The Repression of the LGBT Community in Kazakhstan and Russia

University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Master Political Science International Relations 29 January 2016 Author: Bram Liplijn (10002677) Supervisor: dhr. M.C. Hanegraaff !2

Abstract

In this thesis, the pillars of stability theory by Johannes Gerschweski will be tested in the cases of Kazakstan and Russia. The focus is on the repression of the LGBT community in both countries by their respective autocratic regimes. Moreover, this thesis gives new insights and an overview of the legal and cultural strategies that autocratic regimes use to repress LGBT people. Little research has be developed in both fields. The analysis shows that the Russian regime stabilizes itself by legitimating its rule by using anti-LGBT rhetorics, by repressing it with both legal restrictions and cultural norms, and by co-opting with the Russian Orthodox Church in doing so. When it comes to Kazakhstan, the image is less clear. Although the Kazakh regime represses the LGBT community with both legal restrictions and cultural norms, legitimization and co-optation have little do with it.

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Table of Contents Abstract 3 List of Tables 5

1 Introduction 6

2 Theoretical Framework 10 2.1 The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression and Co-optation 10 2.2 Strategies to Repress Interest Groups: Legal Restrictions and Cultural Norms 14

3 Methodology 20

4 Kazakhstan 24 4.1 Legitimation: Family Values 24 4.2 Repression: Legal Restrictions and Cultural Norms 25 4.3 Co-optation: Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions 30

5 Russia 32 5.1 Legitimation: Anti-LGBT discourse 32 5.2 Repression: Legal Restrictions and Cultural Norms 33 5.3 Co-optation: The Russian Orthodox Church 39

6 Analyzing the cases of Kazakstan and Russia 41 6.1 Legitimation 41 6.2 Repression 42 6.3 Co-optation 45

7 Conclusion 47

Bibliography 49 !4

List of Tables

Table 2.2.1 Overview of legal restrictions 17 Table 2.2.2 Overview of cultural norms 19 Table 3.0 Overview of the main concepts and indicators 22 Table 4.2 Forms of repression in Kazakhstan 30 Table 5.2 Forms of repression in Russia 38 Table 6.2.1 Overview legal restrictions Kazakhstan and Russia 43

!5 1

Introduction

The 31st of July 2015 was a special and hopeful day for many Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender activists in Kazakhstan. In Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the International Olympic Committee had come together to hold its 128th IOC Session, and, more importantly, to decide which of the two remaining bids would have the honour to host the 2022 Winter Olympics. Only two cities were left in the race: Beijing, China and Almaty, Kazakhstan. To the disappointment of many LGBT activists, Beijing gets the chance to host an Olympic event for the second time. The vow by the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, that his capital will host a ‘fantastic, extraordinary and excellent’ event, made it ultimately come out as the winner. Almaty was defeated by 40 to 44 votes, with one IOC member abstaining (Phillips, 2015). This decision was not so much a disappointment because the Kazakh LGBT activists are huge sports fans, but more importantly because it is a lost opportunity to draw attention to the problems this marginalized group faces. The hope of many human rights campaigners was that if Kazakhstan was chosen to host the Winter Olympics, the country would face great international pressure to improve the conditions for LGBT people. Tatiana Chernobyl, a lawyer and consultant for Amnesty International, said in a response to the outcome:

Now that we don’t have the Olympics, we are afraid that there won’t be that pressure that we could use to get some changes here” (Flintoff, 2015).

The changes she suggests include a stricter enforcement of the Kazakh laws to protect people with different sexual and gender orientations from discrimination and violence. The fear of the Kazakh LGBT community is that the government is going to implement a ‘Russian-style’ law that would restrict gay rights. The famous banning of the so-called ‘propaganda about non-traditional sexual relationships to minors’, which was passed in Russia in 2013. Their fear is justified by the fact that earlier in 2015 Kazakhstan’s parliament already passed similar anti-propaganda law, which was later struck down by the Kazakh constitutional court (Flintoff, 2015). As mentioned above, the Russian state has already made more progress in restricting the rights of its LGBT-population. The ‘anti-gay propaganda’ law was passed just a year before the

!6 Winter olympics of 2014 were hosted by Russia in Sochi. The law drew widespread international criticism because of this event. In addition, many Russian LGBT organizations had the same hope as the ones in Kazakhstan: that the international attention would pressure the government to take a less discriminatory stance. Although the spotlight on Sochi initially constrained the Russian government, when the Olympics were finished, there was little result. Yelena Goltsman of the organization ‘Rusa LGBT’ stated that:

“Some are still in denial, and unfortunately for those, I believe the awakening will be a very cruel awakening” and “Many people are actually starting to explore what their chances of leaving the country [are]” (Huffington Post, 2014).

The only change did not come out of Russia, but from the International Olympic Committee when it added a clause to the contract for the host country that it should ban any form of discrimination (Flintoff, 2015).

These examples signal that the position of the Kazakh and Russian LGBT community is threatened more and more by their respective states. Discrimination is not only experienced on a day to day basis in daily life, but states actively promote it, or have plans to do so, by proposing and issuing legislation. As shocking and important as these examples are, they only describe the phenomenon of what is happening to LGBTs in Kazakhstan and Russia. It does not give an answer to the question of ‘why’ and only a limited answer to ‘how’. In reports by newspapers on the issue, the anti-gay propaganda law is often mentioned and serves as the prime example. Though this is an important piece of legislation that heavily influences the lives of LGBTs in Russia, it is not the only way in which the state represses this minority. The governments of Kazakhstan and Russia have multiple strategies of suppressing this sexual minority. One of the aims of this thesis is to map these strategies used in the two countries to downplay, marginalize, discriminate, or in the term that will be used throughout this thesis, to repress its LGBT community. Before giving an overview of the strategies used by Kazakhstan and Russia to repress their LGBT community, it is important to know why the governments of these two countries try to do so. There must be a reason why this sexual minority is targeted with specific legislation that makes their position inferior to the rest of the population. The suggestion that the Orthodox culture has a big influence is probable, but at the same time rather vague. Also the Communist legacy of the

!7 Soviet-Union, which both countries were part of, is a reasonable explanation, but one can argue how much history influences the current practices of a state. Furthermore, both suggestions focus more on society in general than on the government in specific, while the mode of governance in this case is more important. Arguing that both Kazakhstan with President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Russia with President Vladimir Putin have in essence an autocratic regime (Ulfelder, 2005), and that these autocratic regimes have one single goal: prolonging its reign as long as possible, it is better to take the theory of the pillars of stability by Johannes Gerschewski as a starting point. Based on the before mentioned questions, the main research question is as followed: Why and in what way have Russia and Kazakhstan repressed LGBT-interest groups over the last five years?

As already highlighted, this research has great societal relevance. Although the positions of the LGBT community in both Kazakhstan and Russia has never been ‘optimal’, the repression of this community has become a worldwide topic of debate. The anti-gay propaganda law has put the LGBT community in the spotlight, with both positive and negative effects. In more countries in the former-Soviet region the discussion on the position of sexual minorities in society has become topical and extreme. On the other hand, there has been a stronger Western focus on the protection of LGBT-rights and the abuses of this group in both Kazakhstan and Russia. Numerous NGO’s dealing with civil liberties, such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Freedom House, have established reports on this subject over the last couple of years. The theoretical relevance of this research is twofold. First of all, it contributes to the discussion on the functioning of autocratic regimes. While there have been many studies on democratic regimes, few scholars have contributed to the literature on autocratic regimes, and more importantly, why they endure. The importance to research this is best captured by the following quote:

“A quarter of the world’s nation states and territories are ruled by dictators. Moreover, there are many regimes in which democratic and autocratic elements of rule are mixed in various ways. It thus behoves political scientists to study the trajectories, manifestations and perspectives of non- democratic rule in general and autocratic rule in particular” (Köllner & Kailitz, 2012).

In other words, autocratic regimes, in all their different forms, are part of this world and they are here to stay. It is thus important to research how they remain stable. Not only in general, but also in relation to the repression of a specific community. In this case the LGBT community. Secondly, !8 there is a gap in the literature on the strategies used by states to repress specific societal groups, and certainly when it comes to the LGBT community. There is no article that gives a complete overview of the repressive strategies used by states. While this is exactly the aim of this research: to map what strategies are used by states to limit the space to maneuver for LGBT groups. Though this research will focus on a specific group in two countries, I am convinced that it will be able to generalize the results and that it will lay the foundation for further research. That is also the strength of this research. It fills up the gap in the literature and gives us a more sophisticated understanding of the ways in which the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan try to influence LGBT-groups within their country.

The central argument of this thesis is that although both the autocratic regimes of Kazakhstan and Russia repress the LGBT community within their borders, they do this for different reasons. Only in the case of Russia the repression of this sexual minority is stabilized by all three pillars. In the case of Kazakhstan, it is harder point out the relation between legitimization and co-optation and the repression of the LGBT community. To build this argument, I will first elaborate on the theoretical framework, the theory of stability and the strategies of repression. This chapter is followed by a methodological overview in which I present the subquestions, the case selection and the data collection and data analysis methods of this qualitative research. The chapters four and five are about the cases selected for this research, respectively Kazakhstan and Russia. Both chapters are structured according to the three pillars. In chapter 6, the link is made between the theories as set out in the theoretical framework and both cases. This analysis is followed by the last chapter in which I make concluding remarks, discuss this research and give recommendations for further research.

!9 2

Theoretical Framework

In order to answer the first question of this thesis, the ‘why-question’, I will make use of the theory by Johannes Gerschewski and his three pillars of stability. In this article, he argues that the stability which is sought after by autocratic regimes rests or relies on legitimation, repression, and co- optation. It is harder to connect a theory to the ‘how-question’, because there has been little research on the strategies of governments to repress specific groups or communities, let alone the LGBT-community. Quitin Wiktorowicz argues in his article on state power in Jordan that two broad groups of state repression can be distinguished: legal constraints (such as the anti-gay propaganda law) and cultural norms, which is much harder to grasp. Another author, Lynette J. Chua, has also made a great contribution to the field with her article on the interaction between social movements and autocratic states. The theoretical insights from both articles will be used to lay the foundation of the research for this thesis.

