F a S T Update Tagikistan Semiyannual Risk Assessment September 2005 to February 2006

F A S T Update

Tajikistan

Semi-annual Risk Assessment

September 2005 to February 2006 T

FAST Update

Tajikistan | September 2005 to February 2006 | Page 2

Contents

Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) 3

Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (average weighted) 5

Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (average weighted) 7

Crime- and Drug-related Events (average weighted) 9

Appendix: Description of indicators used 11

The FAST International Early Warning Program 12

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Contact FAST International: Country Expert: Phone: +41 31 330 12 06 Prof. Shirin Akiner Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:[email protected] www.swisspeace.org/fast

FAST Update

Tajikistan | September 2005 to February 2006 | Page 3

Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative)

Average number of reported events per month: 127 Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment: • The graph records a consistently high level of Country Stability. The intensity of Conflictive Events varied slightly during the reporting period, with a decrease in November and December 2005 and a subsequent increase in January and February 2006. • On the surface, Tajikistan was remarkably unaffected by the transfer of responsibility for protection of the state borders from Russian to Tajik command. This process, initiated in October 2004, was formally accomplished a year later (see graph for Conflictive and Cooperative International Events). Symbolically, it was an important assertion of sovereignty. However, the Tajik troops were chronically under-resourced, lacking basic mobile equipment. Some support continued to be provided by Russian military advisers and by Russian units (including air crews) who were stationed elsewhere in the country. Yet border security was inevitably reduced, particularly in the south, where the long porous border with Afghanistan was constantly being breached by drug traffickers and other criminals. • Initially, Tajik officials insisted that their troops were capable of protecting the border on their own, but in January 2006 it was admitted that there has been a drastic fall in drug seizures. Thus, the volume of cross border trafficking is masked by falling levels of detection. Nevertheless, the impact on Tajik society is perceptible. One consequence has been the rise in street crime, particularly amongst juveniles. President Rahmonov has described this trend as ‘alarming’. There is also a growing pattern of addiction amongst the youth; the main concentration of registered young drug users (some 7,500) is in Dushanbe. Concomitantly, there is a rise in the incidence of HIV/AIDS. Another consequence of the greater availability of illegal narcotics is that law enforcement officials themselves are increasingly participating in drug dealing (see graph on Crime- and Drug-related Events). • Border issues aside, Tajikistan’s external relations during this period were stable, characterized by a cooperative, non-confrontational approach. Traditional ties with Russia were carefully balanced by links with the USA and other Western states, as well as by rapprochement with Iran. Of particular importance was the improvement in relations with neighboring Uzbekistan. By the end of 2005, agreement had been reached on the delineation of 80 percent of the joint border; remaining demarcation disputes were being addressed by an intergovernmental Tajik-Uzbek commission. The Uzbek authorities also finally started to clear the mines that they had planted in the border zone some five years previously. In January, Uzbekistan acceded to the Eurasian Economic Community of which Tajikistan has been a member since its inception in 2000 (other members are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Belarus); this move is likely to further strengthen ties between the two countries.

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Tajikistan | September 2005 to February 2006 | Page 4

• Domestically, Tajikistan showed few signs of instability. There was continuing confrontation between the state authorities and alleged Islamic extremists, but there was little indication of widespread popular support for the latter. Similarly, the harsh sentence that was handed down to Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, one of the leaders of the secular opposition, did not provoke the mass protests that some had predicted. One reason for the relatively low incidence of friction is undoubtedly the strong control exercised by the state authorities. However, there are also more positive factors. The government has presided over a surprisingly strong economic recovery. International financial institutions have been impressed by Tajikistan’s macroeconomic performance and by the progress that has been made in such areas as poverty reduction and public spending management. In recognition of these achievements, in December the IMF approved 100 percent relief on Tajikistan’s outstanding debt; the World Bank announced similar measures a few weeks later. • Progress with major infrastructural projects has also helped to boost confidence and generate a sense of optimism. In January President Rahmonov called for work to be accelerated on the hydroelectric power stations Roghun and Sangtuda-1 (both projects of the Russian company Unified Energy System, currently nearing completion) and Sangtuda-2 (project recently inaugurated, anticipated completion date 2009-2010; U$ 180 million of the finance to be provided by Iran, U$ 40 million by Tajikistan). He likewise highlighted the need to complete construction of the Anzob tunnel (finance provided by Iran, work undertaken by Iranian Sober company), also the Shahriston tunnel (finance under discussion with Chinese construction companies) and Shar-Shar tunnel. When finished, these projects would greatly improve all-year-round road access between different parts of the country. • However, despite the government’s efforts to encourage economic development and to improve the business environment, at grassroots level there were still difficulties. According to a recent survey of 450 Tajik businessmen, conducted jointly by the International Labor Organization and Tajikistan’s national association of small and medium-sized businesses, high taxation and bribery were felt to impede growth; unofficial payments to state officials were a particular source of grievance because they led to unfair competition. When asked about state interference in the private sector, 10 percent felt that it had fallen, but most respondents thought there had been no change. • Tajikistan looks set to maintain a high level of stability in the near future. Prudent economic policies, bolstered by investment in major infrastructural improvements, are generating a significant rate of growth. In the longer term, however, poor standards of security along the border with Afghanistan could create serious problems. Levels of addiction and attendant health problems seem set to rise, as do a range of criminal activities, from corrupt practices among officials to violent street crime.

