. 180 and 249: Citing Pritchett Hanson, (1991) p. 4 Hanson, (2004) p. 23 Mitchell, (1996) pp. 97, 98, 100, 101: Mitchell explains that, “defending one’s own territory was at the heart of Greek warfare…Greek warriors fought for their cities in defence of their most valuable resource, their land, they stood together for the common

50 good. Defence of a city’s land is linked to the wider theme of defence of a city’s freedom, so individuals no longer fought for themselves but for the community”. Keegan, (1994) pp. 244, 245, 246 Dawson, (1996) p. 49 Raaflaub, (1997) pp. 52, 53, 54 81 Pritchett, (1971) pp. 105 – 126 Pritchett, (1974) p. 147 82 Robinson, (2006) p. 18 83 Robinson, (2006) p. 26 84 Pritchett, (1979) p. 322: Pritchett provides valuable context, explaining that Archidamus was not necessarily speaking the truth, but he was “attempting to exonerate the Lacedaemonians from all obligations to protect the sanctity of the place by addressing the gods of Plataiai”. The point then is not that he spoke the truth or not, but that the ideas of just cause were seen to be critical. (My emphasis) 85 Pritchett, (1979) p. 323 86 Coleman (2012) in press and (2011) p. 8: Coleman acknowledges “the strict separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello in terms of international law,” and acknowledges too “it is difficult to sustain this same separation when assessing (situations) in purely ethical terms”. 87 Rawls, (2011) p. 379 Grossman (1996) pp. 164-167: Grossman articulates the congruent moral psychology, that legitimacy of a cause psychologically enables prosecution of violence. The philosophical significance of his argument is apparent in his contention (p. 167) that conflict seen to be morally legitimate, is less likely to degenerate toward atrocity, and more likely to be “in keeping with the kind of ‘rules’ (deterring aggression and upholding individual human dignity) that organizations such as the United Nations have attempted to uphold”. (Parenthesis in the original) 88 Walzer, (2000) p. 229 Later, Walzer seems to concur with Rawls. In discussion of supreme emergency Walzer argues (2000, p. 253) that “the adoption of extreme measures” is justified when “the danger (is) of an unusual and horrifying kind”. He goes to say (p. 268) “utilitarian calculation can force us to violate the rules of war only when we are face to face, not merely with defeat, but with a defeat likely to bring disaster to a political community”. 89 Bolt, (1990) p. 66: In his play, A Man for all Seasons, Bolt illustrates why this must be so, when he has More say: “Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake”. Even those fighting on the side of justice and in supreme emergency may not violate some principles. 90 Rawls, (2011) pp. 380, 381, 382 Nozick, (1974) p. 100: Nozick holds similarly that in an unjust war, soldiers have a positive duty not to fight. Orend, (2006) p. 109: Orend argues that soldiers’ “merely professional function does not dislodge the ordinary human duty not to inflict severe unjustifiable harm on others”. 91 Walzer, (2000) p. 34 McMahan, (2007b) p. 99: McMahan acknowledges, “it is necessary in current conditions to grant just combatants and unjust combatants a legal permission to attack and kill enemy combatants. In legal and conventional terms, combatants on both sides in a war must be regarded as equals, or as having the same status”. But, beyond this idea of legal equality, the present thesis discerns a moral equality, based upon the idea of choice, which Walzer articulates. Soldiers who are denied the chance to commit to a cause willingly, in good conscience, are equal too – but they are equal as small pawns in the misadventures of political belligerents. The dilemma of McMahan’s position is emphasised in the case of the soldier forced by his political masters to fight in an unjust cause. McMahan (2007, pp. 50, 51) would grant this soldier legal protections, but deny him moral dignity. Jonathan Shay explores the psychiatric trauma, which may follow such a position. 92 McMahan, (2009) p. 38

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McMahan, (2007) p. 51: McMahan cites Walzer to argue “innocent is a term…(applied) to people when they have done nothing, and are doing nothing, that entails the loss of their rights”. He goes on: “It does not seem that people can forfeit or lose moral rights simply by defending themselves and other innocent people from unjust attack. If that is so, then those who fight in a just, defensive war and have done nothing else to lose their rights must be innocent in this generic sense. So unjust combatants (he refers to the justice or injustice of the cause in which combatants fight) use wrongful means – the killing of people who are innocent in the relevant sense – to achieve ends that are unjustified (the ends of aggressive war). It is hard to see how this could be morally permissible”. McMahan, (2007b) p. 100: McMahan argues that there is “a deep difference between the permission just combatants have to participate in war and that which is granted to unjust combatants. The permission under which just combatants act is a moral permission that is also recognised in law. The permission granted to unjust combatants, however, is legal and conventional only”. More contentiously, McMahan (pp. 100-101) asserts only combatants in a just cause do not forfeit their moral right not to be killed. This is not an assertion to which the present thesis assents. McMahan (p. 104) construes the legal equality of combatants as nothing but a “concession (permitting unjust combatants) to violate certain people’s fundamental moral rights”. 93 Orend, (2006) p. 109 Coleman (2012) in press and (2011) p. 8: Coleman cites Orend arguing that such soldiers are not “blameless” but equally, they are not culpable and they are not “fully responsible for the jus ad bellum violations involved in engaging in the war”. Perhaps they are not responsible in any degree for these violations. But, the decisive point is that soldiers are not typically responsible for the wars in which they are deployed. 94 Walzer, (2000) p. 32 95 Morgenthau, (1958) p. 247 96 Wight, (1991) pp. xi, xii, 7: The Machiavellians or international realists believe international relations are regulated by force and warfare. 97 Walzer, (2000) p. 3 Hartle, (1989) p. 59 98 Yoder, (2001) p. 14 99 Thucydides, 5.89 100 Morgenthau, (1958) p. 85. Emphasis in the original 101 Wight, (1949) p. 35 102 Carr, (1966) pp. 153, 154 103 Orend, (2006) p. 223 104 Coady, (1997) p. 379 105 Orend, (2006) p. 224 106 Wight, (1991) pp. xi, xii, 7: Wight defines three traditions of international theory. The Machiavellians or international realists who believe international relations are regulated by force and warfare. The Grotians or international rationalists who believe in continuous organised intercourse between states and the Kantians or revolutionists who favour an international moral and cultural whole. Cutler, (1991) pp. 41 – 65: Cutler describes the rationalist ideas of Grotius, which she distinguishes from Hobbesian realism and Kantian revolutionism. Martin Wight and Hedley Bull are seen to exemplify the Grotian rationalists, who accept conflict as inevitable, and seek to define normative constraints within which the evil of conflict may be contained. 107 Carr, (1966) pp. 153, 154: Carr observes President Roosevelt held similarly: “national morality is as vital as private morality”. Walzer, (2000) p. 53: Argues that the correct view is that the duties and rights of states are nothing more than the duties and rights of the men who compose them. McMahan (2007b, p. 97) argues that this, the domestic analogy is “an evident distortion, as is the idea that a collective intention…processed through some institutional decision procedure could have the same moral significance as an intention formed and acted on by an individual moral agent”. Acknowledging this argument,

52 which is beyond the scope of present discussion, this thesis construes the analogy as an heuristic device pointing to the logic that the idea of the political state does not erase ideas of individual obligation. McMahan (2007, p. 51) would himself seem to agree with this logic, as he argues: “when collective action is wrong, it seems that the wrongness must also be imputed to the individual acts through which collective action is implemented or manifest”. Later (p. 53) he writes, it is morally impossible that the collective pursuit of…goals could be self-justifying, or that (collectivism) could automatically carry immunity to punishment”. 108 Bull, (1977) p. 244: Bull explains that Kant espoused the ideology of the French Revolution, arguing that peace should be found in a world republic or civitas gentium. 109 Bull, (1977) pp. 28, 29 Wight, (1991) p. 14 110 Bull, (1977) p. 29 111 Wight, (1991) p. 14 112 Wight, (1991) p. 14 113 Wight, (1991) p. 14 114 Hackett (1962) p. 63 115 Carr, (1966) p. 235 116 Walzer (2000) p. 4 117 Bolt, (1990) p. 22 118 Orend, (2006) p. 109: Orend argues “soldiers must inform their beliefs regarding the justice of the wars they are ordered to fight”. 119 Yoder, (2001) p. xiii 120 Osiel, (2002) p. 3 121 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7: “Once a military superior decides on a legal course of action, there is little (the soldier) can do but obey and comply”. 122 Wolfendale, (2007) p. 95 123 Wolfendale, (2007) p. 95: Citing Hartle 124 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.8. “Subjugation” is the term from para. 2.7. Keijzer, (1978): Doctrinal argument recalls the eighteenth century perspective identified by Keijzer (p. 36) and described by him (p. xxiv) as, a time when “officer posts were chiefly occupied by the nobility, while the ‘inferiors’ were recruited from the lower strata of society”. The doctrinal insistence upon subjugation perpetuates what Keijzer calls (p. 37) the “deep caesura between officers and ‘other ranks’…. The officers (have) more privileges and get more decorations, the ‘inferiors’ (work) for their comfort and, in war, die for their honour”. 125 Wolfendale, (2007) p 77: Citing Kelman and Hamilton Orend, (2006) p. 109: Orend argues that “ordinary soldiers, when confronted with the fact that the war they fight is unjust, will probably still go along with the crowd of their buddies and fight – the pressures to do so are very strong”. But this is to minify military service as something like a schoolyard gang, where people “go along with the crowd” just to fit in and get along. The veridical issue is the power of command, asserted in doctrine, acknowledged by Wolfendale and illuminated vividly by Stanley Milgram. Faced with the power and oppressive force of command, soldiers very often can discern no option but to do as they are told. The pressures, as Orend says, are very great – but they are more than the pressures of peers to “go along with the crowd”. 126 Osiel, (2002) p. 4 127 Osiel, (2002) p. 41 128 Osiel, (2002) p. 37 129 Walzer (2000) pp. 44 - 45 Ignatieff, M. (1997) p. 117 Wolfendale, (2007) p. 79 130 Meron, (2000) pp. 78, 79: Meron explains that the “Martens Clause,” is named for F.F. de Martens, a jurist and the Russian delegate to the Hague Peace Conference. The clause has recognised for “ancient antecedents rooted in natural law and chivalry,” and

53 seen to reach “all parts of international humanitarian law”. The clause appears in the “Preamble to the Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land…. (which) was restated in the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Protection of Victims of War, the 1977 Additional Protocols to those Conventions and the preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons…(and) paraphrased in Resolution XXIII of the Tehran Conference on Human Rights of 1968…” 131 Walzer (2000) p. xvi 132 Hartle, (1989) p. 57 133 Hartle, (1989) pp. 29, 55, 56 134 Walzer (2000) pp. xviii, 41, 42 135 Walzer (2000) p. 44 136 Walzer (2000) pp. xviii: Walzer goes on at p. xix to explain this reasoning, saying the lawyers have constructed a paper world, which fails at crucial points to correspond to the world the rest of us live in”. 137 Super, (1908) p. 75: The law is subordinate to ethics. The logic of the law is derived from ethical thinking, but applied to overt acts only. Husserl, (1937) p. 273: “To act in conformity with law (or doctrine) is not necessarily to act justly. Legality is not identical with justice. To act justly is to act as a just man. The just act springs from an inner attitude of mind”. 138 Walzer (2000) p. 15 139 Walzer (2000) p. 15 140 Walzer (2000) p. 16 Osiel, (2002) p. 23: Osiel argues similarly that membership of a group entails living according to values embodied in an inherited honour code. 141 Walzer (2000) p. 24 142 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para. 2.6 143 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para. 2.10 144 Command and Control, ADDP 00.1 para. 1.7: The primacy of command power is articulated with equal force throughout the suite of Australian military doctrine publications. For example, the publication, Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, argues at para. 2.7; that “the essence of command is the legal authority to direct subordinates”. At para. 3.18 the same publication cites Australian Maritime Doctrine 1, which argues, “the Captain is the ship…no bullet is fired, no missile launched without specific command direction”. 145 Horner, (2002) p. 2 146 Command and Control, ADDP 00.1, para. 1.8 147 Walzer, (2000) p. 311 148 Scaltsas, Mason, (2007): Preface by Dory Scaltsas. 149 Epictetus, Fragments, 10.5 - 6 150 Sherman, (2005) p. 1 151 Evans, (2010) p. 55 152 Epictetus, Doubtful and Spurious Fragments, 35 153 Sherman, (2005): Preface. 154 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 155 Sherman, (2005) p. 3 156 Sherman, (2005) pp. 5, 6, 11 157 Sherman, (2005) p. 7 158 Sherman, (2005) p. 8: My emphasis 159 Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1; 1.3.4; 1.12.34 - 35; 1.20.15 - 16 160 Epictetus, Discourses 3.25.4 161 Kagan, (2003) p.52: Kagan describes honour as central to “the entire Greek cultural experience, the heroic tradition…” The idea of honour qua acclaim pervaded the Greek world. Most authorities acknowledge the power of the idea. For example:

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Bowra, (1959) p. 192: Bowra describes “the cult of honour which did much for the service of the state and inspired heroic devotion and self sacrifice” which could yet be a destructive force. Garlan, (1975) p. 181: Garlan discusses agonistic wars “inspired by the spirit of competition between cities”. van Wees (1992) p. 255: van Wees observes the “common rivalry to be the best,” and notes that “Sparta and Argos, Athens and Thebes, Korinth and Megara, Samos and Miletos fought for centuries over nothing but the control of small border territories of very little economic value…(they) sought to gain prestige by demonstrating their military superiority over their neighbours”. (Emphasis added) 162 Dover, (1974) pp. 236, 237 Adkins, (1975) pp. 154, 155, 163 Dover, (1974) pp. 231, 237 van Wees, (1992) p. 160 164 Bowra, (1959) pp. 192, 193 165 Adkins (1975) pp. 30, 31 166 MacIntyre (1984) p. 147 167 Aristotle, Magna Moralia, Bk. II: 1200a20 168 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. IV: 1123b20-21 And similarly: Aristotle, Magna Moralia, Bk. II: 1202a30: “Of goods, some are external, as wealth, office, honour, friends (and) glory…” 169 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. II: 1107b29-30: “…it is possible to desire small honours, as one ought…and the man who exceeds in his desires is called ambitious, the man who falls short unambitious, while the intermediate person has no name…(though) we sometimes call the intermediate person ambitious…” Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. IV: 1123b4-15: Aristotle describes the relationship of humility and pride to accomplishment and honours which are deserved. Aristotle, Magna Moralia, Bk. II: 1202a36 – 1202b5-8: The desire for honour is seen to be “praised as being ambitious” and explained as quite a different from “blameworthy” desire for “bodily pleasures”. 170 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Bk. I, 1361a 28 171 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics: Bk. III: 1116a18-30, citing Iliad XXII:100 and VIII:148. Dover, (1974) p. 229: Dover cites Xenophon, Hellenica, iv 5.10 apropos Spartan joy at the courageous death of kinsmen in battle. 172 MacIntyre (1984) pp. 132, 133 173 van Wees, (1992) p.255. 174 Sage, (1996) p. 88 175 Wheeler, (1991) pp. 123, 131 176 Wheeler, (1991) pp. 122, 123: Wheeler explains that the warrior code of the Iliad defined the Greek heroic ethos - an aristocracy of warrior princes in competition for “personal honour and eternal fame” – won at great personal risk in battle which was often divorced from higher political goals. When the hoplite phalanx emerged as the military instrument of the polis, military service - no longer the purview of the aristocracy alone – was an obligation and privilege shared with the middle class. But, despite social evolution, the ideology of the hoplite remained unchanged. Wheeler, (2007) p. 186: Argues similarly. Carey, (2007) p. 41: Carey explains that the idea of tactical symmetry on the Greek battlefield goes back to Homer and his “portrayal of Achilles battling man to man with Hector outside the walls of Troy. This infatuation…was projected into collective warfare in the Archaic and Hellenic periods”. Dawson, (1996) p. 53: Dawson writes, “The Homeric heroes live with an absolute imperative…to defend their honour and gain glory”.

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Raaflaub, (1997) p. 50: Raaflaub explains how the Greek army of aristocrats and knights started to give way to hoplite tactics and formations in the second half of the eighth century. 177 Mitchell, (1996) p. 99 178 Gallant, (1991) pp. 146, 147, 152 179 Hanson, (2002) p. 21 (Abridged slightly) 180 Walzer, (2000) p. 27 181 Xenophon, Hellenika, 2.4.17 182 Hanson, (2002) p. 47: Hanson underlines the point, citing Herodotus again; “as free men each individual person wanted to achieve something for himself”. (5.78) 183 MacIntyre, (1967) p. 106: Citing Diogenes Laertius, 7. 89 Epictetus, Discourses: 2.9.1-7: Epictetus argues that men are distinguished from wild beasts and sheep and the like by rationality and self-control. He argues that when men act “for the sake of the belly, or of our sex organs or at random, or in a filthy fashion, or without consideration” that men degenerate to the level of sheep or beasts and the quality (his term is “profession”) of being a man is destroyed. MacIntyre, (1967) p. 107: MacIntyre argues that the Stoic is concerned with the deliberate pursuit of virtue not with the pursuit of pleasure (a la Epicureanism) or with the contentment in the absence of pain (a la Cynicism). Russell, (1995) pp. 269-270: Russell describes the Stoic modus vivendi, living on earth as a “little soul bearing about a corpse” and yet happy and self disciplined, “submitting to God as a good citizen submits to the law”. 185 Cooper, (2007) p. 11 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 23 186 Mason, (2007) Introduction to Scaltsas and Mason, p. 2 187 Epictetus, Discourses 4.1: Of Freedom: Epictetus begins this discourse, “He is free who lives as he wills, who is subject neither to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor force, whose choices are unhampered, whose desires attain their end, whose aversions do not fall into what they would avoid”. Dragona-Monachou, (2007) pp. 112, 113, 125, 126: Epictetus uses “the term prohairesis denoting the autonomous inner disposition and attitude, volition, moral choice, moral purpose, moral character and so on…” Bobzein, (2005) p. 341: “The concept of freedom is central to Epictetus’ philosophy…there seems to be little difference between Epictetus’ concept f freedom and the early Stoic one”. Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 201: “Epictetus’ philosophy is a philosophy of freedom”. 188 Bobzein, (2005) p. 342 189 Epictetus, Discourses 1.12. 9–10: “He is free for whom all things happen according to his moral purpose, and whom none can restrain”. Bobzein, (2005) p. 340: Bobzein describes how the Stoic idea of freedom depends on the disposition of the soul. One is free who is a master of passions, and desires. 190 Long, (2004) p. 119 191 Long, (2004) p. 209 192 Sorabji, (2007) p. 87 Long, (2004) pp. 28, 212: Long explains prohairesis as the most notable feature of Epictetus’ philosophy. The crucial idea is volition, conscientiousness, character and judgement. The term is associated with those things which are up to us” as opposed to externals. Cooper, (2007) p. 12: Cooper explores how Epictetus uses the term prohairesis with a special narrow significance qua considered choice regarding questions of fundamental importance in life. MacCunn (1904) p. 190: “If the moral life is to be set upon a sure basis, it must be through the enlightenment of the will – the will which, to Socrates, as to the Stoics, to Spinoza, to Kant, meant the reason of the individual”. 193 Bobzein, (2005) p. 333

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Long, (2004) p. 91: Epictetus “invites his audience to examine themselves by thinking about…everyday terms…” “He tries to engage his audience by means of everyday terms…with a minimal reference to esoteric theory”. 194 Epictetus, Discourses 3.2.1 – 5: Epictetus describes the development of the Stoic education and argues that the excellent man must first control desires and aversions, second exercise self-mastery over matters of choice and duty “in general” and avoid error and rashness in judgment. Christman, (1988) pp. 110, 111: Discussing the nature of autonomy, Christman observes the Stoic asserts autonomy is only maintained when the person secures active control over urges and impulses. The typical Stoic argument is that one can maintain autonomy in the face of obstacles to action by reshaping preferences to better conform to the set of feasible options, thereby achieving the highest ratio of satisfiable to nonsatisfiable desires. 195 Epictetus, Discourses, 2.10.1 – 2 Epictetus argues similarly in Encheiridion, 5 for the primacy of individual judgment: “It is not the things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about these things…. When, therefore, we are hindered or disturbed, or grieved, let us never blame anyone but ourselves…” 196 Long, (2004) pp. 30, 237 197 Epictetus, Discourses: 2.10.5 – 8 / 3.2.4 / 3.20.5 – 8 / 4.12.16 – 18. Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 132, 135, 204: Bonhoffer describes the ethical demands of Epictetus which are grounded in the foundation of human nature itself, mindful of civil duties. Long, (2004) pp. 201, 203: Long explains how Epictetus revises “conventional concepts of self-interestedness…Epictetus believes that we are irreducibly social and cannot achieve our own good unless we understand ourselves as integral parts of the world in general and of our own society in particular. 198 Epictetus, Discourses, 4.12.17 - 19 199 Annas, (2007) p. 145 200 Long, (2004) p. 240 201 Diogenes Laertius, 7.160 Frede, (2007) pp. 160, 161: Frede explains this argument stems from the origins of Stoicism. 202 Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24: MCWP 3-33.5, para. 7.1, 7.2, 7.9, 7.10, 7.11, 7.21, 7.44 Galula, (2006) pp. ix, x, xii, 4, 8, 11, 25, 52 203 Osiel, (2002) p. 6 204 Galula, (2006) p. xi 205 Galula, (2006) p. 50 206 Galula, (2006) pp. 4, 52 van Creveld, (1991) pp. ix – x, 2, 29, 61, 62, 224 - 225 207 Fukuyama, (2006) p. 6: Underlining this idea, Fukuyama explores the experience of the twentieth century, which is seen to have “made highly problematic the claims of progress on the basis of science and technology…. The ability of technology to better human life is critically dependent on a parallel moral progress in man. Without the latter, the power of technology will simply be turned to evil purposes, and mankind will be worse off…” (Emphasis in original) 208 Hackett, (1983) p. 218 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 209 Keegan, (1987) p. 335 210 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.6 211 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 212 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 states that “once a military superior decides on a legal course of action, there is little their team can do but obey and comply”. 213 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 214 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para. 1.23

57

215 Kuhn, (1970) pp. 114, 150, 151 216 Hackett, (1983) p. 218 217 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.38 218 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.39 219 Epictetus, Discourses 1.29.1: p. 183 220 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 45, 46, 47 221 Long, (2004) p. 92. Abridged. p. 139 Epictetus, Discourses 1.29.3 - 4 222 Epictetus, Discourses 2.10.1: p. 269 223 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para. 2.7 224 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para. 2.8 225 Walzer, (2000) pp. 27: Citing Ruskin 226 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 227 Walzer, (2000) p. 31 228 Walzer, (1970) p. 139 229 Mitchell, (1996) p. 98 Adcock, (1957) p. 9: “To fight for the city was a plain duty that admitted of no hesitation”. 230 Coady, (1997) p. 380: Citing Walzer. 231 Walzer, (2000) p. 312 232 Walzer, (2000) p. 296 233 Locke, (1995) p. 116 234 Locke, (1995) p. 163 235 Tully, (1993) p. 2 236 Williams, (1960) p. 446 237 Hartle, (1989) pp. 89, 90, 93 Fukuyama, (2006) pp. xi, 343: Democracy is seen to be founded in the principles of liberty and equality. Fukuyama argues (p. 45) “there is now no ideology (in a position) to challenge the liberal democracy, and no universal principle of legitimacy other than the sovereignty of the people”. But, (pp. 344, 345) this logic entails, neither cultural uniformity nor complete evenhandedness. As a liberal philosophy, the democratic ideal does not tolerate illiberalism. In this regard, Fukuyama resonates with Grayling (2009, p. 77) who argues that tolerance is central in democratic society, along with other ideas that stop it from being the mere flabby acceptance that anything goes. “Tolerance can not (and) must not tolerate intolerance”. 238 Shay, (2003) p. xiii Grossman, (1996) p. 43: Grossman underlines the significance of this point, observing that “in every war in which American soldiers have fought in this century, (the twentieth century) the chances of becoming a psychiatric casualty – of being debilitated for some period of time as a consequence of the stresses of military life – were greater than the chances of being killed by enemy fire”.

58 CHAPTER TWO

Ever to be the Best

Aien aristeuein: Iliad 6: 208

Background

This chapter explores classical thinking, particularly around the concept of honour, which resonated as a ubiquitous, individualistic and competitive idea throughout the Greek world. The idea of honour; a powerful social metanarrative which found expression in the ambition to be the best, is seen to have exerted significant influence upon Greek ideas of moral responsibility, and personal excellence or aretê.

As a competitive concept, connected to notions of ambition and excellence, honour is seen in this chapter to have evolved from Homeric ideas of individual prowess. As the poleis evolved, the ideals of Homer’s champions, who fought in single combat or as one against a group of assailants, are seen to have informed the larger concepts of civic duty and patriotism which informed the marshaled lines of the massed phalanx.1

Honour, explored and illuminated in this chapter, is significant insofar as it informs concepts of individual excellence and moral autonomy. In the chapter to follow, these ideas are connected to notions of patriotism and civic responsibility. These ideas, united in the motif of the hoplite and reinvigorated in Stoic philosophy, are seen in chapter five to be quashed in Australian doctrine beneath the concept of command.

59 Homer: Ruler of the Greek Imagination

The classical phalanx, incorporating “a new class of citizens, the free farmers who could afford the panoply,”2 preserved the heroic ethos which is a consistent Homeric theme. In Homer, soldiers fought together in a forerunner of the phalanx.3 Hence, we read in the Iliad that:

The ground ran / with red blood, the dead men dropped one after another / from the ranks alike of Trojans and their mighty companions / and Danaans also, since these fought not without bloodletting, / but far fewer of them went down, since ever they remembered / always to stand massed and beat sudden death from each other.4

Yet, Homer is suffused with heroes questing as individuals for fame and glory.5 Before the armies clash, “Paris challenges Menelaus to a single combat which would decide the war, a forerunner of the Battle of

Champions between the Spartans and Argives on Mount Zavitsa”.6 In this way, Patroclus and Automedon fight as individual champions in front of massed armies, “solid as a stone wall” so:

Close together were the helms and shields massive in the middle. / For shield leaned on shield, helmet on helmet, man against man, / and the horse hair crests along the horns of the shining helmets / touched as they bent their heads, so dense were they formed on each other. / And before them all were two men in their armour, Patroclus / and Automedon, both of them in one single fury / to fight in front of the Myrmidons…7

Homer’s champion was heroic, aristocratic and class conscious. Achilles will not fight Asteropaios, until he has established that Asteropaios is of

60 sufficiently noble lineage. “What man are you, and whence, who dare stand up to my onset?”8

The theme of hauteur and prejudice is underlined by “brilliant Odysseus” who rebuked the commoner:

Thersites, of the endless speech…/ who knew within his head many words, but disorderly; / vain, and without decency to quarrel with princes / with any word he thought might be amusing to the Argives. / This was the ugliest man who came beneath Ilion. He was / bandy-legged and went lame of one foot, with shoulders / stooped and drawn together over his chest, and above this / his skull went up to a point with the wool grown sparsely upon it. / Beyond all others, Achilles hated him, and Odysseus. / These two he was forever abusing, but now at brilliant / Agamemnon he clashed the shrill noise of his abuse.9

The unflattering physical description of Thersites is a transparent metaphor for his proletarian social class. This metaphor is set off by the adjective “brilliant,” applied without variation to aristocrats. The allegory is accentuated by Odysseus’ mannerless rebuke:

Thersites, your words are / ill-considered. Stop, nor stand up alone against princes. / Out of all those who came beneath Ilion with Atreides / I assert there is no worse man than you are. Therefore / you shall not lift up your mouth to argue with princes…/…you argue nothing but scandal.10

Striking Thersites with his “scepter”, Odysseus amplifies the

“concentration of military capacities and responsibilities at the top of the social hierarchy”.11 “Doubled over (as) a round tear dropped from him, /

61 and a bloody welt stood up between his shoulders under / the golden sceptre’s stoke,” Thersites is “frightened,” “in pain” and “helpless”.12

Such profound and humiliating physical subjugation, emphasises the submissive position of commoners, and the dominance of the aristocratic hero in Homeric tradition.

Yet, though “the Greek army of knights and the Greek aristocratic state vanished,”13 the hoplite – who marched to war with a manservant14 - preserved patrician ideals.15 The panoply, furnished by individual soldiers,16 was not inexpensive. So, whilst “most hoplites were not professional soldiers, but militiamen,”17 “to be a hoplite determined status and ‘belonging’ in the community,”18 and hoplites enjoyed significant political influence.19

Whilst hoplite armies had few élite corps,20 they evoked élitist ideals, fought for honour,21 (or said so, and recognised the value of saying so) and inhabited a battlefield noted epithetically to be “glory bringing”.22

The tactical conservatism of hoplite combat sustained this motif. In part, inflexible and somewhat ritualized phalanx tactics23 were adaptations to the practical demands of agricultural seasons.24 Yet, it was “the heroic code of the citizen soldier, (more than agricultural practicalities, which) made the idea of shunning decisive battle repugnant”.25 The Greek imagination was ruled by Homer’s romanticism,26 and the rigid formations of armoured men perpetuated a gallant allegory, the mirage of

Achilles, “chivalrous, (seeking) face to face confrontation in open battle”.27

62 Doctrine perpetuates this patrician thinking: a sense of Homeric aristocratic prejudice about who makes decisions and gives orders.28 In chapter five this sort of prejudice is seen as the power of command, an over-emphasis on positional authority which suffocates individual autonomy and moral purpose.

The lineage of this thinking is rooted in the world of Odysseus of the

Iliad, where the nobility were pre-eminent and commoners kept their place.29 In the twenty first century, myths of rank and class are equally hegemonic. As the hoplite phalanx exemplified the society in which it was found, so the twenty-first century military reflects the social order.

As military doctrine overplays the power and authority of command, so society aggrandizes the “corporate rich”.30

In the sixth century B.C, Theognis of Megara described the qualities separating the good and noble from the bad and base. Whilst noble men possessed judgement (gnome), being therefore capable of moderation, restraint and justice, the proletariat lacked these virtues, being therefore shameless and arrogant. Theognis believed, moreover, that virtue could not be taught. “It is easier to beget and rear a man than to put good sense into him. No one has ever discovered a way to make a fool wise or a bad man good…you will never make the bad man good by teaching”.31

The view found resonance in the élitist perspective which attached to the ideology of honour: so very much a part of the Greek world,32 and today a

63 formidable, though unobtrusive, aspect of the classical inheritance of western arms.

The Beginning of Freedom for Greece

Centred upon the Aegean Sea, the ancient Greek world was defined and divided by a great rivalry between Athens and Sparta. Toward the end of the fifth century, these two great and contrasting states were joined in

“epochal” conflict.33 Casting aside typical restraints,34 the two powers gave way to “implacable rivalry,” in the quest for honour and glory.35

Their epic struggle continues to inform historical, cultural, political and philosophical thought.36 This was the Peloponnesian War, fought between

Athens and Sparta and their allies, and described by Thucydides as:

A great war and more worthy of relation than any that had preceded it. This belief was not without its grounds. The preparations of both the combatants were in every department in the last state of perfection (and) the rest of the Hellenic race (took) sides in the quarrel; those who delayed doing so at once having it in contemplation. Indeed this was the greatest moment yet known in history, not only of the Hellenes, but of a large part of the barbarian world – (indeed) of mankind.37

In 404B.C, following spectacular victory at Aegospotami, Spartans stood on the soils of Attica watching the dismantlement of Athenian democracy.38 After three decades, the Peloponnesian War was over. The walls of Athens were broken down. Sparta seemed unassailable,39 and it was thought to be “the beginning of freedom for Greece”.40 Sparta had won the game of hard power. Yet, poised to assume leadership

64 (hēgemonia) in Greece,41 Sparta stood imperilled by the handmaids of hubris, retribution and ruinous destruction, nemesis and atê.42

Within a generation, Spartan oppression had aroused disaffection throughout the Peloponnesian League.43 Following defeat by

Epaminondas at Leuctra in 371B.C, Sparta began a long spiral of decline.

The collapse of Spartan influence was not mere fate. Embedded in the politics of ancient Greece,44 and woven in the fabric of Spartan society, were the flaws which precipitated the disintegration of a superlative military power.

Many of these flaws turned on the axle of honour (timē), defined by Plato

(d: 347B.C) as: “good things given for virtuous deeds…dignified bearing and the cultivation of one’s dignity”.45 Whilst honour was not divorced from notions of integrity or virtue, the most dramatic and evident attachment was to ideas of celebrity and reward. The ancient concept of honour was ambitious; but it was not foolhardy – and did not impose an obligation to embark upon recklessness.46 Ultimately, ideas of honour were connected to “a pervasive fear of shame…and the competitive drive to ensure that whatever people were saying (about one), it was nothing one need feel ashamed about”.47

Honour: A Common Rivalry to be the Best

United by language and a fluid, inclusive Pan-Hellenic religion,48 ancient

Greece was defined by a shared understanding of honour which extended throughout the autonomous and often quarrelsome poleis.

65 In 479B.C, the Athenians rejected alliance with Persia which would have secured Athenian military advantage over all the other Greeks. Recording the moment, Herodotus illustrates the cultural unanimity which connected the separate city-states. Dismissing the Persian envoy, Herodotus has the

Athenians say:

There is no amount of gold anywhere on earth so great, nor any country that surpasses others so much in beauty and fertility, that we would accept it as a reward for medizing (which means going over to the Persians) and enslaving Hellas…. It would not be fitting for the Athenians to prove traitors to the Greek people, with whom we are united in sharing the same kinship and language, with whom we have established shrines and conduct sacrifices to the gods together, and with whom we also share the same way of life.49

Yet, though united against an enemy with whom though political alliance was understood to be treacherous, ill-fitting and debasing, Greece was devoured by an obsessive contention for honour.50 War, determining prestige between the poleis, was endemic.51 Considered in relative terms, honour was established and defined through competition52 juxtaposed with “fear of humiliation, reproach and the withdrawal of affection and respect”.53 The upshot was a society “addicted to comparison and competition…(within which) issues were very readily translated into

54 55 terms of ‘face’”. Writing around 440B.C, Sophocles illustrates this point. Following defeat in the contest for Achilles’ armour; Ajax is aggrieved, he has been slighted and feels a very public loss of face56 at favour bestowed upon the sophistic, cunning Odysseus.57 Ajax proclaims a “simple truth”:

66 If the bestowing of the famous armour Had rested with Achilles while he lived, To give them as a war-prize to the bravest, No rival then would have filched them from my hands; But now the sons of Atreus have contrived That a man of dishonour should have them…58

“Abject” and “in dishonour,”59 Ajax is “left an outcast, / Shamed by the

Greeks,”60 as Sophocles acknowledges the unifying concept of honour as a powerful, essential social metanarrative. Ajax emphasises the point, dishonoured he feels unable even to face his father:

What countenance can I show my father Telamon? How will he ever stand the sight of me If I come before him naked, armed with no glory, When he himself won chaplets of men’s praise?61

Ajax resolves to die – rather than endure the ignominy of public mockery,

“the virulent / Slur of the Greeks’ slander”.62 Before suicide by the blade given to him by Hector, Ajax affirms the conviction that death was preferable to life with dishonour: “Let a man nobly live or nobly die / If he is a nobleman: I have said what I had to say”.63

Through love of honour and fear of disgrace, Greek society impelled men to compete impetuously for success. Isokrates believed, that “through being well-spoken of and praised and remembered we have a share in immortality, and so…should be willing to undergo anything”.64

Illustrating honour’s allure, Agis II (Spartan King after 427, died around

398B.C) pursued a campaign in Central Greece in order to enlarge

67 “Spartan power and his own glory”.65 In the same vein, “one Spartan remarked that during war ‘nothing is more enjoyable or honourable than to be dependant on no-one, but to live on booty taken from enemies that provides sustenance and renown’”.66 Thucydides writes similarly of the

Athenian politician and general Alcibiades (d: 404B.C) that he urged attack upon Sicily as a means by which he might win wealth and honour:

By far the warmest advocate of the expedition was…Alcibiades son of Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his success. For the position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means could bear….67

Equally, it was fear of disgrace which compelled Nicias (d: 413B.C),

Athenian politician and general, to persist in the disastrous siege of

68 Syracuse in 414B.C. Ordering a withdrawal, Nicias – great rival of

Alcibiades – “would have risked the reputation he had spent his life building and guarding”.69 Nicias was right to be alert to the risk of failure.

Upon his surrender he was “condemned as a voluntary prisoner and as an unworthy soldier”.70

Acknowledging the connection of social ideals and private aspirations,

Plato averred that the constitutions of states were reflected in the disposition of people. Acknowledging that “there are as many forms of human character as there are of constitutions,” Plato observes, in the

68 Republic, that constitutions are not born from oak or rock, but from the characters of the people who live in the cities.71

Plato’s description of the oligarchic Spartan state72 as “honour-loving”73 coincides with the biographer Plutarch (d: 119A.D) who observed the character of the Spartans. Plutarch records that Agesilaus II, who commanded the Spartan army during its supremacy between 404 –

371B.C, encouraged the “spirit of ambition and contention” which

Lycurgus introduced “into the constitution as an incitement to virtue,” and that he “wanted there to be some point of difference between good men, and thus an element of rivalry among them”.74 To encourage this love of honour and the fear of disgrace, Spartan men would:

Spend most of the day around the gymnasia and the so-called leschae…. No remarks would be passed about anything relating to moneymaking or commercial dealings. Instead the main function of the time spent thus would be to bestow some praise on good conduct or criticism on bad. (Thus Lycurgus) accustomed citizens to (be)…almost ecstatic with fervent ambition...75

Aristotle (d: 322B.C), whose “account of the virtues decisively constitutes the classical tradition of moral thought,”76 believed similarly that excellence was rewarded with honour,77 which he acknowledged as “the prize appointed for the noblest deeds,” and “the greatest of external goods”.78 However, though Aristotle recognised honour as a “prize of excellence” which was “rendered to the good,”79 he acknowledged honour as a public artifact underpinned by an intricate etiquette80 and complicated

69 by other ideas; such as those of social class, wealth, power and influence.81

For example, Aristotle observed that “men who are well-born are thought worthy of honour, and so are those who enjoy power or wealth: for they are in a superior position”.82 Similarly, Aristotle remarks that those who achieve political stature become so saturated by “pride (in) their superiority (they) are unwilling to remain on a level with others”.83 The association of honour with public prominence is so conspicuous, that

Aristotle believed most people “enjoy being honoured by those in positions of authority because of their hopes…they delight in honour as a token of favour to come”.84

Connected by Aristotle to notions of “ambition,” honour is conceived in terms of public prominence or public accolade.85 “Honour,” argues

Aristotle, “is the token of man’s being famous”.86 There is more than a modicum of rivalry surrounding the concept and thus Aristotle believes men are shamed when “lacking a share in the honourable things shared by everyone else”.87 Aristotle paints a transparent picture of honour as a competitive concept, and avers that:

Citizens seem to face dangers because…of the honours they win by such action: and therefore those people seem to be bravest among whom cowards are held in dishonour and brave men in honour. This is the kind of courage that Homer depicts in Diomede and in Hector:

First will Polydamas be to heap reproach on me…

And

70 For Hector one day ‘mid the Trojans shall utter his vaulting harangue: ‘Afraid was Tydeides, and fled from my face.’

This kind of courage is…due to excellence, for it is due to shame and to desire for a noble object (i.e. honour) and avoidance of disgrace which is ignoble.88

As a competitive concept,89 the Greek sense of honour was entwined inextricably with notions of individual excellence or aretê.90 Rewarded for individual excellence by properly proportionate public honours, a man was expected to be proud, not vainglorious or hubristic. This was the swaggering Aristophanes mocked in Frogs (405B.C) when Dionysus derides the horrors described by Hercules, who seems to be something of a blowhard.91 Hence, Aristotle believed that “with regard to honour and dishonour, the mean is proper pride, the excess is known as a sort of empty vanity, and the deficiency is undue humility”.92

Honour and Hubris

Honour was thus informed by hubris. The most typical reading of this concept is the “overweening arrogance”93 illustrated by Sophocles in the play Ajax (circa 450 – 430B.C):

Whenever men forget their mere man’s nature, Thinking a thought too high…/ they fall On most untoward disasters sent by Heaven.94

Sophocles paints hubris as an idea saturated with egoism and irreligious presumption. Hence, when Telamon encourages Ajax, on the eve of his

71 departure for the fighting around Troy: “Child…/ Resolve to win, but always with God’s help,” Ajax courts disaster by a “senseless boast:

Father, with God’s help even a worthless man / Could triumph. I propose, without that help, / To win my prize of fame”.95

Seeking honour for himself, Ajax tells Athena, “Goddess…/ Go stand beside the other Greeks; help them. / For where I bide, no enemy will break through”.96 Thus, in his quest for honour Ajax is diminished by the unattractive self-importance for which he was punished, when the gods drove him to madness and suicide. But hubris was also apparent in less dramatic, more typical and perhaps less heroic displays of public haughtiness, which often degenerated to contempt and insolence.97 This was behaviour understood by Aristotle which:

Consist(ed) of doing or saying such things as involve shame for the victim, not in order that anything may happen to yourself, or because anything has happened to yourself, but simply for the pleasure involved…The cause of the pleasure thus enjoyed by the insolent man is that he thinks himself greatly superior to others when ill-treating them. That is why youths and rich men are insolent: they think themselves superior…. One sort of insolence is to rob people of the honour due to them.98

Aristotle underlines the Greek understanding of honour as a public construct in contrast to dishonour, or disgrace or to acts which pointed to disrespect. Aristotle observes that besides insolence, hubris might be apparent in public acts of slighting, and these might be acts of contempt or spite.

72 Spite, writes Aristotle, “is thwarting another man’s wishes, not to get something for yourself but to prevent his getting it”.99 The jealousy which ignites spite reflects rivalry which, for the Greeks, was so much a part of honour. So, when the Spartan general Brasidas sought reinforcements in order to capitalise upon his success in the capture of Amphipolis,

Thucydides writes that “the Spartans, however, did not support him, partly out of envy on the part of the chief men…”.100 Aristotle emphasises the animus of envious spite, citing Achilles’ jeremiad against

Agamemnon: “He hath taken my prize for himself and hath done me dishonour”.101

Dishonoured when Agamemnon takes his prize woman, Briseis, Achilles withdraws to his tent in a fearsome sulk. Achilles refuses to take further part in the fighting, returning only to avenge the death of his friend

Patroclus at the hand of Hector. To modern eyes, Achilles seems little more than churlish. Yet, his behaviour was intelligible to the Greeks who attached such importance to their public position, and to the public courtesy afforded by their fellows. To defame another was a common artifice by which one might raise one’s relative status. Such behaviour however, was seen by the Greeks to be more than unmannerly, it was seen to be hubristic.

73 Honour and Aretê

Aretê, among the most powerful words of commendation, “both in Homer and in later Greek,”102 was connected to the qualities most valued by society.

In the classical era, concepts of honour and aretê had evolved from heroic ideas recalled by Homer,103 whereby a man was identified completely by his actions, and defined by his social context. “Every individual (had) a given role and status within a well-defined and highly determinate system of roles and statuses”.104 For Homer, honour, morality and social structure were one and the same thing.

There was only one set of social bonds. Morality as something distinct did not yet exist. Evaluative questions were questions of social fact. It was for this reason that Homer spoke always of knowledge of what to do and how to judge. Nor were such questions difficult to answer except in exceptional cases. For the given rules which assigned men their place in the social order, and with it their identity, also prescribed what they owed and what was owed to them and how they were to be treated and regarded if they failed, and how they were to treat and regard others if those others failed. 105

Adkins underlines this reasoning. He describes Homeric society wherein the highest commendation was reserved for the man of wealth and social position who revealed martial valour in war, and offers as an illustration, the exchange between Sarpedon and Glaucus in Book XII of the Iliad.

74 Sarpedon, to stir Glaucus to greater activity in the battle, asks him challengingly:

‘Glaucus, why are we honoured most highly in Lycia with a seat of honour, with choice meats, and with full cups?’

