Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo: the preeminence of national political interests Sylvie Gangloff

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Sylvie Gangloff. Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo: the preeminence of national political interests. Balkanologie. Revue d’études pluridisciplinaires, Association française d’études sur les Balkans, 2004. ￿hal-03134700￿

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Vol. VIII, n° 1 | 2004 Volume VIII Numéro 1

Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo: the preeminence of national political interests La politique de la Turquie dans le conflit du Kosovo : les pré-éminence des intérêts (politiques) nationaux

Sylvie Gangloff

Édition électronique URL : http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/517 ISSN : 1965-0582

Éditeur Association française d'études sur les Balkans (Afebalk)

Édition imprimée Date de publication : 1 juin 2004 ISSN : 1279-7952

Référence électronique Sylvie Gangloff, « Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo: the preeminence of national political interests », Balkanologie [En ligne], Vol. VIII, n° 1 | juin 2004, mis en ligne le 21 janvier 2010, consulté le 30 avril 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/517

© Tous droits réservés Balkanologie VII I (1) , juin 2004, p. 105­122 \ 10 5

TURKISH POLIC Y TOWARD S THE CONFLIC T I N KOSOV O : THE PRE­EMINENC E O F NATIONA L POLITICAL INTEREST S

Sylvie Gangloff*

In February­March 1998, tensions in Kosovo between Albanians and Serb s suddenly rose to an armed level . The appearance o f a Kosovo Liberation Arm y (UCK, Ushtrica Çlirimtare e Kosoves) had seriously worried the Serbian authori ­ ties who decide d o n several arrests and attacke d village s where UÇ K fighter s were finding ­ o r were supposed to have found ­ support . Massacres o f som e Albanians took plac e and continue d sporadicall y the followin g year , notabl y during th e summe r o f 1998 . The internationa l communit y trie d t o mediat e between th e tw o oppose d people s bu t withou t an y success . Finall y NAT O members, concerned tha t th e Serbia n authoritie s wer e organizin g ­ o r wer e about t o organiz e ­ a n ethni c cleansing , launche d ai r strike s agains t th e Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (March 1999­June 1999). During the entire conflict, Turkish leaders did not take major initiatives in the international diplomatic arena. They even refrained, especiall y during th e first phas e o f th e fighting , fro m commentin g o n th e event s an d th e whol e issue di d no t giv e ris e t o passionat e politica l debat e (a s i t ha d fo r Bosnia ­ Herzegovina). Afte r th e decisio n o f militar y interventio n wa s mad e b y it s NATO allies, here again, Turkish military and political leaders looked rather re­ luctant to invest in this military operation. Turkish leaders did not oppose th e intervention (a s they did in the case of Greece and Russia for example) but ex ­ pressed their willingness to remain on the side . Between 199 2 an d 1995 , th e persecutio n o f Muslim s i n Bosnia ­ Herzegovina arouse d scandalize d reaction s i n the publi c opinio n i n Turkey . The Turks saw ­ o r perceived ­ thei r fello w Muslim s massacre d precisel y be ­ cause o f their religion . The war i n Bosnia­Herzegovin a wa s extensivel y com ­ mented o n in the press and in public declarations, and Turkey exerted a fairl y

* Chercheur associe au laboratoire d'études turques, CNRS/UM R 8032. ([email protected] ) 106 / Balkanologie VII I (1), juin 2004, p . 105­12 2

intense diplomatic pressure o n the international community by launching in­ itiatives whenever i t could i n the internationa l organization s to which i t be­ longs (NATO , OSCE , UN, Organizatio n o f the Islami c Conference) . Moreover , Turkish leaders insisted on the implementation o f the decisions o f the Unite d Nations, even i f this meant a military intervention 1. A few years later, in 1998­1999, the conflic t between Serb s and Albanian s in Kosov o di d no t a t al l arous e th e sam e concer n an d th e sam e scandalize d reactions ­ even though Albanians are almost entirely Muslims and were als o subject to Serbian assaults. Concern for massacred fello w Muslims was not a s visible, not as widely denounced and not s o widely instrumentalized by some Turkish politica l factions . Turkis h official s wer e extremel y cautiou s i n thei r public declarations on the responsibilities in this conflict and on the suggeste d diplomatic o r military (re)­actions . Indeed, it seems that Turkis h official s ha d some other concerns in mind and that the political and juridical nature o f the conflict itsel f was embarrassing for them. Comparisons between the situatio n in Kosovo and the situation in South­East Turkey were actually made by som e Western leader s her e an d there . Therefore, whatever th e religiou s aspect s o f the conflic t i n Kosovo ­ o r the reality o f massacres o f civilians ­ i t was a mat­ ter o f politica l prioritie s t o stic k t o the principl e o f nationa l unit y ove r th e claims o f some « terrorists » and to the principle o f non­interference i n inter ­ nal affairs. The numerous Turk s of Albanian origin in Turkey did not play an y major politica l role, nor did ­ a t first ­ the Turkish minority in Kosovo whose presence an d situatio n arouse d interes t bu t whic h onl y became a subjec t o f political interest o r political maneuvers later in 2000.

A CAUTIOUS DIPLOMAC Y I N THE BALKAN S

The policy of the Turkish government concerning the conflicts in the Balkans has been very cautious since 1991. The options for Turkey were limited. It could act only in accord with the West, unilateral action was not possible or even wished fo r (in politica l o r financia l terms) . I t shoul d no t b e forgotte n tha t Turke y an d Turkey's initiatives were carefull y watched b y the other Balkan countries, suspi­ cious of its real intentions, and prompt to denounce any move on its part. Turkey's long domination of the Balkans sets it up as a suspicious actor in the eyes of most of the countries in the area ; it was against the Ottoman Empire that the Balka n nations forged their independence. This phenomenon of « fundamental enmity »

1 See Gangloff (Sylvie), « L a politique balkanique de la Turquie et le poids du passe ottoman », in Bougarel (Xavier), Clayer (Nathalie), éds., Le Nouve/ Islam balkanique. Les musulmans, acteurs du post­communisme, iggo­2000, Paris : Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001. Sylvie Gangloff ­ Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo \ 107