The theoretical framework is divided into two parts that are based on these two main questions. I will begin introducing by the article of Gerschewski who discusses why autocratic regimes repress interest groups within their borders. I support his argument by making references to various other scholars, such as: Wolfgang Merkel, Stanislav Shkel & Eduard Gareev and Beatriz Magaloni, among others. Secondly, I will introduce the various strategies to repress interest groups, the second pillar, as described in the literature by Wiktorowicz and Chua.

2.1 The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression and Co-optation

Little research has been published about the functioning of autocratic regimes, especially compared to the number of studies on democracies in all its forms: representative, direct, deliberative, presidential, parliamentarian, etc (Merkel & Gerschewski, 2011). The most sophisticated research on autocracies has been developed by Geschewski. He argues that there are three pillars that stabilize autocratic regimes: legitimation, repression, and co-optation. Not only do these pillars stabilize the regime, but it also makes them endure, irrespective of their subtype. Gerschewski (2012) argues that these three pillars develop over time and that ‘reinforcement processes’ take

!10 place within and between them. He states that there are three research waves on which the three pillars are based:

“The totalitarianism paradigm until the mid-1960s that highlighted ideology and terror; the rise of authoritarianism until the 1980s that placed more emphasis on socio-economic factors; and, starting with Geddes’ seminal article in 1999, a renaissance of autocracy research that centered mostly on strategic repression and co-optation” (Gerschewski, 2012: 14).

Not surprisingly, the main focus will be on the latest period and the strategic repression and co- optation by states. Though this does not mean that one pillar can be considered as more important than the other ones.

“Only the joint just of cooptation, repression and legitimation may minimize the risks involved in each of them separately” (Shkel & Gareev, 2014).

Thus, an autocratic regime is not stable without all three pillars stabilizing each other. A regime is threatened when a serious crisis occurs in one pillar and the other two cannot sufficiently compensate this instability (Merkel & Gerschewski, 2011).

Gerschewski (2012) defines legitimation as“the process of gaining support” and he argues that it seeks to guarantee compliance with the rules, passive obedience and toleration within the population. Simply put, it’s about people believing that an autocratic regime is legitimate. It is not a question about whether it actually it, but more if it is perceived as such. In arguing this Gerschewski makes a reference to the Weberian tradition of “legitimacy belief”, stating that:

“legitimation seeks to guarantee active consent, compliance with the rules, passive obedience, or mere toleration within the population” (Gerschewski, 2012: 18).

There has been a widespread discussion if legitimation of the autocratic regime is necessary since its power does not depend on public opinion. Magaloni (2008) only sees repression and co-optation as the two principal instruments stabilize the regime, or to ‘survive in office’. Though Köllner & Kailitz (2012) and Shkel & Gareev (2014) argue that this is a misconception. The globalization and informatization of society have changed the political reality. Legitimation of the regime is important, because it is one of the vital underpinnings of every political order. There must always be the idea that a regime, whatever the type may be, is legitimate.

!11 “Today’s autocracies cannot rely entirely on their abuse of power in a strictly hierarchical, pyramid-shaped political order as the unconstrained tyrants of the past - from whom all power was derived - might have done” (Gerschewski, 2012: 18).

In capturing the complete concept of legitimation, both performance and output legitimation, Gerschewski introduces specific support and diffuse support, as coined by Easton (1967). The former refers to the fulfillment of demands and is thus performance oriented while the latter is more about the representation of the regime, what it stands for, a normative-ideological foundation (Merkel & Gerschewski, 2011). Performance is for an autocratic regime more important than for another regime type. Since autocracies are in principle less stable, they depend more heavily on performance in the field of security, order and economy (Merkel & Gerschewski, 2011). Specific support can be measured by looking at the economic, social and public order performances of a country, while diffuse support is best measured by surveys about people’s attitude, which in turn can be influenced by propaganda, promoting fear and enemy stereotypes (Shkel & Gareev, 2014; Gerschewski, 2012).

The second pillar that Gerschewski suggests is repression. He describes this as the backbone of autocracies, though on its own it will not keep autocratic regimes stable, because in the long run it has proven to be too costly. Gerschewski uses the definition of repression given by Christian Davenport:

“Repression involves the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions” (Davenport, 2007: 2).

An often used addition to this definition is given by Wintrobe (1998). Who also includes actions taken by the regime to limit the political freedom of citizens. Thus, repression is a tool to neutralize the dangers to the autocratic regime. Gerschewski operationalizes repression by making a distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ intensity repression, or ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ repression, although the difference between the two is rather fluid (Merkel & Gerschewski, 2011). High intensity repression or coercion are visible acts that have a great impact, such as targeting well-known individuals, a large number of people or major (oppositional) organizations. Examples of this high intensity repression are the repression of demonstrations, (violent) campaigns against parties, and

!12 attempted imprisonment or assassination of oppositional figures. It targets the physical integrity and individual freedom (Merkel & Gerschewski, 2011). Low intensity repression or coercion is more subtle on the other hand. It is less visible because it is mostly about groups of minor importance. Concrete examples of low intensity coercion are the harassment and intimidation of individuals and groups, formal and informal surveillance apparatus, and the curtailment of political rights such as the freedom of assembly (Gerschewski, 2012). Gerschewski argues that repression is best captured by the different indexes by Freedom House, Amnesty International and the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI).

The third and last pillar that stabilizes autocratic regimes is co-optation. Gerschewski defines co- optation as“the capacity to tie strategically-relevant actors (or a group of actors) to the regime elite” (Gerschewski, 2012: 22). The strategically-relevant actors are most of the time military and business elites who should be persuaded not to exercise their power to obstruct. In other words, they need to be co-opted. In the article by Bertocchi and Spagat (2001) it is stated that governments respond to a potential oppositional threat by co-opting it. Not surprisingly, they give the example of post-Soviet Russia in which the government used the privatization process to build a coalition with the traditional industrial and agricultural power structure. Thus, potential rivals are co-opted by offering them power-sharing deals (Magaloni, 2008). According to Shleifer and Treisman (2000) there are two ways an oppositional stakeholder can be neutralized.

“Either he must be expropriated of the stake that gives him leverage or he must be co-opted - persuaded not to exercise his power to obstruct” (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000: 8).

This implies that stakeholders are not being banned from playing the game, but that they are dealing with new cards.

“Transforming stakeholders from opponents to supporters of reform often requires the creation of rents by the government that these stakeholders can be offered in exchange for their support” (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000: 9).

They come to conclusion that rather weak governments are most inclined to ‘support’ oppositional stakeholders on order to widen their support base. This can be done in two ways, via formal institutions such as granting offices and policy concessions and via informal institutions: patrimonialism.

!13 “Patrimonialism refers to a strategy of generating loyalty to the regime by sharing and distributing rents among actors who do not belong to the inner circles of the political elite” (Gerschewski, 2011: 10).

These actors are tied to the regime by rents, but at the same time it is avoided that they grow too strong.

A similar concept to co-optation has been developed by Wintrobe (1998). He argues that dictatorships, autocratic regimes, remain their power by combining a strategy of repression and loyalty at the same time. On the one hand, the co-opted coalition members should express their loyalty towards the regime in supporting it. On the other hand, the regime downplays its strength to prevent its support from collapsing (Shkel & Gareev, 2014).

2.2 Strategies to Repress Interest Groups: Legal Restrictions and Cultural Norms

There is not much literature that explicitly focuses on how states try to control interest groups within their countries, let alone on how they repress LGBT-interest groups. Though based on the available literature, there are two broad strategies of repressing the rights of this sexual minority: Legal restrictions and cultural norms. Legal restrictions limit the space to maneuver for LGBT- groups. Cultural norms norms are fostered by the legal tools, for example the criminalization of LGBT-groups, and the media and are important when it comes to public support for legal restrictions. In this way, governments indirectly influence the position of the LGBT community.

Wiktorowicz (2000) describes in his article how there has been as change in the so-called ‘social control mechanisms’ used by stated. He argues that there has been a shift away from the use of force towards alternative measures, such as legal restrictions. Wiktorowicz states that:

“regimes have increasingly relied upon the disciplinary technologies and tactics of the modern state, rather than on coercion” (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 48).

Regimes seek discipline, stability, order and predictability and have in achieving this instituted technologies of surveillance. The social control of states over individuals is enhanced by dictating when and where they are present. In order to be able to exert control, states in the Middle East, the example given by Wiktorowicz, make use of the administrative apparatus and regulation:

“to observe, register, record, and monitor” (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 48).

!14 The aim is to record all available data of collective action to eliminate uncontrollable space. In other words, legal measures are taken to restrict the space to maneuver of interest groups. The same is argued by Lynette J. Chua in her article on gay collective action in Singapore. She also describes multiple forms of legal restrictions by the the government in order to marginalize this community and to block its organization. She argues that the Singaporean government imposes legal restrictions to restrain civil-political liberties, with the aim of achieving social and political control (Chua, 2012).

The case used by Wiktorowicz is state power in Jordan. He gives a set of examples of how the Jordan government tries to control all forms of group work and collective action. All groups must be registered at a specific ministry:

“which is charged with reporting, inspecting, observing, and counting collective activities within its administrative purview” (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 49).

All ministries have a specific area of responsibility that they control, which also limits the space for organizations, since they are not allowed to engage in activities that are under control of multiple ministries. For example: political parties, union and professional associations are regulated by the ministry of interior. The ministry of culture, on the other hand, is in charge or regulations all voluntary cultural organizations etc. This ‘bureaucratic mechanism’ is used instead of more overt repression. Almost the same accounts in the case of Singapore. The formation of associations of 10 or more persons is prohibited by the Societies Act. Just as organizing public assemblies, and public speeches by the Public Order Act (Chua, 2012).

By doing this, the Jordan state, according to Wiktorowicz, aims to control and monitor all collective activities that take place within its borders.

