Special Warfare The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

Reconnaissance

PB 80Ð93Ð1 February 1993 Vol. 6, No. 1 From the Commandant Special Warfare

Knowledge is power, and since ancient times knowledge about the enemy and the operational environment has been an key element of military power. As the commander’s eyes and ears, recon- naissance forces contribute directly to the com- mander’s battlefield intelligence. That intelli- gence, in turn, encourages success by permitting best use of our combat power. It is no coincidence that the first U.S. intelli- gence organization, World War II’s Office of Stra- tegic Services, was also the forerunner of our mod- ern-day Special Forces. From the OSS through Desert Storm, reconnaissance has continued to be an important SOF mission. With the changing nature of conflict, intelligence promises to become Special Forces, has been developed for distribu- even more important as our smaller armed forces tion to the field this spring. The first of a new are presented with contingency missions requiring series of how-to SF manuals, FM 31-20-5 will more discriminate use of our forces. express the doctrinal concepts of SR in practical Special reconnaissance is one of Special Forces’ applications by defining it, identifying planning five primary missions. We tend to think of SR in and mission procedures and furnishing specific the traditional perspective of a small team man- techniques practiced by operational units. In the ning an observation post in a wooded area. How- future, similar manuals are planned for foreign ever, in today’s smaller force-projection Army, internal defense, unconventional warfare, coun- there are many possible scenarios. While deployed terterrorism and direct-action missions. throughout the world, SF teams are often the only Technology for SR is also advancing, and in the U.S. presence that can gather facts and answer near future, soldiers can expect new equipment questions for a joint-force commander deploying which will allow them to collect and report intelli- into the country. This reconnaissance may be con- gence in near-real time. Technology, however, has ducted from the front seat of a rental car or its limitations. It may break down, and some of the accomplished by phone calls. On today’s highly most critical elements that define modern conflicts mobile battlefield, SF teams may find themselves cannot be photographed or reported on by electron- pinpointing resistance pockets in urban or by- ic means — they can only be collected face to face. passed areas where general-purpose forces are ill- Our intercultural-communications skills and mili- suited for the mission. These missions will tary experience give us the ability to collect that increase the combat effectiveness of our forces type of information. Effective intercultural com- while reducing collateral damage and noncombat- munications, combined with our tactical and tech- ant casualities. nical training, make Special Forces soldiers a true In the past, our intelligence requirements had a force multiplier whatever the mission. clear focus, for the potential enemy was clearly identified. With the disintegration of communism, we face a much more difficult task. It is not clear who the enemy is, where we will confront him, when that may occur and who our coalition part- Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow ners will be. This ambiguity further complicates an already demanding mission. In order to focus our SR experiences on the future, a new manual, FM 31-20-5, Special Recon- naissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for PB 80Ð93Ð1 Contents February 1993 Special Warfare Vol. 6, No. 1

Commander & Commandant Features Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow 2 A Theory of Ground Reconnaissance Editor by Maj. William H. Burgess III Jerry D. Steelman Graphic Art Director 9 Reconnaissance: Looking to the Future Through the Past Bruce S. Barfield by Lt. Col. Robert H. Huckabee

12 FM 31-20-5: New Manual Focuses on Special Reconnaissance by SFC Jim McGill

16 Special Reconnaissance Planning: Notes from the JRTC by Capt. Brian R. Vines

V E AS R I RT T A E S LI B 20 Intercultural Communication: The Need for Conceptual Skills E T by Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission 23 Mission-oriented Language Training is to promote the professional development of special by CWO 2 Thomas F.D. Rogers operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of both established doctrine and new ideas. Views expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This 24 The OSS: America’s First National Intelligence Organization publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. by Lawrence H. McDonald Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, and should be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: DSN 239-5703 or commercial (919) 432-5703. Special 33 Interview: Lt. Col. David G. Christie, Australian SAS Regiment Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the author. 36 Mission Planning and Rehearsal Systems: New Tools for Mis- Official distribution is limited to active and reserve sion Preparation special operations units. Individuals desiring a private subscription should forward their requests to: by Capt. Dan Smith Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Gordon R. Sullivan Departments General, United States Army 39 Enlisted Career Notes Chief of Staff 40 Officer Career Notes Official: 42 Foreign SOF 44 Update Milton H. Hamilton 46 Book Reviews Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 03209 Cover: Night-vision-goggle photo copyright Leif Skoogfors/Wood Fin Camp and Associates, Headquarters, Department of the Army used with permission. Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield. A Theory of Ground Reconnaissance

by Maj. William H. Burgess III

To be forewarned is to be fore- olfactory means by persons operat- dures employed by a reconnaissance armed, and Army commanders ing on the ground or in the waters force in relation to its target (as engage in ground reconnaissance to or airspace in close proximity to the well as the menu of other collection achieve timely forewarning. Force target, reconnaissance overlaps assets employed against the target) reductions, the concept of AirLand human-resources intelligence, or are influenced by target signifi- Operations and national military HUMINT, collection.2 cance, mobility and geometry. strategy are increasing the Army’s Reconnaissance is a means of mil- Targets may be of tactical, opera- relative need for forewarning. As a itary geography, which has topo- tional or strategic significance. consequence, the art of ground graphic, demographic, meteorologic Strategic objectives are related to reconnaissance will undergo consid- and hydrographic components, is the attainment of long-term nation- erable scrutiny and discussion over conducted at strategic, operational, al goals. Operational objectives are the next several years. This article and tactical echelons, and focuses of regional or intermediate-term offers a context for discussion. on weather, enemy and terrain. value. Tactical objectives relate to Reconnaissance is the explorato- Weather concerns are typically light the employment of forces in individ- ry, preliminary inspection or survey conditions, visibility, wind speed ual battles and engagements. of a region to examine its terrain or and direction, and type and amount Mobility is the relative ability of determine the disposition of mili- of precipitation. Enemy concerns the target to change position or tary forces therein.1 Derived from are size, activity, location, unit or location. Target mobilities are high, the Latin re (again) and cognoscere organization, time, and equipment, medium and low (or immobile). (to know), reconnaissance entails or SALUTE. Terrain concerns are High mobility targets are capable of the “recognition” and gathering of observation and fields of fire, con- changing their location within pertinent information. When con- cealment and cover, obstacles, key hours or minutes, and include ducted through visual, audio and or terrain, and avenues of approach, or mobile ballistic missile units, air- OCOKA. craft formations and trains. Medi- Views expressed in this article are um mobility targets are only capable those of the author and do not neces- Targets of changing their positions over con- sarily reflect the policies of the De- The objectives of reconnaissance siderable periods of time, normally partment of the Army or other gov- are called reconnaissance targets. exceeding 48 hours, and include ernment agencies. The tactics, techniques and proce- field headquarters of military units

2 Special Warfare of corps size or greater, semi-fixed ways and water obstacles. ities. Overt collection may be con- intelligence facilities and mobile ducted in or out of battle dress. bridges. Modes Examples of overt collection are Low (or no) mobility targets nor- Principal modes of reconnais- varied and can range from foreign- mally do not change position at all, sance are the overlapping categories observer participation in host- and include storehouses, airfields, of battlefield reconnaissance and nation military demonstrations to fixed C3I facilities and fixed bridges. surveillance, overt collection, and cross-border surveillance conducted In some cases, the mobility of a tar- reconnaissance by deception. from vehicles, aircraft or fixed get is so low, or nonexistent, that Battlefield reconnaissance and observation posts or watchtowers reconnaissance or surveillance of surveillance is the survey of mili- located in friendly territory. the target can be conducted months tary activity in a particular area of Reconnaissance by deception or years before any other action is operations, normally done within a occurs where the existence and even undertaken. zone of armed conflict or war by the activities of the reconnaissance Geometry is the relative geograph- small groups of mounted or dis- element may be open or known, but its true allegiance and purpose are ic diffusion or area covered by the mounted soldiers in battle dress. It masked. To a degree, reconnais- target. Target geometries are point, may be done passively or by force.3 sance by deception parallels “false area and linear. A point target con- Reconnaissance forces perform this flag” espionage operations. Recon- sists of one or more elements concen- activity in carefully selected areas naissance by deception may be sub- trated at a single place, such as to provide a picture of the battle- classified into the overlapping cate- radar sites, bridges and ships. Area field or operational area by report- gories of “surrogate” and “pseudo” targets are diffused, usually consist- ing timely information on weather, operations. Surrogate operations ing of several elements situated threat and terrain and accurately are essentially HUMINT collection- within a certain area at varying dis- locating dangerous, high-value tar- by-proxy operations, usually of very 4 tances from each other, e.g., airfields gets for relevant weapons systems. limited scope and extent. They are and major industrial complexes. Lin- Overt collection is the consented normally (but not always) done out ear targets are long and narrow, and or acquiesced-in observation of of standard battle dress and can be include railroads, highways, trails, selected activities in a particular conducted across the operational pipelines, telecommunications lines, area of interest or operations. It continuum. Coastwatchers in the columns of troops on the march, long may be a primary activity, or it may Solomon Islands during World War bridges (e.g., across bays), water- be incidental to other mission activ- II, for example, made extensive and effective use of indigenous surro- gates in the execution and defense of their collection activities.5 Pseudo operations are exemplified by the employment in southern Lebanon of HUMINT Israeli Army sayeret (reconnais- sance commando) troops, capable of passing themselves off as indige- nous Lebanese or Palestinians,6 to GROUND acquire terrorist bases and other FORCE targets for the Israeli Air Force. RECON Levels In terms of targets and functions, ground reconnaissance partially RECONNAISSANCE overlaps but is distinguishable from the HUMINT collection means of espionage. Levels of ground recon- MILITARY GEOGRAPHY naissance are defined primarily by their planned purposes, normally correlating to the echelons under- taking the reconnaissance. Interrelationship of Military Geography, HUMINT, Tactical reconnaissance supports Reconnaissance, and Ground Force Reconnaissance maneuver and defense at echelons corps and lower. It is a normal bat- tlefield activity in all combat-arms

February 1993 3 of strategic (i.e., national) signifi- cance. It is thus a term appropriate- ly applied to espionage and other activities of national-level intelli- gence organizations. Ground-force

TOPOGRAPHY strategic reconnaissance would then

DEMOGRAPHY seem to be limited to the employ- ment of national- or joint-level spies METEOROLOGY STRATEGICSTRATEGIC and the occasional special-recon- HYDROGRAPHY naissance mission of national signif- OPERATIONALOPERATIONAL icance (e.g., entering a hostile or denied port and emplacing radia- MILITARYMILITARY tion sensors and transmitters on a submarine suspected of carrying fis- TACTICALTACTICAL GEOGRAPHYGEOGRAPHY sionable material). Army SF have long performed “special” reconnaissance in friendly, denied or contested areas. Only recently, however, reconnaissance has been embellished with a direct Components and Levels of Military Geography tie to special-operations forces to create the mission of special recon- naissance, defined as:13 Reconnaissance and surveillance organizations, oriented toward mili- fixed- and rotary-wing aviation and actions conducted by special opera- tary factors of weather, enemy and remotely-piloted vehicles. These tions forces to obtain or verify, by terrain. Army tactical forces dedi- complement air and naval plat- visual observation or other collection cated to ground reconnaissance nor- forms, national technical means methods, information concerning mally operate within 150 kilometers and other assets. Ground-force the capabilities, intentions, and of the forward line of troops at corps reconnaissance aids in the early activities of an actual or potential level and 50 kilometers forward of location, tracking, targeting and enemy, or to secure data concerning the FLOT at division level in linear attack of critical deep enemy capa- the meteorological, hydrographic, warfare,7 and within similar ranges bilities and thereby enhances opera- geographic, or demographic charac- in nonlinear operations.8 Reconnais- tional flexibility and minimizes risk teristics of a particular area. It sance at echelons brigade and lower to friendly forces.11 includes target acquisition, area tends to be generalized within the Operational reconnaissance nor- assessment and post-strike recon- naissance.14 relatively limited areas of interest mally focuses on military factors but There are difficulties with this and zones of operations of such can also address non-military fac- definition, however: Although there units. At echelons division and tors, particularly under conditions are exceptions, most of the business corps, however, reconnaissance is other than war. U.S. forces em- of SOF is conducted at the theater focused on named areas of interest, ployed for operational ground recon- level, and so “operational reconnais- or NAI, and target areas of interest, naissance include Army Special For- sance” would in most cases be a 9 or TAI. ces, Navy SEALs, and Fleet Marine more appropriate term applied to Operational reconnaissance is Force Reconnaissance companies. reconnaissance by SOF. Yet, opera- conducted to acquire information in Strategic reconnaissance is under- tional reconnaissance is not the support of planning and maneuver taken for national purposes, e.g., to exclusive domain of SOF, and the at echelons above corps, as where collect data on matters relevant to historical employment of SOF in theater assets survey a country or the formulation or execution of for- reconnaissance is not limited to region prior to the forced entry of eign policy of the national govern- operational activities. Arguably, contingency forces. It helps to ment. There is no Department of “special” reconnaissance should secure friendly forces, confirm sen- Defense definition per se of “strate- comprise unique reconnaissance sor intelligence and verify enemy gic reconnaissance,” although the and surveillance activities that are forces. The ground component of phrase implies the selected place- clear exceptions to the norm or are operational reconnaissance compris- ment of human assets and technical beyond the capabilities of other es the collection capabilities of surveillance platforms (satellites reconnaissance units, irrespective of ground patrols, sensors, cavalry,10 and aircraft)12 to collect information associations with SOF or other spe-

4 Special Warfare cialized organizations. to measure results of such activity. of information about the inhabitants • Topographic reconnaissance is of an area. It aids in the preparation Tasks the specific gathering and reporting of maps and overlays, and assess- Definitional problems notwith- of information about the surface ment of the condition of inhabited standing, principal reconnaissance configuration and condition of natu- areas for military operations. At the tasks for ground forces are defined ral and man-made terrain in an tactical level, demographic recon- as follows: NAI or TAI. It aids in the produc- naissance is focused on the SALUTE tion, correction or enhancement of factors. At operational and strategic • Target acquisition comprises maps and overlays and assessment levels, demographic reconnaissance the detection, identification, loca- of the present conditions of the ter- also addresses psychological and cul- tion and reporting of a target in suf- rain for military operations. It over- tural factors. Collecting data on pop- ficient detail to permit the effective laps with meteorological and hydro- ulations in a potential zone of opera- tional maneuver is a form of demo- employment of organic or deep- graphic reconnaissance. At the tac- graphic reconnaissance. Demograph- strike weapons and other means. tical level, topographic reconnais- ic reconnaissance is intimately relat- The purpose of target acquisition is sance is focused on the OCOKA fac- ed to topographic reconnaissance. to obtain target locations, move- tors of terrain, and specifically • Meteorological reconnaissance is ments, development, strength, type includes locating and assessing the specific gathering and reporting 15 identification and vulnerabilities. fording sites and the reconnais- of information about atmospheric • Damage assessment is the de- sance of routes, bridges, tunnels phenomena such as wind speed and termination of the effect of attacks and ferries for friendly maneuver direction, cloud cover, surface visi- 16 on a target. Damage assessment forces. Topographic reconnaissance bility, weather and obstructions to by ground-force reconnaissance at operational and strategic levels vision, and state of the ground entails the far or close visual, photo- differs only in scale from tactical around the observer. Meteorological graphic or electronic survey of a topographic reconnaissance and is reconnaissance supports theater specific point or area of military sig- closely linked with demographic deep-strike weapons systems, raids, nificance that has been subjected to reconnaissance. and operational maneuvers by land an air or missile strike, a battle • Demographic reconnaissance is or sea forces. It is also conducted as between opposing forces, or the like, the specific gathering and reporting part of the effort to predict the oper- ations of enemy deep-strike weapons systems and maneuver GEOMETRY forces. • Hydrographic reconnaissance is the reconnaissance of militarily sig- nificant bodies of water and DIFFUSE marginal land areas. It is conducted LINEAR to determine depths, beach gradi- ents, the nature of the bottom, the POINT location of obstacles and barriers, the speed of currents, the thickness HH of ice, defensive preparations and MM I other military and nonmilitary I EE LL STRATEGICSTRATEGIC GG characteristics of a target. DD OO HH W • Nuclear, biological and chemi- I W I cal reconnaissance is the specific UU OO OPERATIONALOPERATIONAL MM RR detection, gathering and evaluation of information about the presence NN TACTICALTACTICAL (or absence) of radiological, biologi- OO cal or chemical contamination from MOBILITY SIGNIFICANCE weaponry or industrial activity, of the extent of such contamination, and of specific terrain, buildings, equipment or airspace in selected Categorization of Reconnaissance Targets areas of military significance. In this regard, detection of industrial contamination can include the search for trace compounds associ-

February 1993 5 ated with the illegal narcotics trade. hauled them back to Israel.17 tional planning and extends • Direct-action collection compris- • Special-collection tasks are through deployment to the initia- es short-duration raids, ambushes those that do not fit squarely into tion of hostilities or operational and other offensive actions under- the forementioned task categories. activities. At the tactical level, taken to seize and recover person- They are typified by unique infor- Stage I reconnaissance is conducted nel, material or information of mili- mation requirements entailing from deployment through the initia- tary significance for intelligence reconnaissance and surveillance tion of hostilities. exploitation. It overlaps many of the activities of extreme political or mil- Stage II reconnaissance is con- techniques and procedures of recon- itary sensitivity that are beyond the ducted to help set up, or shape, the naissance with the tactics of direct normal capabilities of most recon- conditions for decisive employment action. At the tactical level, for naissance units, and which require of forces. At the operational level, example, it includes the activities of special training on the part of par- critical deep enemy capabilities are ambush patrols and raids by ticipants and generation or sanction acquired and tracked for targeting armored cavalry. At the operational of the requirements from very high or attack. At the tactical level, reconnaissance assets are focused level, direct-action collection levels of the government.18 Con- on locating and identifying maneu- includes the capture of designated trary to a common misconception, ver forces, fire support, lines of military equipment or personnel in this category of reconnaissance does communication and command and enemy rear areas by SOF. not include “special activities.”19 control.22 An example of direct-action col- Stage III ground reconnaissance lection is Operation Tarnegol 53. Employment supports attainment of the desired On the night of Dec. 26, 1969, 70 All reconnaissance must be con- decisive result. At the operational Israeli Defense Force commandos ducted within the four-stage opera- and tactical levels, it is focused on raided the Egyptian radar base of tional cycle of the supported unit or providing information that will aid 20 Ras A’rab. Dressed as Egyptian sol- force. Stage I reconnaissance is the commander in determining diers, the Israelis landed by heli- conducted to protect forces and pre- when conditions have been achieved copter, assaulted the base, disas- pare them for operations.21 At oper- for successful maneuver: e.g., the sembled two Russian-made P-12 ational and strategic levels, Stage I focus is on surveillance of friendly radar-equipment shelters from two is constant, whether forces are in and enemy lines of communication, ZIL trucks, slung-loaded the shel- garrison or in the field. It begins target acquisition and damage ters beneath CH-53 helicopters, and with the commencement of opera- assessment. Stage IV operational reconnais- sance supports preparations for fur- BATTLEFIELD RECONNAISSANCE ther follow-on or new major engage- AND SURVEILLANCE ments or campaigns, and is focused on determining the condition and status of remaining enemy forces. Stage IV tactical reconnaissance supports reconstitution of friendly forces by focusing on defensive surveillance and patrolling of avenues of approach and lines of communication. Regardless of stage, all reconnais- sance must be purposeful, continu- ous, aggressive, timely, secure, reli- able and accurate. Reconnaissance is purposeful when it is undertaken to answer well-defined, and often time-sensitive requirements that OVERT RECONNAISSANCE support specific missions and activi- COLLECTION BY DECEPTION ties, e.g., the pre-and post-strike surveillance of a major C3I node which must be neutralized before a Modes of Reconnaissance planned follow-on operation by the- ater forces can be undertaken. Reconnaissance not tied to a specific

6 Special Warfare ty information about, and deter- mines precise locations of, recon- naissance targets. Reliability is the quality factor in reconnaissance. Conclusion STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE & ESPIONAGE Commanders need information on which to base their decisions. Often, this information is not in pre-exist- SHARED RESPONSIBILITY ing data bases, or the information is changing with the fluidity of the op- OPERATIONAL erational environment. Reconnais- RECONNAISSANCE sance leads to information, informa- tion yields intelligence, and intelli-

SHARED gence fuels the generation of land RESPONSIBILITY power. Thus, a condition precedent to victory in the first battle in the TACTICAL next war or conflict will be effective COLLECTION TARGET/REQUIREMENT RECON- ground reconnaissance. Without NAISSANCE

TACTICAL OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC effective reconnaissance, Army com- manders may find victory elusive.

