transnational institute

Burma Policy Briefing Nr 12 October 2013

Burma’s Ethnic Challenge: From Aspirations to Solutions

The present time of political transition in Recommendations Burma/Myanmar1 is the most hopeful in terms of aspirations and potential since inde- To end the legacy of state failure, the pendence from Great Britain in 1948. Many present time of national transition must outcomes, however, remain possible. There is be used for inclusive solutions that involve still no inclusive political framework or na- all peoples of Burma. The most important tional consensus that guarantees future peace, changes in national politics have started in democracy and progress for all citizens. many decades. Now all sides have to halt military operations and engage in socio- As in any troubled country in transition, political dialogue that includes government, it appears good strategy to concentrate on military, ethnic, political and civil society the positives. Certainly, this has been the representatives. response of the international community towards the quasi-civilian government of Political agreements will be essential to President that assumed office in achieve lasting peace, democracy and March 2011 from its military predecessor, ethnic rights. National reconciliation and the State Peace and Development Council equality must be the common aim. The (SPDC). As the doors to the country opened, divisive tradition of different agreements and international perceptions of Burma’s govern- processes with different ethnic and political ment rapidly transformed from pariah status groups must end. in the West to a pro-democracy model for the developing world. In the past eight months, In building peace and democracy, people- Thein Sein – a former general and SPDC centred and pro-poor economic reforms leader – has been welcomed as a state guest to are vital. Land-grabbing must halt, and the USA, Australia, UK, France, Norway and development programmes should be other European countries. appropriate, sustainable and undertaken with the consent of the local peoples. Of key importance, the start of the release of Humanitarian aid should be prioritized for political prisoners, the relaxation of censor- the most needy and vulnerable communities ship, and the admission of Suu Kyi and not become a source of political and National League for Democracy (NLD) advantage or division. As peace develops, candidates to parliament have instigated internally displaced persons and refugees hopes that the new political system might be must be supported to return to their places of made to work. At the same time, new cease- origin and to rebuild divided societies in the fire agreements with a majority of the armed ethnic borderlands. ethnic opposition groups in the country’s borderlands have furthered expectations that The international community must play real reform could be underway. Equally strik- a neutral and supportive role in the ing, economic change has fostered excitement achievement of peace and democracy. that, after decades of conflict and humanitar- National reform is at an early stage, and it is ian suffering, Burma could be on the brink vital that ill-planned strategies or investments of an economic boom on one of Asia’s most do not perpetuate political failures and ethnic strategic but impoverished crossroads. injustice.

Burma Policy Briefing 1 Such optimism and markers of reform by elected parliament in five decades, a crucial no means suggest that distressing events or stage has been reached. With the next general regressive trends should be overlooked. After election not due until 2015, there are growing decades of political and ethnic conflict, the questions about reform direction and mo- sentiment is widespread that the present time mentum. Government officials seek to project of state transition must be built upon to truly the present political, ethnic and economic deliver peace and inclusive socio-political re- difficulties as teething problems that will dis- form for all Burma’s peoples. In a break from sipate over time. In reality, history has long the repressive malaise under military rule, a warned that their resolution is integral to new sense of energy and openness has begun future peace and democracy in the country. in parts of the country. In particular, for domestic and international confidence to build, two key issues remain to After two years of the Thein Sein govern- be resolved: how the new political system will ment, however, a cautious mood is also be- evolve and how the military’s control over ginning to set in. There have been too many politics will devolve. disappointments and injustices in Burma’s past for simple optimism now. Despite many For this reason, while political manoeuvrings promises of reform, progressive change for and ethnic ceasefire talks continue, it is es- many citizens has either not happened or is sential that state failure and national divi- on the drawing boards and yet to be imple- sions do not become sustained under a new mented. incarnation of military-backed government. Important steps have been made in national For the moment, there are different centres reconciliation during the past two years. of authority in national politics between the But promises and ceremonies will never be president, government, Union Solidarity and enough. The long-standing aspirations of Development Party (USDP), armed forces Burma’s peoples for peace and justice must and new legislative assemblies, while mili- find solutions during the present time of tary officers and units still dominate many national transition. This can only be achieved aspects of daily life in the field. Meanwhile through transparent and inclusive processes many citizens continue to feel excluded from that truly address long-standing political and political representation and influence at both ethnic needs. Challenges must be faced up to the community and national levels where the – not downplayed or ignored. NLD and ethnic opposition parties are strug- gling to make impact. In essence, political change remains top-down after five decades Warnings from history of military rule, and democratic and ethnic reforms are still in their infancy. A lack of political experience or knowledge is often blamed for Burma’s difficulties in Against this unsettled backdrop, regressive national reform. In reality, the country has trends have continued. These include eco- one of the most contested ethnic and politi- nomic inequalities, land-grabbing, continued cal histories of all post-colonial territories in militarization and ethnic conflict2 – the latter, Asia. In a land of obvious natural and hu- most especially in the Kachin and Shan states man resource potential, the present time of but also and other parts of political transition is far from the first time the country where violent Buddhist-Muslim that hopes have been raised of a stable and communalism has taken place.3 A further prosperous future. There have been four pre- 240,000 civilians have been internally dis- vious occasions of national expectation and placed from their homes since the Thein Sein dialogue. On each occasion, however, divi- government assumed power4; loss of life and sion and exclusion continued, providing the humanitarian suffering have continued; and, backdrop under which internal conflicts and although confrontations have lately reduced, military-dominated government developed there seem no immediate solutions to po- and ultimately set in. litical challenges that, in many cases, have existed since independence. The consequences have been deep and must not be repeated. After over six decades of Thus, halfway through the life of Burma’s first violence and political impasse, crises exist in

2 Burma Policy Briefing every area of national life, from the economy Tensions, however, were rising in other parts and environment to health and education. of the country, especially among Shans and But among many failings, the marginalisa- Kachins – the latter even more after Prime tion and suppression of different political Minister promoted Buddhism as the and ethnic interests have become the most official state religion (most Kachins are fundamental in a country where minority Christians). The status of Buddhism and peoples make up an estimated third of the religion is not a new or uncontested issue in 60 million population. Nationwide peace Burma. Finally in March 1962, as U Nu made and inclusive democracy have yet to be ready to address the federal seminar, Gen. Ne established. Win seized power in a military coup, ending Burma’s brief experience with parliamentary The first lost opportunity in political transi- democracy. “Federalism is impossible,” he tion was at independence in 1948. National said. “It will destroy the Union.”7 hopes of a co-operative future had been raised by the 1947 Panglong conference A third opportunity for national political where ethnic principles for the new Union reform did briefly appear to occur under were agreed. But with key parties already Gen. Ne Win’s “” outside the new political system, the 1947 (1962-88). Despite the arrest of politicians constitution was riddled with inconsistencies and violent suppression of student protests, and never sufficient to bind the new Union a nationwide Peace Parley took place in Ran- together.5 The new parliamentary system was goon during 1963-64 between the military federal in intention but not in name. As so- government and different communist and cialist and communist supporters battled for ethnic forces. Socialist and non-aligned poli- control of government, armed conflict swept tics were then popular in the post-colonial across the country to include Karen, Karenni, world, and opposition groups were keen to Mon, Rakhine and other ethnic groups who hear the new government’s views. But once felt marginalised and took up arms to press the totalitarian nature of Ne Win’s ambi- for ethnic rights and self-determination. tions became clear, armed resistance quickly Thousands of lives were lost, the economy resumed. Subsequently, an Internal Unity collapsed and a divided state of conflict took Advisory Body to advise on a new constitu- root. It was a devastating blow from which tion was formed that included U Nu and the country never recovered.6 other political and ethnic leaders follow- ing their release from prison. But impasse A factionalised parliamentary system strug- soon followed, and U Nu went underground gled on through the 1950s. But with insur- with political colleagues to launch an armed gent groups (principally communist and movement, allied with the KNU and other ethnic) controlling much of the countryside, pro-federal ethnic forces in the Thai bor- national authority and important sectors of derlands, to try and restore parliamentary the economy were increasingly taken over democracy to the country. by the national armed forces, known as the . U Nu’s campaign proved short-lived. It was not the first – or last – time that the attempt There was nevertheless a second period of to join Burman and non-Burman forces in hope for national political change following “united front” opposition would fail to bring the first period of Tatmadaw rule, the “Mili- down the central government.8 In 1974 a new tary Caretaker” administration (1958-60). constitution was imposed after a disputed na- This occurred during 1960-62 when civilian tional referendum. But Ne Win’s isolationist government was returned in Burma’s third “Burmese Way to Socialism”, an odd mix of general election after independence. Prior Buddhist, Marxist and nationalist principles, to the military hand-over, Tatmadaw offic- was never sufficient to resolve the country’s ers held peace talks with the insurgent Karen needs. As insurgencies and black markets National Union (KNU: formed 1947) and, flourished around the country’s borders, in a manner reminiscent of present political Burma declined even further over the next flowerings, a Federal Movement galvanised decade to Least Developed Country status amongst ethnic politicians that led to a fed- at the United Nations as one of the world’s eral seminar in the then capital Rangoon. poorest states. The goals of “unity in diver-