is not a particularity o f the Balkans , but what i s particular in this case is the in ­ ability of the Balkan people to overcome their antagonism . This historical and emotional background is a serious handicap for Turkey, which has to act cautiously and cannot take any sharp position on the conflict s or tensions i n the area . It is still under constan t threat o f being accuse d o f re­ turning to its warrior­like tendencies, and must therefore ac t very cautiously 2. The anti­Turkish policy of Greece in western circle s has already had disastrou s consequences fo r Turkey. Moreover the military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 considerably reinforced this perception o f a bellicose country, regime, and peo­ ple. Turkey officially intervene d to protect the rights of the Turkish populatio n on th e island . Thi s officia l justificatio n coul d onl y rais e suspicion s i n th e Balkans that Turkey might put forward the same excuse to interfere i n Balka n affairs. This « Cyprus syndrome » is constantly reiterated in the Balkans (i n the public opinion, in the press, as well as in public political declarations). Therefore, Ankara has systematically secured its Balkan diplomacy by the « principles and positions » of the international community and had notabl y refused to actively participate in military interventions. When NAT O issued an ultimatum t o Serbi a in February 1994 , Turkey certainly backed this initiativ e but proposed it s participation i n air strikes only for logisti c missions 3. Again, in August 1995 during the operation Delibarate Force, Turkey welcomed the ac­ tion but the Turkish Air Force did not participate in the actual bombing 4. Turkey has als o worked hand­in­hand wit h Washington i n the plannin g of its regional diplomacy. It was only after the United States got involved in the settlement o f the conflic t i n Bosnia­Herzegovina i n 1994­199 5 and afte r i t re ­ cognized the FYRO M (Republic o f Macedonia) and signed military agreement s with the latter, that Turkey itself took the step o f signing military agreement s with Macedoni a (Apri l 199 5 and Jul y 1996 ) an d Bosnia­Herzegovin a (augus t 1995 and January 1996). Again in Spring 1998, when the increasing repressio n in Kosov o motivate d th e deepenin g o f th e militar y cooperatio n betwee n Macedonia and NATO , Turkey, too, strengthened it s own military cooperatio n with Skopje. Like the United States, Turkey supported Albania, Macedonia an d the Bosnian­Croa t Federation , politically and militarily . Last, Washington an d Ankara undertook a collaborative effort to re­arm and train the Croat­Musli m army in the framework o f the U S « Train and Equip Program » 5.

2 Se e Gangloff (Sylvie) , « Th e Weight of Islam in the Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans » , Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, (5), 2000/2001. 3 Milliyet, 11/02/94. A total of 18 Turkish F­16's were stationed in the Ghedi base in Italy to contribute to the implementation of the no­fly zone. 4 Turkish Daily News, 31/08/95. 5 The training began in May 1996 in two bases near Ankara. All of the armored units of the Bosnian army have been trained in Turkey. Milliyet, 09/06/97. 108 /BalkanologieVII I (1) juin 2004, p. 105­12 2

Turkey has also been carefu l no t to cut of f relations with the FR Y (Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia) . I t ha d actuall y kep t rathe r goo d relation s wit h Yugoslavia during the whole cold War period and these stable relations gre w even stronger in the late 70's and in the 8o's 6. After the collapse o f Yugoslavi a and the irruption o f conflicts, Turkish leaders tried not to antagonize Serbia . For example, they waited fou r months (unti l May 1992 ) before recallin g thei r ambassador afte r Belgrad e ha d done s o (January 1992 ) and durin g the whol e conflict, contact s wer e maintaine d a t the leve l o f charg é d'affaires. Afte r th e Dayton agreement, Turkish leaders quickly renewed their relations with thos e they previously called « Serbian aggressor s » . Indeed, they actively supporte d Serbian polic y afte r th e Bosnia n war 7. Turkish businessmen, including mem ­ bers of the MUSIAD 8, hastened to invest in this country and the agreements re­ gulating trade between the tw o nations were rapidl y concluded. Bosnia doe s not see m to receive the sam e attention. In 1997 , bilateral trade did not excee d $25 million.

KOSOVO : ANOTHER DILEMM A FO R TURKE Y

As during the wa r i n Bosnia , Turkey condemne d th e violenc e o f the re ­ pression i n Kosov o and propose d it s participation i n an internationa l peace ­ keeping force, but, in contrast to its reaction toward the events in Bosnia, it did not displa y an intense diplomatic activism . As usual, national interest clearly prevailed over any kind of religious, cul­ tural or historical solidarity . Here again, Turkey could not take any unilatera l steps in this conflic t an d had to act cautiously i f it wanted to avoi d antagoni ­ zing Balka n populations . Bu t anothe r dilemm a wa s added . I n th e cas e o f Bosnia, the independence o f the country was accepted ­ i f not recognized ­ o n the internationa l scene , but i n the Kosov o case the entir e internationa l com ­ munity ­ a t least officially an d at first ­ insiste d on the territorial integrity o f the FRY . In this context, it was / is indeed hard to imagine Turkey supporting a movement o f separatis m (o r on e s o perceived b y the internationa l commu ­ nity) whe n i t wa s / i s fightin g a simila r movemen t o n it s ow n territory .

6 Jeli c (Miiko), Stojiljković (Jerka), Bajić (Danka), « Yugoslav­Turkish Relations, 1976­1988 » , Yugoslav Survey, 3 0 (4) , 1989 ; Atadv (Türkkaya ) « Turkey' s Expandin g Relation s with the CI S and Eastern Europe », in Dodd (Clement), ed., Turkish Foreign Policy. New Prospects, London : Eothen Press, 1992, p. 114. 7 Som e commentators (like Hasan Ünal) have suggested that Turkey wanted to develop cooperation with Serbia in order to avoid a perennial Serbo­Greek alliance. Zaman, 09/06/97. 8 Th e MÜSIA D {Müstakil Sanayici ve Ďsadamlan Derneġi) i s an association of businessmen openly advo­ cating their link to Islam. Sylvie Gangloff ­ Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo \ 10 9

Actually, numerous scholar s or politicians made this analogy between Kosov o and Kurdista n (a n ethni c minority , i n majorit y i n it s ow n area , demandin g rights o r claimin g independence) . Th e Yugosla v ambassado r i n Ankara , fo r example, did not miss an opportunity t o refer to the figh t agains t the PK K in Turkey ( « Turkey shoul d understan d Belgrad e better than an y other countr y since it is involved in similar situation ») 9. Therefore, Turkey did not launch an y diplomatic initiative o f importanc e and, at most, has condemned the violence o f the repression and has called fo r a constructive dialogue. Even before the outburst o f massacres in the spring of 1998, Turkish leaders were extremely cautious in their Kosovo policy. They had been urged by the Kosovars to help them but they did not respond : As early as 1992, Ibrahim Rugov a went t o Turke y an d aske d fo r recognitio n ; the Prim e Minister o f the « shadow cabinet » , Bujar Bukoshi, asked Turkey to send obser ­ vers to the 2 2 March 199 8 elections 10 ; Adem Demac i calle d o n Turke y to b e more activ e i n the settlin g o f Kosov o problem 11 ; etc. Most o f the leader s o f Kosovo expressed thei r disappointmen t wit h thi s « passive polic y » , a polic y that had been qualified a s « pure rhetoric » by the writer Rexhep Oosja 12. Very soon after the increase of the repression in Kosovo in March 1998, the former Turkish Foreign Minister went to the FR Y (on the 8 March). During this visit, he delivere d t o President Milosevi c a letter fro m Siileyma n Demirel , a t the time president o f Turkish republic, which stated that « Turkey , too, has to fight terroris m o n it s territor y » 13. Durin g thi s visit , Ismai l Ce m asserte d Turkey's intention t o support FRY' s admission t o international organizations , and a new bilatera l agreement wa s signed 14. Last , he went t o Kosov o but ne ­ glected to meet loca l Albanian leaders 15. During the whole cours e o f 1998, the Yilmaz government remaine d actuall y extremel y inattentiv e t o the develop ­ ments in Kosovo, especially during the Serbia n military operations during th e summer16. The mai n preoccupatio n o f Ankar a i s th e ris k o f a n extensio n o f th e Kosovo conflic t t o the entir e peninsula , an d here , « its » national interes t i s concerned. The scenario most frequently pu t forward i n Turkey (as elsewhere)