ECHELONS ARMY/ NATIONAL CORPS AND THEATER AGENCY BELOW COLLECTION RESPONSIBILITY/MEANS Maj. William H. Burgess III is a Special Forces officer currently serv- ing as a staff officer within the U.S. Relationship of Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Special Operations Command, Mac- Reconnaissance and Espionage Dill Air Force Base, Fla. A graduate of the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, he holds a bache- and appropriate mission or activity naissance is timely when the infor- lor’s degree in political science from is not purposeful. mation realized is known to the Southeastern Massachusetts Univer- Reconnaissance is continuous supported commander in time for sity, a master’s degree in public when it is undertaken in, and not that commander to act on the infor- administration from Clark Univer- limited by, all conditions of weather mation provided to his benefit. sity and a doctor of laws degree and terrain. Reconnaissance is Reconnaissance is secure when it from American University. aggressive when it is undertaken is undertaken with the knowledge with audacity and despite threat of only those friendly personnel countermeasures, e.g., the close with an absolute need to know and observation of insurgent leaders without any awareness on the part such as conducted by British special of the target or other threat forces. forces against the Irish Republican Reconnaissance is reliable and ac- Army in Northern Ireland. Recon- curate when it generates high-quali-

Notes: 1 The Department of Defense defines reconnaissance as: “A mission sance in force” is an offensive operation designed to discover or test undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection meth- the enemy’s strength or to obtain other information. Joint Pub 1-02. ods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or 4 See FM 34-36, Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Elec- potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, tronic Warfare Operations. hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.” 5 Cmdr. Eric A. Feldt, R.A.N., The Coastwatchers (Garden City, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and N.Y.: Nelson Doubleday, Inc., 1979); Walter Lord, Lonely Vigil: Associated Terms. Coastwatchers of the Solomons (New York: The Viking Press, 1977). 2 Human-resources intelligence comprises the intelligence derived 6 The Israelis are known to use Israeli Druze, Bedouin and Circas- from the human collection discipline that uses human beings as both sian scouts, as well as Jews who have migrated from Arab countries, sources and collectors, and where the human being is the primary for such purposes. See Samuel M. Katz, Follow Me! A History of collection instrument. Joint Pub 1-02. Israel’s Military Elite (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1989); also, 3 See the discussion of direct-action collection on p. 6. “Reconnais- Soldier Spies (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press).

February 1993 7 7 TRADOC Pam 525-42, U.S. Army Operational Concept for Long 13 FM 100-25; FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. Range Surveillance Units; FM 7-93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit 14 Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. Operations. 15 Joint Pub 1-02; and Joint Pub 3-05. 8 TRADOC Pam 525-5, AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evo- 16 Joint Pub 1-02. lution of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and 17 Katz, Follow Me!, pp. 87-88. Beyond (1 August 1991); John G. Roos, “New Army-Air Force War- 18 Arguably, this should be the definition of “special Fighting Concept Sees Joint Power Projection Operations,” Armed reconnaissance.” Forces Journal International, October 1991, pp. 12, 14. Note, howev- 19 Activities conducted in support of foreign-policy objectives that er, that the historical practice of U.S. Army tactical long-range-patrol are planned and executed so that the role of the U.S. government is formations has been not to operate beyond accurate friendly artillery not apparent or acknowledged publicly. They are also functions in range. support of such activities but are not intended to influence U.S. polit- 9 NAI are points or areas where activity confirms or denies a par- ical processes, public opinion, policies or media and do not include ticular course of action; TAI are engagement points or areas. Both diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or are usually along an avenue of approach or mobility corridor. FM 34- 36. related support functions [emphasis added to the original]. Joint Pub 10 Although cavalry perform reconnaissance-in-force, they are prin- 3-05, GL-19-20; see also Lock K. Johnson, “Covert Action and cipally used to screen the front and flanks of the main body, fix Accountability: Decision Making for America’s Secret Foreign Policy,” enemy positions for fire and maneuver, and other tasks that are not International Studies Quarterly (1989), Vol. 33, pp. 81-109. reconnaissance per se. 20 The stages described modify the current AirLand Operations 11 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, p. 16. concept by extending the duration of Stage I. 12 William V. Kennedy, et al., The Intelligence War (London: Sala- 21 TRADOC Pam 525-5, pp. 16, 17. mander Books Limited, 1983), pp. 63, 100, 101-02, 120-21, and 175. 22 Ibid. p. 20.

8 Special Warfare Reconnaissance: Looking to the Future Through the Past

by Lt. Col. Robert H. Huckabee

Among the key features of the planned reconnaissance was used to warfare, cavalry performed the pri- 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Depart- great advantage by armies and mary reconnaissance mission and ment of Defense Reorganization Act nations. The earliest recorded recon provided commanders with informa- was the definition of special-opera- mission is found in the 13th and tion on enemy troop dispositions, tions forces and the identification of 14th chapters of the Old Testament positions and lines of communica- special-operations activities. book of Numbers. Here is told the tions, as well as reporting on ter- Congress identified these activi- story of how Moses sent 12 special- rain and road nets. Few military ties as: direct action; reconnais- ly-selected men into Canaan to: exploits can match the color and sance; unconventional warfare; for- “See what the land is, and whether drama of Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart’s eign internal defense; civil affairs; the people who dwell in it are “Ride Around McClellan” during the psychological operations; countert- strong or weak, whether they are second year of the Civil War. This errorism; humanitarian assistance; few or many, and whether the land four-day reconnaissance in force — theater search and rescue; and such that they dwell in is good or bad, Stuart rode with 1,200 troopers — other activities as may be directed and whether the cities that they made the dashing young Rebel lead- by the President or the Secretary of dwell in are camps or strong- er an instant celebrity and gave Defense.1 The second of these, holds...”2 The information returned Gen. Robert E. Lee valuable infor- reconnaissance, demands the atten- by these agents provided the basis mation upon which he would base tion of SOF planners and operators, for the Israelites’ decision to post- his first bold offensive against the particularly the Army’s Special pone their entry into the Promised Union army. Ironically, it may have Forces, because of its historical Land. also sown the seeds of Confederate strategic implications and opera- In the 13th century, the leg- defeat at Gettysburg a year later, tional significance. endary Mangoday forces served as when Stuart’s liberal interpretation It is interesting to note that the the long-range eyes and ears of of Lee’s orders took him off on legislators who framed the 1986 Genghis Khan and made significant another circuitous adventure and amendment stipulated that SOF contributions to the conquest of half deprived his commander of vital were to perform reconnaissance, as the then-known world by his Mon- combat information at the war’s opposed to intelligence, activities, gol hordes. Led by their comman- most critical juncture. which fall within the purview of der, Yasotay, and never numbering The period from the end of the other government agencies. By defi- more than a few thousand, these Civil War through World War I is nition, reconnaissance is limited to elite volunteers underwent arduous practically devoid of any examples seeking out information and does not training, seemed to relish hardship of reconnaissance other than the involve analysis or interpretation. and were sworn to sacrifice their use of scouts on the western fron- History is replete with examples lives in service of the Kha-Khan.3 tier. These men, often Indians, pro- of how information gained through At the dawn of the modern age of vided vital information to Army

February 1993 9 posts, patrols, wagon trains and set- their wartime activities are directly until the deepening of American tlements regarding terrain, weath- linked to today’s Special Forces.5 involvement in Vietnam caused a er, local flora and fauna and, most After World War II, our national shift in emphasis. importantly, the activities and leadership began to consider our Having operated in Vietnam and mood of indigenous tribes. capability to operate at the lower throughout Southeast Asia since It wasn’t until the early days of end of the conflict spectrum — 1957 in a variety of roles, Army World War II that the genesis of the below the level of conventional war. Special Forces changed character in United States’ special-ops capability From these post-war studies the mid-1960s. It was during this came into being under the auspices evolved the decision to institutional- period that the 5th Special Forces of the Office of Strategic Services. ize an “unconventional warfare” Group began conducting extensive Based on the British model, the force structure and, on June 19, long-range reconnaissance opera- OSS was organized to provide a 1952, the Army activated the first tions. The so-called “Greek” projects national capability to conduct intel- such unit in its history — the 10th were responsible for most of these ligence gathering and, as the OSS Special Forces Group, under the missions. The first of these special chief, Maj. Gen. William J. Dono- command of Col. Aaron Bank, a for- projects, Project Delta (Special van, labelled it, “unorthodox war- mer OSS operative and one of the Forces Operational Detachment B- fare.”4 The most notable successes Army’s few special-ops experts.6 52) was organized in 1964. Projects achieved by OSS elements were During the remainder of the decade Omega (SFOD B-50) and Sigma those of Detachment 101 in Burma and into the 1960s, Special Forces (SFOD B-56) were formed two years during 1943-45 and the contribu- doctrine and training focused on later. Other reconnaissance activi- tions of the three-man Jedburgh psychological operations, guerrilla ties were conducted by SFOD-53 teams and larger (30-man) opera- warfare and counterinsurgency, and B-57 (Project Omega). Each of tional groups in the European the- with little thought given to recon- these units consisted of a number of ater of operations. These units and naissance. This would continue 4-10 man reconnaissance teams of U.S. and South Vietnamese Special Forces and indigenous irregulars, “roadrunner” teams (indigenous sol- diers disguised as Viet Cong or North Vietnamese) and a reaction- force unit.7 Although not part of the 5th Spe- Brig. Gen. J.E.B. cial Forces Group, the joint Military Stuart’s “Ride Assistance Command - Vietnam’s Around McClel- Studies and Observations Group, or lan,” a four-day MACV-SOG, was activated in 1964 reconnaissance in and employed Special Forces per- force during the sonnel to conduct ground reconnais- second year of the sance and surveillance missions Civil War, made into North Vietnam, Laos and Cam- the Rebel leader an bodia. Its operational elements were instant celebrity organized under launch sites known and gave Gen. as forward operating bases and Robert E. Lee valu- later as command-and-control sites. able information. In 1967, three command-and-con- Ironically, Stuart’s trol sites had been established: absence at Gettys- Command and Control - North at burg a year later Da Nang, Command and Control - deprived Lee of Central at Kontum and Command information at a and Control - South at Ban Me critical time. Thuot. Each location was responsi- ble for a specific operational area and consisted of 12-man (three Spe- cial Forces and nine indigenous) Spike reconnaissance teams, Spe- cial Forces-led 35-man Hatchet strike platoons and larger exploita- Library of Congress tion units. Under such exotic code

10 Special Warfare names as Shining Brass, Nickel learned from Special Forces and Forces detachment and company Steel and Prairie Fire, MACV-SOG MACV-SOG activities in Southeast commander, and successively as ran a total of 2,675 cross-border Asia can and should serve as a basis group S-1, executive officer and operations from 1965 through for future operational planning, group S-3 for the 5th Special Forces 1972.8 organization and training. Group. Prior to attending the Com- The Special Forces reconnaissance Reconnaissance is nothing new. mand and General Staff College in projects were closed down between The basic methodology of gathering 1987-88, he was the J-1 of Special 1970 and 1971 and MACV-SOG was information has varied little since Operations Command - Central. His deactivated in 1972. The accomplish- Moses dispatched that ancient mis- other assignments include tours ments and contributions of these sion into Canaan 1,300 years before with the 82nd Airborne Division activities have often been overlooked Christ. It is an eyes-on business. and the 173rd Airborne Brigade in or underplayed in the post-war era of Modern technology has improved Vietnam. He holds a master’s degree introspection and criticism. Evolving and refined our ability to report and from Ohio University. from a fragmented effort to meet the process information in a more time- expanding operational-intelligence ly and accurate manner. Satellite Notes: requirements, Special Forces recon- burst communications facilitate the 1 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Amend- naissance activities grew into a coor- rapid transfer of data to operational ed) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government dinated theater program which pro- commanders. Futuristic high-tech Printing Office; 1986), p. H10636. vided the Military Assistance Com- equipment developments, such as a 2 The Layman’s Parallel Bible (Grand mand - Vietnam approximately 50 lightweight low-probability-of-detec- Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan Publishers; 1973), percent of its ground-combat infor- tion/low-probability-of-intercept p. 369. 3 9 Ethan Heral; “Yasotay and the Mango- mation. Even Gen. Creighton W. radio and an electronic filmless day of Genghis Khan” Armed Forces Journal Abrams, whose antipathy for Special camera, will further enhance our International, January 1985, pp. 38-69. Forces was widely known, grudgingly capabilities to provide real-time or 4 Alfred H. Paddock Jr., U.S. Army Special acknowledged the effectiveness of near-real-time combat information Warfare: Its Origins (Washington, D.C.: these strategic operations.10 to multiple echelons. However, it is National Defense University Press, 1982), p. 5. From these historical examples, the still the individual soldier who 5 Ibid., pp. 27-28. one can readily detect a commonali- remains the basic component of any 6 Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: ty of purpose and organization of effective reconnaissance system. The Birth of Special Forces (Novato, Calif.: the forces charged to conduct recon- Today’s Special Forces soldier Presidio Press, 1986), p. 171. naissance missions. The objective of possesses the requisite skills to 7 Osprey Elite Series, U.S. Army Special Forces, 1952-84 (London: Osprey Publishing such activities has remained carry out the missions assigned him Ltd., 1985), p. 17. unchanged by the passage of time: by Congress, including that of 8 Leroy Thompson, De Oppresso Liber: The It is to gather information and reconnaissance. It is, however, the Illustrated History of the U.S. Army Special report it. Once distilled into intelli- burden of the Army’s leadership Forces (Boulder, Colo.: Paladin Press, 1987), gence, this information can be used structures, command-and-control pp. 78-79, 82. 9 Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar and by commanders or heads of state for systems, equipment and training to Richard H. Shultz, Special Operations in planning or decision-making. Too, ensure the success of any endeavor U.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National the strategic importance of the he undertakes on behalf of his Defense University Press, 1984) p. 181. information demands that those nation. 10 Ibid., p. 141. undertaking reconnaissance mis- The past holds the key to the sions be expressly selected and future. trained for their tasks. Both of these considerations have contem- porary value. Lt. Col. Robert In our present effort to advance H. Huckabee is and hone our national SO capabili- currently chief of ties and force structure to meet the Unconvention- future contingencies and wartime al Warfare Forces requirements, it is imperative that Branch, Special we pause to examine the historical Operations Divi- record. Looking to the future sion, Directorate through the perspective of the past of Operations, the provides a foundation of experience Joint Staff. Previously, he was upon which we can build. This is assigned to the Army Staff. A char- particularly true in terms of recon- ter member of the Special Forces naissance, wherein the lessons Branch, he has served as a Special

February 1993 11 FM 31-20-5:

New Manual Focuses on Special Reconnaissance

by SFC Jim McGill

In the spring of 1993 a new Spe- tion in 1994, FM 31-20-1, Special FM 31-20-5 is the first of the series, cial Forces manual will be fielded Forces Tactics, Techniques and Pro- it contains some basic SF informa- by the Special Warfare Center and cedures, will contain tactics and tion which will migrate into 31-20- School. FM 31-20-5, Special Recon- procedures common to all SF mis- 1. Later editions of the SR manual naissance Tactics, Techniques, and sions, such as SF command and will be even more SR-specific. Procedures for Special Forces, is the control, mission planning, infiltra- first field manual focused on one tion and exfiltration and post-mis- Organization specific SF mission. Oriented sion activities. Development of the The SR TTP is broken down into toward SF operational units and TTP for direct-action missions (31- four chapters and supporting mission planners from the SFODA 20-4) is currently on hold. Because appendixes. The chapters lay the through SF battalion levels, the manual is a continuation of the doc- trinal processes established by Joint Chapter 2 Chapter 4 Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Applicability Chapter 1 Chapter 3 Appendixes Overview Pre-Mission Employment Post-Mission Operations, FM 100-25, Doctrine for Employment Activities Army Special Operations Forces, SF Group and FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. It defines the scope of SR, identifies planning con- SFOD C siderations and conveys the experi- ences and expertise of SF units operating in various geographic SFOD B regions.

