Turkish Policy Towards the Conflict in Kosovo: the Preeminence of National Political Interests Sylvie Gangloff
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Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo: the preeminence of national political interests Sylvie Gangloff To cite this version: Sylvie Gangloff. Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo: the preeminence of national political interests. Balkanologie. Revue d’études pluridisciplinaires, Association française d’études sur les Balkans, 2004. hal-03134700 HAL Id: hal-03134700 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03134700 Submitted on 8 Feb 2021 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Balkanologie Revue d'études pluridisciplinaires Vol. VIII, n° 1 | 2004 Volume VIII Numéro 1 Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo: the preeminence of national political interests La politique de la Turquie dans le conflit du Kosovo : les pré-éminence des intérêts (politiques) nationaux Sylvie Gangloff Édition électronique URL : http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/517 ISSN : 1965-0582 Éditeur Association française d'études sur les Balkans (Afebalk) Édition imprimée Date de publication : 1 juin 2004 ISSN : 1279-7952 Référence électronique Sylvie Gangloff, « Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo: the preeminence of national political interests », Balkanologie [En ligne], Vol. VIII, n° 1 | juin 2004, mis en ligne le 21 janvier 2010, consulté le 30 avril 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/517 © Tous droits réservés Balkanologie VII I (1) , juin 2004, p. 105122 \ 10 5 TURKISH POLIC Y TOWARD S THE CONFLIC T I N KOSOV O : THE PREEMINENC E O F NATIONA L POLITICAL INTEREST S Sylvie Gangloff* In FebruaryMarch 1998, tensions in Kosovo between Albanians and Serb s suddenly rose to an armed level . The appearance o f a Kosovo Liberation Arm y (UCK, Ushtrica Çlirimtare e Kosoves) had seriously worried the Serbian authori ties who decide d o n several arrests and attacke d village s where UÇ K fighter s were finding o r were supposed to have found support . Massacres o f som e Albanians took plac e and continue d sporadicall y the followin g year , notabl y during th e summe r o f 1998 . The internationa l communit y trie d t o mediat e between th e tw o oppose d people s bu t withou t an y success . Finall y NAT O members, concerned tha t th e Serbia n authoritie s wer e organizin g o r wer e about t o organiz e a n ethni c cleansing , launche d ai r strike s agains t th e Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (March 1999June 1999). During the entire conflict, Turkish leaders did not take major initiatives in the international diplomatic arena. They even refrained, especiall y during th e first phas e o f th e fighting , fro m commentin g o n th e event s an d th e whol e issue di d no t giv e ris e t o passionat e politica l debat e (a s i t ha d fo r Bosnia Herzegovina). Afte r th e decisio n o f militar y interventio n wa s mad e b y it s NATO allies, here again, Turkish military and political leaders looked rather re luctant to invest in this military operation. Turkish leaders did not oppose th e intervention (a s they did in the case of Greece and Russia for example) but ex pressed their willingness to remain on the side . Between 199 2 an d 1995 , th e persecutio n o f Muslim s i n Bosnia Herzegovina arouse d scandalize d reaction s i n the publi c opinio n i n Turkey . The Turks saw o r perceived thei r fello w Muslim s massacre d precisel y be cause o f their religion . The war i n BosniaHerzegovin a wa s extensivel y com mented o n in the press and in public declarations, and Turkey exerted a fairl y * Chercheur associe au laboratoire d'études turques, CNRS/UM R 8032. ([email protected] ) 106 / Balkanologie VII I (1), juin 2004, p . 10512 2 intense diplomatic pressure o n the international community by launching in itiatives whenever i t could i n the internationa l organization s to which i t be longs (NATO , OSCE , UN, Organizatio n o f the Islami c Conference) . Moreover , Turkish leaders insisted on the implementation o f the decisions o f the Unite d Nations, even i f this meant a military intervention 1. A few years later, in 19981999, the conflic t between Serb s and Albanian s in Kosov o di d no t a t al l arous e th e sam e concer n an d th e sam e scandalize d reactions even though Albanians are almost entirely Muslims and were als o subject to Serbian assaults. Concern for massacred fello w Muslims was not a s visible, not as widely denounced and not s o widely instrumentalized by some Turkish politica l factions . Turkis h official s wer e extremel y cautiou s i n thei r public declarations on the responsibilities in this conflict and on the suggeste d diplomatic o r military (re)actions . Indeed, it seems that Turkis h official s ha d some other concerns in mind and that the political and juridical nature o f the conflict itsel f was embarrassing for them. Comparisons between the situatio n in Kosovo and the situation in SouthEast Turkey were actually made by som e Western leader s her e an d there . Therefore, whatever th e religiou s aspect s o f the conflic t i n Kosovo o r the reality o f massacres o f civilians i t was a mat ter o f politica l prioritie s t o stic k t o the principl e o f nationa l unit y ove r th e claims o f some « terrorists » and to the principle o f noninterference i n inter nal affairs. The numerous Turk s of Albanian origin in Turkey did not play an y major politica l role, nor did a t first the Turkish minority in Kosovo whose presence an d situatio n arouse d interes t bu t whic h onl y became a subjec t o f political interest o r political maneuvers later in 2000. A CAUTIOUS DIPLOMAC Y I N THE BALKAN S The policy of the Turkish government concerning the conflicts in the Balkans has been very cautious since 1991. The options for Turkey were limited. It could act only in accord with the West, unilateral action was not possible or even wished fo r (in politica l o r financia l terms) . I t shoul d no t b e forgotte n tha t Turke y an d Turkey's initiatives were carefull y watched b y the other Balkan countries, suspi cious of its real intentions, and prompt to denounce any move on its part. Turkey's long domination of the Balkans sets it up as a suspicious actor in the eyes of most of the countries in the area ; it was against the Ottoman Empire that the Balka n nations forged their independence. This phenomenon of « fundamental enmity » 1 See Gangloff (Sylvie), « L a politique balkanique de la Turquie et le poids du passe ottoman », in Bougarel (Xavier), Clayer (Nathalie), éds., Le Nouve/ Islam balkanique. Les musulmans, acteurs du postcommunisme, iggo2000, Paris : Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001. Sylvie Gangloff Turkish policy towards the conflict in Kosovo \ 107 is not a particularity o f the Balkans , but what i s particular in this case is the in ability of the Balkan people to overcome their antagonism . This historical and emotional background is a serious handicap for Turkey, which has to act cautiously and cannot take any sharp position on the conflict s or tensions i n the area . It is still under constan t threat o f being accuse d o f re turning to its warriorlike tendencies, and must therefore ac t very cautiously 2. The antiTurkish policy of Greece in western circle s has already had disastrou s consequences fo r Turkey. Moreover the military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 considerably reinforced this perception o f a bellicose country, regime, and peo ple. Turkey officially intervene d to protect the rights of the Turkish populatio n on th e island . Thi s officia l justificatio n coul d onl y rais e suspicion s i n th e Balkans that Turkey might put forward the same excuse to interfere i n Balka n affairs. This « Cyprus syndrome » is constantly reiterated in the Balkans (i n the public opinion, in the press, as well as in public political declarations). Therefore, Ankara has systematically secured its Balkan diplomacy by the « principles and positions » of the international community and had notabl y refused to actively participate in military interventions. When NAT O issued an ultimatum t o Serbi a in February 1994 , Turkey certainly backed this initiativ e but proposed it s participation i n air strikes only for logisti c missions 3. Again, in August 1995 during the operation Delibarate Force, Turkey welcomed the ac tion but the Turkish Air Force did not participate in the actual bombing 4.