Burma Policy Briefing 3 sity” at Burma’s independence now seemed a As refugee numbers steadily rose, no deci- very distant dream. sive or inclusive moment arrived where all peoples and parties came together to po- This backdrop of breakdown led to the fourth litically discuss and agree Burma’s future. time of hope for national political change Eventually, the SPDC claimed that a new during 1988-90, which was inspired by constitution was approved by a controversial the 1988 democracy uprising and remains referendum in May 2008 in the aftermath of fresh in national memory today.9 The initial in which over 130,000 people protests, which were student-led, were sup- died. The pro-Tatmadaw USDP subsequently pressed with considerable loss of life, quash- won the general election held in November ing the “hopes of an entire nation”.10 But, in 2010, widely regarded as not free and fair 13, their wake, they triggered a series of events forming the basis for the Thein Sein govern- that transformed the political landscape. ment that assumed power in March 2011. But Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Programme Party once again, political change was occurring (BSPP) and the insurgent Communist Party in a nationally divided landscape. Due to of Burma collapsed; a new military govern- repression and a lack of substantive reform, ment, the State Law and Order Restoration the NLD and its ethnic allies from the 1990 Council (SLORC: reformed into SPDC in election had not taken part in drawing up the 1997), assumed power promising democratic new constitution or general election; ethnic and economic reforms; the new government opposition forces – both with and without offered ceasefires to ethnic opposition forces ceasefires – felt similarly excluded; and the in the borderlands; and the newly-formed new system of “disciplined democracy” NLD and ethnic nationality allies won a was dominated by representatives of the landslide victory in the 1990 general election, USDP and Tatmadaw, the latter of which was Burma’s first in three decades. It was, said reserved 25 per cent of all seats in the legisla- the NLD leader , Burma’s tures. “second struggle for independence” – the first from colonial rule: the second from military Thus, as Snr-Gen. prepared to dictatorship.11 transfer government leadership to President Thein Sein in March 2011, there were few Repression, however, and political stasis domestic and international expectations of soon set in again. For the next two decades significant or rapid reform. Burma was still a Aung San Suu Kyi and democracy support- far from united country, and political power ers were frequently arrested or imprisoned; remained in the hands of a Tatmadaw-backed the SLORC-SPDC government continued and mostly ethnic Burman elite who had, in only slowly with a hand-picked National effect, ruled the country since 1962. Convention to draw up a new constitu- tion; the ruling generals created a new mass In fact, from this unpromising start, a fifth movement, the Union Solidarity and Devel- moment of countrywide aspiration for na- opment Association (reformed as USDP to tional change was just about to begin.14 participate in the 2010 elections) as a pro- Tatmadaw successor to the BSPP; economic reform largely remained on the drawing Contemporary landscape boards, with valuable business concessions mostly the reserve of regime favourites close In the United Kingdom in July 2013, Presi- to the SPDC chairman, Snr-Gen. Than Shwe; dent Thein Sein made a historic promise that international opinion was divided between claimed international attention: “I guarantee Western boycotts and Asian engagement; to you that by the end of this year there will and, despite the spread of ethnic ceasefires, be no prisoners of conscience:..the guns will armed conflict continued in several border- go silent everywhere in for the very lands. Fighting was especially acute in south first time in over sixty years”. In a carefully- and east Burma where student and Burman scripted speech, he outlined three compo- political activists who fled from urban areas nents in national transformation: political, had allied with the KNU and other pro- from a state-centred to free market economy, federal ethnic forces in a new cycle of anti- and from armed conflict to a “just and sus- government fronts.12 tainable peace”. “We are aiming for nothing

4 Burma Policy Briefing less than a transition from half a century of politics: military, pro-democracy and ethnic military rule and authoritarianism to democ- nationality. Burma’s destiny and their very racy,” he said.15 political futures are at stake.

Shortly afterwards, the killing of demonstra- On the government side, leaders of the rul- tors by the security services during Burma’s ing USDP know that, on a free and fair vote, short-lived democracy summer was mourned their party is unlikely to win the 2015 elec- on the 25th anniversary of the symbolic “8- tion now that the NLD and ethnic national- 8-88” in a series of public events attended ity movements are taking part in the new for the first time by ruling and opposition political system. Against expectation, the party members, many of whom had returned new legislatures in Nay Pyi Taw have taken from exile. on a broader range of political and eco- nomic issues for discussion and legislation As such events testify, there has been a than initially anticipated (although not in remarkable change in the political climate the ethnic states and regions17). But parlia- in Burma during the past two years. Despite mentary processes, which are dominated by this, many citizens continue to question how USDP and Tatmadaw members, have not, so deep and sustained the present state trans- far, led to significantly different reforms that formation will truly be. For the moment, reflect democratic hopes and ethnic aspira- although the national political system has tions. Instead, laws on such issues as land and apparently broadened, the same Tatmadaw- investment, media and the formation of asso- backed elite continues to control the govern- ciations have remained restrictive or favoured ment and transitional process. the existing status quo, fuelling opposition criticism.18 In addition, although President This poses a central dilemma. Over two years Thein Sein won praise for suspending the into the life of the Thein Sein government, -backed Myitsone hydro-electric dam there is still no indication as to whether faster for the life of the current parliament, protests and more radical reforms can be brought have continued – and been repressed – over about by immediate dialogue and constitu- other controversial economic projects agreed tional change based upon ethnic and pro-de- under the SPDC government, including the mocracy group views or whether a long-term Letpadaung copper mine and the oil and gas process of evolutionary reforms is envisaged pipelines to China.19 by government leaders that will maintain pro-Tatmadaw domination in the meantime. In general, however, President Thein Sein has How this challenge is answered will have achieved a far more stable and accepted tran- epoch-shaping implications for the course of sition in national government than even his Burmese politics in the coming decade. most enthusiastic supporters expected when he assumed office in 2011. By reaching out to As in previous times of national change, there the NLD and ethnic opposition groups, Thein is no pre-ordained script for political events. Sein has been able to win a vital breathing President Thein Sein’s leadership has gener- space for the post-SPDC government, which ally been respected. But the present political has been quickly rewarded by the loosening landscape is confusing and often rife with in Western sanctions. But while the inter- speculation, spreading uncertainties among national community has been testing new both ruling and opposition parties who rec- methods of engagement in a long-isolated ognise that many issues need to be resolved country, Burma’s leading stakeholders have, before the next general election in 2015. in many respects, already moved on to a new Among obvious emergencies, the upsurge in generation of challenges and obstacles. Buddhist-Muslim communal violence or re- newed conflict in the Kachin region, in which Many difficulties exist within the govern- uncounted lives have been lost, are reflective ment, reflecting institutional and personal of deep crises within the country.16 One-party tensions as six decades of totalitarian rule be- rule may be at an end. But a new consensus gin to unwind. Different and often competing and institutional balance in political rela- centres of authority have started to appear. tionships are yet to be found between the Contradictory opinions and personal rivalries three main groupings in post-independence exist between supposedly reformist and hard-

Burma Policy Briefing 5 A. Ethnic Political Parties

1. Elected to the legislatures (2010) All Mon Regions Democracy Partya Lahu National Development Partyc Chin National Partya Pao National Organisationa b Chin Progressive Party Phalon-Sawaw [Pwo-Sgaw] Democratic Ethnic National Development Partya Partya Inn National Development Partya Rakhine Nationalities Development Partya Kayan National Partya Shan Nationalities Democratic Partya Kayin People’s Party Ta-ang (Palaung) National Partya b Democracy and Development Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin Stated Partyb Wa Democratic Partya a Nationalities Brotherhood Federation participant b ceasefire group connection c party from 1990 election d government-backed

2. Electoral parties that did not win seats (2010) All National Races Unity and Development Mro or Khami National Solidarity Party (Kayah State)a Organisatione Asho Chin National Partyb c Northern Progressive Partyd Danu National Democracy Partyb c Rakhine State National Force Progressive Partyd Tai-leng (Red Shan) Nationalities Kaman National Progressive Party Development Partyb c Khami National Development Party Wa National Unity Partyb e Kokang Democracy and Unity Partye a withdrew due to political pressures b Nationalities Brotherhood Federation participant c formed 2012 d registration not accepted due to ceasefire group connection e party from 1990 election