The new doctrinal concept of hav- SFOD A ing a TTP manual for each SF mis- sion will continue with manuals on foreign internal defense (31-20-3), unconventional warfare (31-20-2) User Applicability Guide for FM 31-20-5 and counterterrorism (31-20-6), in that order. Scheduled for comple-

12 Special Warfare foundation of SR mission planning and provide general SR mission pro- cedures and information. Informa- tion is ordered chronologically: Chapter 1 provides an overview of special reconnaissance, discussing the nature and fundamentals of SR, its relationship to other missions, its history and its place in AirLand Operations. Chapter 2 deals with pre-mission activities, including mission analy- sis, mission planning, mission preparation and pre-employment preparation. Chapter 3 covers actual employ- ment of SR. Area assessment, tar- get acquisition, target analysis and the various types of reconnaissance, including hydrographic, meteorolog- File photo ical, geographic and post-strike, are SF skills such as movement and camouflage techniques, taught during the addressed in detail. Special Operations Target Interdiction Course, are useful in SR missions. Chapter 4 concentrates on post- mission activities, including debrief- due to its location, mission parame- thing similar to combat patrols. In ing, follow-on missions, after-action ters or political implications those cases, the SFOD generally reports and recording lessons requires execution by SOF. FM 31- will be able to gain most, but not all learned. 20 is more specific, defining SR as of the required data. Mission plan- The appendixes provide examples “Reconnaissance and surveillance ners must weigh the criticality of of specific SR techniques and proce- actions conducted by special opera- the target against the risk of losing dures, including such topics as how tions forces to obtain or verify, by a unique asset that is not easily to construct different types of fixed visual observation and other collec- reconstituted, the SFOD. observation and surveillance sites, tion methods, information concern- Historically, if a target was reconnaissance methods, mission- ing the capabilities, intentions, and beyond the organic capability of the specific clothing and equipment, activities of an actual or potential corps commander because of the operational techniques and legal enemy or to secure data concerning distance involved, then it was auto- considerations. The order of the the meteorological, hydrographic, or matically considered to be an SR appendixes follows the order in geographic characteristics of a par- mission. Current doctrine sees dis- which the subjects appear in the ticular area. It includes target tance as only one factor in deter- text. acquisition, area assessment and mining the need for SR. The user-applicability graphic post-strike reconnaissance.” With Other considerations include the demonstrates by its shaded areas these definitions of SR, we can need for SF skills such as extended the application of the SR TTP man- explore what is “special” about spe- land navigation, use of special ual to the conduct of missions at various SF operational levels. All cial reconnaissance. equipment, area orientation and SF units will find the overview use- Modern SR operations task SF cultural awareness, and language. ful, but operators at the company, teams to confirm, deny or refute the Additional training such as move- battalion and group levels will find known information, or pass new ment and camouflage techniques, the chapters on pre-mission, data, for specific special-operations taught during the Special Opera- employment and post-mission activ- areas. When executed in the delib- tions Target Interdiction Course, ities less applicable than the ODAs. erate planning process, discussed in will be useful in missions against Specific SR techniques listed in the Chapter 2 of the SR TTP, this key nodes. An SF team might con- appendixes will be of most benefit known information will be thor- duct SR in urban areas in support to soldiers at the ODA level. oughly researched as the plan of of units not suited for that type execution is developed. In extreme operation, or the mission might be Mission cases when time constraints do not to fix an enemy or find a weakness A simplistic definition of SR is permit deliberate mission planning, in his defenses in an area bypassed any reconnaissance mission that SFODs may have to execute some- by general-purpose forces.

February 1993 13 over” tasking. SR is often conducted to fix a target or to gain information Special Unconventional Foreign Internal Direct Action Counter- Reconnaissance Warfare Defense terrorism which is passed to an attacking force. Sometimes commanders are tempted to ask the deployed SFODA to “roll over” from a SR mission to a direct-action mission NON-SR RELATED after the target confirmation is TASKS passed. Lightly equipped SF teams conducting SR missions employ mostly passive measures. DA mis- sions, on the other hand, are based on violent active measures. While it is the prerogative of commanders to task subordinate units as they see fit, there is a great difference SR RELATED between an SFOD slipping away TASKS after conducting a SR mission and an SFOD announcing its location and intent by engaging an enemy with whatever means it has on hand. Area Assessment Another new section talks about home-station activities and training of SR teams. This section expands Relationship of SR to Other Missions the mission-essential task list to address SR-specific activities that are applicable to all SF missions. As Under the deliberate mission- ing data. By merging the technical the second chart depicts, the appli- planning process, SFODs will data with first-hand reports, com- cation of these activities varies with receive training in systems identifi- manders will gain a complete pic- the mission. At the high end of the cation, and when faced with a com- ture of the battlefield. scale is a team employed on a pure plex rail system or factory, will be Deciding which missions go to SR mission; at the low end is an prepared to identify and exploit key which teams will be driven by the SFODA conducting a counterterror- system nodes. Generally, the cumu- CINC’s special-operations campaign ism operation. Whatever the mis- lative skills of the SF team and the plan, the joint targeting process, the sion, users are encouraged to review familiarity of its members with operational SOF mission criteria, the SR TTP and adapt its content to their SOP and each other’s reac- and considerations of mission, the tasks at hand. Tips on construc- tion of observation and surveillance tions greatly increase the probabili- enemy, terrain, troops and time sites may prove useful to a team ty of mission success. available, or METT-T. While the putting surveillance on a drop zone All reconnaissance operations targeting process is only briefly dis- prior to the drop. Also, SR-styled gather information. Special recon- cussed in the SR TTP, Chapter 2 movement techniques will be useful naissance is conducted to produce addresses the result of this process, to the SFODA when conducting a near-real-time information. On the the Special Operations Mission leader’s reconnaissance during a modern battlefield, this type of Planning Folder. A complete discus- raid. information is key for the comman- sion of the nomination and target- The new TTP is also designed to der’s decision-making process. Two ing process is in FM 100-25 and FM cross-load unique ideas from group sources of near-real-time data are 31-20. to group, and benefit all SF teams. satellites and reconnaissance air- Two common questions asked For example, ideas and successful craft. They can produce detailed about the SR TTP are, “What is new SR techniques used by the 5th SF photos quickly, often without the about this FM?,” and “How can we Group in desert regions were incor- knowledge of the target. However, get a copy?” porated in the manual, so soldiers when the detail required is not The SR TTP does not drastically from the 7th SF Group deploying to available from these sources, or cer- change existing doctrine. It does, an arid region could benefit from tainty is critical, SR operations can however, introduce new thought in the 5th’s expertise. Mountain SR respond to fill in gaps in the exist- the area of “follow-on” and “roll- TTPs common to teams in the 10th

14 Special Warfare SF Group could be exploited by the mission-execution format. It is Promote Liberty in Panama, and as 1st SF Group. While these TTPs are designed to encourage thought and an operations and intelligence mainly addressed in the form of promote a systematic approach to sergeant for ODAs 761 and 766. His planning considerations, specific mission employment, deployment, military schooling includes training information can be found in the execution and team recovery. the Special Forces Qualification appendixes. The days of issuing an SF team a Course, SF Operations and Intelli- Requests for FM 31-20-5 should shovel and a pair of binoculars, gence Course, Military Free Fall be sent through routine publica- then dubbing it an “SR team,” are Parachutist Course, SF Advanced tions channels by updating the over. As laser range finders, elec- NCO Course, Static Line Jumpmas- unit’s DA Form 12. Each SF group tronic filmless cameras and global ter Course and Explosive Ordnance should order sufficient copies to positioning systems become com- Disposal, Basic and Nuclear phases. ensure that each of its SFODAs mon, SF soldiers must gain an He holds a associate of arts degree and SFODBs get copies. The SWCS understanding of the new devices to from Campbell University, Buies Doctrine Branch has exhausted its aid in their missions. The future Creek, N.C. supply of all drafts. These drafts will require extensive training with were forwarded through SF Com- new technologies. Yet while technol- mand to field units for comment. ogy can do many things, it cannot The same distribution list will be replace the skilled eye of the Special used for future TTPs now under Forces soldier. development. Users with recommendations for improving the SR TTP should send SFC Jim McGill their recommendations on a DA is assigned to the Form 2028 to: Commander, Doctrine Develop- USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-DT- ment Branch of DM; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. the Directorate of Training and Doc- Conclusion trine, JFK Special As doctrine writers at the SWCS, Warfare Center we know that the SR TTP is not all- and School. His inclusive. FM 31-20-5 will never previous assignments include serv- take the place of a well-written and ing with the 7th SF Group as an rehearsed unit SOP. It is not operations sergeant for ODA 785 designed to be a “check the block” during operations Just Cause and

February 1993 15 isolation facility, or ISOFAC, receives its operations order, or OPORD, and mission briefing, and begins mission preparation.2 To obtain the highest probability for success, an ODA must use its time Special efficiently during isolation. Time spent beforehand in developing Reconnaissance area assessments, team cross train- ing, and training in standard oper- ating procedures can pay off during Planning: isolations. Battalion staffs can save detach- Notes from the JRTC ments additional time by providing them with required information “up front.” Often at JRTC, ODAs do not receive the battalion S-2’s intelli- gence products until they request them. ODAs need area assessments, doctrinal, situational, event, and by Capt. Brian R. Vines decision-support templates in order to develop viable courses of action. Without these products, mission planning is interrupted while the In almost every rotation at the ic or geographic characteristics of a team develops or requests analysis Joint Readiness Training Center, particular area. SR includes target of the terrain, weather, enemy and SF teams discover the need to reac- acquisition, area assessment and battlefield environment. quaint themselves with current doc- post-strike reconnaissance. It is per- At the end of the mission briefing, trine, and the area of planning and formed at the strategic, operational the ISOFAC commander provides executing special-reconnaissance or tactical level.1 the SF team with a proposed isola- missions is no exception. Prior to conducting SR, Special tion schedule and a list of require- Predominantly, officers and Forces soldiers should be familiar ments already requested or provid- 3 NCOs alike fail to apply doctrine — with applicable doctrinal references, ed for the team. These require- the command-estimate process and including: ments may include: intelligence preparation of the bat- • FM 101-5, Staff Organization • Ranges tlefield — into their SR mission and Operations • Training facilities planning; they focus more on prepa- • FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special • Rehearsal sites • Updated intelligence products ration for the briefback than for the Forces Operations • Maps mission. Since the aim of JRTC is to • FM 31-20-5, Special • Air items replicate combat as realistically as Reconnaissance • Accompanying supplies possible and provide feedback to • ARTEP 31-807-31-MTP, Mission • Items for emergency resupply soldiers on the application of doc- Training Plan for the Special • Mission-peculiar equipment trine, the purpose of this article is Forces Company: Special • Isolation expendables to educate Special Forces soldiers Reconnaissance • Escape-and-evasion data on SR for “real world” contingencies • FM 34-36, Special Operations • Basic load ammunition rather than to serve as a checklist Forces Intelligence and Electronic • NBC equipment. for JRTC rotations. Warfare Operations SR is reconnaissance and surveil- • FM 34-2, Collection Management Decision making lance conducted by SOF to obtain or • FM 34-2-1, Reconnaissance After receipt of the mission brief- verify, by visual observation or and Surveillance and ing and OPORD, the ODA uses the other collection methods, informa- Intelligence Support to tactical decision-making process to tion concerning the capabilities, Counterreconnaissance develop the commander’s estimate. intentions and activities of an actu- • FM 6-20, Fire Support in the Air- The process, outlined in Chapter 5 al or potential enemy. SOF may land Battle. of FM 101-5 and the Army Com- also use SR to secure data concern- Upon selection to execute a mis- mand and General Staff College ing the meteorological, hydrograph- sion or plan, the ODA moves into an Student Text 100-9, The Command

16 Special Warfare Estimate Process, consists of five ences include task organization responsibility.8 phases: and schemes of maneuver. Detach- The last phase of the comman- • Mission analysis ment members should avoid the der’s estimate is the decision. The • Course-of-action development common pitfall of focusing on one ODA commander presents his deci- • Course-of-action analysis good COA and developing other sion brief, known as the mission- • Course-of-action comparison throwaway COAs that are only dif- concept brief, to the mission approv- • Decision and execution. ferent because of infiltration or ing authority.9 The detachment’s Mission analysis is the means exfiltration.6 recommended COA is either through which the commander The entire ODA analyzes the approved, combined with aspects obtains an understanding of the COAs individually to share infor- of other COAs, or given further mission.4 It includes: mation and discard COAs that are guidance. • Purpose of the higher-headquar- not feasible. They use war gaming The approved COA becomes the ters mission (from the missions to visualize the flow of an operation, the concept of the operation for the and intents of the next two high- given friendly strengths and dispo- team’s OPORD, and the basis for er commanders) sitions, enemy assets and possible the ODA’s mission planning. Often • A review of the area of operations courses of action, and a specific teams will save unused COAs as to understand the higher-head- operational area. Detachment mem- possible contingency plans. The quarters mission and intent bers should consider a reaction and commander receiving the briefing • Identification of tasks to be per- counteraction for each COA during should have his staff in attendance formed, either specified or war gaming. Detachment members to ensure continuity. This is partic- implied should determine the strengths and ularly important if the ODA is to • Determination of mission-essen- weaknesses of each COA.7 become operationally or tactically tial tasks Once COAs are analyzed, the fea- controlled by a conventional unit • Determination of constraints, sible ones are compared to identify through a Special Operations Com- restrictions, required assets and the one with the highest probability mand and Control Element, or risk trade-offs of success. A decision matrix is an SOCCE. • Construction of restated mission excellent technique for determining In those cases, the SOCCE is and commander’s intent the best COA. Team members may very important to an isolating • Construction of a time schedule. use their own matrix for compari- ODA. It must deconflict and pro- The detachment uses facts on son of COAs within their areas of vide to the SFODAs a plan for com- current status or conditions to sup- port its mission analysis. It fills information gaps with assumptions if information is not known. During mission analysis, the assistant operations sergeant should begin developing the intelligence esti- To obtain the high- mate based on these facts and est probability for assumptions. success, an ODA Upon completion of the mission must use its time analysis, the ODA commander efficiently during approves the restated mission and isolation. Time issues his initial planning guidance, spent beforehand which provides a common starting in developing area point for the detachment to develop assessments, team its courses of action. COAs should cross training, and be developed without bias. Team training in stan- members continuously exchange dard operating information and coordinate within procedures can the detachment to ensure the con- pay off during current development of feasible isolations. COAs for consideration by the commander.5 COAs are documented by state- ments with sketches. Each one must be significantly different from any others. Significant differ- Photo by Craig Beason

February 1993 17 mand and control in the special- that indicate enemy courses of the collection effort.18 An example operations area, a communications action. As the enemy force is visual- collection worksheet can be found in plan, a link-up plan, and a force- ized, critical areas, designated FM 34-2, Collection Management, protection plan (including fire-sup- “named areas of interest,” become Appendix A, Figure A-1. port planning and restricted-fire apparent. An NAI is a point or area The final two phases of the intel- measures). The SOCCE should also where enemy activity or lack of ligence cycle are processing, and coordinate the intelligence-collec- activity will confirm or deny a par- disseminating and using. The key to tion efforts of the conventional ticular enemy COA. NAIs aid intel- these two phases is an effective force with the ODA. This allows ligence collection, reconnaissance ODA internal and external commu- continuity between the ODA and and surveillance, and analysis. The nications plan. the intelligence requirements of the event template depicts the NAIs conventional force commander.10 and the relationship of events on Communications plan The SOCCE can also integrate con- the battlefield.14 Once the ODA infiltrates the spe- ventional-force and host-nation The decision-support template cial-operations area, the communi- assets into the planning and execu- relates the details of event tem- cations plan is often a measure of tion of fire support and escape and plates to decision points that are mission success. It should include evasion. significant to the operation. Deci- internal and external communica- sion-support templates are the link tions, communications security, IPB between operations and intelli- SAVSER SUP 5, redundancy, con- Intelligence preparation of the gence. They provide a structured tingencies and enemy direction- battlefield is often a weakness of basis for using experience and finding threats. It should include all ODAs participating at JRTC. This judgment to reduce battlefield of the communications assets avail- is a result of limited guidance from uncertainties.15 able to the team and be thoroughly the battalion S-2s, time restraints IPB is more than a mechanical rehearsed. and intelligence sergeants failing to process. It provides ODAs with a In addition to the collection and apply their education from the means of synchronizing the intelli- communications plan, the ODA pre- Operations and Intelligence Course. gence system with other battlefield pares numerous other plans to meet IPB is a dynamic approach to ana- operating systems. Templates help mission requirements and contin- lyzing weather, terrain and the in developing the collection plan, an gencies. To save time during isola- enemy in a specific geographical important element of the intelli- tion, routine parts of these plans location. It continues throughout gence cycle.16 can be addressed in SOPs. isolation and execution.11 The intelligence cycle consists of Using IPB, the ODA generates four phases: directing, collecting, Escape and evasion plan several visual aids that help to processing, and disseminating and At JRTC, units have habitually illustrate how the enemy might con- using. The commander identifies developed weak escape-and-evasion duct himself in a particular situa- priority intelligence requirements plans. This weakness results from tion. These templates, classed as during the directing phase. PIRs poor planning and teams not receiv- situational, event and decision-sup- serve as a tool to provide focus for ing timely E&E guidance supplied port,12 are graphic portrayals of the collecting phase. This focus to battalions from the joint special enemy force structure, deployment forces the entire intelligence system operations task force. Teams or capabilities, normally drawn to to look for specific indicators which require timely guidance and over- scale. will answer the PIR. The ODA must lays to support their development of Situational templates are devel- restate its mandated PIRs to fit its assisted and unassisted E&E plans. oped during the decision-making mission. The team’s PIR becomes Developed plans need to be dissemi- process to aid COA development. the basis for the ODA collection nated so that team members can They are snapshots depicting what plan.17 understand and rehearse them. All a threat force might do at a certain agencies that can assist in the E&E time and place on the battlefield. Collection plan must also be aware of the plan. The The situational template is the The collection plan provides a SOCCE, for example, can possibly intelligence estimate in graphic framework for ODAs to determine request conventional assets to form.13 and evaluate intelligence needs. recover an evading ODA. During comparison of COAs, the Because of the diversity of missions, intelligence sergeant develops event capabilities and requirements, the Fire-support plan and decision-support templates to collection plan has no prescribed ODAs often neglect the fire-sup- assist in war gaming. Event tem- doctrinal format. An intelligence port plan. It contains information plates identify and analyze battle- collection plan worksheet is a valu- necessary for understanding how field events and enemy activities able aid in planning and directing fire support will aid the operation.