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Tajikistan | September 2005 to February 2006 | Page 5

Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (average weighted)

Average number of reported events per month: 127 Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment: • The graph depicts a moderate, but stable level of Cooperative International Events throughout the reporting period. The level of Conflictive International Events was also moderate. In January there was a slight peak in Cooperative International Events, but this soon subsided. There was a corresponding minor decrease in Conflictive International Events until January 2006, but in February, the level reached the same intensity it had at the beginning of the reporting period. • The modest level of Cooperative International Events does not fully reflect the positive developments that characterized Tajikistan’s foreign relations during the period under review. The dominant issue was border protection. In 1992 the Tajik government concluded an agreement with Moscow whereby Russian troops would guard Tajikistan’s borders. However, in October 2004, by mutual consent, it was decided that there should be a phased transfer of responsibility to the Tajik authorities (see FAST Update 2004/4). The ceremonial transfer of the control of the Tajik-Afghan and Tajik-Chinese borders sections to the Tajik authorities was officially marked on 19 October 2005, though the operational handover had already been completed somewhat earlier. However, as agreed, Russian military advisers (the full complement to number 280 officers) would be attached to the newly formed Tajik Committee for the Protection of the State Border. Moreover, units of the Russian Federal Security Service’s border guard service and the 201st motorized rifle division, as well as two helicopter crews would remain in Tajikistan and in emergencies would provide assistance. • Nevertheless, there were many weaknesses in the Tajik forces’ operational capacity, especially regarding essential equipment such as helicopters, communications and armored vehicles. Of particular concern was the long southern border with Afghanistan, since this was one of the main routes for the trans-shipment of illegal narcotics (see graph on Crime- and Drug-related Events). Senior Tajik officials openly admitted that there were some stretches of the Afghan-Tajik border (e.g. in the Shuroobod section) for which no effective surveillance could be provided. President Rahmonov’s appeal to the international community for technical assistance prompted a strong and rapid response. This included a pledge from the European Union to speed up programs to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan border; according to the EU special representative for Central Asia, Jan Kubis, ‘many, many millions of euros’ had been earmarked for this project. The UN agreed to finance the Tajik Drug Control Agency for a further two years (set up in 1999, this body had already received funds worthU$14.5 million from the UN). Furthermore, in coordination with the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, the US State Department agreed to help finance mobile squads to counter cross border drug smuggling. In January, the USA started delivering supplies (e.g. winter uniforms, canned goods, tents and medicines) as part of a U$3 million aid package to Tajik border guards. © swisspeace

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Tajikistan | September 2005 to February 2006 | Page 6