3. Parties from 1990 election in 2002 United Nationalities Alliance (boycotted 2010 election) Arakan League for Democracya Kayin (Karen) National Congress for Chin National League for Democracy Democracy Kachin State National Congress for Mon National Democratic Fronta Democracy Shan Nationalities League for Democracya Kayah State All Nationalities League for United Nationalities League for Democracy Democracy Zomi National Congressa a allied in the 1998 Committee Representing the People’s Parliament with the National League for Democracy line officials in the capital Nay Pyi Taw20; change and ethnic peace through parliament President Thein Sein has preferred to oversee where he is Speaker22; economic cronyism such policy areas as the economy and ethnic and vested interests from the SPDC era have ceasefires through his own advisors and com- proven hard to shift23; Tatmadaw officers have mittees21; the USDP chairman ex-Gen. Shwe frequently appeared to be initiating their Mann, who has ambitions to become the next own operations in the field without regard to President, has sought to promote political Presidential orders24; and, in case there was

6 Burma Policy Briefing any doubt, commander-in-chief Snr-Gen. become a democratic arcadia. Unless new reminded the country on restrictions or emergencies intercede, the Armed Forces Day 2013 that the Tatmadaw NLD is still expected to become the major- would continue to play a leading role in ity party in the next general election in 2015. national politics in accordance with the 2008 But political opinion is growing that the road constitution in implementing the new system to victory – and potentially government – is of democracy.25 by no means as smooth or certain as many citizens and international sympathizers once Eventually in August, to apparently clarify hoped that it would be. some of these ambiguities, President Thein Sein announced that, in future, he would lead A host of challenges face the NLD on the the transitional process himself by creating road to 2015, and pro-democracy and ethnic a separate reforms committee because of opposition supporters have voiced increasing the poor performance of the government.26 criticisms of the party that has spearheaded Action, he said, would be taken against the democracy movement since 1988. A officials who were corrupt, lacked transpar- number of challenges stand out. After years ency, neglected the people’s grievances or of suppression, the NLD’s aging leadership monopolized ministerial authority. The latter, has faced difficulties in re-forging a national he warned, “are still following the old system party28; the NLD is very dependent on chang- of central command and will not submit to ing the 2008 constitution in a parliament devolution of their power and authority.”27 where it is out-numbered for future party progress, including for Aung San Suu Kyi to Such words appeared a bold statement of become President29; by compromising with intent and, if implemented, would portend the Thein Sein government, the NLD has an important break with the centralised and lost its credentials among many activists and undemocratic system of national govern- communities as the leading hope for radi- ment in the past. There is, however, a very cal reform; in particular, Kachin, Muslim long way to go, and it is still far from clear and other non-Burman groups have been how government authority will be balanced disappointed by the apparent reluctance of between Burma’s politicians and soldiers in the NLD to speak up for their interests and the future. Indeed, while the USDP’s electoral against abuses since entering parliament30; future may be uncertain, the Tatmadaw’s Burman-majority communities, too, have national outreach actually looks greater in criticised the NLD’s reticent performance, 2013 than in any time in post-colonial history including protestors against the Letpadaung through a combination of political change, copper mine31; and, with the party now ethnic ceasefires and military deployments represented in Nay Pyi Taw, rumours have and operations since Thein Sein assumed of- flourished about political relationships in the fice. In short, in the new democratic era, the “chess-games” between NLD and government long-standing questions over the Tatmadaw’s leaders, especially Aung San Suu Kyi, Thein role in national life and politics have yet to be Sein and Shwe Mann.32 answered. Certainly, for the moment, the NLD has not Many of the same ambiguities and difficul- made a significant parliamentary mark nor ties over national organisation and politics had popular impact on ameliorating the ma- have affected the NLD and Burma’s renascent jor political crises of the time, including land- democracy movement since the SPDC step- grabbing, the and Buddhist- down. The NLD’s advent to the legislatures Muslim communal violence. In this vacuum, in the 2012 by-elections, albeit with just 43 and 88 Generation Student seats, has reflected the significant change in leaders have often been a more vocal presence the political environment that has seen the in reflecting social and national concerns. In gradual release of political prisoners and consequence, the likelihood has grown that relaxation in media and political controls members of the 88 Generation Students and during the past two years. However, mirror- other pro-democracy supporters will form ing political experiences in the parliamentary their own party to stand in the 2015 polls, era of the 1950s, greater societal freedom by placing particular emphasis on political in- no means indicates that Burma has suddenly clusiveness and ethnic reconciliation.33

Burma Policy Briefing 7 For their part, NLD leaders are quick to point has intentions to run as a single Federal out that, as yet, they have no real political Union Party in the next general election36; power and, after six decades of military rule, members of the 9-party United Nationali- the party has had to act very carefully to ties Alliance (UNA), which won seats in keep rapprochement with the government the 1990 general election but, like the NLD, and Tatmadaw moving. A primary goal has did not stand in the 2010 polls37; and the been to ensure that there is no regression to 11-party United Nationalities Federal Coun- the pervasive repression of the past and, they cil (UNFC), which includes both ceasefire argue, the party’s pragmatism in working and non-ceasefire groups that want a politi- with government and business realities has cal agreement with the government before a underpinned the improved socio-political nationwide ceasefire.38 As the UNFC recent- environment in much of the country.34 From ly announced following a conference that time to time, too, NLD leaders have been included NBF, UNA and other opposition very explicit in their criticisms of the slow members, their goal is “to form the present pace of reform. Most obviously, Aung San Union of Burma/Myanmar into a Federal Suu Kyi reflected public frustrations when she Union of national states and nationalities told the party’s Central Executive Committee states, having national equality and self- last May: “The last three years saw no tangible determination”.39 changes, especially in [the area of] the rule of law and the peace process.” “Only a desire for Beneath this surface unity, however, the change,” she warned, “is not enough.”35 ethnic landscape is highly fragmented. Many examples can be highlighted. Ceasefires have In summary, the NLD knows that it still has yet to be formalised in northeast Burma much to achieve – both nationally and in- where the Tatmadaw, sometimes in appar- ternally – if it is to continue leading popular ent contradiction of President Thein Sein’s aspirations for democracy and determine the orders, has maintained military operations course of national politics through parlia- against the Kachin Independence Organi- ment and the 2015 general election. sation (KIO) and its allies, the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) and Ta-ang (Palaung) Finally, the situation of the third key group- National Liberation Army (TNLA)40; as ing in national politics – the ethnic nation- result of conflict, another 240,000 civilians ality – is also uncertain and complex, as have been internally displaced since the the national landscape undergoes its most Thein Sein government took office, prin- significant transformation since the 1960s. cipally in the Kachin, Rakhine and Shan Whether in parliament, ceasefires or not, states41; although relationships have been many ethnic groups still feel excluded from improving, there are political differences national politics. The result is an array of ac- between nationality parties that won seats tions by different parties, with many nation- in the 2010 general election and those from ality leaders believing that government and the 1990 polls that did not stand in 201042; Tatmadaw leaders are continuing to play a among armed opposition groups, there are game of “divide and rule” rather than resolve also differences of strategy between the the country’s ethnic challenges during an- UNFC and a Working Group on Ethnic other key time of political change (see Charts, Coordination (WGEC), which is supported A, B and C). by the Euro-Burma Office, over whether political agreements with the government In general, as in 1948, 1962 and 1988, ethnic must precede a formal nationwide cease- parties have returned to demands for a fed- fire43; the Tatmadaw is continuing to pro- eral union. Since the Thein Sein government mote local militia and ethnic Border Guard assumed office, calls for a federal system of Forces against opposition groups in the field government have been increasingly expressed (see Chart C)44; and there remain a host of by different ethnic groups and parties – both issues of local importance that are the source inside and outside of parliament. of continuing tensions. Amongst these, the rights of Muslims, sometimes known as Ro- In voicing federal demands, three groups hingya, in the Rakhine state or the demand stand out: the 15-party electoral Nationali- of Burma’s strongest armed opposition force, ties Brotherhood Federation (NBF), which the United Wa State Army, for a separate