18 Special Warfare Fire support is the collective and 4. The operations sergeant briefs SF Group, also serving as a detach- coordinated use of indirect-fire Annex B, Operations. ment commander during Operations weapons, armed aircraft and other 5. The ODA commander con- Desert Shield and Desert Storm. A lethal and nonlethal means in cludes with his visualization of the graduate of the Infantry Officer support of a battle plan.19 ODAs mission from start to finish. Basic and Advanced Courses and should develop a fire-support plan 6. The remainder of the detach- the Special Forces Qualification regardless of whether assets are ment is prepared to discuss any Course, he holds a BA degree from available. This will allow quicker annexes of the OPORD not dis- Sam Houston State University, responses as fire-support assets cussed previously, if the commander Huntsville, Texas. become available. or his staff have any questions. 7. Charts and sand tables help Notes: Other plans support the team’s briefing. The 1 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Infiltration and exfiltration plan- briefback is done from note cards Operations, p. 3-4. ning is generally strong during rather than read to the commander. 2 Ibid., see pp. 7-10 to 7-18 for the deliber- JRTC rotations. The acronym After the briefback the team con- ate mission-planning process. PACE (primary, alternate, contin- tinues preparation and rehearsals 3 Ibid., p. 7-11. gency, and emergency) should be a for the mission. Emphasis should be 4 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Oper- rule of thumb for planning all oper- placed on an effective rest plan ations, pp. 5-8 to 5-10. ations, including infiltration, exfil- prior to infiltration to ensure opti- 5 U.S. Army Command and General Staff tration, assembly, resupply, casual- mum performance in the opera- College, Student Text 100-9, The Command ty evacuation and link-up. tional area. Estimate Process, p. 3-1. This article has focused primarily 6 Ibid., p. 3-6. Rehearsals 7 Ibid., p. 4-1. on premission activities as areas 8 Ibid., pp. 4-1 to 5-2. The importance of rehearsals can- requiring improvement in SR. Most 9 FM 31-20, p. 7-16 for the MICON brief. not be overemphasized. Isolation teams that participate in JRTC are Also see Detachment Mission Planning should focus on mission prepara- proficient in individual skills and Guide. tion, but often more time is spent basic patrolling techniques. Many 10 FM 31-20, p. 5-19. 11 U.S. Department of the Army, Field rehearsing for a briefback than for teams are familiar with applicable Manual 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of actions on the objective. Rehearsals doctrine but often don’t realize the the Battlefield, p. 4-1. should include every aspect of the need to apply it at detachment 12 U.S. Department of the Army, Field plan, under the best simulated com- level. The key to successful SR is Manual 34-2-1, Reconnaissance and Surveil- bat environment possible, including realistic multiechelon training con- lance and Intelligence Support to Counter- reconnaissance, pp. 2-14 to 2-26. wearing mission equipment both ducted in the most realistic condi- 13 Ibid., pp. 2-14 to 2-18. day and night. tions available. This can be 14 Ibid., pp. 2-18 to 2-20. enhanced by providing objective 15 Ibid., pp. 2-20 to 2-23. Briefback feedback to the unit on its ability to 16 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Once its mission planning is com- use, understand and apply current Manual 34-2, Collection Management, p. 2- 22. pleted, the detachment presents a doctrine. 17 FM 34-2, pp. 1-3 to 1-8. briefback to the tasking comman- 18 Ibid., pp. A-1 to A-9. der. The purpose of the briefback is 19 U.S. Department of the Army, Field to assure the higher commander Capt. Brian R. Manual 6-20, Fire Support in the Airland and his staff that the ODA under- Vines is currently Battle, pp. 1-2 to 1-7. 20 FM 31-20, p. 7-16 for mission briefback. stands and is prepared to accom- an SFODA observ- Also see Detachment Mission Planning 20 plish the given mission. Although er/controller in Guide. many SF groups have their own the Special Opera- briefback SOPs, the following for- tions Division, mat is effective: Joint Readiness 1. The ODA commander intro- Training Center, duces his team and acquaints the Little Rock Air commander and his staff with the Force Base, Ark. His previous con- operational area. ventional assignments include ser- 2. The ODA commander gives a vice as a rifle platoon leader and five-paragraph OPORD on the anti-armor platoon leader in the team’s mission. 82nd Airborne Division. He has 3. The assistant operations commanded both a military-free-fall sergeant briefs Annex A, specialty detachment and an SF Intelligence. operational detachment in the 5th

February 1993 19 assignment with an operational group. His organization then is responsible for sustainment and enhancement training. There is also an inherent individual responsibili- Intercultural ty to maintain proficiency. We are doing reasonably well. Communication: Contrary to popular belief, learn- ing a foreign language is not diffi- cult. It is a natural process in all The Need societies. A billion plus Chinese and Arabs learned the two hardest for Conceptual languages in the world. They did that under adverse weather condi- Skills tions, rampant pestilence, wars, hunger, no Defense Language Insti- tute, no assessment and selection, no bonuses and no entertaining technology. So it is not surprising by Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow that highly motivated Special Forces soldiers have been able to acquire linguistic skills with little difficulty. To date not a single Spe- cial Forces soldier has failed the initial training program at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. It is only a mat- ter of time before language profi- When a Special Forces soldier regional information and interper- ciency will be officially integrated begins his career he relies heavily sonal skills. This synchronization is into Special Forces qualification on his technical skills. However, as a cognitive process. It is the mental and unit readiness reporting. he progresses in seniority and capacity and agility to select, store, Nonverbal skills attains greater responsibility, a process and use information. shift takes place as he becomes Intercultural communication is a Nonverbal communication is a more dependent on his human and very broad and complex area. It is universal human phenomenon. It is conceptual skills. I would like to based upon multidisciplinary fields possible to stop speaking, but it is focus on the human skills, or more of study which a Special Forces sol- not possible to stop behaving. From specifically, the “intercultural com- dier needs to master if he is to be this continual behavior others make munication” piece of this equation. effective. He is exposed to these inferences concerning one’s thoughts and emotional states. Within the last decade, intercul- fields in institutional training, and These inferences are in turn acted tural communication has received his skills are enhanced and sus- upon by those who make them, a considerable interest and attention tained in the unit. response just as real as if the origi- in the special-operations communi- nal message had been verbal and ty. We frequently approach this Language intentional. A husband turning his subject obliquely by discussing We expect every Special Forces back on his wife and slamming the “coalition warfare,” “force multipli- soldier to be bilingual. By that we door without a word is heralding a cation” or “security assistance,” mean he has a working knowledge significant message. It is therefore just to mention a few subjects. (speaking and comprehending) of a not very difficult to understand Regardless, there is considerable foreign language consistent with what benefits a person can derive agreement that intercultural com- the regional orientation of his unit. from understanding nonverbal lan- munication is important to our total He is first introduced to a language guage, since we communicate in a readiness. at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy multiprocess manner. (It is interest- Effective intercultural communi- Special Warfare Center and School ing to note that studies indicate cation is the synergy one achieves and must acquire a minimum mem- females are better receivers of non- by synchronizing language, nonver- orized proficiency of 0+\0+ before verbal communication than males.) bal communications, cultural and he is allowed to proceed to his The understanding of gestures

20 Special Warfare and behavior is very difficult when received and interpreted. Unless we dynamics is imperative. The orien- the various elements are separated have been properly trained, we have tation must also take into account from their context. However, when thus maximized the potential for a the area’s geography and climate. gestures and behavior are fitted communication failure. On a very practical level, our together into their composite posi- For example, the gesture of form- increased understanding of the sim- tion, a complete picture evolves. At ing a circle with the thumb and ilarities and differences among peo- times you may find a dichotomy forefinger, the other fingers point- ple of different cultures will allow between the verbal and the nonver- ing up, is widely accepted as the for messages to be more accurately bal meaning. In those cases the American “okay” sign. However, in sent and received. For example, a nonverbal gesture will generally Brazil it is considered vulgar or Catholic from Haiti, one from Rome prove to be more truthful. obscene. The gesture is also consid- and one from Los Angeles will view Within a single culture, we utilize ered impolite in Greece and Russia, their religion from very different the nonverbal system almost uncon- while in Japan, it signifies “money” perspectives. In Japan, eye contact sciously. A study conducted in 1970 and in southern France “zero” or is key to the way you feel about someone, and the less of it the bet- estimates that within a single cul- “worthless.” Nevertheless, it must ter. What a westerner considers an ture, only 30 percent of what is be noted that there are several emo- honest look in the eye, the Oriental communicated in conversation is tions that span cultural boundaries: takes as a lack of respect and a per- verbal. But, it is when individuals anger, happiness, fear, surprise and sonal affront. Even when shaking from different cultural groups begin disgust are the key ones. The bot- hands or bowing, and especially to interact that their unconsciously tom line is that we must pay when conversing, only an occasional assumed system of nonverbal com- greater attention to this area than glance into the other person’s face is munications ceases to function well. we have done to date. considered polite. The rest of the The gestures and behavior may Cultural orientation time great attention is paid to fin- actually be the same, but they may gertips, desk tops and the floor. I be assigned different meanings This brings us to the field of cul- imagine it is a good idea to keep from one culture’s system to the tural and area orientation. For Spe- one’s shoes shined, for many Orien- other’s. Thus in a multicultural con- cial Forces, an understanding of the tals will have their eyes on them. text we frequently have no alterna- objective area’s people, their hopes, On the other hand, Arabs flinch tive but to send messages blindly, aspirations, religion, culture, histo- at the sight of shoe soles. Hence, not knowing how they will be ry and economic and political feet are best kept flat on the floor, never propped up on a table or desk, or crossed over the knee. These are just a sampling of cultural differ- CONCEPTUAL SKILLS: Planning, ences that can obstruct effective communication when not taken into SENIOR LEVEL consideration. Organizing, Coordinating, Interpersonal skills Staffing & Controlling The last area that I would like to HUMAN SKILLS: Intercultural mention is interpersonal communi- Communications, cation. Primarily, it requires the ability to maintain an open mind, MID LEVEL the sensitivity to observe and grasp Character, Maturity, the situation, and most important- TECHNICAL SKILLS: Endurance, ly, the ability to listen with under- Operations & Intelligence, Persuasion, standing. For a Special Forces sol- Communications, Weapons, Teaching & dier it is critical that he is an effec- Medical & Engineering Negotiating tive teacher, and the ultimate nego- ENTRY LEVEL tiator and persuader. These are the skills which allow him to be a “force multiplier.” To be a good negotiator is not easy. Standard strategies often leave people dissatisfied, worn out, or alienated, and frequently all Importance of Conceptual/Human Skills three. Often people find themselves in a

February 1993 21 require negotiation. For Special Forces, the ability to COMMUNICATION effectively negotiate, persuade and NON-VERBAL teach is critical in foreign internal defense and unconventional war- INPUT fare. Our technical competence is of little value if we are unable to ORIENTATION

CULTURAL & AREA get the other party to do what we

FOREIGN think is necessary. These skills can LANGUAGE determine the success or failure of a mission. INTERPERSONALSKILLS Special Forces takes great pride in being a force multiplier, con- tributing across the entire spec- trum of conflict. However, our con- tribution will only be as effective as our ability to master technical EFFECTIVE and conceptual skills and our abili- INTERCULTURAL ty to skillfully pass information COMMUNICATION through effective intercultural communication.

OUTPUT Maj. Gen. Sid- ney Shachnow is currently the com- Cognitive Process manding general, JFK Special War- fare Center and dilemma. They see two ways to whenever possible and that where School. During negotiate: Good Guy or Bad Guy. your interests conflict, you insist more than 30 The good guy wants to avoid per- that the results be based on some years of commis- sonal conflict and makes conces- fair standards independent of the sioned service, he has served as a sions readily in order to reach will of either side. This technique is commander or staff officer with agreement. He wants an amicable focused on merits and is gentle on Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, air- resolution; yet he often ends up people. It must be learned and fla- mobile, airborne, and Special Forces exploited and feeling bitter. The bad vored with knowledge of the foreign units. His most recent assignments guy sees any situation as a contest language, nonverbal communica- include serving as commanding gen- eral of the Army Special Forces of wills in which the side that takes tions, area and cultural under- Command and commanding gener- the more extreme position and standing, and good interpersonal al of U.S. Army-Berlin. His military holds out longer fares better. He skills. education includes the Infantry Offi- wants to win, yet many times ends Like it or not, we are all negotia- cer Basic and Advanced Courses, up producing an equally difficult tors. Negotiation is a fact of life. the Special Forces Qualification response. This exhausts both him Everyone negotiates something Course, the Army Command and and his resources, as well as harm- every day. A person negotiates General Staff College and the Army ing his reputation and relationship with his spouse, with his children War College. He holds a bachelor’s with others. Other strategies used and in various person-to-person degree from the University of fall between the two extremes of relationships. Negotiation is a Nebraska and a master’s degree getting along with people and get- basic means of getting what you from Shippensburg State College, ting what you want. want from others. It is back-and- Shippensburg, Pa. We advocate a strategy based on forth communication designed to a method developed by the Harvard reach an agreement when you and Negotiation Project. Issues should the other side have some interests be decided on their merits rather that are shared and others that are than through haggling. It suggests opposed. Since conflict is a growth that you look for mutual gains industry, more and more occasions

22 Special Warfare es and vocabulary-grammar exercis- form, we begin rehearsing the es — on the anticipated POI and its classes under the supervision of the component LPs. language instructor and team lin- First, we coordinate through our guist, concentrating on proper pro- Battalion S-3 training NCO to nunciation, diction and instructor schedule a 2-3 week block at our techniques. We are able to combine battalion language lab with an both speaking and listening skills, Mission-oriented accredited instructor. Then we as all team members participate in schedule training time prior to the this phase. The class is then given Language Training block to write LPs to support the in the target language before a POI, under the direction of our murder board consisting of detach- strongest team linguists. The ment members and the language strongest speaker is assigned the instructor. The majority of the by CWO 2 additional responsibility of coordi- questions posed by the murder nating with the contracted instruc- board are asked by those who are of Thomas F.D. Rogers tor in order to identify the needed native or near-native proficiency in grammar review and lessons, vocab- order to better prepare the primary ulary and exercises needed to sup- instructor. Over the years, language training port the LPs. Our attempts to develop effective has become one of the top training Grammar is focused on proper mission-oriented language training priorities for Special Forces sol- verb conjugation, with emphasis on are still evolving and changing. diers, yet language sustainment has the present tense, the preterite, the ODA-716’s approach is a combined continued to be one of the most dif- periphrastic future and the impera- effort of the entire detachment. We ficult areas to maintain. tive. We also reinforce proper sen- hope it will serve as an example of Each Special Forces group is allo- tence structure and other subjects, imagination and teamwork being cated funds to conduct internal lan- as needed, in accordance with our used to accomplish the mission and guage training. These budgets allow current skill level. The idea is to that the program will be of value to for language labs, instructors, mate- enable us to speak in simple, direct other units seeking to optimize the rials and OCONUS immersion pro- terms that our host-nation soldiers use of their language-training grams. In spite of all these re- will understand. Then we work on resources. sources, language training is at developing vocabulary lists that times inefficiently conducted, when support the lesson plans. For exam- measured against on ODA’s mis- ple, if we are discussing the con- CWO 2 Thomas sion-essential task list and upcom- struction of fighting positions, not F.D. Rogers is the ing missions. The following only do we have to be able to say detachment tech- approach has been developed by “parapet” in the target language, nician of ODA- ODA 716 to focus its language but we also have to describe a para- 716, Company A, training for specific missions. The pet in terms that recruits can 1st Battalion, 7th program was devised for ODAs understand: “Then you must con- Special Forces which have a FID primary mission struct a parapet to the front of the Group. With more and an upcoming mobile training position. A parapet is nothing more than 15 years in team or deployment for training than a low mound of dirt, which is Special Forces, he has served in into theater. packed down and is capable of pro- assignments with the 10th, 11th and In lieu of language-enhancement viding protection against small- 7th SF Groups and the Special War- training that aims to generally arms fire.” Without detailed, fare Center and School. upgrade team proficiency, we have descriptive words in the LPs, the found that a specific, mission-ori- host-nation troops often get lost ented language training program is during the instruction. of greatest value to the ODA. Our Writing skills are addressed program is based on developing through the POI’s previously devel- post-site-survey programs of oped lesson plans. The instructor instruction, or POIs, and lesson corrects them and provides one-on- plans, or LPs, which are directly one instruction on the salient gram- focused on the requirements of mar points and word usage that upcoming missions. We base the each individual requires. Then we majority of our language training — rewrite the corrected LP. listening, writing, speaking exercis- After the LPs are in their final

February 1993 23 The OSS: America’s First National Intelligence Agency

by Lawrence H. McDonald

The Office of Strategic Services from a pool. The names of those turned down, Olympic track and was America’s first national intelli- whose applications appear in the field star Alan Cranston, now chair- gence agency, founded belatedly in OSS Central Files but who, for one man of the Senate Veterans’ Affairs 1 the crucible of war, long after other reason or another, were not Committee, enlisted in the Army great powers had accorded foreign appointed to serve in the OSS, as a private. Mystery writer Leslie intelligence and covert operations a Charteris was also not selected, but make a most impressive list. When distinct and permanent role within the OSS Counterintelligence his application for the OSS was their political systems. Branch adopted the sobriquet of his As predecessor to the Central detective hero, the Saint, as its code Intelligence Agency, the OSS not name.2 Asked to list his sports and only passed on to the CIA its hobbies, John Wayne wrote, “foot- records, methods and experience, ball, played college ball at the Uni- but it provided a training ground versity of Southern California; for many of the ClA’s eminent intel- squash and tennis, fair; deep-sea ligence officers. Four of the ClA’s fishing, seven marlin in two years; fourteen directors — Allen Dulles, hunting, a good field shot; horse- Richard Helms, William Colby and back riding, have done falls and William Casey — have been OSS posse riding in pictures, not as easy veterans. as it sounds.” Wayne was also not Officers were not simply assigned appointed to serve in the OSS.3 to OSS by an army personnel office; The courage and daring of the rather, the OSS selected officers men and women of the OSS is leg- endary, making cloak and dagger a Copyright 1991 by Lawrence H. byword; OSS records document the McDonald, used with permission. often incredible bravery of its This article previously appeared in agents and operational teams. the Spring 1991 issue of Prologue, Courtesy National Archives “Incredible” is not too strong a Quarterly of the National Archives. OSS applicant Leslie Charteris word — even the OSS director, Maj.

24 Special Warfare Gen. William J. Donovan, carried lect, correlate and disseminate all acquired from all these agencies.8 the OSS’s L-tablet (potassium intelligence relating to national But COI failed to win their sup- cyanide) when in danger, to avoid security.7 He appointed Donovan, port. J. Edgar Hoover described 4 capture. who served as a dollar-a-year man, COI as “Roosevelt’s folly.” When Donovan served with great dis- as chief of this civilian agency. The COI agents made a clandestine raid tinction in World War I as an officer U.S. Army, Navy, State Depart- on the Spanish embassy in Wash- in the 42nd Division, the “Rainbow ment, FBI, Secret Service, Immigra- ington to photograph documents, Division.” Awarded the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service tion and Naturalization Service, Hoover, eager to protect his own Cross, the Distinguished Service Customs Service and Treasury De- territory, ordered several FBI squad Medal, and the Croix de Guerre, partment all had offices for foreign cars to the embassy, sirens blaring, “Wild Bill,” as he was known to the intelligence, and COI was to synthe- forcing the COI agents to take troops, returned from France one of size and disseminate intelligence flight.9 Assistant Secretary of State the most highly decorated American soldiers.5 After the war, Donovan served in the Coolidge administra- tion before founding a New York City law firm in 1929. Before Amer- ica marched to war again, he was a millionaire. Donovan’s reputation for reckless bravery followed him into World War II. He went ashore with the troops at Anzio. He met with OSS Detachment 101 guerrillas behind enemy lines in Burma. On D-Day, he and David K. E. Bruce went in with the invasion force. When he and Bruce found themselves pinned down by a German machine gun on Utah Beach, Donovan informed Bruce that they could not allow themselves to be taken alive and asked him if he was carrying his suicide pill, the L-tablet. Bruce con- fessed he had neglected to bring the poison tablet with him. Donovan searched his pockets for his own L- tablets but found none. “Ah well,” he said, “no matter for the pills. If the Germans take us, I’ll shoot you first as your commanding officer, then I’ll shoot myself, so there’s nothing to worry about.”6 He was, as President Eisenhower later described him, “the last hero.” He loved the excitement of war and seemed eager for American inter- vention in the war against the Axis. An Irish American and an interven- tionist Republican, Donovan made a welcome addition to the bipartisan war coalition that President Roo- sevelt desired. On July 11, 1941, the President Courtesy National Archives established (6 F.R. 3422) the Office Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, chosen by President Roosevelt to head the of Coordinator of Information to col- COI and later the OSS, was a Medal of Honor winner in World War I.