• The question of foreign military bases continued to excite comment. Rumors suggested that an American base might be opened in Tajikistan, but this was firmly denied by President Rahmonov. He insisted that only one foreign military base was to be deployed in Tajikistan – the Russian base – and that this was guaranteed by the interstate agreement signed in Dushanbe in October 2004 (an air force component formed part of this agreement). However, since autumn 2001 the Tajik government had permitted the Western-led coalition to use their airspace, likewise an aerodrome in Dushanbe to refuel planes. Also, French military air transport planes and a contingent of French servicemen were stationed at the Dushanbe aerodrome. Yet there was no intention of extending the scope of this agreement; on the contrary, the French presence was to be drastically reduced over the coming months. It was anticipated that in 2006 only two French transport planes and some 150 servicemen and engineers would remain in Tajikistan. • Relations between Russia and Tajikistan appeared to be flourishing. When Imomali Rahmonov visited Moscow in October, President Putin emphasized ‘the high level of cooperation between the two countries’, particularly in combating terrorism and drug trafficking. An important development was the State Duma’s draft endorsement of the Russian-Tajik agreement on labor and mutual protection of citizens’ rights, aimed at facilitating the resolution of migration problems, including the prevention of illegal labor migration from Tajikistan to Russia. Trade between the two countries increased substantially in 2004-2005. There was also major Russian investment in infrastructural projects (see graph on Country Stability). • Regional relations were cordial, particularly with Iran. During the reporting period there were several high- level contacts between Tajikistan and Iran, including President Rahmonov’s visit to Tehran in January 2006. Several important agreements were signed, aimed at strengthening trade, transport and investment ties between the two countries. The need for closer cooperation on cultural issues and for a dialogue between Tajik and Iranian parliamentarians were also highlighted. In February Iranian-funded construction work began on Sangtuda-2 power plant, a major new hydroelectric power station in southern Tajikistan. Future plans envisage the promotion of regional cooperation via improved trade and transport facilities. One example of this is the agreement reached by Tajik, Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani leaders on the margins of the Organization of Islamic Conference Summit (7-8 December 2005, Mecca) to build a power line linking Tajikistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan. As described by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, ‘Iran and Tajikistan are one spirit in two bodies’. The warmth of Tajik-Iranian relationship has challenged two popular assumptions. One is that the different ideological stances of the two countries – Tajikistan espouses a secular constitution, Iran an Islamic constitution – would inhibit rapprochement between Dushanbe and Tehran and might even drive a wedge between them. The second is that Dushanbe’s obvious determination to improve relations with the West, particularly with the USA, might cause it to downplay or even reduce its links with Tehran. To date, there are no signs of this happening. Progress was made on the complicated issue of the delineation of Tajikistan’s state borders. Political agreement was reached with China and Uzbekistan and by October the process of final demarcation was nearing completion. The question of mine clearance along the border with Uzbekistan, however, was still causing concern. In 1999-2000, Tashkent unilaterally planted mines in the border zone to deter insurgents. Yet the main victims were civilians. By the end of 2005, some 78 Tajik citizens (mainly women and teenagers) had been killed when they inadvertently strayed into the unmarked mine fields. In 2005 Uzbekistan promised to clear these mines. However, by the end of the year there was some confusion as to whether or not this operation was proceeding on schedule. On a more positive note, Uzbekistan began supplying electric power to Tajikistan; it also continued to supply gas, though with a sharp price hike (from U$42 to U$55 per 1,000 cubic meters). These energy supplies were vital to cover Tajikistan’s winter needs. • Tajikistan’s international relations are stable and predominantly cooperative in nature. Barring unexpected developments, either in neighboring states or in more distant parts of the world, they are likely to continue in this mode for the foreseeable future. Dushanbe has succeeded in forging a shrewdly balanced foreign policy, which encompasses different (and potentially mutually antagonistic) sets of relationships. The closest bond is with Russia; this is underpinned by strategic linkages that range from economic to security ties. However, regional relationships are also carefully nurtured. At the same time, a friendly stance is maintained towards Western states.

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Tajikistan | September 2005 to February 2006 | Page 7

Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (average weighted)

Average number of reported events per month: 127 Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment: • The situation remained stable during the reporting period. Cooperative Domestic Events were on a moderate level, likewise Conflictive Domestic Events. There was a slight improvement in Conflictive Domestic Events at the end of 2005, which subsided in early 2006. • The main source of Conflictive Domestic Events was the ongoing effort of the government to combat the perceived threat of religious extremism. The primary focus was on the Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT), banned in Tajikistan since 2001. During the reporting period the police made a number of raids on HuT bases, mostly in the north of the country. Over 20 people were arrested on charges of inciting ethnic, racial, regional and religious strife, though a few were also accused of plotting to overthrow the country’s constitutional order. The police reportedly discovered subversive books and leaflets, photocopying equipment, arms and ammunition. • In separate operations the police arrested eight individuals (one of them an Uzbek citizen) who were said to be members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The Uzbek government claims that this group, which was formed in Uzbekistan in the mid-1990s, has perpetrated numerous terrorist acts in the region. In September 2000 the US State Department placed the IMU on its list of international terrorist organizations to which US citizens are forbidden to give assistance, and whose members are denied entry to the USA. According to the Tajik authorities, for the past three years the IMU (according to some reports now renamed the Islamic Movement of Turkestan) has been actively recruiting adherents in and around Dushanbe. Members of this organization are said to have assassinated three Tajik officials in April 2005; at the time of their arrest they were allegedly plotting to foment armed conflict in Tajikistan. To this end they had allegedly accumulated a large stock pile of explosives and weapons in the remote Jirgatol District of eastern Tajikistan. Noteworthy is the claim of the Tajik police that during recent arrests of HuT members they found documentary evidence revealing links between this organization and the IMU. Such a connection has been mooted before, but no evidence has been provided. • In January, in a surprisingly frank public statement, Tajik Interior Minister Khumdin Sharifov said that support for Islamic extremists was mounting, and that they were campaigning and recruiting members ‘even in prisons and penitentiaries’. He further commented that the extremist organizations were in contact with one another and apparently consolidating their forces. He did not believe that they had as yet embarked on the path of armed struggle, but confirmed that ‘we are confiscating armaments and bombs’ from members of these groups. He also mentioned a new radical organization called Samariya, which apparently surfaced in Tajikistan for the first time in 2005.