9 Se e the interview he gave to Turkish Daily News, 30/0199. 10 Anadol u Ajansi, 17/03/98. 11 Cumhuriyet, 16/10/98. 12 Oosja (Rexhep), La question albanaise, Paris : Fayard, 1995, p. 233. 13 Tanjug, 08/03/98 ; Reuters, 09/03/98. 14 Milliyet, 09/03/98 ; Hürriyet, 09/03/98 . 15 Zaman, 09/03/98. 16 Uzge l (Ílhan), « Kosov o ; Politic s of Nationalism and the Question o f International Intervention » , Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, (4), 1998­1999, p. 330. 110 /Balkanologi e VII I (1) , juin 2004, p. 105­12 2

has been the fear that i f Albanians in Kosovo were granted independence, the Albanians i n Macedonia woul d follo w the movement, provokin g the disinte ­ gration o f the Republi c o f Macedonia an d a regional conflict 17. Turke y imme ­ diately strengthene d it s militar y assistanc e t o th e Republi c o f Macedonia , where ther e i s a larg e Albania n communit y wit h clos e link s to the Kosova r Albanians, and which was, therefore, the weak point in the containment o f the conflict i n Kosovo. In June 1998 , negotiations were engaged on the delivery of 20 F­ 5 planes to the Macedonia n arm y and the training o f Macedonian pilot s in Turkey . In the previou s weeks , NAT O had organize d a « demonstration o f force »in Macedonia (the Determined Falcon maneuvers), while the Serbian air force penetrated severa l times into the contested zone between the two coun ­ tries. Turkey contribute d a s wel l t o th e NAT O nava l forc e statione d i n th e Albanian port o f Durres18, and very early (since the beginning o f March 1998), it proposed its participation i n a peacekeeping force 19. The Turkish press has praised the « realistic approach » of the authorities . The independence o f Kosovo was clearl y rejected and newspapers eve n refer ­ red t o the « energetic interventio n » of the internationa l communit y durin g the Sprin g 1998 20. As for the dail y Türkiye, o f nationalist and Islamist tenden ­ cies, i t covere d thi s even t i n a rathe r dispassionat e tone 21. A t thi s point , contrary to the cas e o f Bosnia­Herzegovina, the issu e did not raise much poli ­ tical debate . Nationalist an d Islamis t medi a di d denounc e th e massacre s o f Albanians i n Kosovo and criticize d the cautious approac h o f the government , but di d not, in any case, instrumentalize the issue for propaganda o r electora l motives. The Islamist part y (th e Fazilet partisi 22), fo r the sam e reason s a s th e government, di d no t organiz e massiv e demonstration s o r fund­raising cam ­ paigns. And it should be pointed out that Turks o f Albanian origins were hea­ vily represented i n the central administration o f the Fazilet partisi ! However , spectacular informatio n wa s onc e in a while publishe d i n the Islamis t press . One could read, for example, in the edition o f 3 1 August 1998, that Serb s had li­ terally disemboweled youn g Albania n girls . In the sam e edition , it i s as wel l stated that th e Serb s had installe d Russia n S­30 0 missiles i n Kosovo , a mov e that symbolizes high danger in Turkey with the ­ a t the time ­ ongoing contro­

17 See , for example, Cumhuriyet, 19/06/98. 18 Thi s NATO forc e was composed o f one ship each from Turkey, Italy, Spain and Macedonia. Anadolu Ajansi 09/07/98. 19 Thi s participation was approved by the Turkish parliament in October 1998. 2° Cumhuriyet, 13/03/98 ; Milliyet, 08/07/98,11/03/98. 21 Se e for example, « An active diplomacy in Kosovo » , Türkiye, 07/07/9 8 ; « Las t warning to Milošević », Türkiye, 24/09/9 8 ; « 2 0 000 Kosovars flee their villages » , Türkiye, 31/07/98 . 22 I n lanuary 1998, the Islamist party, Refah partisi, was dissolved under the decision of the constitutio­ nal court. Another Islamist party, the Fazilet partisi, was immediately created. Sylvie Ganglof f ­ Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo \ 11 1

versy o n th e deploymen t o f Russia n S­30 0 missile s i n Cyprus . However , a s usual (as it had been the case for the conflict in Bosnia­Herzegovina), some edi­ torials wer e mor e vindictive 23. The y vigorousl y denounce d th e ne w ethni c cleansing, the inaction o f the international community and the new orthodo x plot and, for some o f them, openly advocated the independence o f Kosovo. Of course, the massiv e massacre s undertaken b y the Serbia n authoritie s durin g the course o f Spring 1999 revitalized in all the newspapers the image o f Serb s as « ethnic cleansers », « murderers » and « butchers » . But Turkish leaders maintained their commitment to the preservation o f the territorial integrit y o f the FR Y and were extremel y reluctan t to interven e in the internal affairs o f Kosovo. To reject the parallel with the situation in the southeast o f Anatolia, they put forward two kinds o f arguments : 1 ­ The repression in Kosovo was on such a large scale that no compariso n was possible. President Demirel even called this repression a « genocide » 24. 2 ­ The nature o f the conflic t was completely different. « They call them a minority i n Kosov o bu t w e d o no t hav e minoritie s i n Turke y » , declare d Siileyman Demirel 25. Turkish leaders were backed, in this approach, by most of the editorialists : « There i s no other stat e that commit s suc h violence agains t it s own popula ­ tion on it s own territory (... ) The war between the Serb s and the Albanians i s both an ethnic and religious confrontation » 26. Turkish leaders officially advocate d the « restoration » of the rights o f the Albanians27. B y insisting o n the restoration o f the right s o f the Albanian s i n Kosovo, the Turk s avoide d an y unwelcome compariso n wit h the Kurd s (wh o never ha d an y right s i n the pas t suc h a s those enjoye d b y the Albanian s i n Kosovo under the 197 4 Yugoslav Constitution). Here again, Turkey has followed the path o f the United States. The Turkish air force participated in NAT O air strikes on the FRY 28 and after June 1999, as it had announced very early on, it contributed to the international peacekeepin g force statione d i n Kosovo . Around 1 000 Turkis h soldier s wer e deploye d i n

23 See fo r example Necati Özfatura in Türkiye, 10/04/98 , 05/08/98, 06/08/98. Comments on Kosovo o f one of this famous editorialist of Tiirkiye, had been compiled and published at the end of 1998 : Özfatura (Necati), Hedefteki Ülke. Kosova [Kosovo . A Threatened Country], Ístanbul: Ízci, 1998. 24 Hürriyet, 13/04/99 . 25 Anadol u Ajansi. 28/04/99. 26 Milliyet, 26/03/99. 27 I n the proposal the Turkish government made on 16 March 1998 to halt violence in Kosovo, they ex­ pressly recommended « restoring the rights of all ethnic groups in Kosovo, which they enjoyed at the time of Kosovo's autonomy ». Turkish Daily News, 17/03/98. President Demirel talked as well of the « res­ toration of fundamental rights and freedoms of Albanians in Kosovo » during his official visit to Albania in mid­July 1998. Albanian Telegraphic Agency, 15/07/98. 28 A total of 11 F­16's planes were stationed in the Ghedi base in Italy. 112 /Balkanologi e VII I (l),juin 2004 , p. 105­12 2

