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ANALÍTICA REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA Nº 7 ANALÍTICA Revista de Filosofía, Nº 7 Director Óscar Augusto García Zárate Comité Editorial David Villena Saldaña Javier Vidal López José Antonio Tejada Sandoval Pablo Quintanilla Pérez-Wicht Miguel Ángel León Untiveros Reseñas Alonso Zela Comité Consultivo Internacional Alberto Cordero-Lecca (City University of New York, EE.UU.) Jean-Pierre Cometti (Universidad de Provenza, Francia) Pascal Engel (Universidad de Ginebra, Suiza) W. D. Hart (Universidad de Illinois, Chicago, EE.UU.) Øystein Linnebo (Birkbeck College, University of London, Reino Unido) Georg Meggle (Universidad de Leipzig, Alemania) Francisco Miró Quesada Cantuarias (Sociedad Peruana de Filosofía) Luis Piscoya Hermoza (UNMSM, Perú) Jorge Secada Koechlin (Universidad de Virginia, EE.UU.) Scott Soames (Universidad de California Sur, EE.UU.) Correo-e: analí[email protected] URL: http://cesfia.org.pe/analitica Incluida en The Philosopher’s Index ISSN: 1996-1464 Depósito Legal: 2012-01040 SUMARIO Presentación 5 ARTÍCULOS Interpretation, Triangulation and Meaning 11 Pablo Quintanilla Tipos de lectura de la mente: objeciones a la propuesta de Bermúdez 47 Laura Danón Hegel, Ciencia y Teoría de Conjuntos 69 Paul Thagard Tres tipos de significado 89 Patrick Suppes El sexto y séptimo dogma del empirismo y la concepción semántica de las teorías científicas 109 Miguel Ángel León Untiveros RESEÑAS The Princeton Companion to Mathematics 135 Reseñado por Javier Castro Albano Roy T. Cook. A dictionary of philosophical logic 141 Reseñado por José Antonio Tejada Sandoval NOTICIAS Día Mundial de la Filosofía 153 PABLOCONTENIDO QUINTANILLA XIV Congreso Nacional de Filosofía 155 II Jornada de Estudiantes de Filosofía Analítica 159 Peirce 2014. The Charles S. Peirce International Centennial Congress 161 Talleres de Filosofía Analítica 162 LIBROS RECIBIDOS 167 4 PRESENTACIÓN Un año más ha transcurrido. Y con él, un nuevo número de Analítica ve la luz. Así, pues, una vez más –y es éste un hecho por demás significativo, y que llena de orgullo al comité editorial– un mancomunado y sostenido despliegue de esfuerzos, en un medio en que resulta particularmente dificultoso mantener «con vida» una publicación académica, hacen posible llevar a ustedes, estimadísimo público lector, otro número de nuestra revista. Y a través de ésta, hoy como al inicio, hace ya algo más de seis años, va también comunicado el esfuerzo de aquellos estudiosos que colaboran con sus escritos a fin de mantener la vigencia de una publicación como ésta que busca difundir investigaciones que, encuadradas preferentemente en el terreno de la reflexión filosófica de cuño analítico, exhiban un nivel óptimo de calidad académica y escritural para beneficio de la comunidad filosófica. No estará de más mencionar en el marco de esta breve presentación la labor que el Centro de Estudios de Filosofía Analítica (CESFIA) ha desarrollado recientemente en lo que concierne puntualmente al auspicio, ya por dos años consecutivos, de un importante evento académico, y cuyo espíritu no es otro sino el de fomentar la seria y concienzuda investigación entre las nuevas generaciones de estudiantes sanmarquinos dedicados a los menesteres de la meditación filosófica, generaciones que constituyen una verdadera y pujante reserva intelectual de nuestra comunidad académica. En efecto, se trató de la I y la II Jornada de Estudiantes de Filosofía Analítica, llevadas a cabo, respectivamente, el 2012 y el 2013, en las instalaciones de la «Decana de América», la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos. El CESFIA de manera PRESENTACIÓN particularmente entusiasta patrocinó, como veníamos diciendo, el mencionado evento, y halló una muy receptiva respuesta por parte de los jóvenes investigadores de nuestra universidad que han orientado su reflexión hacia el cúmulo de temas que conciernen a la sólida y respetable tradición analítica. A continuación, pasemos revista sucintamente a las colaboraciones que en esta ocasión Analítica ha tenido el honor de publicar. En la sección de artículos, se ofrecen los siguientes textos. Procedente de la pluma de Pablo Quintanilla, PhD. por la Universidad de Virginia, y actualmente decano de Estudios Generales de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, tenemos «Interpretation, Triangulation and Meaning».También Laura Danón, Doctora en filosofía y actualmente investigadora de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, colabora en esta ocasión a través de «Tipos de lectura de la mente: objeciones a la propuesta de Bermúdez». Por su parte, Paul Thagard, PhD por la Universidad de Saskatchewan, profesor de filosofía y director del Cognitive Science Program de la University of Waterloo, nos ofrece «Hegel, Ciencia y Teoría de Conjuntos». Patrick Suppes, autor, como es bien sabido, de importantes contribuciones en el ámbito de la filosofía de la ciencia, y actualmente profesor emérito de la Stanford University, ahora comparte con nosotros «Tres tipos de significado». Cerrando esta sección, tenemos «El sexto y séptimo dogma del empirismo y la concepción semántica de las teorías científicas» artículo de Miguel Ángel León, licenciado en Derecho por la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú y doctorando en filosofía por la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos. En la sección dedicada a las reseñas, tenemos el texto de Javier Castro Albano, becario doctoral de la Universidad de Buenos Aires y ayudante de primera de Lógica, quien efectúa la presentación crítica de The Princeton Companion to Mathematics. Finalmente, José Antonio Tejada, miembro del CESFIA y egresado de la maestría en Historia de la Filosofía de la Universidad Nacional PRESENTACIÓN Mayor de San Marcos tomó a su cargo la reseña