UNIVERSITY O F IO W A STU DIES

S TU D I ES IN TH E S O C IAL S C I EN C ES

. . D . d t F E HAY ES PH . E N , , i or

VO LU M E VII NU M BER 1

Th e D i p l o m a ti c R el a ti o n s o f E n g l a n d w i t h t h e Q uad ru ple Alli an c e 1 8 1 5 - 1 8 3 0

BY M Y RNA BO Y C E

PU BLIS H ED B TH E U NIV ERSI I OW A I Y TY , C TY

CONTENTS CHAPTER ’ I ENGLAND S ENTRANCE INTO THE QU ADRU PLE ALLIANCE 5 II TH E GENERAL POLICY OF CASTLEREAGH AN D CANNING TOWARD THE INTERPRETATION OF THE QU ADRU PLE ALLIANCE III TH E CONGRESS OF AIX LA - CHAPEL LE IV TH E CONGRESS OF TROPPAU V TH E CONGRESS AT LAIBACH VI TH E CONGRESS OF VERONA VII TH E E CONOM IC BASIS OF THE ENGLI SH DIPLOM ACY IN THE CONGRESS VIII SU M M ARY BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPTER I

ENGLAND’ S ENTRANCE INTO THE QU ADRU PLE ALLIANCE 1 8 1 5 -1 8 3 0

With the overthrow of Nap oleon the victors of France were confronted with the task of reconstructing the map of Europe and of restoring peace and order . For this purpose the Con e gress of Vienna was assembl d, and a year later the Quadruple

was e Alliance formed, d stined to become the most power ful concert of powers ever maintained in time of peace . A e i discussion of the origin, character, purpos s , and just fication of such a union arouses numerous questions that demand con sideration and solution .

hi o of Was t s d minating alliance , this strong concert England ,

i s s 1 8 1 5 Austr a, Ru sia, and Prus ia, in the period from to

1 8 3 0 s n e , neces ary to the reconstructio of Europ following the Nap oleonic r egi m e? Was it an acknowledgment of the failure of the Congress of Vienn a to establish order and th e regard ’ ? of one nation for another s rights Was this Alliance , then , a t e logical outgr of the Vienna conferenc s , or was its need

e an d i ts fores en in the dreary days of desolation , form gradually evolved ? Was it a great machine of repression or instrument of war projected into time of peace ? Did England see in such an alliance a noble means of guidi ng aright an erring nation ? Was she actuated by selfish motives in casting as ide the policy

- f e of Pitt , the policy of non inter rence , or was she forced to a realization that what concerned Europe was of consequence to ul - f England , that she co d no longer be a self suf icing na ti on al uni t ? For forty years followi ng th e Second Treaty of

Paris, the peace of Europe was steadfastly maintained wi th

a an I S out single encounter between y of the powers . this a justification for the reactionary character of the alliance ? In order to answer thes e questions and to under stand the origin of the Alliance together with the work confronting it, 5 STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

t the work left undone by the Congress of Vienna, its Shor

or be as e . comings failures, should p sed in bri f review I n that assembly of crowned heads and di ctating diplomat i sts r , powerful though the Czar Alexander and P ince Metter b nich were, the responsi ility of adjusting the infinite disputes e should necessarily have fallen to England, that mistr ss of the ’ seas who overwhelmed Napoleon s s chemes for Afr ica and Asia ; it was English money subsidizing the armies of Austria and Russia which enabled them to continue in the field ; it ’ ’ was England s army, finally, and England s general that con the quered the European foe . Moreover, England , alone among powers against France , because of her geographical location and her general foreign relations could have been a disinter ested force and an equitable judge in decidi ng upon conti n en tal readjustments . Furthermore , the English people , among Whom for . the decade past there had been developing a moral sense as a nation, a comprehension that out of the

French Revolution there had emerged certain rights of man , expected and rightfully demanded that the settlement of Eu rope be made upon a higher basis than the principle of l egi ti

l aw e . macy, that it be founded upon a high r moral Lord Castlereagh himself recognized this new attitude not only of 1 8 1 4 England but of Europ e . In a letter written in May , , to “ i s i m ossi bl e Lord Bentinck he said, It , p not to perceive a great moral change coming on in Europe, and that the prin i l e c p s of freedom are in full operation . The danger is, that the transition may be too sudden to ripen into anything likely m ” 1 to ake the world better or happ ier . Lord Castlereagh ,

was as then , not oblivious to this change , but a reactionary failed to respond to the awakened era . And so in the Con

er gress , England was content to take an inferior part , to p “ ” i r mit Metternich , that mind wh ch never er ed , to be the dominating personality . Surely there was in the Polish question a right to be up held and a principle of justice upon which to act . But in this the op portunity for England to interfere was allowed to p ass by . “ Up to the period of the Congress of Vienna , no British

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n et r ackn owl ed statesma had ever s his hand to an inst ument , g

a . i n g as valid acts, the two partitions of Pol nd Had the British plenipotentiary foun ded his objecti on s up on this prin i l r c p e, had he positively efused to commit his Government to t he d any such acknowledgemen , and had insiste on the erec

e a tion of an independent Polish state, he would have be n p l ss p aud ed by the whole of Europe , whilst Austria and Pru ia would not only have not opp osed it , but , on the contrary, ” 2 would have acquiesced in it with pleasure . “ as Backed by such powerful support, well as by the voice of public opinion throughout Europe , it is more than probable the that he "Castler eagh ) might have been successful , but mo o ment when he gave up the principle , and t ld the emperor that he was not indi spo sed to witness even with satisfaction that his Imperial Majesty should receive a liberal an d important hi aggrandi zement on s Polish frontier, and that it was to the n d degree a the mode to which he alone obj ected, he threw away hi ” 3 the only weapon w ch he could successf ul l y wield . That Lord Castlereagh was not taking this moral stand was felt

ff . r n . by the Under Sec etary of Foreig A airs, Mr Cook He ex “ h or ted hi s superior to fling aside the treaties and to declare that nothing should induce Gr eat Britain to ackn owledge the ” 4 validi ty of those acts . Again England failed to appreciate an ideal for which she E i s had been fighting, the building up of B ritish mpire . It i n true that in the Congress and the Treaty of Paris, England made important acquisitions, and certainly expanded very ma teri l l a y in her colonial possessions, keeping islands of no con sequence to the imperial ideal . It was merely acquisitions of land regardl ess of its u se to England . That not even Liver pool was alive to the colonial situation is clear from the fol “ lowing extract from a letter to Castlereagh : We have Guada loupe and the Saintes in our hands, which have in fact been conquered . We have no desire for any more colonies, but it may not be amiss to cons ider them as fair pledges for the just ” 5 claims of our own subj ects .

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s Then , too, in the Eastern que tion, concerning the unrest of the Balkan states, England could without doubt have used di her influence to allay scord, indeed even to settle definitely s di d the position and rights of those state in Europe . Austria di d . not dare broach the subj ect , nor Russia question it It ’ h n was England s part , a responsibility S e should have take u pon herself . s the Again , in the question of the lave trade, Congress of Vienna failed to respond to the demands of the reform party of England . Castlereagh appeared satisfied to receive a gen

o eral declaration of the p wers against it .

Following the Congress of Vienna , treaties between the powers were made with the idea of supporting the work of

Vienna . The Treaty of Chaumont was entered into in the 1 8 1 5 sp ring of , and in the November following the second m treaty of Paris was concluded . It confir ed the work of the i e Congress w th its glaring d fects . To the potentates of its i making, it was obv ous enough that a means of enforcing the term s and of maintaini ng the status of thi ngs as therein pro i an v d ed would be necessary . That instrument proved to be

l r e . o o di alliance The C ngress of Vienna, theref re , was rect y sponsible for a continued union of powers . e But even before the treaty, th re had been exp ressed opinions concerning concord of action for the maintenance of peace , 6 As as and the repression of revolutionary development . early 1 8 00 this note appeared in the Parliamenta ry Debates In order to rend-er this security as complete as p os sible it seems necessary at the period of a general p aci fi cati on to form a treaty to which all the principal powers of Europe

s Should be partner , by which their respective rights and pos

s e ses ions , as they shall then have been established , shall be fix d and recogn ized ; and they Sh ould all bind themselves mutually to protect and support each other against any attempt to i h

I Com rehen fringe them . t should reestablish a general and p

l aw as sive system of public in Europe, provide as far possible

s for repre sing future attempts to disturb general tranquility,

" and , above all , for restraining any proj ects of aggrandize ment and the ambition Similar to those which have produced all

e r 2 n d D eba XXL 1 8 . H a s a e . , t s , , p ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE AL LIANCE 9 the calami ties inflicted on Europe since the disastrous war ” 7 of the French Revolution . Cas tlereagh in his desire and plan for an alliance to se f cure the future peace o Europe Showed himself magnanimous , e a stat sman , having at heart the interests not only of England ,

: but also the welfare of the continent . He made the statement “ It is the province of Great Britain to turn the confidence she has inspired to the account of peace , by exercising a con

‘ ci l i ator her y influence between the Powers, rather than put self at the head of any combination of Courts to keep others i in check . The immed ate object to be kept in vi ew is to we inspire the states of Europe, as long as can , with a sense n of the dangers which they have surmounted by their u ion , i of the hazards they will incur by a relaxation of v gilance, to make them feel that the existing concert is their onl y perfect securi ty against the revolutionary embers more or less ex ” 8 i i n st g in every state of Europ e .

sov Before the definitive Treaty of Paris was Signed, the er ei n s a g of Russia , Austria , and Prussia, in person , bec me l n e parties to a solemn compact , the Holy Al ia ce , formulat d in

1 8 1 5 an n d September, . To this document Engl d never Sig e her name, allied though she had been with these nations through ni i t the Napoleo c Wars, and at the time of s promulgation uni

was e ted With them in the occupation of France . It declar d “ that the articles , in consequence of the great events which s h e have marked the cour e of the t ree last years in Europ , and especially of the blessings which it has pleas ed Divine Provi dence to shower down upon those states whi ch place their con fi d en ce and hope in it alone "their maj esties) acquired the intimate conviction of the necessity of founding the conduct to be observed by the powers in their reciprocal relations upon the sublime truths which the Holy religion of our Savi or ” “ 9 w t . as r e teaches In this holy union it fu her decre d , the three contracting monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity and considering each other as fellow country men, they Will on all occasions and in all

ai d s places, lend each other and as istance and regarding them

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e selves as fathers of families, th y will lead them in the same Spirit of fraternity with which they are animated to protect i rel gion , peace, and justice . “ e In consequence , the sole purpose in forc shall be that of ” r i 1 ° doing each other reciprocal se v ce . Why such an alliance should be formed to the exclusion of England was perplexing and irritating to the English House

. r e of Commons , chiefly to the Whigs Why the th e Powers e which had entered into a tr aty with England , pledging all the contracting parties to an identity of interest and object, should have entered into a triple alliance, why its sole nego ti ati on and signing had taken place outside the usual medium o of diplomacy, and what its real purp oses were, were pr blems 1 1 exciting the sus picion of England . ‘ M r . Brougham in his attack in the House on the unusual i manner in wh ch it had been drawn up , and on the character

i ts e t of t rms, demanded from Lord Cas lereagh the reason for ’ England s exclus ion and the necessity of the Powers entering the solemn pledge . Such a treaty, unheard of in history since the crusades, an unthinkable product of modern Europe , gave b rise to unwarranted alarm , itter j ealousy , and p rophecies of “ despotism ba sed upon false analogies . When crowned heads ” “ was met , it was declared, the result of their united councils ” 1 2 not always favorable to the interests of humanity . The war against Poland had been prefaced by a proclamation in similar language to that whi ch thi s treaty contained . Castle reagh in reply to the opposition stated that the sovereigns had addressed a j oin letter to the Prince Regent inviting him into l the Holy Al iance, but although the latter approved highly of t its terms, he was unable to become a par y, as the laws of

England did not permit such a procedure . Two months after the formation of the Holy Alliance , the r u Quad ple Alliance was formed . To this England became a party . This compact, providi ng for the employment of means

di - to maintain the peace of Europe , bin ng the contracting p ar ties to aid each other against all attempts to disturb the es abl i shed di succession , provi ng for meetings of the allies from

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f s hi i t to time to time to arrange di ficultie w ch m gh arise , and discuss and settle any diff erences occurring between any two 1 3 h as l . powers, often been confused with the Holy A liance In reality in the minds of the statesmen of the period there e e appears to have b en no di stinction . In the corr spondence i of Cann ng and Wellington and in the memoir s of Gentz , the “ ” ” expressions Holy Alliance and Quadruple Al liance ar e

n used sy onymously . Modern hi storians make mu ch of the point that the Holy 4 was 1 t Alliance from its inception a dead letter, and main ain

was ll nta that it the Quadruple A iance , or the Pe rchy "as it was sometimes call ed af ter the admission of Fr ance to its ff councils) which became an influence in European a air s . That the congresses were called in accordance with the provisions Al of the Quadruple l iance is unquestioned, but whether the two alliances were ever considered by their authors as distinct or unrelated raises a point .

Joscel i n e e : Bagot , in his life of Canning, d clares By the treaty drawn up in November, the five Powers or the Pentarchy, pledged themselves to act in concord for the maintenance of a n t the European peace . There is a cle r distinctio between his kn committee and what is own as the Holy Alliance, although the policy to be pursued h as been general ly known as that of the ” l ai A liance only . Bagot, himself, however, has failed to m n “ r : W e tain the distinction . He w ites h ther the attitude of Great B r itain which final ly disconcerted the H ol y Al li an ce and ” n made for liberal gover ment of Europe, whereas in the

l t n o fol owing s atement of Gentz, he recognizes distinction “ Now i H ol Al li an ce , this truly sacred union, of wh ch the y is but c w an imperfe t symbol , as never manifested in a more reassuring manner than at the time of the conference at Aix ” 1 6 - hi s M em oi r s t la Chapelle . Greville in makes the s atement , “ While Lord Castlereagh was obliged to pretend to di sapprove

n ti n n ta t H l A i of the C o e l S ys em of the o y ll ance.

In like manner, recognizing the alliances as one and the same

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hi 1 8 24 e t ng, Wellington in wrot , Although , therefore, the o Holy Alliance, properly s called, would be applicable to trans

i H ol l li an actions w th the Porte , the system of the y A ce sup posed to be established by the treaties of Paris and Aix-la

li b tr an sac Chapelle , was never considered app ca le to those ” 1 8 tions . Canning, in response to a call for a conference on “ Wi r e the Greek and Turkish Situation declared, I ll not be

’ “ ” i c al l ed th e H ol Al li an plunged into what s vulgarly y ce. Whether the alliance which became the active force in Eu r o ean ff l p a airs be called the Holy Alliance , the Mora Pentarchy , or the Quadruple Alliance, England was a member for very

- e s . t r d finite reason First, the doub ful tranquillity of Eu ope , ’ an Engl d s long alliance with the Powers, and her temporary e occupation of France , were pow rful influences imp elling her to

l e l was remain an al y against Franc . In the second p ace, she actuated by an active purpose . To carry into execution not only the maintenance of the treaties of peace connected with the settlement of Europe "just then concluded) but also f or the purpose of controll ing the ambition and jealousies of the ” 2° great Allied Powers themselves in relation to ea ch other .

t n Al m a England , at the ime of her entrance i to the liance , y have foreseen a divergence of opinion resp ecting the interpreta

-v i d ed tion of the duties of the allies as pro in the treaty, and may have anticipated the impossibility of acting in harmony wi s th her allies . And yet by the pre sure of existing conditions, she had of necess ity to become a participant in European af

‘ -er fairs , not definitely changing her form policy of isolation i but temporar ly suspendi ng it .