Clearly the indication is that they are not earning this honour by their present inactivity; whereas if they fight bravely and do not shirk, the Lycians will say:

‘Not ingloriously do our kings rule throughout Lycia and eat fat sheep and drink choice wine. No; they have excellent strength, for they fight in the foremost ranks of the Lycians.’106

This exchange demonstrates how the aristocratic Sarpedon and Glaucus earn, by their deliberate effort and accomplishment in battle, the privilege and acclaim that accrues to them by birth.

“The chief aim of Homeric man was honour,” (timē) which depended on acts, not intentions, and attached to a scale of values and social class.107

“Personal exposure justified societal privilege (which was) usually hereditary for Homeric chieftains”.108 So, “within a Homeric community, individuals and families (were) ranked in order of their excellence or goodness (aretê). A man or woman of excellence enjoy(ed) honour and a good reputation”.109

The Homeric hero is an aristocrat,110 bound by a socially implicit honour code whereby:

Each strove to prove himself the best (aristos) in a display of martial excellence (aretê). Valour in battle validated leadership…. In this society, respect among one’s peers mattered, as did the glory

75 (kleos) of an individual passed to future generations. Skill in combat proved a man’s aretê; death in battle assured kleos and fit the noble ideal (kalon). Thus, a long life and peaceful death rated disdain in comparison to a short life made glorious by a noble death.111

The Homeric hero is thus exemplified by Achilles; in many ways a selfish unattractive figure, yet esteemed because no man matched him in physical battle.112 Achilles illustrates the heroic understanding of virtue, an idea enmeshed with notions of oikos: kinship, friendship,113 and guardianship.114 Reflecting the import of oikos qua friendship or guardianship, courage was esteemed more than a personal quality, as an attribute necessary to defend close others. Thus, kudos or honour accorded the man who excelled in battle, was a mark of recognition by people who relied upon his guardianship.115 These are ideas which illuminate Agamemnon’s leadership of the Greeks against Troy. In a clash fuelled by the disdain shown by Paris (Prince of Troy) to Menelaus

(King of Sparta, and husband of Helen), Agamemnon fought more as the brother of Menelaus, than as King of Mycenae.116

Beyond ideas of kinship, the heroic moral vocabulary was informed by social rank. “In the epics, a hereditary ruling élite has a monopoly on physical prowess, intelligence and beauty”.117 For Homer, courage was not merely the capacity to face harm and danger, but the capacity to face particular harms and dangers in particular ways, according to social convention.118 The characters in the Iliad do not find it difficult to know what they owe to each other, or to understand what is expected of them.

76 Confronted with the possibility of wrongdoing they feel shame, and they seek “honour (which) is conferred by one’s peers (because they understand that) without honour a man is without worth”.119

Achilles is intelligible then, honour bound by ineluctable social rules120 to avenge the death of Patroclus as a champion in combat with Hector. He is a man of standing, and as such he exemplifies the heroic reading of aretê; a tightly defined concept which related to the excellences men required to fulfil societal roles with honour.

In classical Greece, honour continued to be derived from aretê,121 but the moral centre of gravity had advanced. Notwithstanding the distinct moral views which evolved in separate states,122 “the primary moral community was no longer the kinship group, but the city-state”:123 a changed social context, which decoupled ideas of aretê from the particularities of social role.

Being the best in Homer was “a matter of status as much as of personal merit”.124 The moral evolution is illustrated by Sophocles when, in

Antigone he has Antigone ignore the order of Creon, ruler of Thebes, to leave the body of Polyneices unburied and dishonoured:

Ismene: Would you bury him, when it is forbidden in the city?

Antigone: He is my brother – and yours too. I will not prove false to him / It is not for (Creon) to keep me from my own / Let me endure this terror. No suffering of mine will be enough to make me die ignobly.125

77 Whereas for “Homer the question of honour was the question of what was due to a king, in Sophocles the question of honour has become the question of what is due to a man”.126 In the fifth century, the virtues expected typically of kings remained in esteem, but they were no longer confined to the defined social place of kingship. At the same time, common citizens were no longer imprisoned within the subservient part.

In consequence, the fifth century experienced a moral tension between being a good man and being a good citizen. This tension infused the reading of aretê which is seen, less in the fulfillment of narrow heroic roles, than in the terms of a broader human excellence.127

Even so, this was an understanding of human excellence which was saturated with competitive notions of success and accomplishment.128

Aretê, which for Aristotle entailed habituated excellence,129 came to incorporate quieter introspective virtues whilst retaining much of the heroic implication inherited from earlier times. 130 The idea retained the sense of toil, expense and accomplishment which Pindar (518 – 438B.C) observed when describing the games: “Ever for the sake of aretai do toil and expense strive to achieve a deed…”.131 In this way, aretê remained central to the very public Greek conscience, and to the Greek obsession with reputation.132

Honour and the Polis

Homer’s champions were renowned for single-handed exploits and feats of arms. We read of “bold Hector” who would “never stay back where the

78 men were in numbers / but break out in front, and give way in his fury to no man”. We read also of Hector who “alone defended the gates and the long walls” of Troy.133 Articulating a more individualistic notion of honour than his classical successor, the Homeric champion was nevertheless informed and inspired by notions of patriotism. Thus, in the

Iliad, Hector enjoins:

He who among you / finds by spear thrown or spear thrust his death and destiny, / let him die. He has no dishonour when he dies defending / his country, for then his wife shall be saved and his children afterwards…134

Yet, though inspired to “fight in defence of (his) country,”135 the Homeric champion did not fight, as his classical successor, for the political autonomy and institutions of the state. Public institutions in the archaic poleis were fragile. Politics were controlled by prominent men and their personal followers.136 As public institutions became more secure and confident, the political influence of family élites was diminished. While inequality and hierarchy persisted, by the late sixth and first half of the fifth century Greek cities were seemingly egalitarian.137 Notwithstanding inevitable miscarriages, the principles of impartial justice and the public, nonpartisan rule of law became more evident.138 In a significant trial,

Pericles, was put before a tribunal in 430B.C in order to establish his probity. His name cleared and his character unsullied, he was reinstated.139

79 In Sparta, the communal military messes (syssitia) of homoioi, (the peers), illustrate how formal public institutions supplanted informal family networks. A further demonstration of the displacement of private influence by public law is in the arrest of the Regent Pausanias, a member of the Agiad royal family and regent for the son of Leonidas following

Thermopylae (480B.C). Pausanias had been victorious over the Persians at

Plataea (479B.C), but his personal influence and ability did not set him above the law. The Spartans acted against even such a prominent man, because they believed the principles and consistent ideals of justice were inviolable.140 Thucydides writes that:

As (Pausanias) was about to be arrested in the street (he) set off at a run for the temple of the goddess of the Bronze House, the enclosure of which was near at hand, he succeeded in taking sanctuary before they took him, and entering into a small chamber, which formed part of the temple to avoid being exposed to the weather, he remained there. The ephors (magistrates), for the moment distanced in the pursuit, afterwards took the roof off the chamber, and having made sure he was inside, shut him in, barricaded him in, and staying before the place, reduced him by starvation.141

Similarly, when the Spartan King Agis, “on return from campaign, wished to dine at home with his wife, and sent for his rations from the communal mess, the polemarchs (senior officers, the commanders of regiments or morai)142 refused to send them and subsequently fined him for omitting one of the customary sacrifices”.143 In Athens, the democratic constitution of Cleisthenes in 508B.C affords a decisive example of the

80 ascendancy of public institutions and the comparative decline of informal private power.144

As politics evolved, so the phalanx matured. Describing the classical phalanx, Tyrtaeus articulated a transvaluation of Homeric aretê. Tyrtaeus, who played a significant part in the Second Messenian War, wrote

“propaganda poems to urge his fellow Spartans on in battle. (The typical) themes are that one sacrifice self for the common interest, (and) that death in battle brings immortal glory”.145 Where once, champions had fought and died as individuals in front of massed forms, fighting and dying were now anonymous and among equals. But, anonymous death in the phalanx became a hero’s sacrifice, which the polis would honour. Hoplitic aretê qua lionized champion became associated with civic duty and patriotism.146 Tyrtaeus wrote of soldiers fighting in order, setting:

…foot to foot to attack rushing foes. / This is a man’s best, greatest, noblest praise, / And shall to youth immortal glory raise. / True is that soldier, faithful to defend / His country’s cause, his people’s common friend, / Himself who hazards life, and standing high / Exhorts his comrades that he bravely die. / This is he can boast a valiant heart, / And in the fight maintains a hero’s part. / Himself he turns embattled foe to fight, / And stems the torrent of th’ unequal fight. / Ennobling friends, house, parents as he dies… / His children’s children and those yet to come, / Shall reap fresh honours from their parent’s tomb.147

Revered by the Spartans, Tyrtaeus writes of “aretê, the greatest possession of mankind /…a common good for the polis and the whole

81 demos, / when a man holds firm and stands unshaken in the front of the phalanx”.148 Thus, he exhorts:

Every man must take his shield toward the front-most fighting, making an enemy of Life, and considering the black spirits of Death and Evil as dear friends…those who turn in fear, all their virtue (aretê) is lost; no man can speak of each and every misfortune that fall upon a man without honour. In horrific war it is nice to spear the midriff of some fleeing man, and a slain man who is sprawled in the dust with a spear point in his back is disgraced.149

Tyrtaeus underlines how Greek hoplites, being free, fought courageously for political independence150 and “to defend and enhance the intangible honour of the community”.151 Their fight had became a fight to the death

– in order, informed by a sense of martial honour and etiquette152 and the notion of a just cause in which all citizens shared the honour and the obligation of courageous sacrifice.153 Illustrating this point, Herodotus records the observation of Demaratus who observed of the Spartans,

“fighting together they are the best soldiers in the world. They are free – yes – but not entirely free: for they have a master, and that master is

Law”.154 Bound equally by legal and moral ideals, these soldiers were citizens who shared the privileges and responsibility of political self- determination. Citizenship was established upon the foundations of land, and the shared obligation to defend this land.155 The defence of this land, and its preservation as “unplundered” and “unravaged” was the source of considerable civic pride.156 Hanson explains that:

82 The sight of troops running through fields chopping away at vines and olive trees was unbearable to most voting citizens…. invasion and occupation were blows to a citizen’s pride, as everything that was dear fell into the hands of the enemy. Thus, most Greek city- states felt completely justified in using their landholding hoplites in an effort to remain inviolable; then they could be secure in the belief that they had done everything possible to remain aporthetos – unravaged and unplundered by the enemy.157

The hegemony and intricacy of these ideas is illustrated by the aristeion and the disgrace of Aristodemos. The aristeion was formal recognition, decided by public ballot, of valour in battle. The idea illustrates the philosophy of the Greeks, who recognised and rewarded individual excellence regardless of social rank. In contrast, the Persians punished men who did not fight well.158 Aristodemos was the Spartan who, having failed to meet his obligations at Thermopylae, sought redemption at

Plataea. Herodotus records:

That two of the 300 men, Eurytos and Aristodemos, had the opportunity to return safely to Sparta…since they had been released from the camp by Leonidas and were laid up in Alpenos with the most serious case of eye disease…. When Eurytos learned of the Persian advance around the mountain, he asked for his arms, put them on, and ordered his helot to lead him to those who were fighting. After leading him to the fighting, the helot fled and disappeared from sight, while Eurytos charged into the raging battle and was killed. But Aristodemos was left behind, faint and feeble…

So after returning to Lacedaemon, Aristodemos met with disgrace and dishonour. The dishonour he suffered was that not a single Spartan would give him fire, or speak to him, and his disgrace was

83 that he was called ‘Aristodemos the Trembler.’ But at the Battle of Plataea he acquitted himself of all blame that had been cast upon him.159

Describing Plataea, Herodotus recalls that the Spartans attacked the strongest of the Persian divisions, and conquered it. He notes:

The man who proved best and bravest by far was Aristodemos, the only one of the 300 to have survived Thermopylae, for which he had met with disgrace and dishonour. After him, the best were the Spartans Poseidonios, Philokyon and Amompharetos. When the question of which man had proven himself the best came up for discussion, however, the surviving Spartans recognised that Aristodemos had wanted to die in front of everyone because of the charge against him, and so had left his post in a rage and displayed great feats, while Poseidonios did not want to die, but had proven himself a noble and courageous man all the same, and was therefore much the better man for it.160

The bravery of Aristodemos at Plataea recalls Hector who:

…strode out in the foremost / and hurled himself on the struggle of men like a high-blown storm-cloud / which swoops down from above to trouble the blue sea-water.161

Similarly, Homer describes Agamemnon who:

…drove on and killed a man, Bienor, shepherd of the people, himself, then his companion Oîleus, lasher of horses; / who springing down from behind his horses stood forth to face him, / but Agamemnon stabbed straight at his face as he came on in fury / with the sharp spear, nor did helm’s bronze-heavy edge hold it, / but the spearhead passed through this and the bone and the inward / brain was all spattered forth.162

84 Yet, the courage of Aristodemos was dismissed as the action of a madman – berserk ferocity which owed nothing to notions of civic duty or obligation. His impetuosity illustrates how a conception of honour, redolent with Homeric élitism,163 had evolved to become a larger and unifying construct associated with patriotism.164

As honour evolved, city states “sought to gain prestige by demonstrating their superiority over their neighbours”.165 Hence, arms and armour stripped from the vanquished (skyla) and dedicated in sanctuaries or on the battlefield, was a religious dedication which exorcised evil from the site of conflict.166

One form of tribute to (the gods) is the trophy, arms and armour of prize hung about some tree trunk or pillar, or piled in a heap, on the foughten field: which as the name denotes is a memorial of the rout, and Zeus is invoked…. I do not doubt that this is an offering to the protecting deity, set up in that spot where he had proved his present power. Sometimes it is distinctly said that trophies are consecrated to the gods of battle, sometimes a permanent trophy is erected in a sanctuary….167

But more than mere votive, battlefield trophies represented an opportunity for competitive exhibition. The trophy did not necessarily imply decisive victory, and “even a beaten army or fleet might claim victory in one part of the action and set up a trophy accordingly”.168

Trophy rights were granted to the side in possession of the field at the conclusion of battle. Possession was understood to entail the ability to recover and bury one’s dead. Affording the fallen proper funerary rites

85 was enormously significant, and “the homage universally offered the dead pervades Greek literature”.169

To abandon the bodies of dead friends and kinsmen to carrion birds and beasts was a disgrace and a violation of divine law; accordingly, much of the fighting in the Iliad takes place around the bodies of slain heroes, which must be dragged out of the fighting and carried back to their friends to receive their due funeral rites. But in classical warfare, when a man fell, the ranks closed up and pressed on; the dead were left until after the battle. So there developed the custom of formally sending a herald after a lost battle to ask permission from the victors to take up the dead from the battlefield. If the losers did not do so, they did not admit the enemy were masters of the field, and so did not formally acknowledge defeat. (Thus) a skirmish in which the Athenian cavalry lost a few dead, but recovered the bodies the same day without a truce, hardly counted as a victory for the enemy. (But) when the pious Nicias, after re-embarking his men from a successful raid on enemy territory, found that two dead bodies had not been taken up and sent a herald to recover them under a truce, his action turned a clear victory into a formal defeat.170

Opposing forces would thus try to force their enemy to solicit humiliating truce, the formal admission of defeat. Without such a truce, the dead of the defeated army would remain unburied and thus dishonoured, where they had fallen. The ignominy of soliciting a truce is demonstrated by the example of King Pausanias of Sparta who, after the defeat of Lysander at

Haliartos in 395B.C arrived with an army the day after the battle. In order to recover the bodies of Lysander and his comrades, Pausanias sought an armistice. “The resentment at Sparta was profound, and Pausanias was

86 exiled for having submitted to ask for a burial truce instead of fighting a battle for the purpose of recovering the bodies of the slain”.171

The honour attached to the rights of a trophy also inspired undignified hubris and extravagant, competitive display. Illustrating this observation,

Herodotus describes the dedication of three Phoenician triremes after

172 Salamis in 480B.C. To offer anything less magnificent would risk the mockery of men, quite apart from the displeasure of heaven.173 Pritchett argues that such offerings are more in the nature of “self-glorification on the behalf of a victorious state or hegemon, that pride has swallowed up piety” so that the dedication is more in the line of propaganda than propitiation.174 In Hellenika, Xenophon captures such Spartan hubris when, after victory at Coronea in 394B.C, Agesilaos “ordered Gylis the polemarch to assemble the troops and set up a trophy, adding that they should all be garlanded…and that all the flute players should play…. And

Agesilaos went to Delphi, where he dedicated a tenth of the spoils to the god, a dedication that amounted to not less than a hundred talents”.175

Xenophon captures the sense of competition ever to be the best, which infused even votive ritual. “Donors use(d) the term akrothinion, literally

‘top of the heap,’ or ‘pick of the crop’”.176

Predictably, the competitive egotism of votive extravagance evolved as a

“monument commemorating the glory of the people and later of the victorious leader”.177 This, the gauche hubris and hauteur of victorious generals, was criticised by Euripides in Andromache, (426B.C) where has

Pelus say:

87 …the custom here is topsy-turvy. / When the public sets a war memorial up / Do those who really sweated get the credit? / Oh no! Some general wangles the prestige! - / Who, brandishing his one spear among thousands, / Did one man’s work, but gets a world of praise. / These self-important fathers of their country / Think they’re above the people…178

The contention for acclaim which animated Greek life was also discernible behind the rituals of diplomatic forms and exchange between the poleis. Making this point, Thucydides observes that though the

Peloponnesian War was begun by:

The Athenians and the Peloponnesians with the dissolution of the Thirty Years’ Peace made after the conquest of Euboea. To the question why they broke the treaty, I answer by placing first an account of their grounds of complaint and points of difference that no-one may ever have to ask the immediate cause which plunged the Hellenes into a war of such magnitude. The real cause, however, I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable.179

Sparta was not fearful of subjugation to Athens. Rather, Spartan anxiety was provoked by the possibility of dishonour, were Athens to become too powerful. Fuelling this apprehension, Athenian ambassadors present when the Spartans repudiated the Thirty Years truce, admitted growth of the Athenian Empire was motivated by honour, fear and profit. Equally,

“deliberate insults that dishonoured victims who felt shame if they could not take revenge,” are acknowledged motives for conflict.180

88 Thucydides records Pericles as saying that one should never give in over a trifle. Objecting to Spartan negotiations for peace, Pericles argued:

There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to go through everything, and that is the principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians. I know the spirit which inspires men while they are being persuaded to make war is not always retained in action, that as circumstances change, resolutions change. Yet I see that now as before the same, almost literally the same, counsel is demanded of me; and I put it to those of you who are allowing yourselves to be persuaded, to support the decision of the assembly even in the case of reverses, or to forfeit all credit for their wisdom in the case of success. Now it was clear before time that Sparta entertained designs against us; it is still more clear now…. I hope that you will none of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara decree, which appears in front of their (Sparta’s) complaints, and the revocation of which is to save us from war, or let any feeling of self-reproach linger in your minds, as if you went to war for a slight cause. Why, this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your resolution….181

Athenian insistence that Megaran traders be excluded from ports in the

Athenian empire was not mere political pretext,182 but neither was declared politics the whole story. Behind the scenes, the sense that honour had been slighted inflamed real passions.183 Pericles insisted the

“assembly reply to the Spartan ultimatum in terms which were ‘just and befitting to the city’”.184 Neither Athens nor Sparta was prepared to concede, lest compromise be seen as dishonourable infirmity. Honour turned upon the appearance of strength and prestige, not upon the realpolitik and not upon moral responsibility or principle.185

89 Honour was the ends which justified any means. Inspiring public ostentation in the quest for individual political influence,186 honour was equally the driving force of inter-state jealousy and conflict. 187

So, recording the Melian Dialogue (416B.C), Thucydides describes how

Athens demanded the surrender of Melos; explaining that by surrender, the Melians would validate Athenian power, and thus fortify the relative position of Athens against Sparta. But the Melians did not want to be dragged into the Peloponnesian conflict and sought for their neutrality to be respected. The rulers of Melos saw great baseness and disgrace in the prospect of Athenian bondage, and thus valued freedom above the practical concerns of safety.188

Melians: So you would not agree to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side?

Athenians: No, for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power.189

At the end of a long siege, the Athenians “put to death all the grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for slaves, and subsequently sent out five hundred colonists and settled the place themselves”.190 The desecration of Melian liberty thus secured the honourable fantasy of Athenian democracy.

The classical ideals of honour, which disguised the atrocity of this act, had evolved from Homeric seed. Honour, the foundational and controlling feature of classical society, perpetuated an intense and violent

90 competition for relative precedence, which was so important that the end justified callous means.

In the Afterglow of Greatness

The competitive ideology of honour dominated the classical landscape, fuelling a destructive vortex of unimaginable intensity.191 For example, between the first Persian Wars in 490B.C and the Battle of Chaeronea in

192 338B.C, Athens never enjoyed an entirely peaceful decade. Inflamed by honour; the Peloponnesian War, which was the greatest of Greek tragedies, presaged Spartan downfall and Athenian collapse.193

After Chaeronea, and in the afterglow of greatness, Philip II Macedon

194 (382 - 336B.C) subjugated Greece. Establishing the Corinthian League under Macedonian military governorship in 337B.C, Philip tranquilised the competitive feuding which, inflamed by honour, had inspired ruinous contention between the poleis. Sparta, refusing to join the League, was reduced to a satellite territory.195

The end of the Greek ascendancy laid the groundwork for Alexander’s championship of Hellenism,196 a political, military and cultural tradition which continues to exert a persistent subtle philosophical influence.

Yet, even as Athens teetered on the cusp of insignificance, the statesman and orator Demosthenes (384 - 322B.C), recalled ideals of honour and citizenship which once defined Athenian eminence.197 Speaking in defence of the historian, Androtion, Demosthenes reminded the Athenian people that Athens:

91 Has never to this day…been eager for the acquisition of money; but for honour it has been eager, as for nothing else in this world. It is a sign of this that when Athens had money in greater abundance than any other Hellenic people, she spent it all in the cause of honour.198

Demosthenes demonstrates the honour Athenians believed they won by fighting. His rhetoric illuminates an enduring and public conscience; the cultural interconnection of honour and moral responsibility. This relationship defined the significance of honour as a controlling feature within the Greek cultural narrative, and a crucial element within the classical inheritance of western arms.

Conclusion

Inseparable from the aretê standard, honour has been explored by this chapter as a defining feature of Greek society. Connected to notions of individual excellence and moral autonomy, honour was seen in this chapter to have evolved from individualist Homeric ideals.

As the poleis evolved, so readings of honour matured to involve ideas of civic duty and patriotism. These ideas mark the main line of advance pursued by the chapter to follow, in which discussion explores in more depth, the metaphor of the phalanx in which hoplites fought and died as equals.

92 ENDNOTES: CHAPTER TWO

1 Pritchett, (1985) p. 7 2 Raaflaub, (1997) p. 49: Explaining the interweaving of political and social evolution, Raaflaub continues: “This ended the phase of elite domination of the polis and ushered in an age of egalitarian constitutions”. Pritchett, (1971) pp. 3, 27, 31: In his discussion of military pay and provisions Pritchett also makes the point that military and social evolution were interlinked, and that the army came to include citizens who could afford weapons and armour. He observes (p. 3) “the citizen was obliged to pay for his own equipment”. Anderson, (1970) p. 6: Describes the army of citizens of “sufficient substance to arm themselves”. 3 van Wees, (1996) pp. 1, 2 Sage, (1996) pp. 11, 12 4 Homer, Iliad, 17. 360-365 5 van Wees, (1996) p. 24 Sage, (1996) p. 11 6 Pritchett, (1985) p. 11 7 Homer, Iliad, 16. 214-219 8 Homer, Iliad, 21. 150 9 Homer, Iliad, 2. 212-222 10 Homer, Iliad, 2. 247-256 11 Garlan, (1975) pp. 83, 86, 146: This tradition is reflected in Homer, where there was an élite, obligated to the public display of wealth, power and courage, and the common soldiery, beholden to “group in the background and applaud the chivalry of the heroes”. 12 Homer, Iliad, 2. 2265-269 13 Raaflaub, (1997) p. 50: Citing Martin Nilsson 14 Pritchett, (1971) p. 49 Anderson, (1970) p. 46 15 Wheeler, (1991) p. 122 16 Wheeler, (2007) p. 195 17 Carey, (2007) p. 40 18 Raaflaub, (1997) p. 54 19 Adcock, (1957) p. 5 Raaflaub, (1997) p. 54: Noting the expense borne by each hoplite in furnishing equipment offers, “To be a hoplite determined status and ‘belonging’ in the community”. Hunt, (2007) p. 125: Hunt observes that “in Greece, as in many other cultures from the Neolithic to the present, military service brought prestige as well as rights within the society”. Dawson, (1996) p. 50: Dawson discusses the economic and agricultural factors, which framed war but which, by themselves, were insufficient to inspire conflict. He argues “the key to the Greek system of warfare is that hoplites, who had to furnish their own equipment, constituted a privileged minority in the city-state, comprising perhaps one third of the free population, and they were often the only full citizens. Their political and social predominance was based squarely on their right and duty to carry a shield into battle…. It was this style of battle that had endowed small farmers, or the more prosperous of them, with a prestige unknown in other ancient societies, and it transformed peasants into citizens…(These) hoplites adopted this style of warfare because their status depended upon their demonstrated ability to defend their soil”. 20 Pritchett, (1974) p. 221 21 Dawson, (1996) p. 52: “All wars were ostensibly fought for honour”. 22 van Wees, (1996) p. 6 23 Wheeler, (2007) pp. 188-9: Wheeler explains the ritual of set-piece hoplite battle, which restricted violence to a single bloody clash and guaranteed the political survival of belligerents. He speaks to idealized concepts of martial gallantry articulated in the notion of agon, which frame broad notions that open battle is preferable to dishonest trickery.

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These ideas are seen to inform ideas of western military professionalism, the codes of military honour which resonate with larger social and cultural constructs of gentlemanliness. 24 Hanson, (1998). Hanson presents a thorough analysis of the Greek phalanx as a military form which only gave way to professional troops supported by larger economies than those of the poleis and thus able to deploy specialised corps, to develop advanced military technology and to campaign for extended periods. Hanson argues directly (p. 19) that, observing the hoplite as a citizen farmer, “almost every consideration of a Greek army – logistical, tactical, strategic, psychological and technological – was in some way connected to agriculture”. Anderson, (1970): Anderson observes at p. 2 that: “Profitable agriculture was confined to the plains and the lower foot-hills around them. Each city-state had its own patch of plain…and most lived hand-to-mouth. The loss of a single harvest might be endured, but the loss of two in succession meant ruin. A Greek state, therefore, making war upon its neighbour, could hope to reduce the enemy by gaining possession of his agricultural land for a few weeks when the corn was in ear”. He continues (p. 3) to note that: “The destruction of the year’s harvest could be achieved by marching an army through the fields, trampling the growing crop or beating it down with sticks…” Anderson explains (p. 6) how fighting was accommodated by the hoplite citizen-farmers. He notes: “The ordinary Greek army consisted of part-time soldiers, citizens of sufficient substance to arm themselves, but unwilling to leave their homes and unable to desert their regular occupations for more than a short period each year. Their campaigns were conducted in the season before the harvest when the farmers were free and the enemy’s crops most vulnerable”. Hunt, (2007) p. 109: “The hoplite was an untrained amateur fighting a decisive battle during a break in the agricultural schedule”. Such a fighting season cost society little, as crops could be tended and harvests reaped before battle was fought on crop stubble, which would not suffer for the press of men. Krentz, (2007) pp.154, 155: Krentz illuminates the agricultural pressure for the decisive battle, observing that invaders could damage some crop at most times of the year, “since grains, vines and fruit trees were harvested in different seasons. In early spring, invaders could interfere with the planting of chickpeas and summer crops and the grafting of olives and vines, though they had to cut the grass grain with sickles. In late May or June when the grain was ripe but unharvested, they could burn it (or cut it and eat it). In July, they could interfere with the last of the grain crop, or with the threshing. Figs, almonds and chickpeas matured in August; grapes, pears and apples in September and in October and November farmers normally planted legumes, barley and wheat. Olives were gathered and then pruned in November”. He notes that the best time to launch an invasion was when the enemy silos were at their lowest and before the harvest – but of course this was the time when an invading force was itself, most likely to be missed from the field. Adcock, (1957) p. 7: Armies fighting in summer “wished to be home again for the harvest and the gathering of the grapes and olives. (Because this was an agricultural reality for both sides) one battle nearly always settled the business”. 25 Hanson, (1998) p.8 Anderson, (1970) p. 5: Describing the political aversion of citizens of the poleis to standing armies, Anderson acknowledges the inherited and heroic psyche which would make it anathema for “property-owning citizens to sit back in idleness, letting their bodies grow soft and their fathers’ weapons blacken in the chimney smoke”. Dawson, (1996) pp. 50, 51: Dawson explains similarly how the hoplite citizen soldier derived prestige and meaning from his role, this was “civic-militarism…defensive and protective militarism, the sole purpose of which was to promote communal esprit de corps…. The hoplites were tied to their own soil…”. 26 Carey, (2007) p. 57 Dawson, (1996) pp. 48, 49 27 Wheeler, (2007) p. 188 28 Kagan, (2003) p. 362. 29 Garlan, (1975) p. 177

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Finley (2003) p. 71: The world of Odysseus had a highly developed sense of what was fitting and proper. In the assembly, only the aristocrats could make proposals and debate ideas. Commoners were able only to acclaim or dissent as they listened. Only aristocrats could advise the king – and he might take heed if he chose. 30 Mills, (2000) p. 161: “Many of whose members possess far more money than they can spend with any convenience…(for whom) the price of things is simply irrelevant…who never have to do anything…”. 31 Kagan, (2003). p. 362: Citing Theognis. 32 Hanson, (2000) p. xxv: Those deserving the honours of the polis were portrayed gloriously on friezes, in literature, art and in pottery. 33 Carey, (2007) p. 42 34 Wheeler, (2007) pp. 188, 202: The Peloponnesian War initiated an incremental – not a dramatic – military “revolution. The changes were more strategic than tactical. 35 Mitchell, (1996) pp. 101, 102 Dawson, (1996) p. 67: “Honour and glory were supremely valuable for their own sake”. 36 Kagan, (2003) pp. 1-3 37 Thucydides, 1.1.1-2 38 Starr, (1972) pp. 31, 32 39 Jones, (1993) pp. 92-3 40 Xenophon, Hellenica, Bk. II.ii. 22 41 Buckler, J., Beck, H. (2008) pp. 1-3 42 Adkins, (1975b) p. 215: “Fear of displaying a hubris of which the gods might disapprove, and might punish with subsequent disaster, should restrain the victor from behaving too harshly to the vanquished…” 43 Kagan, (2003) pp. 485, 487 44 Buckler and Beck, (2008) p. 6. 45 Plato, Definitions, 413e 46 van Wees, (1996) p. 10 47 Robinson, (2006) p. 11 van Wees, (1992) p. 67: van Wees underlines the pervasive and competitive quest for acclaim, renown and reputation. 48 Kearns, (2010) pp. 1, 2, 5, 37 Cary and Haarhoff, (1963) pp. 317, 318 Adkins, (1975b) p. 215: Adkins notes Athens became more secular in the second half of the fifth century. 49 Herodotus, 8.144.2 50 The idea of Greek society being defined and devoured by the obsessive contention for “honour” is observed widely in the literature: Kagan, (2003) p. 52: Kagan describes honour as central to “the entire Greek cultural experience, the heroic tradition…” Garlan, (1975) p. 181: Garlan discusses agonistic wars “inspired by the spirit of competition between cities”. van Wees (1992) p. 255: Van Wees observes the “common rivalry to be the best,” and notes that “Sparta and Argos, Athens and Thebes, Korinth and Megara, Samos and Miletos fought for centuries over nothing but the control of small border territories of very little economic value…(they) sought to gain prestige by demonstrating their military superiority over their neighbours”. (Emphasis added) Bowra, (1959) p. 192: Bowra describes “the cult of individual honour, which did much for the service of the state and inspired heroic devotion and self sacrifice,” which he observes had an equal potential for incalculable harm. Mitchell, (1996) pp. 100, 101: Mitchell explains how ideas of honour, freedom and patriotism were interlaced, so that hoplites came to fight not merely for themselves, but “for the community which embodied their interests”. 51 Raaflaub, (1997) p. 56 Sallares, (1991) p. 162 52 van Wees, (1992) p. 160: “The competitiveness of Archaic and Classical Greek society is well-known. Honour and reputation (were) its goals”. Dover, (1974) p. 236

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53 Dover, (1974) p. 236. Adkins, (1975) pp. 154, 155: Adkins supports this perspective, describing, in classical society, “the persistence of Homeric standards” which entailed “the chief good (was) to be well spoken of, the chief ill to be badly spoken of, by one’s society…” The corollary he observes “is obvious, if to have a good reputation is more important than anything else, ‘loss of face’ must be as terrible as it was in Homer”. 54 Dover, (1974) p. 237. 55 Elected proboulos in 413-412, formerly a general, treasurer of the Athenian alliance and prize-winning tragedian. 56 Sophocles, Ajax: Lines 41, 99 57 Mullen, (1973 / 1974) p. 489: Mullen illustrates the low esteem in which Odysseus’ trickiness was held, citing Pindar: “Sophistry was rank then too, / mongering fictions, two-hearted, cultivating its vile sleights. / It desolates all splendour, then for obscurity / raises some hollow monument”. Mullen goes on to cite Pindar’s prayer: “Let that never be my way, Zeus Father! In forthrightness / let me walk rather, so that when death comes / I leave my children a clear name. / Some bid for gold, others for vast lands, I to rest in the dust / with a reputation, the city round, / for praising fine men and scourging foul”. 58 Sophocles, Ajax, Lines 442 - 447 59 Sophocles, Ajax, Lines 425, 426 60 Sophocles, Ajax, Lines 439 - 440 61 Sophocles, Ajax, Lines 463 - 466 62 Sophocles, Ajax, Lines 137 -8 63 Sophocles, Ajax, Lines 479 - 80 Dover, (1974) p. 229: Similarly, cites Isokrates; “Good men would choose to die honourably rather than live disgracefully”. 64 Dover, (1974) p. 229: Dover also notes Xenophon who held, “And when their fated end comes, they do not lie forgotten and without honour…but they flourish eternally in men’s praises”. 65 Kagan, (2003) p. 333 66 Rawlings, (2007) p. 6: Citing Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.16 67 Thucydides, 6.15.2 - 3 68 Creasy, (1852) pp. 25-37. Luginbill, (1999) pp. 196, 199, 202-203 69 Kagan, (2003) 294-5, 322 70 Kagan, (2003) 321 Creasy (1852) p. 37: “Nicias and (fellow general) Demosthenes were put to death in cold blood”. 71 Plato, Republic, VIII 544d 72 Kagan, (2003) pp. 330, 331 de Selincourt, (1962) p. 118 73 Plato, Republic, VIII 545a Dover, (1974) p. 230: Dover references the term, philotimos 74 Plutarch, (2005) Agesilaus p. 43 Dover, (1974) p. 230: Dover explains the advantage of honour was a reputation as “a man who sacrifices himself for others”. Such a reputation often entailed significant personal cost. 75 Plutarch, (2005) Lycurgus p. 30 Kagan, (2003) p. 337: Describing Alcibiades’ intrigue in Sparta, (413-412) Kagan writes of “the contests for personal honour (which) played an important part in Spartan policy”. 76 MacIntyre (1984) p. 147 77 Aristotle, Magna Moralia, Bk. II, 1200a 20 78 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. IV, 1123b 20, 21: “(h)onour…is surely the greatest of external goods. Honours and dishonours, therefore, are the objects with respect which the proud men appear concerned; for it is honour that they chiefly claim…”. Aristotle, Magna Moralia, Bk. II, 1202a 30: “Of goods some are external, as wealth, office, honour, friends, glory…” 79 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. IV, 1123b 35 – 1124a 1: The original reads, “honour is the prize of excellence and it is to the good that it is rendered”.

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Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. IV, 1124a 24: “In truth, the good man alone is to be honoured”. 80 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. IX, 1165a 14-35: Honour should be appropriate and properly due. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, Bk. III, 1232b 18-20: “Honour, great or small, is of two kinds; for it may be given by a crowd or ordinary men or by those worthy of consideration…” Aristotle, Magna Moralia, Bk. I, 1192a 30-35: Aristotle argues that it is wrong to demand more honour than one deserves, and equally ill-considered to insist on receiving too little. 81 Aristotle, Politics, Bk. II, 1266b 38, 1267a 1 Sallares, (1991) p. 163: Sallares argues that class struggles were ubiquitous in antiquity. 82 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. IV, 1124a 21-23 83 Aristotle, Politics, Bk. V, 1304a 37-38 84 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. VIII, 1159a 19-21 Plato, Republic, V 475b: Plato argues similarly that “if honour-lovers…can’t be honoured by people of importance and dignity, they put up with being honoured by insignificant and inferior ones”. Herodotus, 5.111: Similarly “death from a worthy hand is only half as bad as it might otherwise have been”. 85 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. II, 1107b 29: “…it is possible to desire small honours as one ought, and more than one ought, and less, and the man who exceeds in his desires is called ambitious, the man who falls short unambitious, while the intermediate person has no name…” Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. IV, 1123b 4-15: Aristotle describes the properly proud man whose “claims are in accord with his merits”. The temperate man is he who is worth little and thinks himself worthy of little. The vain man is he who being worth little thinks himself worth a great deal. The unduly humble man is he who understates his rightful claim to honours. Aristotle, Magna Moralia, Bk. II, 1202a 36 – 1202b 5-8: Ambition is seen to be “incontinence with regard to honour”. Even so, “honour and glory and office and riches, and the other things with respect to which people are called incontinent are not blameworthy. (But) the man who is concerned with these more than he ought is called incontinent in the complete sense”. 86 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Bk. I, 1361a 28 87 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Bk. II, 1384a 9 -10: Aristotle uses the word shame. Plato, Definitions, 416a: Plato observes anaischuntia or shamelessness: enduring “dishonour for the sake of profit”. 88 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. III, 1116a 18-30 citing Iliad XXII 100 and VIII 148 Dover, (1974) p. 229: Dover cites Xenophon, Hellenica, iv 5.10 apropos Spartan joy at the courageous death of kinsmen in battle. 89 Dover, (1974) p. 231: “When someone is honoured, the honour is necessarily withheld from others who wanted it just as badly; no one can win unless someone else loses, and an honour shared with everybody is a doubtful honour”. 90 Bowra, (1959) pp. 192, 193 91 Aristophanes, Frogs, pp. 546, 547 92 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. II, 1107b 23, 28 Sophocles, Ajax, Lines 132 - 133: “The gods / Love men of steady sense and hate the proud”. 93 Rawlings, (2007) p. 14 94 Sophocles, Ajax, Lines 758 - 761 95 Sophocles, Ajax, Lines 767 - 769 96 Sophocles, Ajax, Lines 775 - 777 97 Plato, Definitions, 415e: Hubris is defined as “injustice, driving one to dishonour someone”. Rawlings, (2007) p. 29 98 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Bk.II, 1738b 22-30 99 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Bk.II, 1738b 13-20

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100 Thucydides, 4.108.7 101 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Bk.II, 1738b 33 102 Adkins (1975) pp. 30, 31 103 Toynbee, (1981) p. 27: Toynbee argues, “the one element in Greece’s ephemeral Mycenaean cultural superstructure that survived the collapse of the Mycenaean civilization was the poetry (which was) both oral and secular”. Toynbee goes on (pp. 27- 28) to explain the oral and secular nature of this tradition, which enabled poetry to be a fluid and evolving cultural artefact, sustaining Homeric ideas in the classical milieu. Thanks to the poetic tradition, the past was maintained and celebrated as relevant and intelligible. 104 MacIntyre (1984) p. 122: MacIntyre goes on (p. 125) to explain how “character (was illustrated by) incident….in heroic society character of the relevant kind can only be exhibited in a succession of incidents and the succession itself must exemplify certain patterns…(Thus) character and incident cannot be characterised independently of each other. So to understand courage as a virtue is not just to understand how it may be exhibited in character, but also what place it can have in a certain kind of enacted story”. 105 MacIntyre (1984) p. 123: Tense changed. Emphasis in the original. 106 Adkins (1975) p. 34 107 Adkins, (1975) pp. 35, 63 Rawlings, (2007) p. 31 108 Wheeler, (1991) p. 128 109 van Wees, (1992) p.69, 71: “The magnitude of one’s honour corresponded to the degree of one’s excellence”. 110 Adkins (1975) p. 34: Thersites is the only common man whose voice is heard. Toynbee, (1981) p. 27: It was the princes’ exploits, which were celebrated. van Wees, (1992) pp. 80, 81 Greenhalgh, (1973) p.168 111 Wheeler, (1991) p. 122 112 Wheeler, (1991) p. 137 van Wees, (1992) p. 371 n 147: Achilles is described as a hero of “might” (bie) 113 Finley, (2003) pp. 44-52, 66-7, 72, 96: Finley observes that ideas of kinship and community were elemental to Greek society. Gallant, (1991) pp. 146, 152: Gallant discusses the “ideology of obligation and reciprocity” which evolved as the “institution of ritualized friendship in the Classical and Hellenistic periods”. Adkins (1975) pp. 34, 35 van Wees, (19916) p. 3 Homer, Iliad, 2.362: Nestor advises Agamemnon to “set men in order by tribes…by clans / and let clan go in support of clan, let tribe support tribe”. The idea of tribes underlines the close association of kin, and the pervasive sense of the relational community. 114 Gallant, (1991) pp. 148, 149 115 MacIntyre (1984) pp. 122 -123 Adkins, (1975) p. 35 Adkins, (1975b) pp. 209, 212 Raaflaub, (1997) p. 52: A similar thinking is likely in the pre-polis society of the Greek Dark Ages. 116 Garlan, (1975) p. 24 Finley, (2003) p. 66 117 van Wees, (1992) p. 81 118 MacIntyre, (1984) p. 125 van Wees, (1992) p. 72 119 MacIntyre, (1984) p. 125 120 MacIntyre (1984) p. 124 121 van Wees, (1992) p. 158 Adkins, (1975b) p. 213: “Even in the democratic courts of Athens…the possession of aretê was more important than being merely dikaios (i.e. comme il faut). 122 MacIntyre (1984) p. 133 123 MacIntyre (1984) p. 132

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124 Van Wees, (1996) p. 33 125 Sophocles, Antigone, Lines: 51-52, 54, 110-113 126 MacIntyre (1984) p. 133 127 Bowra, (1959) p. 198,199, 201 Adkins, (1975) p. 161 128 Adkins, (1975) p. 169, at note 3 Adkins, (1975b) p. 213: Citing Herodotus 129 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. II, 1103.7 - 26 130 Bowman, (2006) p. 46 Adkins, (1975) pp. 225, 226, 349, 332, 350: Adkins remarks that the quieter virtues were understood to be imperative to civic success. 131 Adkins, (1975) p. 160 132 Bowman, (2006) p. 46 133 Homer, Iliad, 22. 458-459, 507 134 Homer, Iliad, 15.494-497 135 Homer, Iliad, 12.243 136 van Wees, (1996) p. 15 van Wees, (2009) p. 233 137 van Wees, (2009) p. 233 138 Freeman, (1991), p. 52: Defending Euphiletus, charged with the murder of Eratosthenes (a seducer and adulterer), Lysias (445 – 380 B.C) claimed that in killing the adulterer, Euphiletus had merely “obeyed the laws of Solon, permitting the slaughter of an adulterer caught in the act”. The successful defence illustrates the paramount importance accorded the law. 139 Pritchett, (1974) pp. 12, 13, 14, 20 140 Pritchett, (1974) p. 12 141 Thucydides, 1.134. 1 - 3 142 Lazenby, (1985) p. 5 143 Lazenby, (1985) p. 23 144 van Wees, (2009) p. 233: van Wees illustrates archaic society, dominated by “two or three large networks of prominent men and their personal (my emphasis) followers…. (for example) the Spartan king, Cleomenes could mobilise enough personal supporters to mount a private invasion of Athens to help his friend Isagoras…against the Alcmeonid family”. Such was the scale of the private network, which was gradually replaced by institutions collectively controlled by the community. 145 Pritchett, (1985) p. 37 Lazenby, (1985) p. 37 146 Wheeler, (1991) pp. 123, 131 147 Bailey (2010) p. 46 148 Rawlings, (2007) p. 100 149 Rawlings, (2007) pp. 54-5 Anderson, (1991) p. 15. Anderson writes of the shield used othismos, offensively, not merely defensively to ward off blows. 150 Sage, (1996) p. 88 151 van Wees, (1992) p.255. Emphasis added. 152 Garlan, (1975) pp. 26, 27, 28 153 Keegan, (1994) p. 232 de Selincourt, (1962) p. 119 Pritchett, (1971) p. 3 154 Herodotus, 7.104 155 Garlan, (1975) pp. 89, 90: 156 Pritchett, (1991) p. 453 157 Hanson, (1998) p. 180 158 Pritchett, (1974) pp. 276, 289, 290 159 Herodotus, 7.229 – 7.231 160 Herodotus, 9.71 161 Homer, Iliad, 11. 296-8 162 Homer, Iliad, 11. 91-98

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163 Wheeler, (1991) p. 143 164 Rawlings, (2007) p. 205. Rawlings describes the similar disgrace of Pantites, and cites Plutarch who recalled that, in Sparta, “tremblers” were debarred from every office, intermarriage with them was a disgrace, they were liable to be struck by anyone who so pleased, they were not permitted to look cheerful, they were obliged to go about in a squalid condition wearing cloaks with colourful patches and with half their beards shaved, and half left to grow. 165 van Wees (1992) p. 255 Anderson, (1970) p. 4: Anderson supports this idea, and observes that “the principal idea behind the ordinary trophy (was) the sign of defeat, not the monument of victory”. 166 Pritchett, (1974) p. 254 Pritchett, (1979) pp. 277, 278 Pritchett, (1971) p. 55 Anderson, (1970) p. 4 167 Pritchett, (1974) p. 248: Citing W.H.D. Rouse (1902) “always worth quoting because every sentence is documented”. 168 Anderson, (1970) p. 5 169 Pritchett, (1985) p. 95 170 Anderson, (1970) pp. 3 – 4. 171 Pritchett, (1974) pp. 261 – 262 172 Herodotus, 8.121 173 Jackson, (1991) p. 229 174 Pritchett, (1979) p. 285 175 Xenophon, Hellenika, 4.3.21 176 Jackson, (1991) p. 229 177 Garlan, (1975) p. 62: Discussing the “trophymania” of the Peloponnesian War. Pritchett, (1974) p. 273 Dawson, (1996) p. 55 178 Euripides, Andromache, Lines: 693-700 179 Thucydides, 1.23.4 - 6 Luginbill, (1999) pp. 106, 107: Luginbill describes Spartan reluctance to prosecute unnecessary military operations. He notes that, by the time of the actual commencement of the Peloponnesian War the Spartan “vote to declare war was (unwilling, and) occasioned by the fear of Athenian growth and the threat it posed to their power”. 180 Rawlings, (2007) pp. 13, 14, 15 181 Thucydides, 1.140.1 - 5 182 Kagan, (2003) pp. 39, 40, 49, 50 183 Kagan, (2003) pp. 45, 46: Kagan observes, “the Spartan’s honour, their conception of themselves, depended not only on the recognition of (their) leadership (but the appearance of military and political strength)”. 184 Dover, (1974) p.228 185 Kagan, (2003) pp. 215, 216, 217: In 420 the Spartans suffered great public insult by the Eleans. The general perception of weakness caused the Spartans embarrassment and encouraged attack upon the Spartan colony of Heraclea in Trachis and the murder of the Spartan governor there. Further, when Alcibiades bought a small force to Patrae in 419, the population could have resisted had they desired – but the perception of Spartan decline was fundamental in their acceptance of an Athenian alliance. Woodhouse, (1933) p. 17: It was Agis of Sparta who, by his 418 campaigns in Arkadia, “shattered the far-reaching designs of Alcibiades, and restored the tarnished prestige of Sparta”. 186 Kagan, (2003) pp. 249, 250: Kagan describes the drama and competitive display of Nicias and Alcibiades, each driven by rivalry to satisfy ambition and appear the more honourable man. 187 Kagan, (2003) p. 248: “Both Perikles and Cleon had been willing to term the Athenian Empire a tyranny, and the Athenian spokesman at Sparta in 432 used language not unlike that found in the Melian dialogue: ‘We have done nothing amazing or contrary to human nature if we accepted an empire…and then refused to give it up, since we were conquered by the strongest motives – honour, fear and self-interest. And we are not the first to have

100 acted this way, for it has always been ordained that the weaker are kept down by the stronger’”. Adkins, (1975b) p. 216: Even the gods were on the side of the big battalions. 188 Walzer, (2000) pp. 5, 6 189 Thucydides, 5.94 – 5.95 190 Thucydides, 5.116.4 191 Keegan, (1994) p. 232: “The Greek genius for discord”. 192 Garlan, (1975) p. 15 Robinson, (2006) p. 14 193 Jones, (1993) p. 148 Kagan, (2003) pp. xxiv, 484, 487 194 Kagan, (2003) p. 489 Hunt, (2007) p. 145 195 Jones, (1993) pp. 149, 150, 151 196 Davis, (1999) p. 27 197 Pritchett, (1974) p. 4 198 Pickard-Cambridge, (1914) p. 115: Citing Demosthenes, The Prosecution of Androtion

101 CHAPTER THREE

Standing Firm in the Ranks

Your real man stands firm in the ranks. Euripides, “Heracles” Ln. 163

Background

The previous chapter examined classical thinking, around the idea of honour, which was a leitmotif throughout the Greek world. Entwined with ubiquitous ambition to be the best, honour was seen to have informed Greek ideas of moral responsibility, and personal excellence or aretê. The previous chapter thus gave detailed insight into the accepted wisdom of those who served in the phalanx.