8 Burma Policy Briefing B. Armed Ethnic Opposition Groups

Arakan Liberation Partya b National Socialist Council Nagaland Arakan Army (Khaplang faction)a Chin National Fronta b c National United Party Arakan/Arakan Democratic Karen Benevolent Armyd National Councilc Hongsawatoi Restoration Party New Mon State Partyb c d Kachin Independence Organisationb c e Pao National Liberation Organisationa c Karen National Uniona b c Rohingya Solidarity Organization KNU/KNLA Peace Councild Shan State Army-Northb c d Karenni National Progressive Partya b c Shan State Army-Southa Kayan New Land Partyb d Ta-ang (Palaung) National Liberation Armyc Lahu Democratic Unionb c United Wa State Armyd National Democratic Alliance Army (East Wa National Organisationc Shan State)d All Burma Students Democratic Fronta f

a Post-2011 ceasefire b Present or former National Democratic Front member c United Nationalities Federal Council member d SPDC era ceasefire, continued post-2011 e SPDC era ceasefire, broke down 2011 f Non-nationality force, based in ethnic territories state within Shan state presently stand out often standing by, over 250 civilians have for their potential to cause instability within been killed (predominantly Muslim) and over the country.45 140,000 displaced from their homes (also mostly Muslim), raising fundamental ques- To answer such countrywide complexity, tions about the achievement of multi-cultural ethnic leaders returned during 2013 to the democracy in Burma.47 popular saying of the late Shan leader, Chao Tzang Yawnghwe: “Diverse actions: common All leading political voices in the country a i m s”. 46 But, in private, concerns have been have struggled to acknowledge the nature increasing that, until a common platform of the crisis and seek inclusive solutions. and opportunity for political agreements are A government-appointed commission achieved, there is little likelihood of a break- into the Rakhine state violence suggested through moment in resolving the country’s the present “separation” of the communi- ethnic crises. Equally disturbing, although ties be continued and the size of Muslim the gradual decrease in armed conflict has families be limited, while President Thein been welcomed in communities around the Sein himself defended the 969 movement country, a plethora of new crises has caused leader, U Wirathu, as “a son of Lord Bud- further worries during the past two years, dha” following criticisms in the international reflecting the uncertain dynamics of change media48; Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD in the post-SPDC era. All political groupings have also echoed the government defence – whether military, pro-democracy or ethnic that the problem is essentially one of the law – have been challenged as to how to respond. and citizenship49; and while Christian and other minority groups fear what communal Outstanding amongst these issues is the tensions might presage50, the initial anti- emergence of an assertive Buddhist nation- Muslim impetus has come from Rakhine alism, spearheaded by the monk-led “969” communities, themselves a nationality peo- movement, which has been reflected in ple claiming ethnic rights, who allege that Buddhist-Muslim communal violence that the illegal immigration of “” from originated in the Rakhine state but subse- and into their lands is the quently spread to Meiktila and other towns underlying cause of communal conflict. The in central and southern Burma and historic existence of Muslim communities in in the Shan state. With the security services the territory is not in doubt. But with politi-

Burma Policy Briefing 9 C. Border Guard Forces and Militia

1. Border Guard Forces (established 2009-10) BGF Battalion Number Former Name/Description BGF 1001-3 New Democratic Army-Kachina b BGF 1004-5 Karenni Nationalities Peoples Liberation Fronta BGF 1006 Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army-Kokanga b BGF 1007 Lahu militia, Mongton, Shan statec BGF 1008 Akha militia, Mongyawng, Shan statec BGF 1009 Lahu militia, Tachilek-Mongkoe, Shan statec BGF 1010 Wa militia, Markmang, Shan statec BGF 1011-22 Democratic Karen Buddhist Armya b BGF 1023 Karen Peace Force (ex-KNU 16th battalion)a b a former ceasefire group b connected party or leaders won seats in 2010 election c former Tatmadaw-controlled militia

2. Ceasefire groups or breakaway factions that have become militia (pyithusit)

Kachin Defence Army (ex-KIO): now Kaungkha Militia Lasang Awng Wa Peace Group (ex-KIO) Mon Peace Defence Group (ex-NMSP) Mong Tai Army Homein (Homong) Region Pao National Organisationa Palaung State Liberation Partya Shan State Army-North (3 and 7 Brigades)

a Connected party or leaders won seats in 2010 election

3. Other militia under Tatmadaw Regional Commands

​There are over 50 local militia, and their titles vary. The strongest are in the Shan state. The best- known include: Common Name Location Pansay Militiaa Muse township Militiaa Tar Moe Nye Militiaa Kutkai township Mong Paw Militiaa Muse township Mangpang Militia Tangyan township Monekoe/Phaunghsai Militia Mongko township Monhin/Monha Militia Mongyai township Ahdang Militia Putao township, Kachin state

a leader won seat in 2010 election cal and economic grievances unaddressed, displaced persons (IDPs) in Burma’s ethnic Rakhine leaders feel that their very identity borderlands, as well as over 130,000 refugees is under threat.51 (mostly Karens) and as many as two mil- lion migrants, many of them unregistered, Similar alienation and humanitarian needs in Thailand.52 But at the very moment of face other conflict-torn communities around ceasefires when displaced persons are hoping the country. After decades of conflict, there to return home, ethnic leaders fear that new are currently an estimated 650,000 internally- obstacles are being put in their way that will

10 Burma Policy Briefing prevent political solutions and the rebuilding last British census in 1931, is only adding of damaged communities.53 to concerns that minority groups could be further marginalised on Burma’s social and Such marginalisation is already having a political map.57 Said the 2013 Magsaysay negative impact on ethnic nationality percep- award winner, Seng Raw Lahpai of the Metta tions of government change. In particular, Development Foundation: “Of course, after new land laws and land-grabbing by busi- decades of strife, the peoples of Myanmar ness, Tatmadaw and other vested interests want livelihood progress and social develop- since Thein Sein assumed office have been ment. But, in a land of abundant human and underpinning further community displace- natural resource potential, it is also vital that ment and impoverishment on a major scale.54 new projects are appropriate, sustainable Due to popular protests, the China-backed and in consultation with the local peoples. in the Kachin state is currently The mistakes of the past should not be re- suspended by President Thein Sein. But with peated.”58 domestic and international investors lobby- ing hard, both the Myitsone dam and such Thus, as 2013 progressed, it was economic contested programmes as the Dawei Devel- grievances that began to revive expressions opment Project with Thailand are eventu- of ethnic resentment under the Thein Sein ally expected to go ahead. As isolation ends, government. Many ethnic parties called the pressures on ethnic minority lands and for a moratorium on large-scale invest- resources are only increasing. ment projects until permanent political and ceasefire have been reached.59 There were still This, in turn, raises huge international hopes that peace talks could heal the political questions that will have impact on internal divisions. But in the community front-lines, events as Burma undergoes its most signifi- there were also fears that economic tensions cant reorientation in regional geo-politics in could spark the resumption of conflict. As a generation. The divisions between Asian magazine warned: “Peace be engagement and Western boycotts are reced- d a m m e d ”. 60 ing, but the consequences are still far from certain. Among international actors, China became dominant in Burma under the previ- Outlook to the future ous SPDC regime. As evidence of this rela- tionship, the oil and gas pipelines to While the present political landscape is un- province from the Rakhine state are both certain, there is no fundamental reason why scheduled to come on-stream during 2013- peace and democratic transition should not 14, bringing to fruition China’s “two oceans” take root in Burma. Precedent certainly sug- goal of access to both the Pacific and Indian gests caution. But as UN Special Rapporteur Oceans. But in their wake, such mega deals on Human Rights Tomás Ojea Quintana has are bringing to the surface a new sense of stressed, the challenge is to learn from the international competition over political and past to build a better future.61 And in Burma’s economic engagement in Burma. “Myanmar case, the political lesson is quite outstand- cleans house – China’s worst nightmare?” ing: the recurring tragedy in post-colonial the Financial Times questioned in April.55 Burma is that no genuinely inclusive process “No more irresponsible remarks”, Xinhua of consultation and reform has ever been countered in June as the first gas deliver- completed. ies started. “Western criticism of the cross- border pipelines is totally irresponsible and Importantly, then, although human rights ill-disposed.”56 violations have not ended, processes have been started under the Thein Sein govern- Ethnic leaders, however, fear that, whoever ment that mark a potentially significant the investors, few of the benefits from the change from previous eras. For a rare mo- host of economic projects currently envis- ment, formerly opposing parties have been aged or underway in their lands will go to talking about ways to address political and the local peoples. Equally concerning, the economic failings together. It is vital that this government’s intention to hold a national momentum should continue before new na- census in 2014, the most important since the tional divisions become entrenched. For this