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THE GENERAL POLICY OF CASTLEREAGH AND CANNING TOWARD THE INTERPRETATION OF THE QU ADRU PLE ALLIANCE

Diplomatic transactions are always to a greater or l ess de

' gree veiled in obscurity ; they are al ways i n large part hidden

s record of history, ciphers to which time and chance may fur e n ish the key . Features of greatest importanc are purp osely omitted ; motives, fears, and prophecies in the recorded volumes di t of plomatic papers have no place, and in their s ead , gen

r l i z i n r e e a at o s e a . , summaries, and m morials fill the p ges The s ul ts of conferences, the conclusion of long and heated de

ff s war a bates, of di erence tending either toward or peace, p pear ; but the arguments p r o and con upon courses of action ni a e a di eventually determined , the sig fic nt conv rs tions among p l m i o at sts carried on Outside the regular conference hall, the

a d dinners at which intrigues are inaugurated , fathomed or

— i n ll justed diplomatic correspondence, a of these have no The recognition . They are the omitted chapters . necessity of an envoy sparing the feelings of a colleague or of hiding the mistakes of a home mi nister imposes a Silence which is often misconstrued . Upon the construction placed upon these incomplete records and the surmises and suspicions they arouse , is based the public condemnation or justification of mini sters and nations . Lord Castlereagh in the period before the Congress of Vien o na, like most European ministers in that era of rev lutionary

was so t to r e ideas and excesses, s rongly conservative as be

‘ actionary ; and although his attitude following 1 8 1 8 became m li - ore beral , and his policy, one of non acquiesence in the

r es policy of rest iction supported by his alli , he was condemned b by his contemporaries and has been blamed y historians since, hm for his adherence to the system of repression . To Englis en 1 3 STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

di s e satisfi d with the outcome of Vienna, and alarmed by the assumptions of the Holy Alliance and by the coalition of the four great Powers in time of peace, it was self evident that H i Castlereagh upheld the entire continental policy . s former i act ons confirmed them in the op inion, and the courtesy with which he spoke of the allies in publi c seemed further proof ff of his agreement with the Powers . It is with di iculty that a man can again secure confi dence when his past acts have once condemned him . So it was with Castlereagh . Until recently, the blame of the English suppo rt of the Quadruple Alliance h as fallen upon him, and the glory of disc oncerting that council h as redounded to Canning alone . That Castlereagh pur sued the policy which he trul y felt to n to di be of adva tage England is more cre ble today, as we

s e 1 8 1 4 to 1 8 22 view in retro p ct the period from , the time during as t which , foreign minister, he prac ically dictated foreign poli c H i s e e y. policy of repression as indicated in a note in D c m 1 8 1 5 s ber , is but the expre sion of a natural fear .

i l a In regard to the l bera movement in Prussia, he s id that he felt great anxiety and that it was impossible to foretell to what end the n ew ideas of government and revolutionary ten d n ci s 1 r u e e there prevalent would be carried . His dist st of the revolutionary principles was often voiced in his l etters to Eng

e H saw lish repres ntatives abroad . e new constitutions launched was in France , Spain, Holland , and Sicily, and of the con ser v ati v e opini on that such attempts at republ ican government d should not be encourage , and that it was the duty of England 2 Al to retard rather than to accelerate the new principles . though fearing the results of sudden revolutionary outbursts, “ and proclaiming it to be tr ue wisdom to keep down the petty contentions of ordinary times, and to stand together in ” 3 e support of the established principles of social order, Castl ’ reagh did n ot necessarily approve of England s enter ing into

i n congresses with Austria, Prussia , and Russia, to which all ternal aff airs of the smaller countries were to be subj ected . Against such a policy of interference he wrote : “ of u r It is not my wish to encourage, on the part this co nt y,

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- became wider with the calling of each congress . At Aix la

s Chapelle , Castlereagh oppo ed the prevailing sentiment ; at

Tr o eau c pp and at Laibach , he obj e ted to the presence of Eng l ish representatives, lest he be accused of acquiescing in the r European policy . The inst uctions he drew up for the Con gress of Vienna wer e to the efi ect that Englan d must n ot 5 j oin in the policy of the Quadruple Alliance . The break with

was n ot i the e h the Alliance , then , to take place w th d at of t u Castlereagh . It should not be cons rued p rely as the new policy of a new minister . ’ Metternich s esteem for Cas tlereagh has been employed by cri tics of the latter to Show that he must have been in the con ’ fi d en ce of Metternich and that h e approved of the Prince s 1 8 1 4 policy of interference . Metternich had met C astlereagh in at Basel and there he had laid the foundations of a good feel ” 6 i n h as s g . It been suppo ed that there had been some under th e standing between them previous to congress of Verona, for otherwise he would not have expressed the hope that Castle s reagh would be the English repre entative , and have written , “ ” 7 hi m as I awaited here my second self . Although the correspondence would not support the state ment that Castlereagh upheld the method of what is known ’ astl er e- as the Metternich system , and although G agh s communi cations to the House of Commons do not sustain the alliance s in the broader powers it as umed, opp onents have , nevertheless, wi susp ected him of secret agreement th Metternich . Greville “ hi s M em oi r in s claims that , While Castlereagh was obliged to

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pretend to disapprove of the continental Alliance, he secretly gave to Metternich every assurance of his private concurrence , ’ and it was not till long after Canning s accessi on that Metter nich could be persuaded of his sincerity in opposing their views, always fancying that he was obliged to act a part as his prede 8 c essor s had done to keep the House of Commons quiet This

e s secret agr ement , if such existed, is the clo ed chapter in Castle ’ r h eag s relations with Metternich and the Quadruple Alliance . It is not to be found in the diplomatic correspondence of Castle reagh himself or in the corresp ondence of Metter nich that i s t available . The question, therefore, as to the duplicity of Cas le hi s reagh in relations to Parliament , and the question as to his part in the disruption of the Alliance are unanswered , and his condemnation or praise will res t with his adherents or op

n nt p o e s . d as With the diplomatic correspon ence evidence , it must hon estl y be acknowled ged by the supporters of either Castlereagh or Canning that neither countenanced the Quadruple Alliance in its more fully developed policies . But to Canning must be ff accredited greater rigor, more e ective opp osition in contro ’ s verting the tendencies of the other Powers . Castlereagh stand

- was one of non agreement with their policies . It was negative . ’ Canning s objections, on the other hand , his declarations of the l po icy of England , were the course of active resistance . was In the settlement of Vienna, Canning had no part , nor “ it concluded on principles upon which he approved . But from n th al the time when they were sig ed to e end of his life, he ways held the provi sions were to be accepted as inviolable by ” 9 Al n to n England . The liance, the means decided upo maintai i ts o the peace, Canning recognized . It was the extent of p wer to which he took exception .

Canning was not a lover of revolution . On the contrary , he “ passed nearly thirty years of his life fighting for old i nsti tu ” 1 " tions , in the House of Commons, but he could not , as he “ ”1 1 himself states, shut my eyes to the real state of things .

r The glo y of England , its prestige on the continent and throughout the whole world , were ever before Canning in his

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To the continental Powers to whom the responsibility of a was n minister to a Parliament beyond comprehe sion, the refusal of C anni ng to act in concord could only be construed as the policy of the minister alone . The contention that the demands of Parliament were being fulfill ed by Canning ’ s position or that acquiesence in the policy desired by the Powers would meet with the disapproval of the House of Commons, was looked upon

as . ni by Metternich a mere excuse He believed that its Opi ons, i 1 8 23 if adverse, m ght be overruled . Until he labored under the delusion that the English foreign mi nisters secretly agreed to hi f measures w ch o ficially they denied , and that their real policies “ were not represented by their language in Parliament . It is

ni as essential a part of the national council , Can ng wrote to l ni Henry We lesley, an d woe to the mi sters who should un der take to conduct the aff airs of this country upon the principle of settling the course of its foreign policy with a Grand Alliance, and Should rely upon carr ying their decisions into eff ect by ” 1 8 throwing a little dust in the eyes of the House of Commons . Canning repeatedly insisted that the English ministers abroad should make it clear to the allies that when diff erences arose in e “ the foreign relations, th y must not be viewed as a feint to ” 1 9 a n w . void co flict ith public opinion His policy, Canning

wa wished it understood, s one of conviction and not one to meet 20 ’ r i n the parliamentary exigencies of the time . Mette nich s ability to influence C an ni ng or to shake him from a determined policy led him to write that England had entered upon a false “ ni was and dangerous liberalism, and that Can ng certainly a ” very awkward opponent . With this l ack of sympathy between Canning and Metter di nich , with a misunderstan ng of the part that the English

Parliament exercised in foreign relations, the congresses after

Castlereagh seemed doomed to failure . The policy of Castle reagh to refuse assent to the usurped power of the congresses, and to hold aloof in solitar y opposition to the wish of the com bi n ed allies will doubtless be seen to foreshadow the breach of cul mi n England with the Quadruple Al l iance, a breach which ated under Canning .

1 8 C i C t H . e e e . a e o a . 3 78 a o l St p l t n , nn ng, p , " nning W l sl y)

1 9 C 221 C i Ch a . a o . a o a i V ol . . a to B g t , nn ng, II, p , " nn n g s B g t)

20 b d . 1 1 8 . I i , p CHAPTER III

THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE

a of The allied Powers, as a me ns of executing the work the

“ Al li r ni congress of Vienna and the Quadruple ance, ag eed to u te “ from time to time in congress, to arrange together any mat ters of general interest which mi ght arise and to settle and di s cuss any di ff erences whi ch might occur between an y two ” 1 was ul Powers . It further stip ated that there should be no di scussion of the aff airs of any Power without the r ep r es en tati on of that country in the deliberation . In accordance with u this general agreement , the sixth article of the Quadr ple Alli ance provi ded more specifically for the assembly of the sove reigns . The purposes were stated, and the obj ects of the con “ f er en ces wer e d ecl ar ed to be the greatest common interest and a the consideration of measures which would be the most bene fi i l ‘ ” 2 c a to the p eace and prosperity of the world . In Metter ’ n ich s opini on the terms imposed a duty upon the Powers which “ they were under obligation to perf orm : The five courts which ” “ nl were assembled at Aix, he wrote, are not o y invited there , 20 8 1 5 but by the treaty of November , 1 , they are bound to ” 3 come . i 1 8 1 8 Accord ngly, in the fall of , the sovereigns of Russia, di Austria , and Prussia , together with the Austrian plomatists, ’ M n d I str i a etter ich, Vincent , and Gentz ; the Russian , Capo , e Ness lrode and Lieven ; the Prussian , Hardenberg, Humboldt , B er n stof f and ; the English , Wellington and Castlereagh ; and the e Ra n ev al French , Rich lieu , y , and Mounier, met for their

first congress . Preliminary to the meeting, petitions to the Eng l ish representatives requesting the consideration of certain meas s ures, expres ions of opinion regarding the meeting, together with statements of the results expected from the congress, and

1 i m oi r G e e M e . 6 7. r v ll , s , II , p 2 i XI I ell o S i l em en tar D e a he . 773 . W ngt n , mp y sp tc s , , p 3 M h A uto o h 4 e e b a . 1 6 . tt rnic , i gr p y, III , p 1 9 STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE S the arranging of private interviews and meetings previous to

the congress , were among the important preparations . They ar e of significance in reflecting the attitude which prevailed at e the meeting, that of good will or reserv d suspicion , and in por i tend ng points of disagreement , should wide discussion be per m i tted . The opening of the congress to the consideration of new ques tions was looked upon by both Englan d and Austria as dan 4 r ge ou s . Metternich and Castlereagh in the early part of Sep tember concurred in the opinion that it would be unwise to permit mi scellaneous discussion ; to the discussion of Spa nish affairs they were particularly opposed . France and Russia, on e the other hand, seem to have be n agreed as to the necessity

an of bringing the Sp ish question before the Congress . The ’ Emperor having heard the request of the Spanish ch ar ged f the ni af aires at St . Petersburg for admission of a Spanish mi s ter to the conference, referred the matter to France . France

n approved, and the attitude of these two Powers was made k own to Castlereagh in August through private conversation with the Due de Richelieu and Pozzo di Borgo . Richelieu considered it necessar y for the conference to take some step for medi ation e betw en Spain and her colonies . He p roposed sending a mem ber of a younger branch of the Spanish dynasty to be King of

Buenos Ayres . Pozzo di Borgo was of the opinion that the Spanish king Should be admitted to Ai x -la- Chapelle as the only mode of settling all Spanish questions . hi Against these proposals Castlereagh protested . His c ef ar gum en ts were that if the King of Spain were admitted his min i er a st s lso would have to attend, that inconveniences would pro bably result and the whole work of the conference would be rendered impracticable ; and that the other European nations though submitting to the dominion of the four Powers would 6 resent the admittance of Spain to the councils . The fear of the introduction of Spanish aff airs appears to have been para “ ”

i h . mount the minds of the English I cannot conceive , “ f wr ote Mr . Cook to Castlereagh , that you would go further in mediation with Spain than good offices and possible guarantees,

6 75 Ca e ea h to M e e i h . 4 el i o S u l em e a D e a he . ) W l ngt n , p p nt ry sp tc s, XII , p , " stl r g tt rn c

C e ea h . S I bi d . 6 75 e i o to a , XII, p , "W ll n gt n stl r g )

G 6 5 el o o C a t e ea h . I bi d . 6 t l , p , "W lin gt n s r g ) ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 21

m i ” 7 a mediation by ar s s out of the question . The

Emperor of Russia, although he did not protest before the con

s was nx to s gress against wide discus ion, a ious avoid embarras ing questions ; he suggested that the meeting should be brief as w 8 hi s early return to Russia as necessary .

e u s The situation was vi wed as precarious . In Aug st, Ca tle reagh while in Paris heard it both r umored and openl y sta ted that the meeting had been postponed until later in the fall, in 9 order to give time for summoning the King of Spain . Metter

a t i s nich, in the s me mon h , learned that the approach ng congres wa k s looked upon by the Diet of Fran furt with suspicion , and “ that intr iguers were planning to carry measures to Aix-la “ ” 1 ° r r f Chapelle to inter upt the prog ess of a fairs . Castlereagh received communication from the government suggesting the i n i expediency of . the Powers entering upon transatlant c and col i l 1 1 on a . questions, but later received a long petition from Mr