“Social groups that operate in the shadows of society outside the panopticon gaze of the bureaucracy are unpredictable and thus potentially threatening to state power” (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 49).

This is the biggest challenge of a system that relies on total control: groups that do not ‘conform to the logic of the system’ and that remain outside the radar of the government. This is why the government requires that all ‘civil society activities’ are exercised within the organizations or groups that are within the reach of the administrations: the respective, above mentioned, ministries. Wiktorowicz states that if these activities fall outside the state-delineated space, then they are a !15 potential source of disruption and thus must be limited and repressed. A concrete example from the Jordan is case is the Law of Public Meetings which makes it illegal to hold informal gatherings, especially when it comes to discussing political affairs. When individuals, groups or organizations want to hold public meetings then consent by and registration with the authorities is needed. If a public meeting is organized, it has to meet strict requirements such information on the location and the objective of the meeting and the signing by at least fifty ‘well-known individuals’ who are not objectionable to the regime. If these rules are neglected, then the organizers of the meeting can be subject to punishment, such as imprisonment.

“Any meeting held illegally is subject to force. The law is rarely enforced to its extreme, but it s successfully used to circumscribe unregistered collective action” (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 50).

The aim of the regime is to maximize surveillance and social control over civil society organizations by utilizing bureaucratic processes, regulations and other practices.

“A myriad of requirements makes organizational activities transparent to state officials, thus reducing the chances of a collective action ‘surprise’ that should threaten regime power” (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 51).

If such control is not met by the government, then it can take up a more extreme measure against an organization and dissolute it. In the case of Jordan, most dissolutions occurred because the above mentioned requirements were not sufficiently met.

Another way of the state to exert control is that it can restrict ‘transgression’ into the political sphere. In other words, civil society organizations are not allowed to deal with politics. In Jordan, only political parties are allowed to organize political activities, as stated in the Political Party Law, Law 32 of 1992 (Wiktorowicz, 2000). In addition, Law 33 of 1966 prohibits that nongovernmental organizations are used for political gains. All activities of such organizations should “maintain an unambiguously apolitical content” (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 54). The aim of these laws is to prevent the emergence of opposition movements. In the case of Singapore, politics is also a controversial topic of discussion for civil society organizations. If an organization wants to have a meeting about a ‘political subject’, then it has to be approved by the municipal administration (Chua, 2012). Also issues of religion are identified as controversial.

A different strategy to repress civil society organizations is by regulating, controlling and censoring the media. The Singaporean media is controlled through a licensing system in which the !16 state has to approve the management appointees. On top of that, there are specific rules for specific subjects. Chua states that:

“Content that ‘justifies’ or ‘glamorises’ lifestyles such as homosexuality, lesbianism, bisexualism, transsexualism [and] transvestism’ are specifically banned” (Chua, 2012: 716).

Moreover, when the internet was introduced in Singapore in 1994, it was censored with regards to positive portrayals of homosexuality.

The most extreme restriction for the LGBT community in Singapore is the prohibition of certain sexual conduct. Section 377A of the Penal Code marks “gross indecency” between men as criminal. This encompasses public displays of affection to private, consensual sex. Not surprisingly, same-sex relations have no legal recognition in Singapore (Chua, 2012). Table 2.2.1 gives an overview of the legal restrictions as discussed in the literature above.

Table 2.2.1 Overview of legal restrictions

Legal Restrictions Examples from the literature Restrictions to organize Singapore (Societies Act) Jordan Restrictions and threat of punishment of any Singapore (Public Order Act) form of formal and informal meeting, such as Jordan (Law of Public Meetings) informal gatherings, group activities, organizational meeting, assemblies and public speeches Media regulation through a licensing system Singapore (Broadcasting Act; Newspaper & Printing Press Act) Content is controlled and censored on specific Singapore (Free-to-air Television Programme subjects Code) Internet censorship Singapore Penalization of “gross indecency” between men Singapore (Section 377A of the Penal Code)

Chua (2012) states that the use of laws and legal procedures to suppress the LGBT community does not only have a direct effect, but also a great indirect impact, which she refers to as ‘the cultural power of repressive law’ (Chua, 2012: 721). In other words, cultural norms also restrict the room for maneuver for the LGBT community.

!17 First of all, an indirect outcome is that such laws make suppression more acceptable and legitimate (Barkan, 1984). Another result is that it can discredit a movement and thus making it less appealing for supporters to join and to stay active.

“Prosecution may also help discredit the protesters as common criminals and frighten other activists and potential supporters” (Barkan, 2006: 182).

Going back to the case of Singapore, gay activists have not been arrested because of their protest, but examples have been set by opponents who were imprisoned because of the violation of legal restrictions, and as a result lost cultural legitimacy.

“Thus, gay activists shun illegal tactics, not only because of formal sanctions, but also because leal repression sends the message that such tactics can cost them cultural legitimacy” (Chua, 2012: 721).

Another result of the legal restrictions set by the state is that gay activists adapt a strategy that is not public, overt and confrontational (Chua, 2012). To put it differently, they operate in the shadow. This form is self-discipline is also highlighted by Wiktorowicz, because it has two positive effects for the state: (1) the group, in this case the LGBT community, marginalizes itself and (2) it will cost the state less means: money and police and legal capacity.

“While controlling nongovernmental organizations in civil society through disciplinary power, upheld by repression, the state has also implemented self-disciplining mechanisms within the community of nongovernmental organizations itself, thereby reducing the cost of surveillance of the state” (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 55).

This self-discipline is also mentioned by Chua. In addition, she links it to being a legitimizing source, in a cultural form.

“Obedience to formal law earns cultural legitimacy, where disobedience loses it” (Chua, 2012: 714).

Thus, the LGBT community loses cultural legitimacy if it does not obey the rules that are set out by the government. Consequently, it has to self-discipline itself in its expression. In another quote, Chua confirms this statement.

!18 “Gay activists shun illegal tactics, not only because of formal sanctions, but also because legal repression sends the message that such tactics can cost them cultural legitimacy” (Chua, 2012: 721).

Table 2.2.2 Overview of cultural norms

Cultural Norms Examples from the literature Discredit a movement Singapore Frighten supporters Singapore Undermine cultural legitimacy Singapore Enforcing self-discipline Jordan Singapore

!19 3

Methodology

In building the main research question of this thesis, I have established three subquestions that have to be answered and that constitute the structure of this thesis. First of all, I will focus on the question why autocratic regimes try to repress LGBT-groups within their borders. In doing so, I will make use of the literature on autocratic regime stability, mainly the article by Johannes Gerschewski on the three pillars of stability for autocratic regimes: legitimation, repression, and co-optation. I argue that LGBT-groups are repressed as a means of stabilizing the regime. Secondly, I will look into the strategies autocratic states use to repress LGBT-groups. In the articles by Lynette J. Chua and by Quitan Wiktorowicz, there can be made a distinction between two broad strategies of states to repress interest groups: legal restrictions and cultural norms. I argue that one strategy is not used more often than the other, but that they influence and reinforce each other. Thirdly, I will research to what extent there has been a change in the repression of LGBT-interest groups in Russia and Kazakhstan. Has their situation become worse over de last five years because of the repressive strategies of their autocratic regimes. As previously mentioned in the introduction, the main research question of this thesis is:

- Why and in what way have Russia and Kazakhstan repressed LGBT-interest groups over the last five years?

In order to answer this question. I have established three subquestions that each answer a distinct part of this main question: why, how, and has it become worse.

1) Why do Russia and Kazakhstan repress LGBT-groups? 2) What strategies do Russia and Kazakhstan use to repress LGBT-groups? 3) Has there been a shift in the strategies used by Russia and Kazakhstan over the last five years? In other words, has the repression of LGBT-groups become worse?

Answering the main research question and these subquestion will give insights in how the repression of the LGBT community in Russia and Kazakhstan may develop. Based on the three !20 subquestions, I have formulated five hypothesis that will be tested in this research. The four hypothesis are based on the first subquestion. I argue that the autocratic regimes of these countries repress repress their LGBT community as a means of seeking stability of their regime. Based on the second subquestion, the third hypothesis is about the usage of both legal restrictions as cultural norms to repress the LGBT community. They do not only influence each other, but also reinforce in other. Especially legal restrictions shape the cultural norms. Lastly, the fifth hypothesis is, not surprisingly, based on the third subquestions. I argue that the repression by both countries has become worse over the last five years, because of the strategies used by Kazakhstan and Russia. An overview of all the hypothesis is given below:

1) Kazakhstan and Russia repress their LGBT communities to stabilize their autocratic regime. 2) Kazakhstan and Russia legitimate their autocratic regimes by gaining diffuse support for their anti-LGBT discourse. 3) Kazakhstan and Russia use a mix of legal restrictions and cultural norms to repress their LGBT community. 4) Kazakhstan and Russia co-opt with ‘the Church’ to repress their LGBT community and to stabilize their autocratic regime. 5) The repression by Kazakhstan and Russia of the LGBT community has become worse over the last five years.