Kosovo i n Jul y 1999 . The y ar e statione d aroun d i n Southwester n Kosov o (German sector) where the Turkish community predominantly lives. Around a hundred Turkish policemen were also sent to participate in the « Interim Civi l Administration » 29. Last, Turkish coordination office s were opened in Pristin a and i n Prizre n i n Jul y 199 9 durin g Ismai l Cem' s visit 30. Officially , the y wer e mandated t o coordinat e the distributio n o f Turkish humanitarian assistanc e in the province . Even when a representative o f the UÇK , Shaip Muja, came to Istanbul, the visit was carried out at a time when the United State had recognized the UÇ K as a partner in the negotiations. Nothing was said about the contacts he mad e in Turkey, but this trip was officiall y mad e to visit si x UÇ K fighters who wer e under treatment in a Turkish hospital, a convenient way to visit with the leas t possible diplomatic visibility. In the interviews he gave, Shaip Muja remaine d rather cautious on his opinion on Turkish policy toward Kosovo 31. More surprisingly, Turkey finally participate d i n the actual bombings du ­ ring the NAT O strikes. This represented a noticeable chang e i n the lin e follo ­ wed durin g the conflic t i n Bosnia­Herzegovina , an d reaction s i n the Turkis h press were rather mixed32. Turkish leaders themselves were somewhat embar ­ rassed and rumors spread in the press before confirmation i n mid­May 1999 33. A month earlier , Biilen t Ecevit , the forme r Prim e minister , was categoricall y denying Turke y coul d participat e i n offensiv e missions 34, and mos t analyst s did not expect Turkey to do so35. Turkey probably wanted to strengthen its po­ sitions within the Alliance, and this, several weeks after the Washington sum ­ mit where it had to fight hard against the French­English proposal to establis h a European Identity o f Defense and Security , which would have marginalize d it. A few days earlier, the Turkish cabinet had also approved the NAT O request for using Turkish bases during the air strikes 36.

29 « Repor t of the Secretary­General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo » , S/2000/1196, December 15, 2000. See as well Milliyet, 09/04/00, Tiirkiye, 22/10/00. 30 Tiirkiye, 22/10/00 ; Anadolu Ajansi, 28/07/00. 31 Tepel i (Selcuk) , « Sirplar' i destekleye n Tiirkle r » [Thes e Turk s wh o suppor t th e Serbs] , Aktiiel, 21/01/99. 32 See , for example, the editorials of titer Turkmen, Hiirriyet, 27/05/99 and Sedat Elgin, Hiirriyet, 21/05/99. 33 Reutei , 16/05/99. The public was informe d i n a n interview give n by the president. Se e Hiirriyet, 21/05/99. 34 Cumhuriyet, 04/04/99 ; Anadolu Ajansi, 04/04/99. See as well, for example, Ismail Cem (press confe­ rence) : « Turkis h planes are carrying out a defensive mission. There is no single indication that Turkish planes will exceed this concept » . Anadolu Ajansi, 25/03/99. 35 Turkish Daily News, March 25,1999; Johyon Naegele, RFE/R L Features, April 1st, 1999. 36 Turkish Daily News, May 22,1999 ; Gazeta 55, May 14,1999. Sylvie Gangloff ­ Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo \ 11 3

When Albanian s wer e massivel y expelle d fro m Kosovo , Turkey opene d its door s t o them . Thi s i s actuall y a constan t componen t o f th e Turkis h Republic's policy toward Turkish and Muslim communities in the area : it had accepted, almost without an y restriction, refugees an d immigrants fro m th e Balkans (Turk s fro m Bulgari a i n th e beginnin g o f th e 50' s an d i n 1989 , Albanians fro m Yugoslavi a i n th e 50' s an d th e 6o's , Muslims fro m Bosnia ­ Herzegovina afte r 1992 , etc.). The onl y exception s wer e du e to the ver y im ­ possibility t o settl e them , a s when 350 000 Turk s fro m Bulgari a poure d i n Turkey in 1989. A total o f 1 8 000 Kosovar s officiall y cam e to Turkey from th e end o f March 1999 to June 1999. Almost half o f them were settled in the Kirk ­ lareli camp in Thrace37, which had been built fo r the Bulgarian Turks who ar ­ rived in 1989 and later used for the Muslims from Bosnia­Herzegovina . All of these Kosov o Albanian s returne d t o Kosov o durin g th e Summe r 1999 . Th e Turkish Re d Crescen t als o se t u p tw o ten t citie s fo r refugees , on e i n Macedonia (Boyane ) and one in Albania (Elbasan) . Last, a new discourse appeared a t the beginning o f the NAT O strikes. The claim to an Ottoman legacy , which had been previousl y exclusivel y made b y nationalist an d Islamis t circles 38, emerged i n officia l discourses . The claim t o an Ottoma n legac y i n the identit y an d th e histor y o f the Turk s has becom e more and more pronounced these past years, but, in general, official discours e tended to avoid any reference to this (common) heritage when the Balkan peo­ ple ­ and conflict ­ were concerned 39. In the Kosovo case, President Demirel fi­ nally mentioned the « duty to save our Kosovar brethren » 40 an d the « histori­ cal and mora l responsibilit y o f Turkey » 41; Ismail Ce m pointed to the « 50 0 years experience in Kosovo » 42 ; and former Prime Minister Biilent Ecevit sta­ ted tha t « th e Kosovar s ar e ou r brother s an d th e legac y o f ou r histor y » 43, « the heritage presented t o us by history » 44. Turkish leaders were probabl y

37 I n mid­1999, 7 6o° Albanian s out of an official total of 17 50 0 had been settled in Kirklareli. Anadolu Ajansi, 04/06/99. 38 See , for example, about Kosovo, « Th e orphans o f the Ottoman Empire claim their rights » , Zaman, 19/10/96 ; or the editorialis t o f Türkiye, Necat i Ozfatura, wh o almos t systematicall y referre d t o the Ottoman Empire in his numerous articles on Kosovo. 39 Severa l publications have emphasized this ­ stil l visible ­ Ottoma n heritage in the Balkans. Hasan Mercan (a Turk from Kosovo) has published, in the editorial houses of official Turkish foundations, seve­ ral books on Turkish poetry in Kosovo ; Raif Virmica has published books on Ottoman architectural mo­ numents in Kosovo (see, for example, Virmica (Raif), Kosova 'da Osmanh Mimari Eserleri, Ankara : Kiiltiir Bakanhgi, 1999 ; Kosova Hamanlari, Ankara : Kiiltiir Bakanhgi, 2002); etc. 40 Anadol u Ajansi, 08/04/99. 41 Anadolu Ajansi, 01/04/99. 42 Anadol u Ajansi, 04/04/99. 43 Declaratio n of Prime Minister Ecevit during his visit to the Kirklereli camp. Hiirriyet, 08/04/99. 44 Aksam, 08/04/99. 114 / Balkanologie VII I (1), juin 2004, p. 105­122