The present chapter explores and illuminates the hoplite phalanx as a metaphor, the embodiment of ideals such as political freedom and civic obligation in defence of a just cause. Exploring the thinking behind

Hellenic arms, this chapter explicates war as a moral idea entwined with the ideals of human society.

Classical Hoplites

Just as Homeric epic was a cultural staple of the poleis, so classical phalanx warfare preserved the essence, and advanced the technique, of

Homer’s proto-phalanx battle.1 Specifically, the classical age matured and emphasized the sentiment of patriotism, which was vague and

102 ambiguous in Homer,2 whilst retaining the heroic idealism, conspicuous in Homeric epic.

Classical hoplites were “citizens (who) accepted military service as a matter of course,”3 and furnished their own expensive panoply.4 Able to afford their own arms, hoplites were a social élite described by Keegan as

“prize troops,” and “men of standing”.5 Earning their appellation from

“the total set of (their) equipment (hopla),”6 hoplites may have come from the “urban élite which lived as a rentier population off taxes or tribute extracted from the surrounding countryside,”7 or they may themselves have been yeoman farmers.8 In any case, the hoplite was

“always one of the richer members of a Greek community,”9 a class apart from the “landless rootless poor” who were unwelcome on the classical battlefield,10 though they might have provided oarsmen for the all- important fleet.

Classical hoplites evolved the Iliad’s heroic mythology. Homer

“emphasized the world of the individual acting for himself,”11 extolling an aristocracy of warrior princes in competition for honour won in battle.12 The hoplite champion, informed by higher political goals, was less impulsive. After the rise of the classical polis, the emphasis was on the integrated fighting unit of the phalanx,13 and wars were fought less for individual glory and more “to uphold the honour of the citizens, meaning especially the hoplite class, and took the form of a duel for the literal and symbolic protection of their land”.14

103 Thus, indivisible from the phalanx, the hoplite fought for the common good. Yet, though embracing classical principles of public purpose, the hoplite did not abandon his epic past, and “the ideology of the hoplite remained the heroic ethos of Homer,”15 an ethos which perpetuated aristocratic notions of social class.

Unlike the heroic champions, hoplites were “the first people on earth to contract between themselves, as equals, to fight the enemy shoulder to shoulder without flinching from wounds, and not to yield the ground on which they fought until either the enemy had broken or they themselves lay dead where they had stood”.16

Hoplite conflict was won by the united courage of individuals who bore the burdens of civic obligation, fighting as much for ideals as for political sovereignty.

Crossing a no man’s land perhaps 150 yards wide at a clumsy run, under a weight of armour and weapons of seventy pounds, the ranks drove straight into each other. Each individual…thrusting his spear point at some gap between shield and shield, and seeking to hit a patch of flesh not covered by armour – throat, armpit or groin….As the second and third ranks were brought up short by the stop in front, the phalanx concertinaed, throwing the weight of seven men on to the back of the warriors engaged with the enemy. Under this impact, some men inevitably went down at once, dead, wounded or overborne from the rear. (This) might create a breach in the shield wall….If it widened there followed the othismos, ‘push with shield,’ to widen it further and to win room (for) swords….17

104 This was vicious, uncompromising combat. Yet, though ferocious in practice, hoplite conflict was philosophically sophisticated. The ethos which pervaded classical Greek life and politics, perfused the phalanx.

Determined that the power of the state should rest with the people, the

Greeks determined too that citizens should bear the burden of defending their state as peers. Demonstrating this ethos, hoplite conflict was fundamentally “ritualized,”18 “an affair of honour, fought according to established conventions, between moral (if not physical) equals”.19 The

Greeks were:

Far removed from malpractice. For so far were they from plotting mischief against their friends, with the purpose of aggrandizing their own power, that they would not even consent to get the better of their enemies by fraud, regarding no success as brilliant or secure unless they crushed the spirit of their adversaries in open battle. For this reason they entered into a convention among themselves to use against each other neither secret missiles nor those discharged from a distance, and considered that it was only a hand-to-hand battle at close quarters which was truly decisive. Hence, they preceded war by a declaration, and when they intended to do battle gave notice of the fact and of the spot to which they would proceed to array their army.20

Owing much to Homer,21 the ethos of hoplite conflict was chivalric, reflecting the ideology of honour, courage, equality and mutual obligation, which pervaded Greek life, culture, politics and warfare.22

Hoplite warfare defined and depended upon standards “which were not observed in war against barbarians”.23 The details of such codes of

105 conduct are “generally beyond our recovery because of the incidental nature of remarks”24 about them, and because significant elements of such codes, like “the unwritten laws which governed treaties, truces and the like,”25 are often tacit, traditional, and not recorded.

The hoplite and the phalanx demonstrated the civic-military connection of the poleis,26 a philosophy which is emblematic of classical warfare and elemental to the military inheritance of the West. Placing importance upon individualism, duty and cohesion among people, classical Greek thinking is foundational to the Western military tradition, notwithstanding the frightening violence of contemporary warfare.27

Classical thought underpins:

A more or less common core of practices, that reappears generation after generation, sometimes piecemeal, at other times in a nearly holistic fashion, which explains why the history of warfare is so often the brutal history of western victory – and why today Western armies have little to fear from any force other than themselves.28

Prescribing subjugation rather than morally autonomous commitment,

Australian military doctrine fails to interpret the intricacy of the hoplite’s ethical motif. The phalanx was an anonymous, courageous mass of individuals, each serving the state as equals, each abiding by and committed to an ideology of civic duty:

The richer citizens in Greek states professed their readiness to serve with person and fortune; and their conduct proved their sincerity. But although every man was ready to lie out his money to equip himself to the best of his ability, he was not ready to pay

106 taxes to support a standing army. Indeed he would have thought it disgraceful to pay someone else to relieve him of one of the most perilous and difficult of his obligations. 29

These ideas of civic duty coincided with the mutual obligations which permeated society as part of the ritualized friendship which extended throughout Classical society.30 “But in battle, individual hoplites raised on a diet of Homer (recalled) ideals of heroic glory when they sang the paean”.31 This was a choral lyric addressed to Apollo and sung on many occasions, but as an invocation by armies on the march and before battle.32

Honour and Duty in the Phalanx

“In sheer potency the Hellenic Greeks stand in the topmost rank of the peoples who have made civilization”.33 The artifacts of Greek culture, modes of thought and philosophy continue to be influential. In particular, the phalanx of classical Greece is emblematic of ideals foundational to western military tradition.34 West Point proclaims ideals of “duty, honor and country”.35 The Royal Australian Navy claims “honour is the fundamental value on which the Navy's and each person's reputation depends”.36 In each case the sentiment recalls ideas which are seeded in the classical age.

The Spartan general, Brasidas, who marshaled his out-numbered force to fight a numerically superior adversary in order, illustrates the classical bequest to western military thinking.

107 Thucydides describes how, abandoned by the Macedonian army of

Perdiccas, Brasidas found the Illyrians of Arrhabaeus on the point of attacking him. At this point Brasidas formed his hoplites into a square with the light troops in the centre and prepared for a disciplined fighting retreat. With about three hundred picked men, Brasidas posted himself in the rearguard to fight off the Illyrians. Before the fight, Brasidas addressed his troops:

Peloponnesians, if I did not suspect you of being dismayed at being left alone to sustain the attack of a numerous and barbarian enemy, I should just have said a few words to you without further explanation. As it is, in the face of the desertion of our friends and the numbers of the enemy, I have some advice and information to offer, which, brief as it must be, will, I hope, suffice for the more important points. The bravery that you habitually display in war does not depend upon your having allies at your side but on your native courage; nor have numbers any terrors for citizens of states like yours, in which the many do not rule the few, but rather the few the many, owing their position to nothing else than to superiority in the field. Inexperience now makes you afraid of barbarians; and yet the trial of strength which you had with the Macedonians among them, and my own judgement, should be enough to satisfy you that they will not prove formidable. Where an enemy seems strong but is really weak, a true knowledge of the facts makes his adversary the bolder…. Thus, the present enemy might terrify an inexperienced imagination; they are formidable in outward bulk; their loud yelling is unbearable; and the brandishing of their weapons in the air has a threatening appearance. But when it comes to real fighting with an opponent who stands his ground, they are not what they seem; they have no regular order that they

108 should be ashamed of deserting their positions when hard-pressed; flight and attack are equally honourable with them, and afford no test of courage; their independent mode of fighting never leaving anyone who wants to run away without a fair excuse for doing so. In short, they think frightening you at a secure distance a surer game than meeting you hand to hand; otherwise they would have done the one and not the other…. Stand your ground therefore when they advance, and wait your opportunity to retire in good order….37

Reminding his troops of the courage which was their birthright, Brasidas understood that “Greek soldiers conducted themselves on campaign precisely as civilians in their respective city-states”.38 He recognised that for Spartans, military honour was the be-all and end-all of their existence, cowardice was a matter of shame, and defeat a matter of dishonour.39

Writing between 685 – 668B.C, the Spartan poet Tyrtaeus illustrated honour as a significant idea, foundational to the identity of individual

Spartans, and the Spartan state. Addressing “The Proper Way to Die,”

Tyrtaeus transliterated Homeric duel between individuals into the mass duel of the hoplite phalanx:40

It is noble for a brave man to fall in the front line of battle, fighting for his country… let us fight bravely for this land, let us die for our children, and spare our lives no more. Young men, fight close to one another, and never be the first to fly disgracefully, or to be seized by panic, but fill your heart and your thoughts with ample courage: never consider your own life, when you are fighting with men. Do not run and abandon the older men, who no longer have agile knees; do not abandon the old. For it is shameful when an

109 older man falls in the front line and lies before the young, one whose hair is white and whose beard is grey, breathing out his brave spirit in the dust, holding his private parts, blood covered in his hands…stand steadfast, with both feet set firm on the ground, biting your lip with your teeth.41

“The spirit of Tyrtaeus’s lines was echoed by virtually every Greek commander”.42 Lionizing “the valour of the Spartan warriors in the language of Homer,”43 Tyrtaeus depicts a way of thinking about warfare which made Hellenic arms unsurpassed throughout the ancient world. He brings expressive intensity to the epic tradition, depicting a model of heroism which privileges the common good. In Tyrtaeus we find exhortations “about the glory of dying in battle for the fatherland, further immortalized by Horace, Tennyson and Wilfred Owen”.44

Significantly, Tyrtaeus evolved the Homeric tradition – he did not abandon it. He resembles Homer and other archaic poets, taking evocative and significant words and phrases, and demonstrating the

“enormous popularity and influence of the epic tradition”.45 We see pre- classical foundations of his elegy illustrated by Homer who offered:

For a young man all is decorous / when he is cut down in battle and torn with the sharp bronze, and lies there /dead, and though dead still all that shows about him is beautiful; / but when an old man is dead and down, and the dogs mutilate / the grey head and the grey beard and the parts that are secret, / this for all sad mortality, is the sight most pitiful.46

110 The Greeks fought differently, because they thought differently.47 Hoplite warfare was physically brutal,48 not philosophically brutish. Inspired by the ubiquitous ambition to be the best, the hoplite was motivated by a sense of civic militarism and by mutual obligation in defence of a just cause. Ideas of moral responsibility, and personal excellence meshed with patriotic duty to define the bequest of Hellenic culture:

Personal freedom, superior discipline, matchless weapons, egalitarian camaraderie, individual initiative, constant tactical adaptation and flexibility (and) preference for the shock battle of heavy infantry.49

These are Hellenic ideas, which have “made Europeans the most deadly soldiers in the history of civilization”.50 They are ideas which underpin the disciplined courage elemental to western arms, and they are ideas which illuminate the concepts of merit and moral autonomy quashed within Australian doctrine, by prescribed expectation that soldiers

“subjugate their will” to “military superiors”.51

In Homeric armies, the idea of subjugation perhaps reflected the social dominance of the warrior chieftain who was expected to:

March at the head of his men, seeking the opportunity for a model and decisive duel in full view of his troops. He was the protagonist, the spearhead of his army. His position required that he prove the might of his arm and pay with his life if necessary. That was how he demonstrated to both gods and men his aptitude for command.52

111 But this was a mode of thinking which receded as the classical age cultivated shared concepts of patriotism and civic obligation. In the classical phalanx, commanders were distinguished no more and no less from any other soldier. The dominant idea was “the paramount status” of citizenship:53 a concept interleaved with ideas of personal freedom, individual initiative and egalitarian camaraderie, and identified as crucial to the western military tradition.

More than philosophical abstractions, these ideas underline persistent and material cultural artefacts. Notions of honour and individual excellence are the cornerstones of western military thinking, and without them the western military instrument would be substantially diminished. These are ideas which explain why western armies fight as they do:

No other culture but the West could have brought such discipline, morale and sheer technological expertise to the art of killing than did the Europeans at the insanity of Verdun…. No American Indian tribe or Zulu impi could have marshaled, supplied, armed – and have killed – and replaced – hundreds of thousands of men for months on end for the rather abstract political cause of a nation state. The most gallant Apaches…would have gone home after the first hour of Gettysburg.54

This is not to say that the West has a mortgage on courage or upon notions of honour and individual excellence. But, it is to say that the particular western interpretation of these ideas is a crucial contributor to

Western military dominance. Yet Australian military doctrine overstates

112 ideas of command; overlooking philosophical ideas of moral autonomy, merit and responsibility which galvanise and explain feats of arms.

“At the root of infantry battle in classical Greece lay the value of personal courage”.55 The idea of courage as personal, resonates with ideas of moral autonomy, integrity, individual self-respect and merit.

Personal courage reflects the moral ideas of obligation and responsibility, which came to be recaptured and articulated powerfully in Stoicism.

Connected to steadfastness borne among “men from the same localities who served together,”56 courage in the phalanx revealed moral commitment to the “common good”57 and attached to the ritualized friendship which was ubiquitous in Greek society.58 Courage in the phalanx articulated an ideology of reciprocal obligation and stood upon the contextual substructure of “honour”.59 Personified by the hoplite, honour was the defining theme of the Greek world. Art, literature and the public imagery of the polis were united in homage to the ethos of personal excellence and public duty personified by the hoplite.60 The hoplite exemplified notions of mutual obligation in defence of a just cause which are foundational to the western military tradition. This was service, subordinate to ideals and in no ways subjugated by command, as

Australian doctrine would have it. “An officer class simply did not exist in Greek cities,”61 and even private soldiers were gentlemen.62 Hoplites were citizens and equals,63 fighting because they were committed – not because they were compelled.

113 This was public commitment, a social contract informed by inherited concepts of honour and by evolving notions of aretê. The phalanx was allegorical; articulating ideas of honour and shame which were individualistic, yet emphatically public and foundational to social life.

The phalanx thus reflected the connection of individual honour and virtue which was distinctively Greek, yet pace Bowman, strictly functional.

Bowman argues in his philosophical history, Honor, that:

The Greek heroes, obsessed with their own reputations to an unprecedented degree, tended to become unusually individual, and that set the Greeks apart from more functional honor cultures that ruthlessly subordinated the individual to the larger society.64

But Bowman reflects upon the Homeric ideal, and neglects to observe the assimilation of this cultural motif in classical society. “The Homeric kings, who went out before their people to challenge their equals in single combat, had no place in the (classical) phalanx; pre-eminent strength, beauty and swiftness of foot were no longer the first qualities demanded of a leader”.65 In the classical poleis, honour and aretê were united, but entwined with more than military prowess. In the classical phalanx, the valour of Homer was esteemed, yet service was morally autonomous service among equals in a just cause and more than a self-interested quest for individual acclaim.

United in a Just Cause

Greek wars, fought ostensibly for honour, reflected the need of a polis to protect its land.66 The notion was aporthetos – a “perception in the minds

114 of small farmers that their ancestral land should remain at all costs inviolate”.67 But more than ostensible, honour was ostensive. More than seeming, honour was demonstrable: “honour and land were essentially the same”.68 The idea that land should be inviolate was attached to the practical needs of subsistence. But the thinking was attached equally and firmly to intangible ideas of civic duty and just cause. Pritchett recalls

Onasander who observed in his Strategikos, (4.1-3) that:

It should be evident to all that one fights on the side of justice. For then the gods also, kindly disposed, become comrades in arms to the soldiers, and men are more eager to take their stand against the foe. For with the knowledge that they are not fighting an aggressive but defensive war, with conscience free from evil designs, they contribute a courage that is complete; while those who believe an unjust war is displeasing to heaven, because of this very opinion enter the war with fear…The general should call heaven to witness that he is entering upon war without offence.69

The decisive point is that Greek warfare entailed something along the lines of the Roman ius fetiale – traditional rites which propitiated the gods and defined the cause as just. These ideas derived particular significance from the religious sentiment which perfused the political, social and religious life of the poleis. This was society in which:

Important acts of state were accompanied by sacrifices; a religious oath was administered to magistrates, jurymen and other officials. The admission of the youth into the ranks of the citizens was a solemn religious ceremony, in which the epheboi swore in the

115 names of gods whom they termed histores (witnesses) to defend the land.70

These ideas continue to resonate in the Western military canon, where military service is not merely in the political defence of geographic territory, but in defence of the “moral high ground” which is an idea attached to “national values” and seen to be expressed in “oaths of service”. The decisive rationale is that without “moral legitimacy” or just cause, the war is lost.71

So, infused with a sense of civic obligation and confident in the rightness of their cause, hoplites marched not only in defence of ground, but out of a feeling of “patriotism, love of and commitment to their native city”.72

Xenophon records Spartans “marching out with the citizens”.73

Illustrating analogous patriotic sentiment in Athens, Pritchett notes that

“it is an enemy of Athens who speaks the following words: ‘The

Athenians use their bodies for her as though they were the bodies of quite other men….’”74 Pericles underlines this sentiment in the oration he delivered before the sepulcher of the Athenians lost in action during the first year of the Peloponnesian War. Pericles recalled:

My predecessors in this place have commended him who made this speech part of the law, telling us that it is well that it should be delivered at the burial of those who fall in battle. For myself, I should have thought that the worth which had displayed itself in deeds would be sufficiently rewarded by honours also shown by deeds; such as you now see in this funeral prepared at the people’s cost. And I could have wished that the reputation of many brave

116 men was not to be imperiled in the mouth of a single individual…. For it is hard to speak properly upon a subject where it is even difficult to convince your hearers that you are speaking the truth. On the one hand, the friend who is familiar with every fact of the story may think that some point has not been set forth with that fullness which he wishes and knows to be deserved; on the other, he who is a stranger to the matter may be led by envy to suspect exaggeration if he hears anything above his own nature. For men can endure to hear others praised only so long as they can severally persuade themselves of their own ability to equal the actions recounted…. However, since our ancestors have stamped this custom with their approval, it becomes my duty to obey the law and to try to satisfy your several wishes and opinions as best I may.

I shall begin with our ancestors: it is both just and proper that they should have the honour of the first mention on an occasion like the present. They dwelt in the country without break in the succession from generation to generation and handed it down free to the present time by their valour. And if our remote ancestors deserve praise, much more do our fathers, who added to their inheritance the empire which we now possess, and spared no pains to be able to leave their acquisitions to us of the present generation. Lastly, there are few parts of our dominion that have not been augmented by those of us here, who are still more or less in the vigour of life; while the mother country has been furnished by us with everything that can enable her to depend on her own resources whether for war or peace….

If I have dwelt at some length upon the character of our country, it has to show that our stake in the struggle is not the same as theirs who have no such blessings to lose, and also that the eulogy of the men I am now speaking might be by definite proofs established. That eulogy is now in great measure complete for the Athens that I have celebrated is only what the heroism of these men and their

117 like have made her, men whose fame, unlike that of most Hellenes, will be found to be no greater than what they deserve. And if a test of worth is wanted, it is to be found in their closing scene, and this not only in the cases in which it set the final seal upon their merit, but also in those in which it gave the first intimation of (their merit). For there is justice in the claim that steadfastness in the country’s battles should be a cloak to cover a man’s other imperfections; since the good action has blotted out the bad, and his merit as a citizen more than outweighed his demerits as an individual.75

Pericles illuminates the competitive and individualistic ideals of honour which infused Greek life. But he points also to the collective and inherited notions of civic obligation and just cause which inspired service in the classical phalanx. This thinking is underlined in the oration by reference to the Athenian constitution and the “equal justice and freedom which we (Athenians) enjoy in our government and ordinary life”.76

Acknowledging the ideals of citizenship which galvanised soldiers from all the Greek poleis, Pericles underlines the mutual commitment to service in a just cause which is obscured by the concepts of command and subjugation in Australian doctrine.

These ideals resonate throughout the age of the classical hoplite.

Xenophon records in Hellenika that soldiers, standing together in the phalanx, sought pitched battle as the honourable way to preserve

“country, homes, freedom and honours,” recognizing that “one who dies fighting will be fortunate…for no one, however wealthy, could procure

118 for himself so fine a moment” as death beside his comrades in the fight for a just cause.77 Socrates argues similarly:

Dying in war looks like a splendid fate…Even if he dies a pauper, a man gets a really magnificent funeral, and even if he was of little account he gets a eulogy from the lips of experts, who speak not extempore but in speeches worked up long beforehand.78

Herodotus underlines the significance of sacrifice in a just cause, describing Tellus, who “died most nobly on the battlefields, (so that) the

Athenians buried him at public expense…and gave him great honours”.79

Soldiers derived confidence from the knowledge that rites and monuments were assured at public expense. The intent to honour the dead was a pan-Hellenic concern. 80

The loving care for the funerary monument – in memory of and not by way of provision for, the deceased – is one of the most frequent subjects in Attic vase painting: and the monuments themselves were intended to commemorate the life that had been lived rather than to meet the needs of a life to come. Even in Homer the shade of Elpenor, Odysseus’ faithful companion who had been left unburied on the island of Aeaea, asks not only for decent burial for himself, but also for a ‘memorial’ impressive to posterity.81

Modern cenotaphs, echoing with the same ideals, demonstrate how profoundly and subtly Western military thinking preserves Hellenic tradition, whereby “war dead (are) lionized…and held up as monuments, both literally and figuratively to the greatness and glory of (the) state”.82

119 United in a just cause, joined by the ranks and files of the phalanx, the hoplite did not require remarkable individual skill at arms.83 He required enormous courage to stand alongside his comrades and “look the spears in the face”.84 What mattered was the ability of individual soldiers to fight together as a cohesive unit.85 So, in the Laches Plato remarks that “in battle one has to fight in line with a number of others”.86 Emphasising the unity which distinguished the Spartan army of peers, The Spartan King

“Demaratus (told) Xerxes (that) Spartans fighting as individuals were ‘no worse’ than other men, but fighting together they were the best of all men”.87 Demaratus referred, not merely to uniform patterns of drill and manoeuvre, but to the shared honour code with which all Spartiates were imbued in the agoge.88 The agoge was a military barracks school into which all boys were enrolled from the age of seven, and from which they graduated at twenty. Illustrating this point, Herodotus describes Plataea where the Spartan phalanx destroyed the Persians fighting under

Mardonios. He writes that:

The Persians were not inferior in courage or strength, but they did not have hoplite arms and skill. They were dashing out beyond the front lines individually or in groups of ten, joining together in larger or smaller bands, and charging right into the Spartan ranks, where they perished.89

Similarly, though the Spartan Aristodemus is described by Herodotus as displaying “great feats” in combat against the Persians, he is noted to have “left his post in a rage,”90 and criticised for this, because the phalanx depended upon solidarity and collective effort.91

120 Underlining the importance of fighting in order, Plato argues that individual skill at arms was valuable only “when the ranks are broken and it becomes necessary for a man to fight in single combat, either in pursuit when he has to attack a man who is defending himself, or in flight when he has to defend himself against another person who is attacking him”.92

The phalanx was strongest when soldiers stood, unified by shared ideals.

Tyrtaeus wrote:

Valour / The fairest gift for youthful pride to wear: A good alike to the community, The good alike city and people share! Lo, where he steadfast in the front rank fights, Heedless of dastard flight, exposing life, Comrade exhorting for our country’s rights This man is gallant in the warlike strife! Him the whole city mourns with deep regret.93

Throughout the Greek world, this expectation saw generals fight and risk death alongside their men.94 At Marathon, Plutarch records that the political rivals, Themistocles and Aristides “fought together valiantly,” as hoplites among the Athenians who were “the hardest put” against the

“barbarians”.95 Not only does this example reveal a unity of purpose and resolve, it underlines the morally autonomous ideals which perfused the

Greek phalanx, in contrast to the Persian tyrant Xerxes, who remained

“perched on a throne” at Thermopylae.96

Notoriously, the aspis97 or shield is an enduring metaphor of the hoplite’s commitment qua individual citizen to collective ideals of the polis. “A

121 man carried a shield, unlike helmet and cuirass, ‘for the sake of the whole line’…an unbroken shield wall was virtually impregnable”.98 Hence, to abandon the shield – perhaps in order to facilitate an unencumbered flight

– was “a crime against every citizen within the phalanx”.99 Hoplites fought, not because they sought acclaim for individual gallantry, but because they accepted the imperative of their place in society. Whilst there is the sense of noblesse oblige, the decisive idea is not informed by social class, but by moral obligation.

Recaptured by Stoicism after the collapse of the poleis, this philosophy of classless moral obligation found its most profound expression in Sparta.

Following the reforms of Lycurgus, Spartan men shared a common mess

(variously called syssitia, phiditia, andreia or syskenia), where “the rich

(were) obliged to go to the same table as the poor” and to eat “of the same bread and same meat”.100 These common messes were cornerstones of the enomotia, foundational units of the Spartan army similar to a modern platoon, numbering about thirty-six men, and commanded by enomotarches.101 The custom of the syssitia helps explain why the

Spartan army was distinguished by esprit, commitment and confidence, not by domineering command.102 The common messes afford unambiguous example of how deeply the hoplite ideal was entwined and interlaced with the civic responsibilities of the poleis.103 “All citizens, whatever their personal or social circumstances or even age, were first of all lifelong hoplites of their city, liable to fight and die without exception during any summer of their lifetime”.104

122 The actual social and political sequence of events at the end of the Greek Dark Ages that led to this movement toward the arrangement and subsequent tactics of hoplite battle cannot and

will not be known…But surely by the early seventh century B.C the so-called hoplite reform – if we may use such a dramatic term – must have attracted a growing number of farmers, who now became restless at the idea that anyone might traverse their own small parcel of land. (Hoplite farmers usually owned properties outside the city walls of between five and ten acres).105

The hoplite then, stands as the cornerstone of the civic militarism, which united society in the pursuit of ideals. The same ideals are pivotal to western armies which, like hoplites, “fight with and for a sense of legal freedom (as) the products of constitutional governments and thus are overseen by those outside religion and the military itself”.106 The hoplite exemplifies the western soldier who fights, not because he is forced or threatened, but because he is committed to a “common cause,” which is to the “safety of his country”.107 These ideals, which make clear why cowardice was the most serious offence in the phalanx,108 reflect stable society and realization that war-fighting is more properly defensive, and not expeditionary in the quest of territory, status, wealth or revenge.109

The same ideals of civic militarism and mutual obligation define Greek generalship.110 Greek generals fought and died with their men; “after all, they belonged to the same class”.111 Reflecting upon “The Riddle of

Command” in the Second World War, General S.L.A. Marshall, who pillories the “evil” of “sedentary generalship” which corrodes inspiration, commitment, physical courage, moral courage and personal fealty,

123 articulates a similar perspective.112 There is much of Marshall’s censure echoed by Aristophanes, who, in Peace, criticises the:

Goddam brigadier with his triple plumes / And scarlet uniform, dyed he says in genuine / Dye from Sardis, but should there ever come some times / When he had to fight in such an outfit, he’d turn pale / And be the first to run, triple plumes and all.113

Similarly in Acharnians, Aristophanes lampoons Lamachus the Athenian general killed in 414 at the siege of Syracuse. Lamachus is mocked for a crest of feathers from the “greater bragtale,” and satirized for the profit and social advantage which seeming separates him from Dicaeopolis, “an honest citizen, not a social climber, and since the war a simple soldier, not a profiteer, whereas (Lamachus) since the war began (has) been a well-paid cipher”. Lamachus the poseur is compared unfavourably to “old graybeards in the ranks, drawing no pay”.114 The evil of sedentary generalship, criticised by Marshall, is undiminished by the ages.

Hoplites then exemplify the Western military ideal, as they stand united dutifully in defence of a just cause – as free men not subject to the yoke of tyranny.

Free Citizens: Better Warriors

The uncompromising brutal fashion in which Greek armies sought decisive battle and annihilation rather than disgrace, reflects the esprit of soldiers united by the idea of consensual government or politeia and inspired by the principle of freedom or eleutheria.115 “As the polis

124 evolved, the men who owned the land fought in the army to defend the territory of the polis, (and they) sat in the assembly to participate in its decisions”.116 Aeschylus observed that men fought to safeguard their sons, wives and sanctuaries. In The Persians he has the Herald exhort: “O

Greek / Sons, advance! Free your fathers’ land, ‘ Free your sons, your wives, the sanctuaries / Of paternal gods, the sepulchers / Of ancestors. /

Now the contest’s drawn / All is at stake”.117 These lines underline that men fought, as Aristotle argued, courageously for their way of life, seeking to avoid dishonour more than death.118

Herodotus concluded similarly, “free citizens are better warriors, since they fight for themselves, their families and property, not for kings, aristocrats or priests”.119 He argued that:

The Athenians, while ruled by tyrants were no better in war than any of the peoples living around them, but once they were rid of tyrants they became by far the best of all. Thus it is clear that they were deliberately slack whilst repressed, since they were working for a master, but that after they were freed, they became ardently devoted to working hard so as to win achievements for themselves as individuals.120

The freedom of consensual government and political equality was a distinctive ideal in the Greek world. Most poleis were broadly informed by similar ideas – such as those of age and class121 - and “many of the city-states had similar social and political structures”.122 Even oligarchic

Sparta, like most of the poleis, was populist.123 Hence, despite rigorous discipline, the Spartan army was not tyrannical, and did not expect

125 unthinking compliance from seasoned hoplites, who are noted to have protested against the unwise tactics of commanders.124 Committed to the ideals and custom of political independence, the Spartans rejected the

Persian general Hydarnes, who proposed suzerainty under Xerxes, the

Persian King:

Lacedaemonians, why are you trying to avoid becoming the King’s friends? You can see that the King knows how to honour good men when you look at me and the state of my affairs. This could be the same for you if only you would surrender yourselves to the King, since he would surely think you to be good men and allow each of you Greek territory to rule over. To this they replied, ‘Hydarnes, you offer us this advice only because you do not have a fair and proper perspective. For you counsel us based on your experience of only one way of life, but you have had no experience of the other: you know well how to be a slave but have not yet experienced freedom…if you could try freedom, you would advise us to fight for it, and not only with spears, but with axes!125

Herodotus reveals the clash of cultures which separated free Greeks from oppressed Persians. He paints a vivid picture of the Hellenes who fought with deliberate, committed and cohesive viciousness on:

The finest and most level land…so that the victors depart from the field only after great damage has been done, and I won’t say anything at all of the defeated, for they are completely destroyed.126

Herodotus has the Persian satrap Mardonios express incredulity at the phalanxes, which ran at each other, colliding violently, stabbing with spears before the othismos, the push, “as ranks to the rear put their bodies

126 into the hollows of their shields and forced those ahead constantly onward”127 in order to break the adversary’s formation (pararrexis) and begin the work of hand-to-hand killing.128 Pararrexis is used, “with the meaning of rout…often combined with fleeing to indicate a general collapse of an entire formation. The meaning conveyed is not a break- through, but a complete rout”.129

Though “considerable ink has been spilled debating whether this pushing

(othismos) is literal or metaphorical,”130 the mode of fighting demanded unquestioned discipline – a discipline accepted by each of the hoplites.131

Such discipline, known as eutaxia, is common in Hellenic military inscriptions, and cited in the inscriptions for gymnastic competition.132

This was discipline attached to ideas of aretê and a long way removed from the control exerted upon men by tyranny. The wholehearted individual eagerness to join battle is illustrated by the Spartan, reported by Plutarch to have painted a life-sized fly on his shield. The soldier intended to get so close to his enemies that the blazon was seen at its true size.133 Eager and committed to ideals, the Greeks who joined the collision of battle so violently, seemed to Mardonios, evil counselor to

King Xerxes of Persia, to be “inspired by recklessness,”134 because he failed to recognise the honour, equality and obligation which united individual volunteers in the phalanx. The armament and tactics of hoplitic warfare reflected ideas which, pervasive within the poleis, were oppugnant to Persian despotism. Tyrtaeus explains:

127 Those who, standing their ground and closing ranks together, / endure the onset and close quarters and fight in the front, / they lose fewer men. They also protect the army behind them. / Once they flinch, the spirit of the whole army falls apart, / and no man could count over and tell the number of evils, / all that can come to a man, once he gives way to disgrace.135

In contrast, the Persians – who were subjects without rights - fought as men pressed under tyranny.136 Herodotus acknowledges this, observing that after Mardonios spoke in support of Xerxes the King, “the rest of the

Persians remained silent and did not dare express an opinion in opposition to the one that had been offered”.137 Tyranny afforded no place, as

Aristotle has it, for men to “live as they like,”138 or as Aeschylus has it, for “the tongue of freedom’s voice”.139

To foreshadow the discussion of chapter five in this regard, Australian doctrine is more Persian then Greek. Articulating the expectation that

“men must learn to obey orders when all their instincts cry out for them not to be obeyed,”140 doctrine presumes commanders have the power to enforce or insist upon compliance even in the face of conscientious objection. The doctrine expects men to fight because they are compelled, even if they are not committed.

The Greeks thought differently, and consequently fought differently.

Greek society valued individuality. Aristotle explained that “every citizen must have equality,” and held that “not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave”.141 Resonant throughout the Greek world, these were more

128 than democratic ideas. Accepting that social and political structures reflect ideas of conflict,142 these propositions were foundational to the poleis, which depended upon the courageous citizens who served in the phalanx.143 The phalanx and the philosophy which grew around it, reflect the integration of citizenship and military service. Integration forged cohesion, camaraderie and mutual purpose among free individuals who fought for more than political security, but for self-respect and for the respect of their community.144 Hence Tyrtaeus writes of the shame which entails when a coward is speared in the back, running away from the fighting:

Ah, grief! That foe should lacerate behind / The coward hide that flees on martial ground. / Ah, shame! That his dead corpse the brave should find / Exhibiting in front no glorious wound.145

But Tyrtaeus writes of more than the explicit theme of shame and cowardice. The importance of cohesion amongst committed men is the foundational motif. Without this presumption, implicit exhortation to face the foe lacks purport.

Writing famously of the Battle of Mantinea 418B.C, Thucydides accentuates the point. As the Spartans and Argives squared off for the brutal collision, Thucydides recalls how the Spartans advanced “slowly and to the music of many flute players – a standing institution in their army, that has nothing to do with religion, but is meant to make them advance evenly, stepping in time, without breaking their order, as large armies are apt to do in the moment of engagement”.146 Underlining the

129 need for close order, cohesion and courage, Thucydides observes the tendency of:

Armies, (as they go into action) to get forced out rather on the right wing, and one and the other overlap with this, their adversary’s left; because fear makes each man do his best to shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the man next to him on the right, thinking that the closer the shields are locked together the better will he be protected. The man primarily responsible for this is the first upon the right wing, who is always striving to withdraw from the enemy his unarmed side; and the same apprehension makes the rest follow him.147

Aristophanes describes the terrifying experience of face-to-face killing at close range for dramatic effect in Peace:

What an ugly face War has! / Is it really the war god we’re running from: / the fearsome one, the tough leather one, / the one that makes the pee run down our pants?148

The fearsome face of hoplitic battle is significant because it draws attention to the enormous bravery men mustered in order to remain steadfast in the ranks and files of the phalanx. Defining courage, Plato has

Laches describe a hoplite:

Good heavens, Socrates…if a man is willing to remain at his post and to defend himself against the enemy without running away, then you may rest assured that he is a man of courage.149

Hoplite battle was a terrifying, consuming and ultimately definitive experience shared by Greeks. In his introduction to the collected works of

130 Aeschylus, Richmond Lattimore describes the great tragedian, born in the last quarter of the sixth century, who left behind more than seventy plays of which seven survive. Aeschylus fought at Marathon, where he lost his brother in action, and died at Gela in Sicily in 456 or 455B.C. His epitaph makes no mention of his enormous success as a tragedian but reads:

Under this monument lies Aeschylus the Athenian, Euphorion’s son, who died in the wheatlands of Gela. The grove Of Marathon with its glories can speak of his valour in battle, The long-haired Persian remembers and can speak of it too.150

This epitaph illustrates how it was that finding courage amidst the clash of hoplite arms was a lifelong source of honour and pride. The epitaph recalls the dread of hoplite collision and the courage required to face and to endure this particular terror in pursuit of a just cause. Significantly, the epitaph asserts something else: a sense of social identity. Aeschylus was a hoplite – at Marathon he fought besides other hoplites in a struggle of equals, men who provided their own armour and banded together in defence of a just cause. There was a great degree of acclaim which followed hoplite service; commendation which did not attach to the javelin thrower, slinger or archer. “In this context, we may be reminded that the ancient Greeks lived much closer to the poverty level than modern economic historians often indicate. The difference in the cost of various arms and armour was a real one (and) the pride of wealth and valour remained with the heavy-armed”.151

131 Hoplites were a social elite who adopted and preserved many aristocratic attitudes inherited from Homer.152 Being men of property, hoplites were able to provide their own weapons, and they embarked upon conflict with evident martial courage and resolve.153

Impoverished and unable to furnish their own armour, the hoplites’ social inferiors may have offered yeoman service as oarsmen in the fleet, or taken to the field at dishonourable distance. Unarmoured, unable to face the spears at close range, such men were seen to rely, not upon martial courage, but upon the arrow, the sling, and the javelin. They were held in disdain.154 So, we read in the Iliad of “strong Diomedes,” who despises

Paris for his archery more than for his adultery:

You archer, foul fighter, lovely in your locks, eyer of young girls. / If you were to make a trial of me in strong combat with weapons / your bow would do you no good at all, nor your close-showered arrows. / Now you have scratched the flat of my foot, and even boast of this. / I care no more than if a witless child or a woman / had struck me; this is the blank weapon of a useless man, no fighter. / But if one is struck by me only a little, that is far different, / the stroke is a sharp thing and suddenly lays him lifeless, / and that man’s wife goes with cheeks torn in lamentations, / and his children are fatherless, while he staining the soil red with blood / rots away, and there are more birds than women swarming about him.155

Aeschylus replays this theme in The Persians where Persian bowmen are

“fearful in aspect / dreadful in battle,” but unsuccessful against “Greeks

132 (who) stand firm in combat,” with “Pikes wielded close and shielded panoplies”.156

Similarly, in Heracles, Euripides concerned with ideas of “true nobility”157 has Lycus – usurper of the Theban throne - cast aspersion against Heracles, whom he mocks as:

A man who / made his reputation fighting beasts, / who never buckled a shield upon his arm, / never came near a spear, but held a bow, / the coward’s weapon, handy to run away / The bow is no proof of manly courage; / no, your real man stands firm in the ranks / and dares to face the gash the spear may make.158

Recalling the battle on Sphacteria, and the surrender of the beleaguered

Spartan garrison in 425B.C, Thucydides affords historical insight. After a siege lasting seventy-two days, during which time the Spartans were subject to unrelenting assault by Messenian archers and slingers, the

Spartans under the command of Epitades, gave up their arms. Of the original force of four hundred and twenty hoplites, two hundred and twenty two were taken alive to Athens. Thucydides writes:

People could scarcely believe that those who had surrendered were of the same stuff as the fallen; and an Athenian ally, who some time after insultingly asked one of the prisoners from the island if those that had fallen were noble and good men, received for answer that the atrakatos – that is the arrow – would be worth a great deal if it could pick out the noble and good men from the rest; an allusion to the fact that the killed were those whom the stones and the arrow happened to hit.159

133 Describing this occasion, Pritchett cites A.W. Gomme, the great student of Thucydidean warfare: “They (the Athenians on Sphacteria) did not, in the conventional and gentlemanly manner of hoplites, move to the pitch suitable for hoplites and there fight it out with the Spartans”.160 The

Athenians ignored a chivalric code which, in 370, inspired Agesilaus to withhold his attack until the Arcadian force was properly united and organised. To do otherwise, argued Agesilaus, would have been cowardly and he “wanted to make the intended battle squarely and openly”.161

Conclusion

Informed and contextualised by the previous chapter, which investigated honour as a cultural leitmotif, this chapter examined the hoplite phalanx as a metaphor of civic obligation in defence of a just cause and political freedom. This chapter described classical hoplite battle prosecuted by men who fought and died in defence of ideas. These men forged an uncompromising code of honour, connected to steadfastness among those who served together as equals.