There are several key concepts in the research questions and the hypothesis that need to be defined. Firstly, and probably the most important one, is autocratic regime: “A system of government in which supreme political power to direct all activities of the state is concentrated in the hands of one person, whose decision are subject to neither external legal restraints nor regularized mechanisms of popular control” (Johnson, 2005). When it comes to LGBT, I will take the definition used by Human Rights Watch. LGBT (community or people): Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender; an inclusive term for groups and identities sometimes associated together as ‘sexual minorities’. This thus includes all individuals and organizations who identify themselves with LGBT. For the following concepts, I mostly use the definitions as established by Gerschewski, since he combined these in his pillar of stability theory. Legitimation is the process of gaining support to guarantee compliance with the rules, passive obedience and toleration within the population. A variable of legitimation is diffuse support, which can be conceptualized as the representation of the regime,

!21 what it stands for. In the case of repression, I will use the definition by Davenport (2007): Repression involves the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions. This also includes actions taken by the regime to limit the political freedom of citizens. As stated in chapter 2, in this research repression has two variables: legal restrictions and cultural norms. Legal restrictions are about legalistic and state power tools, of which ‘the law’ is the most prominent one. In contrast, cultural norms are more fluid and are about the discretion of a movement, frightening supporters and undermining cultural legitimacy. Co- optation will be defined as the capacity to tire strategically important actors to the regime. In this case, I will focus on informal actors or institutions, which are actors who do not belong to the inner circle of the political elite, but are tied to it by rents. Lastly, ‘the Church’ is defined as all religious institutes. Table 3.0 gives an overview of the main concepts and their indicators, as discussed in theoretical framework. The light grey areas are not included in this research, because of their apparent ‘misfit’. Both specific support and formal institutions have little to do with the repression of the LGBT community and are for that reason left out. Table 3.0 Overview of the main concepts and indicators

Main Concept Secondary Level Indicator Level Legitimation Specific support Economic, social, educational and security performance Diffuse support The influence of propaganda, fear, scapegoating and enemy stereotypes Repression Legal restrictions See table. 2.2.1 Cultural norms See table 2.2.2 Co-optation Formal institutions Policy concession via parties, elections, legislatures Informal institutions Capacity to bind strategic actors via rents

(Gerschewski, 2010: 11-14).

As mentioned in the introduction, the cases that have been selected for this research are Kazakhstan and Russia. There are several reasons why these two countries are ‘most similar’. They are historically tied to each other trough their Soviet legacy. Both republics are successor of the Soviet-

!22 Union. An interesting detail in this shared history is that Kazakhstan was the last USSR republic that declared its independence (BBC, 2012). Since the dissolution of the Soviet-Union, both Russia and Kazakhstan have grown considerably in economic terms. Out of the five Central-Asian countries, Kazakhstan is the richest and the average income almost matches that of Russia. In 2014, the GDP per capita in Russia was $12.736, while in Kazakhstan $12.601 (The World Bank, 2016). Though the most important similarity between the two countries is that they both have an autocratic regime, which is the most important condition to test the pillars of stability theory. By focusing on two specific cases, Russia and Kazakhstan, it will be possible to give an in-depth analysis of the issue.

In order to conduct this qualitative research, I will make use of a content-analysis of reports and documents of various NGO’s who conduct fieldwork in the region. Human Rights Watch has established both for Kazakhstan and Russia in-depth reports on the position of the LBGT community in both countries. The two most important reports are provided by Human Rights Watch. The HRW Report of 2014: ‘License to Harm, Violence and Harassment against LGBT People and Activists in Russia’, contains 94 contains interviews with LGBT people and activists from 16 cities and towns in Russia. The HRW Report of 2015 on Kazakhstan: ‘That’s When I Realized I was Nobody, A Climate of Fear for LGBT People in Kazakhstan’ is based on 23 interview with LGBT people and activists, mostly from the city of Almaty. In addition, the Soros Foundation Kazakhstan was the first NGO to write a report on the situation of LGBT people in Kazakhstan. ‘Unacknowledged and Unprotected: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender people in Kazakhstan’ is based on a questionnaire with 991 respondents. Other important reports that are used in this thesis are of the OSCE, Freedom House and Amnesty International. In addition, several editorial articles are used to highlight examples of the last five years, the period of 2010-2015.

Unfortunately, I was unable to collect and to conduct enough interviews to include in the research. Because of various reasons, I was only able to arrange two interviews of which one was collected. Since this number is very small, it would not contribute in any way to this thesis.

!23 4

Kazakhstan

4.1 Legitimation: Family Values

Apart from some some public statements made by members of the Kazakh parliament, the Majilis, the Kazakh authorities have been rather silent when it comes to discrediting and scapegoating the LGBT community. President Nursultan Nazarbayev has not made any reference to the LGBT community over the last years and also on the official website of the President, Akorda, there is no reference made to anything that can be linked to LGBT. Also the party program of Nur-Otan, Kazakhstan’s biggest party with President Nazarbayev as chairman, does not make any reference to the LGBT community in its party program. The party program does make a reference to the family values as the ‘cornerstone of society’.

“In the age of globalization, only those people who cherish their history, culture and native tongue can be successful. The development of the Kazakh language, culture and traditions and the preservation of identities of all nationalities is our strategic priority. Family is the most important institute in preserving values of our society. Continuity of generations, respect for seniors, care of children traditions of mutual support, diligence and aspiration to knowledge are all forged in the family. Strengthening the family and preservation of traditions shall guarantee stable development of our statehood. Therefore, we must make every effort to strengthen the cult of the family” (Programme of the “Nur Otan” Party, 2013).

Thus, it becomes clear that the promotion of family values is one of the most important priorities in Kazakhstan. Although there is no anti-LGBT rhetorics, the assumption can be made that this can be read between the lines.

Moreover, targeting or scapegoating is the LGBT community is not part of the discourse of the Kazakh regime. President Nazarbayev rather focuses on the country’s development. He has said about the developments of the last 25 years of Kazakhstan, that it is a “great journey from disorderliness to prosperity” (HRW, 2015a: 2). To most social issues, the Kazakh government has a rather neutral position. According to the Human Rights Watch report of 2014 on Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev applies a strategy of ‘palatable social reform’. Also when it comes to the position of

!24 Kazakhstan in international affairs, this can be considered as rather neutral, playing a proud leadership role in international forums. In 2010, it was the chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Two years after, it was elected for the United Nations Human Rights Council. Also future, comparable projects play an important role in formalizing the regime’s position.

“International ambitions continue to pulse among the country’s political elite” (HRW, 2015a: 2).

Among these future projects, the Expo 2017: ‘Energy of the Future’ and its quest for a non- permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in 2017-2018, are the most important. Also the lost bid for the Winter Olympic games of 2022 was one of Kazakhstan’s international ambitions. Though these ambitions have little to do with the position of the Kazakh government towards the LGBT community. The suggestion is that the Kazakh government derives its legitimacy from other, mainly economic, sources. Though as discussed in the previous chapter, this specific support is not included in this research.

4.2 Repression: Legal Restrictions and Cultural Norms

Homosexuality was decriminalized in 1998 by the Kazakh state. Since then, the government has passed favorable legislation in relation to gender marker change. Though when it comes to the rights of the LGBT community, the state has done nothing to suggest legislation that bans discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. In other words, its anti- discrimination legislation is lacking an LGBT section. Article 142 on ‘Violating equality of the citizens’ and article 164 on promoting hate based on different social characteristics of the Kazakh Criminal Code do not have any reference to sexual orientation and gender identity (OSCE, 2010). This contributes to lawlessness of discrimination of LGBT people. Moreover, also the Kazakh state continues to associate homosexuality with criminal behavior. ‘Lesbianism’ and muzhelozhstvo (sodomy) are listed in the Kazakh Criminal Code in articles 121-123 as separate categories for faced sexual contacts (OSCE, 2010). In addition, there are restrictions on freedom of assembly and speech and there have been reports of the detention of civil society activists (Flinthoff, 2015).

Moreover, the few regional human rights organizations that are active in Kazakhstan have adopted a discourse of intolerance towards the LGBT community, because they argue that there is no visible discrimination of this group. According to Ermek Abdrasulov, vice-president of Eurasian

!25 Human Rights, the legislation of a country matches the sense of justice and legal culture of that country (Kamalova, 2015).

Also transgender people say that they face great problems when it comes to Kazakh legislation (HRW, 2015a). Gender laws make it extremely difficult to change the gender marker in official documents. This is allowed by the state, but the requirements that have to be fulfilled are extremely high. Tim Shenker, a Kazakh activist and transgender man, states that the law makes it impossible for him to change his documents since he did not undergone a full sex-reassignment surgery. Starting his transition six years ago, he still uses his own ‘male’ documents, in which he has his old name and old photo. The result is that it is extremely difficult for him to travel somewhere. According to Schenker, transgender people are exposed and ‘outed’ every time they need to provide identification (Flintoff, 2015).

After the anti-gay propaganda law was introduced in Russia in 2013, Kazakhstan’s southern neighbor, Kyrgyzstan, followed in June 2015 with a similar law that is believed to have even harsher punishments (Putz, 2015b). In Kazakhstan, an anti-gay propaganda law passed its parliament and was signed by President Nazarbayev in February 2015. The law ‘On Protection of Children from Information Harmful to their Health and Development’ was largely based on the Russian propaganda bill, although the final draft were never publicized (HRW, 2015a; Human Rights First, 2015). However, according to ‘rumors from within the government, the discriminatory law induced a very broad ban on the sharing or publication of information referring to same-sex relations in settings where children might be present (HRW, 2015a). One of the initiators of the law, Majilis (Kazakhstan’s lower parliamentary house) member Aldan Smayil, said that:

“the draft provides a ban on information products depicting cruelty and violence, provoking children to life-threatening acts, including suicide, containing scenes of pornographic, sexual, and erotic nature, promoting non-traditional sexual orientation” (Putz, 2015a).

Other arguments that have been mentioned by the initiators are that same-sex relations contradict the ‘national mentality’ and that they ‘threaten the family values and demographics’ (Kosolapova, 2014).

Surprisingly, the Kazakh Constitutional Court announced on the 26th of May 2015 that the pending legislation on ‘propaganda of nontraditional sexual orientation’ was unconstitutional (HRW, 2015b). According to the Kazakh media, the Constitutional Court rejected the proposed bill because the wording was vague and unclear (Human Rights First, 2015). Though this does not

!26 mean that the implementation of the anti-gay propaganda law has been avoided. Several conservative lawmakers, including Aldan Smavil, have indicated that they will work on passing another version of the law in the near future (Flintoff, 2015). Furthermore, there have been calls by the most extreme homophobes to class homosexuals as ‘criminals’ and to impose a complete ban on homosexual relations’ (Kosolapova, 2014).

The Kazakh government has put in place legal restrictions on the use of internet for civil society groups and NGOs, which has complicated the relationship between the latter and the government, expressing its fear (OSCE, 2010). In 2009, the Kazakh government issued new internet legislation that can be considered as a ban of gay propaganda on the internet. Also due to the vague wording of this law, LGBT activist in Kazakhstan are afraid that they are at risk for putting information about sexual orientation and gender identity issues online (OSCE, 2010). The list of websites that have been banned by the government has continually expanded including already hundreds of websites (Freedom House, 2015b).