“ s James S tephen sfi suggesting African and colonial condition . s which Should have consideration in the congress . Rea ons were t t a i r e given agains the res oration of H iti to France, both w th t gard to the welfare of Haiti and o the advantage of England . The demand for consideration of the abolition of slaves was made, and a statement of two important measures which should be put before the congress ; first, whether France might not be reasonably invited to declare herself in regard to her views on li St . Domingo, on account of their connections with the abo tion the di of slave trade and the peace of the In es ; second, whether if she meditate new expedi tions the influence of Great Britain and other powers at the congress might not be properly em 1 2 ployed to induce her to desist from that purpose . Not only was there a demand for the discussion of the slave situation in hi s t s particular case, but also a entiment on the part of the

7 Ibid .

8 bi . 6 78 el i o to E a a h u s . I d , XII , p , "W l ngt n rl B t r t) i bi . 6 6 5 el o to a e ea h . 9 . C I d , p , "W l ngt n stl r g ) 1 0 M 2 e i h Au o bi o h 1 . e a . 8 tt rn c , t g r p y, III , p 1 1 C h C on 4 3 a e ea o e e e . 7 . stl r g , rr sp d nc , XI , p

M r . e h e a a i e of th e e e was e to E a at an ea a e St p ns, n t v W st Indi s , s nt ngl nd rly g B m to p u rsu e th e p rofessi o n of th e l aw . y eans of a m atri m o ni a l al li a nce wi th th e

ami of M r . i be o e h e ob ai e a ea i n Pa i am e hi h h e e i e on f ly W l rf rc , t n d s t rl nt , w c r s gn d m i h r bei ng a p p o inted aster n C a nce y . 1 2 C h Co e o XI 23 4 M r C a e ea n e e . . Jas . e he to a e e h . stl r g , rr sp d nc , , p , " St p ns stl r ag ) STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE S

English people for a declaration of the Powers against the

Slave trade . With these conditions confronting them at the opening of the

s congres , it was but natural that the confidence of one n ation t a oward another should be str ined . Castlereagh wrote “ I do not expect much good from Metternich ’s negotiation at Paris, and should not wish myself mixed in it . The less a ’ e c British minister dabbl s in Monsieur s politi s , the better . Charles will be of considerable use to me in keeping Metter he ” 1 3 nich steady and apprising me of what is about . By the Prime Minister little trust was placed in Emperor

Alexander . Liverpool , in his correspondence with Castlereagh wrote “ I think you will find no di ffi culty in keeping the Emperor of Russia from coming in November ; this visit might certainl y ” 1 4 lead to intrigues .

By the time of the meeting, many of the suspicions and fears which the statesmen had harboured through the year 1 8 1 7 and 1 1 the summer of 8 8 had disappeared . The Sinister fear that the Emperor had contemplated an alliance with the Bourbons e of Franc , Spain, and Italy , the belief on the p art of Russia that there were secret negotiations between Great Britain and

of Austria , had in the main given way to a spirit extreme cau ? 5 of tion After the first few days the congress, Castlereagh, knowing well the anxiety of Liverpool concerning the feeling “ : Y ou prevailing there , sent this message will probably wish to know my real opinion upon the sincerity of all that is passing around me . My Opinion has always been that, whether Sincere or not we ought to meet it as if it was ; but my belief is that the Emperor of Russia is, in the main , in earnest in ” 1 6 what he says . Castlereagh was persuaded that the Em

r r wa p e o s , though desiring sway, intending to pursue a peace 1 7 policy and to maintain his connection with the allies . England did not enter this conference with the hope of ac complishing a great work ; on the contrary, it was her purpose

Ch a e e a m i i e to Au i a . rl s St w rt, n st r str

1 3 1 C a e ea h to Li e o o . b . I id , XI , p , " stl r g v rp l )

1 4 b 2 Li e oo to C a e ea h . d . I i , p , " v rp l stl r g ) - M e e i h A u o bi o a h Ge z M em oi . 1 9 1 2 . tt rn c , t gr p y, nt r, III , p

6 C C 4 C a e ea h to L e oo . 1 e ea h o e o e e . 7 astl r g , rr sp nd nc , XII, p , " stl r g iv rp l )

1 7 b d . 4 8 . I i , p ENGLAN D AND THE QUADRUPLE AL LIAN CE 23 onl y to prevent innovations and to support the alliance with n ew out giving to it a aspect . An English official stated that “ he did not expect much from Aix-la- Chapelle except the ad mission of France to the confederacy and the withdrawing of the troops from her Fear of discussion of the work done in congress by the n ew Parliament whi ch would con

w the r vene in the inter, was prima y motive forcing England to take a conservative stand, to avoid secret protocols and to n w r ej ect e treaties . The time and place for the first congres s was made known through regular di plomatic channels . The intentions appear but to have been to assemble early in September, owing to the rise of the question concerning the admissi on of the Spani sh

wa No t King, the meeting s deferred several weeks . definite da e

n for the f ormal opening appears . There was apparently an u

r an di n d e st g that all should be present by the first of October . Wellington upon his arrival on September the twenty-seventh

th an found eKing of Prussia already there . Castlereagh d Rich el i eu an d wa had also arrived, the Emperor of Russia s ex 1 9

ected . n l p the next day As in the congress of Vien a , the rea w r v ork took place in private inte iews, and for the most part the results were not written down . At the official conferences mi themselves no nutes were kept , and the documents which were to form the official reports were preserved in the form of protocols .

The first work before the Powers, that for which they had e assembl d, was the substitution of a permanent policy toward France in place of the temporary measures that had been adop

i n ted the Treaty of Paris . The Treaty contained an article providing that at the end of three years , the four allies to gether with the King of France were to meet for the purpose of deciding whether the army of oc cupation should be withdrawn , from France or whether the condition of that state was such as to necessitate its maintenance for a further period of five years . The three important questions to be settled were, there u fore, the evacuation of France , the pec niary settlement , and the position of the French King in the European councils .

1 8 1 bi d XI . 4 2 M r C C 7 . k t Lo h oo e o a e ea . , , p , " rd stl r g ) 1 9 eli o S u leme ar D es a t he . 71 8 e i o to Gen W l ngtn , p p nt y p c s , XII, p , "W ll ngt n . C ou W n n oc o o . nt , g ) STUDIE S I N TH E SOCIAL SCIENCES

n That the troops would be withdraw , and that some terms for a financial settlement would be made , and also that the King would be admitted, was generally understood . The point was to what extent the work would be carried . b By Octo er fifth , the work of the French settlement had so s i far progres ed that it was certa n evacuation would take place . i wi Well ngton began immediately the plan of thdrawal . Shipping

’ of stores, transportation of the English troops, mapping out of routes by which the diff erent armies were to depart for their

r 20 respective countries, all were supe vised by Wellington . A

n grand review of the troops before the sovereig s was planned, and necessary arrangements for the reception and entertain ment of royalty were delegated to him . These military con e w cerns occupied most of his tim , and ith the exception of very detailed work on the state of the finances, he had little part in h t e remaining business of the congress . n m O the first of October, Wellington reported to the inisters upon the financial arrangements . He declared that the French w government as prepared by loans arranged with the bankers, 2 1 Hope , B aring and Company to meet its obligations . Calcula tions had been made for the French by Monsieur Mounier, whose accounts later had been reviewed by Alexander Baring .

l . Mr . Baring reported the method of ca culation to be correct The sum of ten millions of francs he considered fair as di scount to France . A further allowance of thirty sous upon the price of the rentes to be given for the hundred million francs would be two million francs . The total debt amounted to two hun dred and eighty milli ons . Allowing ten million for discount l and two mi lion for rentes, the amount of two hundred and

- was sixty eight millions , it estimated would be the amount due

was the allies . It proposed that this sum should be met in “ i nine equal payments , to be made the s xth of each month ” The a from January to September . final st tement was as follows :

20 bi . 725 . I d , XII , p

i th e m i i e of th e o e . 21 1 bi d XI I . 720 e o to ) , , p , "W ll n gt n n st rs c n gr ss

STUDIE S I N TH E SOCIAL SCIENCES

was l l brought forth by France, Wellington of inestimab e va ue i to England . His liberality toward France facil tated greatly a

r l al e peaceable ag eement . He was wi ling to low France fifte n

i a ni s m llion francs s indem ty, ba ing this amount upon

8 n ot 1 8 1 9-1 8 20 mill . frs . discount due until .

4 mi f r a . Of ll s . int . for sums p id by France on account

1 - 1 3 . 1 8 7 1 8 8 1 8 20 mill for the solde in , due in . 3 i f r 1 s . 1 8 8 . m ll . for the solde of November

The terms of final settlement as drawn up in the protocol of the ninth of October were based largely upon the two reports of i r r Baring and Well ngton . The ag eement p ovided for the pay

-fi v e sum ment of two hundred Sixty million francs, of which i e “ ” one hundred mill on was payabl by inscriptions of rentes, 1 1 8 s 8 . bearing intere t from the second of September, The one hundred Sixty-fi v e million remaining was to be paid in nine monthl y installments commencing on the sixth of the following

January, by bills on the bankers Hope , Baring and Company . Castlereagh obj ected to the confidence thus placed in the bank ing houses . There appeared greater risk, he thought , in placing

o s great an amount of public money in private firms . The only

- safe guard was their personal security, for according to the ar rangement the alli es did not even have the security of the 2 5 French government . So great was the fear of Prussia of dan ger resulting from a falling of French rentes that her mini sters demanded for To d i s themselves security from Baring and Company . allay trust , the demand had to be complied with . This caution on f ew the part of Prussia seems justifiable , for within a weeks of the settlement the public credit in France was severely re shaken . Cash in the banks fell from one hund d seventeen million to thirty-seven mill ion ; the r oute fell from seventy-six 26 - to seventy one . The great remittances abroad had taken the i Specie from the country . Th s, although merely a temporary

al crisis, made it necessary for the lies to alter the terms of the settlement . After the close of the congress , several of the i ministers , therefore, went to Par s and there agreed, to keep

25 id 2 b . 8 8 . I , XII , p 6 2 1 bi d . 763 . , XII, p ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE AL LIANCE 27 on deposit the inscriptions for the one hundred millions and to postpone the payment until the first of June

The pecuniary settlement with France, though the most ted the ious business before congress, was not considered the most l f i i di fii cu t to handle . The di ficulty of determ n ng the method of inviting the King of France to participate in future congresses

an i f l dem ded more del cate treatment on the part o the al ies . To a supplementary article of the All i ance recognizing France as an ally and openly declaring the Alliance no longer quad t ruple but quin uple , England would not consent . There was

n ew dan ger, the English thought, in giving a character to the

ll i an d i s A ance , in risk ng the re entment of nations that were 28 w t “ i excluded . Lord Bathurst ro e, I should l ke it better if e mi the invitation was given to any m etings which ght take place, than say that the King was invited to become a part of the e ” 29 engagem nts to meet under the sixth article . Toward the “ new treaty, England felt even greater anxiety . We have “ r e been made very ne vous , Liv rpool wrote , even by the pos ” ° i i l i t n ew 3 s b y of a treaty to which France might be a party .

The recognition of France as an ally, therefore , was not made by treaty, but by one of the protocols of the congress, a con v en ti on r entered into by the plenipotentia ies of the four courts . “ I n t n s the third ar icle, it was annou ced, that France a sociated with the other powers by the restoration of the legitimate and l constitutiona monarchy, is engaged to concur from now on for the maintenance and establi shment of a system which has given peace to Europe and which alone can assure the duration of ” 3 1 it . Closely allied with this question was the determi nation of ul a method by which meetings in the future sho d be announced . Bathurst informed Castlereagh of the necessity of bearing con stantl y in mind the doubtf ul reception of an innovation by “ all or s the English Parliament . We were more less impre sed

2 7 B i s h and Fo ei S ate Pa e . 20 . r ti r g n t p rs, VI, p A ex E A a em e efi i e our é e l e m o e et les é o u e d e " nn ) rr n g nt d n t ly, p r gl r d p q s ’ ’ 0 asqu i ttem en t d es derni ers d e l indem ni té Pécu ni ai re a u r r fo nir p a l a Fra nce. 28 C h C C a e ea o e o en . 63 L e ool to a le ea h e . stl r g , rr sp nd c , XII , p , " iv rp st r g ) 2 9 1 bi d . 5 5 Lo a h u to Ca e ea h . , p , " rd B t rst stl r g )

3 0 b Li ol C e ea h . . 63 e o to a I id , XII, p " v rp stl r g ) 3 1 n i P 1 B r i s h a d Fo e S a e a e . 5 . ti r gn t t p rs , VI, p STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES with the apprehension of great inconveni ence arising from a decision being now publicly announced of continued meetings ” 3 2 s was at fixed point . The whole cabinet of the opinion that the time of the next meeting should be decided an d announ ced, but that an announcement and statement of the same general purpose of such deliberation by circular letter should be avoided . Canning was the most emphatic of the cabinet members in de n oun ci n g a call by circular letter . There existed, he believed,

e . no basis for such a proce ding The ninth article of the Treaty, he construed as applicable only to a meeting called for the pur “ pose of watching the internal state of France as far as it may l ” 3 3 endanger the public tranquil ity . England won her point

1 5 was and in the protocol of November , it announced that the power s which had concurred in the Act judged it necessary to “ i vi establish definite assembl es . Let there be, it pro ded , assem n blies among the august sovereig s themselves, or among their ministers and res pective pleni potentiaries the time and p lace of their meetings will be each time previously ar ’ 3 4 ranged by means of di plomatic communications . Besides acting in accordance wi th the principles of the Eng l to e ish cabinet , Castlereagh in the congress had repr sent the

English people in urging abolition of the slave trade . A pro position had been made in the preceding February relating to

o s l the slavery questi n , and had been pre ented to the severa t ministers of the various countries . But previous to the mee ing 3 5 - - l h e . at Aix la C apel e, no answer had be n received At this

t h C astl er ea h ‘ r o osed m ea time , to press the mat er furt er, g p p

r t . sures . Two p a icular propositions were submitted The first provided for addressing a di rect appeal on the p art o of the five Courts to the King of Portugal, founded up n the Declaration made in His Maj esty ’ s name by his Plenipotentiary f a at Vienna, and urging His Maj esty to give ef ect to that declar li tion at the period fixed by Spain for final abo tion , viz . , on 2oth 1 8 20 the of May, .