trying to justify their participation in the strikes. But, more important, this dis­ course als o appeare d durin g th e electora l campaig n fo r th e legislativ e elec ­ tions (1 8 April 1999). Actually, the beginning o f NAT O strikes and massiv e ex ­ pulsions o f the Albanians fro m the Kosovo province fell right in the middle o f this electora l campaign . I t motivated , o f course , som e competitio n amon g Turkish politicians . Tansu Cille r (leade r o f the conservativ e part y Dogru Yol Partisi) criticize d the government fo r its « apath y ove r Kosovo » 45, Prime mi­ nister Ecevi t visited the Kirklarel i camp a few day s before the elections 46, etc. In addition, the fear that the Islamist party (the Fazilet Partisi) would gain a lot of votes ­ i t had receive d 21, 3 % of the vote s in the previou s elections , whic h had le d to constant politica l crisi s ­ incite d the « secular » politicians to com ­ pete wit h th e Fazilet i n term s o f solidarit y wit h th e oppresse d brothers . Indeed, as it had been the case during the conflict in Bosnia, but to a much les­ ser extent , becaus e o f feare d compariso n wit h th e situatio n i n South­Eas t Anatolia, the Kosovo conflict was used by the Islamists as a political platform .

THE ALBANIANS I N ISTANBU L : A LOBBY FO R TH E KOSOV O CAUS E ?

The Turks of Albanian origin were mobilized and fairly active in their lob­ bying for the Kosov o cause. Most o f these Albanians settled in Istanbul in the 50's and the 6o's. Under the agreement signed between Yugoslavia and Turke y in 1953 , Turks from Yugoslavi a could immigrate t o Turkey. As a consequence , many Albanian s declare d themselve s Turk s and move d t o Turkey 47. Aroun d 150 000 « Turks » immigrated t o Istanbul a t the time 48, although most immi ­ grants o f Albanian origi n questio n this figure 49. The y settle d i n areas wher e the Albanian s wh o migrate d i n the 30' s live d (Bayrampasa , Aksaray , Kuciik ­ Cekmece).

45 Milliyet, 28/01/99. 46 Milliyet, 07/04/99 ; Aksam, 08/04/99. 47 A s the 1953 census in Yugoslavia shows, many Albanians declared themselves Turks. The number o f « Turks » in Yugoslavia therefore officially rose from 9 7 954 in 1948 to 259 53 5 in 1953. 48 Se e Cevat Geray, probably the most reliable source on immigration from the Balkans to Turkey. Geiay (Cevat), Tixrkiye'den v e Tiirkiye'ye gocler ve gocmenlerin iskam (1923­1961) [Le s migrations de Turquie et vers la Turquie et 1'installation des migrants], Ankara : Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Yay., 1962. 49 Ku t (Sule), « Turk s o f Kosov o : Wha t to Expect » , Perceptions, 5 (3 ) [available on the internet a t : www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/V­3/skut­4.htm]. Sylvie Ganglof f ­ Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo \ 11 5

Numerous association s represen t thi s community i n Istanbul 50. Mos t o f them were created in the 5o's and 6o' s for cultural and socia l reasons: to hel p new emigrant s fin d lodgin g an d work , t o organiz e fol k festivals , etc . Afte r 1990, some o f these « folkloric association s » began to have politica l preoccu ­ pations. Some, like the « Association o f the Kosovars » , set up in 1994, have ex ­ plicit politica l orientations . Thi s latte r associatio n i s fairl y activ e i n it s lob ­ bying fo r Kosovo , organizing meeting s wit h Turkis h deputie s an d officials , diffusing it s messag e t o th e press , etc. 51 When a repressio n campaig n wa s launched i n Kosov o in February 1998 , these Albania n association s immedia ­ tely mobilized , organizin g tw o demonstration s i n Istanbu l : the firs t o n 8 March, a few days after the beginning o f the repression, the second two month later. To reinforce their support campaign, fifteen o f these associations also set up a « Kosovo Information Commissio n » in May 199852, whose aim was to co­ ordinate their initiatives and to lobby the press 53. In addition, a representativ e office o f the Republic of Kosovo in Istanbul was inaugurated in December 1996. This opening did not receive, of course, any official authorization. However, ac­ cording to Kosovo Daily Report54, Albania's ambassador to Turkey, the Minister of Informatio n o f th e Republi c o f Kosov o an d th e vice­chairma n o f th e Democratic League o f Kosova attended the opening ceremony . This represen ­ tative office o f the Republic o f Kosovo seems to be closely linked to the LDK 55. Despite the active mobilization o f their « leaders » , the Albanian commu ­ nity itself di d not really take part in this lobbying. These Albanians are in fac t generally «turkified » , and most do not speak Albanian anymore. For example, there i s toda y n o specifi c communit y pres s (neithe r i n Albania n no r i n Turkish) in Istanbul56. They definitely d o feel concerned about the fate o f their fellows in Kosovo and they have some kinship for the Albanians; however, this does not mean that they are ready to assume an y particular personal ­ politi ­ cal or financial ­ engagement fo r Kosovo . According to the words o f the leade r of on e o f th e mos t influentia l Albania n groups , th e « Turkish­Albania n

50 Fo r example : Shoqata e gjilanasve ; Kosovahlar Kiiltur ve Dayanisma Derneġ i / Shoqata e kosovareve (Aksaray) ; Pristineliler Kültür ve Dayanisma Derneġ i / Shoqata e prishtinasve (Bayrampasa); Prizrenliler Dayanisma v e Kultii r Derneġ i / Shoqat a e prizrenasv e (Fatih ) ; Türk­Arnavut Kardesliġ i Kültü r v e Dayanisma Derneġ i / Vellazeria Shqiptaro­Turke (Bayrampasa) ; etc. See Rapper (Gilles de), les Albanais â Istanbul, Istanbul : IFE A (coll. « Le s dossiers de 1'IFE A »), 2000, pp. 22­23 . 51 Rapper (Gilles de), op.cit., p. 13. 52 Anadol u Ajansi, 11/05/98. 53 This commission dissolved itself a year later. 54 Kosovo Daily Report, 26/12/96. 55 Rappei (Gilles de), op.cit., p. 20. 56 A journal, Besa, was published every two months by the Türk­Arnavut Dernegi but its political content seems not to have suited the Turkish­Albanian community. It lasted from 1993 to 1996. 116 / Balkanologie VII I [1] , juin 2004, p. 105­12 2