Exploring the thinking behind Hellenic arms, this chapter has explicated war as a moral idea entwined with the ideals of society. But these ideas, the concepts of honour, duty and morally autonomous commitment to a just cause are absent from Australian doctrine.

The classical cornerstone of western arms is apparent in the Apology, where Plato has Socrates say; “men of Athens: whenever a man has taken a position that he believes to be best, or has been placed by his

134 commander, there he must, I think, remain and face danger, without a

thought for death or anything else, rather than disgrace”.162 Socrates

betrays by the word “disgrace,” the connection of honour and civic

responsibility. In classical Greece; honour, inseparable from the aretê

standard, had evolved to bring in the collective ideas of duty and

patriotism which united individuals in the poleis.

Eclipse of the Greek poleis did not entail collapse of the Greek ideal.

However, collapse of the poleis did transform the social, political and the moral milieu.163 Stoicism emerged as part of the philosophic response to this social transformation.164 Stoicism continues to be significant as systematic body of thought which connects modern ideas to ancient foundations. Furthermore, the philosophy resonates with military ideals.165

One of the last Stoics, Epictetus disregarded heterodox innovation. He brought philosophical creativity and brilliance to the reinterpretation of classic Stoic principles. His ideas, which resonate with military ideals, challenge the argument of Australian doctrine that soldiers are “required to subjugate their will”.166 Stoicism and the arguments of Epictetus are explored in the chapter to follow.

135 ENDNOTES: CHAPTER THREE

1 Pritchett, (1985) p. 1: Pritchett describes the “hoplite reform” which “marked a change from pre-hoplite warfare” to “pitched battle between phalanxes in armour”. Pritchett, (1971) p. 31 Mitchell, (1996) p. 90 Raaflaub, (1997) pp. 49, 50 Schwartz, (2009) pp. 143, 145, 146 2 Wheeler, (2007) p. 197 3 Anderson, (1970) p. 39 4 Jackson, (1991) p. 229 Dawson, (1996) p. 50 Raaflaub, (1997) p. 49 Wheeler, (2007) p. 195 5 Keegan, (1994) p. 250 Lazenby, (1991) p. 106: Hoplites, argues Lazenby, “remained an elite, and the non- aristocrats among them probably adopted many aristocratic attitudes….(and) they retained sufficient of the aristocratic way of thinking to regard prowess in battle as glorious”. Adcock, (1957) p. 5: Adcock explains that “the city-states had developed as aristocracies, and the nobles would naturally fight, presumably in the front rank so long as they were young enough to take the field. But more men than these were needed, and the duty and privilege of fighting as hoplites was extended to members of the middle class who could provide themselves with equipment”. (Emphasis added.) Sage, (1996) p. 31 6 Wheeler, (2007) p. 195: The hopla is described as a helmet, spear, sword and a double grip shield called the aspis. Other equipment – armour such as cuirass and greaves, were at the individual soldier’s discretion. The full set of equipment is estimated to have weighed 30kg. This great weight underlines the ritualistic and set-piece nature of hoplite conflict. Schwartz, (2009) pp. 25, 26, 27: Noting that peltasts took their name from the pelte – their crescent shaped shield, Schwartz acknowledges that hoplites should properly have been called aspistai, after their large concave and double – handled shield. Holite is taken, he explains, from hopla – which is generically applied to the set of weapons. That said, hoplon could mean the hoplite shield, whilst aspis was a rather generic term for any shield. 7 Sallares, (1991) pp. 162, 164: “The propertied class in classical Athens…depended on slave labour insofar as permanent labour forces on farms…were concerned”. (Emphasis in the original) 8 Thucydides, 1.141.2: Thucydides describes the Athenians as “personally engaged in the cultivation of their land”. Hanson, (1998) p. 36 9 Mitchell, (1996) p. 91 Dawson, (1996) p. 50: Dawson argues that the “hoplites who had to furnish their own equipment constituted a privileged minority in the city-state…. Their political and social predominance was based squarely on their right and duty to carry a shield in the phalanx”. Anderson, (1970) p. 5: Anderson observes that: “The richer citizens in Greek states professed their readiness to serve with person and fortune; and their conduct proved their sincerity”. 10 Hanson, (1991) pp. 5, 6 Hanson, (1998) p. 23: Hanson describes how light-armed auxiliary troops were often drawn from the “very poor landless men (who were) despised”. Raaflaub, (1997) p. 53: “Hoplite-farmers were the essential group among the citizens. Those who failed to qualify did not count for much socially and politically”.

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Lazenby, (1991) p. 105: The poor were excluded (from hoplite armies) because they could not afford to buy the relatively expensive equipment required”. Ober, (1991) p. 177: The hoplite was “most typically a citizen-farmer”. 11 Mitchell, (1996) p. 100 Wheeler, (2007) p. 186: Homeric warfare is described as the “fluid battles of a few heroes”. 12 Van Wees, (1996) p. 1 Anderson, (1970) p. 13 Dawson, (1996) p. 53 13 Pritchett, (1971) p. 32 Anderson, (1970) p. 13 14 Dawson, (1996) pp. 54-5 15 Wheeler, (1991) pp. 123 Wheeler, (2007) p. 186: Homer’s “unwritten code of warrior ethics” was a dominant theme in Greek culture. When the classical polis emerged from the Greek Dark Ages, the new hoplite class was seen to have “democratized warfare without abandoning completely the aristocratic ethos of Homeric heroes”. Carey, (2007) p. 41: The infatuation with the combat of individual heroes, epitomised in the clash of Hector and Achilles, was “projected onto collective warfare in the archaic and Hellenic periods”. 16 Keegan, introduction to Hanson (2000) p. xii (Emphasis added) Lazenby, (1991) p. 98: Lazenby underlines this point. Describing the relationship between hoplites and their commanders, he writes: “Even an old cynic like Archilocos felt he could trust a commander who was ‘short, bow-legged to look at, set squarely on his feet and full of heart…(there was) a natural camaraderie between hoplites and their commanders. After all, they belonged to the same class. Even in the Spartan army….” Vaughn, (1991) p. 39: Few hoplite armies had elite contingents – the notable exception being the Macedonian Sacred Band. 17 Keegan, (1994) pp. 249, 250 18 Pritchett, (1974) pp. 147, 186, 251, 252 Anderson, (1970) pp. 1,2 Raaflaub, (1997) p. 56 Schwartz, (2009) p. 173 Carey, (2007), p. 41 19 Ober, (1991) p. 179: (Parenthesis in the original.) Wheeler, (2007) p. 186: Wheeler speaks of the democratization of warfare, as men of an equivalent social class fought according to a shared unwritten military honour code. Mitchell, (1996) p. 92: Mitchell explains how the Greeks spoke the same language and shared fundamental cultural motifs. He writes that this shared cultural heritage and perspective enabled a style of warfare which “had its own common language and its own rules of combat. War was, in a sense, a means of settling diplomatic difference in a way which both sides understood”. So, for most of the archaic and classical period, war was “a straight and honest contest between the two sides”. 20 Pritchett, (1974) p. 251. Citing Polybius. At p. 252 Pritchett holds: “the passage quoted from Polybius gives the explanation of ancient belli jura as dictated by feelings of honour and a desire for final decision”. 21 Dawson, (1996) p. 54 22 Hanson, (1991) p.7 23 Pritchett, (1974) p. 173. Citing H. Berve. 24 Pritchett, (1974) p. 173. With reference but not citing F.W. Walbank. 25 Pritchett, (1974) p. 173. With reference but not citing P. Ducrey. 26 Pritchett, (1974) p. 230: “War was a natural form of public service to which all male citizens…were called”. Mitchell, (1996) p. 96: The hoplites’ “fierce attachment to their family plots of land, the basis of both their livelihood and their citizen status, was the factor which determined their part in the hoplite battle”.

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Ober, (1991) p. 177: The rough manual labour of the citizen soldier “helped to integrate the everyday private life…(with) military duty”. Dawson, (1996) pp. 50, 51 Hunt, (2007) p. 137 Wheeler, (1991) pp. 122, 123 Sage, (1996) p. 33 27 Hanson, (2000) pp. 17, 227 Hanson, (2002) pp. 4, 12, 19, 21, 22, 55, 56 28 Hanson, (2002) p. 24 29 Anderson, (1970) p. 5 30 Gallant, (1991) p. 146 Schwartz, (2009) p. 175 31 Wheeler, (1991) p. 123 32 Pritchett, (1971) pp. 105-108 33 Toynbee, (1981) p. 38 34 Hanson, (2002), pp. 1-5, 6, 8, 12, 13,16, 17, 22, 225 35 Motto of the U.S. Military Academy: Heinl, (1966), p. 360 36 Royal Australian Navy Leadership Ethic, p. 37 37 Thucydides, 4.126.1-6 38 Hanson, (2002) p.4 39 Thucydides, 6.11.6: Thucydides writes that Nicias reminded his soldiers that “instead of being puffed up by the misfortune of your adversaries, you ought to think…the one thing awakened in the Spartans by their disgrace is how they may, even now…overthrow us and repair their dishonour, inasmuch as they have for a very long time, devoted themselves to the cultivation of military prowess above all”. 40 Adcock, (1957) p. 7 41 Tyrtaeus, in Trypanis, (1979) pp. 126-8 42 Mitchell, (1996) p. 100 43 Dawson, (1996) p. 54 44 Schwartz, (2009) p. 118 45 Schwartz, (2009) p. 117 46 Homer, Iliad, 22: 71-76 47 Carey, (2007) p. 37 48 Vaughn, (1991) p. 38 Cites Xenophon who describes the horrible aftermath of Koroneia (394 B.C) 49 Hanson, (2002) p.4 Hanson, (2000) p. 223: Hanson underlines the sense of voluntary commitment and self- discipline, noting: “there were no conscientious objectors in the Greek city-state in the great age of hoplite battle…Such issues (were) an abstraction for the Greeks (and) they were rarely discussed by either philosophers or military analysts. Hanson, (2004) pp. 21-23: Hanson describes the themes of Greek military dominance which are foundational to the western tradition. At p. 21 in particular, Hanson notes the idea of superior discipline, which he explains as “the ready acceptance of command by the soldiers themselves… good battle order flowed from the consensus of the Assembly….” 50 Hanson, (2002) p.5 51 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 52 Garlan, (1975) p. 145 53 Garlan, (1975) p. 178 54 Hanson, (2002) p.9 55 Keegan, introduction to Hanson (2000) p. xi 56 Lazenby, (1991) p. 89 57 Mitchell, (1996) p. 99 58 Gallant, (1991) pp. 146, 147, 152 59 Pritchett, (1974) p. 252: “Polybios gives the explanation of the ancient beli jura as dictated by feelings of honor and a desire for final decision”.

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60 Hanson, (2000) p. xxv 61 Keegan, (1994) p. 249 Schwartz, (2009) p. 180: During the hoplite era, commanding officers were not distinguished in the manner of modern generals. Schwartz describes how they “not only participated in the fighting, but (took station) right where the fighting was thickest. Two closely connected functions of the hoplites are needed to understand this properly: a civil / political function…and a military one where they partook as equals of the defence of the polis”. 62 Anderson, (1970) p. 40 63 Anderson, (1970) p. 47 64 Bowman (2006) p. 46 65 Anderson, (1970) p. 13 Schwartz, (2009) p. 119: Observing the verse of Tyrtaeus, Schwartz remarks that “the virtues of strength, beauty, agility, wealth and the like are criticised as such – they are just not enough for the polis, which above all requires bravery and steadfastness of its citizens”. 66 Dawson, (1996) p. 52 Adcock, (1957) p. 6 67 Hanson, (2000) p. 4: Hanson underlines this idea, observing that: “The mere sight of enemy ravagers running loose across the lands of the invaded was alone considered a violation of both individual privacy and municipal pride. Usually a quick response was considered necessary, in the form of heavily armed and armoured farmers filing into a suitable small plain…where brief but brutal battle resulted either in concession granted to the army of invasion, or a humiliating, forced retreat back home for the defeated”. Hanson, (1991) p. 4: Affirming this logic, Hanson describes the provocative destructive attack, which provoked defence of ancestral plots. He notes that in the aftermath of battle, occupation, destruction of rural infrastructure, murder, rape and enslavement rarely followed until the final terrible years of the Peloponnesian War when the agriculturalists’ monopoly on conflict had evaporated. Keegan, (1994) pp. 244, 245, 246: Keegan accepts the logic of the aporthetos idea, and the likelihood of highly ritualized, brutal and decisive battles. Raaflaub, (1997) pp. 52, 53, 54: Discussing the evolution of the polis and the phalanx, Raaflaub argues that concepts of land ownership and territoriality were inseparable components of an interrelated process. The crux of discussion is summarised on p. 54 where he writes: “The hoplites fought on their land, for their land”. Mitchell, (1996) p. 97: Defending ones territory, argues Mitchell, was “the heart of Greek warfare…universally recognised as the strongest incentive to fight”. The psychology, he argues is revealed plainly by the example of “the Spartan king, Archidamus (who) led his troops into Attica at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war (and) advanced to the plain of Acharnae, in full view of the city walls”. The Spartans ravaged the plain, “in the confident expectation that the Athenians would give battle”. But the Athenians did not respond. Archidamus “could not believe that the enemy (stood) idly by while their fields and farms were occupied. In the city, Pericles was barely able to hold his hoplites back”. Dawson, (1996) p. 49: Dawson describes Greek strategy, which entailed forcing the defender to join combat. This “could be accomplished simply by marching on to his fields”. The defender then used the single means at his disposal (the hoplite phalanx) in the only way possible (the direct charge). 68 Dawson, (1996) pp. 52, 55 69 Pritchett, (1979) p. 323 70 Pritchett, (1979) p. 8 71 Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24: MCWP 3-33.5, para. 7.1, 7.2, 7.9, 7.10, 7.11, 7.21, 7.44 72 Mitchell, (1996) p. 98 Adcock, (1957) p. 9 73 Lazenby, (1985) pp. 15, 16

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74 Pritchett, (1971) p. 27 75 Thucydides, 2.35-2.42 76 Thucydides 2.37.2 77 Xenophon, Hellenika, 2.4.17 78 Plato, Menexenus, 234c 79 Herodotus, 1.30.4 80 Vaughn, (1991) p. 42 Mitchell, (1996) p. 99 81 Pritchett, (1985) p. 96: Citing Panofsky. 82 Vaughn, (1991) p. 58 83 Anderson, (1991) pp. 28, 29: Hoplites were largely untrained amateurs. 84 Lazenby, (1991) p. 91 citing Xenophon: Symp. 2.14 85 Anderson, (1970) p. 84 Aristotle, Politics, 4:1297b 20 86 Plato, Laches, 182a 87 Lazenby, (1985) pp. 4, 16, 17, 77 88 Lazenby, (1985) p. 25 89 Herodotus, 9.62.3 90 Herodotus, 9.71.3 91 Adcock, (1957) p. 4 Lazenby, (1991) pp. 95, 103 Mitchell, (1996) p. 95 92 Plato, Laches, 182b 93 Bailey, (2010) p. 32 94 Hanson, (2002) p. 35 95 Plutarch, Lives, “Aristides” Vol 1. p. 438 96 Hanson, (2000) p. 112 97 Wheeler, (2007) p. 196: Describes the double grip aspis circa 700 Anderson, (1970) pp. 14, 15 Schwartz, (2009) p. 28: Schwartz describes the aspis as “90cm to 1m across, circular and noticeably concave…. consisting primarily of a wooden core (poplar or willow)”. 98 Lazenby, (1991) p. 95 citing Plutarch Sayings of the Spartans Anderson, (1970) p. 15 citing Plutarch Moralia 220A 99 Hanson, (2000) p. 64 (Emphasis added) Schwartz, (2009) pp. 148, 153 100 Plutarch, Lives, “Lycurgus” Vol 1. p. 61 101 Lazenby, (1985) pp. 5, 13 102 Lazenby, (1985) p. 4 103 Schwartz, (2009) pp. 175, 177, 178, 180 104 Hanson, (2000) p. 92: The idea of citizenship is important here because, of course, the citizenry of Athens and Sparta were supported by a vast underclass of metics (resident aliens, denied access to the rights and liberties of citizenship) and slaves (in Sparta, these slaves were in two classes: the helots state owned and not subject to economic exchange, but subject to all other cruelties, and the perioeci (or dwellers about). These peoples, the original inhabitants of Lacedaemonia, were a largely autonomous distinct social underclass. 105 Hanson, (2000) p. 29 (Parenthesis in the original) Keegan, (1994) pp. 245-6. Keegan observes, additionally, that eighty per cent of the citizens were farmers. 106 Hanson, (2002) p. 21 107 Walzer, (2000) p. 27 108 Pritchett, (1974) pp. 239 - 241 109 Hanson, (2002) p. 22 110 Schwartz, (2009) p. 180, 181 111 Lazenby, (1991) p. 98 112 Marshall, (2000) pp. 103, 104, 105

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113 Aristophanes, Peace, pp. 324-25 114 Aristophanes, Acharnians, p. 32 115 Hanson, (2000) pp. 118, 124 Hanson, (2002) pp. 36, 39, 48, 49, 54, 55 116 Raaflaub, (1997) p. 55: Concluding on p. 57, Raaflaub holds that “land-owning farmers from the very beginning (of the polis had) formed an integral element, both militarily and politically….(as) landowners, soldiers and assembly-men, they (were) the essential part of the citizen body”. (Emphasis in the original) Dawson, (1996) p. 50: Explaining that the rationale behind hoplite battle was more than economic, and more than a response to agricultural imperatives, Dawson argues that the hoplites were the only full citizens of the polis. The hoplites were “citizens in battle”. The hoplite embodied an ideal and, in consequence, excluded the evolution of other styles of combat. 117 Aeschylus, The Persians, Lines: 401 - 406 118 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 3.1116a 20-30: Aristotle describes different types of courage. The greatest he holds is “the kind of courage that Homer depicts” this sort of courage was seen to be due to excellence and quite different from the physical courage (or the seeming courageous display), which was compelled or inspired by the desire to avoid pain. Hanson, (2002) p. 55: Hanson underlines this reasoning, describing how the Greeks fought as freemen, for the ideal of freedom. 119 Hanson, (2002) p. 47 120 Herodotus, 5.78 121 Sallares, (1991) pp. 165-192 at p. 166: Citing Graf, who observes rituals in Attica, analogous to Spartan age-class rituals. 122 Hunt, (2007) p. 110 123 Dawson, (1996) p. 51: Citing Runciman, who argues that, “the poleis were all, without exception, far too democratic. Some, of course, were more oligarchic than others. But this meant only that their government was in the hands of a relatively smaller number of relatively richer citizens….the ideology of the Greek poleis was…strongly populist; it was, that is to say, hostile to the concentration of power in the hands of any single person, family or group, except for limited periods as endorsed by the citizen body as a whole”. 124 Thucydides, Bk. 5.65.2: Describes a soldier’s criticism of Agis’ reckless advance against the Argives at Mantinea - 418B.C. Heeding the soldier’s advice, Agis withdrew safely. 125 Herodotus, 7.135 126 Herodotus, 7.9. β – 7.9. Υ 127 Hanson, (2000) p. 28 Keegan, (1994) pp. 249, 250: Keegan describes the pushing and hacking of the othismos. Pritchett, (1985) p. 29: Describes the othismos and argues, “the tactical purpose of the tightly knit mass was to break through the enemy formation…. Shields were dashed against shields as each side attempted to push the other back…while they thrust with swords and spears”. At p. 65 Pritchett again mentions the othismos and the reference of Herodotus to the term in the context of a struggle of the body of Leonidas. Bailey, (2010) pp. 35, 169: Bailey cites martial fragments of Callinus who exhorts, “push the shield with power”. Wheeler, (1991) p. 130: Describes the othismos “the great shoving match” which Tyrtaeus references as “shield to shield combat”. Anderson, (1991) pp. 14 – 20: Describes the shield, and references Demaratus who describes it as a weapon borne by each soldier for the sake of the whole line. Adcock, (1957) p. 4: Adcock describes how, “the two opposing phalanxes met each other with clash of shield on shield on shield and blow of spear against spear…. every man in the line knows that his life depends on his neighbour’s fighting as steadily, as

141 skillfully and as bravely as himself. No form of combat could so plainly exhibit the community solidarity that was of the essence of the Greek city-state”. Carey, (2007) pp. 38, 39: Carey cites Plutarch’s dicta that men carry the shield for the sake of the entire line, and describes the evolution of the thrusting spear, as opposed to the throwing spear. He also describes the phases of the hoplite battle, the preparation, charge, collision (othismos) push, rout and aftermath. Schwartz, (2009) p. 183, 184, 200: Schwartz explains the othismos as the brutal, decisive and chaotic joining of hoplite battle. He explains at p. 183 how the word derives from the Greek verb to “push” or to “shove”. 128 Pritchett, (1985) pp. 7, 8 Lazenby, (1985) pp. 37, 38 129 Pritchett, (1985) p. 69 130 Wheeler, (2007) p. 209 131 Adcock, (1957) p. 4 Dawson, (1996) p. 50 132 Pritchett, (1974) p. 238 133 Lazenby, (1985) p. 30 Anderson, (1970) p. 20 citing Plutarch Moralia 243c 134 Herodotus, 7.9.Υ Anderson, (1970) p. 1 135 Hanson, (2000) p. 119: Citing Tyrtaeus. (Emphasis added) 136 Hanson, (2002) p. 55 137 Herodotus, 7.10 138 Aristotle, Politics, 6.1317b11: “(Another note of liberty is) that a man should live as he likes”. 139 Aeschylus, The Suppliant Maidens, Line: 948 140 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.8 141 Aristotle, Politics, 6.1317b20-21, 6.1317b25 142 Plato, Laws I, 625, 626 esp. 626 c: “a well run state seems to me to demand that its organization and administration should be such as to ensure victory in war over other states”. Over the course of this discussion, Plato describes how the administration of the state is related to the ideas of war. Raaflaub, (1997) p. 54 143 Hanson, (2000) p. 29 Hanson, (2002) p. 22. 144 Hanson, (2002) p. 52 145 Bailey, (2010) p. 30 146 Thucydides 5.70 147 Thucydides 5.71 148 Aristophanes, Peace, pp. 284-5 149 Plato, Laches, 190E. direct reference to the hoplite at 191b: “the hoplite (fights) in the manner I describe”. 150 Lattimore, 1991, Introduction to the Oresteia, p. 1 151 Pritchett, (1991) p. 53 152 Lazenby, (1991) p. 106 153 Hanson, (2002) p. 58 Keegan, (1994) p. 247 154 Hanson, (1991) pp. 5, 6 Dawson, (1996) p. 50 Carey, (2007) p. 41 155 Homer, Iliad, 11-384-395 156 Aeschylus, The Persians, 27-28, 239, 1025. 157 Arrowsmith, W. Introduction to Heracles, p. 283 158 Euripides, Heracles, Lines: 157 – 164 159 Thucydides 4.36, 4.39, 4.40 160 Pritchett, (1974) p. 174

142

161 Pritchett, (1974) p. 175 162 Plato, Apology, 28 d. 163 MacIntyre, (1967) p. 100 164 Russell, (1995) p. 260 Saunders, (1966) p. 59 165 Sherman, (2005) p. 1 Evans, (2010) p. 55 166 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7

143 CHAPTER FOUR

Seek not Outside Yourself: The Stoic Ideal

Ne te quaesiveris extra

Background

Following an overview of Stoicism, this chapter will explore the thinking of Epictetus, whose ideas are an alembica enabling the moral claims and principles of Australian doctrine to be reinterpreted. Discussion will inform analysis of doctrinal ideas in the chapter to follow.

Eclipse of the Poleis and the Rise of Stoicism

By 338B.C, Philip II of Macedon had gained control over Greece, laying the foundation for the empire of his son, Alexander the Great. Eclipse of the self-governing poleis did not augur collapse of Greek ideals, but it did transform the moral milieu. With collapse of the poleis came the disintegration of established moral structures and language.1 For this reason the end of the classical Greek ascendancy entailed that people were unable to characterise their moral lives within a framework of familiar language and concepts.

In classical poleis society the focus of moral life had been the city-state.

Despite recognising the “almost Stoic self-sufficingness,”2 Aristotle described when he held that: a Alembic: A distilling apparatus derived from the Greek alchemical ambix / ambyx.

144 Goods have been divided into three classes…some of them are described as external, others as relating to soul or to body; and we call those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods.3

The moral life had been a “life of self-realization through action” which had demanded “some sphere, some resources, some instruments, and, indeed, in the long run, if it (was) to come to maturity, nothing less than what the well-furnished Greek State offered to its citizens”.4 But:

In the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman Empire the sharp antithesis between the individual and the state is inescapable. The question now is not, ‘in what forms of social life can justice express itself?’ or ‘what virtues have to be practiced to produce a communal life in which certain ends can be accepted and achieved?’ but, ‘what must I do to be happy?’ or ‘what goods can I achieve as a private person?’ The human situation is such that the individual finds his moral environment in his place in the universe rather than in any social or political framework.5

Within the well-integrated society of the poleis, ideas of virtue reflected an inherited tradition embodied by the Homeric hero and attached to social rules and status.6 As the established social world disintegrated, there came a sense of political insecurity and ethical uncertainty.

7 Stoicism, found by Zeno of Citium around 320B.C, emerged as a philosophic response to the uncertainty which accompanied social and political disintegration.8

After Zeno, Stoicism evolved under Cleanthes of Assos, and Chrysippus.9

Succeeding Chrysippus, Stoicism entered a second phase informed by

Panaetius, the father of Roman Stoicism, who taught Posidonius.

145 Panaetius relieved the rigid austerity of the ancient Stoa. A friend to

Scipio, he influenced Cicero, who played an influential part popularising

Stoicism in Rome. The final phase of Stoicism is characterised by three connected with Rome: Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.10 Stoicism can be seen therefore, to have evolved over the course of some five hundred years. Yet, whilst “the teaching of Zeno, in the early part of the third century B.C, was by no means identical with that of Marcus Aurelius

11 in the latter half of the second century A.D,” Stoic ethical doctrine remained relatively unaffected, and occupied a consistently important place in the canon.12

Reverberant with ideas handed on from Plato and Aristotle,13 the remote ancestor of Stoicism was Socrates.14 This is a significant connection, which has often been overlooked.15 Yet, indifferent to physical comfort and devoid of pretense,16 Socrates the “critic, the outsider, the private foe of public confusions and hypocrisies”17 exemplified Stoicism.18 The resonance was epitomised by Socrates at the time of his trial, “his refusal to escape, his calmness in the face of death, and his conviction that the perpetrator of injustice injures himself more than his victim, all fitted in perfectly with Stoic teaching,”19 according to which “one rises above the travails of everyday life, refusing to allow them to hold one’s actions and attitudes hostage”.20

Stoicism captured the Socratic conviction that “it is the good will that alone is significant”.21 This idea, which had received significant emphasis

146 in the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, defines the bequest of classical thinking to modern ethics.22

Contemporaneous in origin with Epicureanism, in which it recognised a philosophical adversary,23 Stoicism exerted conspicuous influence upon the philosophical life of the Roman Empire and upon Christian ethical thought,24 particularly insofar as “the main importance of the Stoics was ethical”.25

The Stoic argues that “men, as rational beings (are) conscious of the laws to which they necessarily conform, and that virtue consists in conscious assent to, and vice in dissent from, the inevitable order of things”.26 The aim of philosophy was rational understanding,27 and virtue is “a rational disposition to be desired in and for itself and not for the sake of any hope, fear or ulterior motive”.28

Stoicism, then, emerges from the collapse of the poleis to fill the philosophic void perfused once by the hoplite who, in the poleis, embodied a social and moral ideal. Responding to the collapse of long- established social and moral structures, Stoicism articulates a philosophy of morally autonomous and purposeful self-discipline. Beyond the defined moral milieu of the poleis, Stoicism reasoned that there is one

“supreme law,”29 “one rational human nature, and therefore one appropriate attitude to all men”.30 Without the cursus honorum of poleis life, Stoicism saw men as moral equals, each equally responsible for themselves and each subject equally to divine providence.

147 Stoicism

Stoicism, which stands beyond Epicureanism and Skepticism as “the most important and influential development in Hellenistic philosophy,”31

“followed the Platonist Xenocrates in treating philosophy under three broad headings: logic, physics and ethics”.32 According to a simile, the

Stoics saw philosophy as “a fertile field in which logic corresponds to the surrounding wall, ethics to the fruit and physics to the soil or vegetation”.33

Thus, the Stoics built a powerfully coherent34 “emotionally narrow”35 philosophy, which held the universe to be a rational structure amenable to rational explanation. “Logic and physics (were understood to) have fundamental ethical implications, and ethics itself (was seen to be) wholly integrated with physics and logic”.36 Logos: understood by the Stoics as that faculty in man which enables him to think, to plan and to speak was thought to be embodied in the universe at large. Prefiguring Spinoza,37

Stoic monism38 held that “Cosmic Nature or God (the terms refer to the same thing in Stoicism) and man are related to each other at the heart of their being as rational agents”.39 For the Stoic, rational acts are acts in accord with Nature, and virtue consists of a will which is in accord with

Nature.40 Similarly, “moral evil is manifested in behaviour contrary to orthos logos – (the universal or natural law)”.41 Thus, in Stoicism, Nature is “first and foremost a normative, evaluative, or if you will, a moral principle”.42 Thus, ethics, logic and physics are:

148 Indissolubly linked together since it is one and the same reason (logos) which in dialectic binds consequential propositions to antecedents, which in nature establishes a causal nexus and which in conduct provides the basis for perfect harmony between actions…it is impossible to realize rationality independently in these three spheres.43

Alongside the influence of Platonic and Aristotelian thought,44 Stoicism reflects the tint of Cynicism.45 From Cynicism came the idea that “the real nature or physis of a man consists in his rationality”.46 By itself, this is not surprising – Plato and Aristotle would agree. However, the Cynics, who

“tried to practise a life of strict virtue,”47 invested the principle with an ascetic stringency, arguing that “a man needs nothing but physical and mental self-discipline to fulfil himself and live according to nature”.48

Thus, Cynicism established the foundation of Stoic reasoning that the so- called “externals,” things conventionally regarded as good, such as property and reputation, are irrelevant if not inimical to human flourishing.49 Resonant with the ideas of integrity and decency, which are prominent within Epictetus,50 Cynicism held man’s “only protection is his own aidos, self respect”.51 Well-established by the second century, by which point Stoicism was no longer a developing philosophy,52 the hard edge of Cynicism informed the Stoic credo that “between virtue and vice there is nothing intermediate. Just as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust”.53 Thus, for the Stoic:

149 In the life of an individual man, virtue is the sole good: such things as health, happiness,b possessions are of no account. Since virtue resides in the will, everything really good or bad in a man’s life depends only on himself. He may become poor, but what of it? He can still be virtuous. A tyrant may put him in prison, but he can still persevere in living in harmony with Nature. He may be sentenced to death, but he can die nobly like Socrates. Other men have power only over externals; virtue, which alone is truly good, rests entirely with the individual.54

Stoic Ethics

For the Stoic, “the decisive characteristic of virtue is the absolute firmness of the wise man’s rationality”.55 Thus logic and natural philosophy prepared the ground for ethics which is “the fruit of the garden”.56 Chrysippus wrote:

There is no possible or more suitable way to approach the subject of good and bad things, the virtues and happiness than from universal Nature and the management of the universe.57

For the Stoic, “the value of (everything) in the world depends upon its relationship with Nature. Accordance with Nature (was seen to) denote positive value and contrariness to Nature, the opposite”.58 Thus recognising virtue or “moral beauty” to lie in accordance with Nature, the

Stoics held “all goods (to be) equal,”59 and accessible to the responsible choice of people.

b Meaning, selfish, indulgent happiness – unlike the concept of eudaimonia, and disconnected from virtue.

150 Understanding man to be the “only natural being who has the capacity to act in a manner which fails to accord with the will of Nature,”60 the Stoics

– like Kant some centuries later61 - understood man to be a moral agent and recognised that the “achievement of good character calls for the most arduous efforts”.62

Considering that “only virtue has intrinsic worth,”63 and reasoning that virtue demanded the potentiality of vice,64 the Stoics recognised the free will and rationality of man, whom they regarded as a conscious participant in the rational mechanism of the universe. The Stoic held thus that “the character, which a man develops…is his own character, not

Nature’s (God’s)”.65 For the Stoic, a virtuous life was governed by rational principles and directed deliberately toward the perfection of a man’s individual nature.66 This position accepted that men were obliged to fulfil certain socially derived duties.67 In this regard, Stoicism recognises social and political obligations which Cynicism rejects.68

Epictetus

Epictetus was born between 50 – 60A.D at Hierapolis, 100 miles east of

Ephesus and connected to that city by a Roman road. Likely a slave by birth, Epictetus was acquired by Epaphroditus, a freedman who served first as Secretary to Nero and then to Domitian upon his accession in

69 81A.D. Epictetus describes himself in The Discourses as “a lame old man”.70 Christian sources attribute this lameness to the cruelty of a master, though not to Epaphroditus specifically. Epaphroditus permitted

151 Epictetus to attend the lectures of the Stoic, Musonius Rufus, and it was under the patronage of Musonius that Epictetus began his teaching career in Rome. Epictetus taught in Rome until Domitian banished philosophers from Italy around 95A.D, at which point Epictetus re-established his school in Nicopolis.71

Epictetus remained in Nicopolis, a large and sophisticated city, until his

72 death in 135A.D. In the context of Roman society, saturated with rivalry for wealth and repute, it is noteworthy that Epictetus was famous in his lifetime as a dedicated Stoic and teacher.

In this he contrasts radically with the immensely wealthy and powerful Seneca, who was not a practising teacher and whose Stoicism, though certainly sincere, was fully tested only in old age when Nero forced him to commit suicide. Epictetus escaped that end, but his slavish origins, chronic ill-health, exile and probably precarious income are experiences to keep in mind as one reads his often severe comments on the inability of more materially fortunate people to handle themselves with dignity and equanimity.73

This background of hardship and endurance frames the Stoicism of

Epictetus as a philosophy applicable to the profession of arms.74 But more than a philosophy of endurance, Epictetus resonates with the military ideal when he articulates a philosophy of freedom. This is not physical liberty but inner freedom. Central to his Stoicism, the idea is moral autonomy, which is expressed in other ways as integrity or self-control.75

“In our power” claims Epictetus, “are moral character and all its functions; not in our power are the body, the parts of the body,

152 possessions, parents, brothers, children, country and associates in general”.76 The concept is described by Vice Admiral James Stockdale, who relied upon Epictetus’s Stoicism during years of imprisonment and torture by the Communist North during the Vietnam War. To paraphrase

Stockdale, Epictetus:

Belittles physical harm, but this is not braggadocio. Rather, he speaks of physical harm in relation to the devastating agony of the shame of men who know in their hearts that they have failed to do their duty vis-à-vis their fellow man or God. Epictetus proclaimed a philosophy that will do you good if your child dies, or if you must die or be tortured. For Epictetus, there is no such thing as the ‘victim’ of another; you can only be a victim of yourself. It’s all in how you discipline your mind. Who is your master? He who has authority over any of the things on which you have set your heart.77

Stockdale embraced the kernel of Epictetus’s doctrine that:

Some things are up to (me. These are) those things that are in the grasp of (my) Will, (my) Free Will. (These things) are up to me, within my power, within my will, and properly subjects for my total concern and involvement. They include my opinions, my aims, my aversions, my own grief, my own joy, my judgements, my attitude about what is going on, my own good and my own evil.78

Emphasising ideas of integrity, moral autonomy and self-discipline, the thinking resonates with military ideals and the philosophy that:

The ethical man must above all remain the agent of his own fate. He must bring to bear his own reasoning powers, and he must shoulder ethical responsibility for what he chooses to do in given

153 circumstances. The notion that a soldier was ‘only following orders’ or that an individual acted in a certain way because others did is never an acceptable mode of ethical reasoning.79

Yet, Epictetan ideas of character and responsibility confront the stipulation of Australian doctrine that soldiers “subjugate (their) will” to command.80 Epictetus describes an ethic of individual responsibility, rather than passive compliance and conformance. The philosophy emancipates the individual, and reveals a larger and richer concept of duty. Stockdale says that thanks to Epictetus:

I was on a different track – certainly not an anti-military track, but to some extent an anti-organization track…. I had become a man detached – not aloof, but detached – able to throw out the book without the slightest hesitation when it no longer matched the external circumstances…. (U)ndergirding my new confidence was the realization that I had found the proper philosophy for the military arts as I practised them. The Roman Stoics coined the formula Vivere militare! – ‘Life is being a Soldier’. (The implication is plain). If you neglect your responsibilities when some severe order is laid upon you, do you not understand to what pitiful state you bring the army?81

These ideas are typical of Epictetus who contributed powerfully to

Stoicism during the final period of its evolution82 and who, along with

Aurelius, reveals “what it meant in practice to be a committed Stoic. (In his words) the theory comes alive and the dry summaries of early Stoic doctrine take on flesh and blood”.83

154 Influenced by Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic,84 Epictetus articulates a philosophy of “endurance rather than hope”.85 Primarily an ethicist,86

Epictetus “passed over the heterodox Stoics of the second and first pre-

Christian centuries…and followed the doctrine of the old Stoa”.87 He expressed philosophical creativity in the interpretation of classic Stoic texts,88 which he expected to be approached deliberately, with intent to pursue moral improvement.89

Epictetus articulates a philosophy of unwavering self-control. The idea of self-mastery, foundational and crucial to Epictetus’s Stoicism, is amplified and complemented by awareness of civic duties and responsibilities. So, Epictetus does not profess a self-obsessed philosophy, but holds that we should acknowledge duties because:

I ought not to be unfeeling like a statue, but should maintain my relations both natural and acquired, as a religious man, as a son, a brother, a father, a citizen.90

Epictetus is seen in this way to acknowledge the domain of “the appropriate” which, in Stoic philosophy includes self-regarding pursuits such as looking after one’s health and property, besides socially oriented fields such as duties and relationships.91 But to reiterate a decisive point:

Epictetus believes strongly that self-mastery is essential, and without it people will be unable to fulfil the obligations which entail from social roles. This logic informs Epictetus’ insistence upon disciplined judgement or, to use the technical Stoic term, “assents”. He believes that the properly responsible man – being a man who has mastered himself and his social

155 obligations - will not be caught off guard by an ill-disciplined or careless judgement. 92 Epictetus writes:

Even in dreams, or drunkenness, or a state of melancholy – madness, a man may not be taken unawares by the appearance of an untested sense impression. – This, says someone is beyond us. But…. a man’s judgements show him as a man.93

In this argument, Epictetus underlines the philosophy of self-mastery recalled by James Stockdale as the philosophy which sustained him through years of Vietnamese imprisonment and torture.94 Epictetus makes the case that self-mastery demands absolute control over desires and aversions, over choices, attitudes and rational judgement.

For Epictetus, self-mastery entails unwavering self-control, but the morality he conceives is theonomic.95 This means he sees moral duties as divine commands. Epictetus writes that the good man will “act as an imitator of God”.96 Expanding this logic he offers:

What greater penalty can befall the man who is uninterested and disobedient to the divine injunction than to grieve, to sorrow, to envy, in a word to have no good fortune but only misfortune. Do you not wish to free yourself from all this?