3 2 C h C 5 5 a h u to C a e ea h — P o o ole a e ea o es o d e e . stl r g , rr p n nc , XII , p , "B t rst stl r g r t c ’ d e l a c n f er en ce e e l e P e i o e i a i e des Cou d Au str i che d e a e d e l a o ntr s l n p t nt r s s , Fr nc G a e e a e d e Pr u s se et d e Ru si e— Ai x -l a -Ch a e e l e 1 5 No emb e r nd Br t gn , , s p ll , v r , 3 3 i 1 b d . 5 6 . , XII , p 3 4 i i h an d o ei a e P a e P o o o e d e l a C o e e e e e l es Br t s F r gn St t p rs, " r t c l nf r nc ntr ’ Pl en i o ten ti ai r es d es C ou d Au str i c h e d e a e d e l a G a e a e d e p rs , , Fr nc , r nd Br t gn , Pr u sse et d e Ru e Ai x -l a -Ch a e e l o 1 5 No emb e , ss , p ll , v r ,

3 5 b . 29 9 . 26 . I id , VIII, p , VI , p ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 29

The second suggested that the Powers there represented shoul d a ccept the principle of a qualified right of mutual visit , as r t r t adopted by the courts of G ea Britain , Spain , and Po ugal an d the Netherlands, and should apply the same to the case of t 3 6 e as s . their r spective flags, circum ances might point out The s i oh vote on these po nts were unfavorable , and a request for jecti on s on the part of the diff erent countries to the right of visit was complied with . Russia though approving of the prin i l c e s . p eof abolition , was reluctant to yi ld to the proposed mea ure

n l She looked forward to the fi al abolition on the part of Portuga , and in accordance with the visionary and idealistic dreams of

i n i t the Emperor, formulated a plan for the creation of new st u l tions, to control the right of visit and execute the aws against 3 7 “ piracy and other breaches of abolition . The Russian Mem ” hh oir, Castlereagh reported, seems expressly to wit old, or i rather to delay its adherence, until there s reason to presume that a general concurr ence is attainable ; but surely in all such cases the most certain mode of obtaining a general concurrence , ” 3 8 i r s to augment the ranks of the concur ing parties . Austria

r also prefer ed to await univer sal abolition . a France, unlike Russia, agreed with England th t the right of visit as outlined in the English memorandum was no i n f r ac

r tion of the law of nations . She approved the p inciple of lim iting “ exercise of this power to the immediate purpose for which ” it is granted, and the confining of the work to the African coasts . The obj ections were that , should she enter into such a as me ure , it might be looked upon as a concession for the evacua

sh e tion of France ; and further , that could not approve of the principle of subj ecting French property to the jur i sdi c

wn tion of authority other than her o tribunals . Prussia feared the abuse of the right of search and foresaw the possibility of moles ting commerce in the open seas . Eng l ’ Wh and s purpose consequently failed for the time being . y the Powers postponed the passage of such a measure un til the

Slave trade Should have been universally abolished, Castlereagh , attempted to answer as follows : “ Perhaps it is because no instance can be quoted that any

so I bi d . 5 7. , VI , p - 3 7 bi . 67 69 . I d , p p 8 3 b . 8 0 . I id , p STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE S

s r u Slave trader, under either the Rus ian , P ssian, or Austrian i o flags has yet appeared on the coast of Afr ca , that these P wers , from a sentiment of delicacy towards the States more directly interested both in the local and maritime question , have felt some reluctance to take a lead in giving the sanction to this 3 9 principle . di S In ad tion to the disagreement on the lavery situation , dis sent among the allies ap peared i n several other noteworthy i n

An e stances . act of guarant e brought forth by the Emperor Alexander and concurred in by the continental powers roused serious opposition on the part of the English emissaries . The act was concerned wi th a reciprocal safeguarding of possessions

a of each of the countries which were p rties to the agreement . “ It proposed the establishment of the casus f oed er i s on a com mon basis, against any extension , whatever, by one of the parties, ” was of his present possess ions . This guarantee to apply to

a European possessions . The proposal met with the hearty p probation of Metternich who saw in it an advantage to both

Austria and Prussia . Not so with the British Government , “ M o di etternich wrote, who will find it imp ssible to take a rect t and obligatory part in so extensive an act of guaran ee . He i l bel eved, however , the proposition shou d not be rej ected because ’ of England s inability to accept it . His prophecy with regard ’ 40 to England s po sition proved correct .

Liverpool , alarmed by such a suggestion , and fearing that it set would the mind of Europe again afloat , urged the pre “ v en ti on of the act . We cannot on any account be parties to any guarantee which may be maintained in it , we ” n w cannot enter into any e engagements . The situation present

a o s as the ed seri u pect to England , for conclusion of this act which woul d supersede the Quadruple Al l iance would n eces sitate her compliance with it , or her exclusion thereafter from ff 4 1 e l continental a airs . The gen ral desire among the continenta powers to hold England as an ally led to the rej ection of the plan . ’ o b Again , on an ther question England s o jection carried

3 9 1 bi d . 8 0 M em o a um of the i i h Go e m e . , VI , p , " r nd Br t s v rn nt ) 4 0 M e er i h A u i o h o b a . 1 8 3 . tt n c , t gr p y, III , p 4 1 i C e o S u lem e a r D e a he . 8 3 0 L e oo to a tle W ll n gt n , p p nt y sp tc s, XII , p , " iv rp l s ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 3 1

n weight . This concer ed the Spanish situation , the question of th was aux medi ation between Spain and e colonies . Liverpool ious that the point should not be urged by Spain , but as a pre caution sent word to Castlereagh to bear in mind the interests hi of English commerce in s treatment of the matter . He men ti on ed the distinction which England should maintain between the colonies of South America which had declared their i n d ep en m i dence for ally and those wh ch had not . With the colonies that had not yet made such a declaration , mediation could be mi 4 2 e per tted . Sinc none of the Powers were desirous of under taking the task of medi ation an invitation was sent by the French and Russian ministers to the Duke of Well ington asking hi m him to mediate . To , the proposition seemed impracticable, as he considered that the Powers had no right to interfere unless requested by at least one of the parties implicated ; and still less would they have such a right shoul d Spain refuse the right of r h inte vention . He believed t at little could be accomplished f h without per ect agreement on the subj ect among t ePowers . As hi a consequence of s reply, no settlement of the Spanish trouble w 4 3 as made . England had su ccessfully resi sted the demands made by the allies in the congress for continued i nterf erences in French f f w the n e . a airs . She prevented formation of a alliance She relegated the Spanish question to a position of unimportance . m She opposed the su moning of congresses by circular letter . Work which it would seem should have found a place in the

e wa conferences, remained untouched . Th re s discussed neither

s the form of government , nor the representative system , nor the maintenance or modi fication of the privileges of the nobility nor the liberty of the press , nor anything touching the interest ” 4 4 of religion . There was res er ve and timi dity in the introduction of new questions on the part of all . The English cabinet in particular expressed uneasiness during the whole course of the proceed “ Y ou ings . will be glad to find that there has not appeared the slightest disposition to push the discussion here beyond the i ” l ne that had been chalked out by the circular from Paris, was

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a e e “ a message to Liverpool from C stl r agh . Knowing well that the foreign correspondence could be demanded in Parlia e ment , both Castlereagh and the cabinet desired few pap rs to be d Ai x drawn up . The real debates on the questions considere at

- k o i la Chapelle, they new, w uld take place in the Engl sh Parlia hi “ i ment . For t s reason , such warning as I th nk it would be i to an k the safest th ng sep arate without y declaration , as we now how roughly these state papers are apt to be handled in Parlia ” 46 “ ” ment , and the more general the declaration , the better, were among the expressions of Castlereagh of the anxiety pre f vailing in the Foreign O fice . One of the greatest di ffi culties that the English experienced was the inability on the part of the allies to recogn ize the

r t n f subse vience of the Depar ment of Foreig Af airs to Parliament . u Liverpool , distressed by the R ssian attempts to inveigle Castle

the ser reagh , urged him to convince the Russians that foreign vice dared not be d rawn into politics that would be at variance 4 7 r with the spirit of the government . Du ing the whole pro ced ur e mi En i an d of the conferences, the nisters of g in deciding n upo the measures confronting them , had constantly to bear in

o mind the reception of their w rk at home . In the financial ’ “ re settlement , the question raised in Castle agh s mind was How will such an arrangement be looked upon by the homegovern ” ment ? In his obj ections he urged not so much his own wish “ n ot as the probable remonstrance of the home treas urer . I do believe that our Treasurer w ould trust so large a sum as four d million of our treasury bills for sale out of their han s, upon ” 4 8 any private security whatsoever, was the note sent to

Wellington . If the English diplomatists could have adopted

- - ul a motto for their mode of procedure at Aix la Chapelle , it wo d certainly have been to this eff ect : Let us produce as f ew docu ments as possible for the perusal and criticism of our Parlia ment . So f ew were the important documents drawn up and the protocols entered into that a brief summary of the Significant

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4 7 1 bi d . 63 . , XII, p 4 8 C h l i elli o S u l em e ar Des a he . 760 a e ea to e W ngt n , p p nt y p tc s, XII , p , " stl r g W l ng ton ) .

STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

the system into its ture light , and givi ng to the counsel s of the great Powers the efficiency an d almost the simplicity of a ” 5 ° Single state .

t c n Approving, as his statement seems to, of the system of o gesses , it cannot be taken as proof of the desire to give any e great amount of power to the congress . B fore subsequent con f er en ces e wi were called, Castlereagh stat d that th all respect “ - - to the work of Aix la Chapelle , he would question the prudence

f o or in truth , the e ficacy, of any formal exercise of its f rm and ‘5 1 provisions .

Ai x - - f Gentz , in a memoir drawn up at la Chapelle , a firmed that in his opinion the p olicy of holding a Congress was best suited

AS M em oi r to European needs . a conclusion to the meeting, his e was read xtolling the conference in its lofty idealism , in the harmony among its members, and in the delicacy with which

Two the work was handled . great benefits , he proclaimed , in generalizations whi ch woul d be inoff ensive to a most exacting critic , result from the congres s . “ First , that of having entirely cleared the ground , removed

a n d e t all doubts , fully r es ablished the confidence of each of the cabinets in the p roceedi ngs and principles of the others, and in the stability of the general harmony . “ i Secondly, that of having by confidential interv ews, earnest di a n d l e mi scussions, the contact of intel ig nt nds , imbued the sovereigns and their ministers with the necessity of maintain e i ing intact a system which , what ver ts theoretical merits or de feets is at present the only one practicable the anchor of sal ” 5 2 vation for Europe .

Was the conference of Aix - la - Chapelle a success ? The answer must be in the affirmative if we consider its result in relation to e the purposes for which is was call d , but in the light of the work which it might have done , like the congress of Vienna , it e is found wanting . The slav ry Situation remained unsettled ,

f t o and the Spanish di ficulties , bo h colonial and d mestic, were

o . prolonged , to become considerati ns of a coming congress Its chief importance lay in the establishment of a precedent for the reunion of sovereigns and ministers in accordance with

so r h C h t i o . C a s tl e ea o e o en e . 5 5 C a e ea o L e o g , rr sp nd c , XII, p , " stl r g v rp l )

' 5 1 2 . 1 bi d , p . 3 1 .

5 2 M e er i h A u obi o a h Ge z M em oi . 1 9 2 . tt n c , t gr p y, nt r, III , p ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 3 5

a the Quadruple Alli nce . Furthermore, the beginning of a breach between England and her allies was forecast at this

to er early date , for all Powers began realize though vaguely, p al haps, that there existed in England a government power which would ever be looked upon by the English as superior to al an internation congress , a power to which all English policy must be bent . CHAPTER IV

THE CONGRESS OF TROPPAU

The period of 1 8 20-1 8 23 in the history of the Quadruple Alli ance was marked by three important assemblies of the allied powers . It was the period of the Austrian congresses, as the e All i conferenc s were rightly designated . were held in Aus trian terri tory ; that of Troppau in Silesia in 1 8 20 ; that of 1 8 21 1 2 Laibach in Carniola in ; that of Verona in Venetia in 8 3 . For still another reason these congresses should be termed Aus

. was trian In the case of Troppau and Laibach , it a question in which Austria alone was vitally concerned , which led to their

aw assembly . Verona s the completion of Austrian interference w in Italy . It was Austria that outlined the policy and sa to its

r e execution . It was the period of supremacy of the Austrian actionary policy . The first for mal meeting of the Quadruple Alliance took 1 20 place at Troppau in November and December of 8 . Though

- - 1 8 1 8 the Congress of Aix la Chapelle had been held in , it was

al specific ly provided for by the treaty of Paris . That of Trop

was be ac pau , on the contrary , the first congress to called in

or an l c d ce with the general principles of the Quadruple Al iance , the principles declaring for the maintenance of peace and tran quillity in Europe , and for the meetings of the sovereigns to consider together threatening evils and means of promoting the welfare of the European states . In 1 8 20 and 1 8 21 such events transpired within a f ew months as seemed to threaten the destruction of the old system . Revo

l uti on s . broke out in Spain , Portugal , Naple , and Piedmont

r a c Prussia was on the verge of revolution . Military plots in p tically every state added to the anxiety of the monarchs . Met ’ r n i ch e te s theory se med justified, that revolution was a con tagi on and that so long as a germ remained alive every state was in danger of contamination . With the spectacle of actual 3 6 ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE AL LIAN CE 3 7

i i f ul revolution in progress, it was w th little d fic ty that Metter nich secured the approval of the Emperor of Russia and the

King of Prussia for a congress . s ev i To England, the expediency of a congre s for the very dent purpose of interfering with the internal aff airs of a state t 1 8 20 was doubtful . In Sep ember, , Castlereagh in a despatch to the British minister at Vienna wrote With all the respect and attachment which I feel for the

as system of the Alliance, regulated by the transaction of Aix

- r u la Chapelle, I should much question the p dence , or, in truth , f the e ficacy, of any formal exercise of its forms and provisions on the present occas ion when the danger springs from the i n e ternal convulsions of indep ndent states , the policy of hazard ” 1 ing such a step is much more questionable . Castlereagh was desirous that general questions Should not th be admitted if a congress convened . It seemed to him at Austria because of her proximity to the revolution in Ital y Should act independently of the Alliance and propose the cours e to be taken there ? In reply to the memoir of the Austrian minister calli ng for a conference to adopt a policy toward revo l ti on ar u e . y Naples, Castlereagh stat d his obj ections He would not consent to the p roposed hostile league of the five Powers against Naples . “ If all are pledged not to recognize but with common con

n w b sent the order of things o su sisting, that force , if requisite

e i ts is to be employ d for overthrow, all are principles , not only

all ea m morally but de jure in the war, though may not b r ar s

m i s in the execution of the com on cause . Now this a concert ” 3 n which the British government can ot enter into . This declaration of Castlereagh is a definite statement of a policy absolutely opposed to interference by the Alliance . It was a poli cy form ulated by Castlereagh and forcefully main tai n ed and executed by his successor Canning . Against such

u a a leag e , C stlereagh urged six objections of which the first and the last are particularly Significant . It was a recognition of that same higher power that had been a check at Aix -l a-Chap ’ elle . The first reason he stated for England s not entering into

l a tler ea h Co e o 1 2 C h C s s e e . 3 a e ea to Lo e a g , rr p nd nc , XII , p , " stl r g , rd St w rt ) .

2 1 bi d . 3 1 8 . , XII, p a l bi d , p . 3 1 3 . STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES such an agreement was that it binds to engagements which they could not be justified in taking without laying the whole ” a before Parliament, and s if to emphasize the influence of this m branch of govern ent, the final summary of his objection de “ n oun ced the league as most certainly to be disapproved by ” 4 our Parliament . The loss to Engli sh commerce was likewise reckoned with in coming to the decision that the Powers ought not to inter fere . t i t In the course of the despa ch , Castlereagh made clear ’ that England s interference was out of the question , and that was in the naine of the Alliance , intervention opposed ; but to ’ “

e . the p ropriety of Austria s interference, he would agr e Aus

a as a tria must, at le st far as we are concerned, make the me sure , i ” 5 s . whatever it , her own hi i From t s attitude , Canning would have d ssented, for he

- nl stood for non interference on the part not o y of the Alliance , but also on the part of any individual state in th e internal af f fairs o an other state .