February 1993 25 Adolf Berle disdained all espionage counteract the effect of these actually originated in rumors as “paranoid work.” Army and Navy rumors, German Propaganda Minis- disseminated by OSS itself. The intelligence chiefs, jealous of their ter Joseph Goebbels actually main- OSS colonel was obviously exagger- own prerogatives, offered little coop- tained that he had planted misin- ating, but his observation does eration and sometimes deliberately formation regarding Hitler’s illness point up the dangers inherent in withheld information from COI. to lull the Allies into complacency.11 black propaganda.14 COI was also divided within. The Like an unmanageable form of Various forms of systematic chief of COI’s Foreign Information germ warfare, however, MO’s black deception were employed by the Service was Pulitzer Prize winner propaganda found its way back into OSS to mislead German intelligence Robert Sherwood.10 He believed American lines, where it was into thinking that the Allied land- that FIS should broadcast only reported as authentic information ings at Normandy were only a feint white propaganda, the open dissem- in the press. In October 1944 the calculated to draw German forces ination of the truth, but Donovan Washington Post published a Unit- away from the main Allied attack at wanted to make use of black propa- ed Press story of a “captured circu- Pas de Calais. This “grand decep- ganda as well, which deliberately lar” composed by a German “League tion,” largely the work of the British falsifies its source, purporting to of Lonely War Women,” who Double-Cross System, was essential emanate from the enemy. In the promised free love to soldiers home to the success of Operation Over- case of the OSS, it actually originat- lord. To defend his Fortress Europe ed in the OSS Morale Operations against this supposed second inva- Branch, called MO, and little “COI was also divided sion force, Hitler deployed 18 divi- escaped the fertile imaginations of within. The chief of sions to Pas de Calais and only six its officers. Their fabricated news- COI’s Foreign Infor- to Normandy. When the Germans papers, radio programs, poison-pen finally discovered the deception, the letters, leaflets, pamphlets, posters, mation Service, Allied beachhead at Normandy was stickers, rumors, passports of sur- Robert Sherwood, too strong to be dislodged.15 render, and other machinations believed that FIS The advantages of disinformation brought propaganda to the level of a and deception notwithstanding, science. should broadcast only Sherwood wanted nothing to do It is to the MO Branch that Allied white propaganda, with black propaganda, and he propaganda owed such stratagems but Donovan wanted joined with Librarian of Congress as cartoons drawn to foster the Ital- Archibald MacLeish and Budget ian predisposition to believe that to make use of black Director Harold Smith to heighten Hitler had an “evil eye,” the sample propaganda as well. the chorus of those urging the Pres- towel marinated in itching powder OSS machinations ident to dismantle COI. But Dono- and targeted especially for “Friends van also had advocates; he profited of Japan” in China, leaflets purport- brought propaganda much from the advice and support edly issued by the German Health to the level of a of a British naval intelligence offi- Service Ministry warning of psychic science.” cer stationed in Washington, Ian impotence resulting from air Fleming, later to become the author attacks, and anti-Nazi pamphlets of the James Bond espionage nov- adorned with feminine cheesecake on furlough. The circular was in els.16 Fleming provided Donovan so distracting even well-disciplined fact MO propaganda.12 with valuable information on the Wehrmacht personnel could not fail When not carefully controlled, structure and operation of the to notice. OSS black propaganda could per- British intelligence system and In the form of gossip, MO used ilously distort America’s own intel- encouraged COI to develop the clos- many variations on the theme ligence. In fall 1944 U.S. Army est possible liaison with MI6, the “Where is Hitler?” MO spread rum- intelligence in Delhi mistakenly British Secret Intelligence Service. ors that Hitler was to speak at cer- absorbed MO black propaganda Still more important to the vital tain anniversaries, while his rum- broadcast from Chittagong indicat- connection between COI and British ored death, disappearance, illness, ing a weakening of the Japanese intelligence and covert operations psychotic condition or flight from position in Southeast Asia.13 In was Sir William “Little Bill” Germany were all part of the or- June 1945 a columnist for the Lon- Stephenson, Britain’s wartime chestration of misinformation on his don Daily Express wrote that a intelligence chief in the United whereabouts and silence. MO U.S. Army colonel serving in the States, who generously supplied “Comeback Studies” showed that OSS had found that nearly half Donovan with highly classified these plants were reported as facts the information in the files of the information concerning the superior in the press of neutral countries. To OSS Secret Intelligence Branch methods and organization of the

26 Special Warfare British Secret Intelligence Service. records and all its functions, except logical warfare in direct support of Little Bill made Wild Bill an indis- Sherwood’s foreign-information military operations. It defined psy- pensable channel for the exchange activities, which were assigned to chological warfare to include propa- of top-secret information and warm- the Office of War Information, were ganda, economic warfare, sabotage, ly assisted his efforts to design transferred to the OSS. JCS Direc- guerrilla warfare, counterespi- COI/OSS under British influence tive No. 67, dated June 23, 1942, onage, contact with underground groups in enemy-controlled territo- and direction. described and empowered the OSS ry, and contact with foreign-nation- President Roosevelt resolved the to prepare intelligence studies, to ality groups in the United States. matter. On June 13, 1942, he abol- plan and execute subversive activi- From a small civilian agency com- ished COI and established by mili- ties, and to collect information posed of little more than a handful tary order the Office of Strategic through espionage. JCS 155/4/D, of branches and offices, by the end Services under the jurisdiction of dated Dec. 23, 1942, further autho- of the war the OSS would develop the Joint Chiefs of Staff. COI’s rized the OSS to carry out psycho- more than 40 branches and units with a well-chosen staff of almost 13,000 men and women. Modeled closely on the British systems of intelligence and covert operations, the OSS combined the functions assigned to four British organiza- tions — MI6, Special Operations Executive, Political Warfare Execu- tive, and the Foreign Office Research Department — into one agency.17 OSS not only added oper- ational units to carry on clandestine warfare and sabotage, but as a self- sufficient agency, assumed full responsibility for the entire intelli- gence cycle, including direction and planning of intelligence require- ments; collection of intelligence; evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation; and dissemina- tion or distribution of the final prod- uct to appropriate offices, called customers. The OSS assigned the collection of covert intelligence primarily to its Foreign Nationalities Branch and its Secret Intelligence Branch. FNB provided a new field of politi- cal intelligence by organizing con- tact with political refugees and with those important groups in the U.S. that were of recent foreign extrac- tion and therefore retained distinc- tive ties with their countries of ori- gin. Its staff was small, 40 or 50 people, but immigrant groups, eager to show their loyalty to the Ameri- can war effort, voluntarily provided information concerning Europe and Courtesy National Archives the Mediterranean area. Military order signed by President Franklin Roosevelt abolishing the Office Far more important to intelli- of the Coordinator of Information and establishing the OSS, with Donovan gence collection was the OSS Secret as its head. The action was calculated to quell COI’s internal disputes. Intelligence Branch. SI’s special

February 1993 27 task was espionage, the collection of intelligence by clandestine means, primarily from human sources. Espionage is distinct from other forms of intelligence collection such as communications interception, cryptanalysis and photographic interpretation. But though the OSS Foreign Broadcast Quarterly Corporation recorded radio inter- cepts and the OSS London Office’s Enemy Objectives Unit employed photographic interpretation to plan strategic bombing, espionage was the main source of all OSS intelligence.18 Most of the intelligence collection for the French Riviera campaign in August 1944 was the work of the OSS, especially the OSS field offices in Caserta and Algiers, which gath- ered intelligence on everything, as William Casey said, “down to the location and condition of every last pillbox or pylon.” Some of the most significant intelligence gathering was the product of OSS offices in neutral capitals.19 The OSS Lisbon and Madrid offices were established early, and the OSS Istanbul office was located in a famous seat of intrigue. OSS Stockholm sent agents into Norway and Denmark. In Switzerland, a memorable contri- bution to determining the progress of German nuclear and bacteriologi- cal research was made by an OSS officer, Moe Berg, who spoke six Courtesy National Archives languages.20 But Moe Berg will be Allen Dulles, an American espionage agent during World War I, served as remembered at least as well for his director of the OSS Bern office. years in the American League as catcher for the Washington Sena- duction and the V-1 and V-2 rock- dismissed as so many meaningless tors and the Boston Red Sox. ets. At first, British MI6 experts facts. The swarm of unprocessed The work of Allen Dulles’s OSS Harold “Kim” Philby and Sir Claude information, sometimes haphazard Bern office was outstanding. During Dansey dismissed much of the intel- and indiscriminate, generated by World War I, Dulles had served as ligence collected by the OSS Bern collection may lead to an intelli- an American espionage agent in office as the fabrications of German gence glut more confusing than Switzerland. As director of the OSS plants spiced with just enough enlightening. Sorting out the raw Bern office, he rarely failed to take truth to make it seem plausible. data produced by SI and other OSS advantage of sound intelligence pro- vided by unsolicited walk-ins. At Time would show that Philby was a units, integrating it into a coherent great personal risk, German anti- Soviet agent, and careful appraisal pattern, analyzing it and preparing Nazis Fritz Kolbe, Fritz Molden, and analysis would establish the finished intelligence in the form of Hans Bernd Gisevius and others quality and reliability of the OSS reports, studies and memorandums brought Dulles vital intelligence Bern production.21 in response to anticipated customer concerning German order-of-battle, Without proper evaluation, the requests — these were the functions aircraft defenses, submarine pro- best intelligence collection may be of the OSS Research and Analysis

28 Special Warfare Branch. The R&A staff selected the the wilderness of mirrors that was information contributed by OSS, pertinent material from the mass of World War II espionage, James however, was the tactical or field fragments and details furnished by Angleton, known to his colleagues intelligence often provided by teams clandestine sources and incorporat- in the intelligence community as from the Special Operations ed it with information drawn from the Delphic Oracle, may have Branch, or SO, working behind overt intelligence — the periodicals, already discovered the treachery of enemy lines with resistance groups. books, monographs and other publi- Kim Philby and the Cambridge The foremost concern of SO teams cations and records available in our apostles Guy Burgess and Sir and missions was liaison with the open society. At least 80 or 90 per- Anthony Blunt before the war resistance, providing weapons and cent of the intelligence exploited by ended. That the OSS was also the supplies to the indigenous under- R&A derived from open sources target of Soviet penetration is cer- ground forces, training them, and available at places like the Library tain. Ardent Marxists and Commu- planning and coordinating their of Congress and the National nists, like the Lincoln Brigade vet- sabotage with Allied operations. SO Archives, where the OSS main- erans and emigré scholars, were teams also secured target informa- tained small offices.22 among the most competent and ded- tion and assisted in the rescue of Protecting the security of OSS icated antifascists, and Donovan downed Allied airmen. intelligence collection, analysis and knowingly appointed them to posi- Outstanding among the SO mis- operations against enemy intelli- tions in the OSS. “I’d put Stalin on sions in Europe were the Jedburgh gence was the function of the OSS Counterintelligence Branch, X-2. the OSS payroll if I thought it teams. These were specially trained Counterintelligence exposed and would help us defeat Hitler,” said three-man teams parachuted into 24 counteracted enemy espionage. Pen- Donovan. France, Belgium and Holland on etration, as James Jesus Angleton Donovan believed that the OSS’s and after D-day. Each team consist- observed, is the essence of counter- principal contribution would be ed of two officers and a radio opera- intelligence. OSS X-2 worked its strategic intelligence, the basis for tor. One officer was a native of the way inside the Axis intelligence sys- the formation of national policy. country to which the team was sent, tems while preventing enemy pene- This primarily would be the final and the other was British or Ameri- tration of OSS operations. product of collection, analysis and can. Working closely with the Before D-day, British Counterin- synthesis by the FNB, SI, R&A and British Special Operations Execu- telligence, MI5, captured practically X-2.25 Some of the most valuable tive, SO sent 87 Jedburgh teams every German spy whom the Reich had sent into Britain, some 120 agents in all, and forced them to turn against their Nazi masters. These doubled agents identified other German spies, revealed the methods of the German intelligence services, provided the Allies with German codes and ciphers, and sent carefully contrived disinformation back to Germany. This Double- Cross System, made famous by Sir John Masterman’s monograph of the same name, was the work of the Twenty Committee, to which Nor- man Holmes Pearson, the chief of OSS London X-2, was assigned as liaison.23 The revelation after the war of massive Soviet penetration of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service at the highest level severely weak- ened the credibility of all British intelligence services despite post- war efforts to recover the confidence Courtesy National Archives of their allies by rigorous enforce- Soldiers from OSS Detachment 101 teach members of the native resistance to ment of the Official Secrets Act. In use automatic weapons in their fight against the Japanese.

February 1993 29 and 19 OSS operational groups, or Detachment 101, which did much to into reckless retaliation against the guerrilla units, into France alone.26 win the war for the Burma Road. To native population, and inflaming In June 1944, as the Allied inva- re-establish contact with Chiang the smoldering embers of resent- sion of France began, a wave of pop- Kai-shek’s Nationalist army, the ment into a conflagration of hate ular support for the army of libera- Allies had to wrest control of the against the Japanese occupation of tion swept across Europe. Resis- Ledo-Burma Road away from Burma. Before the war ended, tance forces, assisted by the Jed- Japan’s 15th Army and open the Detachment 101 destroyed burghs, crippled German efforts to highway from the Lashio railhead Japanese forces many times its counterattack by cutting rails, de- to Kunming. numbers.29 stroying bridges, mining roads, cut- Enlisting the support of native Less than three weeks after V-J ting off telecommunications and peoples like the Kachins, Karens Day, President Truman signed the sabotaging German vehicles. As a and Chinese in Burma, some 1,000 order terminating OSS, effective consequence, the German response officers and men of Detachment 101 Oct. 1, 1945. When the OSS finally to the Allied invasion was delayed formed a guerrilla army more than closed its doors, custody of all its by 48 hours. So successful were the 10,000 strong that fought savage records was assigned to one of two Jedburgh teams that General Eisen- agencies. One thousand cubic feet of hower requested additional SO sup- reports and other files from the port for resistance groups and for “Fighting under some library of the Research and Analy- acquisition of tactical intelligence.27 of the worst combat sis Branch were sent to the State Even before V-E Day, many of the conditions in the war, Department. All other OSS records Jedburghs were transferred to the were transferred to the Strategic China theater, where their methods Detachment 101 per- Services Unit, a War Department of training, organizing, supplying fected the art of guer- office made up of veterans drawn and leading indigenous troops were rilla warfare, harass- from the OSS Secret Intelligence applied with the same success as in and Counterintelligence branches. Europe. SO teams inflicted heavy ing the enemy with Half the records acquired by SSU losses on Japanese forces by sudden strike-and-evasion consisted of the files of the New strike-and-withdraw tactics, tactics, baiting them York, San Francisco and Washing- destroying communications and ton OSS offices; the other half com- transportation, and isolating units. into reckless retalia- prised the records of all OSS over- Vital to Japan’s control of the tion against the seas offices. Bringing together more Chinese interior was the mile-long native population, than 6,000 cubic feet of records from bridge that crossed the Hwang Ho the home offices and from OSS out- (Yellow) River near Kaifeng. This and inflaming the posts all over the world, the SSU double-track bridge was the thread smoldering embers of carefully arranged them according that joined the Japanese armies of resentment into a con- to point of origin, thereunder by north and south China. Against all OSS branch or unit, and thereunder odds, Jed veterans and a brave flagration of hate by file type. To this day, every file band of Chinese guerrillas under against the Japanese folder received by SSU bears the the command of Col. Frank Mills occupation of Burma.” mark of this fundamental system of and Maj. Paul Cyr mined the great arrangement. Having labeled each Hwang Ho bridge. On Aug. 9, 1945, folder, the SSU then shelved the the day Nagasaki was bombed, SO jungle warfare against determined records alphabetically, beginning Mission Jackal blew away two large Japanese troops. The monsoon with the Algiers Office and ending spans in the bridge just as a rains fell upon them in sheets. with the Washington Office.30 Japanese troop train was passing Leeches crawled through the eye- In 1947 the Central Intelligence over. The entire train, carrying lets of their boots; they poured the Agency assumed custody of the OSS some 2,000 Japanese soldiers, was water and blood out of them at the records so carefully arranged by the dragged to the bottom of the Hwang end of the day. Cholera, plague and SSU. In 1980 the CIA began trans- Ho.28 typhus were a constant threat. ferring its OSS archives to the The destruction of the Hwang Ho Malaria and bacillary dysentery National Archives, becoming the bridge was one of many achieve- were unavoidable. Fighting under first national intelligence agency ments of SO Detachment 202 in some of the worst combat conditions ever to release its once-classified the China theater. Pre-eminent as in the war, Detachment 101 perfect- records for research. The process of the model for successful guerrilla ed the art of guerrilla warfare, transferring, arranging, and operations and the predecessor of harassing the enemy with strike- describing this valuable group of Special Forces was the famed SO and-evasion tactics, baiting them records has been under way now for

30 Special Warfare more than a decade. Though the history. From the intelligence files Archivist and has written several Central Intelligence Agency contin- of the OSS alone, one could write a articles on the OSS and its records. ues to declassify and transfer history of the war, and writers and Mr. McDonald holds bachelor’s and records remaining in its OSS scholars the world over will contin- master’s degree from Georgetown Archives, the National Archives has ue to plumb the depths of OSS University and a Ph.D. in history already received more than 4,000 records for many years to come. from the University of Maryland. cubic feet of OSS records and opened them for scholarly investiga- tion.31 Descriptive lists are now Lawrence H. available for most of the OSS McDonald is a records at the National Archives, projects archivist and the lists have been computer- at the National ized to improve access and control.32 Archives in Wash- Researchers use these OSS ington, D.C. Since records more heavily than any other 1985 he has 20th-century military records in the worked on the National Archives. They offer a accessioning, kind of précis of the Second World arrangement and description of the War, revealing information never records of the Office of Strategic Ser- before available about one of the vices. He has also served as a great defining moments in modern reviews editor for the American