The report on Kazakhstan of Human Rights Watch (2015a) argues that there is a ‘climate of fear’ in the country about being honest about sexual orientation and gender identity. This fear has grave consequences for the people that feel it: it impedes their access to eduction, employment and health care. According to lawyer and consultant for Amnesty International, Tatiana Chernobyl, the major problem is the hostile public opinion towards the LGBT community and that there is no apparent change that the younger generation will be more tolerant.

“Public attitudes in Kazakhstan are very much negative among young people, among older people, so you can’t say who is the average hater” (Flintoff, 2015).

Another related problem mentioned by Tim Shenker, a transgender man, is that many Kazakh citizens do not have a concept of fundamental human rights.

“They don't care for their own rights. They don't know that they have rights, so of course they don't think about the rights of other groups of people” (Flintoff, 2015).

According to the OSCE study of 2010, LGBT people most often mention public hostility as the biggest problem to their wellbeing, among family violence, homo and transphobic attitudes promoted by the media and by public officials (OSCE, 2010). This is not without reason. According to polls conducted by Soros Foundation Kazakstan, 81.2% of the respondents expressed the opinion

!27 that LGBT people face disapproval and disrespect from those in the general population (Soros KZ, 2009).

In order to avoid public hostility and humiliation, LGBT people have adjusted their lives to life in the shadow. To put it differently, they have taken measures for self-discipline. According to Arman Bima, a dance teacher and choreographer in Almaty, fear keep many LGBT people in the closet and in denial about discrimination.

“So they repeat the things that say, ‘No, why I should say to everyone I am gay? If you do this secretly, everything is good.’ But it’s not true. Everyone has the problem” (Flintoff, 2015).

Secrecy is not only important because of public opinion, but also about seeking recourse to justice. Human Rights Watch (2015) reports that the trust of the LGBT community in Kazakhstan in the national human rights institutes or other bodies, such as courts, is extremely low.

These concerns of the LGBT community are not without reason, there is a stigma associated with criminalization and medicalization when it comes to same-sex relationships. Kazakh public institutions and civil servants have made public statements of disapproval of the existence of same-sex relations and families. During a public discussion of the reforms of the Kazakh Family Code in 2008, public servant of the Almaty department on the Protection of Children and the Almaty Public Security Office stated that minors can be traumatized because they live in a family with LGBT parents (OSCE, 2010).

Also public statements made by politicians have a great impact on public opinion and can be considered as ‘extreme’. Before mentioned member of parliament Aldan Smayil has stated that LGBT people are ‘criminals against humanity’ and that homosexuality is ‘amorality of the highest degree’ (Kosalopova, 2014). Another member of the Kazakh parliament, Bakhytbek Smagul has made similar statements saying that the promotion of LGBT rights is an abnormal policy of Western countries and they (the Kazakh) have to protect themselves from this phenomenon. Kairbek Suleymenov, also a parliamentarian, has said that the national traditions of all the nations living in Kazakhstan are in contradicting with the tendencies developing in Western countries, pointing to the same-sex marriage.

“I am sure that we will never allow this, but we have to create mechanisms, legal and political leverage to counter them” (Kosolapova, 2014).

!28 Current mayor of the capital Astana and former Minister of Defense, Adilbek Zhaksybekov, has made statements in his position as minister denying LGBT military service (Kosolapova, 2014).

Also when it comes to law enforcement by the police, the LGBT community is discriminated and even threatened. Several LGBT NGOs have reported cases in which the police neglected violence reported by LGBT people and also detains people of this group to extort bribes (OSCE, 2010). Violent robbing of gay men by gangs is not being investigated by the police (Flintoff, 2015). Moreover, when it comes to physical violence against LGBT people, such as beatings, punches, sexual molestation and rape, in 15% of the cases the perpetrators are police (Soros KZ, 2009).

In addition, LGBT people in Kazakhstan face discrimination in the workplace and in schools. Employment discrimination ranges from firing, refusing to hire, or denying promotion, based on someone’s sexual orientation or gender identity. In order to avoid this, more than half of the LGBT community conceal their sexual identity, and more than a quarter have only told a selection of people. Only 8.9% feel they can be open about themselves on the work floor (Soros KZ, 2009). The same accounts for discrimination in education: at school or university. LGBT respondents in the Soros Foundation Kazakhstan report stated that they have been physically and psychologically abused by fellow students and teachers (Soros KZ, 2009).

Lastly, medical specialist often refuse to provide services to LGBT people (OSCE, 2010; Flintoff, 2015). Furthermore, medical professionals express a number of stereotypes through means of media about the LGBT community that are harmful to the position of the latter. There are several examples of well-known sexologists explaining on television why people can be LGBT that are scientifically unproven (OSCE, 2010). Another example is given by the Open Societies Foundation. This organization has reported the about the difficult position of MSM (men who have sex with men) in relation to the prevention of HIV infections. When researchers of the Open Societies Foundation met with the Republican AIDS Center, a government body responsible for the national response to HIV, they were told that gay men did not exist in Kazakhstan. As a response to the question why the MSM were left out of the AIDS response (Doyle, 2012). This signals the complete unwillingness of medical specialists to threat the LGBT community or to include it in its health prevention programs. It is supported by research done by the Soros Foundation Kazakhstan, reporting that two third of LGBT people hide their sexual orientation or gender identity from medial specialists in order to avoid discrimination (Soros KZ, 2009). Table 4.2 gives a complete overview of all the forms of repression. !29 Table 4.2 Forms of repression in Kazakhstan

Legal Restrictions Cultural Norms Lack of anti-discrimination laws based on sexual Hostile public opinion orientation Kazakh Criminal Code still associates LGBT Measures for self-discipline by the LGBT with criminal behavior community Strict gender ‘transitioning’ laws Public statements made by Kazakh (local) authorities and politicians Proposed anti-gay propaganda law Weak or absent law enforcement by the police Restrictions on the usage of internet by Employment discrimination organizations Discrimination in education Refusal of treatments by medical specialists

4.3 Co-optation: Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions

Religion is playing a more and more important role in Kazakh society. Although the Kazakh government is extremely wary of extremism (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Kazakhstan, 2014), the state actively promotes what it calls ‘traditional religions’, such as Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Shintoism, Hinduism and Buddhism. In order to do so, the Kazakh government took the initiative to host a ‘Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions’, being aware of the increasing role of religion in society (Akorda, 2016). Since the first congress in 2003, every three years, so five times in total, the congress came together at the Palace of Peace and Accord in the Kazakh capital Astana. Although the Congress never issued any statements on LGBT issues, it is strongly focused on promoting the values of morality and spirituality. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Head of the Secretariat of the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions and Chairman of the Kazakh Senate, has stated while addressing the Congress that:

“As confessional guides, you are the keepers of moral and ethical values, influencing the minds and feelings of individuals and the society as a whole. You can inspire good deeds and accomplishments and help overcome the barriers of ignorance, fear and misunderstanding” (Astana Times, 2014).

Though the Congress does not specifically spread anti-LGBT sentiments in society, but keeps its wording rather vague, it does not mean that religious leaders in Kazakhstan express themselves in the same wording. The OSCE describes in its 2010 report on Kazakhstan a case in which religious institutions have promoted intolerance towards the LGBT community in the country. In the summer of 2008, there was the rumor that a possible gay pride parade was going to be held in the city of !30 Almaty, although organizing the parade was not confirmed by any LGBT organization. As a response, public statements were made by religious leaders of a number of denominations denouncing the event.

“These institutions referred to LGBT people as ‘decomposing pseudo-subculture’ that is a threat Kazakh society’s spiritual traditions and morality. They urged the state to ‘oppose the tendencies which decompose society and harm the dignity, security and wellbeing of people’” (OSCE, 2010).

Thus, there is a weak link between the Kazakh government and religious institutions active in the country, via the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions. The statements made by different religious institutions as a reaction on the possible pride parade, did not seem to be fostered by the authorities.

!31 5

Russia

5.1 Legitimation: Anti-LGBT discourse

In many articles it becomes clear that one of the main motives of the current government of Russia, under the rule of president Putin, focuses on the LGBT community because it is looking for a someone to blame and it wants to divert attention from, for example, its plundering of the Russian economy (Childs, 2013). Also Fierstein (2013) states that the true motives of Putin lie elsewhere and that it has less to do with the LGBT community in specific. He argues that politicians scapegoat a certain group to solidify their bases and also to draw attention away from their failing policies, which is what is happening in Russia at the moment.

“Counting on the natural backlash against the success of marriage equality around the world and recruiting support from conservative religious organizations, Mr. Putin has sallied forth into this battle, figuring that the only opposition he will face will come from the left, his favorite boogeyman” (Fierstein, 2013).

According to Stone (2013), the ‘gays’ are blamed by Putin for Russia’s decline. He states that this move by the president is a political one and that the goal is to gain trust while taking control over a nation that is weak. Moreover, Stone argues that the autocratic regime of Russia is on the verge of collapsing.

“Anti-gay laws are the canary in the coal mine for a nation ready to collapse” (Stone, 2013).

Also Weber (2013) agrees with the above mentioned statements and argues that spreading the anti- LGBT sentiment in society is merely a way of distraction public opinion, which will now not focus on the economic problems of the country, because the government does not have the will or the skills to tackle these problems. In doing so, the government of president Putin has turned on the LGBT minority in the country and has rewritten history in the process (Childs, 2013). The government uses a narrative that depicts LGBT people as a threat and destructive to Russia’s population growth, its traditional way of life and even its statehood (HRW, 2014a).