England had little interest in Italian aff airs, and consequent l y any hostile action taken by Austria against the Italian king ff doms would a ect her but slightly . A disinterested policy or w a s e e. one little forceful , th refore, possibl With Spain , how m ever , her position was fir er . Russia and Austria had for some time been watching the development of liberalism in Spain , and had directed notes to England disclaiming the tendencies

s there . They had insinuated that England was ecretly giving

a . to the constitutionalists of Sp in her approval , if not actual aid

- Russia had proposed intervention . The ultra royalists in France likewise fea red the eff ects upon them of the overthrow of the

1 8 20 a r e B ourbon power in Spain . In April , , Wellington , p p hending the attitude of the European Powers, wrote to Castle reagh , opposing any interference in Spain . The king, he said, had not called for as sistance and it was doubtful whether it

be r would possible for the Powers to inte vene at that time, pitted against each other as they appeared to be . But of this “ ” was t he convinced , No foreign power ought o interfere .

4 bi . 3 1 4 . I d , p 5 bi 3 5 6 . I d , XII , p . ENGLAN D AN D THE QUADRUPLE ALLIAN CE 3 9

There is no country in Europe in the aff airs of which foreign a ers can interfere with so little advantage as in those of Sp in . There is no country in which foreigners are so much disliked and ” 6 even despised . l a was When the cal for a congress c me, therefore , England prepared to resist any attack upon Spain . Austria had men ti on ed particularly the Italian question as the significant one was r to be considered, and Castlereagh anxious that the Empe or of Russia should not attempt to introduce any n ew subject s of discussion . Russia, as England had feared , did prop o e in the congress , intervention in Spain , but England vehement l y protested . The Spanish question was then dropped . In September it was definitely arranged that the confer 20 o n en ces would begin on October . The greatest c ncer was felt on the part of Metternich as to what England intended to do . 1 7 “ In his memoirs, September , he wrote , Will anyone come ? ? s e from London and who Ca tlereagh is desir d by many , but he will not be able to come ; f or this matter Wellington could be he ? ” 7 nominated . Will come or will they choose to send him Neither Castlereagh nor Wellington was sent to represent Eng I t f land . was deemed su ficient to authorize Lord Stewart , the the British minister to Vienna, to attend congress and to look i after Engl sh interests . M etternich found hi s strongest ally in the Emperor Alexan “ der . The Emperor Alexander has become much wiser than was he in After several private interviews , Metternich “ hi s 1 0 i recorded in diary, November , The friendl ness of the u R ssian Emperor for me continues . It is a return to the e 1 8 1 3 1 1 y ar . If he had been in the year 8 5 as he was in the 1 8 1 3 year , there would have been no The Russian policy because of the opposing views of the ministers and the was Emperor to Metternich an interesting obj ect of obser vation . e ul “ N sselrode he co d manage . Nesselrode is morally dead ; ” ’ as e I r i h e . w it is just if he wer not ther at all Capo d st a , o ever, at one time the most influential adv i ser of the Emperor

opposed the principles and policies of Metternich . He was ’ ’ England s strongest friend in the congress and Metter nich s

eWell i n ton S u lem e a D a h - e e 1 1 6 1 1 7. g , p p nt ry sp tc s, I , p p . 7 M e te i h Au obi o a h 9 3 3 . t rn c , t gr p y, III, p . S I bi d 4 02 , III , p . . STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

? o n h e most powerf ul opp nent Metter ich wrote was a small , ” u to mean, intellect , but one which m st be made turn even was as against his will . It only after weeks of persu ion that Metternich forced the Emperor to cease depending upon ’ f his minister s Opinions . The ef ect was to prolong the con 27th gress ; November , Metternich recorded his progress in the congress “ We are gradually attaining results . They are unhappily ’ not successful to the degree I had wished ; with Capo d I str i a it ’ f d I str i a is even di ficult to carry out a p lain benefit . Capo is e not a bad man , but honestly sp aking he is a complete and ” thorough fool ; a perfect miracle of wrong headedness .

Insignificant though England appeared in the congress, and strong as the unanimity seemed to be between the Emperors of

an ul Russia and Austria from being natural allies, Engl d co d - k still find in Austria a chec a gainst Russ ia, and in France

s i n likewise an ally against Russia . In the matter of Rus ian ter f er en ce in the Greek revolution, it was early seen in the congress that Austria would v i ew . wi th suspicion and j ealousy any move on the part of Russia in the southeast . Austria. had ’ been ap prised of Englan d s supp ort in this matter previous to the meeting . With France , England had found a bond of m sy pathy, because of French fear that Russia would demand the entrance of a Russian army into Spain . o f f As a result the uno ficial alliance, because it fostered strong tendencies ready to become active forces upon provoca e tion , neith r the Spanish Situation nor the Greek revolution dared be acted upon in the congress . The revolution of Naples, therefore, remained the only subj ect open to consideration . The congress opened with a statement by Austria of the con di ti on s e in Naples, and the urgent nec ssity of the allies to per

i n w r form their duty restoring peace . It as unnecess a y for ’ ob England s representative to raise any obj ections , for both jecti on s and passive approval had been given to Austria in

r r September preceding . Castle eagh had notified Lord Stewa t that according to a str ict interpretation of the Alliance the

r v revolution in Naples did not come under its su eillance . It

is, nevertheless , an event of such great importance in itself

s C as tl er ea h Co e o d e e XI I 3 n . 5 0 . g , rr sp nc , , p

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’ i I r i thoughts are mine ; but the drawing up s by Capo d st a .

In loftiness of purp ose , the obj ects proclaimed from Troppau are only secondary to the noble expressions of the Holy All i

ance . The first declaration to the King of Sicily by the three 2o h e a kings was dated November t . Pr faced by several p ar graphs dealing wi th the duty imposed upon the allies of restor L ai ing peace, the invitation to the King to join with them at bach was issued . Had it not been for the strong appeal of France that a reconciliation of the King of Naples with his subjects be under to the taken by the allies, before recourse arms was attempted, meeting with King Ferdi nand would most probably not have been proposed, and the congress of Laibach would have been rendered unnecessary . Although England and France did not

Sign the declarations drown up at the congress , or j oin with th e three sovereigns in issuing the invitation to Naples, the

King of France on December third sent a message to Naples, exp ressing his approval of the action taken by the congress , urging his attendance at Laibach , and regretting that he him w t 1 2 self as unable o be present . A second doc ument of Significance did not appear until De m r w ce be . as eighth It this, the circular to the Austrian ,

Prussian , and Russian ministers at the court of London which led to the attack in the English Parliament on the foreign policy of Liverpool and Castlereagh . This circular is a statement of the policy adopted at Troppau . The sovereigns declared their intentions of repressing rebellion that opposed legitimate governments . Upon this principle, which they recognized as n ew not a one , but as one founded upon the principles laid down 1 8 1 4 1 8 1 5 h e in the treaties of and , they based t right of inter v n i n w e t o . The inference as made that the courts of London and 1 3 Paris would approve the proceeding .

The opposition to the policy outlined in the circular, and ’ C astler ea h s o was to g apparent appr val of it, led in the Eng lish Parliament by Lord Holland and E arl Grey . The only evidence presented by Liverpool in defense of this attitude and

i r as proof of his disapproval of the course taken , was his c cu

1 2 i i h an d o ei P - a e a e . 1 1 4 7 1 1 70 . Br t s F r gn St t p rs , VIII , p p l a i - I b d , p p . 1 1 4 9 5 1 . ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 43 lar letter from the foreign office to the B ritish ministers at 21 1 9 1 8 . the foreign courts, dated January , Why England had not protested earlier against the principles of despotism laid down at Troppau was a question to which the English ministers failed to make a strong reply . The statement that the events of Troppau had been known in the latter part of December was a weak apology, for the policy prevailing at Troppau had been discussed in European papers long before this time , and England was certainly aware of the course that was being 1 4 r adopted at the cong ess . Both Liverpool and Castlereagh attempted to justify the allies somewhat by declaring before Parli ament that the revo l i n was l but ut o in Naples not a popu ar one, that it had been the work of a military clique . In restoring the monarchy, therefore , the Powers were acting in accordance with the wishes

i ni oo of the popul ace . The Engl sh mi sters preferred to l k upon i the interference in Naples as an exception , and not to adm t it as the accepted policy of the Alliance . The general principles o set forth by the sovereigns they strongly disclaimed . Liverpo l “ declared, Never did Russia , Austria, and Prussia do a more ” 1 5 ill advised act , than when they put forth the declaration .

r em on str a In answer to the question , why England had not ted against the work of the allies , Earl Liverpool without doubt “ touched the keynote of the policy England had adop ted : The country must not put itself into the situation of having made a h a vain remonstrance , which it s not the courage or the means ” 1 6 to enforce . From this it would app ear that the policy taken wi th regard

was to the conduct of the congress based upon economic interest . The problems of whether England desired to maintain her neutrality with Naples, or whether She approved of restoring

or legitimate rule, whether She resented the interference of the allies, all had to be answered not upon theories, sentiment , or

i n precedent , but upon the basis of the advantages or d sadv a

n tages to her . Russia and Austria, it was know , had immense ul f w armies that co d be put into the field upon a e weeks notice . A vehement remonstrance by England suppo rted by arms would

1 4 Ha a D eba e . 1 0 6 1 . ns rd , t s , V, p 1 5 bi 1 0 65 . I d , p .

1 6 1 bi d . STUDIE S I N TH E SOCIAL SCIENCES

ff have been necessary to make their opposition e ective , and this was deemed inexpedient . There was nothing for England to gain . Havi ng issued the invitation to the Ki ng and the circular to

n the foreig courts, the congress stood ready for adjournment . c of Instead , it was de ided to await the answer the King of

Naples . This prolonged the meeting until the end of Decem 1 1 th “ ber . Metternich on December wrote, The King of Naples may come or he may stay away ; measures must be taken to ” suit both cases . The waiting was wearisome . Troppau was little accommodated to the entertainment of royalty , and the inclemency of the weather added to the disagreeableness of the “ 2l st n o surroundings . December , Metternich recorded, Still ” s 24th news from Naples . At la t on December , the courier the arrived bearing news that the King would go to Laibach . “ r I start tomorrow morning, my Emperor ; the next mo ning, ” 27th 1 7 the Emperor Alexander, on the Metternich wrote . Would England be present at Laibach ? Metternich hoped h s e would j oin the al lies there . France and England have r t i been asked to take pa in the step , and it s to be expected i C that they w ll not refuse their onsent , Since the principle on which the invitation rests is in perfect harmony with the agree ” 1 8 ments formerly concluded by them .

1 7 i o A u i h 4 e ob o a . 4 0 6 09 . W ll ngt n , t gr p y, III, pp , 1 8 i 4 4 1 b d , p . 6 . CHAPTER V

THE CONGRESS AT LAIBACH

When it was decided at Troppau that the congress Should d be continued , it was very wisely agree to adj ourn to Laibach , a city better suited to accommodate the members . Situated i us was n southern A trian territory, it not an undesirable win t e ering place . A win er r sort it proved to be to the Sovereigns mi i and nisters of the congress, for w th little to do but await

s t developments in Naple , there was op por unity and leisure to

hi . enj oy the suns ne and soft winds, Italian in nature e The members began to assemble Jan uary fourth . Mett r nich , ever ready to seize the advantage of preliminary conver t sati on s and an oppor tunity of obs erving tendencies, was the firs

r f ew to ar ive . A days later, the Emperors of Austria and

Russia, and the King of Naples were present . Their first meet ing on January Sixth Metternich dubbed the “ Festival of the ” Three Kings . ’ England s p olicy oppo sing the principle of interference in l the name of the Al iance had not been changed , and consequent ’ l y M etternich s hopes that England mi ght send representa

" ti v es to particip ate at Laibach were not realized . The Honor

r n was f able Robert Go dO was present, but Since he not o ficially

e the . accredited to the congress, did not att nd conferences How

of was e ever, toward the end February, Austria dispos d to look ’ with comparative complacence upon England s stand , and went so far as to invite the un official English representative into pri 1 vate conferences . was o r e France , after armed intervention determined up n , fused to countenance the conferences . Any determined oppo sitiou on her par t would have aroused the indignation of Russia and Austria , both of which would have seen in such action , the old revolutionary sp irit attempting to assert itself . Therefore ,

1 C C 2 a e ea h o e o en e . 3 7 . stl r g , rr sp nd c , XII , p 45 STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE S

r to p reserve her f iendly relations with the European Powers, France had recourse only to silent disapproval and eventual withdrawal . The work of the congress commenced with a call upon King e hi F rdinand to declare s opinions concerning the revolution .

AS was expected , he implored the sovereigns to restore the old monarch and to establish the power of kingship as it had been 2 previous to the events of 1 8 0 . Under the direction of the 20th Powers, he framed a letter, January , to his son , the Prince

s . Regent of Sicily , informing him of the action of the congres

“ I have found them irrevocably determined not to admi t the state of things which had resulted from these events or whi ch

as o could result from them, to regard it inc mpatible with the

as tranquillity of my realm , as well with the security of neigh e boring states , and to combat it by force of arms, in the cas where forces of p ersuasion could not effect an immediate ces sation of them . The declaration of the allies themselves to Naples was trans mi tted 1 9th by two circulars, dated January , to the ministers of the three Powers residing at Naples . The conditions calling forth intervention were reviewed , and the general principles, so

set often proclaimed as the bases of their action , were again 3 forth . The policy upon which the allies had agreed , was also é ’ c . de lared When the news reached Nap les , the French charg d ff 9th a aires there addressed a note on February , declaring that France would act in compliance with the instr uctions sent to 4 the ministers of Austria , Prussia, and Russia . The decision upon Sicilian aff airs made at Laibach was made known to the Austrian people by a declaration issued by the 1 3 . Austrian government , February Again the events in Naples necessitating action by the allies were developed in minute de tail , and the marching of troops into the Italian province was announced to be a measure of greatest need .

The congress in consequence , the report stated , had ordered troops to cross the Po , and if the conflict proved more severe h t an anticipated , the Russian Emperor stood prepared to join 5 hi s a forces with those of Austri .