And how shall I free myself? – Have you not heard over and over again that you ought to eradicate desire utterly, direct your aversion towards the things that lie within the sphere of your moral purpose, and these things only, that you ought to give up everything, your body, your property, your reputation, your books, turmoil, office….For if once you swerve aside from this course, you are a slave, you are a subject, you have become liable to hindrance and

156 compulsion, you are entirely under the control of others. Nay, the word of Cleanthes is ready at hand, ‘Lead thou me on, O Zeus, and Destiny’. 97

Epictetus and Moral Autonomy

Freedom, an essentially contested concept,98 is the most fundamental tenet of Epictetus’ Stoicism.99 For Epictetus, freedom is entirely attitudinal.100 In this way, his philosophy is eudaimonic. This means freedom and happiness are connected in mind and reason.101 This is not a connection which fits modern understanding. Eudaimonia was the

“standard name for the ancient philosophers’ ‘goal of life’ (and) it may be translated by ‘happiness’ but it cannot mean what we mean by happiness”.102 Something of the meaning is conveyed by modern connotations of flourishing and doing admirably insofar as these terms relate to ideas of well being and moral excellence. The decisive point is that, for Epictetus, eudaimonia requires virtuous character, nothing else.103 For him, only “the mental is of absolute value…it cannot be dependent upon anything else at all, and can suffer no disturbance or injury by anything which is external to it”.104

Freedom and happiness are thus construed qua free will or autonomous moral purpose,105 or “unshakableness, purity and similar topics, but never of justice or any other cardinal virtue. In substance, all the cardinal virtues are advocated in Epictetus, in fact in places in the same terms…but they are nowhere used as a principle of division for the broad field of moral action”.106 For Epictetus, the point is that good people

157 cultivate the mentality of moral autonomy.107 He believes “the essence of the good is a certain kind of moral purpose,”108 to which everything should be “subordinate”.109 Epictetus argues that good is not connected to external or material things. “Like the Socrates of Plato’s early dialogues,

Epictetus does not impose elaborate doctrines on his audience. Rather, he exhorts them to try to know themselves, to practise self-examination, and to discover a source of goodness that is purely internal, independent of outward contingencies”.110 He writes: “if you wish any good thing, get it from yourself”.111

Freedom, for Epictetus, is “absolute mental freedom within the earthly life”.112 Epictetus describes freedom as something which is “independent and self-governing”.113 He writes:

When it is in another’s power to put hindrances in a man’s way and subject him to compulsion, say confidently that this man is not free. (But) don’t look for a deed of sale or purchase. But, if you hear him say ‘Master,’ in the centre of his being and with deep emotion, call him a slave even if twelve fasces precede him; (Fasces were the insignia of official authority, carried by lictors or attendants. Twelve was the number for a consul). And if you hear him say, “Alas! What must I suffer!’ call him a slave; and, in short, if you see him wailing, complaining, in misery, call him a slave in a toga praetexta. (The robe worn by high officials).114

This excerpt underlines Epictetus’ idea of freedom as a moral concept,115 a matter of “unimpeded volition”116 or self-mastery,117 “restricting that which depends on us to certain ‘mental events’ or movements of the

158 soul”.118 Epictetus argues that “under our control are moral purpose and all the acts of moral purpose”,119 nothing else. He is thus only concerned with “those things which are in our power under all possible circumstance and with absolute certainty. He is concerned to identify the things

(activities, behaviour) that in the course of one’s life can in no circumstances be prevented or spoiled by external factors, including other people’s interference”.120

The moral autonomy and dignity expressed by Epictetus is rendered by the term prohairesis. By this, Epictetus describes “a moral quality…not connected primarily with actions but linked to persons and their character dispositions or state of mind”.121 The thinking reflects the intellectual and eudaimonic tone of Epictetus’ ethics,122 and implies the “self- restriction,”123 which connects to the Epictetan understanding of freedom as “inner freedom”.124 Epictetus asks, “what are tragedies but…the sufferings of men who have admired external things,”125 and argues that we should train ourselves, so that our desires and aversions are unable to be frustrated.126 We should thus intend for internal objectives or states only; avoiding desire or aversion directed toward external things.127

Epictetus writes:

He is free who (has mastery of himself and thus) lives as he wills, who is subject neither to compulsion nor hindrance, nor force, whose choices are unhampered, whose desires attain their end, whose aversions do not fall into what they would avoid. (Thus it was that) Diogenes says somewhere: ‘The one sure way to secure freedom is to die cheerfully:’ and to the Persian king he writes:

159 ‘You cannot enslave the Athenian State any more than you can enslave the fish.’ ‘How so? Shall I not lay hold of them?’ ‘If you do,’ he replies, ‘they will forthwith leave you and escape like the fish. And that is true, for if you lay hold of one of them, it dies; and if these Athenians die when you lay hold of them, what good will you get from your armament?’ That is the word of a free man who has seriously examined the matter.128

Epictetus thus follows Stoic doctrine that external things could be neither good nor averse; merely indifferent.129 The meaning “good” and “bad” is restricted to the “moral sense of these words”.130 “Goods comprise the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance and the rest; while the opposites of these are evils, namely, folly, injustice, and the rest”.131 For this reason, “goodness is confined to moral excellence, and badness to the opposite of this”.132 Describing the man, born into slavery and emancipated, Epictetus offers a compelling illustration:

It is the slave’s prayer that he be set free immediately. Why? Do you think it is because he is eager to pay his money to the men who collect the five per cent tax? No, it is because he fancies that up till now he has been hampered and uncomfortable, because he has not obtained his freedom from slavery. ‘If I am set free,’ he says, ‘immediately it is all happiness. I shall pay no attention to anybody, I talk to everybody as an equal and as one in the same station in life, I go where I please.’ Then he is emancipated, and forthwith, having no place to which to go and eat, he looks for someone to flatter, for someone at whose house to dine. Next, he either earns a living by prostitution, and so endures the most dreadful things, and if he gets a manger at which to eat he has fallen into a slavery much more severe than the first; or even if he grows rich, being a

160 vulgarian he has fallen in love with a child of a girl, and is miserable, and laments, and yearns for his slavery again. ‘Why what was wrong with me? Someone else kept me in clothes and shoes, and supplied me with food, and nursed me when I was sick; I served him in only a few matters. But now, miserable man that I am, what suffering is mine, who am a slave to several instead of one. However, if I get rings on my fingers,’ he says, ‘then indeed I shall live most prosperously and happily.’ And so, first in order to get them he submits to – what he deserves! Then…the same thing over again. After that, when he…becomes a slave as he enters the senate, then he serves in the handsomest and sleekest slavery.133

Thus, exposing the shame of psychological slavery, Epictetus illustrates freedom qua mastery of one’s passions134 and moral autonomy.135 For

Epictetus, “freedom is a virtuous state of mind, desirable and to be aimed at,”136 but not directly related to the free-will problem137 which, pace

Huby,138 most thinkers ascribe to Stoicism.139

According to Epictetus, freedom comes from self-mastery, which means the refusal of things which are beyond one’s control. He argues that whatever someone admires from among the things that fall outside his moral choice (prohairesis) deliver him into slavery.140

What is important is the judgment and mental discipline to acknowledge that external things have no power over the individual’s resolve to exercise his will.141 Explaining moral weakness as “failure to see the good as it really is,”142 Epictetus holds that:

The function of the good and excellent man is to deal with his impressions in accordance with nature…. to assent to the true,

161 dissent from the false and to withhold judgment in a matter of uncertainty.143

Epictetus defines a philosophy of dignified self-control.144 Underlining the decisive theme of moral autonomy, Epictetus queries, “what is it which makes a man free from hindrance and restraint?”145 In living,

Epictetus argues that “it is the knowledge of how to live”.146 Resonant with the critical logic that what is in our power is nothing more than desire, aversion and choice,147 the philosophy is “prudential and pragmatic (intended to) determine how one can avoid failures and disappointments and how one can keep or attain an undisturbed and well- poised emotional state”.148

Rendered by prohairesis: “what is up to us,” or “in our power,”149

Epictetus articulates a view of freedom which harbours socially embedded roles and relationships150 and which resonates with the ideas of

“peace of mind, tranquility and philosophical liberation, (which are) fundamental tenets of Stoicism”.151 These ideas underpin Epictetus’ reading of volition and integrity.152

Epictetus: His Concept of Prohairesis

Epictetus develops the idea of prohairesis in a distinctive way qua “will” or “volition”:153

What persons are in terms of their mental faculties, consciousness, character, judgements, goals and desires: volition is the self, what each of us is abstracted from the body.154

162 Prohairesis thus connects to autonomy and integrity155 and to ideas of

“rational decisions about how it is appropriate to act”.156 The term recalls

Aristotle.157 But Epictetus draws a tighter line than Aristotle,158 and evolves the earlier Stoic position of prohairesis qua deliberate choice before a choice.159

For Epictetus, prohairesis is our true self160 which, unlike our physical body, can never be constrained by anything external.161 The concept of prohairesis; “rational self-determination,”162 enables Epictetus to develop his doctrine that we are free or unassailable when we exercise control over our will,163 taking account of ourselves and keeping in mind who we are as people.164 The thinking is eudaimonistic;165 “reason, developed perfectly and correctly is identical with virtue and with happiness”.166 For

Epictetus, “happiness is based solely on virtue, on intellectual right conduct and can not suffer the least increase or decrease through externals”.167 Emphasising intellectual right conduct, Epictetus underscores the distinctive Stoic idea that “virtue is a developed and trained disposition to do the right thing for the right kind of reason”.168

Epictetus illustrates the concept by imagined conversation with a tyrant:

‘I will put you in chains’. ‘What are you saying, man? Me? My leg you will put in chains, but my prohairesis not even Zeus can conquer’.169

Making stark, the contrast between the alienable leg and the inalienable self qua mind / rationality / will, “Epictetus emphasizes the mind’s capacity for autonomy to a degree that is without clear parallel in the

163 preceding Stoic tradition”.170 Emphasizing the mind’s sovereignty and the moral autonomy Stoics regard as decisive, Epictetus illuminates the logical foundation stones of the Stoic conviction that pain or external discomfort is not an evil.171 Epictetus lets us see how, faced with the impediments of ordinary life, Stoics make no big thing of these set-backs, but respond with deliberate rational self-possession.172

Recognising thus that “developed moral reasoning is a requirement of virtue”173 and that “what we choose depends on us,”174 Epictetus holds that we “should not desire things that are not under (our) control,”175 This doctrine, rejected by Berlin as “the retreat to an inner citadel,” and “a sublime form of the doctrine of sour grapes”176 is more properly a doctrine of autarchic self-mastery and self-restraint.177 The position is based upon the premise that for a rational man there is “no quality more sovereign than moral choice…everything else (is) subordinate, and this moral choice itself free from slavery and subjection”.178

Even so, Epictetus argues that we adopt objectives “in harmony with

Nature,”179 and pursue these without thinking of them as good or bad.180

Though abandoning the language of Zeno, proegmena (preferred externals), and apoproegmena (dispreferred externals),181 Epictetus continues to operate with the same concepts, emphasizing the autonomy of man and observing that earthly prosperity generally entails the sacrifice of moral worth and personal honour.182 “Materials,” says

Epictetus, “are indifferent, but the use which we make of them is not a

164 matter of indifference”.183 Wealth, for example, is not immoral but proegmena, “from which results the duty always to prefer what is more to what is less when no moral interest is violated”.184 Thus, says Epictetus,

“when someone tells you, ‘These things also are indifferent,’ do not become careless, and when someone exhorts you to be careful, do not become abject and overawed by material things”.185

In this way Epictetus does not trivialise externals, but puts them in perspective.186 In the Encheiridion we read, “ if I can get money and at the same time keep myself self-respecting and faithful and high-minded, show me the way and I will get it”.187 Life, argues Epictetus, is like a banquet:

As something is being passed around it comes to you; stretch out your hand and take a portion of it politely. It passes on; do not detain it. Or it has not come to you yet; do not project your desire to meet it, but wait until it comes in front of you.188

Underlining the hollow satisfaction which is to be derived from externals,189 Epictetus holds “the origin of sorrow is to watch for something that does not come to pass”.190 Rather, Epictetus believes “the free mind proves its control over matter and makes it into the material and means of moral action”.191 Thus, “the Stoic never strives for the possession of external goods for their own sake”.192 This logic reflects the

Stoic perspective that “the employment of reason has itself a distinct kind of value, (something beyond results, which) we value from a self- regarding standpoint”.193

165 Epictetus argues that God has “conferred upon us the gift, and with it the task, of distinguishing the values of external things and of directing our action according to these distinctions”.194 Thus, attention toward externals has value as a rational operation of the will, but not on account of the external result.195 Much like in dice, the dice are indifferent but the players can “make a careful and skilful use of what has fallen”.196

We must trust God and act rationally on the basis of truth or fact,197 combining moral indifference about externals with care, circumspection and rationality.198 Epictetus argues, “watch over yourself as over an enemy;”199 “is what appears really good or bad as it appears?”200 Here,

Epictetus is interested in logic201 and concerned with “proof against being led into error and with wariness and in general with assents”.202 This is for the reason that “all moral activity is the product of an assent”203 and significant because, despite the human faculty for virtue,204 “what impels the person to virtue is not an infallible inner voice but the knowledge of truth which must first be acquired”.205 Hence, “the purpose of philosophical education is to form the prohairesis according to Nature.

Moral perfection and with it, also blissful happiness, consists in desiring, willing (acting) and judging according to Nature”.206 “Virtue is actually something simple lying in the human being himself, but (it) can only be attained through constant work, self-discipline”207 and self-examination.208

Without skill in reasoning and the detection of fallacies based on knowledge of logic, the Stoics acknowledged one will assent to

166 impressions when there is a good reason not to – or withdraw an assent which may properly be given.209 Illustrating the importance of assent,

Epictetus held:

Moral accountability is - primarily connected with the use of our impressions rather than with our actions. We are morally responsible because it is in our assenting and choosing that our character and dispositions are reflected.210

The virtuous man is uncompromising, commanding himself “so that even in dreams, or drunkenness, or a state of melancholy-madness (he) may not be taken unawares by the appearance of an untested sense- impression”.211 This idealistic argument underlines the attachment of moral responsibility to choice, or assent to appearances.212 “The stress in

Epictetus is on the point that it is oneself who chooses, and that one is not necessitated in one's choice”.213 One should however, be informed by logic which enables a proper interpretation, so that we might assent to what is true and withhold assent from what is obscure or false.214

Arguing thus that “God has commended (us) to (ourselves), and He has subjected to (us) alone (our individual) moral purpose,”215 Epictetus challenges us to command ourselves, to make deliberate and self- disciplined decisions. “Consider,” he asks, “at what price you sell your freedom of will. If you must sell it, man, at least do not sell it cheap”.216

The point is that only oneself can harm one’s prohairesis; when “I” is located “in flesh or externals”.217 Epictetus says, “remember this – that if

167 you are going to honour anything at all outside the sphere of your moral purpose, you have destroyed your moral purpose”.218

For this reason, prohairesis – which has some analogue to desire - must be trained; conditioned to choices which are “up to us” and independent of externals.219 By training in such proper choices, we learn to make our prohairesis “free”:220 acquiring the self-mastery to approach everything in good conscience, with a morally autonomous inner disposition,221 “both cautiously and confidently at the same time”.222

Examining the paradox of caution and confidence, Epictetus explains that people confuse objects of fear with objects of confidence.223 Arguing that we should “turn around what frightens (us) to see what it really is”,224

Epictetus explains the formation of judgement to be something we can control. For this reason, judgement belongs to the sphere of moral purpose, and should thus be approached with caution.225 We should show confidence in relation to things beyond the domain of moral purpose.226

This logic illuminates “the basic tenet of Epictetus’ ethics: to judge what is in our power and what is not”.227

Accepting only prohairesis, qua “moral choice, moral purpose (or) moral character” to be within our power,228 Epictetus dismisses worldly possessions, offices and honours as delusive.229

Why, look you, no one is afraid of Caesar himself, but he is afraid of death, exile, loss of property, prison, disenfranchisement. Nor

168 does anyone love Caesar himself, unless in some way Caesar is a person of great merit.230

The man, “strong in moral purpose” is not deluded by “offices and honours. When anyone tries to terrify him by means of these things he says, ‘Go to, look for children; they are scared by masks; but I know they are made of earthenware and have nothing inside”.231 The principle is that we should pursue self-mastery or inner freedom,232 distinguishing things which are within our control and things which are beyond our control.

Externals, being beyond our control, should be a matter of indifference and thus approached with confidence. For Epictetus, confidence in the face of earthly challenges – even death – “is the result of a proper philosophical life, of which Socrates is an exemplum”.233

“Socrates was considered by Epictetus to be the martyr of freedom”.234

This was “freedom reduced to virtue”,235 and quite different from physical liberty since “not even a man of authority is free if he has to do something against his will and lives under psychological or moral pressure”.236

Socrates exemplified the unhampered man, a free personality who maintained his principles and suffered no harm, because he bore his fate in noble spirit.237 Recalling Cleanthes prayer: “Lead thou me on, O Zeus and Destiny / To that goal long ago to me assigned,”238 we see in Socrates a free man, one who acquired freedom by destroying the infatuation with mere physical liberty and giving up everything beyond his control.239

169 Socrates serves as an example because he preserved by all means, “the man of honour and principle that he was”.240 Detached from morally indifferent externals, he found freedom in an inner space “entirely his own…more securely shielded from outside interference than any worldly home could ever be”.241 Socrates thus exemplifies Epictetan principles achieving inner moral freedom by self-mastery and the elimination of desires.

Epictetus and Moral Obligation in Society

For Epictetus, integrity extends beyond our obligations to ourselves to entail “respect, cooperation, justice and kindliness with respect to every human being one encounters”.242 Epictetus thus acknowledges the obligations and civil duties which attach to us as people in society,243 and argues that we must recognise proper duties – even if they are unpleasant.

So he writes:

Do you think that Menoeceus (who gave his life to save Thebes) derived but little good when he died… Ho there man, did he not maintain the patriot that he was, the high-minded man, the man of fidelity, the man of honour? And had he lived on, would he not have lost all of these? Would he not have acquired the character of the coward, the ignoble man, the disloyal, the lover of his own life? 244

This evokes his essential Stoicism. For the Stoic “befitting acts are those which reason prevails with us to do (such as performing duties), honouring one’s parents, brothers and country…. Some duties are

170 incumbent unconditionally, others in certain circumstances”.245 There is the sense of right and appropriate action which distinguishes the wise or virtuous man, and which encloses “the range of actions which is natural to man as he matures and his social awareness increases”.246

Hence, Epictetus asks us to remember that we are citizens of the universe who should “think in terms of the entire moral community of which (we) are a part”.247 Epictetus is mindful that we are embedded in social contexts, where moral obligations and duties are inescapable.248 He writes:

Consider who you are. To begin with, a Man; that is one who has no quality more sovereign than moral choice, but keeping everything else subordinate to it, and this moral choice itself free from slavery and subjection. Consider therefore, what those things are from which you are separated by virtue of the faculty of reason. You are separated from wild beasts, you are separated from sheep. In addition to this you are a citizen of the world, and a primary part of it, not one of the parts destined for service, but one of primary importance, for you possess the faculty of understanding the divine administration of the world, and of reasoning upon the consequences thereof. What then is the profession of a citizen? To treat nothing as a matter of private profit, but to act like the foot or the hand which, if they had the faculty of reason and understood the constitution of nature, would never exercise choice or desire in any other way but by reference to the whole. Hence, the philosophers well say that if the good and excellent man knew what was going to happen, he would help on the process…. Next bear in mind that you are a Son… (and) know also that you are a Brother…(and) that you sit in the town council. If you are young,

171 remember that you are young; if old remember that you are an elder; if a father, remember that you are a father. For each of these designations, when duly considered, always suggests acts that are appropriate to it.249

Recognising the duties and commitments attached to social roles,250

Epictetus argues that “we cannot be anything worthwhile unless we consistently act in accordance with the standards pertaining to the roles of our choice”.251

In this way, Epictetus “illuminates the functionalism of Stoic ethics

(acknowledging that) proper function can be seen to be rooted not only in a person’s nature, but also in the specific relationships and jobs which define the person one is”.252 The Stoic commitment to virtue thus informs one’s social role, affording a basis upon which people can relate properly within the social milieu – without self-interest and iniquity.253 “Only the virtuous person can be relied on to do what is right, and this will not be at the expense of others (and it will not be by virtue of ‘place in society’)”.254 Only personal virtue is significant. Besides personal virtue, social relationships are immaterial. Yet the Stoic was not callous or unfeeling255 as Nietzsche assumed.256 For, whilst the Stoic aims to live virtuously and thus “in accord with Nature,” this is not an aim achieved by relinquishing social obligation, but by aspiration to virtue in the way life is lived.257 Stoics aspire to live their socially embedded lives well, for example, as Stoic military officers. But, such an aspiration does not entail subjugation of the will, as Australian doctrine prescribes.

172 Sherman explains this logic by reference to etiquette-bound acts. We might not, she argues:

Feel in our heart what we show on our face or fully endorse the practices to which the social conventions bind us. The commitment is to outward conduct, to what we show and display to others. In etiquette we allow for a gap between candour and performance…. appearances sometimes matter for their own sake. The outer aesthetic is the thing, and it is recognised as essential to the mutual ritual.258

Ideas of etiquette then, let us see social ritual as mutual politesse, a shared ritual contained by social boundaries. Etiquette enables social interaction to be structured and intelligible, and for people to demarcate between public and private personae. The idea of etiquette illuminates the relationship between private virtue and public obligation, for it is mistaken and likely impossible, to be virtuous by standing aside from social relationships and commitments. 259 Indeed:

For Epictetus, one of the things that Stoicism teaches us is a sense of our own limitations, and the limitations that our circumstances put on us and our ability to change things. Our aspiration to virtue develops within the social roles that we have and that we cannot romantically think away.260

Epictetus offers the example of the Senator and Stoic, Helvidius Priscus, to illustrate this point. Vespasian tells him not to enter the Senate.

Helvidius responds that, whilst Vespasian can strike him from the rolls of the Senate, so long as he is a Senator it is his duty to attend Senate meetings. Vespasian tells Helvidius not to speak. Helvidius argues that, as

173 a Senator it is his duty to speak and to say what he thinks. Vespasian tells

Helvidius that if he speaks he will be executed. Helvidius responds that then it is his part to die – but it is not his part to die in sorrow, neither to recoil from duty.261 The point is that we must preserve our proper character as rational people, entwined within the social fabric.262 The reasoning accords with the democratic ideals of a liberal society which, whilst concerned with ideas of moral character, aspires “not to interfere with its members’ ‘inner life,’ but rather only to limit their external conduct”.263

Epictetus encourages us to be like the red thread sewn into the hem of the toga praetexta, “which stands out, conspicuous in it…as a good example to the rest”.264 We should play our part, as a thread which goes to make up the garment, but play it as well as we might.265 Thus, Epictetus acknowledges:

The rational and the irrational are different for different persons, precisely as good and evil and the profitable and the unprofitable are different for different persons. For determining the rational and the irrational we employ our estimates of what is in keeping with one’s own character.266

This is an approach connected to the earliest Stoic doctrines where the wise man was compared to “a good actor who, if called upon to take the part of a Thersites or of an Agamemnon, will impersonate them both becomingly”.267 Epictetus reiterates the logic:

174 Remember that you are an actor in a play, the character of which is determined by the Playwright: if he wishes you to play the part of a beggar, remember to act this role adroitly; and so if your role be that of a cripple, an official or a layman. For this is your business, to play admirably the role assigned you; but the selection of that role is Another’s. 268

Conclusion

“Stoic ethics and especially Epictetan ethics still have a practical and pedagogical value”.269 Epictetus articulates an uncompromising philosophy of self-mastery. His assertion of individual integrity resonates with military culture, whilst yet confronting military dogma. This is for the reason that military culture, like ancient society, is concerned with duty and obligation, and structured by conventions which circumscribe ideas of individual integrity and moral autonomy.

The punctilios of “dress, the way you wear your hair, posture, language, what one can say and what not, and in particular what it is appropriate for one to do or not to do,”270 were inescapable for Epictetus. The same dogmas define military society and doctrine. But, though these ideas striate the surface, Epictetus articulates a philosophy which reveals that more than playing a part, being good demands moral autonomy.271 This obligation is the same for everybody, relative to the sort of person one is.

“There is not a single set of rules which define, let alone decide, how one should act which hold for everybody”.272 The contrastive idea of

175 Australian doctrine that soldiers subjugate their will to command seems ethically precarious.

Perfused with ideas of “natural law and natural equality,”273 the Stoicism of Epictetus evokes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which, in

Article One, proclaims that all people, being endowed with reason and conscience, are free and equal in dignity and rights.274 Epictetus thus articulates a profound philosophy, one which calls the moral claims and principles of Australian doctrine into question.

Epictetus enables us to see how positions in the military command chain entail neither moral disenfranchisement nor moral primacy. Epictetus suggests how those in the profession of arms might fulfil obligations which they perceive to be a public duty, whilst maintaining an undiminished moral autonomy. In this way, Epictetus recalls the hoplite ideal. Fighting as moral equals275 hoplites were social peers who shared the burden of civic obligation. They fought as men of integrity, committed to a cause they believed to be just; not because they were compelled.

Informed by Epictetus and framed by the enduring hoplite metaphor, discussion in the following chapter examines Australian doctrine.

Decisive themes involve ideas of obedience and coercion.

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ENDNOTES: CHAPTER FOUR

1 Schmidt, (1891) p. 7 2 MacCunn, (1906) p. 309 3 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1.1098b.11-13 4 MacCunn, (1906) p. 309 Sherman, (2004) p. 51: Sherman describes how, for Aristotle, “externalities may impede not only one’s chances of happiness (i.e. one’s chances of complete and realized virtuous activity), but one’s chances of goodness (i.e. one’s chances of responding and deciding hos dei – in a way that is appropriate now.) (Parenthesis in the original). 5 MacIntyre, (1967) p. 100 6 MacIntyre, (1967) pp. 103, 104 Schmidt, (1891) p. 1 7 Inwood and Gerson, (1997) pp. 103, 110 8 Russell, (1995) p. 260 Saunders, (1966) p. 59 Berlin, (2000) p. 211 9 Inwood and Gerson, (1997) pp. 107, 108 10 Russell, (1995) pp. 265-266, 267, 268 Saunders, (1966) p. 59 Gill, (2006) passim 11 Russell, (1995) p. 260 12 Russell, (1995) p. 260 13 Kamtekar, (2004) p. 460fn, 477, 483 Long, (1968) p. 335 Long and Sedley, (1995) p. 400 Long, (2004) p. 48 MacCunn (1906) pp. 308 – 309: MacCunn explains that Aristotle accords a greater weight to externals than the Stoics. Aristotle recognises the “resources, equipment (and) instruments without which the virtues would never come to birth…. It is impossible, or at least not easy, to act nobly without some furniture or fortune”. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 10. 1178a.9 – 25 Benn, (1902) p. 291 White, (1979) pp. 146, 148 14 MacIntyre, (1967) p. 100 Sherman, (2005) p. 30 15 White, (1979) pp. 144: “The historical break conventionally marked by the deaths of Alexander the Great in 323 and Aristotle in 322 has long discouraged the drawing of lines of influence from the Classical to the Hellenistic period”. 16 Russell, (1995) p. 261 17 MacIntyre, (1967) pp. 100 - 101 Erler, (2007) p. 99 18 Long, (2004) pp. 68, 70, 71, 98, 192 19 Russell, (1995) p. 261 Erler, (2007) pp. 99-100: Erler affirms Russell’s logic here, describing how, in discourse II.I, Epictetus helps us to understand how Socrates offered a paradigm Stoics might follow. 20 Pettigrove, (2004) p. 198 21 MacCunn, (1904) p. 193 22 MacCunn, (1904) p. 193 23 White, (1979) p. 146 24 Clark, (1940) pp. 50, 51, 52

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MacIntyre, (1967) pp. 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 Long, (1974) pp. 107, 109, 113, 115 Russell, (1995) p. 276 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 43, 200, 204 Morgan, (1943) p. 115 Laing, (1903) p. 64 Stoops, 1919) p. 20 Benn, (1902) pp. 284, 290, 299 Stockdale, (1993) p. 4 25 Russell, (1995) p. 275 26 MacIntyre, (1967) p. 105: MacIntyre explains that this logic follows from the Stoic conviction that human life proceeds through an eternally predetermined cycle to which human actions should abide. Russell, (1995) pp. 261, 262: Russell explains what he describes as the Stoic idea of cosmic determinism. The divine Logos, who was also a beneficent Providence, ordained the course of nature. Long (1970-71) p. 85: The Stoics, explains Long, sought to live consistently with or according to Nature (capitalised to indicate the idea of cosmic nature). This idea was captured by expressions such as “life according to reason,” and “life according to virtue”. Equally, ideas of “happiness” are seen to have the same connotation. 27 Epictetus, Discourses 4. 8. 12 28 MacIntyre, (1967) p. 106: citing Diogenes Laertius, 7. 89: Expanding this idea, MacIntyre holds that virtue was to be sought “only for its own sake” (Emphasis in the original). States such as pleasure, pain, hope, desire, and fear were best disregarded as the Stoics sought to “cultivate a passionless absence of desire and disregard of pleasure and pain…called apathy”. (Emphasis in the original). Epictetus, Discourses 2.9.1-7: In this discourse, Epictetus describes how man is distinguished by rationality. He writes, “When we act pugnaciously, and injuriously, and angrily, and rudely, to what level have we degenerated? To the level of wild beasts”. He goes on to say that such behaviour destroys the “profession” (read essence or rational nature) of man. 29 Lindsay, (1920) p. 428: Making this point, Lindsay explains that Stoic ethics are not based on the “needs of the individual,” but on “the demands of the supreme law”. This logic sets up a tension between individuality and individual responsibility. Frede, (2007) p. 165: Frede helps to explain this tension, writing that “what makes a piece of behaviour (presupposing individual choice) a good and fitting action it is the right thing to do and done for the right reasons”. This is underpins what he calls “the universal imperative”. Frede who describes choice based upon what sort of person one is, and the role one is expected to fulfil further illuminates the idea of individual responsibility. 30 MacIntyre, (1967) p. 107 Russell, (1995) pp. 269-270: citing Aurelius 31 Long, (1974) p. 107 32 Long, (1974) p. 118: Long explains that this division was (at p. 119) “For the purposes of expounding their system”. Also on p. 119, he describes the Stoic idea of ethics as “practical not merely theoretical”. Clark, (1940) p. 62: Clark articulates also, the “three parts of (Stoic) philosophic argument. One part of it concerns physics, another ethics and the third, logic”. 33 Long, (1974) p. 119: citing Diogenes Laertius Clark, (1940) p. 53: citing Diogenes Laertius 34 Long, (1970-71) pp. 90, 91 Schofield, (2006) p. 236 35 Russell, (1995) p. 260: Russell describes Stoicism as emotionally narrow and “in a certain sense fanatical; but it also contains religious elements of which the world (was) in need, and which the (earlier Greek philosophers) seemed unable to supply”.

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Laing, (1903) p. 62: Laing describes the “Stoic ideal which, with all its narrowness of conception, still contained the germ of an infinite Ethical possibility”. In contrast to what he describes as the Epicurean “travesty,” Laing describes how Stoicism set the foundation for a new era of ethical and artistic contemplation which came to be played out in the artistic metaphors of Christian art and Byzantine, Lombard and Gothic architecture. 36 Long, (1974) p. 119: Long goes on to explain the subtle and complex inter-relation of these ideas. He writes that, in one sense, “the practical goal of ‘living well’ may be said to make physics and logic subordinate in Stoicism to ethics”. But, he acknowledges that in the broadest sense “ethics informs all parts of Stoic philosophy” whilst being, at the same time, a sub-division of the other parts. Long and Sedley, (1995) p. 344, 56.A. Citing Diogenes Laertius 7.84, who describes the Stoic division of philosophy into logic, physics and ethics. Kidd, (1955) p. 187: Kidd describes the internal unity and consistency of Stoic philosophy. He explains the particular relation between Stoic physics and ethics which was significant as a reference point for considerations of happiness, and observes that though the Stoics “laid down that ethics should be taught before physics, in practice they always prefaced moral questions with some physical explanation”. 37 Spinoza, (1955) pp. 48-51, 55: (The Ethics) concerning God qua substance, particularly propositions vii – xi, xv Long, (1974) p. 107: Observes Stoic influence upon Spinoza and Kant: pp. 165-166, 185, 208 MacCunn (1904) p. 190: MacCunn observes similarity between Stoicism, Spinoza and Kant. Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 200 38 Clark, (1940) pp. 56, 59, 66, 87, 97 Bobzein, (2005) pp. 16, 17, 30, 31, 45 - 46 Long, (1968) p. 332 Long, (1970-71) p. 93 Long, (1974) p. 152 Long, (2004) pp. 155, 163 Russell, (1995) pp 262, 264 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 134, 202 MacCunn, (1904) p. 197 39 Long, (1974) pp. 108: Long goes on (p. 111) explain that the idea of “the cosmos as ‘one’ was asserted by Zeno, and the ‘unity of being,’ defended by the Stoics, goes back through the Megarians to Parmenides”. Later, (p. 148) Long explains that the Stoic idea of nature is “not merely a physical power causing stability and change; it is also something endowed with rationality par excellence. That which holds the world together is a supreme rational being, God, who directs all events for purposes which are necessarily good”. Long, (1968) p. 332: Long explains that “like Aristotle, the Stoics saw evidence of purpose in the regularity of natural phenomena and organic life, but unlike Aristotle they attributed its cause to the conscious agency of God…who permeates all things in virtue of the pneuma they contain”. In order to be purposive, this force was necessarily rational. Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 19: Bonhoffer argues that “God is reason, knowledge, orthos logos, and consequently we humans must recognise our true good in our rationality, which distinguishes us from the beasts”. 40 Epictetus, Discourses 1.6.12 - 22 Diogenes Laertius, 7.107 Long, (1970-71) pp. 85, 94 Long, (1974) pp. 168, 179 Long and Sedley, (1995) pp. 352, 365 Russell, (1995) pp. 262, 273 Inwood and Gerson, (1997) p. 191

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Saunders, (1966) p. 111 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 21 Gahringer, (1953) p. 300 DeBruin, (1995) p. 2: Cites Donagan who asserts Stoicism as foundational to the rationalist tradition of moral philosophy. 41 Long, (1968) p. 334 42 Long, (1970-71) pp. 88, 91 43 Long, (1974) p. 120: Citing Émile Bréhier, Histoire de Philosophie (Paris 1931) 1. p. 299 44 Long, (1974) pp. 112, 113, 121, 122, 124, 151, 184, 226 45 Clark, (1940) p. 50 Long, (1974) pp. 109, 110, 234 Russell, (1995) p. 260 46 Long, (1974) p. 110: Long goes on to explain (p. 111) that this idea was at the root of Stoic indifference to externals and the conviction that virtue was the only secure foundation for happiness. MacCunn (1904) p. 190: Explains that “if the moral life (was) to be set upon a sure basis, it must be through the enlightenment of the will – the will which, to Socrates as to the Stoics…meant the reason of the individual”. Here, the Cynics came to exert the primacy of rational personal conviction over knowledge. But, in all these traditions, there was one point of concurrence, that being, “that in things moral, it is the spirit that profiteth…’men are rich and poor not in their establishments, but in their souls’”. 47 Clark, (1940) p. 51 48 Long, (1974) p. 110 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 166: Bonhoffer amplifies this idea, noting that the “Stoics declared the life according to nature to be the moral goal of the human being”. He goes on to explore the Stoic thinking that man enjoyed a natural predisposition toward the good, arguing (p. 167) that the “human being is by nature noble, high-minded, faithful, chaste and modest, sociable, loving, (and) concerned about doing good”. 49 MacCunn, (1904) p. 191 Schofield, (2006) p. 241 50 Long, (2004) pp. 130, 140 51 Schofield, (2007) p. 76 52 Long, (1974) p. 115 53 Diogenes Laertius, 7. 127 Inwood and Gerson, (1997) p. 201: Inwood and Gerson confirm the Stoic perspective that “there is nothing in between virtue and voce” and that “a man must be either just or unjust”. 54 Russell, (1995) p. 262 Saunders, (1966) p. 111: Citing Clement, Saunders notes similarly; “Zeno the Stoic thinks the end to be living according to virtue”. Diogenes is cited for his observation that “Zeno was the first…to define the end as ‘life in agreement with nature’ which is the same as a virtuous life”. Long, (1970-71) p. 96: “The Stoics gave happiness as one of their descriptions of ‘the goal’. The Stoics held the pursuit of the goal referred to by the expressions 'acting according to reason', 'virtue' and 'human nature' to be a moral imperative, a command of Nature (or God)”. The thinking was eudaimonistic. Long, (1968) p. 333: The Stoics asserted that moral badness was the sole evil. Long, (2004) p. 82: Exploring the Socratic elenchus in Epictetus education agenda, Long writes that “Stoic doctrine (teaches) that conventional goods such as health or wealth are not strictly good nor their opposites strictly bad”. Kamtekar, (2004) p. 484: Kamtekar observes that, for the Stoic, “only virtue is good and only vice evil”. White, (1979) pp. 145: White acknowledges that, for Zeno, the particular essence of man is reason. White goes on (p. 149) to describe how this idea informed Stoic thinking that the only good was virtue, “namely a certain state of the soul”.

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55 Long and Sedley, (1995) p. 385 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 19: Bonhoffer explains how, for the Stoic, “God is reason, knowledge, orthos logos, and consequently…humans must recognise true good in (the) rationality, which distinguishes (humans) from beasts”. Sherman, (2004) p. 27: Sherman illustrates how Stoicism differs from Aristotelianism in this regard, explaining that, for Aristotle, virtuous choice entails “bringing to alogon echon (the non rational part of the soul) into harmony with the rational part (to logon echon) More specifically, the emotions which motivate us cannot be hidden from our understanding and awareness”. (Parenthesis in the original) 56 Long, (1974) p. 179 57 Long, (1974) p. 179: Citing Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis in Pohlenz, Moralia 58 Long, (1974) pp. 179, 189 Long, (1970-71) p. 89: Long describes the Stoic goal of living as “living in accordance with experience of Natural events”. Saunders, (1966) p. 111: Citing Cicero, Saunders observes “Zeno…who was the originator and first head of the Stoics, set forth that the end of goods is the morally honourable life, and that this is derived from the recommendation of nature”. 59 Diogenes Laertius, 7. 100-102 60 Long, (1974) p. 182 Long, (1970-71) pp. 100, 101 61 Gass, (1994) p. 53 62 Long, (1974) p. 182 63 Long, (1974) p. 192 Kidd, (1955) p. 181: “The Stoics maintained that virtue was the only good; everything else, therefore, was not good”. 64 Long, (1974) p. 182 65 Long, (1974) p. 183 66 Long, (2004) p. 146 67 Long, (1974) pp. 183, 184 Kidd, (1955) esp. pp.181, 182, 183, 188 68 Schofield, (2007) p. 83 MacCunn, (1904) p. 193 69 Long, (2004) p. 10 Stockdale, (1995) p. 224 Sherman, (2005) p. 14 70 Discourses, 1.17.20 71 Russell, (1995) p. 267 Long, (2004) p. 10 Stockdale, (1995) p. 224 72 Long, (2004) p. 11 73 Long, (2004) p. 11 74 Stockdale, (1995) p. 21 Stockdale, (1993) pp. 3, 6 75 Long, (2004) pp. 112, 113 76 Sherman, (2005) p. 27 77 Stockdale, (1993) pp. 3, 4, 5 French, (2003) p. 66: French holds similarly that “according to Stoicism, the one thing we always control is our own will. And it is by our will that we decide how to respond to events in our lives…the way we allow…fate to affect our inner selves is entirely up to us”. 78 Stockdale, (1993) p. 7 79 Gabriel, (1982) p. 27 80 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 81 Stockdale, (1993) p. 6 82 Clark, (1940) p. 52 Mason, (2007) Introduction to Scaltsas and Mason, p. 1

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83 Long, (1974) p. 115 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 199: Reading Epictetus, Bonhoffer finds, “real pleasure…no dry analysis, no scholastic distinctions, no empty declamations, but everywhere…the warm pulsation of life and earnest personal conviction”. 84 Long, (2004) p. 98 Long, (1974) p. 234 Gill, (2006) p. 47 85 Russell, (1995) p. 269 86 Bobzein, (2005) p. 5 Mason, (2007) Introduction to Scaltsas and Mason, p. 3 87 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 4 88 Cooper, (2007) p. 11 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 23 89 Cooper, (2007) pp. 15, 19 90 Discourses 3.2.4 91 Long, (2004) p. 115 92 Long, (2004) p. 116 Gill, (2006) p. 42 93 Discourses 3.2.5, 3.2.12 94 Discourses 3.2.1 -7 95 Long, (2004) pp. 181, 184, 185, 186 - 188 96 Epictetus, Discourses, 2.2.13 97 Epictetus, Discourses, 4.4.32-34 98 Gallie, (1955-6) pp. 171-172 99 Epictetus, Discourses 4.1: Of Freedom Bobzein, (2005) p. 341 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 113 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 201: “Epictetus’ philosophy is a philosophy of freedom”. 100 Long, (2004) pp. 27, 222 101 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 34, 200, 201 Bobzein, (2005) p. 338 Long, (2004) pp. 190–196 102 Long, (2004) p. 190 103 Sherman, (2005) p 27 Haidt, (2006) pp. 82, 87 104 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 201, 202 105 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) pp. 112, 113, 125, 126 106 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 31 Long, (2004) p. 33: Long explains, “the early Stoics had made an elaborate classification of ‘virtues’ and other ‘values’. Epictetus takes no interest in such technicalities. He uses the standard word for virtue (arête) sparingly…(but instead uses) words that signify integrity, freedom, courage, sturdiness and conscientiousness”. 107 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 45, 46, 47 108 Epictetus, Discourses 1.29.1 109 Epictetus, Discourses 2.10.1 110 Long, (2004) p. 92. Long underlines Epictetus’ insistence on self-mastery. At p. 139, he offers, “(t)he whole point at issue is personal integrity”. 111 Epictetus, Discourses 1.29.3 - 4 112 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 35: The point is amplified by Bonhoffer on p. 202 where he argues that peace and freedom are attained only by the eradication of “passionate desire” earthly goods and pleasures. 113 Discourses 4.1.56 114 Discourses 4.1.56 - 58 115 Bobzein, (2005) p. 342 116 Long, (2004) p. 119 117 Bobzein, (2005) p. 340

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Epictetus, Discourses 1.12. 9–10: 4.1.1 118 Bobzein, (1998) p. 160 119 Epictetus, Discourses 1. 22. 10 - 11 120 Bobzein, (2005) p. 332 121 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) pp. 113. The idea is further explored at p. 129, where Dragona-Monachou underlines the Epictetan concept of “freedom as a moral quality” something “independent and self-governing” and “the greatest good”. Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 36: Bonhoffer writes that “the freedom which so often inspires Epictetus’ praise is…anything but unbridled licence; it is rather restraint in god,” an idea of self-mastery and control. 122 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 18 123 Bobzein, (2005) p. 331 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) pp. 114, 130 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 36 124 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) pp. 120-121 125 Epictetus, Discourses 1.4.26 126 Cooper (2007) p. 16 Crivelli, (2007) p. 21 Sorabji, (2007) p. 91 127 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 68 Cooper (2007) p. 16 Sorabji, (2007) p. 91 128 Epictetus, Discourses 4.1.1 – 4.1.27-33 129 Long and Sedley, (1995) p. 357 Epictetus, Encheiridion 27 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 37 Kidd, (1955), p. 181 Kamtekar, (2004) p. 484 130 Long and Sedley, (1995) p. 374 131 Diogenes Laertius, 7. 102 132 Long and Sedley, (1995) p. 345 133 Epictetus, Discourses 4.1. 33 – 40 134 Bobzein, (2005) p. 343 135 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 126 136 Bobzein, (2005) p. 342 137 Bobzein, (2005) p. 13: Bobzein writes, “The development of the concept of the will is…clearly related to the problem of determinism and freedom. However, as I see it, the development of the concept of the will did not spring from the discussion of early Stoic determinism and freedom. This is not to deny that the early Stoic concept of assent and in its wake, the Epictetan concept of prohairesis, are essential both for the development of the concept of the will and for the problem of the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility”. 138 Huby, (1967) p. 358 139 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 120 Long and Sedley, (1995) p. 392: Long and Sedley explain the free will problem, describing the Stoic world as one “governed by a fate which predetermines every detail of every world cycle”. Ground in logic and physics, this determinism would seem to nullify individual ethical choice – or free will. The Stoics argue otherwise believing that within this predestined world cycle the responsibility of the individual is to live willingly and to fulfil the role assigned to the best of our ability. 140 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) pp. 129-130 141 Epictetus, Discourses, 2. 16. 27 – 29 142 Long and Sedley, (1995) p. 375 143 Discourses 3.3.2 144 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 129 145 Discourses 4.1.63