Notes: 1 Entry 92, box 179, folder 56, COI/OSS Central Files, Washington- Express, June 9, 1945. An OSS cable quoted it in a press clipping that Registry Office-Administrative Files-7, Records of the Office of was filed in the “Mud File” of Donovan’s headquarters records. Strategic Services, Record Group 226, National Archives, Washing- 15 William Casey, The Secret War Against Hitler (1988), pp. 98-101. ton, D.C. (hereinafter cited as RG 226, NA). 16 Some of Ian Fleming’s correspondence with OSS appears in 2 Entry 92, box 156, folder 64, COI/OSS Central Files, Washington- entry 190, box 318, folder 393, London Secret Intelligence Branch- Registry Office-Administrative Files-7, RG 226, NA. Operational Files 45, RG 226, NA. Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the 3 Entry 92, box 362, OSS folder 22087, COI/OSS Central Files, CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency Washington-Registry Office-Administrative Files-7, RG 226, NA. (1981), pp. 81-82. 4 Instructions for the use of the L (lethal) and K (knock-out) tablets 17 Robin W. Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, are given in entry 110, box 38, folder 373, Stockholm Special Opera- 1939-1961 (1987), pp. 60-61. tions Branch-Operational Files-19, RG 226, NA. 18 Concerning FBQ, see entry 92, box 397, folder 24402, RG 226, 5 American Decorations: A List of Awards of the Congressional NA. Concerning the R&A EOU, see entry 91, London War Diaries in Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross and the Distin- History of the London Office of the OSS, National Archives Microfilm guished Service Medal Awarded under Authority of the Congress of Publication M1623, roll 3, RG 226. the United States, 1862-1926 (1927), pp. 256, 697. The historian David Kahn maintains the superiority of cryptanaly- 6 Richard Dunlop, America’s Master Spy (1982), p. 439. Donovan’s sis over espionage in his book The Code-Breakers: The Story of Secret arrangements for Overlord appear in the OSS cable files, entry 134, Writing (1963), p. 273. However, it is significant, as Christopher box 159, folder 1026, Washington-Registry Office-Radio and Cables Andrew points out, that without espionage the Allies might have 49, RG 226, NA. taken many years to break the all-important codes generated by the 7 Walter Karig published one of the earliest accounts of Donovan’s German code machine Enigma. Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: work as Coordinator of Information in his article “The Most Mysteri- The Making of the British Intelligence Community (1985), pp. 448- ous Man in Washington” in Liberty magazine, Jan. 3, 1942. The arti- 457. cle was filed in the COI/OSS Central Files, entry 92, box 65, folder 39 19 Casey, Secret War, pp. 48-54, 132. (8345), RG 226, NA. 20 Moe Berg’s personnel file appears in the COI/OSS Central Files, 8 John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA entry 92, box 313, folder 1, OSS folder 19487, RG 226, NA. (1987), pp. 45-53. 21 OSS Bern Office records in entries 125 and 190, RG 226, NA, are 9 Ibid., pp. 61-62. often annotated in Allen Dulles’s own hand. Ranelagh, The CIA, pp. 10 Robert Sherwood won Pulitzer Prizes for his plays Idiot’s Delight 72-78. The OSS Survey of Foreign Experts and the George Office also (1936), Abe Lincoln in Illinois (1938), and There Shall Be No Night had the function of intelligence collection. (1940) and for the biography Roosevelt and Hopkins (1949). 22 Winks, Cloak and Gown, pp. 474-476. 11 MO Illustrative Material, entry 169, folder 2253, Washington 23 Winks, Cloak and Gown, pp. 280-291. Not all SI efforts to pene- Office-Morale Operations Branch-Operational Files-81, RG 226, NA. trate Germany were successful, as William Casey’s wartime report 12 Entry 139, box 161, folder 2150, Washington-Morale Operations demonstrates, entry 190, box 300, folders 82/A and 94, London - Branch-Operational Files 69, RG 226, NA. The same story also Secret Intelligence Branch - Operational Files - 9 and 21, RG 226, appeared on the front page of the Italy edition of Stars and Stripes, NA. Most of the SI agents sent into Germany were never heard from Oct. 14, 1944. again. 13 Entry 139, folder 2058, Washington Office-Morale Operations- 24 R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Cen- Operational Files 66, RG 226, NA. tral Intelligence Agency (1972), pp. 10-11. A memorandum of DeWitt 14 Entry 190, box 683, folder 1113, Washington-Director’s Office- Clinton of Feb. 27, 1946, discusses penetration of OSS briefly: entry Operational File-266, RG 226, NA. The story appeared in the column 92, box 120, folder 32, COI/OSS Central Files, RG 226, NA. of C.V.R. Thompson, New York correspondent of the London Daily 25 In the perennial debate over the importance of analysis as

February 1993 31 opposed to collection, Donovan also tended to give priority to analy- series of financial files created by the Secret Intelligence Branch in sis. Entry 154, box 116, folder 2097, Kandy - Registry Office - Opera- the OSS Bern office, for instance, are labeled: BERN-SI-FIN-4. To tional Files-18, RG 226, NA. take another example, the second series of personnel files created by 26 Entry 91, box 24, History of the OSS in London, War Diary, SO the Special Operations Branch in the OSS Kunming office are Branch, OSS London, vol. 4, book 1, Jedburghs, pp. i-xxv, RG 226, labeled: KUNMING-SO-PERS-2. NA. The London War Diary is the most thorough history of any OSS 31 In 1975 and 1976 the National Archives opened 1,000 cubic feet overseas office, consisting of more than 14 cubic feet of records. It is of OSS records received from the State Department for research. Of readily available on National Archives Microfilm Publication M1623. the more than 6,000 cubic feet of records in the OSS Archives of the Concerning the Special Operations Branch, see rolls 6-7; concerning Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA has, since 1980, transferred the Jedburghs, see roll 8. The OSS Operational Group Command more than 3,000 cubic feet of records to the National Archives. Once developed out of the SO Branch. OG teams were larger than those of they are declared inactive, only a small part of the records generated SO, usually composed of about 20 to 30 men. Unlike SO teams, the by federal agencies can be permanently preserved. The records of the OG teams often engaged small enemy units in direct combat. The OSS are an exception; most of them will be assigned for permanent London War Diaries describe OG operations in vol. 4-A, M1623, roll retention at the National Archives. A critical survey of literature on 9. The origin of the name Jedburgh is uncertain. It appears as early intelligence can be found in George C. Constantinides, Intelligence as July 7, 1942, in an SOE directive. It apparently derives from and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography (1983). An official history British infiltration during the Boer War in South Africa. See Fabrizio of the OSS was prepared by the SSU History Project. This was pub- Calvi, OSS, La Guerre Secrete en France, 1942-1945: Les Services lished in two volumes in 1976 with introductions by Kermit Roo- Speciaux Americains, La Resistance et La Gestapo (1990), p. 359. sevelt: Volume 1, War Report of the OSS and Volume 2, The Overseas 27 Entry 91, box 24, London, vol. 4, book 1, Jedburghs, RG 226, NA. Targets War Report of the OSS. Bradley Smith, Shadow Warriors, pp. 290-293. 32 Computer printouts have re-established the original SSU system 28 Many citations for Mission Jackal, SO Detachment 202 in China of arrangement and sorted them out according to point of origin, Theater, and the Jedburgh missions in Europe can be found in the associated location, branch, file type, personal name, code and project Code and Project Names printout, which is based on descriptive lists name, entry and keyword. Volunteer workers at the National written for the OSS Archives of the Central Intelligence Agency. Archives have contributed significantly to the preservation of the 29 Roger Hilsman, American Guerrilla: My War Behind Japanese OSS records by refoldering, labeling, covering records in mylar, per- Lines (1990), pp. 67-227. forming other holdings maintenance work and by preparing records 30 Researchers will note, for example, that file folders for the fourth for microfilming.

32 Special Warfare Interview:

Lt. Col. David G. Christie, Australian SAS Regiment

Lt. Col. David G. Christie is the tional intelligence gathering, bilateral training exercises with the Australian Liaison Officer for the harassment of the enemy in depth, U.S. and regional forces. U.S. Army Special Operations Com- recovery operations, siege-hostage mand, assigned for duty with the terrorist operations and special- SW: What are the prerequisites for JFK Special Warfare Center and warfare operations. Our special- the SAS, and what kind of training School. Assigned to USASOC since warfare role may be likened to the do you go through? February 1990, he was also as- U.S. unconventional-warfare role. Christie: All applicants must have signed to the former JFK Center for Despite these varied roles the regi- completed about two years’ service. Military Assistance from 1972-74 as ment is primarily a reconnaissance This saves the regiment resources, a student in various courses. An and surveillance organization, in that basic training has already Infantry Corps Officer, most of his designed to conduct operations been completed. Additionally, the service has been in special opera- beyond the scope of conventional two years’ service criterion is, in tions. Since joining the Australian forces. itself, a selection procedure, since Army in 1967, he has had training, applicants must have their com- command and staff appointments in SW: Is it very active currently? manding officers’ recommendations, special operations and is a former Christie: Elements of the regiment and they must have performed well commander of the Australian have remained active in training- to achieve that recommendation. Parachute School at Nowra, assistance tasks throughout the Applicants must be mentally and Australia. Southeast Asian and southwest physically fit, they need to be able Pacific regions. Individually, mem- to accomplish demanding tasks, SW: What are the missions of the bers of the regiment participate alone or as a member of a group, in Australian Special Air Service with other members of the Aus- conditions that are less than pleas- Regiment? tralian Defense Force in United ant, and they need to continually Christie: To achieve its mission, Nations peacekeeping tasks. Fur- perform to the limits of their ability the regiment focuses on a number of thermore, the regiment maintains and endurance. The regiment’s roles which are diverse in nature an extremely intense training cal- selection criteria are similar to the and include strategic and opera- endar and participates in a range of Special Forces Assessment and

February 1993 33 Selection Course conducted by your series of courses, including basic tactics. Soldiers also complete more 1st Special Warfare Training demolitions, weapons handling, advanced training in their special- Group. regimental signaller, and medical ist skill areas. assistant. Once assigned to a troop, SW: How long is the selection reinforcements undertake training SW: Would other people in the Aus- course? in the basic skills of the troop to tralian Army attend the same Christie: The selection course is which they are assigned. These schools? approximately three weeks in dura- troop skills relate to the different Christie: No. One of the Special Air tion. This course is not designed to environments in which the troops Service Regiment subunits is a teach. It is designed to identify specialize — air operations, water training squadron. The training those applicants best equipped to be operations and vehicle-mounted squadron is manned primarily by able to assimilate the demanding operations. The selection-and-rein- experienced senior noncommis- year of training that will follow the sioned officers who have advanced selection procedure and then to use skill levels in the various specialist that training to accomplish areas. In this regard, the training assigned tasks. Motivation plays a squadron performs much the same very big part in success on the function for the Special Air Service selection course and service in the Regiment as your training group regiment. does for Special Forces. Training Squadron conducts courses specifi- SW: How much influence did your cally for the regiment, and the stan- course have on our SFAS Course? dards required are those set by the Christie: I understand that your regiment’s commanding officer. The training group sent a team to observe a number of other courses, courses conducted by Training as well as the course conducted by Squadron are not normally avail- the Special Air Service Regiment. able to other Army members. While in Australia, your team SW: What is a sabre squadron? observed closely the conduct of a Christie: The term sabre squadron full selection course and departed is used to describe the fighting Australia with a full course pack- squadrons of the regiment. The age. The information gathered in Special Air Service Regiment has Australia was used in the produc- three sabre squadrons. In addition, tion of the SFAS Course. I don’t find there is a regimental headquarters the similarities surprising at all. In “U.S. Special Forces to provide command and control fact, even if the courses had been and set policy guidelines, a base produced in total isolation, I would provide an immense squadron to provide for the admin- think there would be many similari- capability to support istrative needs, a signal squadron ties. Both forces, after all, require U.S. interests. I think and the training squadron I men- very similar performance from the tioned earlier. selected soldiers. that capability is characterized by thor- SW: Since their main mission is SW: Once selected, do the soldiers go reconnaissance and surveillance, through the regular SAS training oughly competent peo- what kind of reconnaissance train- course? ple at all levels.” ing do they get? Christie: Before posting to the Christie: I mentioned the basic Special Air Service Regiment, all training all soldiers receive before applicants who have successfully forcement training cycle takes they are posted to a squadron and completed the selection course about 10 months, that is, from the the advanced training once posted. must complete a basic parachute commencement of the selection The patrol course goes into detail in course and an SAS patrol course. course to posting to an SAS the techniques of conducting a On posting, all soldiers are Squadron. On posting to an SAS patrol, how to best use the environ- required to relinquish rank and sabre squadron, all soldiers com- ment, the conduct of observation revert to the rank of trooper. In the mence advanced training, although and surveillance and the reporting Special Air Service Regiment, the this is still concerned with the of information obtained. In addi- initial rank is that of trooper, but a bread-and-butter requirements of tion, the Special Air Service Regi- private is not the same as a troop- their trade, such as shooting, field- ment spends considerable effort on er. Soldiers must then complete a craft, navigation and small-unit teaching skills such as patrol

34 Special Warfare debriefing, to ensure that maximum commander, or it may be directly by tle time available to conduct train- benefit is gained from each patrol. the headquarters of the Australian ing in something so basic as Our soldiers need to know how to Defense Force. The information patrolling. In addition, Special pull all the reconnaissance informa- gained by the Special Air Service Forces has available an enormous tion into a format that will describe Regiment is for the commander of array of high-tech equipment for what they’ve seen to someone who the force that SAS elements are which training must continually be needs to use the information, and so supporting. conducted. they are taught to compile all this information into a reconnaissance SW: Can you make any comparison SW: From your service here, what impressions have you formed of Spe- survey, or target survey. The aim of between the reconnaissance skills cial Forces? that from the SAS Regiment’s point that we train for in Special Forces Christie: I think Special Forces are of view is to allow a regular-army and what you train for in SAS? a wonderfully skilled force with unit, or a naval or air force asset, to Christie: I think the reconnais- immense capabilities. I don’t always move against that target, should it sance skills needed are the same in agree with the methods of training, be desired, and so the intelligence both countries. But I think the Spe- but I grew up in a different environ- has to be well-presented. As in your cial Air Service Regiment spends ment, so I’m probably biased toward Special Forces, there is a consider- more time learning and reinforcing the SAS way of doing things. I think able amount of equipment to assist the basics. The style of instruction Special Forces are being forced to soldiers in gathering information, in the Special Air Service Regiment become more conventional, which I and the skills needed to use that is much more personal. From the think is something that your com- equipment for maximum benefit time of allocation to a patrol, which manders are well aware of. I also requires good training. All of these is the basic operational element of think that the force is “headquar- skills are enhanced on the Patrol the regiment, consisting of five men, tered to death.” The important Commander’s Course. In the spe- it is the responsibility of the patrol thing is that U.S. Special Forces cialist areas, courses teach such commander to ensure that his provide an immense capability to skills as beach reconnaissance and patrol is well trained, and he support U.S. interests. I think that survey. spends most of his time making this happen. The skills required for capability is characterized by thor- SW: So the reconnaissance informa- reconnaissance and surveillance oughly competent people at all lev- tion gained wouldn’t just be for SAS demand as much learning time and els. I am very thankful to have been use? practice as demolitions, scuba div- able to watch and learn, just by Christie: That is correct. In the ing, or any other advanced skill. being here. Australian Defense Force, elements From my observations and under- of the Special Air Service Regiment standing of the missions required of assigned to operations would be U.S. Special Forces and the envi- commanded at the highest level. ronments in which these missions That may well be a joint-task-force must be achieved, there is very lit-

February 1993 35 Mission Planning and Rehearsal Systems:

New Tools for Mission Preparation

by Capt. Dan Smith

Army special-operations forces tors to plan their missions. • Fire-support and air opera- have a critical need for information The purpose of an MPRS is to tions — to plan for suppression or about their operational areas in increase the accuracy and speed of destruction of threat capabilities. order to conduct mission analysis mission planning and rehearsal by • Decision making — to assist in and planning. To provide a rapid integrating operational, intelligence development and assessment of response to potential worldwide and terrain information. A system courses of action. military or humanitarian crises, which superimposes imagery, • Rehearsal/navigation — to commanders, staffs and soldiers threat and tactical-situation infor- practice moving through the opera- need to be able to integrate infor- mation onto terrain would produce tional area. This can be a static or mation, plan, assess, rehearse and an electronic sand table for use in moving product used to assist the execute operations for areas with the following: operator with navigation and other which they are unfamiliar. • Familiarization — to help deci- aspects of mission execution while No change in current planning sion makers or operators learn on an operation. procedure is needed. What is need- about the operational area during • Debriefing — to assist an opera- ed is an improvement in execution mission preparation. tor in recalling and explaining of the planning procedure, in terms • Site/target/objective planning — details of an operation in which he of speed, planning data and meth- to assist in the design of tactical mil- participated. ods for exchanging data between itary plans (actions at the objective • Image analysis — to gain a bet- users. The answer may lie in auto- area). ter understanding of an image. mated mission-planning-and- • Line-of-sight analysis — to • All-source analysis — to gain a rehearsal systems, which can con- determine what can be seen from more comprehensive view of an solidate and present visually, infor- various vantage points for planning area, facility, objective or target. mation that has been gathered observation, cover and concealment, • Intelligence reporting — to through a comprehensive collection communications, range fans for communicate intelligence informa- plan. It should be understood that friendly and threat weapon systems. tion to decision makers, operators an MPRS is not a substitute for the • Route planning — to assist in or other intelligence users. mission-planning process — it is a the design of ground and air routes An MPRS is limited by the avail- tool to assist planners and opera- during a mission. ability, age and accuracy of the data

36 Special Warfare Left: Satellite photo of the Joint Readiness Training Center, including the area of Rat- tlesnake Drop Zone.

Below: Digital terrain map of the area sur- rounding Rattlesnake Drop Zone.