Association » (Türk­Arnavut Derneġi), the mobilization o f the Turkish popula ­ tion o f Albanian origi n was rathe r disappointing 57. Th e participatio n i n th e two demonstrations organized by the leaders o f this community during sprin g 1998 was quite low58, and when the « ethnic cleansing » campaign was laun ­ ched i n Marc h 1999 , mone y collecte d fo r humanitaria n purpose s b y th e Albanian association s wa s rathe r poor 59. Th e Turkis h Albanian s di d not , o f course, join the UCK 6°. However, during the sprin g o f 1999, they assiste d th e refugees b y lodging some o f them i n their houses o r by preparing their coun ­ try house beside the camp o f Kirklareli in Thrace to accommodate them 61. Moreover, eve n i f mobilized , leader s o f thes e association s kee p a lo w Kemalist profile. First, they have completely integrated, and propagate, the of ­ ficial discours e o f a tolerant , multicultural , and westernize d Turkey . Second , these associations ar e generally financed b y conservative parties. In any case, they are careful to isolate themselves from the Islamist milieu that tries to use their cause as a political platform. Therefore, even i f they openly advocate the independence o f Kosovo 62, they understan d ver y wel l that Turke y has som e national priorities . Two month s afte r Ismai l Cem' s trip t o the FR Y in Marc h 1998, Kamil Bitis , the chairma n o f the « Kosov o Information Commissio n » , even described Ismail Cem's attitude as « ver y positive » 63. The Turkish government ha s kept to its previous and officia l lin e and ha s not supported the initiatives o f these associations. The two demonstrations or ­ ganized during Sprin g 199 8 were not authorized, nor was the inauguration o f the representativ e office . O n 8 March , th e polic e barre d th e rout e t o th e Yugoslav Consulate, the destination o f the demonstrators. But a few sign s in ­ dicate that th e authoritie s too k advantag e o f this networ k t o make contact s that migh t on e da y be useful. Fo r example, the openin g o f the representativ e office o f the Republi c o f Kosov o in Istanbul di d no t receive d an y officia l bac ­ king and no member o f the government attended 64, but nothing was done to prevent this inauguration o f which the Foreign Ministry was well informed. A

57 Intervie w with Halil Metin, president of the Tiirk­Arnavut Dernegi, August 29, 2000. 58 Th e first demonstration (March 1998) gathered around 6 000 people according to the press (Turkish Daily News, 09/03/98), 2 000 according to the official press agency (Anadolu Ajansi, 09/03/98) and from 8 to 10 000 according to the organizers. As for the second demonstration, it was even less popular. 59 Intervie w with Halil Metin, August 29,2000. 60 T o the exception of the Albanians recently arrived from Kosovo. Interview with Halil Metin, August 29, 2000. 61 Rappe r (Gilles de), op. cit., p. 20. 62 Se e for example, «Kosova Cumhuriyeti 6 yasinda » , Besa, (7), luly 1996. 63 Anadol u Ajansi, 11/05/98. 64 The ceremony was held in a Hotel in Istanbul on the 20th o f December. Sylvie Gangloff­ Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo \ 117

few leaders o f political parties als o attended the demonstrations . During th e demonstration o f the 8 March, the ANA P (Anavatan Partisi) eve n dispatche d an electoral bus to the route o f the demonstration 65.

THE TURKISH MINORIT Y I N KOSOV O

One of the constant lines of Turkish policy toward Kosovo is the insistenc e on the participation o f the Turkish minority in the peace talks. The Serbs full y subscribed to this request, which allowed them to break the Albanian unity in Kosovo. For the sam e purpose , Belgrad e grante d man y cultura l right s t o th e Turks in the 6o' s and 70's . After the 196 8 revolt in the province, Belgrade sup ­ ported the publicatio n o f severa l newspaper s i n Turkish 66, an d Turkis h wa s listed a s an officia l languag e i n the 197 4 Constitution. Later on, in 1985 , a de ­ partment o f Turkish studie s opene d a t the Universit y o f Pristina. In the mid ­ go's, aroun d 5 0 student s wer e registere d i n thi s department 67. Thi s polic y continued after the abolition o f Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 : the Albanian lan ­ guage, but no t Turkish , was banne d fro m broadcastin g o f the officia l Radi o Television ; Albanians lost their jobs, but not the Turks 68.

This Turkish minority numbers around 1 2 000 according to the 1991 census (0,6 % of the tota l populatio n o f the Kosov o province), but the Kosov o Turk s claim that they number at least 60 000. This figure i s also widely quoted in of ­ ficial an d unofficial Turkis h sources 69. They claim that the 199 1 census is no t reliable du e to political manipulations an d that the number o f Turkish spea ­ kers i s eve n muc h larger . Indeed , ethni c identitie s ar e rathe r comple x an d unclear in the area , the practice o f shifting identitie s widespread. No definit e

65 Turkish Daily News, 09/03/98. 66 Detail s o f these publications can be found in Bartlett (C.N.O.),« Th e Turkish Minority in Yugoslavia », Bradford Studies on Yugoslavia, (3) , 1980, pp. 11­12 . 67 Fo r details o f number o f students in Turkish language (fro m primar y education to university), se e Tunahgil (Cemali) , « Yugoslavya'd a Turk dilinde egitim ­ ogrenti m (1951­1997 ) » [Educatio n and tea­ ching in Turkish in Yugoslavia ­1951­1997], Turk DUnyasi Tarih Dergisi, (134), fevrier 1998. 68 Ku t (Sule), op. cit. 69 Her e are, for example, a few example of these estimates : 60 00 0 Turks and 200 00 0 Turkish spea­ kers according to the president o f the Tiirk Demokratik Birligi (Anadolu Ajansi, 18/03/99) ; 2° 00 0 ac­ cording to the permanent Turkish representative to NATO , Onur Oymen [Turkish Daily News, 25/03/99) ; 40 to 50 00 0 according to Tekin (Arslan), Balkan Volkam, Istanbul: Otiirken, 1993, p. 300 ; 20 to 40 00 0 according to the Turkish Foreign Ministry (declaration o f the F M speaker, Mehmet Atancali, 24 March 1999)­ Th e U N Hig h Commissioner for Refugees estimate s this population at around 2 0 000 . Kosova r Albanians claim that the real figure is much smaller. Radio 21,31/07/00, quoted by Albanews, 01/08/00. 118 / Balkanologie VII I [1], juin 2004, p. 105­12 2

estimate can thus be made, opening a vast margin to various political claims. According to the 199 1 census, there ar e 7 227 Turks in the are a o f Prizre n (the locatio n o f th e villag e o f Mamusa whic h i s inhabite d b y Turks 70), 88 7 Turks in Gilan 71 i n the eas t o f Kosovo, 445 Turks in Mitrovica (i n the north o f Kosovo)72 and 198 6 Turks in Pristina. In Turkish sources, the villag e o f Draga s is sometime s als o sai d t o b e inhabited b y Turkis h people . I n reality , thes e Muslims, the Goran s [Goranci), speak a Slavi c language bu t Turkis h source s tend to assimilate this population to Turks 73. This is, here, a typical case of a minority squeezed between a majority (th e Serbs i n th e RFY ) and « a minorit y i n majorit y » in it s ow n provinc e (th e Albanians), fighting t o get some rights. These Turks would be more comforta ­ ble in a multicultural societ y ­ and a federal administrative structure ­ than i n a countr y dominate d b y Albania n nationalists . I n sum , they ar e concerne d with thei r long­ter m viabilit y in Kosov o a s an ethni c group . Their relation s with the Albanians ar e therefore tainte d with suspicions . On the other hand , Albanians view the « pro­Turkish policy » of Serbian authorities as an « evil al­ liance » . The Albanian s notabl y accus e the Turk s o f having « collaborated » with the Serb s during the 199 9 massacres and expulsions . On the whole, the legitimate claim s o f the Albanians are viewed by som e of these Turk s as a threat o f Albanization. Other Turks , however, feel clos e to their persecuted Musli m co­religionists . Actually, numerous Turk s have bee n Albanized i n th e pas t twent y years . Beside s regula r marriage s betwee n Albanians and Turks, the Albanians, who ­ a s the Turks ­ obtained some rights under th e 197 4 Constitution, pu t pressur e o n the Turks , or even had a n anti ­ Turkish policy 74. The Kosovar Turks are therefore represente d by two politica l parties : ­ the Turkish Democratic Union (Turk Demokratik Birligi, TDB) 75, whic h i s opposed to an Albanian domination and often perceive d as pro­Serb, or, in any case, closer to the Serbs. For example, it opposed the boycott o f the official (FRY ) elections an d school s afte r 1990 . It i s actively lobbying fo r the restitution s o f