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146 Discourses 4.1.63 147Discourses 1. 1.7 – 12, 4.1.66 – 82 Encheiridion, 1 148 Bobzein, (2005) p. 333 Long, (2004) p. 91: Epictetus, explains Long, “tries to engage his audience by means of everyday terms such as desire, purpose, freedom and happiness, with a minimal reference to esoteric theory. His lessons are dialectical lessons – invitations to the audience to examine themselves,” in order to determine how to overcome distress and frustration in life. 149 Gill, (2006) pp. 47, 48 150 Annas, (2007) p. 148 151 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) pp. 115, 124 152 Long, (2004) pp. 210-232 153 Long, (2004) pp. 34, 160, 207, 220 154 Long, (2004) p. 28 155 Long, (2004) p. 209 156 Sorabji, (2007) p. 87 Long, (2004) p. 212: Long describes how Epictetus (like Aristotle) connects prohairesis to “the things which are up to us,” describing the idea as “the requirement to make correct use of our impressions. How we use them is up to us, because it falls within the purely internal domain of judgment, assent and impulse”. Long notes that Aristotle adopted the term to “signify what he called ‘the deliberated desire of things that are up to us…(a) desirous intellect or intellectual desire, and a sort of starting point for action as a human being’”. Cooper, (2007) p. 12: Cooper writes that Epictetus “uses the Aristotelian term prohairesis (considered choice, decision, commitment),” albeit with a narrower Stoic perspective. MacCunn (1904) p. 190: MacCunn illuminates the fundamental place of prohairesis, writing that, “if the moral life is to be set upon a sure basis, it must be through the enlightenment of the will – the will which, to Socrates as to the Stoics…meant the reason of the individual”. 157 Sorabji, (2007) p. 87 Long, (2004) p. 212 158 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1.1214b6 – 1214b11: Aristotle writes “First then about these things we must enjoin every one that has power to live according to his own choice [ed: prohairesis] to set up for himself some object for the good life to aim at (whether honour or reputation or wealth or culture), with reference to which he will then do all his acts, since not to have one’s life organised in view to some end is a mark of folly”. The ideas of prohairesis qua deliberate and externally-focused choice illuminate difference between Aristotle and Epictetus in this regard. Living without this external focus is seen by Aristotle to be folly. (Parenthesis in the original). Sherman, (2004) p. 57: Sherman explains that, for Aristotle, prohairesis is a central idea of character, which is revealed by individual choices. She continues (p. 80) to describe the Aristotle’s rather prudential idea of prohairesis as “a taking, but not taking simply, but taking one thing over another…deliberating about what is better or worse”. In this way, prohairesis is “distinguished from weaker notions of preference”. But it is not so confined as the Epictetan concept of self-mastery. Sorabji, (2007) p. 91 159 Sorabji, (2007) p. 93 160 Sorabji, (2007) p. 87 Long, (2004) pp. 28: Long describes prohairesis as “volition,” or “will”. He says, “the crucial idea is that volition is what persons are in terms of their mental faculties, consciousness, character, judgements, goals and desires: volition is the self, what each of us is, as abstracted from the body”. 161 Long, (2004) p. 227 162 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 19

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163 Crivelli, (2007), p. 22 Long, (2004) p. 171 164 Frede, (2007) p. 154 Crooks, (1913) p. 338 165 Bobzein, (2005) p. 333 Rist, (1977) p. 161 166 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 19 Long, (2004) p. 68: Long explains the Socratic foundations of Stoic eudaimonism, holding that “the Stoics’ hardest and most distinctive thesis was that genuine and complete happiness requires nothing except moral virtue,” an argument made with reference to Socrates’ fortitude and calm at the time of his trial. 167 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 19, 20 168 Annas (1995) p. 247: Annas, (1995) p. 247: Annas explains that the Stoics held that “virtue is sufficient for happiness,” and amplifies this reasoning, noting that, for the Stoics, “virtue is a skill (techne)…a developed and trained disposition to do the right thing for the right kind of reason, and in calling it a skill the Stoics are identifying this disposition with the intellectual ability at its basis”. 169 Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1.24 Epictetus, Discourses 1.29.4-8: Here, Epictetus illuminates the prison metaphor, describing “the essence of good (as) a certain kind of moral purpose”. There is the famous line, “if you wish any good thing, get it from yourself,” and he repeats part of the prison example. 170 Long, (2004) p. 161 171 Long, (1968) p. 329 172 Bennett, (1973) pp. 57, 58 Nussbaum, (2006) p. 503: Nussbaum argues that this position is ultimately quietistic, since people will endure “various forms of correctible misery and indignity…since (these things) do not touch on the basic worth of human dignity”. 173 Annas (1995) p. 248 174 Bobzein, (1998) p. 165 175 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 130 176 Berlin, (2000) pp. 206. Berlin goes on (pp. 210, 211) to describe the individualist psychology of the rational Stoic sage who finds happiness and freedom in a kind of “inner emigration”. Berlin, (2002) p. 15: Berlin describes Stoic ideas of freedom - eliminating desire attached to the external world - as negative. Arneson, (1985) p. 428: Arneson underlines Berlin’s position, noting that being restrained in one’s ambitions and limiting desires may limit frustration – but questions if being reconciled to one’s situation in this way is truly a state of freedom. 177 Epictetus, Discourses 3. 2. 1 - 5 Christman, (1988) pp. 110, 111 178 Epictetus, Discourses, 2.10.1 - 2 Epictetus, Encheiridion, 5: Inter alia Epictetus notes “when we are hindered or disturbed or grieved, let us never blame anyone but ourselves, that means our own judgements”. 179 Epictetus, Encheiridion, 4 180 Cooper (2007) pp. 16, 17 Crivelli, (2007) p. 21 181 Cooper (2007) p. 12 182 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 33, 68, 72, 73, 108 183 Epictetus, Discourses, 2. 5. 1 – 2 Kidd, (1955) p. 181: So, argues Kidd, virtue and vice lay in individual choice, but everything else (wealth, health or any other such external) was indifferent to the summum bonum (good life). 184 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 107 185 Epictetus, Discourses 2. 6. 3

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186 Long, (2004) p. 130 187 Epictetus, Encheiridion 24.3 188 Epictetus, Encheiridion 15 189 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 202 Weberman, (1996) p. 404 Kamtekar, (2004) p. 482 190 Epictetus, Discourses, 1.27.11 191 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 202 192 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 290 Epictetus, Discourses, 2.23.35: Epictetus explains rationality is valued most highly and that externals have value, only insofar as to value them is rational. Annas, (1995) p. 253: Annas illuminates the idea, writing, “the successful Stoic will have considerably revised views about the place in her life of the goods which are the normal object of prudential reasoning. Although she will fully admit that they have value, and it is natural for us to go for them, she will realise that the value of virtuous activity so outweighs the kind of value that they have, that the place they have in her life is that of the material for virtuous activity”. Henry, (2002) p. 257: Henry argues that Stoics will be “unaffected,” by externals, but goes too far when he argues that Stoics have no desire for externals like food, drink or sex. 193 Annas (1995) pp. 249, 250, 251 Irwin, (1995) pp. 286, 287: Irwin underlines the logic proposed by Annas, and acknowledges that the Stoic values reason for its own sake. 194 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 73 Sorabji, (2007) p. 95: Sorabji describes the Stoic virtue of prosokhe, which means self- interrogation, “including the practice of asking themselves, last thing at night and first thing in the morning, whether they had responded or would respond, rightly during the day”. 195 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 73 196 Epictetus, Discourses 2. 5. 4 197 Sorabji, (2007) p. 93 Cooper, (2007) p. 17 Erler, (2007) p. 109 198 Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1.7 Epictetus, Discourses, 3.16.15 - 16 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 73, 74 199 Nussbaum, (1999) p. 188 200 Sorabji, (2007) p. 94 Mintoff, (2006) p. 107: Mintoff explains the Epicurean and Stoic recognition that “a rational person will examine the provenance of all the desires they find themselves with”. Long, (2004) p.85: Long recalls the Stoic dicta to “make correct use of impressions,” enlarging upon the point (at p. 82) that preconceptions, though important, are not sufficient to inform judgement. What is required is disciplined analysis and choice informed by rational Stoic doctrine. Epictetus, Discourses 3.12.15: Epictetus makes this very plain, he says, “just as Socrates used to tell us not to live a life unsubjected to examination, so we ought not to accept a sense-impression unsubjected to examination, but should say ‘Wait, allow me to see who you are and whence you come’”. 201 Epictetus, Discourses, 1. 17. 7 – 8 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) pp. 125, 126 Long and Sedley, (1995) p. 190 202 Cooper, (2007) p. 18 Bobzein, (2005) p. 333: Bobzein describes how Epictetus asserts that those things which are within our power are limited to “the use of impressions which …means our assents and the impulses and beliefs we have as a consequence of assenting”.

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203 Campbell, (1985) p. 329 Bobzein, (2005) p. 334: Bobzein affirms, “(f)or Epictetus, assent, intention and refraining from action depend on us, because we have the general ability to perform them, and no one and nothing external to us has the power of interfering and keeping us from performing them”. This sense of autonomy is decisive in Epictetus’ ethics. Bobzein cites Antipater who had determined “the end (telos) of human life as ‘to do everything in one’s power continuously and undeviatingly with a view to obtaining the predominating things which accord with nature’”. Bobzein goes on to say (p. 335) that “Behind (this) lies the I-cannot-be-bribed-or-blackmailed-into-doing-certain-things” idea of freedom,” which is all about integrity or moral autonomy. Long, (2004) p. 216: Long offers a useful explanation, noting that for Epictetus, “anyone, irrespective of intention or moral character, may experience the sexual allure of a beautiful body, but what we do with that impression is up to us, meaning how we describe it to ourselves and what value we assign to the thing itself. Impressions are causal only in the sense that they make us aware of their objects; but by assenting to them, as in saying, ‘here is something I want for myself,’ we surrender our own agency and put ourselves in the position of being ‘conquered’ or ‘disturbed’”. 204 Epictetus, Discourses, 3.24.12 “man (is) by nature high-minded, and capable of despising all the things that are outside the sphere of his moral purpose”. Epictetus, Discourses, 4.7.8: “(man is) by nature, high-minded, noble, free (and) rational…” 205 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 15: Bonhoffer goes on to say that “it is a principal doctrine of Epictetus that all action is based on opinion, and therefore virtue results from correct opinion, from knowledge itself by itself”. Long, (1967) p. 63: This affirms Stoic theory that man is born with “only the seeds of knowledge; knowledge proper is brought to fruition through experience…and principles of moral choice and rejection are formed”. This is significant because living virtuously, or in accord with Nature, entailed “living (rationally) according to knowledge”. 206 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 23. Bonhoffer explains (pp. 168, 169) that “the vast majority of human beings grow up with wrong conceptions, (and thus) achieve recognition of their moral powers and tasks as a rule only through instruction”. Epictetus, Discourses 1.22.9 -10: Epictetus draws these threads together, arguing; “What then does it mean to be getting an education? It means to be learning how to apply the natural preconceptions to particular cases, each to the other in conformity with nature, and, further, to make the distinction that some things are under our control while other things are not under our control”. 207 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 169 208 Epictetus, Discourses 3.15.8-13 209 Long and Sedley, (1995) pp. 183-184, 31.A, 31.B, 31.C Cooper, (2007) p. 18 210 Bobzein, (1998) pp. 160, 161. Bobzein explains later (p. 165) that individual choices reflect a certain disposition of the mind. “The exertion of this disposition is the only thing that is never necessitated by external circumstances. What we choose, (argues Epictetus) thus depends on us”. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.12.34: Epictetus sets out this reasoning, arguing that the people are accountable for “the only thing that is under (their) control – the proper use of impressions”. Epictetus, Encheiridion, 5: Epictetus sets out again, the argument for self-control and moral responsibility. 211 Epictetus, Discourses, 3.2.5 212 Crivelli, (2007), p. 22 213 Bobzein, (1998) p. 160 Bobzein, (2005) p. 335: Bobzein underlines this point, holding that ‘assent and intention, on the ground of their very nature, cannot be subjected to coercion or force, which includes possible coercion and force exercised by god. (The idea is emphasised by) Epictetus’s use of the term ‘under one’s own authority’”.

187

214 Crivelli, (2007) pp. 20, 21, 24, 25 215 Epictetus, Discourses, 4.12.13-14 216 Epictetus, Discourses, 1.2.33-34 Long, (2004) p. 239: Long illuminates the point, which is that we put our characters on the line. “How people act, especially when critical choices have to be made, reveals their sense of values and thereby the value they assign to themselves”. 217 Sorabji, (2007) p. 89 218 Epictetus, Discourses, 4.4.23-24 219 Sorabji, (2007) p. 89 220 Sorabji, (2007) p. 89. Citing Frede Erler, (2007) p. 110 221 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 112 222 Epictetus, Discourses, 2.1.1: Epictetus says, later in the same Discourse, “when the things that lie outside the province of the moral purpose are involved, there show confidence, but where the things that lie within the province of the moral purpose are involved, there show caution. For if the evil lies in an evil exercise of the moral purpose, it is only in regard to matters of this kind that it is right to employ caution”. Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 67: Bonhoffer writes, “the most elementary claim of Epictetan ethics is the principle that one regard as an evil and hence be allowed to fear nothing external”. Bonhoffer amplifies this remark by observing sin to be the only evil and the only thing to be feared. 223 Erler, (2007) p. 101 224 Erler, (2007) p. 103 Epictetus, Discourses, 2.1.9-10: Epictetus describes deer, frightened by feathers. 225 Epictetus, Discourses, 2.1.6 Erler, (2007) p. 103 226 Epictetus, Discourses, 2.1.6 Erler, (2007) p. 101 227 Erler, (2007) p. 103 Epictetus, Discourses 1.1.1: “The gods have put under our control only the most excellent faculty of all, and that which dominates the rest, namely the power to make correct use of external impressions, but all the others they have not put under our control”. 228 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 112 229 Erler, (2007) p. 103 230 Epictetus, Discourses 4. 1. 60 231 Epictetus, Discourses 3.22.104 - 107 232 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 113 Epictetus, Discourses 3.22.108 - 109: Citing Iliad vi. 492-3 233 Erler, (2007) p. 104 Plato, Phaedo, 63e – 64a: Plato faces death calmly, and argues at one point “the one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death”. Long, (2004) p. 68: Long references the “exemplar Socrates – unflinching victim of a supremely unjust prosecution” as an inspiration to Stoicism. 234 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 112 235 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 127 236 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 127 237 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 131 238 Epictetus, Encheiridion 53 239 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 133 Bobzein, (2005) pp. 349, 350 240 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 133 241 Arendt, (1968) p. 146 242 Long, (2004) pp. 30, 237 243 Epictetus, Discourses, 2.10.5 - 8

188

Epictetus, Discourses, 3.2.4 Epictetus, Discourses, 4.12.16 – 18 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 132, 135, 204 Long, (2004) pp. 201, 203 244 Epictetus, Discourses 3. 20. 5 – 8 245 Diogenes Laertius, 7.108-110 246 Long and Sedley, (1995) p. 365 247 Annas, (2007) p. 140 248 Annas, (2007) pp. 140-1 citing Discourse 2.10.1-12 Long and Sedley, (1995) p. 364: 59.Q 249 Epictetus, Discourses, 2.10.1-14 250 Epictetus, Discourses, 4.12.17 - 19 251 Long, (2004) p. 240 252 Long and Sedley, (1995) p. 368 Long, (2004) p. 237: Long explains that for Epictetus, the correct performance of social roles is “both outwardly and inwardly oriented…. (requiring) sensitivity to the dignity and claims of other persons, but what it is about other persons that should concern us is not how they treat us…but how we dispose ourselves in relation to them. The relevant relationship is entirely one-sided: us in relation to them…. because as Epictetus views the basis of proper relationships, they should be entirely translated, like everything we deal with, into the domain of our volition and integrity”. 253 Annas, (2007) pp. 146, 147 254 Annas, (2007) p. 147 255 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 204 Diogenes Laertius, 7.116 256 Hales, (2000) pp. 323, 324 257 Annas, (2007) p. 148 258 Sherman, (2005) p. 48. (Emphasis added) 259 Annas, (2007) pp. 149, 150 260 Annas, (2007) p. 151 261 Epictetus, Discourses, 1.2.19-22 Frede, (2007) pp. 154-155 262 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 22, 82 263 Osiel, (2002) p. 39 264 Epictetus, Discourses, 1.2.23 265 Epictetus, Discourses, 1.2.18 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 25 266 Epictetus, Discourses, 1.2.6-8 267 Diogenes Laertius, 7.160 Frede, (2007) pp. 160, 161: Frede connects view to the beginnings of Stoicism, when prosopon was used for the first time qua “person” and differently qua the role one might be expected to play in the social context. 268 Epictetus, Encheiridion 17 269 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 6 270 Frede, (2007) p. 162 271 Frede, (2007) p. 163 272 Frede, (2007) p. 163 273 Russell, (1995) p. 276 274 Morsink, (1999) p. 281 275 Keegan, introduction to Hanson (2000) p. xii Keegan, (1994) pp. 249, 251 Lazenby, (1991) p. 98

189 CHAPTER FIVE

Australian Doctrine

Doctrina vim promovet

Background

The previous chapter explored Stoicism, a philosophic response to the collapse of the poleis and the disintegration of social and moral structures. Articulated in the final stages of its development by Epictetus,

Stoicism was seen as a philosophy of endurance and moral autonomy, consistent with and significant to the profession of arms.

The present chapter interrogates ideas of integrity and moral autonomy in

Australian doctrine. Foundational to the hoplite’s ethical motif, these concepts are decisive in Epictetus Stoicism. In doctrine, these ideas are seen to be subordinated beneath the concept of command.

This chapter underlines the primacy of command in doctrinal argument.

Doctrine asserts that “the military could turn its back on ‘leadership’ as a practice and rely solely on ‘command’”.1 This is command acknowledged to “require compliance,”2 which means individuals must “subjugate

(their) will”.3 Emphasising the dominance of command, doctrine holds that “once a military superior decides on a legal course of action, there is little their team can do but obey and comply”.4 This argument presumes a sophomoric, blind, potentially dangerous loyalty.5 The upshot is that,

190 despite acknowledging “moral behaviour implies personal choice,”6 doctrinal argument suffocates the ideas of moral purpose and autonomy which are foundational to military service.7

Doctrine’s Prevailing Theme

Overstating the power of one over another, Australian doctrine disregards the power people must have over themselves. Failing to enunciate ideas of integrity, doctrine establishes a morally impaired concept. In doctrine, the political and bureaucratic constructs of command have overpowered ideas of human moral sense and integrity. The significance of this shortcoming attaches to the questions of moral purpose which pervade international relations and conflict, and to the philosophical character and significance of doctrine.

Doctrinal argument is imbalanced, prejudiced about who makes decisions and gives orders. The perspective recalls the world of Odysseus: “the old nobleman’s value system, the entire catalogue of Homeric virtues which was dismissed as insufficient by Tyrtaeus,” who recognised that the polis required bravery and steadfastness from all its citizens.8 Saturated with the entrenched, domineering and aristocratic virtues of command, doctrine expects soldiers to subjugate their will. Doctrine presents an argument for military subservience, and fails to articulate the importance of individual excellence and moral autonomy. But these virtues are crucial to modern military operations. The point is not that command authority is wrong, but that command authority is insufficient, yet

191 overplayed in doctrine. In doctrine, aretê is seen to depend not upon character, but upon command.

The Significance of Doctrine

Doctrine, the “central foundation of military professional knowledge”9 is an expression of fundamental principles which guide military forces in support of national objectives.10 Related to creeds, beliefs, values and ideology,11 doctrine is the “glue that builds internal cohesion within (the)

Defence Force…providing infrastructure around which organisational confidence can be built”.12 Yet “armies choose doctrines, and not the other way around”.13 The present thesis thus appreciates doctrine as both a reflection of, and an influence upon, military culture which is the

“bedrock of military effectiveness”.14 Entwined within the fabric of military society, doctrine is a formal articulation of “shared basic assumptions”.15 Offering a “common philosophy, nomenclature and perspective,”16 doctrine represents “a framework of reference and interpretation”.17 Doctrine is thus an organisational “artefact,”18 articulating the military “ethos, conceits, and traditions”.19 Doctrine is thus central to the military’s “cultural paradigm”.20

But, in Australian doctrine, argument does not reflect the deep-seated inherited ideals societies recognise as crucially important. Doctrinal argument asserts the dominance of command power and thus, doctrine asphyxiates ideas of personal integrity central to Epictetus, and identified

192 by West Australian born General, Sir John Hackett, as imperative to the profession of arms.21

The Cultural Paradigm

In the case of “the Australian officer corps across its three Services,” the cultural paradigm within which doctrine is construed “was, and remains to a large degree today, derivative of its British ancestry”.22 But at a deeper level, and less conspicuously, the cultural milieu is informed by inherited and persistent classical ideas. Deep-rooted within the “Victorian honour culture,”23 classical ideas were seized in an unquestioning

Gramscian embrace24 by Australian colonists convinced that to be

Australian and to be British was the same thing.25

Classical ideas infused the opinions of Victorian optimate chivalry, “a beautiful and fantastic piece of frostwork”26 informing connection between nations concerned, not with “otherness,” but with “affinities”.27

Thus, during the First War, Australian and “British public-school- educated officers consciously sought Homeric glory on what the French called the champ d’honneur”.28 These officers did not seek victory at all costs, they did not seek to brutalise or torment their adversary. They fought with an elevated sense of honour and sportsmanlike fair play.

Their example demonstrates a body of belief so commanding that it has never been altogether lost.29 The Battle of the Falkland Islands, joined on

December 8th, 1914, is illustrative:

193 In this action, the battle-cruisers Invincible (flagship of Vice-Admiral

F.C.D. Sturdee), and Inflexible engaged the squadron of Vice-Admiral

Maxmilian von Spee in a running sea fight concluded by the victory of

HMS Kent over Nürnberg.30 The gun-fight was described in sporting terms by one of Kent’s officers as “a fair ship to ship engagement. A good chase and a good battering match at short range...there’s a fine shot hole through my cabin; I might try to preserve it”.31

Equally sporting, Vice-Admiral Sturdee sent a message to the Inflexible’s wardroom, where Commander Pochhammer, formerly Executive Officer of Gneisenau was the senior German officer surviving:

The C-in-C (Sturdee) is very gratified that your life has been spared and we all feel that the Gneisenau fought in a most plucky manner to the end...We much admire the good Gunnery of both ships (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau), we sympathise with you in the loss of your Admiral (von Spee) and many officers and men. Unfortunately, the two countries are at War (and) the officers of both Navies who can count friends in the other have to carry out their country’s duty, which your Admiral and Officers worthily maintained to the end.32

This exchange demonstrates the inherited and honourable traditions which perfuse and define the narrative of western arms.33 Recalling his capture after the epic 9th November 1914 battle, between HMAS Sydney and SMS Emden, Franz Joseph, Prince of Hohenzollern (Emden) accentuates the point:

194 (We received) an order from the War Office by which the King of England returned to us officers and subordinate officers our swords. This was in so far meaningless, as we had no swords with us, but doubtless the order was intended as an honour for the Emden, and as such it greatly pleased us.

(Later, transferred as prisoners to the) Hampshire, we were received by Captain Grant, the captain of the cruiser, with great cordiality. It was noticeable at once that we were among members of our own profession….

The London Daily Chronicle and the Daily News observed similarly that:

Captain (von Muller of the Emden) proved himself to be not only a brave and capable officer, but to possess chivalry in his treatment of the passengers and crews of the captured ships….The English nation has now only one regret, and that is that a great part of the Emden’s ship’s company lost their lives.34

Embodied in the universally clement symbol of the Red Cross, and formalised in the Geneva Conventions35 and the International Criminal

Court,36 these were civilized principles, chivalric ideas foundational to western arms, which continue to be crucial to moderate ferocity in conflict.37 They were recognised by Clausewitz who acknowledged the ideas of virtue and the chivalric ritual which regulated violence even in total war,38 and by American Colonel, Lloyd Matthews, who argued in

1997 that society can afford to entrust the instruments of military force only to its “most civilized and enlightened members”.39 The same upright, honourable principles were understood by Demosthenes’ and articulated

195 in his disparagement of Philip II whose “warfare was not of the fair and open kind”.40 Polybius, similarly, contrasted the “open and honourable warfare of the ancients with the deceitfulness of his own age”.41

Evoking high ideals from the classical age, the western military sustains a concept of “‘honourable’ behaviour on the battlefield,”42 and disparages

“non-traditional types of conflict”.43 Underlining the enduring resonance of classical thinking, the 2006 United States counterinsurgency doctrine describes the foe who does not abide by the classical tradition as “elusive, unethical, indiscriminate, deceitful and violent”.44

Positional Power not Moral Strength

Australian doctrine defines leadership as “the process of influencing others in order to gain their willing consent in the ethical pursuit of missions”.45 Captured by Homer’s champions who, defined by their social place were necessarily aristocratic,46 doctrine fails to grasp the richer classical tradition. Defining leadership, doctrine does not propose any idea of individual excellence. Rather, doctrine construes a process of influence over others in order to exact consent from others. For this reason, the idea of consent in doctrine is qualified, prejudiced by the coercive power of hierarchy.

Doctrine reveals a hierarchy which, in practice, places weight on Homeric concepts of class or precedence, and enables socially determined expectations of command to prevail over ideas of personal merit.

Reflecting this established cultural milieu, doctrine grounds ideas of

196 influence in positional power, not in ideas of human potential, character or moral strength. In this way, doctrine nods to the concentration of military responsibility at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy, and fails to articulate the lessons of the classical phalanx.

The Bureaucratic Elite

Australian leadership doctrine, perfused with prejudice about decision- making and order-giving, is essentially autocratic. Even acknowledging that “coercive power”47 enjoys limited utility, doctrine is saturated with the “hard power”48 of command, leaving “unstated how coercive this influence process can be, before the process is no longer leadership but rather management or command”.49 This reasoning presumes the powers of leadership and command to be the same, differentiated not in kind but in degree.

Unable to differentiate the inner moral sense of conscience from the pragmatic positional power of command, Australian doctrine understates the crucial “sober personal virtues of will-power, honesty, (and) high- mindedness”.50 Connoting leadership in bureaucratic terms as an

“influence process,”51 doctrine dissolves the ideas of integrity and moral autonomy which are decisive in Epictetus. Doctrinal logic is Weberian and managerial. In doctrine, ideas of moral autonomy and strength are asphyxiated beneath positional ideas of command, which “depends for its power on its success at disguise and concealment”.52 This is power by hierarchical surveillance, perpetual assessment and classification.

197 Authority is in the indiscernible power of policy, rules, and committees.

Veiled by bureaucratic process, anonymous individuals abrogate moral obligation. Integrity is choked by habits of obedience and the metaphors of respect and agreement. Scruple is smothered by the euphemism of secret agendas and the concoction of ostensible truth. Explained by

Foucault as panopticism,53 bureaucratic power is omnipresent and omniscient, designed “to ensure the prompt obedience of the people and the most absolute authority of the magistrates”.54 The moral strength of the individual is never apparent. Emphasising command bureaucracy, doctrine evokes the vice of acquiescence: the craven failure of bureaucratic people to use unequivocal terms or moral language for fear of their own careers.

Seduced by the bureaucracy of the Third Reich, Adolf Eichmann was

“not Iago and not Macbeth, and nothing would have been further from his mind than to determine with Richard III ‘to prove a villain.’”55 Compliant with the bureaucracy, Eichmann’s evil was monstrous. But more significantly it was, in Arendt’s famous term, “banal”. “He merely, to put the matter colloquially, merely never realized what he was doing”.56

When on trial, Eichmann was described predictably by his defence as

“only a ‘tiny cog’ in the machinery of the Final Solution’ (and) in its judgement the court naturally conceded that such a crime could be committed only by a giant bureaucracy”.57 But this is to underplay the moral responsibility of Eichmann as a man. Arendt argues:

198 If the defendant excuses himself on the ground that he acted not as a man but as a mere functionary whose functions could just as easily have been carried out by anyone else, it is as if a criminal pointed to the statistics on crime – which set forth that so-and-so many crimes per day are committed in such-and-such a place – and declared that he only did what was statistically expected.58

“One cannot extract any diabolical or demonic profundity from

Eichmann”.59 He was manipulated by a totalitarian government, the essence of which is “to make functionaries and mere cogs in the administrative bureaucracy out of men, and thus to dehumanize them”.60

This dehumanization is underlined by the German military code which stated explicitly in Paragraph 48 that: “Punishability of an action or omission is not excluded on the ground that the person considered his behaviour required by his conscience or the prescripts of his religion”.61

Australian doctrine similarly threatens punishment for “non-compliance with rules and orders”.62

The decisive point is that Eichmann acted in accordance with established rules and legal orders. He never felt a need to rely upon his conscience, since he was never expected to make decisions beyond “the framework of the kind of judgement required of him”.63 This is significant because it illustrates the suffocation of morally autonomous judgement by accustomed and orthodox routine.

In bureaucracy, customary routine derives from and epitomises a body of belief. There is a Kuhnian cultural gestalt or paradigm,64 a

199 “weltanschauung or professional ‘mind’”65 which structures distinctive and persistent habits of action and thought and frames a perspective on the world from within which behaviour is rationalised. Routine thus reflects ideas at home in a structured community where commanders, like

Homeric champions, play roles with determinate form. In the military bureaucracy, “leaders and led (are seen to) have labels on them”.66 But these are labels, not of leadership, but of command. Enmeshed within the military hierarchy, command is quite a different thing from leadership.67

But it is seen to be the same thing. Hence, doctrine enunciates no standard of personal excellence external to the idea of command. Leadership, in the terms of doctrine, depends, not upon aretê, but upon command

“influence”.68 Leadership is less about private notions of integrity or honour, than public notions of acclaim and superiority.

Command is a “mechanism of suppression”69 concerned more about conformance than with individual excellence or integrity. Thus,

Australian leadership doctrine holds that “command requires structure, can only be applied down the chain of command and requires compliance from followers”.70

The essence of command is the legal authority to direct subordinates toward the completion of assigned task…. the member is required to subjugate his / her will…. A person in the military must allow themselves to be ordered to do something that they may not normally be inclined to do.71

200 Underlining this position, doctrine holds that “the requirements of Service do not necessitate leadership, but rather command”.72 This draws attention to the fact that in command:

The military leader possesses constitutional power of a magnitude which surpasses that of leaders in most other human groups. If he cannot pull his followers by force of character, he can at least push them by force of law”.73

Bound by such belief, doctrine defines leadership in the determinate and authoritarian terms of bureaucratic role. Recalling Habermas’s critique of

Weber, the model of leadership is all about the power of one over others.74 Doctrine overlooks ideas of character, conscience or moral responsibility, observing, “authority in the military is based upon rank”75.

Insisting that “rank, uniform and medals give those in leadership positions a ‘jump start,’”76 doctrine is indifferent to the foundational and critical ideas of moral purpose which attach to military rank.77 Doctrine is also ignorant of the ideals of conscience and integrity which unite all people in Epictetus.78 Doctrine thus fails to recognise what Nancy

Sherman has called “the moral features of a soldier’s world,” the moral duties and judgements which cannot be defined but which must be understood in order that soldiers survive war’s violence with their character intact.79

In doctrine, potentially dangerous and essentially undemocratic80 ideas of command precedence prevail over morally grounded ideas, such as the assertion by doctrine that “the foundation of leadership is based on

201 individual character”.81 This point is demonstrated by the vignette of Air

Chief Marshal Scherger, which doctrine offers as an illustration of “A

Leader’s Character”.82 But, the vignette is more about positional power.

Recalling “the maxim of Frederick the Great, (that) a soldier must fear his officers more than his enemies,”83 the vignette makes a point of:

A savage dressing down by Scherger, brutally stressing that trainees were available in endless numbers while machines were in short supply.84

Doctrine claims this vignette points to character which, in preceding text, is held to “include such things as…personal integrity, conscientiousness, self-assurance and trustworthiness”.85 But this seems a long bow to draw because despite acknowledging Scherger’s capacity for physical work and his “easy camaraderie, often working stripped to the waist” during operations in New Guinea where “camp sites were rough and facilities invariably rudimentary,”86 the focus of the example is upon Scherger the

“martinet,” and “the savage dressing down”.87

The language, which is evocative, exerts a significant rhetorical effect.

The structure and tone of the vignette is not careful and precise, but emphatic and hagiographic. Scherger, acknowledged as a martinet, is lionized. The dressing down, acknowledged as brutal and savage carries significant implication beyond the literal meaning. This vignette, which derives meaning from the hierarchy of military organisation, affirms the conventions and the social choices, which are defined by that command hierarchy. The vignette is not something that reflects character. The

202 vignette, which is about prevailing institutions of rank and positional power, affirms that in the military, people who are senior in the command chain have power over those junior to them in the command chain. Junior people cannot offer savage dressings down to senior people.

In this way, the vignette of Scherger exemplifies doctrine’s inhibited moral palette, the proclivity to construe personal excellence in the terms of command, and in no other terms. Entailing precedence of one over another, command is a word which defines the “formalized pattern of subordination”88 characteristic of military culture. The predisposition to see things in terms of command is underlined by the example of General

Cosgrove, who offered:

Leadership can be episodic or an ongoing part of a person’s role in life. It can ebb and flow in our daily lives in an accidental way.89

Seemingly innocuous, this example offers insight into the unstated creeds and dogmas which pervade doctrine. Leadership is couched and perceived in the terms of command. The General, with the prestige and authority of high rank and former appointment as Chief of the Defence

Force, describes leadership as episodic, the function of a person’s role as something which ebbs and flows. This is significant, because notions of individual merit and moral autonomy which are stable, persistent, enduring and not at all episodic are overlooked. Yet, ideas of character are crucial within the western military tradition.

203 Words such as honour and shame impose judgement, and expose the moral reasoning which is foundational to the western way of war.90 The scrutiny, understanding and articulation of these moral ideas is imperative. Doctrine fails to meet this need.

Asserting “trustworthiness as a trait that deserves special attention,”91 doctrine cites the example of Captain Harry Howden, RAN:

Trust in one’s leader is no better illustrated than in HMAS Hobart’s ‘miraculous’ survival on ‘Black Saturday’ 15 February 1942. Under the command of Captain Harry Howden RAN…Hobart was the most targeted of all the ships that day…. Throughout the ordeal Howden remained on the bridge calling for the most violent maneuvering and relying on an instant response from his engineers…All Hobart’s ship’s company knew that they owed their lives to Howden’s superb performance.92

Howden’s story, which has almost ritualistic form, illustrates trust placed not in character but in technical proficiency. Howden fulfilled the obligations of the Captain in a kind of enacted fable. He recalls an

Homeric champion, bound by ineluctable social rules to face particular harms and dangers in particular ways.93 Captain Howden played the part expected of him as an expert ship-handler. But the vignette reveals little about the trustworthiness of Captain Howden as a man. His character remains undisclosed. All we know is that Captain Howden played the technically proficient part. He fulfilled expectations discernible in the allegation of Australian doctrine that “the Captain is the ship”.94

Acknowledged as rather “omnipotent,”95 the thinking is centred upon a

204 technical “professional competence”96 for which men win acclaim.

Underlining this technical and practical emphasis, Australian Maritime

Doctrine has, for eleven years maintained the same form of words:

The focus at sea is on the effort of the entire crew to place the combat instrument, which is the ship, into the control of the directing mind of the commander. No shell is fired and no missile can be launched without specific command direction. With very few exceptions this applies even in the most intense of combat situations and it is never widely delegated.97

The decisive point is that excellence is not construed in Epictetan terms qua personal distinction or moral autonomy. Rather, excellence is construed in terms of mechanical dexterity and hierarchical responsibility.

Focused on hierarchical power and the bureaucratic process by which senior people influence junior people,98 Australian doctrine fails to interpret the hoplite’s motif of morally autonomous, freely given commitment. The hoplite integrated and exemplified ideas of collective duty and individual excellence, and through him, moral philosophy found

“embodiment in the social world”.99

Standing fast in the ranks, the hoplite’s was commitment beyond the qualified consent to which Australian doctrine refers. His was a fight to the death in order. But not order imposed by force of command. To the hoplite, order reflected notions of civic duty and Homeric martial etiquette elemental to ideas of individual aretê. Epictetus illuminates a

205 philosophy through which modern doctrine might recapture this foundational moral thinking.

Rejecting the “desire for glory and command,” which stained the

Athenian generals at Melos,100 Epictetus focuses on the power people must have over themselves. Epictetus holds that good people cultivate moral autonomy.101 Dissociating good from external or material things,

Epictetus sees “good” in “moral purpose,”102 to which everything should be “subordinate”.103 Thus, Epictetus encourages people to “know themselves, to practise self examination, and to discover a source of goodness that is purely internal, independent of outward contingencies, capable of generating both personal happiness and integrity”.104 He writes: “if you wish any good thing, get it from yourself”.105

Epictetus resonates with the doctrinal tenet “know yourself and seek self- improvement”.106 But, where doctrine is unable to separate ideas of moral strength from the coercive power of command,107 Epictetus is explicit.

For Epictetus, the inner moral strength of conscience is one thing; the positional power of command, quite another. For Epictetus, leadership example reflects self-mastery, the power of one over oneself. For doctrine, aretê is power over others –even if this power is inconspicuous and couched in bureaucratic language as an influence process.

Epictetus articulates a philosophy of unfaltering moral purpose.

Prefiguring ubiquitous Kantian concepts of duty and responsibility,108 his philosophy is consistent with military ideals. Yet, the independence of

206 Epictetus challenges Australian doctrine. Recalling Socrates who maintained that “one ought never to do wrong or, conversely, that one ought always to do right, and that the relation of parties to each other did not alter the intrinsic worth of an act,”109 Epictetus emphasises the moral self-sufficiency of individuals. The doctrinal insistence on morally insensate compliance110 is erased by Epictetus, who enables us to see soldiers, not as complaisant instruments of command, but as morally autonomous people.

Conscious of soldiers as moral agents, we recognise the reality that “one of the things most of us want, even in war, is to act…morally”.111 At the same time we discern the inadequacy of the doctrinal position, according to which the span of moral action available to soldiers is limited to submissive compliance in the “ethical pursuit of missions”.112 Epictetus paints on a larger canvas. His ideas of moral responsibility recall the unregulated, unforced, dutiful and wholly independent commitment of the hoplite. The logic of Epictetus spans the philosophical dualism of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and enables a more plausible moral reasoning.

Beyond the “Ethical Pursuit of Missions”

Confining responsibility to the “ethical pursuit of missions,”113 Australian doctrine attributes to combatants an absurd ignorance apropos the justice of their cause, an ideal “held in common with Homer’s warriors”.114

Doctrine’s astounding implication is that no-one can cavil, no matter how repugnant the pretext for action. Doctrine thus articulates a “tyrannical

207 power of coercion” which denies servicemen the proper expression of conscience and free will.115 Doctrine suffocates the reflection and awareness which is foundational to ethically responsive military service,116 and enables instead “a one-sided and partial” moral reasoning.117

Doctrine’s narrow focus on jus in bello propriety is not counter-balanced by the doctrinal assertion that “those who fight choose to do so because they are convinced of the rightness of their participation, they believe they are ‘a force for good’”.118 This moralistic rhetoric is debunked by the unassailable power of command.119 “With command comes all the power and authority over subordinates that the ‘leader’ needs to achieve tasks”.120 Thus, noting that individuals have “little say in the

Government’s decision to go to war,” doctrine claims people “must allow themselves to be ordered to do something that they may not normally be inclined to do”.121 Citing General Montgomery, doctrine claims “men must learn to obey orders when all their instincts cry out for them not to be obeyed”.122 Doctrine echoes the reasoning of Huntington:

When the military man receives a legal order from an authorised superior, he does not argue, he does not hesitate, he does not substitute his own view; he obeys instantly.123

But such a restricted view is unworkable, and insensitive to the fact that:

‘Whatever virtue there may be in this game of war, rightly played, there is none when you play it with a multitude of small human pawns’… Then battle becomes a circus of slaughter. 124

208 The decisive point is that virtue is obliterated when soldiers become mere instruments, the small pawns of commanders who force them to fight.125

Yet denying soldiers opportunity to exercise their conscience is the inevitable conclusion of doctrinal argument which asserts the primacy of command.126

Doctrine stipulates more than routine obedience, orderliness and self- control. Rather, doctrine suggests the loss of a vital sense of moral responsibility, the fundamental “humanity”127 Epictetus conveys by prohairesis. Doctrine ignores the fact that “the warrior’s honour (is) both a code of belonging and an ethic of responsibility. These codes acknowledge the moral paradox of combat: that those who fight each other will be bound together in mutual respect; and that if they perish at each other’s hand, they will be brothers in death”.128 Thus:

Soldiers can never be transformed into mere instruments of war. The trigger is always part of the gun, not part of the man. If they are not machines that can just be turned on, they are also not machines that can just be turned off. Trained to obey ‘without hesitation,’ they remain, nevertheless capable of hesitating.129

Not only does doctrine ignore the Greek foundation of the western military tradition, it fails to account for the lessons of recent history.

When you think of the long and gloomy history of man, you will find more hideous crimes have been committed in the name of obedience than have ever been committed in the name of rebellion. If you doubt that, read William Shirer’s Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. The German Officer Corps were brought up in the most

209 rigorous code of obedience…in the name of obedience they were party to, and assisted in, the most wicked large scale actions in the history of the world.130

Overstating directive command power, doctrine affirms a conservative philosophy which presupposes that the fabric of military life is threatened by disobedience. Doctrine presumes, like Hobbes, that an act executed in obedience to authority is “in no sense the responsibility of the person who carries it out but only of the authority that orders it”.131 This is a logic which numbs independent thought and moral autonomy and stands against humanism which “argues for the primacy of individual conscience in such matters, insisting that the moral judgements of the individual must override authority when the two are in conflict”.132

Quashing the moral autonomy of those who are “required to accept personal risks rather than kill innocent people,”133 doctrine imposes an impossible burden. Soldiers who “do what they choose to do”134 and fight from a sense of moral responsibility, accept the obligation to sacrifice themselves. But, it is doubtful that soldiers can be expected to assume such a burden when it is imposed unreasonably.

The decisive point is the impossibility of personal moral choice being coexistent with legal constraint. Decisions cannot be the purely personal determinations of moral conscience when there is a legal obligation. In this way, when the state compels soldiers to fight, then soldiers are denied choice to act “rightly” from a sense of entirely personal obligation.135

Accordingly, “if a soldier admitted that the taking of money or even the

210 taking of an oath obligated him to kill and be killed, he would be turning himself into a mere instrument of the state or of the mercenary captain who hires him”.136 This is significant because, as Rousseau observed, when individual soldiers enter willingly into a social contract with the

State:

Each one puts his person and all his powers under the supreme direction of the general will; the collective body incorporates each individual as an indivisible part of the whole. Free association creates a collective which acquires, from the commitment of each individual, its unity, its common ego, its life and its will.137

For Rousseau, the volonté générale – the general will, which found expression in the high virtue of patriotism, was decisive; a cornerstone of all other virtues.138 Rousseau resonates with Rawls who argued:

It is not possible to have obligations to autocratic and arbitrary forms of government. The necessary background does not exist for obligations to arise.139

War is nightmarish, but it is endured when there is commitment and a moral confidence in a cause worth fighting for. In contrast, “war is hell whenever men are forced to fight”.140 When people fight under duress, they are denied the opportunity to commit or to assume an obligation voluntarily and thus, “their battles are no longer theirs”.141 The idea is underlined by Rousseau who argued that “he who preserves his life at the expense of others, must be willing to surrender his life for the sake of others”.142 Likewise, Camus argues in The Rebel that life cannot be

211 denied, unless one is prepared to renounce life. In order to kill, one must be prepared to die.143 So, in The Just Assassins he has Kaliayev say:

Do you understand why I asked to throw the bomb? To die for an ideal – that’s the only way of proving oneself worthy of it. It’s our only justification… I’m worried by the thought that they have forced us into being murderers. But then I remind myself that I’m going to die too, and everything’s all right.144

Yet, doctrine insists upon the subjugation of the individual’s will, and holds that non-compliance will bring about punishment.145 In this way, doctrinal argument recalls the ruthless philosophy which maintained cohesion throughout the Wehrmacht “towards the end of World War II on the eastern front”146 and the Soviet’s “draconian insistence on blind obedience to orders”.147 The danger is a modus vivendi in which “soldiers let off steam by transgressing accepted civilian norms of behaviour and by acting illegally even according to the far from normal standards of the front”.148

Philosophically callow, doctrinal argument misses the opportunity to recognise principles of conscientious commitment and objection which

“should be tolerated by the state, not because of the quality of the conviction…but rather to sustain the quality of the state within which such a conviction can be freely acquired”.149

Doctrine perpetuates the jeopardy to soldiers’ “moral life” which follows from “the overwhelming coercive social power of military institutions and of war itself”.150 Doing so, doctrine ignores the awful reality that the

212 “destruction of human character can, quite simply, produce bestiality, the utter loss of human relatedness”.151

Failing to allow for the free expression by soldiers of their conscience, doctrine seeks to avert the conspicuous risk of error.152 Doing so, doctrine underlines the power of the senior people in modern armies who, like

Homeric gods “can create situations that destroy good character and drive mortals mad”.153 Doctrine dissolves idealism and diminishes the concept of what’s right, to that which is legal. Acknowledging the place of conscience and free will the Royal Australian Navy offers that it is more important for soldiers to:

Act in good conscience and realise what (they) do. (Soldiers) must never be morally careless. (Soldiers) will make mistakes – making mistakes is part and parcel of being human – but let these not be the mistakes of moral neglect, and let these not be the mistakes of selfishness or cowardice.154

This line of reasoning acknowledges the ideals of conscience, honour and justice intrinsic to the cultural morality which is critical to western arms.155 Australia’s first Defence Act acknowledged this thinking in

1903.156 In 1990, the same ideas were presupposed in legislation, tabled though allowed to lapse, which sought “to permit claims for exemption from particular wars or military operations”.157 On this occasion the

Parliament was influenced by “the strong opposition of the Defence

Force, which stressed the practical difficulties of the principle of selective conscientious objection”.158 Practical difficulty aside, the Defence Force

213 argument is mulish, contra ideas enunciated by Epictetus, and antithetic to foundational democratic principles.