Left: A perspective view of Rattlesnake Drop Zone, produced by the Army Space Command system. Through a pro- cess called image-per- spective transforma- tion, the system com- bines digital terrain data with imagery from satellite photos. (Photos courtesy Army Space Command)

February 1993 37 it uses and the time it takes to pro- indistinguishable, and the viewer ongoing SOF operations. Units duce products. Some systems use appears to be in motion. interested in more information on computer graphics to cover gaps in Contracts for development of the system or demonstrations can data and to add more apparent real- SOFPARS Phase I were awarded in contact Capt. Scott Netherland, ism. It is important to remember 1991 for system delivery in January Army Space Command, at DSN that some features, such as tree 1993; contracts for Phase II were 692-8773, commercial (719) 554- spacing and diameter, for example, awarded in June 1992 for system 8773/8713. would be different in reality from delivery in March 1993. Contracts what is seen on a screen. for Phase III are scheduled to be let A system being specifically devel- in 1995. Once the systems are deliv- Capt. Dan oped for SOF is the SOF Planning ered, they will be tested and evalu- Smith is currently and Rehearsal System. SOFPARS is ated for further development. a detachment com- planned as a family of systems to Another automated planning and mander in Co. A, provide a mission-planning-and- rehearsal system, not SOF-specific, 2nd Battalion, rehearsal capability for air, ground is currently being demonstrated by 11th Special and maritime missions. It will be the Army Space Command to Forces Group. A developed in three phases, with con- acquaint potential Army users with former enlisted tinual SOF-operator feedback dur- the system’s capability. The system intelligence ana- ing the development. Phase I is a exploits digital imagery and terrain lyst and Special Forces weapons comprehensive planning and data, from both government and sergeant, he has served as an intelli- gence analyst and combat-intelli- rehearsal system for Air Force and civil sources. Terrain data provides gence-team member with the 5th SF Army special-operations-aviation the elevation and other topographic Group, as a detachment executive units. It is designed to include information, and imagery provides officer and detachment commander threat-modeling, route planning, information about the current state with the 20th SF Group, and as a integrated maps and imagery, gen- of the ground and situation. tactical surveillance officer and tac- eration of 3-D perspective views and Using these data, the Space Com- tical intelligence officer with the automated production of mission- mand MPRS produces three-dimen- 29th Infantry Division. In his civil- planning products. sional perspective views through a ian occupation, he is an intelligence Phase II would allow Army and process called image-perspective operations specialist in the Office of Navy SOF to use computers to scan transformation. IPT is the geomet- the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelli- digital maps and imagery from ric transformation of digital gence, Headquarters, Department of national and civil sources, and to imagery to change the apparent the Army. In addition to the Special build databases for use in planning camera/sensor position, creating Forces Qualification Course, he is a various courses of action. Phase II true perspective scenes from any graduate of the Intelligence Officer would also generate 3-D perspective point of view. Basic Course and the Infantry Offi- views and automated mission-plan- Demonstrations are tailored to a cer Basic and Advanced Courses. He ning products. Phase III will be a requestor’s requirement and can holds a bachelor’s degree in journal- mission-rehearsal system which run as long as four weeks. The ism from Marquette University and will let troops simulate movement ARSPACE system has been used to is a candidate for a master’s degree through designated areas from vari- support exercises at the Joint at George Mason University. ous viewing angles. Perspective Readiness Training Center. In one views generate a snapshot of ter- example, a SOCCE and SF ODAs rain which may then be manipulat- used the MPRS for mission plan- ed by rotation or zooming in or out. ning, then the SOCCE used it to In a rehearsal system, the snap- assist the brigade staff to plan its shots occur so rapidly as to be mission and to inform the staff of

38 Special Warfare Enlisted Career Notes Special Warfare

SQI “D” reinstated for Skill-qualification identifier “D,” Civil Affairs operations, has again been reserve-component authorized for reserve-component Civil Affairs soldiers. The approval of CA soldiers Career Management Field 38, Civil Affairs Specialist, as an RC-unique MOS did not identify all soldiers assigned to RC Civil Affairs units or the positions which require Civil Affairs training. Future changes to RC Civil Affairs authorization documents will include the addition of the “D” quali- fier to a number of MOSs throughout the structure.

Language proficiency Promotion competition is becoming more specialized and focused. Although important for promotion, speaking a language is not a requirement, proficiency could be used as a future assignments discriminator for promotions and assignments. With the high quality of soldiers competing for promotions and assignments, soldiers should keep their proficiency rating current and their records updated.

ANCOC to become Effective Oct. 1, 1993, promotion to sergeant first class will be linked to requirement for promotion attendance and completion of the Advanced NCO Course. Unit comman- to SFC ders and sergeants major are strongly encouraged to continue placing the highest priority on NCOs’ preparation and timely attendance to ANCOC. Sgt. Maj. Thomas Rupert reminds soldiers that ANCOC consideration lists are only that — final lists are made once all deferments are taken out.

PERSCOM points of contact The following points of contact may be useful to enlisted SF soldiers who need to contact the SF Branch about assignments or career development:

Maj. Christopher Allen ...... Enlisted Branch Chief Sgt. Maj. Thomas Rupert...... Professional-development NCO Mrs. Faye Matheny...... 18 B, C and D assignments manager Ms. Jacqui Velasquez...... 18 E, F, Z and ROTC assignments, ANCOC manager Ms. Dyna Amey ...... SFQC accession manager SSgt. Therese Archambeault...... 37F assignments, ANCOC manager Mrs. Loretta Spivey ...... Branch secretary

Sgt. Maj. Thomas Rupert asks that soldiers direct assignment-related questions to the assignment managers and career-development questions to the professional-development NCO. Students in the SF Qualification Course with assignments questions should contact their student PAC. Branch phone numbers are DSN 221-8340/6044, commercial (202) 325- 8340/6044. Address correspondence to: Commander; PERSCOM; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452.

February 1993 39 Officer Career Notes Special Warfare

SF Branch chief publishes The chief of the Special Forces Branch, Lt. Col. William J. Davis III, has standing orders recently published his branch philosophy and standing orders for all Spe- cial Forces officers: 1. Be honest — Always tell the truth. In these demanding times of the drawdown, we must be totally frank with our soldiers. Integrity is non-negotiable. 2. Be factual. 3. Always do your best — No one can expect more from you, and I cannot accept less. This is what our soldiers deserve. Demonstrate this by execution and not by idle words. 4. Never divulge sensitive information. 5. Never predict what a board will do. 6. We are PERSCOM professionals — The red and blue books serve as our FMs and TMs. Your character, maturity, interpersonal skills and common sense will guide you to the target. 7. Be aware of your operational surroundings. 8. Never let emotionalism cloud your perspective. 9. Always remember who you are and what you represent to our families, our Army, our Department of Defense and our nation. 10. Never forget the Golden Rule. 11. Never forget our Special Forces heritage. 12. Twelve orders and 12 men. Never forget the A-team. De Oppresso Liber! God bless America!

FY 92 SF Accession Board The Special Forces Accession board met Sept. 28-30, 1992, to consider selects 202 from YG 89 applications for Special Forces from year-group-89 officers. The board selected 202 applications for 138 YG 89 requirements in SF. The number of those officers who will successfully complete Special Forces Assessment and Selection, the Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course and language school is unknown. Based on last year’s statistics, these applicants should produce approximately 131 SF officers two years from now. Additional YG 89 applications will be accepted until the fall of 1996. Prospects are good that YG 89 will eventually be filled to the authorized level of manning.

RC SF officers may be able Because of a shortage of Special Forces officers on active duty, particularly to apply for active duty captains, an action is currently being developed that would allow reserve- component SF captains to apply for active duty. Many details have yet to be worked out, but plans call for a board to consider applications from offi- cers who meet the still-to-be-determined screening criteria. Selected offi- cers would be brought on active duty for a three-year tour. Based on the needs of the Army and officer performance, some officers may be allowed to apply for “career status” and compete for selection to major. For further details contact Capt. Scott Peters in the SWCS Special Operations Propo- nency Office, DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial (919) 432-2415/9002.

40 Special Warfare Some 18/39 officers eligible Special Forces officers with Functional Area 39 who completed the Foreign for RSC credit Area Officer Course prior to July 1986 are eligible to receive constructive credit for the Regional Studies Course. To update their ORBs, eligible offi- cers should contact Maj. Ray Morales, FA 39 assignments officer at PER- SCOM, DSN 221-3115. He has a roster of officers who qualify for construc- tive credit, but he cannot update ORBs unless officers notify him.

Some FA 39 officers Some FA 39 officers may notice a different area-of-concentration identifier reclassified on their next ORB. According to the SWCS Proponency Office, some FA 39 officers have been reclassified from 39B, PSYOP Officer, to 39B/C, PSYOP and Civil Affairs Officer, based on their training and duty assignments. This increases the inventory of 39C officers in the functional area and the Officer Distribution Plan.

SOPO welcomes The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office has recently gained the new personnel following personnel: Lt. Col. Dave Wildeman, chief of SOPO; Maj. Ron Fiegle, CA Branch manager; CWO 3 Schaun Driscoll, 180A manager; SFC R.B. Gardner, operations sergeant; Mrs. Jeanne Schiller, FA 39 manager; and Mrs. Mary Ann Handran, secretary. Recent losses are Lt. Col. William A. Behrens, to Office of the Defense Attaché - Lebanon; Maj. Jose Mar- tinez, to U.S. Army - South; and CWO 3 Bobby Shireman, to the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Chaffee, Ark.

New Reserve Component Reserve-component officers assigned to Civil Affairs troop program units in Civil Affairs Officer positions requiring Branch 38 qualification are now required to complete Advanced Course fielded the new two-phase Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course. Phase I of the new course, taken by correspondence, consists of both Army common-core and Civil Affairs-specific subcourses. Phase I culminates with a writing requirement which must be completed prior to the officer attending Phase II resident training at Fort Bragg. Officers previously enrolled in the old four-phase CAOAC are authorized to complete that course for qualifica- tion, with a few conditions. First, they must have been enrolled in either the OAC Phase I common-core correspondence course offered by the Army Correspondence Course Program prior to Oct. 1, 1991, or Phase I of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School prior to Oct. 1, 1992, to meet the old common-core requirement. (Officers who have previously completed any other advanced course are exempt from this requirement.) Second, all CAOAC students must have been enrolled in the old Phase III correspon- dence course not later than Oct. 1, 1992. ACCP will no longer enroll stu- dents in this course. Finally, all correspondence requirements under the four-phase system must be completed by Oct. 1, 1993. Officers who cannot meet these requirements must enroll in the new two-phase advanced course, including those officers who have previously completed any of the old resident phases. Officers who enrolled in and completed the pilot Phase I of the new CAOAC are authorized to complete the course by attendance in Phase IV of the old CAOAC. No other waivers or exceptions are autho- rized. Phase II of the new CAOAC will be taught at Fort Bragg beginning in the first quarter of FY 94. For more information, contact Maj. Ron Fiegle in the Special Operations Proponency Office, DSN 239-6406, com- mercial (919) 432-6406.

February 1993 41 Foreign SOF Special Warfare

Russians seek system Combatting enemy sabotage and diversionary units, both in the rear of to combat foreign SOF deployed operational formations and in strategic rear areas as well — was a continuing concern of Soviet military planners. As a consequence, rear-area forces and employment concepts were well-developed even at tactical levels. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, however, mili- tary and internal-security forces designated to perform these tasks were ini- tially fragmented and disorganized, and eventually allocated among the newly independent states and restructured. The requirement for dealing with enemy SOF, nevertheless, was identified as a most important mission for Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Just months after the USSR’s dissolution, a 1992 article in the premier Russian military jour- nal Military Thought reviewed the growing importance and effectiveness of special warfare as demonstrated in the Gulf War and elsewhere. The authors judged that it was necessary to create a “unified system for combat- ting special operations forces” throughout the depth of the country, to include “specially formed (assigned) personnel and equipment distributed by zones of responsibility and by presumed areas of combat against special operations forces.” The missions and actions of such a system were set out, to include the requirement for interaction among military forces, border troops and internal troops, National Guard units, and civil defense and territorial units. However, given the continuing disarray in Russian military and secu- rity forces, highly permeable borders and the presence of interethnic hotspots inside Russia and around its periphery, creating such a system remains a distant goal.

Salvadoran police force The creation of a new police force in El Salvador, completely civilian in its part of 1992 peace accords membership and command, was one of the fundamental components of the Jan. 16, 1992, peace agreement between the Government of El Salvador, or GOES, and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. In March 1992, in response to this provision of the accords, the GOES abolished the National Guard and the Treasury Police Security Corps, which were among the most active counterinsurgency forces during the 12-year war. In their place, authorities created the Brigada Especial de Seguridad Militar (Special Brigade for Military Security — BESM). Directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense, the unit is composed of four battalions and includes a 456-man military-police battalion organized and structured after the U.S. Army MP doctrinal concepts model. The brigade’s mission statement, unit TO&E, and training calendar were developed in 1992 with the assistance of a U.S. mili- tary adviser. Essential training to prepare the unit for its deployment included: provost-marshal operations, criminal-investigations procedures, physical security, crime prevention, deserter apprehension, prevention of drug and alcohol abuse, leadership, small-arms skills, and counterterrorism training. The MP battalion will deploy for military-security duties sometime in 1993. The other three battalions (475 men each) guard the borders with Guatemala and Honduras. They are charged with guaranteeing national sovereignty, suppressing smuggling of drugs and other contraband, and sup- porting other governmental agencies in the frontier regions.

42 Special Warfare Ukraine sets up In a number of former Soviet republics, internal-security forces are required Golden Eagle units to deal with problems having both law-enforcement and military dimensions. Responding to rising levels of criminal and random violence and other acts of “terrorism,” as well as a perceived need to maintain rapid-response units capable of dealing with natural disasters, epidemics and other emergencies, Ukraine has set up specialized paramilitary security forces throughout the state. These forces — called Berkut (Golden Eagle) detachments to symbol- ize their asserted mobility, combat readiness and resolve — began forming in January 1992 under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They are based on previously existing Militia Detachments of Special Designation, which in the late Soviet period dealt with particularly violent acts of terrorism and chal- lenges to Soviet authority. Planned Golden Eagle strength was to total near- ly 3,000 personnel organized into a regiment in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev, with battalions or companies located in other cities. Berkut detach- ments are equipped and trained in ways analogous to the counterterrorist or special-weapons-and-tactics squads of large Western cities; they possess armored personnel carriers and are comparable to the Austrian “Cobra” counterterrorist force.

Multiservice unit The Fuerzas Especiales Anti-terroristas Urbanas (Urban Counterterrorist primary Colombian Special Forces, or AFEAU) is Colombia’s primary national-level hostage-res- hostage-rescue force cue force. A multiservice force, it has elements from the Army, Air Force, Marines and the Colombian National Police. Created in 1985 after existing military and security forces were unable to respond to the M-19 guerrilla attack on the Palace of Justice in Bogota, it has been deployed against ter- rorists, insurgents and drug traffickers. Each service element provides a 15- man force (two officers and 13 enlisted personnel), all volunteers and all pos- sessing basic and specialized military skills. It is commanded by an Army major and has a headquarters section which includes an executive officer, first sergeant and radio-telephone operator, bringing its total strength to 64 personnel. The AFEAU is under the direct control of the Comandante de las Fuerzas Armadas (Commander of the Armed Forces), and is located at the Escuela de Caballeria (Cavalry School). AFEAU equipment includes scoped 7.62mm Remington sniper rifles, Israeli Galil 7.62mm rifles, 5.56mm AR- 15s, 5.56mm M16A-2s, 9mm MP-5 machine guns, 9mm Beretta pistols, Browning 9mm pistols, Remington 12-gauge shotguns, night-vision devices, M-79 40mm grenade launchers, 7.62mm M-60 machine guns, internal secure voice communication equipment, and numerous types of rappelling equipment. Training is conducted north of Bogota at Facatativa, and includes close-quarters combat; bus, train and airplane hostage-rescue oper- ations; sniper training; explosive training; small- and long-arms marksman- ship; airmobile/air-assault operations, and self-defense techniques. In Febru- ary 1990 the AFEAU deployed to Cartagena during the first anti-drug sum- mit, attended by President Bush. It secured and controlled the Cartagena airport, established sniper positions at the “Casa de Huespedes” (guest house) where the Colombian, Peruvian, Bolivian and U.S. presidents met, established control of the roadway from the airport to the Cartagena Con- vention Center, and raided presumed narco-guerrilla houses and farms. It should be noted that the AFEAU was the unit that captured the notorious drug trafficker Carlos Lehder Rivas in February 1987.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Maj. Arnaldo Claudio of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

February 1993 43 Update Special Warfare

3rd SF Group activates commemorate the Ranger unit lega- became renowned for its heroics in 3rd Battalion cy, officials said. Representatives of the Asian jungle, chiefly in Burma. the Ranger Regiment Association The 5307th was commanded by Col. The 3rd Special Forces Group and the Merrill’s Marauders Associ- Frank D. Merrill, for whom the activated its 3rd Battalion in cere- ation unveiled the Georgia granite Marauders were named. monies at Fort Bragg Oct. 16, giv- stones engraved with the names of ing the 3rd Group its full comple- their organizations. New equipment will assist ment of battalions. Speakers at the ceremony included recon missions Col. Philip R. Kensinger, 3rd Lt. Gen. Wayne A. Downing, com- Special-operations soldiers will Group commander, presented the col- manding general of the Army Special soon have high-tech additions to ors to Lt. Col. Richard W. Mills, the Operations Command and a former their reconnaissance and intelli- battalion’s first commander since its commander of the 75th Ranger Regi- gence-gathering capabilities. deactivation on Dec. 10, 1969. Mills’ ment; Col. David L. Grange, current The Electronic Filmless Camera previous assignment was with the commander of the 75th Ranger Regi- United Nations Transitional Authori- System will give SOF soldiers the ty in Cambodia, where he served as a ability to capture photo images in military observer. distant locations and transmit them “The significance of this activation directly to their headquarters for cannot be overstated,” Kensinger analysis. The system’s camera will said. “While the rest of the Army is store images on a magnetic disk, experiencing downsizing, Special according to Gus McGrue, equipment Forces Command is standing up a specialist in the Combat Develop- new unit.” ments Division of the Army Special The 3rd Group, oriented toward Operations Command’s Force Devel- the Caribbean and Africa, was reacti- opment and Integration Directorate. vated in June 1990; its 1st Battalion The digital image can then be trans- was reactivated at the same time. mitted over standard SOF radio sys- The 2nd Battalion was reactivated in tems or by military or commercial October 1991. Soldiers from 3rd telephone. Group participated in Desert The EFCS will consist of two sets Shield/Storm and Provide Comfort in of equipment, the out-station and 1991 and helped Haitian refugees at base-station sets. The base-station Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in set, the AN/USC-50, composed of a Cuba. camera, monitor, digital-imaging pro- U.S. Army photo cessor, still-video reader, modem and Ranger veterans dedicate Ranger stone in the JFK Memorial Plaza printer, will be deployed at a rear- memorial stones ment; and retired Army Capt. Phil area site, McGrue said. It will be able Two organizations of Army Ranger Piazza, president of the Merrill’s to receive, store, process, edit and veterans recently unveiled engraved Marauders Association. display photo images. The base sta- memorial stones at Fort Bragg to the “We in the Army special-operations tion will be capable of selectively memory of Rangers who died in ser- community owe a great debt to our transmitting to and receiving from vice to their country. predecessors in Merrill’s Marauders other base-station units or out-sta- The memorials, located in the and the Ranger Regiment,” Downing tion units. John F. Kennedy Memorial Plaza, said. The 75th Ranger Regiment is The out-station system, the near the headquarters of the Army the Army’s premier light-infantry AN/PSC-6, will have the same capa- Special Operations Command, were strike force. The 75th derives its lin- bility as the base station, McGrue dedicated Nov. 24, 1992, to those eage from the 5307th Composite said. EFCS cameras will be similar Rangers who fell in battle and to Unit, a World War II outfit that to currently available 35mm com-