!32 Moreover, part of this narrative is that the LGBT community is portrayed:“as a corrosive influence of Western governments” (HRW, 2014a). Central to this narrative is the concept of values. Nontraditional sexual practices and lifestyles versus traditional values of a heterosexual union, a large family, religious observance and obedience to authority. This ideological rhetoric is used by the government to persuade Russians to reject LGBT equality. The discourse of traditional values is used domestically and internationally to limit the space for individual human rights and to justify the restrictions on fundamental freedoms. President Vladimir Putin has also criticized Western values himself in a statement at the Valdei Forum in September 2013:

“[countries] are implementing policies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships, belief in God with belief in Satan” (HRW, 2014a).

This shows that the scapegoating of the LGBT community is used to legitimize the domestic and foreign policies of Russia.

5.2 Repression: Legal Restrictions and Cultural Norms

Homosexuality was officially decriminalized in the Soviet Union in 1993, though this has not resulted in a flourishing LGBT community, which remains largely underground (Guilbert, 2015). Especially the return of Putin to the presidency of the country in May 2012 has marked a change with the previous, more liberal post-Soviet period. Since the reinstatement of Putin as president of Russia, the country has adopted tightening control on civil society organizations, especially the ones which are funded from abroad, and barring those deemed to pose a threat to its constitutional order, defense, and security (Guilbert, 2015).

The ‘infamous’ Russian anti-gay propaganda law was passed unanimously by the Russian parliament and came into force on the 30th of June 2013. The authors of the law initiated it, because they were convinced that LGBT ‘propaganda’ was widespread in the country and that the children had to be protected. Because of this argumentation, the law consist of amendments to the Law on Protection of Children from Information Harmful to Their Health and Development and the Code of Administrative Violations (Federal Law No. 135-FZ) (HRW, 2014a). Thus, the law focuses exclusively on ‘propaganda of nontraditional sexual relationships among minors’ and the ban is applied to all information provided via the press, television, radio and the internet (HRW, 2014b). Other arguments that have been mentioned by Russian officials to justify the law are that it is

!33 supposed to stop the decline in the birth rate and that it should limit the number of divorces (Childs, 2013).

Anyone who breaches the law will be fined, starting 4,000 and 5,000 rubles (US$120 to $150). For government officials and organizations these fines are even higher, respectively ranging from 40,000 to 50,000 rubles ($1,2000 to $1,450) and up to 1 million rubles ($30,000). Even heavier fines may be imposed when the ‘gay propaganda’ is carried out using mass media and telecommunications. This also includes the internet. In the worst case, the activities of organizations can be suspended for up to 90 days (HRW, 2014a).

What’s problematic about the law is that the wording is considered to be ‘vague’ which makes the use of of it, or disuse, easy for the Russian authorities. Virtually any public discussion on LGBT issues can be restricted (Flintoff, 2015). Officially, the law bans ‘propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations’, opening up the options of prosecuting and fining for example those who hold gay pride rallies (Bauder, 2013).

A direct effect of the anti-gay propaganda law is that people have been convicted because of it. Three LGBT activists were fined because they were holding placards with messages of support for LGBT rights in public spaces. Written on the placards were messages such as:

“There is no such thing as gay propaganda,” and “Being gay and loving gays is normal” (HRW, 2014a: 3).

In addition, a newspaper in the Khabarovsk region was fined because it published an interview with a gay teacher who had been fired because of his sexual orientation and his LGBT activism. The teacher, Alexsander Ermoshkin had stated in the article that:

“My own existence proves that homosexuality is normal” (HRW, 2014a: 5).

The newspaper’s editor was fined 50,000 rubles ($1,450) by a Khabarovsk court in January 2014.

The anti-gay propaganda law also includes the internet. The report of Human Rights Watch describes the case of a social network group, Deti-404 (Children 404) that was fined. Deti-404 is an online group that offers psychological support and a community for LGBT children where they can share stories of attacks and humiliation. The authorities of Nizhni Tagil filed a case, based on the propaganda law, against the social network group, which was in first instance dismissed because of the lack of evidence that the Deti-404 promotes nontraditional sexual relations (HRW, 2014b: 5).

!34 Though a year later, the founder of the social network, Elena Klimova, was convicted by the same court and fined 50,000 roubles (Guilbert, 2015).

Another prohibition based on the anti-gay propaganda law is that it is not allowed anymore to hold public events, such as a gay pride parade. But also when it comes to much smaller rallies, activities from several regions have reported that the local authorities refuse to grant them permission, based on the law with the argument that there is a risk that children might be exposed by the event (HRW, 2014b: 4). On the 20th of May of this year, Moscow police broke up a gay rights rally and arrested 20 people. Permission to hold the parade was requested, but the Moscow authorities had blocked it for the tenth year in a row, again arguing that the risk for children to be exposed to ‘nontraditional sexual relations’ would be too high (Reuters, 2015).

There are a couple of examples in which a court ruled strongly against the interests of the LGBT community. The Russian LGBT Network, one of the few LGBT interest organizations, has reported a case in Murmansk’s Lenin district. After an unknown toxic gas was sprayed inside the office of LGBT organization ‘Maximum’, the court ordered that there no reason to initiate a criminal case. Violetta Grudina, one of the victims of the attack, filed for a review of the judgement based on physical damage and bodily injuries, but this was also struck down by the court. (LGBT Network Russia, 2015). According to Artem Zimin, lawyer of the Russian LGBT Network, the whole process has been stalled by the authorities.

“From the very beginning, the police was unwilling to investigate the crime. Despite the fact that we filed a complaint against the police to investigate the case properly, and that Grudina met Alexander Patrikeev, Commissioner for Human Rights, who promised to support an effective investigation of the case, the time limits were constantly exceeded. In addition, we have reasons to believe that the investigation did not take all necessary steps to solve the case” (LGBT Network Russia, 2015).

This examples highlights that also courts repress the LGBT community.

The strictest legislation that has been proposed is about parental rights for LGBT people. In September 2013, a State Duma deputy Alexei Zhuravlyov from United Russia, the biggest and ruling party, proposed a bill that would make nontraditional sexual ‘activities’ of one or both parents reason to deny parental rights. In other words, the law would prohibit LGBT people to have children (HRW, 2014a). The bill was withdrawn a month later, reportedly in order to improve and to revise it (Nicholas, 2013). It has not be been reintroduced yet.

!35 The line between legal constraints and cultural norms that has been drawn in the theoretical framework is not as strict in reality.

According to Human Rights Watch, the implementation of the law has great consequences for the LGBT community in Russia.

“The law denies LGBT people equal social standing and implies that their identities and relationships are unnatural and perverse” (HRW, 2014a).

Although, as mentioned earlier, only four people since the outcome of the June 2014 HRW report were fined for violating the law, the indirect consequences of its adoption were much graver. According to the human rights organization it has spread the violence and harassment of LGBT people and it has also given Russian officials and other public figures the opportunity to give more prominent homophobic hate speeches. Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at HRW has stated that:

“This law openly discriminates against LGBT people, legitimizes anti-LGBT violence, and seeks to erase LGBT people from the country’s public life” (HRW, 2014b: 3).

The results of the law:

“the implied message that those who seem gay - a highly subjective, perception-based determination - are socially acceptable targets of discrimination and violence (O’Connell, 2014).

When it comes to the Russian public opinion towards the LGBT community, the situation has worsened over the last five years. Especially after the implementation of the anti-gay propaganda law, the public has become more hostile towards this sexual minority. Tany Cooper, a Russian researcher at Human Rights Watch, states that the law has fueled the fears within the LGBT community. Moreover, she argues that it promotes the anti-LGBT sentiment and it legitimizes the violence among the public (Guilbert, 2015). According to Provirnina, a self-titled drag king LGBT people are dehumanized.

“We [LGBT people] are treated as subhuman, with no civil or human rights. We are social non- entities, and we are even considered diseased and dangerous to society” (Guilbert, 2015).

Unfortunately, this view is widely shared among the Russian public. A 2013 poll conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Center (VTSIOM) showed that 88% of the Russians supported the amendments of the anti-gay propaganda law and only 7% stated that they were against it. Moreover,

!36 the poll showed that 54% of the Russians were in favor of the banning and criminalization of homosexuality (Russia Today, 2013).

According the the Human Rights Watch report of June 2014, the anti-gay propaganda law also justifies the disruption of LGBT events and activities. The organization got many reports by Russian activists telling that their public events got disrupted (HRW, 2014a). Guilbert (2015) describes the example of Russian drag artist Yulianna Prosvirnina and the disruption of her Moscow based gay an lesbian party. According to her statement, a hooded gang entered the venue and stopped the party.

“Then tables started flying, glasses were breaking everywhere, and girls were kicked in the stomach. Many people hid and most were so scared - too scared to stand together and defend one another” (Guilbert, 2015).

Other examples are the disruption of LGBT rallies and protests by extreme right-wing conservatives.

Closely linked to this disruption is the (organized) assault of LGBT people by homophobic individuals and groups. Human Rights Watch (2014a) interviewed for its latest report 26 people who had been slapped, punched and kicked: with some sustaining serious bodily injury. Many of the attacks took place in public places such as cafes, on the subway, or on the street. Most of them took place in the evening or at night, but there are also reports of assaults during the day and in the presence of other people. The report describes one case in which bystanders wanted to intervene when a LGBT person was assaulted, but stopped after the assailants told them that the victim was gay (HRW, 2014a).

Because the government has portrayed LGBT people as a hazard to children with the anti- gay propaganda law (Law on Protection of Children From Information Harmful to Their Health), the idea has grown that LGBT people are linked to pedophilia. The most prominent group that has been established to ‘protect’ children is Occupy Pedophilia, a loosely organized network of homophobic vigilantes was founded by Maxim Matrsinkevich, a right-wing extremist. Referring to itself as a ‘social movement’, it has branches in a dozen of regions and cities across Russia. It operates by luring victims on fake dates, ambushing them, accusing them of being gay or a pedophile and then subject them to humiliation and abuse. These encounters are most of the time filmed and spread on the internet to ‘warn’ LGBT people about their behavior. The number of videos that have been posted by Occupy Pedophilia and like-minded groups has increasingly grown

!37 in the lead-up and aftermath of the adoption of the anti-gay propaganda law (HRW, 2014a). Another form of discrimination is taking place within educational institutes. Both Freedom House and Human Rights Watch have reported cases in which teachers were removed from their jobs based on their sexual orientation, gender identity or their support for equal rights for LGBT people (Freedom House, 2015a; HRW, 2014b). Human Rights Watch documented seven cases of job dismissals of LGBT educators after there had been complaints about their position. Almost in all examples, the dismissal or forced resignation was the outcome of a public campaign by groups of parents concerned with the moral well-being of their children. It is important to note that most of these groups made a reference to the anti-gay propaganda law as the reason for their ‘moral outrage’ (HRW, 2014a; HRW, 2014b).

