Nikos Karkavelias, Phrynichus Stratonidou Deiradiotes and the Ionia Campaign in 412 BC: Thuc
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The Ancient History Bulletin VOLUME TWENTY-SEVEN: 2013 NUMBERS 3-4 Edited by: Edward Anson ò David Hollander ò Timothy Howe Joseph Roisman ò John Vanderspoel ò Pat Wheatley ò Sabine Müller ISSN 0835-3638 ANCIENT HISTORY BULLETIN Volume 27 (2013) Numbers 3-4 Edited by: Edward Anson, David Hollander, Sabine Müller, Joseph Roisman, John Vanderspoel, Pat Wheatley Senior Editor: Timothy Howe Editorial correspondents Elizabeth Baynham, Hugh Bowden, Franca Landucci Gattinoni, Alexander Meeus, Kurt Raaflaub, P.J. Rhodes, Robert Rollinger, Carol Thomas, Victor Alonso Troncoso Contents of volume twenty-seven Numbers 3-4 86 Jeremy LaBuff, Who(’)s(e) Karian? Language, Names, and Identity 108 Gabriel Baker, Sallust, Marius, and the Alleged Violation of the Ius Belli 130 Andrew W Collins, Alexander the Great and the Kingship of Babylon 149 Nikos Karkavelias, Phrynichus Stratonidou Deiradiotes and the Ionia Campaign in 412 BC: Thuc. 8.25-27 162 Vincent Rosivach, Funding Jury Pay in Athens c. 461 BC Review Article: 168 Thomas A. J. McGinn, Hire-Lease in Roman Law and Beyond NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS AND SUBSCRIBERS The Ancient History Bulletin was founded in 1987 by Waldemar Heckel, Brian Lavelle, and John Vanderspoel. The board of editorial correspondents consists of Elizabeth Baynham (University of Newcastle), Hugh Bowden (Kings College, London), Franca Landucci Gattinoni (Università Cattolica, Milan), AleXander Meeus (University of Leuven), Kurt Raaflaub (Brown University), P.J. Rhodes (Durham University), Robert Rollinger (Universität Innsbruck), Carol Thomas (University of Washington), Victor Alonso Troncoso (Universidade da Coruña) AHB is currently edited by: Timothy Howe (Senior Editor: [email protected]), Edward Anson, David Hollander, Sabine Müller, Joseph Roisman, John Vanderspoel and Pat Wheatley. AHB promotes scholarly discussion in Ancient History and ancillary fields (such as epigraphy, papyrology, and numismatics) by publishing articles and notes on any aspect of the ancient world from the Near East to Late Antiquity. Submitted articles should normally be in English, but the journal will consider contributions in French, German, Italian or Spanish. SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AHB adheres to the usual North American editorial policies in the submission and acceptance of articles but imposes no House Style. 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Detailed instructions about subscriptions and access to digital content can be found on the AHB website: http://ancienthistorybulletin.org PAYMENT Payment may be made via the subscription portal on the AHB website: http://www.ancienthistorybulletin.org/subscribed-users-area/membership-levels/ Cover image courtesy of The Nickle Arts Museum, University of Calgary Phrynichus Stratonidou Deiradiotes and the Ionia Campaign in 412 B.C.: Thuc. 8.25-27 Nikos Karkavelias The figure of Phrynichus, the son of Stratonides from the deme Deiradiotai, became one of the most controversial ones in late fifth century Athens. Through his wholehearted involvement in the oligarchic revolution of 411 B.C. the oligarch might have emerged as one of the most prominent figures in the Athenian political scene during the oligarchic revolution, but this engagement precipitated his violent death as well. The next generations of Athenians remembered him as an arch-traitor, a hated symbol of a tyrannical regime, which in its short life did everything it could to weaken the strength of the Empire, and reduce Athens to a mere compliant follower of its enemy, Sparta. Yet, despite the almost unanimous agreement in other sources,1 Phrynichus is presented in Thucydides (the present case under examination included) in an objective, neutral, if not outright positive light. The historian draws a picture of a man with outstanding intellectual capabilities, sound judgement, great logical faculty, rhetoric dexterity, and leadership talent. Accordingly, in this paper I shall undertake to examine Phrynichus’ capabilities as a military commander in the Ionia campaign. I hope to demonstrate that, despite criticism levelled at the Athenian commander by modern scholars, Thucydides’ judgement of his performance during that campaign, and in particular Phrynichus’ decision to decline battle at sea, against a Peloponnesian fleet that unexpectedly arrived in the vicinity of Miletus, and withdraw instead to Samos in safety, was sound and correct. The land battle at Miletus In the autumn of 412 B.C., Phrynichus along with two more generals, Scironides and Onomacles, was entrusted the most important and ambitious Athenian counter-offensive in Ionia since the disaster in Sicily, the objective of which was to re-conquer lost territory and quell the wave of defections among Athens’ allies.2 The three men were in charge of a not insignificant force consisting of forty-eight ships and 3500 heavy infantry.3 After a short stay in 1 e.g., [Lys.] 20.11-12; Lys.25.8, 10; Ar. Frogs 686-691; Arist. Politics 1305a36-1305b27. Phrynichus is depicted in these sources as a sycophant, opportunist, trickster, and plotter of schemes respectively. 