2 i i n i P -2 6 3 . h a d o e a e a e . 1 1 Br t s F r gn St t p rs , VIII , p p 3 i - b . 1 1 6 1 1 2 5 7 . I d , VIII , p p 4 bi . 1 1 72 . I d , p 5 i m t e a . bi . 1 1 75 De a a i o of Au a G o e e o I d, V, p , " cl r t n stri n v rn nt V nn ) ENGLAND AN D THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 47

Neither the Austri an government nor the English felt content

of with this decree . The possible union the great military power of Russia with that of Austria appea red to England to fore bode grave dangers . There was no assurance that a compro mi s e had not been eff ected by Russia whereby ai d would be given Austria in Italy provided Austria in turn would give Aus her consent to any Russian aggression in the East . To the

i n trian government Vienna and to the Austrian people , the mere proposal of a Russian army crossing Austri an territory ’ d I str i a was obnoxious . Capo had opposed the declaration , 6 but his influence had ceased to be of any consequence . 6 February , the Austrian army numbering men 27 crossed into Italy . A proclamation dated February , and

Fr i m on t Signed by Baron , General of the Austrian forces, was proclaimed to the Neapolitans, urging them to rally to the f support of the King . The of ensive was taken by the army on ff March fourth . Little resistance was o ered and the army with 7 ing less than two weeks had entered Naples . 28 th On February , the congress, having previously provided e 1 8 22 for anoth r conference for September, , dissolved . The

al King of Naples and the It ian princes accompanying him , left

sov er Laibach early in March, but the Austrian and Russian ei n s di g and plomatists remained until late in May . From the t s adj ournmen in February , the formal sessions of the congre s gave way to informal meetings, and the work accomplished after that date was in the nature of private interviews and agree ments . o Had it not been for the revoluti n in Piedmont , any arrange ments entered into after February would have been treated best t as unrelated o the Quadruple Alliance . But the interference of the Powers in the Sardinian kingdom , as a furtherance of the policy adopted toward Naples , must necessarily be associated

i n surr ec with the work of the allies at Laibach . News of the 1 5 t tion was received March th, and straightway an agreemen was consummated between Austria and Russia by which men were to march from Austria into Italy, and Russians 8 were to cross the Austrian borders .

6 M e e i h A u o bi o h 4 a . 8 0 . tt rn c , t g r p y, III, p 7 i - b . 5 1 9 0 5 22 0 . I d , p p S I i 4 b d . 9 0 . , III, p STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE S

’ If England could have understood Metternich s motives, as i l R he recorded them, in demand ng the mobi ization of the us

ri l sian army on the Aust an frontier, al suspicion of a secret e i compact betw en the Powers would have been diss pated . In ’ reply to a letter con demi n g Austria s power in recognizing her inefficiency to cope with the revolutions of Ital y and her ap i n e parent pleasure r ceiving Russian aid, Metternich Showed the artful cunning of diplomacy . “ i s I had to th nk of destroying Rus ian Liberalism , and prov i n g to Europe that hencefor th the Radicals will have to deal with the two powers possessing most freedom of action . “ All the promises , all the speeches of the Emperor of Russia would have been valueless ; but hi s setting in motion some hun ff dred thousand men, their e ective march , the expenditure on

i s them of ten millions , these are facts . The command to halt another fact not less important ; and a hundred twenty thousand

th " men placed in e Russian provinces nearest to our frontiers , with orders to march at the first request of Austria, is certainly hi t a third fact, w ch will prevent these dis urbers from counting ” 9 so rapidly on the Emperor Alexander in the future.

l r eac From Laibach , the Italian rebellions were que led ; the

i n r t o a y principles were supreme . Metternich tried to persuade h a himself that t e Greek situation would settle itself, and compact wi th respect to Greece was signed by th e Emperors of Russia and Austria whereby it was agreed that , “ As it "Greece) has remained up to this time estranged from

a f all the f airs of Europe , we do not feel called upon to inter ” 1 ° ff -on fere in its a airs . The Spanish questi here as at Troppau was left untouched .

The stand. which England had taken at Troppau was main

i n was ta ed at Laibach . At Troppau it clearly Shown that if interference were admitted , She would not become a party to be k n the agreement , and at Laibach England let it now that though she might dissent from . the policy of the allies, remon strance would not be made in the form of an ultimatum . Castle reagh was determined that upon the Italian question , England was should not take the field . England apparently little con

9 bi . 5 29 . I d, III , p

1 0 I b . 5 23 . id , p

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Ai x -l a- of the allies came to an end . At Chapelle the position of e England had be n one of force and prominence . On Significant f an d points her remonstrance had been ef ec tive . At Troppau Laibach her disapproval of interference by the Powers was passed by un heeded . Castlereagh may have looked with l ess disfavor upon the proceedings than his public utterances and f o ficial correspondence indicated , but , nevertheless, in the fact that he had registered the remonstrance in his public acts is to be found the real importance of his attitude . The recog n i ti on n ot that England must interfere within a state, and that ’ the economic interest of the nation f or ebad eEngland s engaging in war to uphold a remonstrance upon a situation of little con ’ hi sequence to her, were Castlereagh S c ef contributions to Eng ’ n l l and s foreig policy . In his policy, therefore, were aid the foundations of the inevitable disru ption of a system govern ing

o- Europe by c ongresses . When the p int had been reached where accredited ministers would not be sent by England to the con f er en ces a wide breach was eff ected ; when action was taken n based upon principles abhorrent to the English ature, the i n breach was widened, and when at last , English economic ter ests woul d be unfavorably aff ected by a congress, the allies and England woul d be found i n opposing camps . CHAPTER V I

THE CONGRESS OF V ERONA

In the f ew years between 1 8 1 5 and 1 8 22 ther e were without doubt more attempts made to unite the p owers of Europe under treaties, alliances, and combinations for a common purpose than i n any other correspondingly short period o f peace . The Con an gress of Vienna, the Treaty of Paris, the Holy Alli ce, and the

r u l i s Ai x - - a Quad ple A l ance, the Congres es of la Chapelle, Laib ch, n d and Troppau , all suggested a union of the Powers, a a com bination of federated interests . m And yet, the sum er preceding the conferences of Vienna and Verona found the European Powers widely separated in policies . The general alliance alone tended to unite the great nations . There was no federative system . Having settled the

l n was o French situation , the Al ia ce Shorn of its only comm n

n ri purpose . The foreig relations of Europe were at this pe od in a state of transition . Attention had been turned from the ri French power, and statesmen were necessa ly influenced by probable future developments rather than by present con

i i n d t o s . I n this period of uncertainty, in which no Power could feel i that it had the unequivoc al support of an ally , ntervention within the internal affairs of a state was admitted . It called forth denunciation on the part of Great Bri tain but did not e provoke resistan ce . No federative policy had been combin d and no demand of its assi stance was made which the B ri tish Parliament would have been b ound in the ri ght of an existing

ri her treaty . Great B tai n consequently, though vigilant in f as watch of European af airs, refrained from interfering so far ff was her interests did not su er . It undoubtedly her policy to unite with no Power until the event or situation calling forth the federated interes ts of states should have developed . “ Russia has long looked to the di smemberment of Turkey as 5 1 STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES aff ordi ng the opportunity of her own most valuable aggran dize ment . Austria is eager to obtain possession of the Slavonian

ri provinces borde ng her own territories , and adj acent to Italy,

. th her favorite obj ect France , connected with e Mediterranean and desirous of acquiring the advantage of commerce , looks with hope and expectation at the independence of Greece ; and Great

Britain interested generally in the protection of commerce , and specially in the maintenance of her own maritime impor

x i tance , must regard with an ous apprehension, every power which seeks to obtain a preponderance in a country so favor

o ably Situated for maritime purposes . Here , there is a c untry e which Russia s eks to magnify in her already vast domain , and

ri di where Aust a , France , and Great Britain have each a rect and urgent interest in restraining and moderating her en 1 r hm n t c oac e s .

w n w Perhaps this as to be the basis of a e federative policy . 1 8 22 In , it was still uncertain and the failure to agree in the Congress is traceable largely to the failure of diplomatists to foresee who the common enemy was to be ; the danger from

Russia being, however, the most zealously guarded .

ri In the sp ng preceding the Congress of Verona , Metternich and the Marquis of Londonderry at a meeting in Germany discussed the Russian situation as related to the Greek r ev ol u w e tion and the Greek war ith Turkey . Th y agreed that in the congress the Powers must not only refuse the inter v ention in the name of the Alliance , but must deny Russia the right of interference . It was definitely understood that the attention of Russia must be turned from the Southeast ?

Great Bri tain was alive to the approaching storm in Europe , and before the Congress had sounded Metternich on Austria ’ s attitude toward Russ ia , and likewise through the Duke of Well i ’ V i l l el e n gton s conferences with Monsieur de , the French foreign minister, had attempted to determine the course France would e adopt toward the Spanish revolution . Here W llington agreed that the Spanish revolution was not a subj ect for the Congress 3 as it was purely a French problem .

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2 1 ,

s I bi d . 29 2 . , I , p ’ Ch a eaub i a C o e d e V e on e Ch a e . t r nd , ngr ss r I , p t r XX ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 5 3

From these two instances it may be seen that the Congress could not be a union of federated allies ; the factions were doomed to be of greater importance than the c ombined Powers . Out of this discussion no two Powers were to be found whose

ri as interests were united on the va ous questions, such the ul Turkish , the Spanish , the Slave trade ; there wo d have been formed the foundation of federative policies . -f 1 8 22 The Congress o Verona, held in the fall of , was not

s r eft only the last of the serie of Italian cong esses, but wh

of ac is greater Significance , the last union of the Powers in

r n c o d a ce with the principles of the Quadruple Alliance . The instructions to Wellington to hold England aloof from inter ference within the internal aff ai rs of any nation were

e a first s nt by Castlere gh in May, The revolution in Spain was recognized as an evil tendency to be steadfastly watched by the allies ; yet the opinion was advanced that there

o was no gr und for believing Europe to be endangered by it . It was hoped that England and the allied countries in confer ence would agree on the subj ect and realize that the purpose of

i n r f r n e the Alliance was not ite e e ce. With resp ct to Spain , “ Castlereagh wrote in the instructions, There seems nothing to t add to or vary , in the course of policy hither o pursued . Solici

r en tude for the safety of the Royal Family , obse vance of our

a em en ts i n g g with Portugal , and a rigid abstinence from any ter f er en ce in the i n ter n al aff ai r s of that country must be con ’ ” 5 i r s d e ed as forming the basis of his Maj esty s policy . In the Turkish question "the war between Greeks and Turks)

Great Britain was instructed to be no party to intervention . Between Turkey and Russ ia the instruc tion declared it to be ’ Great Britain s policy to insist upon the o-bser v an c e of treaties

ri ub and to oppose any breach between the count es . On the s

ect j of the American colonies, England could j oin in no declara

i n str uc tion affirming the rights of Spain . The purport of the

- s tions was non interference on the part of the Alliance . Thi Th di . e policy was retained and enforced by Canning cre t ,

i h to to however , of declaring the pr nciple is ere seen belong

Castlereagh .

4 i i h an d o ei a e Pa e 74 . Br t s F r gn St t p rs , X , D M m r 5 e i o D e a he . 2 8 6 a of e o a um of u i o f o W ll n gt n , sp tc s , IV , p , " r ft r nd Instr ct n l i o th e D uke of Wel n gt n ) . STUDIE S IN THE SO CIAL SCIENCE S

hi s V i l l el e After conservation with in Paris, Wellington ap n ew r plied to the foreign minister, Canning, for any fu ther instructions he might have . The reply gives due credit to the

r policy outlined by the Marquis of Londonder y . “ f i o On the a fa rs of Spain , whether Eur pean or American , I have nothing to communicate to your Grace whi ch can in any degree vary the tenor of the sentiments expressed in the heads of instruction of which your Grace is already in poss ession , or of the conduct which your Grace is therein directed to ob ” 6 serve .

Since the time of the instructions drafted by Londonderry , such occurrences had taken place in the diplomatic intercours e

as with the Powers to suggest that without question , a deter mined proj ect of interference was afoot , and that at the Con

s ul . gre s of Verona measures for action wo d be taken Canning, t therefore , reasser ed the English position in a note to Welling “ i r u ton saying, I am to nst ct your Grace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare, that to any such interference, come ” r t 7 what may , his maj esty will not be a pa y . From time to time suggestions and semi -instructions appear in the communication from the British foreign office to Well i n n gto . They are not significant of any change in policy and s so may be passed without comment . But because of the que tion often raised as to whether Austria would have been per m i t f t ed to interfere in Italian a fairs, had Canning then have been directing the English policy, a reference in his letter to e W llington is noteworthy, in which he refers to the question of w Austria withdra ing her troops , one of the questions for

d i sa discussion at the conferences of Verona . He shows no p proval of the Austrian occupation of the Italian territory . ’ Should it appear your Grace s conviction, that the con ti n u an ce of an Austrian garrison in Pied mont is still abso l utel c h as y necessary, your Gra e only to keep yourself within

ri an d abso the lines of your o ginal instructions , preserve an f ” 8 lute silence in any discussion of Italian af airs . The work before the Congress of Verona in which Great Britain was to take the part of the unyielding opponent to the

S bi d I 3 1 C i i I . 0 a to e o . , , p , " nn ng W ll ngt n )

7 bi . 3 04 . I d , p s i I 0 8 C e o . bi d . 3 a to t , II , p , " nning W ll ng n ) ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 5 5

w contin ental powers , as concerned chiefly with three questions the Span ish situation, the abolition of the slave trade, and the policy to be adopted toward the Spanish American colonies . Of these, the Spanish question became the leading problem , and the t one upon which the Alliance split into three par s . Early in “ the session , Wellington wrote to Canning, It is obvious that i the contest of Verona wi ll fall principally upon me . Pr nce Metternich and Count Bernstorff will remain behind and leave ” 9 to the French ministers and to me to fight the whole battle . As had been anticipated from the conversation between Well i n t n V i l l el e g o and , France brought forward the possibility of o r war with Spain . The army of bse vation maintained by France on the Spanish border, was objected to by Spain , French min i r o ste s stated . But the protection of the French b rder demand

i t o . ed that be retained there, was the French contenti n The revolution in Spain was declared to be a menace to France and might necess itate war at any time . o In view of this situation , Montmorency, the French plenip 1 ° tenti ary read a paper before the Congress in which he r ep r e h ow sented the si tuation as a purely French one . He desired ,

- ever, the sup port of the Alliance in case of war and made three demands of the allies . First , what their attitude would be r e toward the situation , whether they would follow France in t calling their minis ers ; second, what moral aid they would give ; 1 1 and third , what material aid they would guarantee . Alexander , i an x having surrendered h s aggressive policy in the E ast , was

r r o ious to employ his a my in the West . It would tend to ave t p p 1 5 0 ular di sfavor at home with his policy toward Turkey . His , 000 troops were ready to march and it was his purpose to find to use for them . At Vienna, therefore , before going Verona , he had shown his readiness to march them into Piedmont through i Germany, there to await developments in Spain , and to ass st 1 2 France if necessary . d Mettern ich posing as a great frien to Alexander, in a half f hearted manner upheld the Russian of er in public meetings,

e 4 l i Ca i . l bi d . 3 8 e o to , II , p , "W l ngt n nn ng )

Ch a eaub i a C on r és d e V ér o n e . 4 8 . t r nd , g , I , p 1 P 4 M em o a um of th e u ke o f 1 i i h an d o e a e a e . D Br t s F r ign St t p rs , X , p , " r nd l i Wel n gton ) .