70 Th e Turkish Task Force stationed in Mamusa seems to be rather involved in the life of the local Turkish community. It has organized meals for the Iftar during Ramadan, organized courses in mechanics for the locals, and so on. See, for example, KFOR News Update, 03/01/01,12/01/01. 71 Gila n in Turkish, Gnjilane in Serbian, Gjilan in Albanian. 72 Th e Turkish Community of Mitrovica has gathered under the common roof an NG O and later on (in July 2001) joined the Turkish Democratic Union. Anadolu Ajansi, 29/07/01. 73 Th e same confusion is sometimes made in Turkish press concerning the Slavic Muslims in Macedonia (the Torbes). But, for example, the Pomaks in Bulgaria and Greece are not subject to any « Turkificatio n tendencies » in the press (except for a few nationalistic publications). 74 Kut (Sule), op. cit 75 The Turkish Democratic Union (TDB) became the Turkish Democratic Party (KTDP) during the Summer of 2001. Sylvie Gangloff ­ Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo \ 11 9

the rights that the Turks were granted under the 197 4 Constitution, and nota ­ bly the restoration o f Turkish as an official language since the UNMI K did no t recognize it 76. ­ The Turkish Popular Party (Turk Halk Partisi) is , on the contrary, close to the Albanians . I t presented candidate s a t the « illegal » local election s o f 2 2 March 1998 77 and i t is opposed to the restitutions o f the rights o f the Turks. It is sometimes referre d to , in the Turkish press, as the party o f the « Albanized Turks » 78. This party i s said to be clos e to the LD K leader, Ibrahim Rugova . It s support in Kosovo is, however, much less higher than it s counterpart ­ and op­ ponent ­ the TDB . For example, it failed to gather the required 1 000 signatu ­ res in order to be qualified fo r the November 200 1 general elections 79. The TD B lobbying i s directed a t the UNMI K administration a s well a s a t Turkey. A TDB delegation came to Ankara in July 200080 and obtained the bac­ king it sought. The former Turkis h Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, sent a lette r to the UN special representative in Kosovo, at the time Bernard Kouchner, plea­ ding fo r the recognitio n o f Turkish a s an officia l language , and eve n threate ­ ned t o withdra w Turkis h suppor t t o Kosov o i f « th e politica l an d cultura l rights o f the Turkish minority were no t protecte d » 81. Turkey als o exerted it s support fo r the rights o f this minority within NAT O through its permanent re ­ presentative to this organization 82. However, the extremely tense relations between the Turks and Albanian s within the province put Turkey in a rather awkward position and prevented it , on the ground , from activel y standing b y the Turks . Turkish leaders repeate d several times , fo r example , that n o discriminatio n woul d b e mad e betwee n Albanians an d Turk s in the distributio n o f Turkish humanitarian assistance . The Kosovar Turks expressed severa l times the wish that Turke y finance edu ­ cation in Turkish in the area, open a cultural center in Prizren, or grant them a status o f doubl e nationality . Excep t fo r th e Turkis h Re d Crescen t (Kizilay), i t seems tha t onl y the officia l Turkis h religiou s affair s director y (Diyanet) ha s been activ e i n th e area . Th e Diyanet ha s awarde d severa l scholarship s and ,

76 Fo r example, forms for the elections were printed in English, Albanian and Serbian, as these were re­ cognized as official languages since Rambouillet. 77 Ente r (Albanian Independent Press Agency), 22/03/98. 78 I t is apparently notably opposed to the addition o f Turkish in registration form s fo r the elections. Tiirkiye, 01/10/00. 79 Kosovalive , 07/09/01,28/0901. 80 Thi s delegation was received by the Prime Minister and by the Foreign Minister. Anadolu Ajansi, 27/07/00 ; Tiirkiye, 28/07/00 ; Turkish Daily News, 27/07/00. 81 Turkish Daily News, 05/08/00, 21/09/00. 82 See , for example, the diplomatic initiative taken by this representative, Onur Oymen, in March 1999. Anadolu Ajansi, 04/03/99. 120 / Balkanologie VI M [1), jutn 2004, p. 105­12 2

since 1991 , quite a fe w Kosov o Turks enrolle d i n Islami c studie s i n Turkey' s Imam Hatip Lisesi 83. Other initiative s have been taken by private institution s or organizations. For example, Turkish business association have made severa l donations (material s for students i n Mamusa, sugar and flour , and s o on). The nationalists represente d i n Turkey by the Millet Hareket Partisi (MHP ) and it s youth organization, the Ulkii Ocaklari, are somewhat activ e in the area and the Ulkii Ocaklari ha s som e representative s i n Kosovo 84. Th e Turk Diinyasi Arastirmalari Vakfi ha s organize d th e educatio n (i n Turkey ) o f numerou s Kosovo Turkis h teacher s sinc e 1991 . Leader s o f th e Turkis h Democrati c Union/Party (TDB / KTDP ) have close links with this nationalist foundation 85. Finally, the Aydmlar Ocaklari (th e Hearth o f the Enlightened) which represents, this time , th e Turk­Isla m synthesi s ideology 86 opene d a cente r i n Pristina . These institution s an d organizations , althoug h unofficial , hav e clos e link s with Turkey' s leadership . Fo r reasons mentione d above , Turkey's leader s re ­ main reluctant to take officia l diplomatic initiatives 87. The international administratio n i n Kosov o gradually grante d the right s claimed by the TDB. When Bernard Kouchner came to Ankara at the end of July 2000, a representative o f the TD B was invite d to participate i n the talk s (bu t not o f the THP) 88. Two month after , on 1 5 September, in a letter addresse d b y Bernard Kouchner to the TD B president, Turkish was recognized a s an officia l language i n the province 89. I n this letter , Kouchner state d that UNMI K gua ­ rantees th e Kosova r Turkis h community' s right s a s referre d t o i n th e 197 4 Yugoslav Constitution , that th e UNMI K regulations wil l be issue d a s well i n Turkish i n area s inhabite d b y Turkish communities , that identit y card s wit h important information i n Turkish will be issued and that in the municipalitie s where Turkis h communitie s live , instruction i n Turkis h wil l b e offered . Tw o