2 On the date of the expedition, late September to beginning of October, see G. Busolt 1893-1904: 1432; A. Gomme, A. Andrewes and K. Dover 1945-1981 vol.5: 58. 3 D. Lewis 1961 drew attention to the possibility that Phrynichus may have been elected general ex apanton in 412. He pointed to the possible existence of a relationship between the general and a Scironides who proposed a decree at a meeting of Leontis tribe in the 340s ([D.] 58.18), in which case there would have been two generals from tribe Leontis in 412. Since Phrynichus was undoubtedly the most authoritative figure of the two, he would have been elected ex apanton. If this contention of Lewis is valid, the implications for Phrynichus’ public image and prestige that year become obvious. Lewis’ doubted the name Scironides on the grounds of its negative associations with the mythical Megarian bandit, thinking it awkward for an Athenian to bear this name, and he proposed the reading Κιρωνίδης, attested in the Vatican ms. B in Thucydides (he admits, however, that in AHB 27 (2013) 149-161 Page 149 Phrynichus Stratonidou Deiradiotes and the Ionia Campaign in 412 B.C. Samos for regrouping and replenishment, the task force landed at Miletus, the subduing of which, was the main objective of the mission. At the gates of the city they won a victory after a pitched battle against the Milesian hoplites, Chalkideus and his Peloponnesian troops and Tissaphernes with his horse and mercenaries respectively. But later on the same evening, news reached the Athenian camp that a newly arrived Peloponnesian fleet was approaching. Commanding this fleet was Therimenes, who had been ordered to deliver fifty-five ships (twenty-two from Sicily and thirty-three from the Peloponnese) to the Peloponnesian admiral Astyochus. Therimenes had first anchored at Leros, and when he got information about the Athenians’ presence at Miletus, he moved to Teichioussa in the Iasian gulf with a view to reconnoitring the area. There he met Alcibiades who briefed him on the critical situation that had evolved after the Athenian victory. The Athenian exile urged Therimenes not to abandon Miletus at that crucial moment, for otherwise the Peloponnesians would lose every hope of ever holding the entire Ionia region. Thereupon, it was agreed that the next day the Peloponnesians would attack the Athenian force at dawn, and try to save Miletus from falling into the hands of the enemy.4 The war council at the Athenian camp When news of the arrival of an enemy force in the area reached the Athenian camp, a war council among the generals took place to determine what course of action was to be taken.5 In this council, Phrynichus emerged as a charismatic leader, an officer who commanded respect from his fellow officers and managed to carry the day by sheer weight of his arguments. He unequivocally stated that, as far as it was in his power, he would not allow the Athenian force to stay and offer battle to the Peloponnesians at that particular moment. It would not be prudent, he argued, to risk their necks in a single battle, especially when they [Demosthenes]’ passage the sound tradition reads Σκιρωνίδης). S. Hornblower, citing OCD³ under the entry Sciron or Sciros, suggests a connection with the Attic festival of Skirophoria (2008: 822). 4 Thuc. 8.26. On the composition and origin of Therimenes’ force, see Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945- 1981 vol.5: 61; Hornblower 2008: 823. Thucydides, 8.17.1-3, narrates how Chalkideus and Alcibiades with twenty- five ships, of which twenty were Chians, outpaced the Athenians Strombichides and Thrasycles, slipped from their grasp, and caused Miletus to defect. This force apparently joined Therimenes, and thus, the number of Peloponnesian ships reached eighty (cf. Busolt 1893-1904: 1435; Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981 vol.5: 27- 28). 5 Those certainly included Phrynichus, Onomacles and Scironides, and probably Strombichides and Thrasycles (Busolt 1893-1904: 1434 and no 1; Gomme, Andrewes and Gomme 1981: 63); Hornblower (2008: 825-6) ingeniously remarks that there must have been present Argive officers also. But how many there could have been we have no means of knowing.