Burma Policy Briefing 11 to be achieved, significant compromise will Diverse opinions can still be heard. But be needed from leaders on all sides who have underpinning all debate is the very basic not often shown such qualities in the past. question as to whether the new political system is re-formable – and, if so, how? There At present, the framework for political have been arguments, for example, on the transformation is following the seven-stage pros and cons of proportional representa- roadmap laid down by the former SPDC tion to achieve political and ethnic balance government of Snr-Gen. Than Shwe. Now in the legislatures65; there is disagreement as in the seventh and final stage when parlia- to whether the 2008 constitution can really mentarians are supposed to be building a be changed by “amendment”, with the UNFC “modern, developed and democratic nation”, and ethnic allies preferring a “rewriting” both the government and Tatmadaw leader- start66; some minority parties want to estab- ships continue to be dominated by former lish an ethnic state-based system, adding a and serving officers close to Than Shwe. As a new state for the Burman nationality as well67; result, although Thein Sein has won praise for for its part, the NLD has pressed for changes appointing independent advisors (including to the constitutional qualifications for presi- exiles who have returned from abroad), the dent by which Aung San Suu Kyi is currently perception remains widespread that a conti- barred68; and last but not least, while opposi- nuity in reform cannot be guaranteed. There tion parties want to end reserved seats for have been too many setbacks under military- military officers in the legislatures, Tatmadaw backed governments in the past. As Harn leaders have continued to assert their role as Yawnghwe of the Euro-Burma Office recently protectors of the 2008 constitution during the summarised: “Can President Thein Sein be transition to democracy.69 trusted?”62 Importantly, then, although dominated by Against this backdrop, the identity of Burma’s USDP and Tatmadaw representatives, a next president following the 2015 general parliamentary committee has been formed to election remains a persistent subject of specu- review the constitution. Furthermore, after lation, with three other ethnic Burman lead- many years of government taboo, discussions ers also closely watched: parliament Speaker on the critical issue of federalism no longer Shwe Mann, Tatmadaw chief Snr-Gen. Min appear to be barred. Parliament Speaker Shwe Aung Hlaing and NLD leader Aung San Suu Mann has spoken of the need to achieve a Kyi. federal system that is suitable for the coun- try70; Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD and UNA Behind the personal politics, however, one leaders have agreed to work together for undoubted advance is the more open social a federal system through parliamentary environment since Thein Sein took office. processes71; UNFC, NBF and UNA members This provides much better opportunity for have committed to work together for the citizens to meet and discuss the many needs achievement of federalism72; community- facing the country. Compared to the SPDC based organisations have also backed these era when Burma was internationally brack- goals, with civil society groups marking the eted with such repressed states as North 25th year anniversary of the 8-8-88 protests Korea, there has been a sea-change in public by calling for a “democratic federal state”73; discourse during the past two years that has and, during a time of religious tension, faith- been driven by a re-energised civil society based groups have expressed their support and independent media – not the ruling for pro-federal change. “This nation belongs elite.63 Progress is not straightforward, and to all and a true federalism will bring lasting such crises as the Buddhist-Muslim violence peace and development,” the Catholic Bish- have sometimes been blamed on excesses in ops’ Conference recently stated.74 the internet and new media.64 But the ability for citizens to meet and exchange opinions It needs to be stressed, however, that, despite about problems they must resolve together is the growing discussion of political ideas, it a key step in building a peaceful and inclu- presently remains far from clear what kinds sive democracy. For far too long politics of amendments or reforms will be allowed have been dominated by movements holding during the life of the current parliament to guns. meet popular aspirations for change. Indeed

12 Burma Policy Briefing Aung San Suu Kyi has herself described the trywide conflict since the 1963-64 “peace 2008 constitution as the “world’s most dif- parley”. This has allowed internationally- ficult” to amend75, and concerns have been supported programmes on such issues as growing that parliamentary legislation on resettlement, de-mining and development to such issues as land, investment, media and be discussed and, in some cases, initiated for the formation of associations will turn out the first time in decades.81 to be regressive.76 Meanwhile government and Tatmadaw leaders have asserted that As the months have passed, however, ethnic decision-making authority on key national disquiet has not lessened. At present, the issues continues to stand with them.77 Indeed government claims ceasefires with 14 armed a recent discussion of a parliamentary inves- opposition forces through talks coordi- tigation into land seizures was halted by a nated through the President’s Union-level Tatmadaw MP who claimed that such reports Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC), were “creating a divide between the army and headed by Union Minister Aung Min, and t h e p e o p l e”. 78 the government-backed Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) (see Chart B).82 But other than Fuelling opposition concerns, militarization a general notion that aid and development and violence have continued in several ethnic programmes should be started while peace borderlands at a very time when the govern- talks proceed from the “state” to “union” ment has been promoting peace and reform. levels, there is no common agreement about In particular, continuing Tatmadaw offensives how to further proceed. Different strategies against Kachin, Shan and Ta-ang forces in have been proposed by different sides, includ- northeast Burma – the largest since the mid- ing the UPWC, MPC, UNFC and WGEC, 1980s – have renewed historic doubts about often supported by foreign actors and institu- the true intentions of military officers and tions that have sought to become involved in the central government. For example, despite conflict resolution initiatives during the past ceasefires with the government, both the two years.83 Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) and SSA-N have each reported over 100 clashes with Tat- Against this backdrop, final political or madaw units since their peace agreements in demilitarisation details are yet to be dis- December 2011 and January 2012. “Ceasefire cussed. But, in procedural terms, there are does not mean only we should stop fight- five key elements that ethnic organisations ing,” said the SSA-S leader Sao Yawdserk. “It believe are needed if lasting solutions are means the Tatmadaw must stop too.”79 to be achieved. First, the objective must be nationwide peace and an end to the govern- In consequence, suspicions have continued ment practice of separate arrangements. that the current ceasefires are only a tactic to Second, given the divided condition of the increase Tatmadaw control, whether through country, there should be extra-parliamen- parliament in Nay Pyi Taw or military expan- tary as well as parliamentary processes to sion (including pro-government militia) in ensure national inclusion – in essence, a new the borderlands. In response, ceasefire leaders political roadmap. Third, there needs to be have asserted that they will never “entrust” a political agreement – or, at the very least, the future of their peoples to the govern- political guarantees – before permanent ment. “We have revolutionary and political ceasefires and a nationwide peace can truly experience, and we are always alert,” the KNU be declared. Fourth, political talks need to peace negotiator Mahn Nyein Maung recently be transparent and inclusive, involving the warned.80 Tatmadaw, political parties, civil society groups and other stakeholders, otherwise Thus, as in other periods of constitutional it is feared that future agreements will not change, the fundamental challenge remains be unilaterally binding. For this reason, an as to how ethnic peace and political inclusion eventual Panglong-style meeting – often will actually be achieved. On a progressive dubbed “Panglong Two” – will be required note, there can be no doubt that, since its to revitalise the spirit of ethnic equality 2011-12 inception, the “Union-level Peace- agreed at the first conference back in 1947. making” initiative of President Thein Sein has And last, because of the failures to imple- secured the most important halt in coun- ment treaties in the past, there needs to be

Burma Policy Briefing 13 international observation at key stages to of all citizens to promote democracy’s prin- ensure that agreements are adhered to by the ciples, to broaden democracy’s scope, and to different sides. support democracy itself.”88 And Dr Tu Ja, an ex-KIO leader seeking parliamentary elec- If these five elements are in place, then it tion, recently reminded: “Until and unless we is believed that most of the difficulties in get political rights, we cannot end the civil implementation – and they are likely to be w ar.” 89 many – can be faced up to and dealt with as they occur. These include political transi- Such conciliatory words, however, are as far tion, land use rights and tenure security, as conflict transformation initiatives have demilitarization, resettlement and the currently reached. With many eyes focused consolidation of ethnic parties to stand in on the 2015 general election, there is a dan- future elections. Clearly, massive challenges gerous risk of drift – as in previous times of in political reform and conflict transforma- government change – that could leave vital tion lie ahead. political issues unaddressed. The result is very often mixed signals in which it is difficult to It is important to highlight, then, that many build trust in national reform and inclusion.90 of these needs have been reflected in rhe- For example, in a change from the past, torical terms by leaders on the different the government finally allowed significant sides during recent speeches. According to international observation of peace talks – a President Thein Sein: “Only an inclusive key ethnic demand – when the UN’s special democratic society based on equality for envoy Vijay Nambiar (as well as Chinese all citizens will ensure peace and stability, representatives) attended a government meet- especially in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic ing to discuss a new ceasefire with the KIO in and multi-faith country such as ours.”84 The May.91 Subsequently, however, international parliament Speaker Shwe Mann, too, has criticisms revived after the UN Special Rap- acknowledged the difficulties in achieving porteur on the Situation of Human Rights “peace” and “national unity” if “federal” Tomás Ojea Quintana faced restrictions on reform is not introduced through public visits to the Kachin and Rakhine states.92 participation and constitutional review. “Don’t leave it to parliament alone,” he Similarly, the government is continuing to warned.85 And Aung San Suu Kyi spoke at push for a major ceasefire meeting to sign a the August 8-8-88 commemoration of the nationwide accord, attended by international need to respect diversity in the achievement dignitaries, that will have echoes of Panglong of democracy. “I urge all of you to be brave – another ethnic demand. October or No- and united and to do what you should do for vember are the latest proposed dates.93 Many the good of the nation,” she said. “We have nationality leaders, however, are reluctant to negotiate differences to seek common to take part in such a large and symbolic g rou n d .” 86 ceremony until Tatmadaw attacks have stopped and political agreements have been For their part, ethnic leaders across the coun- reached that truly guarantee ethnic rights and try have also urged that the present time of autonomy. For the moment, different sides political transition is used to establish peace have different views on political roadmaps to and democracy. On the latest Karen Martyr’s peace94, and UNFC and UNA members are Day, the KNU chairman Gen. Mutu Say Po presently completing their own constitutional publicly pledged: “Now is the time…for the draft, based on a federal model, which they Karen people to participate and cooperate intend to present to future meetings, whether with unity and boldly express the aspirations with the government, in parliament or at a of the Karen people. The Karen people want Panglong-style meeting.95 to live in dignity.”87 The same hopes have been expressed by leaders of electoral parties. “No- Evidently, then, there remain many vital body wants to see democracy triumph more issues to be decided in both technical and po- than Burma’s ethnic nationalities,” said Hkun litical processes towards peace. In the back- Htun Oo, a former political prisoner and ground, too, are international pressures that chairman of the Shan Nationalities League are only likely to multiply as foreign engage- for Democracy. “It’s a common responsibility ment increases. With economic competition