Just as in the case of Kazakhstan, LGBT people are also discriminated by the police in Russia. LGBT victims of violence who report this to the police are routinely dismissed and even mocked, solely on the basis of their sexuality. Violence against the LGBT community is not taken seriously by the authorities (Guilbert, 2015). According to Weber, the state plays an important role, on both ends:

“What is happening in Russia is state-sponsored violation of a minority’s human rights. The authorities condone or perhaps even encourage attacks against LGBT people, and the police do nothing to protect them” (Weber, 2013).

This lack of law enforcement is not because the police has too little tool to prosecute homophobic violence. On the contrary, there is no will to do so, and more importantly, there is no policy or instructions from the leadership, the government, to take homophobic violence seriously (HRW, 2014a). Table 5.2 gives a complete overview of all the forms or LGBT repression in Russia.

Table 5.2 Forms of repression in Russia

Legal Restrictions Cultural Norms Anti-gay propaganda law (including internet Hostile public opinion restrictions and the prohibition of holding public events) (Federal Law No. 135-FZ) Questionable court rules Disruption of LGBT events and activities Proposed, but withdrawn, legislation on parental (organized) assault of LGBT people such as rights Occupy Pedophilia Job dismissals Discrimination by the police

!38 5.3 Co-optation: Russian Orthodox Church

The historic position of the Orthodox church in Russia can been described as rather ambiguous and complex. During the period of tsarist Russia, with it’s formula of autocracy, orthodoxy and nationhood, the church played an important role in daily life and was able to influence the government to a great extent (Pomerantsev, 2012). Though under Communist rule, the Russian Orthodox was nearly exterminated. After the collapse of the Soviet-Union, the disappearance of Communism and after two decades, the Orthodox church has made its grand revival, with the help of the Kremlin and president Putin. Freedom House reported in 2015 that the Orthodox Church has a privileged position in Russian society, working closely with the government on domestic and foreign policy priorities (Freedom House, 2015 (1)). According to Pomerantsev the church and religion are back “at the heart of the country’s politics” (Pomerantsev, 2012). They have played an important role in helping Putin to deal with his liberal opposition and its allegations of corruption and election fraud. Moreover, the strong and growing influence of the Church fuels the homophobic sentiments within the country (HRW, 2014 (1)). This is in the interest of the Kremlin.

“The state has gone from persecuting the church to co-opting its ancient tropes” (Pomerantsev, 2012).

In return for its support, the church has received generous financial support from state-allied energy giants. Moreover, the Russian parliament, the Duma, passed a law in 2004 (when Putin also was president) to return to the church all its pre-revolutionary property. It is now believed that the church is the largest landowner in Russia and its wealth is assumed to be in the billions (Pomerantsev, 2012). A similar change took place within the Russian population. According to statistics from the Levada Center and the sociology institute VCIOM, up to 90 percent of the ethnic Russians nowadays identify themselves as Orthodox.

Since the reelection of Putin and his reinstatement as president in 2012, the Church has become more vocal in its alliance with the Kremlin and against Western and liberal values, often described as ‘foreign devils versus ‘Holy Russia’. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Krill, has stated on television that:

“liberalism will lead to legal collapse and then the Apocalypse” (Pomerantsev, 2012).

In addition, he has called upon Russians that they should ensure that sin is never formalized by the rule of law, because he beliefs it would mean the self-destruction of the nation (Russia Today, !39 2013). Also other clergy have expressed their opinion about the LGBT community, making the connection with football. Priest Alexander Shumsky has denounced the FIFA World Cup as a ‘homosexual abomination’. In addition, he suggested that the bright, non-standard colors footwear helps to promote the ‘gay rainbow’ (Hafiz, 2014). Also Ivan Ostrakovsky, leader of a group of Russian Orthodox vigilantes has said that: “The enemies of Holy Russia are everywhere” and:

“We must protect holy places from liberal and their satanic ideology” (Pomerantsev, 2012).

Though there is also critique from within the church on its course. Alexei Uminsky, Archpriest of Moscow, said that the church will pay a price for its close alliance with the state. He argues that the church wants to prove to Putin it is a serious and useful player, but that this will backfire (Pomerantsev, 2012).

The anti-gay propaganda law is considered to be the product of the cooperation between the Kremlin and the church and it has wide support among the public because of its negative feelings towards gays (Huffington Post, 2015).

“The law is seen by many as one in a series of moves by President Vladimir Putin to crack down on dissent, smother civil society, and draw closer to the Russian Orthodox Church, which has spoken out against homosexuality and is one of the most influential institutions in the country” (Guilbert, 2015).

The ultimate goal of Putin, and in order to achieve this he co-opts with the church, is to revive the glories of Russia (Thislethwaite, 2014), and in doing so, it represses the LGBT community.

!40 6

Analyzing the cases of Kazakstan and Russia

In this chapter, the cases of Kazakhstan and Russia will be analyzed and compared to each other. This analysis and comparison will be according to the model of Gerschewski and his pillars of stability. The first pillar being legitimation, which is the capacity of the regime to legitimate its rule in the form of specific and diffuse support. The second pillar, repression, is about the capacity to repress opposing movements via high and low intensity measures, though in this thesis these two variables have been exchanged for legal restrictions and cultural norms in order to get a better picture of how these regimes repress. Lastly, the third pillar of co-optation entails the capacity of the regime to bring important societal actors in its sphere of influence. In this case, religious institutions were included.

6.1 Legitimation

Legitimation of an autocratic regime is about gaining support and a believe of its population that its rule is legitimate. To put it simply, its about legitimacy belief which revolves around support. As discussed in chapter 3, legitimation has two variables: specific support and diffuse support. Though in the case of the LGBT community, specific support cannot be measured. Thus the hypothesis is that Kazakhstan and Russia legitimate their autocratic regimes by gaining diffuse support for their anti-LGBT discourse. This hypothesis can only be accepted in the case of Russia where the government uses strong anti-LGBT rhetorics. In the case of Kazakhstan, ‘merely’ a promotion of family values can be found.

The Russian government has a strong anti-LGBT discourse. President Vladimir Putin, but also other government officials, have made statements by which they scapegoat the LGBT community and blame this group for the decline of the country. It is also argued that the Russian regime adopts this position because it wants to draw the attention away from its failing policies. It is also argued that it is a way of distracting public opinion by stating that the LGBT community is a threat to population growth, the ‘Russian traditional way of life’ and to its statehood. An interesting dimension of this discourse is that LGBT’s are framed as a ‘Western export product’, part of a perverted nontraditional lifestyle. Especially the use of ‘traditional’ is important in the regime’s

!41 discourse. All elements lead to the same outcome: the Russian government wants to gain trust by creating a common enemy, of the state and of the public.

The position of the Kazakh government could not be more different compared to Russia, or at least it is not so vocal about it. President Nursultan Nazarbayev has not made any reference to the LGBT community in public statements over the last years. Although Nazarbayev’s party ‘Nur Otan’ strongly forces on traditional and family values, its party program does not make any reference to the LGBT community. You can or cannot read the position of Nazarbayev and Nur Otan towards this group between the lines. The Kazakh regime rather derives its legitimacy from ambitious projects that put the country internationally in a positive light. Such as the chairmanship of the OSCE, the Astana Expo 2017 and its bid for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, another suggestion is that the Kazakh regime derives its legitimacy from other, mainly economic, sources. Which is, for reasons explained before, not included in this research.

6.2 Repression

Repression is the backbone of autocratic regimes. Regimes repress by threatening or using sanction against individuals or organizations in order to neutralize the danger to the regime. As established in the theoretical framework, there are two variables or strategies used by autocratic regimes to do so: legal restrictions and cultural norms. The hypothesis in chapter 3 states that Kazakhstan and Russia use a mix of legal restrictions and cultural norms to repress their LGBT community. In both cases, this hypothesis is accepted, though there are some great differences between the two countries.

The Kazakh state has decriminalized sodomy in 1998, but no legislation has come in return to protect against discrimination against sexual orientation and gender identity. Moreover, LGBT’s are still associated with criminal behavior. Although there have been adopted more progressive gender laws, these can be considered as too strict, leaving no room for a ‘fluid’ gender identity. In addition, the Kazakh lower house, the Majilis, has made an attempt to introduce a copy of the Russian anti-gay propaganda law, though this was surprisingly struck down by the Constitutional Court. In spite of this, Kazakhstan has already strict regulations when it comes to internet freedom. Compared to Russian legal restrictions for the LGBT community, the ones in Kazakhstan are rather weak. Based on the anti-gay propaganda law that has been adopted by the Russian parliament and President in 2013, the LGBT community faces restrictions when it comes to the internet, organizing public events, and any other form of public display. What becomes clear is that

!42 the Russian anti-gay propaganda law is an extremely effective tool to marginalize and downplay the LGBT-community in the country. Prohibiting any form of information sharing or public display to minors of anything that can be perceived as ‘gay’ can be considered as a ‘successful’ strategy. The law prohibiting the propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations among minors covers almost the whole list of legal restrictions as established in the theoretical framework. It becomes clear that the Russian authorities thought twice and designed a law that combines several laws that were implemented in the cases of Jordan and Singapore (see table 6.2.1). Although there have been some convictions based on the law, this number has remained rather low. This does not mean that the law has had little impact. The law is perceived to have influenced several court rules and also had a great impact on the already unfavorable public opinion towards the LGBT community.