1 2 4 o to C a i . e i o D e a h e . 5 7 ell W ll n gt n , sp tc s , I, p , "W ingt n nn ng ) STUDIE S IN THE SO CIAL SCIENCE S

i l a t. but secretly advised France to oppose Wellington , the e first of the ministers to reply to the French overtur s , declared that Great Britain disapproved of any intervention or declara tion by the allies against Spain , and that she looked with almost equal disfavor upon any rupture between France and Spain .

Wellington reviewed the British line of conduct since April , 1 8 20 w , sho ing that it had been the policy of the government to avail itself of every opportunity of recommending to the al l l i es that they abstain from interference in Spain . England , Well i n ton g stated , would decline to engage in any measure on the m 1 4 e hypothetical case as presented by Mont orency . Befor taking

s any action , is would be nece sary for Great Britain to have knowledge of all the circumstances which had occurred between 1 5 the two countries . The three continental Powers in their sep arate replies to the French paper were agreed that they woul d “ act as France should , in respect to their ministers in Sp ain , and would give to France every countenance and assistance sh e " should require the cause for such assistance , and the period and be the mode of giving it, being reserved to specified in a ” 1 6 treaty . It was decided that despatches be written to the respective i ministers of Madr d , in which the courts were to make known e their wish s and intentions to Spain . Having failed to pre vent the Congress from taking action on the Spanish question , and of course refusing to send a similar despatch to the Bri tish

t o envoy at Madrid , Welling on recommended that the P wers confine themselves solely to the external quarrel between France

s and Spain , and that they sugge t nothing with regard to the 1 7 a n internal situation and th t they d o o menace . Great Brit ain then off ered to mediate between France and Spain if France 1 8 e approved . To Franc , however, Great Britain appeared an

con sti tu interested party , one not only in sympathy with the ti on al i sts to of Spain , but directly opposed a strong Bourbon

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STUDIE S IN TH E SO CIAL SCIENCE S

3 The states in actual or in intended negotiation with ” 22 old Sp ain .

n r Chateaubriand , ig oring the distinctions made by Great B it ain, proposed in the Congress to extend the p ri nciple of inter v en ti on to the colonies and to help the ki ng of Spain subdue i . e them No conclusions were reached . In l ght of future vents , however, it may be fair to state that without declaring it , the s o allie underst od that should this situation become more urgent , a congress could be assembled to deliberate upon Spanish Ameri ff can a airs .

s at nn - - At this Congre s, as Vie a and at Aix la Chapelle , the British minister was instructed to urge theallied powers to take active measures against the slave trade . Of the continental powers , France was the one most actively engaged in maritime o w i pursuits, and s it as to France , England f rst put the ques

f a tion of abolition of the slave tra fic . In Paris , Wellington p

r h n p oac ed the French mi ister on this point . He was assured “ that the King and the French government were si ncerely an x

f a ious to put an end to this tra fic , but th t they could devise no measures which could have that eff ect which they could hope to prevail upon the chambers to adopt ; that the measure so often recommended to their attention by the British ambassador at

a ei n e i n am an te c on v i c this court , that of att ching a p f to the l w ” 23 tion of this crime would be inefficient if p as sed into a a . With this little encouragement to a solution of the evil p r ac

ri o tice, the B tish potentiary carried the subj ect int he Con e gress . In the paper read b fore the assembly on the subj ect ,

Wellington denounced France very openly , declaring that he had positive proof that the great contraband trade was carri ed on fl 24 under the protec tion of the French ag. The reason being that “ France is the only one of the great maritime powers of Europe whose government has not entered into the treaties whi ch have been completed with His British Maj esty for giving to certain of the ships of each of the contracting party , a limited power of search and capture of ships engaged in this horrible ” 2 5 r ffi t a s . Wellington proposed that arrangement be made for

2 2 i 2 r u i o t e i o . b . 8 7 o I d , I , p , "Inst ct ns W ll n gt n )

2 3 2 i C a i . bi . 9 5 e o to I d , I , p , "W ll n gt n nn n g )

2 4 Ch a eaub i a C o n r és d e V ér on e . 3 4 . t r nd , g , I, p

25 i i h an d o ei a e P a e . 9 6 . Br t s F r gn St t p rs , X , p ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE AL LIAN CE 5 9

on v en executing the existing law against the trade, or that a c tion be entered into by the Powers to prohibit the importation l of foreign produce from slave trading co onies . This latter u k s ggestions was denounced as stri ing particularly at Portugal .

was Portugal , it claimed, had no representative at the Con gress and had the right of hav ing i ts case heard before such an agreement should be made . The suggestion of an executive council to punish ofi en der s “ was repulsive to the French . This according to the nature of govern ments is the judicial and legislative body that i s called ” 26 u ri pon to decide it . Chateaub and denied the charge that the i “ e. t t French flag covered th s illicit trad He s a ed, To retire the protection of the French flag from foreign indi viduals who make u se the of flag to cover commerce in slaves is entirely just , but France has no need to prohibit that which it has n ever com mi tted 27 . The French people were suspicious of England ’s apparently high moral purpose in urging the abolition . Chateaubriand says, “ e ri i One must admire h re the Ch stlike spir t , the progress of i civ lization , that has been made and continues increasing without ceasing ; but it is a singular thing that this perseverance of the cabinet of Saint James has introduced in all the Congress es t in the midst of questions mos vital and of present interest , this

question incidental and rambling, of the abolition of. the trade in blacks . The English had sold their whites as slaves in

ri Ame ca in a time as near ours as the time of Cromwell . The secret of these contradictions i s to be found in the pri vate i n

r s te ests and mercantile interests of England . This is neces ary to understand in order not to be a dupe of a philanthropy so ” 28 ardent and so lately evident . Ardent as Great B ri tain appeared in behalf of the negro trade sh ewas unwilling to per mit the alliance to declare the slave trade 29 piracy lest it give the Powers too much authority . In the end “ ” the Powers un ited in declaring the trade abominable and in declaring themselves ready to agree to measures judged “ ex

2 6 Ch r i ' a eaub a C on r és d e V ér on e . 3 9 . t nd , g , I , p 27 i b . 3 6 . I d , p 28 bi 3 5 . I d , I , p . 29 l i 4 C i e o D e a hes . 3 3 a to ell o . W l ngt n , sp tc , I, p , " nn n g W ingt n ) STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE S

ecutabl e s in order to a sure the total abolition . It was more of a moral triumph than a practicable This was the last importa nt problem to be brought before

. to the Congress The allies had failed agree as a whole , and, b as factions, had een unable to have common interest through out . The congress closed with France heartily disliking Eng i land , not only because of the Span sh situation , but because of what she considered an absolutely selfish poli cy on the pa rt of

- Great B ritain in the slavetrade. England had united with

r t i Aust ia in distrust of Russia , but Aus ria stood w th France

ff i 0 on the Spanish di icult es . N Power through these conferences was able to find an ally with whom she could be federated for a common purpose. w The strength of the Quadruple Alliance as broken at Verona .

The union failed to become a permanent federation . It may have been that it was doomed to failure because of its wrong foundation , a league of the strong against the weak, rather than

su a uni on of the weak against some formidable power . The e perior pow r , the one which would menace continental Europe, could not yet be clearly foreseen .

- - 3 0 Ch a eaub i a C on r és d e V ér on e . 3 4 1 0 9 . t r nd, g , I, p p CHAPTER V II

THE ECONOM IC BAS IS OF ENGLIS H DIPLO M ACY IN THE CONGRES S

The course of English diplomacy in the period of the Con gr esses cannot be said to have been determined by any one fac

or th i ts tor, the social , the political , e economic . E ach had share in formulating the policy of the British mini sters and rep r esen tati v es abroad . The force of public opinion as a moral force was certainly a direct impulse to the English diplomatists to secure the abolition of the slave trade ; the recognition of

r responsibility to Parliament , the fear of entering into any e l ati on s which might strengthen the opposition and threaten the s f government at home , likewi e had their ef ects , as political forces upon the European relations . Though to no one force may

ri be att buted the sole motive power, yet it is possible for i one to appear predominant . The purpose of th s chapter will the be to trace the economic force, as predominant factor in determining England ’ s foreign relations with the Quadruple

Alliance . The years immediately following the peace were in England

ri a pe od of universal distress . Trade and commerce were dis

ri organized , ag culture and industry had not yet evolved through the industrial and agri cultural revolutions into the n ew sys tem . Millions were unemployed , and to this great mass seek

was 1 8 1 5 1 8 1 6 ing a means of livelihood, there added in , , and

1 8 1 7 o a . , another million , the discharged s ldiers and s ilors The ’ vast maj ori ty of England s working men were star ving ; even the employed were unable to subsist on the l ow wages and were “ ” 1 forced to become recipients of poor relief . Un der such conditions the work of the government was not the to provide primarily for growth of England , nor to seek prestige abroad ; it was not to uphold principles of democracy

1 H 5 74 . 0 amb i e M o e n s tor . r dg , d r i y, X , p 61 STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE S

by the sword . This was the period in which home interests

. w had first to be dealt with The first duty of Parliament as, e e th refor , to establish the stability of the state . Peace had to

r l l ri be maintained at home, iots and a up sings of the masses t had to be quelled . The people had o be led gradually into new

r fields of industry . The discontented were eager f o a demon str ati on h against capital and government, and must from t e ’ state s point of view be given as littl e opportun ity as possible n w e i ts for opposition to the e policies . Parliam nt in extreme caution and timidity was opposed to intertangling foreign rela tions, such as might rouse the nation . In short , the interest with which Parliament watched negotiations abroad was due pri nci pally to the economic condition at home . To trace the influence of economic condi ti ons upon each act i n of the English ministers, or upon every subj ect considered the congresses would be a work impossible as well as i mp r ac ti a l u c b e. S ch an influence must necessarily react on a move u oc ment , a policy, a general situation, rather than p on mere cu r r en ces i , such as the adm ttance of the French King or his ’ representatives to the congresses ; it is wi th the former class that an attempt will be made to relate economic influence . To this belongs the part taken by England in the financial settlement

-Ia- at Aix Chapelle , the opposition to interference in Spain , the stan d of comp arative indiff erence on the question of Naples and

Piedmont , the position of the slave trade , the definite policy of

- i non interference in the Spanish Amer can colonies, the policy of non-intervention towards the Greek revolution in its early stages . The financial depression resulting from the wars l ed to the al cry for retrenchment by the Whigs . The immense nation debt which had steadily accumulated within a f ew years amounted in 1 8 1 5 to pounds . In that year pounds was raised by taxation alone . Even with the war taxes and the l aying aside annually of a sinking fund of over “ the capit al of the debt rose by much more than the diff erence between the amount of money borrowed and the amount ap ” 3 plied to the liquidation of old liabilities . With peace restored h wh o and expenditures reduced , t e people of all classes had

E 2 Z S en cer a ole H or o n l a . 9 . p W lp , ist y f g nd , I , p E 2 3 a o e H s o o l an . 9 . W lp l , i t ry f ng d, I , p ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 63

i s been overwhelmed w th war taxe for a quarter of a century, hoped to obtain relief . The plan of depending upon the Sinking “ n i wa fu d to l quidate the debt s doomed to failure , as the

n h scheme, in fact , depended o t e surplus income of the country

i as being equal to the whole amount of the sink ng fund , and ,

su - the re lt proved , it rarely exceeded one tenth of it . The plan,

a e in a heavily t x d community, with con stituencies clamoring for ” 4 fiscal relief, was certain to fail . The financial situation in addition to th e debt was further 5 embarrassed by the currency situation . With peace it was hoped that the hoarding of money which had resulted from the i e contract on of the currency and fall of prices would ceas , and

ul n o 1 8 1 7-1 8 that money wo d longer leave the country . In , d however , specie continue to be drawn from England in even greater amounts than during the last two years of the war . The deficient harvest of 1 8 1 6 and the very ordi nary one of 1 8 1 7 n ecessitated the importation of foreign grain ; exports and ff e imports fell o . Although France paid the xpenses of the army of occupation , even then , large sums of English money were expended by the army . Subsidies paid by England to her allies duri ng the war gave way to the first years of peace to

I n 1 8 1 6 si x loans . , France raised million francs and again in 1 1 8 7 made provision for thirty millions raised in loans . The rates of exchan ge in these years began to be unfavorable to h England, and in one of the debates on t ecurrency situation the statement was made that : “ If the committee woul d compare the dates of these loan s with the periods at which the rate of exchange began to be unfavorable to towards the country, it would be found fall soon after the ” 6 conclusion of the first French loan . u As a res lt of this financial condition, secret treaties entered “ le into by England were viewed with suspicion, st they require l money for their fulfil ment .

All the great nations were credi tors to England . Through the i great financial houses such as the Rothsch lds and Baring, Eng th land had a most efficient organization for floating eloans . Not only the European countri es but the Americas as well bor

4 b I 3 0 I id , , p . . 5 T i i a E 9 a S o l la nd . 8 . r ll , c ng , VI , p

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i rowed from England . Over ten mill ons were lent and lost in South America between 1 8 22

1 8 23 s Until resumption of specie p ayment had not been made .

1 8 1 7-1 8 In , after long debates on the currency situation , Par l i am en t fixed rates at which notes were to be converted at a 1 8 23 reduced premium until May of , after which all notes were 8 1 8 1 8 ffi i al to be redeemed in gold . In the statement was made o c l y that cash payment would probably not be resumed at the ap

r pointed time , due not to any Situation in the count y itself but “ ” “ to something in foreign relations . What that something ” a t s was , the E arl of Lauderd le s ated, in an oppo ition speech , “ t he "the secretary of the Treasury) had not chosen o explain , but this much appeared that this most important of all measures no longer dep ended upon the decision of the British Parliament but on what might be done by the government. of France or of ” 9 an y other foreign country . Theforeign situation referred to was the approaching con

Ai x - - the to gress of la Chapelle , in which status of France was w be determined . If the armies of France were ithdrawn , Par l i am n t the e foresaw France would want a further loan , and at same time the govern ment was concern ed over the method which would be adopted to pay the present debt. e u In the congr ss of Aix , therefore , England drew p the con

i i n d t o s of the financial settlement . Being the biggest creditor was not only of France but of the other Powers, England left

was to arrange the settlement with France . It as the banking houses of England would have demanded . Castlereagh , having was in mind the situation of the currency in England , worried during the congress as to whether the plan of payment to Hope , e Baring and Company, a private firm , would be acc ptable to

ri the B tish Secretary .