de la obra de Roy T. Coock, A Dictionary of Philosophical Logic. A todos ellos, por supuesto, nuestra inmensa gratitud por la sesuda, responsable y comprometida tarea llevada a efecto en la elaboración de sus impecables y muy interesantes trabajos. Es justo decir que el resultado tanto en el caso de los artículos cuanto en el de las reseñas ha sido óptimo. La idea es ésa, justamente, y no perdemos ocasión de ponerla de relieve: ofrecer a través de nuestra publicación anual textos de calidad que permitan igual al lego interesado en esta dimensión de la reflexión filosófica, como al perito en la materia, ponerse al día en lo que atañe a las investigaciones que actualmente se vienen desarrollando en los campos siempre fecundos de la filosofía analítica. Como siempre, nobleza obliga: también queden expresados nuestros profundos y más sinceros agradecimientos a quienes ahora han contribuido decisivamente a que Analítica continúe circulando entre nosotros. Así, pues, agradecemos de manera muy especial a la Facultad de Letras y Ciencias Humanas de la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos por el apoyo recibido. Muy especiales gracias les sean dadas, del mismo modo, a nuestros atentos lectores. Son ustedes, a la postre, los que en buena medida mantienen vivo el interés no sólo de todos aquellos investigadores que buscan publicar a fin de dar a conocer sus ideas y someterlas a la consideración de la comunidad académica, sino de igual forma de quienes, como nosotros, además, cautelamos que cada edición de Analítica se constituya en un medio que favorezca la más adecuada y cuidada presentación de dichas ideas. Creemos que, hasta ahora lo hemos logrado. El reto, planteado de manera permanente, es, en definitiva, perseverar en el despliegue de nuestros mayores y mejores esfuerzos para que ello sea siempre así. ÓSCAR AUGUSTO GARCÍA ZÁRATE Director de Analítica ARTÍCULOS INTERPRETATION, TRIANGULATION AND MEANING PABLO QUINTANILLA Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú [email protected] Recibido: 15/10/13 Aprobado: 14/11/13 SUMMARY Although Donald Davidson has provided a very powerful account of meaning for natural languages, he has done little to explicate what concept of interpretation is assumed by it. Thus, in this paper I wish to ask what it is to interpret a speaker’s utterance. I claim that it is to be able to describe it in terms familiar to the interpreter, attributing to it truth conditions according to the interpreter’s beliefs about the world, under a triangular setting, in which many different descriptions could do equally well. However, some descriptions might prove better than others due to epistemic virtues similar to those that make a scientific theory more explicative than another one. Key words: Davidson, meaning, interpretation, triangulation, truth conditions RESUMEN Aunque Donald Davidson ha propuesto una concepción muy poderosa de significado para lenguas naturales, ha hecho poco por explicitar la concepción de interpretación que está asumida en esta. Así, en este artículo deseo abordar qué es interpretar una proferencia verbal emitida por un hablante. Sostengo que es describir la proferencia en terminos familiares para el intérprete, atribuyéndoles condiciones de verdad en concordancia con sus creencias, [Analítica, Año 7, N.º 7, Lima, 2013; pp. 11-46] PABLO QUINTANILLA dentro de un contexto triangular en el que diferentes descripciones podrían funcionar igualmente bien. Sin embargo, algunas descripciones podrían probar ser mejores que otras, en consideración a ciertas virtudes epistémicas semejantes a aquellas que hacen que una teoría científica sea más explicativa que otra. Palabras clave: Davidson, significado, interpretación, triangulación, condiciones de verdad In this paper I wish to show how Davidson’s account of linguistic interpretation can be a
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  • University of Cincinnati

    University of Cincinnati

    UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI Date: 14-May-2010 I, Lindsay R Craig , hereby submit this original work as part of the requirements for the degree of: Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy It is entitled: Scientific Change in Evolutionary Biology: Evo-Devo and the Developmental Synthesis Student Signature: Lindsay R Craig This work and its defense approved by: Committee Chair: Robert Skipper, PhD Robert Skipper, PhD 6/6/2010 690 Scientific Change in Evolutionary Biology: Evo-Devo and the Developmental Synthesis A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy of the College of Arts and Sciences by Lindsay R. Craig B.A. Butler University M.A. University of Cincinnati May 2010 Advisory Committee: Associate Professor Robert Skipper, Jr., Chair/Advisor Professor Emeritus Richard M. Burian Assistant Professor Koffi N. Maglo Professor Robert C. Richardson Abstract Although the current episode of scientific change in the study of evolution, the Developmental Synthesis as I will call it, has attracted the attention of several philosophers, historians, and biologists, important questions regarding the motivation for and structure of the new synthesis are currently unanswered. The thesis of this dissertation is that the Developmental Synthesis is a two-phase multi-field integration motivated by the lack of adequate causal explanations of the origin of novel morphologies and the evolution of developmental processes over geologic time. I argue that the first phase of the Developmental Synthesis is a partial explanatory reconciliation. More specifically, I contend that the rise of the developmental gene concept and the discovery of highly conserved developmental genes helped demonstrate the overlap in explanatory interests between the developmental sciences and other scientific fields within the domain of evolutionary biology.