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• According to the Tajik Prosecutor’s Office, the number of arrests on grounds of religious extremism was significantly higher in 2005 than in 2004; however, the number of criminal cases launched against suspected extremists was still relatively low, totaling no more than 74. In an effort to discourage radical sentiments, a ban on the wearing of the hijab (Muslim female head covering) was introduced in schools and universities in October 2005. The decision was justified on the grounds that the headwear ‘represents a religious ideology and is in contravention of the education law’. This ruling is in line with other restrictions on public displays of Islamic practice that have been adopted over the past couple of years, for example the ban on mosque attendance for women, as well as boys under 18 years of age. • Another source of friction was the government’s pressure on secular opposition parties. The main target was Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Tajikistan. He was placed on trial for criminal charges that included terrorism, illegal possession of weapons, embezzlement of state property and forging documents. Iskandarov, who claimed that he had been abducted from Russia and illegally brought back to Tajikistan (see FAST Update 2005/2), put up a robust defense, calling on senior Tajik officials to stand witness on his behalf. Nevertheless, on 5 October he was handed down a sentence of 23 years, to be served in a maximum security prison. He was also stripped of his rank, deprived of his property, fined over U$ 470,000 and prohibited from holding state office for five years after the end of his sentence. Thus, any hopes he may have had of a public career were effectively destroyed. • Opposition activists claimed that the sentence was politically motivated, since Iskandarov was one of the few potential rivals for presidential power. During the civil war he had fought on the side of the anti- government United Tajik Opposition. Subsequently, after the signing of the peace treaty, as part of the agreed division of government posts, he was made head of the Tajik state gas company. However, when changes were introduced into the constitution in June 2003 which paved the way for the incumbent president to remain in power for two more seven-year terms, Iskandarov was openly critical. Thereafter he was dismissed from his post. Yet despite the expectation in some quarters that the harsh treatment meted out to him would provoke a mass protest, the response was largely restricted to his supporters and fellow opposition members. The US embassy expressed some concern over the sentence and the conditions under which Iskandarov had been detained, but the matter received little international publicity. • The removal of Iskandarov from the political arena was possibly motivated by a desire to strengthen President Rahmonov’s power base in the run-up to the presidential election scheduled for November 2006. A further step in this direction was taken in December 2005, when the Tajik parliament approved an amendment to the electoral law which removed the upper age limit for presidential candidates. Previously presidential candidates could not be younger than 35 years of age or over 65. The change means that President Rahmonov (born 1952) will not automatically be barred from running for office for further terms. Nevertheless, the opposition has not entirely lost hope of mounting a challenge in the forthcoming election. The Islamic Rebirth Party has announced that it will be fielding a candidate. Consultations are also underway regarding a coalition of opposition parties. • The struggle between the government and the radical Islamists is set to continue. At present it is still at a low level, but it has the potential for friction to develop further. The secular opposition appears to have little popular support. In all probability, presidential power will continue to grow largely unchecked.

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Crime- and Drug-related Events (average weighted)