44 Special Warfare mercial systems, but must be capable REMBASS, allowing it to comple- Fort Bragg’s Yadkin Road, was of functioning under adverse climatic ment or replace items from the earli- named MacWilliam Hall in honor of conditions and suited for parachute er system, as necessary. Lt. Col. Thomas Cail MacWilliam, and airdrop delivery. Both sets will IREMBASS will be issued on the commander of the 1st Battalion, 2nd be capable of using commercial or basis of nine per SF battalion, one Regiment, 1st Special Service Force. vehicular power, 28 volts DC. per support company, and six per MacWilliam was killed in action dur- The product of a joint study by the Ranger battalion. Fielding is sched- ing the offensive to seize Monte La Army Special Operations Command uled to begin during the first quarter Difensa, Italy, on Dec. 4, 1943. and the Army Materiel Command, of fiscal year 1994. The ceremony was attended by EFCS is scheduled for delivery to Mrs. Thomas Griffith, who was mar- field units in fiscal year 1993. 96th CA Battalion receives ried to MacWilliam at the time of his The Improved Remotely-monitored new streamer death, and his son, Thomas A. Battlefield Sensor System will allow The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion MacWilliam. The two assisted 3rd Group commander Col. Philip R. SOF reconnaissance forces to collect recently received the Meritorious information on movement of person- Kensinger in unveiling a portrait of Unit streamer for its activities in the nel and vehicles without exposing Colonel MacWilliam. Persian Gulf war. themselves to detection. “We in Special Forces trace our lin- Lt. Gen. Wayne A. Downing, com- Composed of monitors, repeater eage directly to the First Special Ser- mander of the Army Special Opera- units, and infrared, seismic/acoustic vice Force, and it is more than appro- tions Command, hung the streamer and magnetic sensors, the system priate to select an individual from on the unit’s flag, calling the 96th offers small size and light weight, that unit for the honor of this memo- “the hardest working, most often important factors for SOF missions. rialization,” Kensinger said. “Lieu- deployed unit in the United States “IREMBASS is a SOF-specific spinoff tenant Colonel MacWilliam personi- Army.” The ceremony took place dur- of the earlier REMBASS,” said Glenn fied the virtues that we value in Spe- ing the battalion’s change of com- Latendresse, also an equipment spe- cial Forces today, and specifically in mand on Nov. 10, 1992. cialist in the Combat Developments the 3rd Special Forces Group.” Lt. Col. James F. Powers replaced Division of USASOC Force Develop- The 3rd SF Group traces its lin- Lt. Col. Carl T. Sahlin, who had led ment and Integration. “REMBASS is eage to the 1st Battalion, 2nd Regi- the unit since November 1990, when too heavy and too big for SOF. IREM- ment of the First Special Service he assumed command during a BASS offers the same capability in a Force. The Canadian-American unit desert ceremony in Saudi Arabia. smaller size.” Three sensors, a was constituted on July 5, 1942. The Powers was formerly assigned to the repeater and a monitor, for example, mission to seize Monte La Difensa Special Operations Command - have a combined weight of 22 called for the 1st Battalion to attack Europe, in Stuttgart, Germany. pounds. by climbing sheer cliffs to the rear of As the only active-duty Civil IREMBASS’s battery-powered sen- the German position. Under heavy Affairs unit, the 96th sent soldiers to sors can be buried or camouflaged fire, the battalion attacked and the Virgin Islands in 1988 following and placed near likely areas of fought hand-to-hand to overrun the Hurricane Hugo, to Panama in 1989 enemy traffic. When activated by a German positions. for Operation Just Cause, to the Per- target, they transmit data in short sian Gulf in 1990 for Operations bursts to the system monitor. SF Regimental History Desert Shield/Storm, and to the Although limited to line-of-sight Calendar available Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in transmission, their range can be Cuba in 1991 to provide shelter to The 1993 Special Forces Regimen- extended by use of the repeater tal History Calendar has recently units. At the receiving end, readouts Haitian refugees. Members of the unit also deployed to Florida in 1992 been distributed to SF units by the on the hand-held monitor classify the Army Special Operations Command’s target as personnel or vehicles and to aid in relief efforts following Hur- ricane Andrew. Office of the Command Historian. indicate type and direction of move- The weekly planning calendar ment. Since the sensors operate only 3rd SF Group dedicates new commemorates dates from SF histo- when activated, Latendresse said, headquarters ry. For information on available they have a minimum battery life of copies, contact Dr. Richard Stewart, 30 days. The 3rd Special Forces Group has USASOC command historian, at A complete system will consist of dedicated its new headquarters DSN 239-4720, commercial (919) two monitors, two repeaters, four building to a Canadian officer in the 432-4720. seismic/acoustic sensors, two mag- 1st Special Service Force killed dur- netic sensors and two infrared sen- ing World War II. sors, Latendresse said. The system is During ceremonies held Nov. 6, completely compatible with the 1992, the headquarters, located on

February 1993 45 Book Reviews Special Warfare

The Banana Wars: A History of Nicaragua I (1912), Haiti (1915- tions or policies. He is just as quick United States Military Interven- 1934), Dominican Republic I (1916- to point out the numerous times tion in Latin America from the 1924), Nicaragua II (1927-1934), that the greed and malevolence of Spanish-American War to the Dominican Republic II (1965), indigenous figures is at the heart of Invasion of Panama. By Ivan Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989). the issue. This refreshingly un- Musicant. New York: MacMillan From a stylistic standpoint, some polemical approach is welcome. Publishing Co., 1990. ISBN: 0-02- may be put off. It is a standard his- Musicant also uses an incredible 588210-4. 470 pages. $24.95. torical work. While much more number of primary sources. This readable than most academic adds to the zest of the prose by pro- The subject of U.S. intervention works, it is nonetheless an academ- viding almost continuous eyewit- in Latin America is not really in ic book. Fortunately, it is at about ness accounts throughout. A stylis- vogue at this time. It has recently the apparent “minimum acceptable” tic strength is the use of a single been used by the political left to length for a history book, nearly 500 quotation from an actual partici- decry the U.S. for its “imperialist/ pages. The ability to use individual pant at the beginning of each chap- colonialist” policies. The right, ter. This device sets the tone and, in meanwhile, dismisses it out of fact, summarizes each chapter. hand as unimportant and of no A weakness that results from the consequence. As usual, both sides heavy reliance on Navy and Marine miss the mark. We need to study Corps sources is an overemphasis the events covered in The Banana on the importance of the Navy in Wars. Not to shackle us, intellectu- seemingly all the “banana wars.” ally or politically, but to find and The Navy was a key player, but the apply insights for the future. Good author could have shortened the policy uses history as an asset, but book by at least 100 pages if he had is not paralyzed by it. As special- left out extensive explanations of operations soldiers, we have a types of cruisers and steaming responsibility to be prepared to times. For some, Musicant’s high give the best advice and counsel degree of detail might be considered possible. This must be informed a weakness, but a history book by history, or it will always be without a great deal of detail is inadequate. liable to be more akin to fiction The organization of this book is a than true historical writing. good one. It is mainly chronological, The Banana Wars is well worth but modified by country: the author reading and having on your shelf as covers one country or operation at a a reference work. It should be at time, as much in chronological least reviewed by all who work in order as possible. There is some chapters separately, as mentioned, Latin America, for a deeper under- overlap with regard to time, but he helps to overcome the problem of standing of the roots of resentment finishes each subject without mix- length. The author is a naval histo- we sometimes feel there. This is a ing the information. This allows the rian, and most of his sources are serious book that will take some reader to use each chapter, as need- Navy and Marine Corps in origin, time and intellectual effort to ed, if he wants to deal only with one but this does not detract from the appreciate and fully utilize. It is discrete situation. It also allows for usefulness to an Army reader. worth the effort. comparative use, without undue The main strength of the book is hunting within the text. The chap- its even-handedness in analysis. Maj. Steven Bucci ters cover, in order, the Spanish- Musicant blasts the U.S. when he CGSC American War (1898), Cuba (1899- describes the times we were wrong- Fort Leavenworth, Kan. 1917), Panama (1885-1904), minded or greedy in our motiva-

46 Special Warfare gence in anti-infrastructure opera- Ashes makes a good start toward tions, yet he reveals nothing about understanding “the other war” in that support, other than low-level Vietnam, and the author deserves human-intelligence operations. credit for that. Low-level HUMINT is the essence of effective police work — the same Capt. Tim M. Mather police work that is so important in a 2nd Bn., 11th SF Group LIC environment. However, the Fort A.P. Hill, Va. author also makes several refer- ences to the importance of intelli- Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a gence provided directly by the New Paradigm of Low Intensity CIA — without discussing that Conflict. Edited by Max G. Man- intelligence, its sources or methods. waring. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Indeed, the author’s limited dis- Press, 1991. ISBN: 08-133-8081-2. cussion points to another aspect of 139 pages. $32.50. intelligence support: what were the contributions (or lack thereof) of Congratulations to Max Manwar- service intelligence organizations ing for compiling some of the best and the DIA? The author notes that articles and papers available on the the priority for those intelligence topic of low-intensity conflict. Con- Ashes To Ashes: The Phoenix organizations was order-of-battle tributors to the book include some Program and the Vietnam War. intelligence, but was that their only of the brightest minds in the busi- By Dale Andradé. Lexington, Mass.: priority? In the author’s defense, ness: Gen. John R. Galvin, William Lexington Books, 1990. ISBN 0-669- much of that information is proba- J. Olson, Gen. Fred F. Woerner, 20014-X. 331 pages. $22.95. bly still classified, and some of it Col. Courtney E. Prisk, Ambassador may never be declassified. However, Edwin G. Corr and Lt. Col. John T. Ashes To Ashes is an examination the need for further information Fishel. of the American Phoenix Program about intelligence support to Like nearly all compilations from and its parallel South Vietnamese Phoenix/Phung Hoang remains. multiple authors, the book suffers program, Phung Hoang, against the Additionally, Ashes To Ashes suf- from a lack of smooth transitions Viet Cong infrastructure. As the fers from three other problems. from one topic to the next, but over- author points out, informed discus- First, in an effort to evaluate the all, Max Manwaring has done a sion of Phoenix/Phung Hoang has effectiveness of Phoenix/ Phung superb job in the editorial process been severely lacking over the Hoang, the author sometimes while attempting to “connect the years. Rather, the program has resorts to relying on statistics — dots.” been so tainted with negative pub- the same statistics which he licity that those persons most quali- derides. (For example, “Statistics, fied to discuss it have, for the most the opiate that soothed Saigon part, chosen to keep quiet instead. ...”[page 129]) Second, the author However, Ashes To Ashes begins to makes repeated references to the fill a void in America’s understand- “incompetent” and “corrupt” Viet- ing of “the other war” in Vietnam namese, while Americans are por- (i.e., anti-infrastructure operations trayed as omnipotent and benevo- against the Viet Cong). Filling that lent. Third, the book suffers from information void is important to poor editing. These relatively minor those American special-operations problems detract from an otherwise forces that have foreign-internal- fine effort. defense missions, if they are to A historian by training, the learn the lessons of that conflict. author supplies a variety of inter- While Ashes To Ashes is a good esting data from various sources start toward understanding about Phoenix/Phung Hoang, but he Phoenix/Phung Hoang, it is not a nevertheless fails to provide a com- complete account. The book focuses prehensive analysis of what this primarily on operations, while inad- information means. Such an analy- equately examining intelligence sis may have to wait until more activities. The author repeatedly information about the program is stresses the importance of intelli- declassified. However, Ashes To

February 1993 47 Essentially, the focus of the book deliberate instrument of terror but selective in his uses of other is on the need for the United States also the harbinger of a legacy of con- research. to develop a new model (or spiratorial evil that pervaded, and A case in point is Stanley paradigm) to address the threat continues to pervade, U.S. policy at Karnow’s Vietnam: A History. posed by what has come to be home and abroad. The true villain Although Valentine quotes Karnow known as LIC. The authors find six and target of the book extends far throughout for Vietnamese histori- primary areas in which America beyond the relatively limited theme cal reference (sometimes out of con- must concentrate its efforts if it is that the title indicates. That villain text), he is strangely silent on to be successful in the often violent is the Central Intelligence Agency. Karnow’s comments regarding and emerging “new world order.” Valentine’s agenda is to convince Phoenix itself. A critic of the pro- They are: 1) Establishment of legiti- the reader that Phoenix was much gram, Karnow nevertheless honest- macy; 2) Organization for unity of more than a particular effort insti- ly recounts the testimonies of for- effort; 3) Type and consistency of gated by the CIA to better coordi- mer high-ranking Viet Cong offi- external support; 4) Discipline and nate the attack on hidden Viet Cong cials as to the effectiveness of capabilities of armed forces; 5) cadres. Instead, Phoenix was a dark Phoenix in disrupting the revolu- Intelligence; 6) Ability to reduce concept that became a way of opera- tionary infrastructure. You will not outside aid to the adversary. Stu- tional life, infecting virtually every find such balance in Valentine’s dents of LIC will recognize each ele- book. ment as essential in U.S. support to All of this is unfortunate, because counterinsurgency operations. there are elements of potential The work is well focused on value within the book. Relying to a SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibili- great deal on interviews with both ty, with examinations of the Sin- civilian and military personnel dero Luminosa, or “Shining Path” involved to varying degrees with insurgent movement of Peru; U.S. the Phoenix effort, the book does support to the legal government of provide insight into the problems El Salvador against the Farabundo that afflicted the program. These Marti Liberation Front; and a problems included the terrible strategic view of Latin America by imprisoning, torturing and killing of General Woerner. innocent Vietnamese, the great dif- Whether or not you agree with ficulty in persuading the Viet- the authors is largely irrelevant. namese to commit to the concept These are thought-provoking ideas and in convincing the myriad agen- offered by people who know the cies and forces to cooperate with business of combining the military- each other in a common goal, and diplomatic means of this nation at the consequences that resulted from both the practical and theoretical placing unqualified or unethical level. Uncomfortable Wars would be Americans in positions that influ- a welcome addition to any profes- aspect of the U.S. involvement in enced Phoenix activities. There are, sional soldier’s library. Buy it, read Vietnam. In his concluding chapter, too, the instances of unquestionably it, and think about it. Valentine further expands this immoral and illegal behavior by speculation into U.S. involvement Americans that should be identified Maj. Robert B. Adolph Jr. in Central America. for what they were. 4th PSYOP Group If you are proponent of Big Broth- Within the framework of a bal- Fort Bragg, N.C. er-type conspiratorial themes, this anced examination and analysis of is the book for you. Valentine’s pre- the program itself, The Phoenix Pro- The Phoenix Program. By Dou- conceived argument is so dominant gram could have been a solid contri- glas Valentine. New York: William throughout the book that the reader bution to the study of American Morrow and Company, 1990. ISBN wonders how honest the author was attempts, both good and bad, to 0-688-09130-X. 416 pages. $24.95. regarding his intent with many of combat communist revolutionary those he interviewed. It appears warfare. Instead, the effort will be The Phoenix Program, by Douglas that the conclusion of this work was wasted on all but those already Valentine, is a selectively and preju- written well before the body and inclined to believe the absolute dicially researched work. It is signif- that all that was needed was to find worst about the United States’ icantly flawed by the author’s prede- what the author considered to be effort to combat communism. termined conclusion that the substantiating evidence. To Military readers may well find Phoenix program was not only a strengthen his thesis, the author is the book difficult to read, both for

48 Special Warfare its confusing style and consistent former bodyguard to Gen. William negative interpretation of virtually Westmoreland,” but more widely all U.S. or South Vietnamese action. known for writings fit for unsophis- The chapters are topically oriented ticated audiences, Thompson has on either components of the pro- finally produced a decent book in gram, characteristics of the pro- Dirty Wars: Elite Forces vs. the gram (such as“Covert Action”), or Guerrillas. what the author has determined to The book begins with a brief but be stages of the program’s exis- interesting introduction to guerrilla tence. There is no continuity, how- warfare before 1900 and covers ever, in either time reference or most of the major guerrilla wars of subject to link the chapters, leaving the 20th century. The layout is, in the reader wondering who was fact, very well done. The text is doing what, to whom, and when. interesting and readable and bro- Valentine’s understanding of both ken up with scores of color and revolutionary and counterrevolu- black-and-white photographs. Side- tionary warfare is poor, and much bar articles are used throughout the of his history is simply wrong. Spe- text to highlight the history of a cial Forces readers will find it of particular unit or otherwise empha- interest, for example, that the size a point. founding of the “First Special Thompson identifies himself as Forces” was linked to the formation and committed allies in the prosecu- the author but does not, however, of the French counterinsurgency tion of counterinsurgency. Yet the cite a single reference or source for force Groupements de Commandos piece is so thoroughly compromised any of his information. Another Mixtes Aeroportes, the GCMA, in and colored by the author’s passion- curious aspect of the book is that 1951, or that “legions of Special ate conviction of the corruptness of sources are listed for very few of its Forces” were rushed to Vietnam by the American effort that it is impos- many photographs. Such might President Kennedy. sible to obtain an even view of the make a reader suspect Thompson’s In summary, this book is clearly reality that was Phoenix. accuracy and originality. The book one to avoid. The problems with the is also a bit overpriced for its con- Phoenix program have been articu- Maj. John F. Mulholland tent. All told, Dirty Wars is decent lated in other works such as Blau- 7th SF Group enough for dayroom reading but not farb’s The Counterinsurgency Era, Fort Bragg, N.C. quite worthy of the library of a seri- Race’s War Comes to Long An, ous student of military elites or Andrade’s Ashes to Ashes, and oth- guerrilla warfare. ers that offer much more to the mil- Dirty Wars: Elite Forces vs. the itary professional interested in the Guerrillas. By Leroy Thompson. Maj. William H. Burgess III field of revolutionary warfare. New York: Sterling Press, 1991. USSOCOM Valentine’s endless accounts of the ISBN: 0-7153-9441-X (hardcover) MacDill AFB, Fla. torture and killing inflicted on the 192 pages. $27.95. acknowledged innocent victims of Phoenix provides legitimate cause Some things improve with age, for study and reflection on the abso- and so it is with author Leroy lute critical nature of moral legiti- Thompson. Billed in the press pack- macy, properly trained personnel et as “counterinsurgency expert and

February 1993 49 Special Warfare

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