14 Burma Policy Briefing intensifying, stability in the ethnic border- lands will become ever more essential, and long-standing crises in such trans-national issues as security, refugees, migrant flow and illicit narcotics will have to be addressed. As an indicator of progress, Burma’s Chair of ASEAN in 2014 will become a very closely watched event.

In summary, as attention begins to turn towards the 2015 general election, there are many signs of recognition that far greater scope of political reform and inclusion are still needed. As yet, however, there have not been obvious agreements when a different political future is discussed and revealed that will resolve ethnic and political discontent within the country. All citizens hope that this transformation will come soon. In the meantime, a fundamental question is still being asked: is the country truly on a path towards inclusive peace and democracy in which all peoples enjoy equal rights together – or will hopes and aspirations once again be disappointed? These remain critical times in determining Burma’s future.

Conclusion

Ultimately, it must be for Burma’s peoples to decide their political future. As in previous times of change, the present landscape looks uncertain and complex. But for the first time in decades, the issues of peace, democracy and promises of ethnic equality agreed at Burma’s independence are back for national debate and attracting international attention. This marks an important change from the preceding years of conflict and malaise under military rule, and expectations are currently high.

It is vital therefore that opportunities are not lost and that the present generation of leaders succeed in achieving peace and justice where others before them have failed. Realism and honesty about the tasks ahead are essential. Burma’s leaders and parties, on all sides of the political and ethnic spectrum, still have much to achieve.

Burma Policy Briefing 15 A Note on Charts: 2013 federalism, eventually returning to Burma under a 1980 amnesty. The charts in this report are only intended as a snapshot of the ethnic landscape during a time of historic change. 9. Min Zin, “Paying the Debt: 25 Years Later, Burma’s Parties vary considerably in size, influence and age. Struggle for Freedom Isn’t Over”, The Irrawaddy, 20 Some organisations date back to the parliamentary August 2013. era (1947-62), while others have only been formed since 2010. As political and military transformation 10. Aung Zaw, “What We Were Fighting For”, The Ir- continues, not all details will be exact, and more change rawaddy, 5 August 2013. is certain in the run-up to the 2015 general election. The complexity reflects the divided national backdrop, 11. Aung San Suu Kyi, BBC Reith Lecture, 5 July 2011. and it is only likely to stabilise when inclusive political agreements are achieved. 12. The main united front was the National Council Union of Burma (formed 1992), which included the 11-party ethnic National Democratic Front (formed Notes 1976 to seek a federal union), the All Burma Students Democratic Front (formed 1988) and the exile National 1. In 1989 the then military government changed Coalition Government Union of Burma of exile MPs the official name from Burma to Myanmar. They are (formed 1990). alternative forms in the , but their use has become a politicised issue. Although this is chang- 13. See e.g., “A Changing Landscape: Analysis of ing, Myanmar is not yet commonly used in the English Burma’s 2010 Polls”, TNI–BCN Burma Policy Briefing language. For consistency, Burma will be used in this Nr 4, December 2010. report. This is not intended as a political statement. 14. For the ethno-political landscape on the eve of the 2. See e.g., John Buchanan, Tom Kramer and Kevin new government, see, “Ethnic Politics in Burma: the Woods, Developing Disparity: Regional Investment in Time for Solutions”, TNI–BCN Burma Policy Briefing Burma’s Borderlands, BCN-TNI, Amsterdam, 2013; “Ac- Nr 5, February 2011. cess Denied: Land Rights and Ethnic Conflict in Burma”, TNI-BCN Burma Policy Briefing Nr 11, May 2013. 15. “President Thein Sein’s Speech at Chatham House (The Royal Institute of International Affairs)”, London, 3. See e.g., “The Kachin Crisis: Peace Must Prevail”, 15 July 2013. TNI–BCN Burma Policy Briefing Nr 10, March 2013; Physicians for Human Rights, “Patterns of Anti-Muslim 16. There are no reliable casualty figures since the Violence in Burma: A Call for Accountability and Thein Sein government took office. The government Prevention”, August 2013; IRIN, “Rakhine sectarian has reported 256 deaths of people killed in communal violence – one year on”, 13 June 2013; International “riots and incidents” while opposition groups claim Crisis Group, “The Dark Side of Transition: Violence as many as 5,000 deaths (including combatants) have Against Muslims in Myanmar”, Asia Report Nr 251, 1 occurred in the Kachin region alone. See e.g., “Riots October 2013. and incidents since new government claim 256 deaths; 541 sentenced”, Eleven Myanmar, 3 July 2013; Edward 4. It is estimated that there are 140,000 displaced per- Chung Ho, “Time for Thein Sein to come clean about sons in the Rakhine state and 100,000 in the Kachin re- Burmese losses in Kachin state”, Kachin News Group, gion: UNHCR, “UNHCR appeals for dialogue following 22 September 2012; Anthony Davis, “Pyrrhic victory in IDP violence in Myanmar”, 13 August 2013; UNOCHA, Myanmar”, Asia Times, 31 January 2013. “Myanmar: Internal Displacement Snapshot – Kachin and northern Shan States (July 2013)”. 17. See e.g., Asia Foundation and Myanmar Develop- ment Resource Institute, “State and Region Govern- 5. For example, important Karen, Karenni and Mon ments in Myanmar”, September 2013. groups, as well as communist, boycotted or were miss- ing from the 1947 general election. In addition, the 18. See e.g., Buchanan, Kramer and Woods, Develop- Panglong agreement only included Chin, Kachin and ing Disparity; Eleven Myanmar, “Myanmar journalists Shan leaders in the Frontier Areas. decry approved press bill”, 6 July 2013; Nyein Nyein, “Activists Reject Bill on Associations as Legislation Goes 6. For an analysis of conflict and post-independence to Parliament”, The Irrawaddy, 7 August 2013. history, see e.g., Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (Zed Books, London and New 19. See e.g., Buchanan, Kramer and Woods, Develop- York, 1991 & 1999). ing Disparity; Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “Fury over Letpadaung copper mine report”, Myanmar Times, 18 March 2013; 7. The Times, 3 March 1962. Shwe Gas Movement, “Drawing the Line: The Case against China’s Shwe Gas Project, for Better Extractive 8. Although other Burman politicians, including com- Industries in Burma”, September 2013. munist, remained in opposition in the borderlands, U Nu was never comfortable with armed struggle and also 20. See e.g., Aung Zaw, “Dangerous Days for Burma’s

16 Burma Policy Briefing Age of Reforms”, The Irrawaddy, 25 June 2013. Introduced ‘No Tangible Changes’”, The Irrawaddy, 27 May 2013. 21. For example, the Myanmar Development Resource Institute, National Economic and Social Advisory 36. Kon Chan, “Ethnic parties to form the Federal Un- Council, and Myanmar Peace Centre. ion Party”, Mizzima News, 10 August 2013. See Chart A. 22. Tha Lun Zaung Htet, “Shwe Mann Demands Parlia- ment’s Involvement in Burma’s Peace Process”, The 37. Ibid. Several UNA members were allied with the Irrawaddy, 3 July 2013. NLD in the 1998 Committee Representing the People’s Parliament and continue to meet with the NLD on elec- 23. See e.g., Buchanan, Kramer and Woods, Developing toral strategy: see e.g., Kay Zin Oo, “NLD, ethnic parties Disparity; William Boot, “Burma’s Busy Black Economy unite in push for constitutional reform before 2015 ‘Threatens Reforms’”, The Irrawaddy, 14 August 2013; election”, Mizzima News, 20 June 2013. Seamus Martov, “What Does the Future Hold for Aung Thaung & Sons?”, The Irrawaddy, 11 May 2012. 38. See Chart B.