Ai x - — In the congresses succeedi ng that of la Chapelle , the

financial distress was ever a check in foreign relations . The e congresses were looked upon as a needless exp nse , and at a time when the government was almost bankrupt , when taxes were

excessive , even this unimportant item was denounced as needless

“ ’ s extravagance . The result of his "Castlereagh ) policy is this,

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STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE S

a i w period of the Congresses, the capit l st class as in a small mi n or i t n y, its influence can be traced in foreig relations . It acted the t with Tory party ; it suppor ed the landed interests, and its

n interests were in tur supported by the Tories . l Such were the genera conditions of England . The way in which they react upon the foreign relations will be seen in the policies adopted by the British mi nisters in dealing with the n most sig ificant problems confronting the congres ses . I n the intervention of Austria in Naples and Piedmont , Eng t te bu . land would remonstra , not forcibly oppose English capi tal was not invested in the Ita lian prov inces to any considerable l ff amount . Trade with Italy wou d be little a ected whether the t monarch were deposed or res ored .

v Austria was determined upon inter ention . She could speak

own with authority for, in addition to her immense army , Rus ’ e s sia s sev ral hundred thousand troop s would assist if neces ary . England financially was in n o condition to oppose an aggr es ta h sive policy within a s te in which s e was little concerned .

r Furthermore , there were milita y revolts in England at the nl time , and the loyal troops could not be spared abroad . The o y ff e icient remonstrance would be by arms, and England was in

a no condition to maintain such stand . Her statesmen could — maintain such a principle, the principle of non interference in ul th n ot this case . The form ation of e principle , however, did necessarily mean that it would be maintained . the In addition to lack of funds, and to the general opinion h e that where England received no benefit , s should remain pas ff u sive , the e ects of the French Revolution upon the E ropean t s ates, still clearly pictured in the English mind, tended to make the government conser vative. C astlereagh shared the opinion of the Tories and of the

Whigs who had temporarily j oined them, that there was danger of revolution at home . He was not certain but that revolution i n any state threatened the status of other nations . Although the governm ent shared with the European powers this fear e of revolution , with England the question of conomic inter est i n cas es of nation in revolution was first of all considered . When Spain asked for the aid of the Alliance to restore to “ her the revolting American colonies, England refused . The ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 67 four al lied powers and France had protested against the seizur e

t to . of Monte Video, but otherwise Spain had been lef herself Great Britain seemed to have more to gain than to lose by the r insurrection . The revolted colonies were open to her comme ce and by weakening Spain they had strengthened the maritime su r em ac di p y of Great Britain . Great Britain was willing to me ate ” 1 1 on condition that Spain would make reasonable concessions .

Spain was unwilling . England had for centuries suff ered under the Spanish trade i e to ri monopoly . If the colon es w re reduced Sp anish autho ty,

England feared the reenforcement of the old colonial system .

Therefore , instead of upholding the principle of legitimacy, a

l i n policy of the al iance, English diplomatists yielded to the ter ests wn of their commercial classes . It was well kno that agents in the coloni es had raised loans and engaged soldiers in

ai d i n su r L ondon , that regiments had left England to the t of r gents , that ships wi h cargoes military stores cleared f om Spanish American ports and that the mercantile interests favored 1 2 revolution .

e Ai x - - e re In the Congr ss of la Chap lle , Castle agh showed a comprehension of the English commercial interests in his state “ r e ment , This reference to intervention in the colonies at once i vives the whole colon al policy system , and even if it were f su ficient to satisfy our interested views, it would reduce the colonies to that state of dependence upon the mother country to which it is impos sible to presuppose that any of them will in ” 1 4 o di the future submit . The discussion in the C ngresses of me a tion between Spain and her colonies, England prevented . But during thes e years British agents were attempting to negoti ate 1 5 1 8 20 a favorable commercial treaty with Spain . From until the time of the independence of the colonies, the trade relations between Spain and Great Bri tain played aconspicuous part in 1 8 20 to the diplomatic relations . In a despatch of January

Castlereagh , Sir Henry Wellesley states , “ Y our lordship wi ll see by my despatches that the Duke of San Fernando complains of the frequency of my representations

1 1 - i E o i k an d o h e i h am 1 8 1 1 3 7 P o li a l Hi o o la n . 1 9 0 . Br dr c F t r ng , , t c st ry f ng d , p 1 2 C H 21 3 21 4 am b i e M o er n i o . . r dg , d st ry, X , p p , 1 4 C C 9 0 a e ea h o e o e c e . . stl r g , rr sp nd n , XII , p 1 5 C 4 e i o o es o en e . 6 1 . W ll n gt n , rr p nd c , I , p STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE S u mm pon co ercial subj ects . In other respects we are upon ver y ” 1 “ good terms . Suspicious that an attempt would be made to reconquer the e colonies for Spain , aft r the invasion of Spain by France i n 1 8 22 , Canning entered into negotiations with the United States m t inis er to London, Richard Rush, suggesting j oint action against the European Alliance extending i ts powers to the American continent . The result was the Monroe Doctrine on the part of the United States and the recogn ition of the in dependence of the colonies a year later on the part of Great B ritain . Canning realizing the commercial advantage to Great B ritain made the “ m n ot remark, Sp anish A erica is free , and if we do mismanage h ” 1 6 s e . our matters sadly, is English

I n a r e r esen urging the abolition of the slave tr de, English p tati v es were actuated without doubt more by the popular cry f m n against slave tra fic , and the de and for this social reform , tha

s t by economic motives, but in the mind of the European sta es s men , the proposals made at the various congres es for a gen ’ eral abolition were viewed in the light of England s self i n

r est te .

France bel n g the country most concerned in the abolition ques

to e. tion , was the one England sought to win over the caus

: Three modes were proposed by Canning persuasion , coercion, he and interest . Of the means of coercion mentioned the possi i was b l i ty of having the Alliance declare it piracy, but perfectly confident France could not concede to B ri tish cruisers the right 1 7 was of visit and capture of the French ships . Nor Canning himself desirous that such a method should be put into p r ac

wa . tice , it s a suggestion rather than a desired result “ AS to letting the Holy Alliance declare it piracy, it would be to give them an authority, which they might turn to worse ” 1 8 purposes . was t A second mode of coercion , suggested by Canning, tha of forbiddi ng the importation of produce from the colonies of was t states permitting the slave trade . He also quite cer ain m that Europe would not accept . England, it is quite clear fro

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o l e r the f l owing note to Wilb rfo ce, could not accede to such a proposition “ Y ou are surprised th at the Duke of Welli ngton h as n ot been instructed to say that we will give up the trade with Brazil

am "for that is, I afraid, the amount of giving up the export o of her sugar and cott n) if Austria, Russia, and Prussia will w prohibit her produce . In fair reasoning e have a right to be surpri sed for we ought to be ready to make sacrifices when we ask them and I am for making them ; but who dares to promise n ni such a one as this, without full k owledge of the opi ons of the ” commercial part of the nation ? 2° At Aix-la- Chapelle the plan of England met wi th counter

i ss proposals to wh ch England could not accede . The Ru ian plan , for the establi shment of an international board of control on

n the West coast of Africa with an inter ational fleet , commis si on ed s n s to suppre s the trade, met with o succe s, neither did suggestions for the establishment of an international fleet in the

Medi terranean against the Barbary pirates . “ w un The sea power of Russia as a dangerous, because an ’ n n s k ow , quantity, the activities of the Czar agents in Spain hi s and Italy had excited the suspicions of ultimate aims , and Great Britain refused to be a party to a plan which would have involved the establishment of Russian warships on the M edi ter ” 21 ran ean . th In e Congress of Verona , England again pressed the subj ect a was of abolition . Here the failure to carry the me sure due , “ n sed uousl Ca ning states, partly from the nations y inculcated by the powers havi ng colonies that self-interest n ow mingles with our humanity and that by our persevering eff orts to bring n ow about the aboli tion in other countries, we are seeking to infli ct upon the colonial pos sessions of our rivals a portion of the evils which the partial abolition is al leged to have brought ” 22 upon our own . sub England, instead of approaching the Congress upon this di fi er en t j cet , had the al ternative of negotiating separately with

ri was t s count es . This matter , in fac , attempted in several ca es, but the practice of purchasing the recogn ition of this ev il by the

20 1 bi . I 4 C i i be o e Oc t. 3 1 d . 75 a to , , p , " nn n g W l rf rc , , 21 C H 20 amb e M o er s o . . . ridg , d n i t ry, X p 22 C 2 e i o o e o d e e . 3 3 . W ll ngt n , rr sp n nc , I, p STUDIE S IN THE SO CIAL SCIENCE S diff erent countries entailed an expense upon the nation whi ch i 1 8 1 8 was openly cr ticised . In Great Britain agreed to pay u n Spain p o nds, in co sequence of Spain agreein g to

ff r the abolition of the trade . At this date, the su e ing of the poor in England was intense, and the opinion was expressed in Parliament that the pounds might be more advantage ousl r n y disposed of in this count y . It would fur ish the means 23 8 000 i sum 5 0 of giving to indiv duals the of pounds each . Seeki ng foreign channels for benevolent purposes was looked up e i on as fals human ty .

Abolition through single treaties was therefore impractical , and resort was had toward making it a general European ques tion . Owing to the pressure at home for the suppression of the

f wa slave tra fic , abolition s strongly advocated by England in the congresses . But the commercial interests of England were too much at variance with those of France to permit a final solu tion of the problem .

was i It upon a situation of l ttle importance itself, yet of greatest concern to England that the British policy so diverged from the European interests as to lead to the ultimate with ’ d r awal of England s representatives from the conferences of the allied Powers . 1 8 20 With the overthrow of the Spanish monarchy in , Eng l and could hope for a liberal commercial agreement . When , therefore, at Verona , the Congress determined to intervene in ’ behalf of monarchy , England s interests and those of her allies

i n were conflict . When neither side would yield the breach in the Quadru ple Alliance was completed .

When the Congress met, Metternich proposed a process verbal

r specifying the cases in which the powers should inte vene , but the Duke flatly refused to subscribe . This was the end of the di li e Congress . The fferences between the Al anc and Great i Britain were proclaimed to the world, and Cann ng wrote to “ Frere soon after, The history of all I could tell in the words “ or rather in the substitution of one word for another, for alli ” ” ” 24 ance read England and you have the clue to my policy . The French armies were marched into Spain and the absolute monarchy was restored . England , though in the p osition of an

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ff b - t indi erent y stander, kept close watch . Jus as in the Austrian intervention in Naples, the British warships appeared in the o i Bay of Naples with secret rders, and so at this time , the Brit sh ff h fleet , always prepared, was stationed o t e coast of Portugal wi th the ostensible purpose of pres erving Por tugal from foreign

was i n invasion and aggression . It a country in which British vestments were to be protected . r e Of the important problems before the Congresses , there

a n . m i s the Greek situation In the Greek revolution , Russia for i obv ous reasons espoused the cause against Turkey . The Greeks were unquestionably des er ving of the sympathy and aid of

wa r Europeans, which s denied them as a esult of the action of But was the Congresses. British commerce in the Black Sea flourishing and commercial interests could perm it of no inter v en ti on s which might weaken that trade , or make Ru sia domi e nant in the E as tern waters . The appreh nsion of this danger i s expressed by Wellington in a note to Canning dated at Verona . “ I have explained to the Count "Nesselrode) that it was i m possible for Great Britain to adopt or to attempt to enforce ‘ upon the Porte the principle of making th e Bl ack S ea another ” 25 t Baltic , or of the Bosphorus a Sound . The question uni ed

Austria and Great Britain, Great Britain agreeing with Metter “ nich to let the revolution burn itself out beyond the pale of civilization .

Aside from the danger of Russian supremacy in the E ast , ’ there was another reas on for England s reticence to succor the

Greek cause . “ Should webe led by any fal se impulse of chivalrous ben ev o lence to participate in the struggle itself, we commit , and there by impair our authori ty ; we abandon the position in which o we might hereafter do mos t go d, and may bring the danger

r of a foreign str uggle home to ou own shores , and to our own ’ 26 institution s . AS 1 8 22 late then as , liberal ideas were discountenanced in

England as forerunners of revolution . About five years later ,

1 11 however, the British fleet again loomed up the waters of a e country in revolt . English capital in Gre ce was in need of protection .

25 C 23 e i o to Ca . e o o e o e e . 5 W llingt n , rr sp nd nc , I , p , "W ll n gt n nning )

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e With the failure of England to agre with her allies at Verona, ’ England s representation in the councils of the Quadr uple Alli

wa ance s at an end . She had entered the Alliance and had acceded to the government of Europe by congresses in the be lief that English interests would suff er without representatives to in the European councils guard them . Emerging from the war as the greatest European power, England had reason to suppose she would dominate the Al liance as she had done the

- - e Powers against Napoleon . After Aix la Chapelle, her influ nce n ew r had passed , due largely to the economic elations between

m n o herself and the European states . Her ar ies were longer d n e . eed d in Europe, her subsidies belonged to the war perio

1 s After 1 8 8 there was little need of English loan . No longer did economic obligations necessitate a dependent attitude upon e e Great Britain . With economic indep ndence secur d, the Powers were at liberty to oppose British interests .

STUDIE S IN THE SO CIAL SCIENCE S

was Quadruple Alliance itself not at that time di ssolved . Though

an i its power in Europe pol tics was broken then, it existed i n r l 1 8 48 theo y unti . e ’ Aft r Verona, England s policy rapidl y diverged from that of the continent and she gradually developed her policy of i so lation or rather returned to it . Metternich wrote that the British government seemed to be devoting itself to a system of complete isolation but that he did n ot believe such a p o ’ i u s ni e s tio pos ible . Unquestionably, Can ng s purpos after “ Verona was to hold England aloof from the continent . Hence a forw rd, England must be content to move steadily on in her ” 1 wn o orbit . Perhaps the chi ef purpose of the Alliance was the main ten an ce e but of peace in Europ , not only between the Powers

hi to wit n the individual states . In order uphold the existing i order, the All ance adopted a policy of repression and succeeded

l a . in que ling liberal outbursts in Naples , Piedmont and Sp in In t other states it checked such movements . The right to in erfere e was bas d upon the theory that if peace was to be maintained, order must be upheld ; consequently revolution whether l ocal

- or national must be thwarted as dangerous to the general peace . di s England, the most liberal member of the Alliance , though f approving o suppress ion in the name of the Powers , yet per m i tted ri it , and through the pe od of the congresses held the Opinion that every European country was endangered by revo lutions in a neighboring state . The p ri mary purpose of the various up risings of the period l was was the desire for reform and iberty . This progress sup o pressed by the Alliance . But in sp ite of the p wer of the Alli i r ei m e ance and ts apparent success in supporting the old g , the spirit of discontent smouldered for a f ew years and then burst i 2 1 48 n 1 8 0 8 3 0 1 8 . forth the revolutions of , , and The Alliance h ad succeeded in retarding for a time the social , political and i i n econom cal development of Europe, but failed to check the

vi e table progress toward reform . The All iance cannot be condemned f or its repressive mea Th i e. e sures when viewed n the light of a general peac results, r however , must be branded as a failure , for through reactiona y

1 h 2 M i h to e i o . e i o D e a t e . 0 7 e e W ll ngt n , sp c s , II , p , " tt rn c W ll n gt n ) ENGLAND AN D THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 75

i an measures mak ng reform impossible, it invited resist ce, in the form of revolution . ul ask Considering the situation in a broader aspect , one sho d himself whether the policy of the Quadru ple Alliance was r e actionary because domi nated by the narrow conservatism of M i etternich, or whether after all in ts policy it had not touched on t up a more fundamental principle , namely, tha any inter national organization for the m ai n tai n en ce of peace either be tween states or wi thin the individual states would not of n eces t al ty be reac ionary . BIBLIOGRAPHY

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