PEACE Info (August 27, 2020) − MANAGING BURMA’S ETHNIC CONFLICT: Subjugation and suppression lead to secession urge Part IV Conclusion − Residents of Shan State Puzzled by Tatmadaw Troops from Karen State − Myanmar Army Acknowledges Killing of Civilian That Sparked Big Protest in Shan State − Arakan Army Releases 3 Chin Youth − CSOs demand halt to military operations as Covid-19 outbreak increases in Rakhine − All three million in Myanmar's Rakhine in virus lockdown − Myanmar’s Rakhine State Under Partial Lockdown Amid COVID-19 Surge − China, Myanmar launch joint research projects − �င�မ��ခ�မ���ရ� ဆ��င�ရ� �ဆ������ဖလ�ယ�ပ�� �မစ��က��န��တ�င� က�င��ပ − ကရင��အ�ဇ�နည��န� အခမ��အန��တက�သ� တစ���စ�အ�က�မ�� �ထ�င�ဒဏ� ၁၅ ရက�ခ�ခံရ − ကရင�အ�ဇ�နည��န� ဝန��ရံသ� �ထ�င�ဒဏ� ၁၅ရက�ခ�မ�တ�၊ ဦ��ဆ�င�သ�မ���က�� စက�တင�ဘ� ၁ရက�တ�င� ဆက�လက��က��န� စစ��ဆ�မည� − မ�ဆယ��ဒသခံ ၃ ဦ� �သဆ�ံ�တ���ဖစ�ရပ� တပ�မ�တ�� စ�ံစမ���န − လက�နက��က��က�၍ �က�က�စ��က��ပန� အမ����သမ�� ၁ ဦ��သ၊ ၃ ဦ� ဒဏ�ရ�ရ − တပ�ရ��ပစ�ခတ�မ���က�င�� �က��က��တ��မ�� အရပ�သ����စ�ဦ��သ၊ သ�ံ�ဦ�ဒဏ�ရ�ရ − �က��က��တ��ပစ�ခတ�မ� အရပ�သ�� ၂ ဦ��သဆ�ံ� − �ပ��က�ဆ�ံ��နဆ� ���ဟင�ဂ���တ�အ�ရ���ဖရ�င��ဖ��� လ��အခ�င��အ�ရ�အဖ����တ� တ��က�တ�န�� − ရခ��င� ၁၁ �မ ���နယ�အထ� COVID-19 �ရ�ဂ�ပ��� က��စက�ပ�ံ���ံ�လ� ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 1 of 32 MANAGING BURMA’S ETHNIC CONFLICT: Subjugation and suppression lead to secession urge Part IV Conclusion By Sai Wansai - August 27, 2020 Finally, we are now at a stage to look into the territories controlled or operated by the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), which cover contested areas, semi-liberated areas, and liberated areas. Deciphering Myanmar Peace Process a reference guide 2016 – BNI In this respect, Kim Jolliffe in his “Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar,” published by Asia Foundation, June 2015, outlined dozens of ethnic armed actors’ sub- national administration systems establishment that are not mandated by the 2008 Constitution. These overlap geographically with each other and with the administration systems of the state in many areas, including with the self-administered areas (SAAs). The government official version is termed as Self-Administered Zones and Division (SAZ & SAD). Accordingly, within Sagaing Region there is Naga Self-Administered Zone (Leshi, Lahe and Namyun Townships); within Shan State there are Palaung Self- Administered Zone (Namshan and Manton Townships); Kokang Self- Administered Zone (Konkyan and Laukkai Townships); Pa-O Self- Administered Zone (Hopong, Hshihseng and Pinlaung Townships); Danu Self- Administered Zone (Ywangan and Pindaya townships); and Wa Self-Administered Division (Hopang, Mongmao, Panwai, Pangsang, Naphan and Metman Townships) Page 2 of 32 Laiza township – Wikipedia In his report he mapped out or rather, specially invented terms for his study, which are “hostile claims, tolerated claims and accommodated claims”. Accordingly, “the three main ways armed actors have gained control or influence over territories and populations: 1) “hostile claims”, where military force is used to seize or maintain access; 2) “tolerated claims”, where ceasefire conditions have led the Myanmar security forces informally permit access; and 3) “accommodated claims” where armed actors openly cooperate with the state in return for access. Very few of these territories have clearly agreed borders and those that do are rarely, if ever, formally documented.” According to his report, such rebel administered territories with varying degrees of system are found in southeast of the country’s Karen State; South and East of Shan State; Kachin State and northern Shan State; northwest of the country in Sagaing Region including Chin and Arakan states, covering the southwest of the country. Southeast Myanmar After more than seven decades of ethnic armed conflict and the new ceasefire that followed since October 2015 Karen areas remain fragile, as do the resulting territorial arrangements, wrote the report. The Karen National Union (KNU), Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), and Tatmadaw and 13 Karen Border Guard Forces (BGFs) territorial claims overlaps in numerous areas. The KNU system of governance is described by Kim Jolliffe as follows. “At the crux of the KNU’s governance system are administrative committees for each of seven locally defined districts, 28 townships therein, and every village tract and village. These committees are each led by a chairperson, and are elected through congresses of representatives from the level below. As such, communities select village chairpersons, who then select representatives for village tract congresses. Village tract congresses then elect village tract chairpersons, who select representatives for township congresses and so on, up the hierarchy. These upwardly elected committees are thus instrumental in electing the organization’s leadership, and are also the primary administrative bodies, holding considerable executive power. The KNU’s armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army, has automatic representation at each level too, but is