Described by the sociologist Robin Williams, as an organic cluster of values, democratic ideals are broadly humanitarian, equalitarian, and individualistic insofar as freedom is recognised in the degree to which individuals are able to make morally autonomous decisions.159 These ideals were acknowledged by the 1985 Senate Standing Committee on

Constitutional and Legal Affairs, which held that:

Australia, as a democracy, even when engaged in armed conflict (should recognise) conscientious belief in order to protect the integrity of the individual against the coercive power of the state.160

“Infused with a deep and abiding concern with… moral character,”161 this argument resonates with the chivalrous martial tradition described by

Osiel as that which inspired the officers who plotted against Hitler:

“obedience ends where knowledge, conscience and responsibility prohibit execution of an order”.162

Insisting upon subjugation, doctrine diminishes intangible ideas of conscience and chivalry. Civic duty and just cause are smothered equally by doctrinal argument which misinterprets the significance of aporthetos.

This was a conviction, shared by hoplites defending the poleis, that their land should remain inviolate.163 The state did not force or oblige hoplites to fight. Confident in the rightness of their cause, hoplites fought out of a feeling of “patriotism, love of and commitment to their native city”.164

214 The hoplite fought willingly to preserve the ideal to which he was committed, not because he was dragooned. Accepting similarly that

“democratic states suffer whenever conscience is coerced,”165

Montesquieu held that “in order to be a good man, one must have the intention of being one, and love the state less for oneself than for itself”.166 Accepting that privilege of conscience entails reciprocal obligation, Socrates considered himself “bound (by the Laws) because he chose to act like a citizen and reaped the benefits of citizenship”.167

Enunciating a comparable idea in Leviathan, Hobbes argued that: “Every man is bound by Nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in Warre, the

Authority by which he is himself protected in time of Peace”.168

Epictetus captures the same motif. Acknowledging the obligations and duties which attach to us as people in society, 169 Epictetus follows the logic of Plato in the Crito,170 insisting that we must bear the burden of duties – even if they are unpleasant.171 In this way, Epictetus articulates the sense of “right action” which distinguishes the virtuous man.172

Epictetus illuminates how an act carried out in compliance with command is profoundly, morally different from an act carried out autonomously. He lets us see through the ideas of dominance and command which were obvious in the Melian dialogue, and which overshadow ideas of moral autonomy in Australian doctrine. Illuminating the “failure of most people to resist unjust authority”,173 Epictetus details the moral strength which is rarely so blatant as positional power.

215 Lacking the moral resolve to defy the despotic cruelty of Tisias and

Cleomedes, Athenian soldiers were responsible for the atrocity of Melos.

Euripides denounced such “barbarity”174 prosecuted in the name of honour. In The Trojan Women, he has Poseidon exclaim that the “mortal who sacks fallen cities is a fool”.175 Similarly, he has Hecuba cry out:

“Achaeans! All your strength is in your spears, not in the mind,”176

Euripides recognises ideas of merit and responsibility which demand ethical resolve and sensitivity. He acknowledges the morality of restraint as a higher ambition than dominance and conquest. Euripides illustrates the ethical understanding of soldiers who abide by reciprocated chivalric codes. This is to recognise that “notions of honour and chivalry, (which) seem to play only a small part in contemporary combat,”177 inform a moral equality between soldiers. More than positional power, and more than aristocratic ideals made irrelevant by democracy, chivalry speaks to intricate moral judgement, etiquette and finesse.178

Ideas of martial chivalry have been contained typically by jus in bello convention. Following medieval scholar Francisco de Vittoria, who held

“all the fault (for jus ad bellum) is to be laid at the door of the princes, for subjects when fighting for their princes act in good faith,”179 the soldier is typically “judged, not by the policies he implements, but rather by the promptness and efficiency with which he carries them out”.180 This logic is illustrated by Shakespeare when he has King Henry V going secretly amongst his soldiers on the eve of Agincourt.

216 King Henry V (in disguise): “Methinks I could not die anywhere so content as in the King’s company, his cause being just and his quarrel honourable”.

Michael Williams (a soldier): “That’s more than we know”

John Bates (a soldier): “ Ay, or more than we should seek after; for we know enough if we know we are the King’s subjects, if his cause be wrong, our obedience to the king wipes the crime of it out of us”.181

So, at Nuremburg, all fourteen German Generals on trial were acquitted of jus ad bellum infractions. The Tribunal held:

It is not a person’s rank or status, but his power to shape or influence the policy of his state which is the relevant issue for determining criminality under the charge crimes against peace.182

Such concepts inform the conventions of international law. These conventions define war as a “legal condition,”183 wherein states stipulate the particulars and provisos of slaughter. But the idea of the political state does not erase ideas of individual obligation. Oppenheim holds that:

It is impossible to admit that individuals, by grouping themselves into States and thus increasing immeasurably their potentialities for evil, can confer upon themselves a degree of immunity from criminal liability and its consequences which they do not enjoy when acting in isolation.184

McMahan, queries similarly:

How can certain people’s establishment of political relations among themselves confer on them a right to harm others, when the harming or killing would be impermissible in the absence of

217 (those) relations? How could it be that merely acting collectively for political goals, people can shed the moral constraints that bind them when they act merely as individuals…185

Seen in this way to be ultimately reliant upon the judgement of people, war is intelligible, beyond the bounds of legal stipulation, as a moral construct.186 Informing the moral perspective, Epictetus enables us to see soldiers are people with volition. He asserts the independent will of individuals and acknowledges that this will never disappears. These are soldiers yes, but they are people who retain absolute responsibility for what they do, and for this reason “the citizen must be satisfied that his nation’s leaders are committed to justice”.187

Hence, acknowledging the evil of aggression entails no war can be just on both sides,188 we understand Meir Amor, an Israeli Army Captain, who refused to serve in operations to put down Palestinian uprisings. He argued: “I don’t agree with what’s going on in the Territories, and I am not willing to kill or be killed for something I don’t agree with”.189

Similarly, Dale Noyd, a Captain in the United States Air Force argued:

“The war in Vietnam is unjust and immoral, and if ordered to do so, I shall refuse to fight in that war. I should prefer that (my) resignation be accepted”.190

The soldiers who fight are moral agents not pawns. For this reason in particular, it is wrong for doctrine to circumscribe, as it does, the moral

218 reason available to soldiers. Acknowledging moral obligations which exceed the restricted frontiers of doctrine:

Professional soldiers remain sensitive (or some of them do) to those limits and restraints which distinguish their life’s work from mere butchery. No doubt they know with General Sherman that war is butchery, but they are likely to believe that it is also, simultaneously, something else. That is why army and navy officers, defending a long tradition, will often protest commands of their civilian superiors that would require them to violate the rules of war and turn them into mere instruments for killing.191

The Limit of Force

Asserting ideas of individual merit and moral responsibility, Epictetus rejects the doctrinal claim that soldiers must subjugate their individual will or integrity to command superiority. He illuminates how it is that soldiers must fight well, with moral insight and perspective. The soldier is not a “mere technician”. He does not stand to the army as his weapon does to him, but makes morally significant decisions, applying complex criteria of proportionality and necessity.192 Du Picq argues famously that:

It often happens that those who discuss war, taking the weapon for their starting point, assume unhesitatingly that the man called to serve it will always use it as contemplated and ordered by the regulations. But such a being, throwing off his variable nature to become an impassive pawn, an abstract unit in the combinations of battle, is a creature born of the musings of the library, and not a real man. Man is flesh and blood; he is body and soul. And, strong as the soul often is, it can not dominate the body to the point where

219 there will not be a revolt of the flesh and mental perturbation in the face of destruction.193

Du Picq paints a vibrant picture, acknowledging that soldiers are not, as

Australian doctrine would have them, the impassive and subordinate instruments of the military bureaucracy. Soldiers are morally autonomous and responsible.194 As morally competent and self-regulating people, soldiers must interpret the jus ad bellum rightness of their cause,195 and regulate the force with which they fight:

Even in a just war certain forms of violence are strictly inadmissible; and where a country’s right to war is questionable and uncertain, the constraints on the means it can use are all the more severe. Acts permissible in a war of legitimate self-defence, when these are necessary, may be flatly excluded in a more doubtful situation. The aim of war is a just peace, and therefore the means employed must not destroy the possibility of peace or encourage a contempt for human life that puts the safety of ourselves and of mankind in jeopardy. The conduct of war is to be constrained and adjusted to this end.196

This logic finds some redolence in Australian Maritime Doctrine which identifies “wars of national survival” as the most extreme manifestation of “operations”.197 Describing the “Spectrum of Operations,” within which force is graduated according to context, Australian Maritime

Doctrine observes:

Since the formation of the UN in the closing stages of World War II, much effort has been expended to limit the form and extent of conflict…and Australia has been a leading actor in such

220 work…The varieties of conditions which can create and sustain conflict are such that we need to think of a spectrum of operations, for not all military activities require the application or even the threat of force. Within this spectrum are countless differing contingencies broadly based on the level and types of threat faced.198

Taking this perspective even further, and acknowledging ideas of individual responsibility, Robert Nozick holds that in an unjust war, soldiers have a positive duty not to fight. Nozick argues that “it is the soldier’s responsibility to determine if his side’s cause is just; if he finds the issue tangled, unclear or confusing, he may not shift the responsibility to his leaders”.199 This logic, which acknowledges the connection between jus ad bellum and jus in bello thinking, recognises the moral responsibility of soldiers to think for themselves.200 Crucially, doctrine denies soldiers access to such a moral perspective.

But such a perspective is essential; in order that soldiers themselves measure the force they apply, and that the collective of which they are a part function justly. McMahan argues that:

An individual’s conscientious refusal to obey a legitimately authorised command to participate in collective wrongdoing is not harmful to the collective but, on the contrary, serves the collective’s higher interests by deterring, restraining or impeding it in the commission of great wrong or injustice…. (W)hen the collective veers in the direction of evil, loyalty may require dissent, refusal and obstruction, even at considerable personal cost.201

221 Jus in bello depends upon the self-regulation of soldiers, who cannot be regarded as insensate killing instruments. In order to fight with moral sensitivity, and to make judgements about essentially contested concepts such as proportion and justice, the meaning of which, “no amount of discussion can possibly dispel,”202 soldiers must exercise individual conscience in the way Epictetus would expect, and in the way doctrine eschews.

The moral anxiety of the Second War nuclear scientists illustrates this point. In The New Men, C.P. Snow; the physicist and novelist who served the United Kingdom Government in several important positions, describes a meeting of scientists convened to find a way of stopping the misuse of science. He has Mounteney say: “We’ve got to stop the people who don’t understand science from making nonsense of everything we’ve said and performing the greatest perversion of science that we’ve ever been threatened with”.203 The narrative voice concludes:

Some of them gave an absolute no to the use of the bomb for reasons which were too instinctive to express. For any cause on earth, they could not bear to destroy hundreds of thousands of people at a go.

Many of them gave something near to an absolute no for reasons which, at root, were much the same; the fission bomb was the final product of scientific civilisation; if it were used at once for indiscriminate destruction, neither science nor the civilisation of which science was bone and fibre, would be free of guilt again.

222 Many, probably the majority, gave a conditional no with much the same feeling behind it; but if there had been no other way of saving the war against Hitler, they would have been prepared to drop the bomb.204

This passage illustrates how nuclear force was considered justifiable only to defeat unjust war waged by Hitler, and only if there were no other way.

The passage illustrates how the scientists interpreted the jus ad bellum rightness of their cause, in order to measure the means by which they engaged in violence. In this powerful, relevant and informed novel, Snow illustrates how justice depends upon the self-mastery of individuals who cannot be dismissed as morally insensate instruments. The novel does not dramatise but reveals, the moral anguish of people who; like Roosevelt,

Bohr and Churchill were “worried to death” by the implications of decisions, which touch the existence and the nature of human society.205

Proceduralist expectations of obedience unless orders are manifestly illegal are illustrated by this example as insufficient. Moral complexity is resolved by reference to conscience, not law.206

But this is precisely the misstep of Australian doctrine, which equates ethical with legal, and presumes soldiers will subjugate their will, and participate in killing without morally consequential decision. Doctrine presumes that compliant accord with command directives will excuse soldiers from moral liability and concern. Doctrinal argument is extreme and partial. Doctrine evades jus ad bellum thinking, and presumes jus in bello liability is limited to formal convention or legal observance.

223 The Limit of Blame

The idea of blame connotes the ideas of moral responsibility, which is different from legal liability. Significantly, doctrine interprets legal compliance, as synonymous with ethical and denies individuals the right to conscientious objection. Doctrine holds that “the essence of command is the legal authority to direct subordinates toward the completion of assigned tasks”.207 Later in the same paragraph, doctrine argues that:

The (individual) is required to subjugate their will…. A person in the military must allow themselves to be ordered to do something that they may not normally be inclined to do. Once a military superior decides on a legal course of action, there is little (the individual) can do but obey and comply.208

But, even responding to military orders, individual people remain morally responsible. Individuals are not excused moral responsibility in order to maintain or strengthen the discipline system.209 Yielding to orders does not alleviate the moral burden borne by individuals. There are occasions where we would want soldiers to express independent judgement and disobey a command. Yet, doctrine prorogues the moral autonomy

Epictetus commends, expecting “subjugation” instead. Doctrine is oblivious to the inevitability of moral responsibility, and ignorant to the reality that, “to be tough enough to carry out policies that (though legal) are literally unmentionable is either to be very cowardly or very wicked”.210

224 Overstating directive command power, doctrinal argument is unsafe.

Insisting upon the subjugation of individual will, doctrine empowers a bureaucracy which “creates and maintains systems of dominance and control over individual behaviour”.211 Within this bureaucracy there is a continuity of the “school mentality of obedience to primitive rules of doing nothing until the teacher-authority allows it, permits it and orders it”.212 But doctrine cannot forgive soldiers of moral responsibility.

Doctrine cannot bear the blame for evil committed by men who allowed their conscience to be subjugated to doctrinal edict.

The Limit of Westphalia

The political ideas which inform Australian doctrine descend from the

1648 European Peace of Westphalia. These treaties installed the modern international system of sovereign nation-states213 to establish the “legalist paradigm as the standard for thinking about military intervention. (The

Westphalian model) rules out initiation of military conflict except in response to aggression”.214 However, though states remain the primary actors in world affairs, the Westphalian system is strained by ideas of global justice and governance, which are unconfined by political boundaries.215

Effecting political resolution to religious conflict, Westphalianism replaced spiritual aspirations with pragmatic ideas of political integrity.

Reflected in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter,216 Westphalian ideas coincide with just war thinking which has drawn back from a wide

225 medieval interpretation of legitimacy, to a narrower emphasis upon self- defence.217 Evoking the poleis and the aporthetos idea, this view vindicates military service only in defence of one’s fellow citizens, their property and their territory. Contemporary developments in international affairs cast doubt upon this model.

Westphalian thinking emphasises the nation state, which is synthetic, created and evolved in morally complex and ambiguous ways.

Westphalian ideas hold states equal. Reality is different. Some states have extensive claims to legitimacy. These claims reflect, for example, the political representation of citizens and the preservation of human dignities. Other states, in contrast, have nothing but legal and diplomatic legitimacy. Thus, Westphalian logic is undercut by precepts of human rights, which enjoin a more pervious state sovereignty, and the obligation of military intervention when the conduct of states falls beneath certain standards.218 Confronted by the “post-Holocaust proclamation, ‘Never

Again!’”219 Westphalian logic struggles to favour the political sanctity of states against the obligation to defend peoples against the violations of governments and to advance the ideals of global justice. Westphalian thinking is strained additionally by the fruition (and the moral complexity) of global economics, pan-national alliances such as the

European Union, and by ideologically motivated non-state actors.220

The decisive point is that as the political motives for military action become less certain and less compelling, moral ideas which vindicate

226 military action become more important. Soldiers have fought typically for the survival of their country and for freedom. But international affairs have evolved to the point where conflict in the quest for such ultimate values is unlikely. At the same time, states have found “a waning ability to attract people’s loyalties”.221 This idea is demonstrated by Van Creveld with reference to the world of sport. Once, like railways, sport was organised on national lines. Van Creveld notes:

The nationalization of sport intensified after 1918, particularly in the totalitarian states which used it to prepare their peoples for war and which, in this respect as in so many others, merely went further than the rest. It probably peaked between 1950 and 1980 or so when, in the USSR under Stalin, to attribute success in sport to any but patriotic motives was to risk punishment and when Communist Chinese competitors…invariably ascribed their success to Mao’s thought”. 222

Yet, to an increasing degree, sport reflects the influence of international commerce. Even in competitions organised on national lines, “teams are sponsored (if not owned outright) by corporations which use them for advertising purposes and deduct them from their taxes”.223 Global mercantilism has succeeded nationalism to demonstrate, alongside the almost universal abandonment of conscription, people’s feeling toward the state and their general reluctance to fight and die on its behalf.224 So, as state-centric ideologies and orthodoxies wane, ideas of moral purpose and religious identity, for a long time the “neglected component of

227 international relations become an increasingly important influence upon the lives of those in the west and in the developing world”.225

The displacement of bellicose nationalism, and the increasing prominence of moral ideas in international affairs, suggests the deficiency of doctrine which suffocates conscience and prescribes obedience no matter what:

“men must…obey orders when all their own instincts cry out for them not to be obeyed”.226

The fustian rhetoric and explicit argument of doctrine is realist, presuming individuals will cast moral scruple aside in the interests of the state. This argument is a fig leaf, which presumes obedience to command is enough to safeguard the integrity of soldiers and the ideals of justice for which they fight. But ideas of conscience, or integrity or, in Epictetan terms, prohairesis, are not constituted by compliance with a normative system like doctrine.

Conscience…arises from a fundamental commitment or intention to be moral. It unifies the cognitive, conative and emotional aspects of the moral life by a commitment to integrity or moral wholeness. It is a commitment to uphold one’s deepest self-identifying moral beliefs; a commitment to discern the moral features of particular cases as best one can, and to reason morally to the best of one’s ability; a commitment to emotional balance in one’s moral decision making, to being neither too hard nor too soft; a commitment to make decisions according to the best of one’s moral ability and to act upon what one discerns to be the morally right course of action. Conscience arises from this meta-moral commitment to morality.227

228 Conscience is thus the most fundamental of moral duties. Yet, Australian doctrine insists upon subjugation of the individual to the state. Thus prepared to coerce people against their deep moral convictions, doctrine affirms the Melian pragmatism of Tisias and Cleomedes.228 Doctrinal argument is deaf to citizens who feel obligated to follow their conscience on matters of moral significance.

In this way, doctrine fails to secure the background condition within which soldiers can behave honourably or virtuously. Doctrine presumes it is enough for soldiers to do as they are told; but this is not sufficient.

“Justice is the first virtue of social institutions,”229 but doctrine articulates a coercive argument, setting out rules of conduct that are fundamentally unjust, and which enable the Australian Defence Force to use soldiers as the means to ends.

The significance of this failure is amplified by the responsibilities of the military as a social institution which textures the morally significant features of society in a more general way.230 As a social institution, the military does not merely condition the conduct and expectations of soldiers. The military plays an important part in the entire social system, reflecting and informing the values, expectations and choices of society more generally.231 So, insisting upon unflinching obedience to authority, doctrine diminishes ideas of integrity and moral identity which are critical to ideas of social justice.

229 The Limit of Victory

In a just war, there must be “outcomes for which soldiers’ lives are not too high a price”.232 Soldiers die in war. However, in a just war they do not die in vain, but to secure morally critical values. Once these aims are won, or within the reach of political negotiation, killing and fighting becomes needless.233 For this reason, just war is limited.

The object…is a better state of peace – even if only from your own point of view. Hence, it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.234

The object is not, therefore, unbridled victory. The adversary should not be crushed unreservedly.235 A just war is realistic, not despoiled by frenzy, self-righteous zeal, intolerance or hubris.236 Thus, soldiers require moral discretion and autonomy beyond the narrow limits established by doctrine.

Conclusion

In the example of Gyges, Plato reveals power’s allurement. Illustrating the enticements of power to evil,237 Plato suggests only selfish benefit, such as reputation and honour, motivates people to justice.238 Plato reveals the challenges of power, and illustrates why ideas of moral strength and obligation are central to leadership.

Regrettably, Australian doctrine lacks coherence and logical power, and fails to enunciate any concept of personal excellence, external to the idea

230 of command. Defining leadership as “the (bureaucratic) process of influencing others,”239 doctrine contradicts itself, asserting,

“leadership…is viewed almost exclusively as a capability that resides within the leader,”240 whilst yet failing to address the nature of this

“capability”. Claiming “leadership influence (to be) independent of authority,”241 doctrine asserts “rank, uniform and medals give those in leadership positions a ‘jump start’.242.

In Australian doctrine Epictetan ideas of integrity suffocate beneath the idea of command. This is a bureaucratic concept, the “legal authority to order subordinates, (it) requires structure, can only be applied down the chain of command and requires compliance from followers”.243 The asphyxiation of individual moral thought is underlined by the Defence

Leadership Framework which “provides a structured listing of the skills, capabilities and knowledge for Defence personnel to perform at eleven identified (bureaucratic) levels”.244

This framework reveals the absence of ideas of personal merit or moral responsibility. In doctrine, ideas of relative precedence, bureaucratic position or role are misread for ideas of individual excellence. Doctrine understands the power of one over others, but not the power of one over oneself. Asseverating no moral ideal, doctrine is exposed to the moral hazard entailed by expectation that soldiers subjugate their will to command power.245 In this way, doctrine legitimates oppressive authority, and denies soldiers the proper expression of conscience and free will.

231 The consequence is to construe the soldier as a mere technician standing to the army as a weapon stands to him or to her. But this is a folly. The aim of war is a just peace. Therefore, the means of war must not encourage a disdain for human life such that the possibility of a just peace is in jeopardy. To serve this aim, soldiers must make intricate, individual and morally significant decisions, mindful of the immediate circumstances and the overarching justice of the cause. Acts permissible in a war of legitimate self defence may be excluded in more doubtful situations. The logic acknowledges the connection between jus ad bellum and jus in bello thinking. Crucially, doctrine denies soldiers access to such a moral perspective.

But such a perspective is essential because, as the political pretexts for military action become ever more ambiguous, so the moral apologia become increasingly critical.246 Military action calls not on compliance, but on conscience.247

Recalling Epictetus who enunciated the idea of integrity or prohairesis, conscience is not constituted by a theoretical framework. Conscience entails a commitment to integrity or moral wholeness. Conscience thus reflects a commitment to self-identifying moral beliefs. Such a commitment was personified by the hoplite who fought willingly for the polis out of a feeling of patriotism. Yet, ignoring this ideal, Australian doctrine insists upon subjugation of the individual to the state. Thus prepared to coerce people against their deep moral convictions, doctrine

232 affirms the enslavement of command, and denies soldiers access to conscience, which is the most fundamental of moral duties.

This discussion is significant because, more than a legal activity, war is a moral activity. War thus demands individual soldiers assert their individual will or conscience. War is conceived as a matter of state policy, not individual volition. But, the atrocities soldiers commit are their own.248 Soldiers cannot, therefore, be denied the right to act according to the dictates of their conscience.

233 ENDNOTES: CHAPTER FIVE

1 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.12 2 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.6 3 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 4 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 5 Coleman, (2009) 6 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.16 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.17: Doctrine argues, “leadership offers a choice to followers – even to the extent that this choice allows for dissent”. 7 Osiel, (2002) p. 7 8 Schwartz, (2009) p. 119 9 Doctrine Development Responsibilities in the Australian Defence Organisation, para 2.18 Leschen, (2002) pp. 5-14: Captain Leschen describes a cohesive well-reasoned doctrinal framework as an imperative, but his focus is entirely operational. 10 Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, ADDP-D, para. 1.3 11 Van Doorn and Janowitz (1971) p. xvi 12 Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, ADDP-D, Preface, p. iii, para: 3 Australian Maritime Doctrine, p.1 13 Johnston, (2000) p. 36 14 English, (2004) pp. 5, 10 15 Schein, (2004) pp. 12. Schein goes on (p. 13) to describe the organising ideas of organisational culture. He describes; “the espoused values, the ‘rules of the game,’ climate, embedded skills, habits of thinking and mental models and linguistic paradigms, shared meanings and root metaphors and formal rituals and celebrations”. He also describes, as significant, the “formal philosophy, the policies and ideological principles” which inform organisational thinking and practice. Doctrine is such a formal artefact. On p. 17 Schein draws these threads together and restates his definition of organisational culture, inter alia “a pattern of shared basic assumptions. English, (2004) p. 10: English illuminates the importance of organisational culture, which he describes as “the bedrock of military effectiveness”. English presents an analysis, less thorough than Schein, but congruent insofar as culture is seen to incorporate ideas such as “values, attitudes and beliefs,” and “norms, values and premises”. English goes on (p. 18) to acknowledge the seminal logic of Schein. 16 Doctrine Development Responsibilities in the Australian Defence Organisation, para 2.19, 2.20 17 English, (2004) pp. 15, 16 18 English, (2004) p. 18 19 Gordon, (1997) p. 580 20 English, (2004) pp. 18, 19 21 Hackett (1962) p. 63 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.4 22 Hurley, (2010) 23 Bowman, (2006) p. 100 24 Gramsci, (1971) pp. 57, 58: Gramsci suggests social or cultural influence derives from the moral paradigm of a dominant group which is embraced by a subordinate group. Huntington, (2003) p. 310: Supporting the logic of Gramsci, Huntington argues, “culture follows power”. 25Morris, (1968) p. 212 Evans M, (2001) p. 87 Mansergh, (1969) p. 95 26 Girouard, (1981) pp. 33

234

27 Cannadine, (2002) pp. xvii, xix Bean, (1950) p. 95 Malim, (1948) p. 163 Singh, (1972) pp. 1, 6 28 English, (2004) p. 65 Adams (2004): In this thesis, Adams explains the ideas of public school chivalry which exerted a conspicuous social and political effect in the first third of the Twentieth Century, and which defined, in a decisive way, concepts of honourable military service and leadership. Bowman, (2006) pp. 98, 99 29 Bowman, (2006) p. 100 30 Sturdee, (1915) pp. 2207 - 2210 31 Wyllie and Wren, (1918) pp. 111, 112 Chatterton, (1934) p. 176: Chatterton features a picture of the hole, 3.5 feet in diameter made by the penetration of a shell from Nürnberg. 32 Hough, (1969) p. 163 33 Osiel, (2002) 127 Shay, (2003) p. 6 34 Hohenzollern, (1928) p. 244 35 Ignatieff, (1997) pp. 112, 118 36 Anderson, (2009) 37 Axinn, (2009) p. 187 38 Ignatieff, (1997) p. 116 Osiel, (2002) p. 20 39 Toner, (2000) p. 22: Citing Matthews. 40 Pritchett, (1974) p. 148 41 Anderson, (1970) p. 1 42 English, (2004) p. 65 43 English, (2004) p. 65 44 FM 3-24 para. 7.11 45 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 46 Homer, Iliad, 21. 150 47 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.13 48 Nye, (2010) 49 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6 para. 1.23 50 Mills, (2000) p. 348: Mills was commenting on the degeneracy of American society, which he saw as having cast moral scruple aside in favour of the relentless pursuit of wealth. Mills wrote (p. 347): “A society that in its higher circles and on its middle levels widely believed to be a network of smart rackets does not produce men with an inner moral sense; a society that is merely expedient does not produce men of conscience. A society that narrows the meaning of ‘success’ to the big money and in its terms condemns failure as the chief vice, raising money to the plane of absolute value, will produce the sharp operator and the shady deal. Blessed are the cynical, for only they have what it takes to succeed”. 51 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 52 MacIntyre, (2000) p. 109 53 Foucault, (1995) pp. 195, 196, 197, 221 54 Foucault, (1995) p. 196 55 Arendt, (2006) p. 287 56 Arendt, (2006) p. 287 (Emphasis in the original) 57 Arendt, (2006) p. 289 58 Arendt, (2006) p. 289 59 Arendt, (2006) p. 288 60 Arendt, (2006) p. 289 61 Arendt, (2006) p. 293 62 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.8

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63 Arendt, (2006) p. 293 64 Kuhn, (1970) pp. 114, 150, 151 65 Huntington, (1981) p. 61 66 Hackett, (1983) p. 218 67 Royal Australian Navy Leadership Ethic, argues in the preface (p. 13 para. 2) “leaders inspire others when they are recognised as ethical people…” Later, in the main text (para 1.16) the Leadership Ethic argues that leadership is not about “power over others,” which is the typical command-focused perspective. Command is seen (para 5.4) to “place primacy on mission accomplishment” and to be quite a different thing from leadership. In the preface (p. 13 para 3) leadership is seen to “amplify command…with moral insight”. 68 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 69 Keegan, (1987) p. 335 70 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.6 71 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 72 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, Ex. Summary Ch. 2, p. 2-1, Para. 2.12 73 Dixon, (1994) p. 215 74 Habermas, (1971) p. 64: Habermas explains that Weber saw bureaucracy as ‘a house of bondage,” with which metaphor he described the “overwhelming power of the tendency toward bureaucratization” which demanded “a leader, strong willed and with an instinct for power”. The dominant idea was “the leader with a machine”. Later (p. 66), Habermas argues that Weber “outlined a sketch of Caesar-like democracy” by which he underlined the central themes of Weber’s sociology within which the chief theme concerned the breeding of authoritarian characters, strong enough to keep the otherwise omnipotent bureaucracy under control. 75 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.38 76 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.39 77 Walzer, (2000) pp. 316, 322 78 Stockdale, (1993) pp. 6, 17, 21 79 Sherman, 2011, New York Times, Opinionator. 80 Fukuyama, (2006) p. xx: Fukuyama articulates the potential hazard of over prominent ideas of command dominance in doctrine. He describes how, “the original bloody battle for prestige (i.e: relative command precedence) between two individual combatants leads logically to imperialism and world empire. The relationship of lordship and bondage on a domestic level is naturally replicated on the level of states, where nations as a whole…enter bloody battles for supremacy”. Fukuyama goes on to explain that liberal democratic ideas “replace the irrational desire to be recognised as greater than others with a rational desire to be recognised as equal”. Resonant with the ideology of the phalanx, this logic separates notions of servitude from ideas of service among equals. 81 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.19 82 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.19 83 Keijzer, (1978) p. 36 84 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.19: The vignette, entitled “Historical Example – A Leader’s Character,” discusses the service of the then Air Commodore, later Air Chief Marshal, Sir Frederick Scherger in the New Guinea campaigns of the Second War. 85 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.19 86 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.19 87 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.19 88 Hackett, (1983) p. 218 89 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.9 90 Walzer, (2000) p. 3 91 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.19 92 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.19

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93 MacIntyre, (1984) pp. 124, 125 Van Wees, (1992) p. 72 94 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, Figure 3-1, para 3.18 95 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 3.18 96 Australian Maritime Doctrine 1, (2000) p. 77 97 Australian Maritime Doctrine 1, (2010) p. 11 The form of words remains unchanged from the earlier doctrine: Australian Maritime Doctrine 1, (2000) p. 77 98 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 99 MacIntyre, (1984) p. 23, 28-30 100 Walzer, (2000) p. 5 101 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 45, 46, 47 102 Epictetus, Discourses 1.29.1: p. 183 103 Epictetus, Discourses 2.10.1: p. 269 104 Long, (2004) p. 92 Later (p. 139) Long describes “Epictetus’ tireless insistence that internal dialogue, self-address, and self-examination are our essential resources for…shaping one’s life…” 105 Epictetus, Discourses 1.29.3 - 4 106 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 3.34 107 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6 para. 1.23 108 Adkins, (1975) p. 2 Russell, (1995) pp. 263, 274 Long, (1974) pp. 107, 165-166, 185, 208 Olsthoorn, (2005) p. 189 109 Super, (1908) p. 77 110 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 111 Walzer, (2000) p. 20 Whitman, (1995) p. 89: Whitman notes “even aggressor nations pay at least lip service to morality…. Soldiers too, go to great lengths to excuse excesses they perpetrate on the battlefield, employing such justifying accounts as duress, ignorance and military necessity. The point is not that these justifications are sincerely and truthfully offered; all too often they are insincere and false. The important thing is that they are made at all”. 112 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 113 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 114 Shay, (2003) p. 105 115 Walzer, (2000) p. 31 116 Wolfendale, (2007) p. 95 117 Walzer, (2000) pp. 32, 33 118 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.14 (Bold face in the original) 119 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 120 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.12 121 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 122 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.8 Reitlinger, (1956) p. 278: Reitlinger illuminates the same sentiment in Himmler’s notorious (recorded) Posen speech (4. October, 1943), when Himmler praised as “hard” the SS who overcome reluctance to “stick it out,” and advance the shocking programme of “evacuation of the Jews, the extermination (Ausrottung) of the Jewish race” “This,” said Himmler, describing the atrocity which followed from SS obedience, “is a page of glory in our history….” 123 Huntington, (1981) p. 73 124 Walzer, (2000) pp. 27. Citing Ruskin. 125 Fukuyama, (2006) pp. 150, 152: Describes the ideas of human dignity and freedom, which follow deliberate, unforced and unfettered choice to risk life for a cause or ideal. 126 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7

237

127 Walzer, (2000) p. 311 Begines, (1993) p. 9 128 Ignatieff, (1997) p. 117 129 Walzer, (2000) p. 311 130 Milgram, (2009) p. 2: Citing C.P. Snow. 131 Milgram, (2009) p. 2 132 Milgram, (2009) p. 2 133 Walzer, (2000) p. 305 134 Walzer, (2000) pp. 25, 26 135 Osiel, (2002) p. 33 136 Walzer, (1970) p. 85 137 Rousseau, (1972) p. 115. My translation: “Chacun de nous met en commun sa personne et tout sa puissance sous la suprême direction de la volonté générale, et nous recevons en corps chaque membre comme partie indivisible du tout. A l’instant, au lien de la personne particuliere de chaque contractant, cet acte d’association produit un corps moral et colectif, compose d’autant de members qui lassemplee a de voix lequel recoit de se meme acte son unite, son moi commun, sa vie et sa volonte”. 138 Van Creveld, (2004) p. 192 139 Watts, (1988) p. 57 140 Walzer, (2000) pp. 28 141 Walzer, (2000) pp. 29 142 Rousseau, (1972) p. 133 143 Camus, (1969) pp. 268, 269 144 Camus, (1962) The Just Assassins, Act. 1 p. 246 145 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7, 2.8 146 Osiel, (2002) p. 196 147 Watts, (1988) p. 61 148 Osiel, (2002) p. 196 149 Walzer, (1970) p. 139 150 Shay, (2003) p. 197 151 Shay, (2003) p. 31 152 Osiel, (2002) pp. 64, 65 153 Shay, (2003) p. 153 154 Royal Australian Navy Leadership Ethic, (2010) p. 88 155 Shay, (2003) pp. 14, 31 156 Smith, (1993) p. 209 157 Smith, (1993) p. 211 A Bill for an Act relating to conscientious objection to certain defence service, proposed by Senator Vallentine (Greens, West Australia), 7 November, 1990, Senate Hansard p. 3581: In the Second Reading Speech, Senator Vallentine argued: “we must recognise the conscientious right of thoughtful individuals who question military operations which do not involve a direct threat to their country. It is not a question of lack of discipline. It is an issue of selective objection”. This (1990) Bill acknowledged A Bill for an Act to amend the National Service Act 1951, introduced by Senator Tate on 28 October, 1982, and which argued in part that “a person whose conscientious beliefs do not allow that person’s participation in a particular armed conflict shall not be required to render military service in that particular conflict so long as those beliefs are held”. In 1985 the private member’s bill put by Senator Tate was subject to a Senate Standing Committee Report which recommended at paragraph 2, (p. ix) that, “Parliament should add to its present recognition of absolute conscientious belief, recognition of specific conscientious belief so as to grant exemption from participation in a particular military conflict where to be compelled to do so would violate the individual’s sense of personal integrity”. 158 Smith, (1993) p. 211 159 Williams, (1960) pp. 427, 440, 448, 449, 460

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160 Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs (1985), para. 9, p. x and para 4.22 p. 30 (Same form of words). 161 Osiel, (2002) p. 39 162 Osiel, (2002) p. 25 163 Hanson, (2000) p. 4 Hanson, (1998) pp. 180 and 249: Citing Pritchett. Hanson, (1991) p. 4 Hanson, (2004) p. 23 Keegan, (1994) pp. 244, 245, 246 Dawson, (1996) p. 49 Raaflaub, (1997) pp. 52, 53, 54 Mitchell, (1996) pp. 96, 97, 98 164 Mitchell, (1996) p. 98 Adcock, (1957) p. 9: The call to fight, argues Adcock, was “a plain duty that admitted no hesitation”. 165 Walzer, (1970) p. 141 166 Montesquieu, (1989) Part 1, Bk. 3, Ch. 6, p. 26 167 Walzer, (1970) p. 98 Plato, Phaedo, 98e – 99a: Plato has Socrates say: “…it seemed best to me, to sit here and more right to remain and to endure whatever penalty they ordered…I thought it more right and honourable to endure whatever penalty the city ordered rather than escape and run away”. 168 Hobbes, (1996) p. 484 169 Epictetus, Discourses, 2.10.5 - 8 Epictetus, Discourses, 3.2.4 Epictetus, Discourses, 4.12.16 – 18 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 132, 135, 204 Long, (2004) pp. 201, 203 170 Plato, Crito, 51d – 54e 171 Epictetus, Discourses 3. 20. 5 – 8 172 Long and Sedley, (1995) p. 365 173 Zimbardo, (2009) Forward to Milgram, p. xv. 174 Euripides, Trojan Women, Line 764: Andromache as she kisses and relinquishes Astyanax. 175 Euripides, Trojan Women, Line 95-97 176 Euripides, Trojan Women, Line 1158-59 177 Walzer, (2000) p. 34 178 Walzer, (2000) p. 35 Yoder, (2001) p. 38 179 Whitman, (1995) p. 91 180 Huntington, (1981) p. 73 181 Shakespeare, King Henry V, Act iv, scene 1, p. 456 Walzer, (2000) p. 39 Whitman, (1995) p. 91 182 Whitman, (1995) p. 93 183 Wright, (1983) p. 7 184 Oppenheim, (1967) p. 357 (Emphasis in the original) 185 McMahan, (2007) p. 53 186 Walzer, (2000) p. 41 Whitman, (1995) p. 90 187 Kemp, (1993) p. 308 188 Walzer, (2000) p. 59 Whitman, (1995) p. 88 189 Whitman, (1995) p. 87 190 Whitman, (1995) pp. 87, 96 191 Walzer, (2000) p. 45

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192 Walzer, (2000) pp. 304, 306 193 Du Picq, (2006) p. 53 194 Grossman, (1996) pp. xv: Grossman illustrates the power of the individual soldier’s conscience. He describes the “extraordinarily low killing rates among Napoleonic and American Civil War regiments,” and notes that “at the moment of truth when they could and should kill the enemy, (many soldiers) have found themselves to be ‘conscientious objectors’”. Underlining this argument, he goes on (pp. 21-22) to describe how, after the Battle of Gettysburg, there were 27, 574 muskets abandoned on the battlefield. Of these, some 90 per cent were loaded, and some twelve thousand were found to be loaded multiple times. This indicated that many soldiers could not bring themselves to fire, and reverted instead to learned drill – standing to load the musket with powder and shot (often multiple times) until they either ran, or were themselves killed. The decisive point is that many soldiers exercised a conscientious objection to killing. 195 Coady, (1997) p. 375 196 Rawls, (2011) p. 379 197 Australian Maritime Doctrine, (2010) p. 52 198 Australian Maritime Doctrine, (2010) p. 51 199 Nozick, (1974) p. 100 McMahan (2007) p. 54: Acknowledging the supremacy of individual conscience, McMahan writes that, “if collective decision making results in a demand that a member engage in seriously wrongful action, then the member must, in this instance at least, repudiate the authority of the collective”. 200 Osiel, (2002) p. 84 201 McMahan, (2007) p. 54 202 Gallie, (1955 – 56) p. 169 203 Snow, (1972) p. 393 (125) 204 Snow, (1972) p. 393 (125) (Emphasis in the original) 205 Rhodes, (1988) pp. 528 - 529 206 Osiel, (2002) p. 106 207 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 208 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 209 Walzer, (2000) p. 312 210 Walzer, (2000) p. 296 211 Zimbardo, (2009) Forward to Milgram, p. xvi 212 Zimbardo, (2009) Forward to Milgram, p. xv 213 Huntington, (2003) p. 52 Van Creveld, (2004) pp. 86, 87, 415 214 Cook, (2004) p. 153 Walzer, (2000) pp. 58 – 63: Walzer makes a similar case, explaining how the legalist paradigm takes form under the aegis of what he calls the “domestic analogy,” that is to say, an analogy where states and international society are construed through notions of civil order. So, aggression on the international stage, among the community of states, is seen as wrong. Similarly, aggression is seen in the civil arena as a crime which is justly punished. This analogy is not incompatible with the radically imperfect structure of international society which Walzer likens to “a defective building, founded on rights, its superstructure raised like that of the state itself, through political conflict, cooperative activity, and commercial exchange; the whole thing (being) shaky and unstable because it lacks the rivets of authority”. In the absence of a universal authority or police force, the states protect their own rights and interests, and the interests of their individual citizens. These are states which, Walzer explains, “cannot be challenged in the name of life and liberty by any other states. Hence, the principle of non-intervention,” which gives rise to the idea that conflict can be justified only in the defence of aggression. 215 Robertson, (2006) p. xxxiii: “At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the dominant motive in world affairs is the quest – almost the thirst – for justice, replacing even the objective of regional security as the trigger for international action” Fukuyama, (2006) p. 351

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Huntington, (2003) p. 35 216 Jackson, (1995) p. 62 217 Coady, (1997) p. 388 Newman, (2007) p. 143 218 Cook, (2004) pp. 155, 156 Newman, (2007) pp. 140, 141 Ignatieff, (1997) p. 107 McMahan, (2007) p. 96 219 Cook, (2004) p. 156 220 Coady, (1997) pp. 387, 388 Van Creveld, (2004) pp. 399 - 401 Newman, (2007) p. 143 Onuf, (1995) pp. 44, 48 221 Van Creveld, (2004) p. 412 222 Van Creveld, (2004) p. 411 (Emphasis in the original) 223 Van Creveld, (2004) p. 412 (Parenthesis in original) 224 Van Creveld, (2004) pp. 412, 413 225 Durwood, R., Marsden L. (2009) p. 1 226 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.8: Citing Gen. Montgomery 227 Sulmasy, (2008) p. 138 (Emphasis in the original) 228 Thucydides, 5.85 - 5.116 229 Rawls, (2011) p. 3 230 Pogge, (1989) p. 33: “Social institutions play a large role in determining both the meaning and the effects of our conduct”. Pogge identifies the form of government, the legal system and the organisation of the police and military forces as among those institutions which exert such effect. 231 Pogge, (2007) p. 29 232 Walzer, (2000) p. 110 233 Walzer, (2000) p. 110 234 Liddell Hart, (1991), p. 338 235 Walzer, (2000) p. 122 236 Walzer, (2000) p. 122 237 Plato, Republic ii, 359d – 360d 238 Plato, Republic ii, 361c 239 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 240 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 3.26 241 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.9, 2.15 242 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.39 243 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.6. My emphasis. 244 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 3.26 Cullens and Kelly, (2006) pp. 32, 33: Cullens and Kelly explain “The ADF leadership model,” describing “a causal chain where desired leadership behaviours are underpinned by leadership capabilities, performance principles and ADF values”. These authors go on to describe the “performance principles and leadership capabilities listed (and) aligned to the very comprehensive Australian Defence Organisation Leadership Proficiency Framework…. the basis for appropriate leadership behaviour in the ADF”. Following is a chart (labeled “Table 1”) describing “performance principle(s),” “leadership capability” and leadership behaviour in three columns and fifteen separate boxes. Apart from the single reference to “ADF Values,” no reference to moral ideas is noted. The whole exercise seems prolix and burdened with bureaucratic cliché. 245 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 246 Fukuyama, (2006) p. 7. Fukuyama goes on to describe (p. 15) the need for rational legitimacy beyond brute force in international affairs and politics. This idea is a leitmotif throughout this entire work.

