UNIVERSITY O F IO W A STU DIES S TU D I ES IN TH E S O C IAL S C I EN C ES . D . d t F E HAY ES PH . E N , , i or VO LU M E VII NU M BER 1 Th e D i p l o m a ti c R el a ti o n s o f E n g l a n d w i t h t h e Q uad ru ple Alli an c e 1 8 1 5 - 1 8 3 0 BY M Y RNA BO Y C E PU BLIS H ED B TH E U NIV ERSI I OW A I Y TY , C TY CONTENTS CHAPTER ’ I ENGLAND S ENTRANCE INTO THE QU ADRU PLE ALLIANCE 5 II TH E GENERAL POLICY OF CASTLEREAGH AN D CANNING TOWARD THE INTERPRETATION OF THE QU ADRU PLE ALLIANCE III TH E CONGRESS OF AIX LA - CHAPEL LE IV TH E CONGRESS OF TROPPAU V TH E CONGRESS AT LAIBACH VI TH E CONGRESS OF VERONA VII TH E E CONOM IC BASIS OF THE ENGLI SH DIPLOM ACY IN THE CONGRESS VIII SU M M ARY BIBLIOGRAPHY CHAPTER I ENGLAND’ S ENTRANCE INTO THE QU ADRU PLE ALLIANCE 1 8 1 5 -1 8 3 0 With the overthrow of Nap oleon the victors of France were confronted with the task of reconstructing the map of Europe and of restoring peace and order . For this purpose the Con e gress of Vienna was assembl d, and a year later the Quadruple was e Alliance formed, d stined to become the most power ful concert of powers ever maintained in time of peace . A e i discussion of the origin, character, purpos s , and just fication of such a union arouses numerous questions that demand con sideration and solution . hi o of Was t s d minating alliance , this strong concert England , i s s 1 8 1 5 Austr a, Ru sia, and Prus ia, in the period from to 1 8 3 0 s n e , neces ary to the reconstructio of Europ following the Nap oleonic r egi m e? Was it an acknowledgment of the failure of the Congress of Vienn a to establish order and th e regard ’ ? of one nation for another s rights Was this Alliance , then , a t e logical outgr of the Vienna conferenc s , or was its need e an d i ts fores en in the dreary days of desolation , form gradually evolved ? Was it a great machine of repression or instrument of war projected into time of peace ? Did England see in such an alliance a noble means of guidi ng aright an erring nation ? Was she actuated by selfish motives in casting as ide the policy - f e of Pitt , the policy of non inter rence , or was she forced to a realization that what concerned Europe was of consequence to ul - f England , that she co d no longer be a self suf icing na ti on al uni t ? For forty years followi ng th e Second Treaty of Paris, the peace of Europe was steadfastly maintained wi th a an I S out single encounter between y of the powers . this a justification for the reactionary character of the alliance ? In order to answer thes e questions and to under stand the origin of the Alliance together with the work confronting it, 5 STUDIE S IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES t the work left undone by the Congress of Vienna, its Shor or be as e . comings failures, should p sed in bri f review I n that assembly of crowned heads and di ctating diplomat i sts r , powerful though the Czar Alexander and P ince Metter b nich were, the responsi ility of adjusting the infinite disputes e should necessarily have fallen to England, that mistr ss of the ’ seas who overwhelmed Napoleon s s chemes for Afr ica and Asia ; it was English money subsidizing the armies of Austria and Russia which enabled them to continue in the field ; it ’ ’ was England s army, finally, and England s general that con the quered the European foe . Moreover, England , alone among powers against France , because of her geographical location and her general foreign relations could have been a disinter ested force and an equitable judge in decidi ng upon conti n en tal readjustments . Furthermore , the English people , among Whom for . the decade past there had been developing a moral sense as a nation, a comprehension that out of the French Revolution there had emerged certain rights of man , expected and rightfully demanded that the settlement of Eu rope be made upon a higher basis than the principle of l egi ti l aw e . macy, that it be founded upon a high r moral Lord Castlereagh himself recognized this new attitude not only of 1 8 1 4 England but of Europ e . In a letter written in May , , to “ i s i m ossi bl e Lord Bentinck he said, It , p not to perceive a great moral change coming on in Europe, and that the prin i l e c p s of freedom are in full operation . The danger is, that the transition may be too sudden to ripen into anything likely m ” 1 to ake the world better or happ ier . Lord Castlereagh , was as then , not oblivious to this change , but a reactionary failed to respond to the awakened era . And so in the Con er gress , England was content to take an inferior part , to p “ ” i r mit Metternich , that mind wh ch never er ed , to be the dominating personality . Surely there was in the Polish question a right to be up held and a principle of justice upon which to act . But in this the op portunity for England to interfere was allowed to p ass by . “ Up to the period of the Congress of Vienna , no British 1 C h C C e ea h to Wm 8 a o . i k a e ea o e o e X . 1 l L e e . stl r g , rr sp nd nc , p " st r g rd B nt nc ) ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 7 n et r ackn owl ed statesma had ever s his hand to an inst ument , g a . i n g as valid acts, the two partitions of Pol nd Had the British plenipotentiary foun ded his objecti on s up on this prin i l r c p e, had he positively efused to commit his Government to t he d any such acknowledgemen , and had insiste on the erec e a tion of an independent Polish state, he would have be n p l ss p aud ed by the whole of Europe , whilst Austria and Pru ia would not only have not opp osed it , but , on the contrary, ” 2 would have acquiesced in it with pleasure . “ as Backed by such powerful support, well as by the voice of public opinion throughout Europe , it is more than probable the that he "Castler eagh ) might have been successful , but mo o ment when he gave up the principle , and t ld the emperor that he was not indi spo sed to witness even with satisfaction that his Imperial Majesty should receive a liberal an d important hi aggrandi zement on s Polish frontier, and that it was to the n d degree a the mode to which he alone obj ected, he threw away hi ” 3 the only weapon w ch he could successf ul l y wield . That Lord Castlereagh was not taking this moral stand was felt ff . r n . by the Under Sec etary of Foreig A airs, Mr Cook He ex “ h or ted hi s superior to fling aside the treaties and to declare that nothing should induce Gr eat Britain to ackn owledge the ” 4 validi ty of those acts . Again England failed to appreciate an ideal for which she E i s had been fighting, the building up of B ritish mpire . It i n true that in the Congress and the Treaty of Paris, England made important acquisitions, and certainly expanded very ma teri l l a y in her colonial possessions, keeping islands of no con sequence to the imperial ideal . It was merely acquisitions of land regardl ess of its u se to England . That not even Liver pool was alive to the colonial situation is clear from the fol “ lowing extract from a letter to Castlereagh : We have Guada loupe and the Saintes in our hands, which have in fact been conquered . We have no desire for any more colonies, but it may not be amiss to cons ider them as fair pledges for the just ” 5 claims of our own subj ects . 2 C n i T 4 a e o Geo e a an d hi s m e . 3 5 . St p l t n , rg n ng i s , p 8 a le o Geo e Ca i and hi s Ti me 3 5 4 . St p t n , rg nn ng s , p 4 I b 3 5 6 . id, p 5 C C C e a h t 5 a le ea h o es onde c e . 4 8 L e o ol to a tl e Oc . st r g , rr p n , XI, p , " iv rp s r g , , STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE S s Then , too, in the Eastern que tion, concerning the unrest of the Balkan states, England could without doubt have used di her influence to allay scord, indeed even to settle definitely s di d the position and rights of those state in Europe .