Average number of reported events per month: 127 Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment: • The graph shows that the average conflictivity of Drug-related Events has been consistently higher than the one of Crime-related Events. While Crime-related Events have seen a decrease in their average conflictivity from September to December 2005 and a subsequent increase in the first two months of 2006, the average conflictivity of Drug-related Events has been on a constant increase since October 2005. However, the full extent of such activities can only be guessed at, since what surfaces in the public domain is surely only the tip of the iceberg. • In accordance with the agreement reached at the Tajik-Russian summit in October 2004, over the following months Russian troops were withdrawn from Tajikistan’s state borders. The national authorities assumed full responsibility for border protection on 1 September 2005. Tajik sources claimed that during the handover period security had not been impaired. According to Rustam Nazarov, head of the Tajik Drug Control Agency (DCA), in the first eight months of 2005 Tajik security forces seized 2.7 tonnes of drugs, which, he claimed, was double the quantity seized in the same period in 2004; figures relating to the capture of couriers similarly demonstrated increased effectiveness in fighting drug smuggling. • Nevertheless, it was recognized that Tajikistan urgently needed technical and financial assistance. President Rahmonov praised the ‘invaluable contribution’ made by Russian forces to protecting the Tajik-Afghan border and emphasized that Russia would continue to play a special role in this area. However, he also called for international support, particularly the provision of military equipment and aircraft (see further graph on Cooperative and Conflictive International Events). The gravity of the situation was underlined in January 2006, when the DCA announced that contrary to earlier optimistic assessments of the performance of the Tajik security forces, drug hauls had in fact fallen sharply over the past few months. The most recent estimate was that in 2005, the Tajik authorities had confiscated a total of 4.5 tonnes of drugs, of which more than half was heroin. However, in 2004, over eight tonnes of drugs were seized, including 4.8 tonnes of heroin, during the year. Further evidence of the deteriorating level of border protection was provided by the police in Russia, who reported that they were now intercepting exceptionally large consignments of Afghan heroin on their territory. The increase in trafficking in recent years is reflected in the growing incidence of drug-related problems within Tajik society. In December 2005, President Rahmonov spoke publicly of an ‘alarming’ increase in juvenile crime, particularly theft, drug addiction and hooliganism.

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• According to the DCA, over the past three years around 12,000 young people in the 18 to 30-year old age group have been registered as addicts; this includes some 7,500 addicts in Dushanbe, 1,200 in Soghd, 1,200 in the south, and approximately 2000 elsewhere in the country. If this trend continues, it will undoubtedly lead to serious health problems. The reported number of cases of HIV/AIDS is still very low, but this probably underestimates the full scope of the problem. • Senior Tajik officials continued to be implicated in drug smuggling (see FAST Update 2005/4). According to the Tajik Prosecutor-General’s Office, 10 law-enforcement officers, including three of high rank, were arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking in 2005. Recent arrests included the deputy head of the intelligence directorate of the Tajik State Border Protection Committee. Most of the hauls were of relatively small quantities (5-10 kgs) of heroin. The individuals who were detained appeared to be opportunistic dealers, seeking quick sales to any available client, rather than members of large, organized networks. • The most high-profile criminal trial during this period was that of the former head of the Tajik Drug Control Agency, Ghaffor Mirzoyev. He had previously been regarded as a close ally of President Rahmonov. During the civil war (1992-97) Mirzoyev had been a field commander on the side of the government forces and later was appointed to head the presidential guard. In early 2004, he took charge of the DCA but in August 2004 he was arrested and charged with a long list of crimes, including illegal storage of weapons, plotting against the state, murder and large-scale embezzlement of public funds. He pleaded not guilty to charges. When he went on trial in January 2006, he called for the presiding judges to be disqualified, accusing them of bias. However, his complaints were rejected. The trial was closed to the public and media. If convicted, Mirzoyev could face a sentence of up to 20 years in prison. At the end of the reporting period the trial was still in progress. • Some commentators believe that Mirzoyev’s arrest was not so much a response to the stated charges, but to the fact that he was attempting to mount a coup d’état. In all probability, there were both criminal and political motives for taking action against him. A similar fate has befallen several other former allies of President Rahmonov, including the erstwhile Interior Minister Yaqub Salimov, who was sentenced to 15 years in prison on charges of treason earlier in 2005. • In the near future it seems certain that protection along the Tajik-Afghan border will continue to deteriorate, despite international assistance (see graph on Conflictive and Cooperative International Events). This will inevitably lead to a rise in drug trafficking. Concomitantly, it seems likely that senior Tajik officials will become involved in drug dealing, thereby seriously compromising law enforcement. The linkage between political and criminal players will also probably grow.

FAST Update

Appendix : Description of indicators used | Page 11

Country Stability The Country Stability index reflects three independent factors: (i) challenges by non-government actors to the state's monopoly of force; (ii) state repression; and (iii) violence entailing physical force against persons or property. The index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. Conflictive Events (relative) Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict- cooperation scale* divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1. Cooperative International Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) Events (average weighted) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Conflictive International Events Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) (average weighted) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Cooperative Domestic Events Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) (average weighted) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Conflictive Domestic Events Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) (average weighted) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Drug-related Events (average Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events weighted) having Drugs as an issue. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Crime-related Events (average Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events weighted) having Crime as an issue. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8.

*The IDEA cooperation-conflict scale is a general weighting scale that attaches a weight to every event. The scale has a range from –13 to +8. Event types that are regarded as cooperative have positive values, conflictive event types have negative values.

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The FAST International Early Warning Program | Page 12

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