Table 6.2.1 Overview legal restrictions Kazakhstan and Russia

Theoretical Framework Kazakhstan (KZ) & Russia (RUS) Restrictions to organize Lack of anti-discrimination laws based on sexual orientation (KZ) Restrictions and threat of punishment of any Criminal Code still associates LGBT with form of formal and informal meeting, such as criminal behavior (KZ) informal gatherings, group activities, organizational meeting, assemblies and public speeches Media regulation through a licensing system Strict gender ‘transitioning’ laws (KZ) Content is controlled and censored on specific Proposed and (implemented) anti-gay subjects propaganda law (KZ) (RUS) (Federal Law No. 135-FZ) Internet censorship Restrictions on the usage of internet by organizations (KZ) Penalization of “gross indecency” between men Questionable court rules (RUS) Proposed, but withdrawn, legislation on parental rights (RUS)

Thus, analyzing the cases of Kazakhstan and Russia, it becomes clear that the legal constraints do not have a great direct impact. Not many people are convicted on the basis of the laws set out in both countries. On the other hand, these laws facilitate and create an environment in the public sphere that is hostile to everything that is perceived as ‘gay’.

In both Kazakhstan and Russia, the public opinion towards the LGBT community can be considered as hostile and there is reason to believe that this will not change in the near future. Not

!43 only is the public hostile towards LGBT people, there are also individuals and groups who assault LGBT individuals. The most important example is Occupy Pedophilia, an organization that puts the LGBT community and pedophilia and the same corner and has an active strategy of lure and humiliate victims. Although violence against the LGBT community is not promoted, both Kazakh and Russian politicians have made strong statements disproving a LGBT ‘lifestyle’ and calling it an ‘amorality’. References of LGBT people as ‘criminals against humanity’ undermine the legitimacy of this group and are an attempt to discredit it. In addition, LGBT’s in both Kazakhstan and Russia face discrimination by a number of actors: the police, employers, educators and medical staff. To avoid this, LGBT people have adopted a measures of self-discipline. These comparisons show a great overlap between the cultural norms as set out in the theoretical framework and the examples of the cases (see table. 6.2.2).

A great difference with the literature and the cases of Kazakhstan and Russia is that surveillance is not a strategy in the latter two cases. In the case of Jordan, the example given by Wiktorowicz, societal groups are observed, recorded and monitored. In other words, there is a strict social control of the state individuals and groups. In Kazakhstan and Russia, this extensive surveillance apparatus is not necessary since the LGBT community are forced by the state to self- discipline. Control is not necessary, because the state has created a climate of fear in which the LGBT community is restricted in its freedom by cultural norms. This example highlights that interconnectedness between legal restrictions and cultural norms. Kazakhstan and Russia can either control the LGBT community by surveillance, which is costly, or they can make sure that LGBT people discipline themselves.

!44 Table 6.2.2 Overview Cultural Norms Kazakhstan and Russia

Theoretical Framework Kazakhstan (KZ) & Russia (RUS) Discredit a movement Hostile public opinion (KZ) (RUS) Frighten supporters (organized) assault of LGBT people (Occupy Pedophilia) (RUS) Undermine cultural legitimacy Measures for self-discipline by the LGBT community (KZ) (RUS) Enforcing self-discipline Public statements by authorities, politicians (KZ) (RUS) Weak or absent law enforcement by the police, discrimination by the police (KZ) (RUS) Employment discrimination, job dismissals (KZ) (RUS) Discrimination in education (KZ) Refusal of treatments by medial specialists (KZ)

6.3 Co-optation

Co-optation has been defined as the capacity to tie-strategically important actors to the regime. The hypothesis established in chapter 3 states that in he cases of Kazakhstan and Russia, this ‘strategically important actor’ are not military or business elites but religious institutes. In Kazakhstan, the Congress of the Leaders of World and Traditional Religions is the main institute by which the government of the country tries to have an influence on morality. In Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church is the main religious ally of the Kremlin.

According to the literature and the pillars of stability theory of Gerschewski. Autocratic regimes respond to a threat by co-opting it. After the collapse of the Soviet-Union, the Russian government found a new ally in its former opponent, the Orthodox Church. Especially since the installment of Vladimir Putin as president, the ties between the state and the church have grown considerably stronger, marked by favorable legislation and positive and supportive statements on both sides. Considering the LGBT community, both actors have bonded over this shared opponent. They have united in the battle between the ‘Western evil’ and ‘Holy Russia’. Thus the former oppositional position of the Orthodox Church has been transformed to widen the support base of the government. It is part of a strategy of repression on the one hand, and loyalty on the other hand. When it comes to the LGBT ‘issue’, these two strategies go hand in hand and are mutually reinforcing each other. The Russian government represses the LGBT community and by doing so it

!45 creates loyalty on the side of the Orthodox Church, which in turn supports the regime with its repression. Another positive side effect for the Russian government is that the strength and influence of the Orthodox Church are constrained and controlled. The Orthodox Church has not been banned from the game, but has been given new cards. And it now has a pretty strong hand. On this basis, the hypothesis that the Russian government co-opts the Orthodox Church in order to stabilize the regime can be accepted.

In the case of Kazakhstan, there is a less clear alliance between the state and religion. Although President Nursultan Nazarbayev was the initiator of the Congress of the Leaders of the World and Traditional Religions, it is not directly used as a tool to stabilize the regime and the repress the LGBT community, at least not directly. The Kazakh government has not chosen one ‘religious’ ally, but rather promotes a view of the country as multi-religious. Though this religious basis is exclusively ‘traditional’ as it is put and although it strongly focuses on values of morality and spirituality, it has not a specific anti-LGBT discourse. This does not mean that these ‘traditional’ religions have a neutral position towards LGBT people. As described in chapter 4, the rumor of a possible gay pride was enough for an outraged response of several religious leaders. Even though the position of Kazakh religious institutes is hostile towards the LGBT community, there can be no link established between these actors and the Kazakh government as a means to stabilize the regime. These stakeholders are not used by Astana to widen the support base. Thus, in contrast with Russia, the hypothesis that the Kazakh government co-opts with religious institutes and uses the Congress of the Leaders of the World and Traditional Religions to do so, can be rejected.

!46 7

CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis and the subsequent research was twofold. Firstly, to test if the autocratic regimes of Kazakhstan and Russia stabilize themselves by repressing the LGBT community within their country. Secondly, an important part of this research is devoted to giving an overview of the strategies used by these states. The pillars of stability theory by Gerschweski and the articles by Wiktorowicz and Chua have been key in building and conducting this research. The concepts of legitimation, repression, legal restrictions, cultural norms and co-optation have been the building blocks of the analysis.

The results of this analysis are quite different comparing Kazakhstan and Russia. In the case of Kazakhstan, it is hard to support the hypothesis that its regime represses the LGBT community as a means of stabilization. When it comes to the first and the third pillar of stability, legitimation and co-optation, only a weak link can be established. The Kazakh government does not have a anti- LGBT discourse, or is at least not vocal about it. One can read between the lines that by strongly promoting family values, the regime must be anti-LGBT, though the problem is that statements confirming this are lacking. Almost the complete same accounts for co-optation. The Kazakh government strongly promotes morality and religiosity through its multi-religious forum, the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, but there is no evidence confirming the hypothesis that it has co-opted these ‘traditional’ religious institutes. This does not mean that the Kazakh regime does not repress the LGBT community. Legal restrictions have been proposed to limit the space to maneuver for sexual minorities. Moreover, a hostile public opinion and discrimination in important realms such as security, health care and education make LGBT people to take measures of self-discipline. Though as severe as the repression is, the main hypothesis that the LGBT community in Kazakhstan is repressed to stabilize the regime, can not be confirmed.

In the case of Russia, the situation is completely opposite. The Russian regime has co-opted the Orthodox Church: it has changed from a former enemy of the state into a strategic ally that promotes the same values. The ties between the Kremlin and the church have grown stronger and stronger over the years, enforcing each other in their anti-LGBT rhetorics. This anti-LGBT discourse is an important factor in the legitimation of the regime. The of promotion of traditional

!47 family values, the dehumanization of the LGBT community and the ‘us versus them’ mentality towards the West have strengthened the Russian regime. Combined with the different legal and cultural methods of repression, all three pillars can be observed, confirming the main hypothesis: Russia’s autocratic regime stabilizes itself by repressing the LGBT community.

In both Kazakhstan and Russia, a negative trend can be observed when it comes to the position of the LGBT community. The introduction of the anti-gay propaganda law in 2013 has life made more complicated for Russian LGBT’s and also the prospects for the future are not looking bright. Over the years, statements from both Russian politicians, the government and the Orthodox Church have become more extreme. The same negative trend accounts for Kazakhstan. Although the Russian-style anti-gay propaganda law did not meet the requirement of the Constitutional Court, it shows that the public and politicians are stressing the importance of repressing the LGBT community. Also in this country, the future does not look that bright.

There are some clear strengths and weaknesses of the research presented. The strength of working with case studies is that it offers the opportunity of giving an in-depth description of the repression of LGBT communities. It is very rich and it has a dense description. In addition, this makes the outcomes also more reliable since a complete overview is given of all the strategies of repression. It is not briefly touched upon, which is more likely to happen when multiple cases are included in the research. Lastly, because this research is about two cases studies, the internal validity is very strong, though at the same time the external validity is questionable. Another methodological weakness of this research is that there is no complete ‘fit’ of the subject with the theory. This is most evident when it comes to the first pillar of stability: legitimation. As stated in the theoretical framework, legitimation has two variables: specific an diffuse support. Specific support, being about the fulfillment of economic, social and public demands, is impossible to connect to the subject of this research, the LGBT community.

I would like to suggest two recommendations for further research on this subject. Firstly, an interesting subject for further research is the interaction of legal restrictions and cultural norms. In this thesis, I only gave an overview with the assumption that both variables influence each other. Further research should determine how and in which way. Secondly, this research specifically focuses on the repression of LGBT people by an autocratic regime. It would be very interesting to test to what extent the strategies of repression are the same in countries with another type of regime.

!48

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