241

247 Keijzer, (1978) pp. xxiv, xxv, 43, 44, 45: Keijzer supports this conclusion, explaining how the role of independent judgement, initiative and mutual consultation has increased – though the diktat by the strict seniority system is still the modus operandi. The same practical demand for conscience and individual judgement is apparent, he explains in the sphere of complex planning and preparation and in regards to the maintenance of technically complicated equipment where expertise does not reflect the linear command structure. 248 Coady, (1997) p. 380

242 CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

Emitur sola virtute potestas

Background

This thesis investigated the ideas of merit and moral autonomy in

Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.6; Leadership in the

Australian Defence Force. Recognising war and military service as moral concepts, the thesis called to mind the dicta of Montaigne, who offered profoundly:

A man’s value and estimation consists in heart and will: there lies true honour. Valour is strength, not of legs and arms, but of heart and soul; it lies not in the goodness of our horse or our weapons, but in our selves. He who falls fighting with obstinate courage, if his legs fail him, he fights on his knees (Seneca). He who, in spite of being in danger of imminent death, abates nothing of his assurance, who, in yielding up his soul, still fixes on his enemy a firm and scornful glance, is vanquished not by us, but by Fortune: he is slain, but not conquered1

Resonant with the ideals which defined infantry battle in classical

Greece, Montaigne recalls the moral autonomy articulated powerfully by

Epictetus. Such a perspective was seen in the present thesis to be crucial to the profession of arms because military service calls, not for compliance, but for conscience.

243 Yet, lacking coherence and logical power, Australian doctrine was seen to enunciate no concept of personal excellence external to the idea of command. Doctrine was seen to understand the power of one over others, but not the power of individuals over themselves. Articulating no moral ideal, doctrine was seen to be exposed to the moral hazard entailed by expectation that soldiers subjugate their will to command power.2

Doctrine was seen thus, to legitimate an oppressive authority and deny soldiers the proper expression of conscience and free will.

Foundational Concepts

This thesis explained the basis of western military thinking in classical military practice and philosophy. Doing so, the thesis reasoned that doctrine could not be properly understood, or re-evaluated, without awareness of the ancestry of ideas:

Originally at home in larger totalities of theory and practice in which they enjoyed a role and function supplied by contexts of which they have now been deprived…. The evaluative expressions we use have changed their meaning. In the transition from the variety of contexts in which they were originally at home to our own contemporary culture; “virtue,” and “justice,” and piety” and “duty”…. have become other than once they were….3

Disconnected from their classical foundation, the moral ideas in

Australian doctrine were seen to be ambiguous, and eclipsed by expressions of command power. Acknowledging the larger historical and philosophic perspective, the present study offered a purposive reading of

244 doctrine. Informed especially by the Stoicism of Epictetus, the thesis reasserted ideas of integrity and self-mastery, which are not part of the command paradigm.

Importance of the Present Research

Recalling the Stoicism of Epictetus as a lens through which doctrinal principles may be interrogated and interpreted, this study challenged doctrinal concepts. The study has thus been a study of judgement and justification, connecting ideas of military leadership and service to foundational ethical concepts.

The importance of this study was seen to lie in the nature of war as a deliberate human endeavour for which people are responsible. Borne by many people in the societies involved, this is a moral responsibility borne immediately and profoundly by those engaged in military service. Yet, soldiers are denied access to their conscience by military doctrine that demands their subjection to command authority.4

The moral obligations of military service reflect aspirations of fair combat and acknowledge martial ideals, which are among the oldest artefacts of human morality.5 Honoured, as often in the breach as in the observance, these ideals are crucial because war is devastating. Without moral responsibility and ideals, war is merely wholesale violence.

Asserting these ideas, the present study established a position contra

Australian doctrine. Looking to the Stoicism of Epictetus, the present

245 study explained how soldiers are very far from the morally voiceless and complacent machines which doctrine demands. Soldiers enlist in military service deliberately and responsibly, but doctrine expects they suppress their conscience and abide by the directions of command, even when “all their own instincts cry out (against obedience)”.6 In this way, doctrine is unmindful of war as a deliberate human endeavour, within which people cannot avoid personal responsibility for their actions.7

Illuminating ideas of personal merit and moral responsibility fundamental to Stoicism, the present study revived vital yet quiescent classical ideas.

These ideas, which underline conscience as the most fundamental of moral duties, point to a significant post-Westphalian perspective.

The thinking which frames Australian doctrine is realist, legalist, pragmatic and descended from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.8 Reflected in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, the Westphalian model presumes the international system of sovereign nation-states, and rules out military conflict except in response to aggression. The ideas are resonant with the assertion of Huntington that:

The military man…tends to assume that the nation state is the ultimate form of political organization. The justification for the maintenance and employment of military force is in the political ends of the state. The causes of war are always political. State policy aimed at continuing political objectives precedes war, determines the resort to war, dictates the nature of the war, concludes the war and continues on after the war.9

246 Yet reality was seen to be different. Contemporary developments in international affairs and the actuality of military operations for at least the past ten years have underlined the insufficiency of Westphalian thinking.

Significantly, Westphalian logic is challenged by precepts of human rights, which enjoin a more pervious state sovereignty, and the obligation of military intervention when the conduct of states falls beneath certain standards.10 Underlining this reasoning, the present study drew attention to the “post-Holocaust proclamation, ‘Never Again!’”11 Westphalian thinking was also seen to be compromised by the fruition of global economics, pan-national alliances such as the European Union, and by ideologically motivated non-state actors.

The present study focussed on the decisive point which is, that as the political foundations for military action become less certain, moral ideas which justify military action become more important.

Recalling Epictetus, the present thesis examined ideas which, since the hoplite phalanx, have been elemental to western military tradition.

Resonant with ideas of conscience, these notions are on the same plane as integrity. The concept is one Epictetus explained as prohairesis, an idea of moral wholeness and a commitment to uphold one’s deepest self- identifying beliefs. His Stoicism thus asserts the most fundamental of moral duties. Yet, Australian doctrine insists upon subjugation of the individual to the state, and is prepared to coerce people against their deep moral convictions.

247 The Significance of Doctrine

This study argued that Australian doctrine fails to capture the ideal of service as equals in a just cause. Inspiring the phalanx, this ideal was explained as foundational to western arms. But, instead of moral principle, Australian doctrine was seen to articulate little more than authoritarianism found upon conceited belief in the commissioned class.

This is regrettable, because doctrine, the “central foundation of military professional knowledge”12 was identified by the present study as a formal expression of fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives.13 Related to creeds, beliefs, values and ideology; doctrine was seen to articulate ideas which, being

“recognised and accepted by the larger society…provide legitimacy and support to its profession of arms”.14 Enlarging this argument, the study explained the relationship between civil and military society. Ubiquitous in classical times, this connection was seen to have been reinvigorated by the camera. Since photographs revealed the Gettysburg dead, “their pockets turned out by thieves, their feet bloated by putrefaction,”15 society has been unable to romanticize or ignore the hideousness of battle and, since this time, society has been engaged in moral discussion intrinsic to conflict.

Yet, Australian doctrine was seen to be disconnected from the moral conversation, which surrounds conflict. Questions of moral purpose have acquired increasing prominence in international affairs and conflict, yet

248 Australian doctrine has perpetuated an out-moded perspective, construing soldiers as little more than the morally insensate utensils of state power.

In this way, Australian doctrine is not only out of touch with the present; it is critically out of touch with the philosophical foundations of western arms.

Service Among Equals

Exploring classical practice, this study explained the classical philosophy underpinning the ideas of western arms. Standing in the phalanx amongst moral and social equals, fifth century hoplites fought selflessly to uphold the common good16 and the public honour.17 The hoplite exemplified classical ideas of patriotic obligation and personal merit.18 But his deeper convictions, reflecting an inherited moral tradition, were resonant with the heroic ethos of Homer.19

Informed by shared ideals of civic militarism and mutual obligation in defence of a just cause,20 hoplite warfare was a philosophical watershed.

Inspired by ideas of individual merit and civic duty, hoplites fought differently because they thought differently.21 Their example persists as an intricate and significant moral metaphor. More than irrelevant abstractions, the ideas which underpinned hoplite conflict are foundational to western arms.

Over the course of chapters two and three, these classical ideas were investigated thoroughly. Decisive themes were seen to be attached to social constructs of honour, which were a leitmotif throughout the Greek

249 world, informing understanding of moral responsibility and personal excellence or aretê.

“Among the most powerful words of commendation in Homer and in later Greek,”22 aretê attached to qualities which were valued and honoured in society. This logic was underlined by Aristotle, whose

“account of the virtues decisively constitutes the classical tradition of moral thought”.23 Aristotle believed aretê was rewarded with honour,24 which he acknowledged as “the greatest of external goods” and “the prize appointed for the noblest deeds”.25

Understanding the competitive ideas depicted by Homer, Aristotle appreciated the logical relationship between honour and ambition.26 The gist was aien aristeuein:27 ever to be the best. This was an obsessive contention for honour28 counterbalanced by a pervasive “fear of humiliation, reproach and the withdrawal of affection and respect”.29

Adkins underlined the thinking, describing how, in classical society, the persistence of Homeric values entailed that “the chief good (was) to be well spoken of, the chief ill to be badly spoken of, by one’s society…”30

Fuelled by ambition, the upshot was the unabated rivalry which consumed ancient Greece. Sophocles illustrates the point when he has

Ajax resolve to die rather than endure the ignominy of public mockery.31

Discussion in chapter two explained how Ajax illustrates the heroic perspective, according to which a man was identified completely by his actions, and defined by his social context.32 For Ajax, as for Homer:

250 Morality and social structure (were) one and the same...There (was) only one set of social bonds. Morality as something distinct (did) not exist. Evaluative questions (were) questions of social fact. It (was) for this reason that Homer (spoke) always of knowledge of what to do and how to judge…. For the given rules which assign(ed) men their place in the social order, and with it their identity, also prescribe(d) what they owe(d) and what (was) owed to them and how they (were) to be treated and regarded if they failed, and how to treat and regard others if those others failed.33

Thus it was that for Ajax, a nobleman who allowed himself to behave ignobly, public shame was an intolerable prospect. Death by his own hand was preferable.

In classical Greece honour continued to be derived from aretê,34 but the moral centre of gravity had advanced, and ideas of aretê were decoupled from the particularities of social role.35 In chapter two, Sophocles was seen to illustrate this moral evolution when he has Antigone ignore the order of Creon, ruler of Thebes, to leave the body of Polyneices unburied and dishonoured.36 The question of honour is thus revealed as the question of what is due to a man, whereas Homer would have been concerned with the respects due to the king.37

As notions of honour evolved, so ideas of the hoplite’s aretê became associated with civic duty and patriotism.38 Illustrating this idea, chapter two referred to Tyrtaeus, who wrote of “aretê, the greatest possession of mankind /…a common good for the polis and the whole demos, / when a man holds firm and stands unshaken in the front of the phalanx”.39 Greek

251 hoplites were thus seen to have fought for political independence.40 But, less pragmatically, they were seen to have fought as free men “to defend and enhance the intangible honour of the community”.41 The idea was aporthetos. Land-holding hoplites committed to the defence of territory for more than pragmatic reasons, because the sight of enemy troops in occupation of ancestral land was an indignity.42

This thinking was explored further in chapter three, where the phalanx was seen to be a metaphor, reflecting ideas of citizenship and military service. The phalanx revealed cohesion, camaraderie and mutual purpose among free individuals who fought for more than political security, but for self-respect and for the respect of their community.43

Connected to steadfastness borne among “men from the same localities who served together,”44 courage in the phalanx revealed moral commitment to the common good and attached to the ritualized friendship, which was ubiquitous in Greek society.45 The hoplite was thus seen to personify defining themes of the Greek world. Art and literature were united in deference to him.46 His ideology, foundational to Western military tradition, was an epic of mutual and morally autonomous obligation in defence of a just cause. Thus, discussion in chapter three observes Hellenika, where Xenophon records soldiers, stood in the phalanx, seeking battle as the honourable way to preserve “country, homes, freedom and honours”.47

252 Underlining these ideas, discussion pointed to the aspis48 as a significant allegory of the hoplite’s commitment to the collective ideals of the polis.

This shield was “for the sake of the whole line…an unbroken shield wall was virtually impregnable”.49 Hence, to abandon the shield was “a crime against every citizen within the phalanx”.50 The same idea is pivotal to western armies which, like hoplites “fight with and for a sense of legal freedom”.51 In this way, the hoplite was seen to exemplify the modern western soldier who fights, not because he is forced or threatened, but because he is committed to a common cause.52

Enlarging upon this theme, discussion in chapter three recalled Herodotus who argued: “free citizens are better warriors, since they fight for themselves, their families and property, not for kings, aristocrats or priests”.53 Yet, fighting and dying among equals in the phalanx, the hoplite was inspirited by the mirage of Homer’s chivalric individualism.

In this way, Hoplites personified concepts which are foundational to the western military tradition. Following disintegration of the poleis, ideas of civic duty and moral autonomy, which had been inherent to the phalanx, were recaptured by Stoicism. In chapter four, Stoicism was seen to articulate these classical concepts in the uncompromising arguments of

Epictetus. Affirmed in recent times by Vice Admiral James Stockdale, the philosophy was seen to be particularly resonant with the profession of arms.

253

Stoic Autonomy

Chapter four explained that, with the collapse of the poleis came a degree of political and ethical ambiguity. Emerging as a philosophic response to this social decline,54 Stoicism recalled ideas handed on from Plato and

Aristotle.55 Significantly, Stoicism also recalled the hoplitic ideal of personal excellence and public duty. The Stoic was seen to argue that virtue is “a rational disposition to be desired in and for itself and not for the sake of any hope, fear or ulterior motive”.56 “The remote ancestor of

(this thinking was) Socrates”.57 Indifferent to physical discomfort,58 and hostile to hypocrisy,59 Socrates exemplified Stoicism.60 His “calmness in the face of death, and his conviction that the perpetrator of injustice injures himself more than his victim, all fitted in perfectly with Stoic teaching”.61

Articulating a prudential, pragmatic,62 autarchic doctrine of self- mastery,63 Epictetus was seen in chapter four to be equally tough-minded as Socrates. Exploring the ideas of moral autonomy64 and self-discipline65 which defined Epictetus’ particularly uncompromising Stoicism, chapter four revealed a philosophy which was seen to resonate with military ideals, whilst challenging the precepts of Australian military doctrine.

More than clichéd ideas of endurance, freedom qua autonomous moral purpose was the overriding theme.66 For Epictetus, the decisive concept was self-mastery,67 which was seen to require unwavering control over

254 opinions, desires and emotions. Epictetus argued that these things are within our power; up to us in a way externals are not. He argued that we undermine our own autonomy and dignity when we make material and external things responsible for our happiness. Discussion recalled Vice

Admiral James Stockdale, who argued that, for Epictetus, “there is no such thing as the ‘victim’ of another, you can only be a victim of yourself. It’s all in how you discipline your mind. Who is your master?

He who has authority over any of the things on which you have set your heart”.68 The philosophy was seen to emphasise ideas of moral autonomy which resonate with the military ideal that the soldier must:

Shoulder ethical responsibility for what he chooses to do in given circumstances. The notion that a soldier was ‘only following orders’ or that an individual acted in a certain way because others did is never an acceptable mode of ethical reasoning.69

The study explained that Epictetus rendered these ideas by the term prohairesis. Epictetus developed this idea in a distinctive way qua “will” or “volition”.70 Prohairesis was thus seen to be connected to autonomy and integrity71 and to ideas of “rational decisions about how it is appropriate to act”.72 The term recalls Aristotle.73 But Epictetus was seen to draw a tighter line than Aristotle,74 evolving the earlier Stoic position of prohairesis qua deliberation before a choice.75 Epictetus described “a moral quality…not connected primarily with actions but linked to persons and their character dispositions or state of mind”.76 The decisive theme is the “self-restriction,”77 which Bonhoffer construes as self-mastery and

255 control.78 In this way, Epictetus articulated an uncompromising philosophy, less about clichéd ideas of endurance than about moral autonomy, apprehended as integrity or self-control.79

Epictetus was emphatic, articulating an uncompromising philosophy of self-mastery: “what we choose (and who we are) depends on us”.80 This means no quality is more sovereign than moral choice; and moral choice itself is free from subjection.81 Thus, for Epictetus, virtue depends upon self-mastery, which is foundational to rational decision.82 Yet, besides the obligation we owe ourselves, Epictetus acknowledged obligation owed to others.

Besides “respect, cooperation, justice and kindliness,”83 Epictetus argued that we must discharge the obligations and duties which attach to us as people in society – even if they are unpleasant. 84 Recognising the duty attached to social roles,85 Epictetus argues that the Stoic does not choose to be a member of society, but chooses to be a Stoic member of society.86

He argues “we cannot be anything worthwhile unless we consistently act in accordance with the standards pertaining to the roles of our choice”.87

Discussion offered the example of the Stoic Senator, Helvidius Priscus.

Prepared to die, but not to neglect his obligation to the Senate,88 the example of Helvidius underlines that we must preserve our proper character as rational people, entwined within the social fabric.89 Thus,

Epictetus encourages us to be like red thread sewn into the hem of the toga praetexta, “which stands out, conspicuous in it…as a good example

256 to the rest”.90 The logic was seen to resonate with the earliest Stoic doctrines where the wise man was compared to “a good actor who, if called upon to take the part of a Thersites or of an Agamemnon, will impersonate them both becomingly”.91

The Stoicism of Epictetus gives fresh impetus to ideas of integrity and honour, which are suffocated in doctrine, where they are subordinated to ideas of command. These ideas are foundational to the western military tradition. Without them, the moral high ground identified as imperative in conflict,92 will be forfeit, because this ground depends upon the merit and responsibility of individual soldiers.

A Doctrine of Command

Chapter five explored Australian doctrine, which was seen to overstate command, whilst failing to enunciate ideals of public duty and private excellence. In this way, doctrine was held to establish a morally impaired concept. An alternative perspective was informed by the philosophy of

Epictetus.

The significance of doctrine’s shortcoming was seen to be attached to the questions of moral purpose which frame international relations and conflict.93 Import attached also to the nature of doctrine itself, which was explained as an expression of fundamental principles guiding military forces in support of national objectives.94

257 Command, the “formalized pattern of subordination,”95 “subjugation,”96 or “suppression”97 characteristic of military culture, is concerned more about “compliance from followers”98 than with individual excellence or integrity. Command enjoys primacy in doctrine, which holds that “with command comes all the power and authority over subordinates that the

‘leader’ needs to achieve tasks”.99 This is for the reason that “once a military superior decides on a legal course of action, there is little their team can do but obey and comply”.100 Hence, doctrine argues, “the military could turn its back on ‘leadership’ as a practice and rely solely on ‘command’”.101

Power in doctrine, though enunciated by genial phraseology as influence,102 is the “hard power”103 of command, which is intrinsic to the military bureaucracy. Doctrine reflects a Kuhnian cultural gestalt104 within which distinctive habits of thought and action derive from and epitomise a body of belief. Beyond this bureaucratic paradigm other ideas make no sense. Doctrinal argument is thus unable to recognise ideas of moral strength, which are crucial to Epictetus. This means that, though doctrine notes coercive power lacks utility,105 the assertion is aureate and logically hollow.

The real meaning of doctrine was seen to lie in explicit assertion that

“authority in the military is based upon rank”106 and the similar insistence that “rank, uniform and medals (were seen to) give those in leadership

258 positions a ‘jump start’”.107 This argument was undeclared, yet conspicuous, in three doctrinal vignettes to which chapter five referred.

In one such vignette doctrine made an example of Air Chief Marshal

Scherger. Described by doctrine as a “martinet,” Scherger was held to exhibit “A Leader’s Character” on the strength of the “savage dressing down” he afforded junior officers.108 Discussion explained that the most significant effect of the vignette was rhetorical. The structure and tone was not seen to be careful, precise and exact, but emphatic and hagiographic. Scherger was lionized. The vignette affirmed that, in the military, people senior in the command chain have power over those junior to them in the command chain.

Referenced to established ideas of bureaucracy, the vignette underlines the power of one over others. This is the determining theme of doctrinal argument, which overlooks the power individuals exercise over themselves. Contrasting with prevailing motifs of command dominance, concepts of individual excellence and responsibility were observed in chapter five to illuminate the central failing in doctrine.

Chapter five explained that, in the phalanx, soldiers who faced the spears were committed not merely compliant. The hoplite was not subjugated by the power of command. To the hoplite, notions of civic duty and Homeric martial etiquette were elemental to ideas of individual aretê. The hoplites fought as self-directed individuals who personified the moral purpose

Epictetus described in the discourse Of Steadfastness.109 Independent of

259 externals, Epictetus saw moral purpose in individual and rational

“judgements”110 to which everything should be “subordinate”.111

Epictetus thus articulated an idea of moral autonomy112 antithetic to doctrinal argument that people “must allow themselves to be ordered to do something that they may not normally be inclined to do,”113 and “obey orders when all their instincts cry out for them not to be obeyed”.114

Insisting upon such subjugation, doctrine operated to diminish intangible ideas of civic duty and just cause, and to turn soldiers into appliances of the state. Freedom of conscience, central to the hoplite ideal and articulated powerfully by Epictetus, was asserted as a constructive and contrastive notion. Enabling us to see soldiers as people with volition,

Epictetus enables us to see how soldiers should resist commands “that would turn them into mere instruments for killing”.115 Epictetus thus illuminates the error of doctrine, which seeks to subjugate the will of individuals to command direction.

Accepting that soldiers apply complex criteria of proportionality and necessity,116 interpreting the jus ad bellum rightness of their cause,117 and regulating the force with which they fight, this study found Epictetus illuminates how soldiers might fight well, with moral autonomy and perspective and in a way doctrine eschews. Doctrine expects soldiers to subjugate their will, to do whatever they are told, to disregard their strongest instincts and to be compliant. In doctrine, ideas of moral autonomy and responsibility suffocate beneath the imperative of

260 command. Doctrine is thus blind to the moral verity that soldiers remain morally responsible even when yielding to orders. Soldiers are never excused responsibility for their actions. The atrocities soldiers commit are their own, and they are accountable for them before the International

Criminal Court.118

Yet, in chapter five, Australian doctrine was seen to be unheeding of the imperative of autarchic moral purpose. Defining leadership as “the process of influencing others,”119 doctrine asserted bureaucratic ideas of rank hierarchy and command, whilst failing to enunciate concepts of individual merit and responsibility. The Defence Leadership Framework underlined the asphyxiation of individual moral judgement in doctrine.

This Framework was seen to be an official sham, a synthetic cursus honorum that misread bureaucratic precedence for personal excellence.

Epictetus informed an alternative perspective. He illuminated the self- identifying moral belief underpinning notions of integrity and conscience or, in Epictetan terms, prohairesis. In chapter five, this thinking was seen to be imperative to the profession of arms, where soldiers bear

“unlimited” moral liability120 for their judgements, decisions and actions.

In chapter five, Epictetan ideas of self-mastery, civic obligation and moral equality, were seen to resonate with the philosophic roots and ideals of western arms. Correspondence was observed also, between

Epictetus and the broadly humanitarian, equalitarian and individualistic principles recognised by Robin Williams as democratic.121 Epictetus was

261 thus noted to enjoy a philosophic consilience with western arms and democratic ideals, which doctrine does not enjoy. These points are expanded below. Provoked by reflection upon Epictetan argument, discussion concludes with consideration of further research, particularly apropos ideas of moral autonomy in the strict seniority system.

Democratic Ideals

Overstating command power and glossing over the imperative of individual conscience, Australian doctrine articulates a repressive philosophy removed from the classical foundations of western arms.

Discipline accepted by each of the hoplites was a long way removed from the control exerted upon men by tyranny. Thus, the Greeks who joined battle so fiercely seemed to Mardonios to be “inspired by recklessness,”122 because he failed to recognise the sense of obligation which united and inspired volunteers in the phalanx.

Just as the philosophy and tactics of hoplite warfare, were oppugnant to

Persian despotism, so the suppressive philosophy of Australian doctrine is oppugnant to the democratic foundation of the Australian nation. This is to recall The Republic, where Plato argued that the constitutions of states were reflected in the disposition of the people,123 and subsequent dicta of

The Laws, where social and political structures are held to reflect ideas of conflict.124

This point is significant because, fighting for “the moral high ground”125 against an ideologically inspired adversary, the character of western arms

262 should reflect the character and aspiration of western ideals. Such a principle is not readily apparent in Australian doctrine, where the power of one over others enjoys primacy over the high aspirations of conscience and integrity. Prescribing subjugation and calling for an irrational obedience to command, Australian doctrine betrays a bureaucratic

“provincialism,”126 out of step with the western military tradition, and the western military ideal.

This study revealed a tension between the kind of obedience enunciated in military doctrine, and the kind of obedience that is commensurate with the military ideal. There needs to be a new truth, a new and more consistent understanding of limits which might frame obedience to command direction.

New Truth

Kuhn recalled Max Planck: “a new truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it”.127 Recalling the past, this thesis provokes consideration of a new paradigm, one more suited for the future.

Australian doctrine tranquilises the ideals of personal excellence and the imperative of moral autonomy which pervaded classical thought. Whilst the “ethical accomplishment of missions”128 is acknowledged by doctrine as the ambition of Australian military service, the idea lacks moral gravity and meaning. In doctrine, “ethical” is estranged from the

263 complex, inherited moral narrative which defines the western military tradition.129 Beyond statutory compliance, the term is neither explored nor explained. In doctrine, the connotation is unthinking adherence to prescriptive codes, following rules, compliance to the laws. Speaking to licit conformance, “ethical” is used in doctrine as a legal term.

Australian doctrinal argument overestimates the moral prestige of military rank, presuming command power provides a compelling reason for soldiers to do what they are told. This model is unconvincing in the post imperial age. Military service is not merely in defence of political geography. Military victory is not the Melian triumph of the strong over the weak. Military success is dependent upon moral legitimacy, and calls for a persistent and unglamorous commitment to societies, to their protection, their enrichment and, at times, to their rebuilding.130 This logic is particularly apposite to modern conflict, which conforms rarely to the patterns of war between states. Modern conflict has passed, increasingly from the hands of the state, into the hands of the insurgent and the warlord.

Of the nearly fifty conflicts today, (most) are insurrections and guerilla campaigns against unpopular regimes, ethnic minority uprisings against majority rule, and jackal gangs roaming freely amid failed states.131

In this troubled and politically ambiguous milieu,132 it is crucially important to encourage individual soldiers to exercise moral sensitivity and responsiveness. This is not an environment where success depends

264 upon concentration of force and the indifferent application of military power. Rather, military achievement depends conspicuously upon soldiers whose idea of service is connected, like the classical hoplite’s, to concepts of moral legitimacy, civic obligation, and individual excellence.

Uncompromising, Stoic and morally explicit, this thinking is unaccounted for in Australian doctrine which prescribes unthinking, morally passive compliance.

The doctrinal suffocation of moral autonomy is grave. Defining a chivalric philosophy of personal integrity, Stoicism underlines the dictum that “there is no substitute for honour on the battlefield”.133 The ancient philosophy provokes exploration of a new truth, one that calls doctrinal argument to advance and to discard unworkable dogmas which subordinate moral strength to positional power.

There must be a new truth. This study does not provide that truth. But, this study does awaken awareness of the imperative for further research which should establish the degree to which soldiers might be expected to subordinate themselves to command direction. New research would make a valuable contribution were it to explore the professional obligation to disobey criminal or morally insupportable orders,134 and inform the basis upon which soldiers might follow command direction with moral confidence. Obedience is a military virtue, and a military necessity. But obedience should be a special kind of morally responsible obedience,

265 informed by notions of integrity and honour, not the subservient conformance doctrine expects.

Accepting that “a military needs professional soldiers of suitable character…with a demanding sense of martial honour,”135 future research would remain attentive to the historic meaning and alert to the evolving sense of these ideas. Such research would inform military doctrine, and stimulate professional scrutiny of ideals such as the chivalric, Stoic principles of moral autonomy. Such ideas, and the professional exploration of them, would inform and underpin morally sentient limits to obedience.

So doing, further research would provoke abandonment of the entrenched modes of rote and rehearsal typical of military education.

Typically not dialectic, military education is tethered tightly to military discipline structures, and thus tends to indoctrinate unthinking uniformity and unquestioning compliance.136 This is enculturated practice which reflects and perpetuates a fetish for routine and rote order following. The upshot is an immutable cultural paradigm which inhibits deliberative moral autonomy and circumstantial reasonableness, and reinforces the

“overwhelming coercive social power of military institutions” which can

“ruin moral life”.137 Jonathan Shay demonstrates that cultural structures, which fortify collective ideals and inspire the virtues and moral autonomy of individuals, would be a very effective counter-weight to this

266 particularly concerning aspect of military life. Concluding a compelling analysis of the Vietnam War he argues:

If war goals, operational methods, and military culture were so unjust that the Nuremburg principles loomed over every Vietnam combat soldier, we must recognise that the blood is on our hands too…. War itself always creates situations in which physical survival contradicts moral survival. Bad moral luck haunts every battle…. However, wrong-headed civilian/military leadership and destructive cultural patterns (like ill-conceived doctrinal argument) bloat isolated bad moral luck into tragedy.138

Further research would therefore, run counter to realist characterisations of war where ideas of “courage and equal combat” are dismissed as

“knightly and irrelevant”.139 The realist holds that concepts of honour, or chivalry were “suitable for medieval knights but (these ideas are) painfully out of step with the times in which we now live…”140 The presumption is that the “exigencies of military life result, unavoidably, in the occasional commission of ‘immoralities.’”141 Ideals, and ideas of honour are thus held to be irrelevant. This reasoning is to ignore the moral traditions of western arms, illustrated powerfully by Hector and

Ajax, and “the Greeks and Trojans (who) fought and gave no quarter in close combat, yet parted friends”.142

It is precisely “because war is so terribly destructive and inclined to escalate into total devastation,”143 that codes of honour and expectations of moral responsibility are indispensible. Honourable ideas are the bedrock of restraint. Honourable ideals are the cornerstone of moral

267 discipline. These ideas are the foundation of just peace following conflict, and critical to the reintegration into society of returning soldiers.144 Ideals are not irrelevant, but crucial and foundational to the western military tradition which accepts “there is something worth living and dying for that is more important than one’s own skin”.145 These are honourable ideals which must be explored and understood, and not suffocated by any realist doctrine of command. Ideals must not be unrealistic, they must relate viably to the world. But there must be ideals, which will be exemplified in the self-disciplined example of honourable people.

To recall James Stockdale, and to paraphrase Epictetus, these people will act autonomously, rationally and purposefully; determined not to fail in their duty to their fellow man, to God and to themselves.146 Such people will not be slavish; they will not surrender their will or conscience to the diktat of command.

268 ENDNOTES: CHAPTER SIX

1 Montaigne, (1935) Of Cannibals p. 211: Reference to Seneca and emphasis in the original. 2 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 3 MacIntyre, (1984) p. 10 Walzer, (2000) p. 16: Walzer argues similarly that “the moral reality of war is not the same for us as it was for Genghis Khan; nor is the strategic reality. But even fundamental social and political transformation…(leaves) the moral world intact or at least sufficiently whole so that we can still be said to share it with our ancestors”. Thus, continues Walzer, we learn moral etiquette by studying those who have gone before. 4 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 5 Walzer (2000) pp. 44-45 Ignatieff, M. (1997) p. 117 6 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 7 This responsibility is underlined by the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which asserts, in Article One, power over persons for “the most serious crimes of international concern”. Similarly, Keijzer (1978, p. 211) describes Article 8 of the 1945 London Agreement which established that obedience to superior orders did not free individuals from responsibility. 8 Cook, (2004) p. 153 Walzer, (2000) pp. 58 - 63 9 Huntington, (1981) p. 65 10 Cook, (2004) pp. 155, 156 Newman, (2007) pp. 140, 141 11 Cook, (2004) p. 156 12 Doctrine Development Responsibilities in the Australian Defence Organisation, para 2.18 Leschen, (2002) pp. 5-14 13 Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine: ADDP-D p. 1 14 Snider, (1999) p. 16 Hartle, (1989) p. 23: Hartle explains that a professional serves a social need in the performance of professional function. These needs are connected to fundamental social values and professional behaviour is judged against larger social expectations. Hence, explains Hartle “the most significant aspect of being a professional and a professional group is the…existence of a particular moral relationship between the professional and the society within which he or she functions”. Later, (pp 56, 85), Hartle explains the basis of law in ideas of moral authority, and the moral ideas – such as principles of human dignity and intrinsic human worth, which underpin the conventions and laws of war. These are seen to be structures which define the moral framework of the profession of arms, and which connect the military profession to the society it defends. 15 Ignatieff, (1997) p. 112 16 Keegan, introduction to Hanson (2000) p. xii Keegan, (1994) pp. 249, 251 Lazenby, (1991) p. 98 Mitchell, (1996) p. 99 Vaughn, (1991) p. 39 17 Dawson, (1996) pp. 54-5 Anderson, (1970) p. 5 18 Van Wees, (1992) p. 158 Adkins, (1975b) p. 213 MacIntyre (1984) pp. 132, 133 19 Wheeler, (1991) pp. 122, 123, 143

269

Wheeler, (2007) p. 186 Pritchett, (1985) p. 7 Adcock, (1957) p. 2 Carey, (2007) p. 41 20 Hanson, (2000) p. 223 21 Carey, (2007) p. 37 22 Adkins (1975) pp. 30, 31 23 MacIntyre (1984) p. 147 24 Aristotle, Magna Moralia, Bk. II, 1200a 20 25 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. IV, 1123b 20, 21 Aristotle, Magna Moralia, Bk. II, 1202a 30: Underlining the sense of honour as an external good, Aristotle writes, “Of goods some are external, as wealth, office, honour, friends, glory…” 26 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. II, 1107b 29 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. IV, 1123b 4-15 Aristotle, Magna Moralia, Bk. II, 1202a 36 – 1202b 5-8 27 Iliad 6: 208 28 Kagan, (2003) p.52: Kagan describes honour as central to “the entire Greek cultural experience, the heroic tradition…” Garlan, (1975) p. 181: Garlan discusses agonistic wars “inspired by the spirit of competition between cities”. Van Wees (1992) p. 25 5: Van Wees observes the “common rivalry to be the best,” and notes that “Sparta and Argos, Athens and Thebes, Korinth and Megara, Samos and Miletos fought for centuries over nothing but the control of small border territories of very little economic value…(they) sought to gain prestige by demonstrating their military superiority over their neighbours”. Mitchell, (1996) pp. 100, 101 Bowra, (1959) p. 192 29 Dover, (1974) pp. 236, 237 30 Adkins, (1975) p. 154: Adkins goes on to observe (p. 155) the corollary that, if “to have a good reputation was more important than anything else, ‘loss of face’ must (have been) as terrible (in classical society) as it was in Homer(ic society)”. 31 Sophocles, Ajax, p. 233 32 MacIntyre (1984) pp. 122, 125 33 MacIntyre (1984) p. 123: (Emphasis in the original) Adkins (1975) p. 34: Adkins makes the same point and illustrates his reasoning by reference to the example of Sarpedon and Glaucus. 34 Van Wees, (1992) p. 158 Adkins, (1975b) p. 213 35 MacIntyre (1984) pp. 132, 133 36 Sophocles, Antigone, pp. 162, 165 37 MacIntyre (1984) p. 133 38 Wheeler, (1991) pp. 123, 131 39 Rawlings, (2007) p. 100 40 Sage, (1996) p. 88 41 Van Wees, (1992) p.255: (Emphasis added). 42 Hanson, (1998) p. 180 43 Hanson, (2002) p. 52 44 Lazenby, (1991) p. 89 45 Gallant, (1991) pp. 146, 147, 152 46 Hanson, (2000) p. xxv 47 Xenophon, Hellenika, 2.4.17 48 Wheeler, (2007) p. 196: Describing the double grip aspis circa 700. 49 Lazenby, (1991) p. 95 citing Plutarch Sayings of the Spartans 50 Hanson, (2000) p. 64: (Emphasis added) 51 Hanson, (2002) p. 21

270

52 Walzer, (2000) p. 27 53 Hanson, (2002) p. 47 54 Russell, (1995) p. 260 Saunders, (1966) p. 59 Berlin, (2000) p. 211 55 Kamtekar, (2004) p. 460fn, 477, 483 Long, (1968) p. 335 Long and Sedley, (1995) p. 400 Long, (2004) p. 48 MacCunn (1906) pp. 308 – 309: MacCunn explains that Aristotle accords a greater weight to externals than the Stoics. Aristotle recognises the “resources, equipment (and) instruments without which the virtues would never come to birth…. It is impossible, or at least not easy, to act nobly without some furniture or fortune”. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 10. 1178a.9 – 25 Benn, (1902) p. 291 White, (1979) pp. 146, 148 56 MacIntyre, (1967) p. 106: citing Diogenes Laertius, 7. 89 Epictetus, Discourses 2.9.1-7: In this discourse, Epictetus describes how man is distinguished by rationality. He argues that irrational behaviour destroys the “profession” or “virtuous nature” of man. 57 Long, (2004) pp. 68, 192 MacCunn, (1904) p. 193 58 Russell, (1995) p. 261 59 MacIntyre, (1967) pp. 100 - 101 Erler, (2007) p. 99 60 Long, (2004) pp. 68, 70, 71, 98 61 Russell, (1995) p. 261 Erler, (2007) pp. 99-100 62 Bobzein, (2005) p. 333 Long, (2004) p. 91 63 Epictetus, Discourses 3. 2. 1 - 5 Christman, (1988) pp. 110, 111 64 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 126 65 Bobzein, (2005) p. 343 66 Epictetus, Discourses 4.1: Of Freedom. Bobzein, (2005) p. 341 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) p. 113 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 201: “Epictetus’ philosophy is a philosophy of freedom”. 67 Bobzein, (2005) p. 340 Epictetus, Discourses 1.12. 9–10, 4.1.1 Long, (2004) p. 119: Long refers to the idea of “unimpeded volition”. Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 201, 202: Bonhoffer argues that for Epictetus, “the mental is of absolute value”. 68 Stockdale, (1993) p. 5: (Emphasis in the original) 69 Gabriel, (1982) p. 27 70 Long, (2004) pp. 34, 160, 207, 220 71 Long, (2004) p. 209 72 Sorabji, (2007) p. 87 73 Sorabji, (2007) p. 87 Long, (2004) p. 212 Cooper, (2007) p. 12 74 Sorabji, (2007) pp. 90, 91, 92 75 Sorabji, (2007) p. 93 76 Dragona-Monachou, (2007) pp. 113 77 Bobzein, (2005) p. 331 78 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 36

271

79 Long, (2004) pp. 112, 113 80 Bobzein, (1998) p. 165 81 Epictetus, Discourses, 2. 10. 1-2 Epictetus, Encheiridion, 5 82 Bonhoffer, (2000) p. 19 Crivelli, (2007), p. 22 Long, (2004) p. 171 83 Long, (2004) pp. 30, 237 84 Epictetus, Discourses, 2.10.5 - 8 Epictetus, Discourses 3. 20. 5 – 8 Epictetus, Discourses, 3.2.4 Epictetus, Discourses, 4.12.16 – 18 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 132, 135, 204 Long, (2004) pp. 201, 203 85 Epictetus, Discourses, 4.12.17 - 19 86 Annas, (2007) p. 145 87 Long, (2004) p. 240 88 Epictetus, Discourses, 1.2.19-22 Frede, (2007) pp. 154-155 89 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 22, 82 90 Epictetus, Discourses, 1.2.23 91 Diogenes Laertius, 7.160 92 Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24: MCWP 3-33.5, para. 7.1, 7.2, 7.9, 7.10, 7.11, 7.21, 7.44 Galula, (2006) pp. ix, x, xii, 4, 8, 11, 25, 52 93 Durwood, R., Marsden L. (2009) p. 1 94 Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, ADDP-D, para. 1.3 95 Hackett, (1983) p. 218 96 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 97 Keegan, (1987) p. 335 98 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.6 99 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.12 100 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 101 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.12 102 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 103 Nye, (2010) 104 Kuhn, (1970) pp. 114, 150, 151 105 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.13 106 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.38 107 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.39 108 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.19 109 Epictetus, Discourses 1.29.1: Epictetus wrote, “the essence of good is a certain kind of moral purpose”. 110 Epictetus, Discourses 1.29.3 – 4 Long, (2004) pp. 92, 139 111 Epictetus, Discourses 2.10.1 112 Bonhoffer, (2000) pp. 45, 46, 47 113 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.7 114 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.8 115 Walzer, (2000) p. 45 116 Walzer, (2000) pp. 304, 306 117 Coady, (1997) p. 375 118 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 119 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 120 Hackett (1962) p. 63 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, ADDP 00.6, para 2.4 121 Williams, (1960) pp. 427, 440, 448, 449, 460

272

122 Herodotus, 7.9. Υ 123 Plato, Republic, VIII 544d 124 Plato, Laws I, 625, 626 125 FM 3-24 paragraph 7.44: This doctrine argues, “Lose moral legitimacy, lose the war”. The example of the French counterinsurgency in Algeria is provided as an example. In this campaign, the French condoned the use of torture against insurgents. This was seen to undermine the moral legitimacy of the French campaign, and to empower the insurgent campaign, which became associated with ideas of just cause and seen as a defensive action against oppression. 126 McGrath, (1993) p. 32 127 Kuhn, (1970) p. 151 128 ADDP 00.6, para 1.8 129 Osiel, (2002) pp. 127, 129 130 Axinn, (2009) p. 187 131 Ignatieff, (1997) p. 125 132 Yoder, (2001) p. 29 O’Donovan, (2003) p. 70 133 Anderson, (2009) p. 342 134 Osiel, (2002) p. 3 Wolfendale, (2007) p. 96 135 Osiel, (2002) p. 40 136 Keijzer, (1978) p. 50 137 Shay, (2003) p. 197 138 Shay, (2003) p. 197 139 Lackey, (1989) pp. 65, 66 140 Toner, (2000) p. 12 141 Toner, (2000) p. 12 142 Shay, (2003) p. 109 143 Yoder, (2001) p. xiii (original emphasis) 144 Shay, (2002) p. 110: “the guilt and remorse (which follow some) acts of war can drive veterans insane when they get home”. Shay, (2003) 145 Toner, (2009) p. 19 146 Stockdale, (1993) pp. 3, 4, 5 French, (2003) p. 67: Referencing Cicero, French writes similarly that dedicated Stoics will be “so committed to…moral duty that no physical or emotional distraction will be able to sway him or her from doing what is right”.

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