subordinate to elected officials.” “Further south, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) has controlled Mon State’s small border with Thailand and another patch of territory on the Mon-Kayin border with near total autonomy since its 1995 ceasefire with the government.” Page 3 of 32 “In Kayah State (also known as Karenni State, a term preferred by its people resistance armies) and neighboring Pekon Township in Shan State, the major ceasefire groups are the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the smaller Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), while other territories are controlled or influenced by around half a dozen state-backed militia, including two BGFs.” Thus, it could be said that KNU, NMSP, KNPP, Kayan New Land Party controlled areas fall under the category of “tolerated claims” while others are controlled by state-backed militia and BFGs which fall into territories with “accommodated claims”. In Karen State, KNU administrate over Hpapun Township, Thandauggyi Township, eastern Hlaingbwe Township, eastern Kyaukkyi and Shwegyin Townships, Eastern Bago. DKBA over Eastern Myawaddy Township, Kyainseikgyi Township, Kayin State. Karen Peace Council over Kawkareik Township, Kayin State. All the three groups hold on territories fall into “tolerated claims”. But the BGFs 1011- 1023 rule over Hlaingbwe, Hpapun, Kawkereik, Myawaddy, Hpa-an and Kyainseikgyi Townships, Karen State are “accommodated claims” and even having a de facto influence on the territories, according to Kim Jolliffe. Southern and Eastern Shan State Likewise, in southern and eastern Shan State various EAOs come under different claims regarding their controlled territories, from “hostile, tolerated to accommodated”. “The Pa-O National Organization (PNO) enjoys a high level of cooperation with the state, which has been augmented repeatedly since it signed a ceasefire in 1991. Its winning of all seats in the Pa-O SAZ as a formally registered political party has provided a new platform for working in an official government capacity. However, the extent of its ongoing influence remains largely dependent on its armed wing, the Pa-O National Army, which has formed a “People’s Militia Force” and maintains a robust parallel administration system of its own,” according to the report. “In contrast, the administration system of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) is completely removed from that of the government. It was established through insurgency in rural Shan communities throughout the state, and has been only marginally tolerated by the Tatmadaw since a ceasefire was signed in 2011.” Regarding how the RCSS administered its territories, the report wrote: “The RCSS divides its area into five regions which it administers through around 20 “administrative battalions”. These administrative battalions are made up of soldiers with specialist training for administration and work alongside regular military “operations battalions”. These units have a degree of autonomy from the center, while the organization’s twelve other departments—for affairs such as revenue, education, and resource management—are based only at the central level and have to work with the local battalions in each area. The organization is currently undergoing a transition from a “wartime constitution” to a “ceasefire-time constitution”, the latter of which provides for greater participation of civilians.” Page 4 of 32 “The United Wa State Party (UWSP) has maintained a patchy presence along the Thai border since the state permitted it to attack Shan rebels in the late 1990s, and to oversee a mass migration of Wa civilians to the area.” “In addition, the UWSP ally, the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), known as the “Mongla Group”, has almost total autonomy along a significant portion of Shan East’s border with Laos and China. The political geography is further complicated by dozens of state-backed militia, including three BGFs, which have varied roles in governance.” The relatively new Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) also has a small ceasefire territory in which it administers around 40–50 small mountain villages. Thus, PNO and PNLO fall into the category of “accommodated claims”, while the RCSS would be more of a “hostile claims” in most of its operational areas mixed with “tolerated claims”, which are southern Mongton, Langkho and Mongpan Townships, and parts of Kengtung and Laikha Townships, Shan State. Other operational areas are parts of most townships in Shan (South) and Shan (East), east of Loilem and west of Kengtung. Also Namhkan, Kyaukme and Hsipaw Townships, Shan State (North) fall into its operational areas, which vary from time to time under “hostile” and “tolerated” claims. United Wa State Army (UWSA) and NDAA or Mongla also fall into “tolerated claims”, with the former ruling over Wa-populated areas of southern Mongton, Monghsat, Langkho and Tachilek Townships, and the latter, Mongla Township, parts of Monyawng, Mongyang and Monphyak Townships, in Shan State.