24. See e.g., Bertil Lintner, “A well-laid war in Myan- 39. “UNFC Statement of the Ethnic Nationality Confer- mar”, Asia Times, 2 February 2013; “The Kachin Crisis”, ence”, 2 August 2013. Seven other armed ethnic groups TNI–BCN Burma Policy Briefing; Than Htike Oo, attended, including the United Wa State Army, Demo- “Thein Sein Cannot Control Army, Shan Rebels Say”, cratic Karen Benevolence Army and Arakan Liberation The Irrawaddy, 3 July 2013. Party.

25. New Light of Myanmar, 28 March 2013; Mizzima 40. See e.g., “The Kachin Crisis”, TNI–BCN Burma News, “Military will continue to play political role, says Policy Briefing. Fighting has reduced with the KIO army chief”, 27 March 2013. since peace talks in May, and the TNLA also held talks in August. But no formal agreements were made. The 26. “President to lead reform process”, Mizzima News, SSA-N has had a renewed ceasefire since January 2012 12 August 2013. but intermittent fighting has continued. The SSA-N has also reverted to a former name of SSA/Shan State 27. Ibid. Progress Party (SSA/SSPP).

28. See e.g., Kyaw Hsu Mon, “Problems in the NLD?”, 41. See note 4. Myanmar Times, 4 February 2013. 42. For example, Mon, Rakhine and Shan parties from 29. See e.g., “Aung San Suu Kyi says Burma to amend the 1990 and 2010 elections hope to integrate before the ‘world’s most difficult’ constitution”, The Irrawaddy, 10 2015 polls. But this is not yet guaranteed. May 2013; Jared Ferrie (Reuters Writer), “Burma’s Con- stitution Likely to Dash Suu Kyi’s Presidential Hopes”, 43. See, “Analysis of the UNFC Position”, EBO Brief- The Irrawaddy, 20 June 2013. ing Paper, August 2013; “Riposte to Article in EBO Briefing Paper No. 8, dated August 2013”, 15 August 30. See e.g., “NGOs criticize Suu Kyi’s ‘failure’ to ad- 2013; Hanna Hindstrom, “Federalism debate fractures dress Kachin conflict”, Mizzima News, 10 January 2013; Burma’s armed ethnic groups”, DVB, 30 July 2013. “Myanmar unrest tests iconic status of Suu Kyi”, AFP, 21 April 2013. 44. “Kachin Rebels Clash With Burma Army and Govt-backed Militia”, The Irrawaddy, 2 September 2013; 31. Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “Fury over Letpadaung copper mine “KIA/TNLA allied force fought against government report”, Myanmar Times, 18 March 2013. troops and militias”, Kachinland News, 18 September 2013. 32. See e.g., Nirmal Ghosh, “High-stakes chess game ahead of Myanmar polls”, The Straits Times, 20 July 45. See e.g., note 3; Tomás Ojea Quintana, “Statement 2013; “Ex-general from Myanmar’s junta considers of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Aung San Suu Kyi alliance”, Associated Press,15 June Rights in Myanmar”, 21 August 2013; “Founding of Wa 2013. State can spark confusion, say political analysts”, Eleven Myanmar, 15 May 2013. 33. Snay Lin, “Burma’s 88 Generation Students to Form Political Party”, The Irrawaddy, 19 March 2013. 46. “Non-Burmans are united”, S.H.A.N., 2 August 2013. 34. See e.g., Eric Randolph, “NLD Patriarch Defends Suu Kyi’s Copper Mine Position”, The Irrawaddy, 18 47. See notes 3, 4 and 16; International Crisis Group, March 2013; Tha Lun Zaung Htet, “Give Cronies a “Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon”, Asia Report Chance to Reform, Says Suu Kyi”, The Irrawaddy, 11 Nr 238, 12 November 2012, pp.1-6. January 2013. 48. “Final Report of Inquiry Commission on Sectarian 35. Kyaw Phyo Tha, “Suu Kyi Slams Reforms, Says Govt Violence in Rakhine State”, Union of Myanmar, 8 July

Burma Policy Briefing 17 2013; Republic of the Union of Myanmar President Of- 57. “Shan leaders meet in Rangoon”, S.H.A.N., 14 June fice, “Time Magazine Misinterpretation Rejected”, Nay 2013; “Census for Mon ethnicity currently underway”, Pyi Taw, 23 June 2013. The Inquiry Commission recom- IMNA, 27 August 2013; “Myanmar prepares for first mendations were variously reported. The Final Report census in three decades”, Radio Free Asia, 19 September (p.66) reflected the call of Rakhines for the government 2013. to promote family planning among “Bengalis” but also cautioned that it should be “voluntary”. 58. Seng Raw Lahpai, “Advancing Peace through Inclu- sive Development”, University of the Philippines Asian 49. “Suu Kyi Pressed on Rohingya Citizenship”, The Ir- Center, 28 August 2013. rawaddy, 16 November 2012. 59. See e.g., “Thein Sein and China must stop pipeline 50. Archbishop Charles Maung Bo and Benedict Rog- project to prevent escalation of conflict in northern ers, “Myanmar’s religious diversity: Dialogue trumps Shan State”, S.H.A.N., 22 May 2013; Shwe Gas Move- violence”, Myanmar Times, 23 August 2013. ment, “Drawing the Line”.

51. See e.g., IRIN, “Prospects for Rakhine reconciliation 60. Saw Yan Naing, “Peace Be Dammed”, The Irrawad- dim”, 2 May 2013; Thomas Fuller, “Ethnic Hatred Tears dy, 17 August 2013. Apart a Region of Myanmar”, New York Times, 29 No- vember 2012; Nyein Nyein, “Arakan Residents Push for 61. See e.g., UN Office of the High Commissioner for More Benefits From State’s Resources”, The Irrawaddy Human Rights, “Myanmar: ‘Reforms continue apace, 19 August 2013; Shwe Gas Movement, “Drawing the but key human rights issues remain unaddressed’ – UN Line”. For a discussion of Burman and non-Burman expert”, 20 February 2013. identities, see, Matthew Walton, “The ‘Wages of Burman-ness’: Ethnicity and Burman Privilege in Con- 62. Harn Yawnghwe, “Can President Thein Sein be temporary Myanmar”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, trusted?”, DVB, 16 August 2013. Vol. 43:1, 2013, pp.1-27. 63. See e.g., Tom Kramer, Civil Society Gaining Ground: 52. See note 4 for figures in the Kachin region and Opportunities for Change and Development in Burma Rakhine state. There are also an estimated 400,000 (TNI, Amsterdam, 2011). displaced persons in southeast Burma, mainly Karen, Karenni, Mon and Shan, and around 150,000 official 64. See e.g., Thomas Fuller, “Internet Unshackled, refugees in neighbouring countries; see e.g., The Border Burmese Aim Venom at Ethnic Minority”, New York Consortium, “Programme Report: July to December Times, 15 June 2012; Eleven Myanmar, “Opposition 2012”, pp.9, 13-14. In addition, there are several thou- NLD dispels rumours amid growing online attacks”, 30 sand displaced persons from Buddhist-Muslim violence August 2013. in Meiktila district. 65. See e.g.; “Proportional representation for Burma?”, 53. See e.g., Charlie Campbell, “Burmese Refugees Mizzima News, 31 July 2012; Richard Horsey, “Shift- Remain in Limbo by Thai Border Despite Political ing to a Proportional Representation Electoral System Reforms”, Time Magazine, 7 August 2013. in Myanmar?”, SSRC Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, 31 January 2013; Kay Zin Oo, “NLD, ethnic 54. See e.g., “Access Denied”, TNI-BCN Burma Policy parties unite in push for constitutional reform before Briefing; Buchanan, Kramer and Woods, Developing 2015 election”, Mizzima News, 20 June 2013. Disparity; Htet Naing Zaw and Aye Kyawt Khaing, “Military Involved in Massive Land Grabs: Parliamen- 66. Sai Wansai, “Amendment or rewriting: 51 years tary Report”, The Irrawaddy, 5 March 2013; Karen on Burma still overwhelmed by constitutional crisis”, Human Rights Group, “Losing Ground: Land conflicts S.H.A.N., 13 August 2013. and collective action in eastern Myanmar”, March 2013; Earthrights International, “There is no benefit, they 67. Kay Zin Oo, “New Constitution will be ready in a destroyed our farmland: Selected Land and Livelihood month: ethnic groups”, Mizzima News, 5 September Impacts Along the Shwe Natural Gas and China- 2013. Myanmar Oil Transport Pipeline from Rakhine State to Division”, April 2013; Shwe Gas Movement, 68. See note 29. “Drawing the Line”. 69. See note 25. 55. “Myanmar cleans house – China’s worst night- mare?”, Financial Times, 15 April 2013. 70. “Speaker says Myanmar cannot copy federal systems from other countries”, Eleven Myanmar, 11 August 56. “No more irresponsible remarks on Myanmar- 2013; Nang Mya Nadi, “Shwe Mann reiterates his sup- China pipelines”, Xinhua, 29 June 2013. For a cautious port for federalism”, DVB, 3 September 2013; “Without assessment, see, Yun Sun, “Chinese Investment in My- federal system, Myanmar’s peace agenda will be difficult anmar: What Lies Ahead?”, Stimson Center, Issue Brief – House speaker”, Eleven Myanmar, 4 September 2013. No.1, September 2013. 71. Nyein Nyein, “Suu Kyi, Ethnic Leaders to Work