83 Speec h o f Miivedde t Bak o (Tur k Demokrati k Birlig i Partisi) , Turk Diinyasi Tarih Dergisi, (105) , September 1995, pp. 9­11. 84 Sansin (Mehmet), « Kosova'dak i Turk Diinyasi » , Sabah, 06/05/97. 85 It should be noted that Turks living in the United States and close to the TD A are as well involved in va­ rious humanitarian, cultural, or political initiatives in Kosovo. 86 Th e Turk­Islam synthesis emphasizes the very fruitful marriag e of Islam and Turkism. This ideology has been adopted by the extreme right in Turkey. 87 This « semi­official diplomacy » (the use or instrumentalization of various associations, foundations or private institutions), is a recurrent tool of Turkish foreign policy, especially in the Caucasus (and notably in Azerbaijan and Chechnya) and in Central Asia, where nationalist or panturkist groups have been used to make contacts and ensure good, but discrete, political relations. 88 Radio 21, 31/07/00, quoted by Albanews, 01/08/00. 89 Tiirkiye, 21/09/00 , 29/10/00. Although Turkis h had been recognize d as an officia l languag e o n 1 5 September, the TD B di d not participate in the 28 October elections because ­ accordin g to the Turkish Foreign Ministry ­ the UN mission « failed to take the necessary steps in time ». Tiirkiye, 29/10/00 ; AFP, 05/11/00. Sylvie Gangloff ­ Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo \ 12 1

months afte r thi s recognition , th e leade r o f th e Turkis h Democrati c Union , Mahir Yagcilar , wa s appointe d t o th e Interi m Council 90. Th e Internationa l Peacekeeping Forc e (KFOR ) ha d alread y starte d t o broadcas t i n Turkis h i n December 199 9 and a Turkish weekly , Yeni Dbnem, ha s been publishe d sinc e then91. Th e ai m o f th e internationa l interi m administratio n o f Kosov o i s clearly to ensure the participation o f al l Kosovo communities to the adminis ­ tration o f the province. And progress has definitely been made with regards to the claim s o f the Turks. Problems stil l regularly occurred. For example, during the 200 0 municipal elections , the Turkis h community decide d to boycott th e registration process organized by the OSC E because the forms were not in their native language . Bu t a n agreemen t wa s finall y reache d wit h th e Kosov o Turkish leaders and they registered for the November 2001 general elections 92.

CONCLUSION

Turkey did not make an y significant contributio n to settle the conflict i n Kosovo. The fear o f a parallel with the situation in southeast Anatolia preven ­ ted i t from exertin g diplomati c pressure , a s it ha d bee n the cas e in the firs t phase o f the conflic t i n Bosnia­Herzegovina. But Turkey was as well, and a s it had bee n th e cas e fo r Bosnia , carefu l no t t o antagoniz e Balka n population s highly sensitive to any Turkish interference in the area. Last, Turkey is not suc h an important actor in the Balkans and, in any case, its influence remains in the shadow o f the U S and Europe . Its positio n ha s bee n fairl y constant : i t support s th e maintainin g o f Yugoslav territoria l integrit y an d demand s enhance d autonom y fo r Kosov o with maximum rights for all the ethnic groups, including the Turkish commu ­ nity. Turkish leaders, for example, vigorously opposed the UN plan outlined i n June 1999 . Their main objectio n wa s the divisio n o f Kosov o into various sec ­ tors, which, according to Ecevit, might lead to a deadlock. In addition, politica l consultations hav e been launched i n February 200 1 with a view to renewin g ties with th e FRY . The Yugosla v Deput y Foreig n Ministe r cam e t o Ankara i n February9^ and Ismail Cem, former Turkis h minister o f Foreign Affairs, was i n

90 Anadol u Ajansi, 13/12/00. 91 Aksam, 09/12/99. 92 The UNMI K used some mobile registration teams which went to Turkish villages. KosovaLive, 16/01/01, 25/06/01, 28/07/01 ; « Repor t on the Secretary­General on the U N Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo » , UN Security Council, 07/06/0 1 ; « Greek Helsinki Monito r Repor t o n the Judicial System, Freedom of the Media and the Situation of Minorities in Kosovo » , IHFMission to Kosovo, February 2001. 93 Cumhuriyet, 08/02/01; Milliyet, 21/02/01. 122 / Balkanologie VII I (1) , juin 2004, p. 105­12 2

Belgrade a t the beginning o f March. He signed a n agreement o n cooperatio n with the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry and an investment deal. This visit, the firs t official visi t o f a Turkish Foreig n Minister to Belgrade sinc e 1992 , is seen a s a turning point in bilateral relations 94. The weight o f internal affairs , i f not in Turkish initiatives then at least i n official discourse , i s mor e tha n noticeable . Thi s wa s alread y th e cas e fo r Bosnia­Herzegovina. Tans u Ciller , forme r Prim e Minister , travele d twic e t o Sarajevo : i n Februar y 1994 , a fe w week s befor e loca l elections , an d i n November 1995 , again fou r week s befor e elections . However, i f the Islamist s used the Kosov o conflict t o publiciz e their message , they remai n rathe r cau ­ tious in this instrumentalization ; here again , because o f the « Kurdish paral ­ lel » but also because, in the case of Kosovo, the international community ­ an d first o f all the Unite d State s ­ did intervene, and strongly , to assis t the perse ­ cuted Albanians/Muslims. The usual rhetoric o f the West applying a « double standard » and letting the Muslims be killed because they were Muslim coul d therefore no t b e applied . Fo r the sam e reason , the « Muslim worl d » did no t mobilize fo r Kosov o (a s oppose d t o Bosnia­Herzegovina) . I n addition , th e Bosnian experienc e was rathe r disappointing. This conflict ende d with a pax Americana an d th e Bosnia n Musli m leader s quickl y chos e betwee n th e al ­ liance with the United State s and with the Muslim world (mainl y Iran wher e they had their best connections even before the war and whose military assis­ ted them). This rather passive attitude o f the Muslim world was o f course in ­ dicated by several editorialists in Turkey 95. Conflicts bearin g religiou s connotations are , in any case , problematic fo r Turkey. It can make use of the«Islamic » discourse only in moderation. Beyond the traditiona l suspicio n towar d the Turk s in the Balkans , its secularism an d its aspiration to be recognized as a fully westernized country forbids Turkey to raise the Muslim banner as soon as its political interests are concerned. In this respect, the manifestation o f conflicts with religious connotations ­ Christian s against Muslim s ­ represent s a challenge fo r Turkey . I f it publicly side s wit h the Muslims, this can only reinforce it s image o f a Muslim state and therefor e cut i t off fro m Europe . Therefore, i f « historical ties and responsibilities » and « moral commitmen t toward s Musli m Albanian s » have bee n pu t forward , Turkish leaders have been careful to reject the idea of a confrontation betwee n Christians and Muslims : « It is not a fight o f Slavic Orthodox Christians on one side and Muslim Albanians on the other (... ) There is no such thing as Muslim­ Orthodox confrontation » 96.

94 Hiirriyet, 03/03/01. 95 Fo r example, « Where are our Muslim brothers ? » , Milliyet, 08/04/99. 96 Suleyman Demirel, in Pulse of Turkey, 27/03/99 (available on internet: www.turkpulse.com/icindeki­ ler.htm)