F a S T Update Tagikistan Semiyannual Risk Assessment September 2005 to February 2006
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F A S T Update Tajikistan Semi-annual Risk Assessment September 2005 to February 2006 T S A F © swisspeace FAST Update Tajikistan | September 2005 to February 2006 | Page 2 Contents Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) 3 Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (average weighted) 5 Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (average weighted) 7 Crime- and Drug-related Events (average weighted) 9 Appendix: Description of indicators used 11 The FAST International Early Warning Program 12 FAST Update Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp Contact FAST International: Country Expert: Phone: +41 31 330 12 06 Prof. Shirin Akiner Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:[email protected] www.swisspeace.org/fast © swisspeace FAST Update Tajikistan | September 2005 to February 2006 | Page 3 Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 127 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: • The graph records a consistently high level of Country Stability. The intensity of Conflictive Events varied slightly during the reporting period, with a decrease in November and December 2005 and a subsequent increase in January and February 2006. • On the surface, Tajikistan was remarkably unaffected by the transfer of responsibility for protection of the state borders from Russian to Tajik command. This process, initiated in October 2004, was formally accomplished a year later (see graph for Conflictive and Cooperative International Events). Symbolically, it was an important assertion of sovereignty. However, the Tajik troops were chronically under-resourced, lacking basic mobile equipment. Some support continued to be provided by Russian military advisers and by Russian units (including air crews) who were stationed elsewhere in the country. Yet border security was inevitably reduced, particularly in the south, where the long porous border with Afghanistan was constantly being breached by drug traffickers and other criminals. • Initially, Tajik officials insisted that their troops were capable of protecting the border on their own, but in January 2006 it was admitted that there has been a drastic fall in drug seizures. Thus, the volume of cross border trafficking is masked by falling levels of detection. Nevertheless, the impact on Tajik society is perceptible. One consequence has been the rise in street crime, particularly amongst juveniles. President Rahmonov has described this trend as ‘alarming’. There is also a growing pattern of addiction amongst the youth; the main concentration of registered young drug users (some 7,500) is in Dushanbe. Concomitantly, there is a rise in the incidence of HIV/AIDS. Another consequence of the greater availability of illegal narcotics is that law enforcement officials themselves are increasingly participating in drug dealing (see graph on Crime- and Drug-related Events). • Border issues aside, Tajikistan’s external relations during this period were stable, characterized by a cooperative, non-confrontational approach. Traditional ties with Russia were carefully balanced by links with the USA and other Western states, as well as by rapprochement with Iran. Of particular importance was the improvement in relations with neighboring Uzbekistan. By the end of 2005, agreement had been reached on the delineation of 80 percent of the joint border; remaining demarcation disputes were being addressed by an intergovernmental Tajik-Uzbek commission. The Uzbek authorities also finally started to clear the mines that they had planted in the border zone some five years previously. In January, Uzbekistan acceded to the Eurasian Economic Community of which Tajikistan has been a member since its inception in 2000 (other members are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Belarus); this move is likely to further strengthen ties between the two countries. © swisspeace FAST Update Tajikistan | September 2005 to February 2006 | Page 4 • Domestically, Tajikistan showed few signs of instability. There was continuing confrontation between the state authorities and alleged Islamic extremists, but there was little indication of widespread popular support for the latter. Similarly, the harsh sentence that was handed down to Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, one of the leaders of the secular opposition, did not provoke the mass protests that some had predicted. One reason for the relatively low incidence of friction is undoubtedly the strong control exercised by the state authorities. However, there are also more positive factors. The government has presided over a surprisingly strong economic recovery. International financial institutions have been impressed by Tajikistan’s macroeconomic performance and by the progress that has been made in such areas as poverty reduction and public spending management. In recognition of these achievements, in December the IMF approved 100 percent relief on Tajikistan’s outstanding debt; the World Bank announced similar measures a few weeks later. • Progress with major infrastructural projects has also helped to boost confidence and generate a sense of optimism. In January President Rahmonov called for work to be accelerated on the hydroelectric power stations Roghun and Sangtuda-1 (both projects of the Russian company Unified Energy System, currently nearing completion) and Sangtuda-2 (project recently inaugurated, anticipated completion date 2009-2010; U$ 180 million of the finance to be provided by Iran, U$ 40 million by Tajikistan). He likewise highlighted the need to complete construction of the Anzob tunnel (finance provided by Iran, work undertaken by Iranian Sober company), also the Shahriston tunnel (finance under discussion with Chinese construction companies) and Shar-Shar tunnel. When finished, these projects would greatly improve all-year-round road access between different parts of the country. • However, despite the government’s efforts to encourage economic development and to improve the business environment, at grassroots level there were still difficulties. According to a recent survey of 450 Tajik businessmen, conducted jointly by the International Labor Organization and Tajikistan’s national association of small and medium-sized businesses, high taxation and bribery were felt to impede growth; unofficial payments to state officials were a particular source of grievance because they led to unfair competition. When asked about state interference in the private sector, 10 percent felt that it had fallen, but most respondents thought there had been no change. • Tajikistan looks set to maintain a high level of stability in the near future. Prudent economic policies, bolstered by investment in major infrastructural improvements, are generating a significant rate of growth. In the longer term, however, poor standards of security along the border with Afghanistan could create serious problems. Levels of addiction and attendant health problems seem set to rise, as do a range of criminal activities, from corrupt practices among officials to violent street crime. © swisspeace FAST Update Tajikistan | September 2005 to February 2006 | Page 5 Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (average weighted) Average number of reported events per month: 127 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: • The graph depicts a moderate, but stable level of Cooperative International Events throughout the reporting period. The level of Conflictive International Events was also moderate. In January there was a slight peak in Cooperative International Events, but this soon subsided. There was a corresponding minor decrease in Conflictive International Events until January 2006, but in February, the level reached the same intensity it had at the beginning of the reporting period. • The modest level of Cooperative International Events does not fully reflect the positive developments that characterized Tajikistan’s foreign relations during the period under review. The dominant issue was border protection. In 1992 the Tajik government concluded an agreement with Moscow whereby Russian troops would guard Tajikistan’s borders. However, in October 2004, by mutual consent, it was decided that there should be a phased transfer of responsibility to the Tajik authorities (see FAST Update 2004/4). The ceremonial transfer of the control of the Tajik-Afghan and Tajik-Chinese borders sections to the Tajik authorities was officially marked on 19 October 2005, though the operational handover had already been completed somewhat earlier. However, as agreed, Russian military advisers (the full complement to number 280 officers) would be attached to the newly formed Tajik Committee for the Protection of the State Border. Moreover, units of the Russian Federal Security Service’s border guard service and the 201st motorized rifle division, as well as two helicopter crews would remain in Tajikistan and in emergencies would provide assistance. • Nevertheless, there were many weaknesses in the Tajik forces’ operational capacity, especially regarding essential equipment such as helicopters, communications and armored vehicles. Of particular concern was the long southern border with Afghanistan, since this was one of the main routes for the trans-shipment of illegal narcotics (see graph on Crime- and Drug-related Events). Senior Tajik officials openly admitted that there were some stretches of the Afghan-Tajik border (e.g. in the Shuroobod section) for which no effective surveillance could be provided. President Rahmonov’s appeal