18 Burma Policy Briefing toward Federal Union”, The Irrawaddy, 18 June 2013. September 2013.

72. See note 39. 86. “Myanmar has yet to build genuine democratic na- tion - Suu Kyi”, Eleven Myanmar, 9 August 2013. 73. “Civil society groups call for creation of a ‘federal state’ during 8888 anniversary”, DVB, 8 August 2013. 87. “63rd Karen Martyrs’ Day…the struggle goes on…”, Karen News, 13 August 2013. 74. “Statement by the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Myanmar: To the Leaders and the People of Myanmar”, 88. “Burma May Have Elections – but Can It Become a 24 June 2013. Real Democracy?”, The Atlantic, 25 September 2012.

75. See note 29. 89. Seamus Martov, “Kachin Rebel Turned Politician Readies for Comeback”, The Irrawaddy, 14 September 76. See note 18. 2013.

77. See e.g., note 25; Win Ko Ko Latt, “Constitutional 90. Saw Yan Naing, “The Struggle to Control the Peace change in hands of government: Shwe Mann”, Myan- Process”, The Irrawaddy, 19 September 2013. mar Times, 18 August 2013; “Constitutional amend- ment must not harm sovereignty, USDP vice-chairman 91. Nyein Nyein & Saw Yan Naing, “UN Special Envoy, says”, Eleven Myanmar, 17 September 2013; Samantha Chinese Observers Attend Kachin Peace Talks”, The Michaels, “Burma’s Former Generals Retain Grip Over Irrawaddy, 28 May 2013. State Govts”, The Irrawaddy, 19 September 2013. 92. Tomás Ojea Quintana, “Statement of the Special 78. Lawi Weng, “Army MP Halts Talks on Military Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myan- Land-Grabs in Burma’s Parliament”, The Irrawaddy, 16 mar”, 21 August 2013. August 2013. 93. See e.g., “Naypyitaw: Nationwide ceasefire in Octo- 79. Nyein Nyein, “SSA-North Says Attacks from Burma ber”, S.H.A.N., 3 September 2013. Army Frequent”, The Irrawaddy, 24 September 2013; “Shan leader to Naypyitaw: No more excuse for break- 94. See note 83. ing truce, please”, S.H.A.N., 31 August 2013. The SSA-S is also known as the SSA/Restoration Council of Shan 95. Kay Zin Oo, “New Constitution will be ready in a State. month: ethnic groups”, Mizzima News, 5 September 2013; “UNFC and UNA forms committee to draft fed- 80. Kay Zin Oo, “KNU will not entrust Karen future to eral constitution”, Eleven Myanmar, 4 September 2013. government”, Mizzima News, 27 August 2013.

81. Different groups have been involved. But the main organisations have appeared the Norway-backed Myan- Transnational Institute mar Peace Support Initiative, the Euro-Burma Office- PO Box 14656 supported Working Group on Ethnic Coordination, 1001 LD Amsterdam and Japan’s Nippon Foundation. The Netherlands Tel: +31-20-6626608 82. “Naypyitaw: Nationwide ceasefire in October”, Fax: +31-20-6757176 S.H.A.N., 3 September 2013. To follow ethnic groups E-mail: [email protected] and ceasefire events, see e.g., Burma News Internation- www.tni.org/work-area/burma-project al, Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2013 (Wanida Press, Chiang Mai, 2013), and Burma Centrum Netherlands website: http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/ PO Box 14563 1001 LB Amsterdam 83. See e.g., notes 43, 81; “President’s 8 point peace The Netherlands guideline quietly shelved”, S.H.A.N., 19 September Tel.: +31-20-6716952 2013; Nyein Nyein, “Ethnic Minorities Stress Trust- Fax: +31-20-6713513 Building, Agree to 5-Point Peace Plan”, The Irrawaddy, E-mail: [email protected] 24 September 2013; “UNFC and UNA forms commit- www.burmacentrum.nl tee to draft federal constitution”, Eleven Myanmar, 4 September 2013. This briefing has been prduced with the financial as- 84. “President U Thein Sein delivered speech to the na- sistance of Sweden, the Royal Norwegian Embassy in tion regarding recent riots in Meiktila and other parts of , the Royal Danish Embassy in Bangkok and the country”, Nay Pyi Taw, 28 March 2013. the Royal Dutch Embassy in Bangkok. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of TNI and 85. “Without federal system, Myanmar’s peace agenda BCN and can under no circumstances be regarded as will be difficult – House speaker”, Eleven Myanmar, 4 reflecting the position of the donors.

Burma Policy Briefing 19 TNI - BCN Project on Ethnic Conflict in Burma Policy Briefing series Burma ISBN/ISSN: 2214-8957

Burma has been afflicted by ethnic con- Burma in 2010: A Critical Year in Ethnic Politics, flict and civil war since independence in Burma Policy Briefing Nr.1, June 2010 1948, exposing it to some of the longest running armed conflicts in the world. Burma’s 2010 Elections: Challenges and Opportuni- Ethnic nationality peoples have long felt ties, Burma Policy Briefing Nr.2, June 2010 marginalised and discriminated against. Unlevel Playing Field: Burma’s Election Landscape, The situation worsened after the military Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 3, October 2010 coup in 1962, when minority rights were further curtailed. The main grievances of A Changing Ethnic Landscape: Analysis of Burma’s ethnic nationality groups in Burma are the 2010 Polls, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 4, December lack of influence in the political decision- 2010 making processes; the absence of economic and social development in their areas; and Ethnic Politics in Burma: The Time for Solutions, what they see as Burmanisation policies by Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 5, February 2011 governments since independence that have translated into repression of their cultural Burma’s New Government: Prospects for Govern- rights and religious freedom. ance and Peace in Ethnic States, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 6, May 2011 This joint TNI-BCN project aims to stimu- late strategic thinking on addressing ethnic Conflict or Peace? Ethnic Unrest Intensifies in conflict in Burma and to give a voice to Burma, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 7, June 2011 ethnic nationality groups who have until now been ignored and isolated in the in- Ending Burma’s Conflict Cycle? Prospects for Ethnic ternational debate on the country. In order Peace, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 8, February 2012 to respond to the challenges of political changes since 2010 and for the future, TNI Burma at the Crossroads: Maintaining the Momen- tum for Reform, Burma Policy Briefing Nr . 9, June and BCN believe it is crucial to formulate 2012 practical and concrete policy options and define concrete benchmarks on progress The Kachin Crisis: Peace Must Prevail, Burma that national and international actors can Policy Briefing Nr. 10, March 2013 support. The project will aim to achieve greater support for a different Burma Access Denied: Land Rights and Ethnic Conflict in policy, which is pragmatic, engaged and Burma, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 11 May 2013 grounded in reality.

The Transnational Institute (TNI) was Other reports founded in 1974 as an independent, international research and policy advo- Assessing Burma/Myanmar’s New Government: cacy institute, with strong connections to Challenges and Opportunities for European Policy transnational social movements, and intel- Responses, Conference Report, Amsterdam, 22 & lectuals concerned to steer the world in a 23 February 2012 democratic, equitable, environmentally sus- tainable and peaceful direction. Its point of Prospects for Ethnic Peace and Political Participa- departure is a belief that solutions to global tion in Burma/ Myanmar, Seminar Report, Bang- problems require global co-operation. kok, 23 August 2012 Political Reform in Burma/Myanmar and Con- BCN was founded in 1993. It works to- sequences for Ethnic Conflict, Seminar Report, wards democratization, respect for human Chiangmai, 20-21 February 2013 rights and a solution to the ethnic crises in Burma. BCN does this through facilitat- Developing Disparity, Regional Investment in ing public and informal debates on Burma, Burma’s Borderlands, February 2013 information dissemination, advocacy work, and the strengthening of the role of Bur- mese civil society organisations. www.tni.org/work-area/burma-project

20 Burma Policy Briefing