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1946 Japan's struggle to end the war United States Strategic Bombing Survey

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JAPAN'S STRUGGLE TO END THE WAR

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CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE 1 July 1946 THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

JAPAN'S STRUGGLE TO END THE WAR

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CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE

1 July 1946

! FOREWORD

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all pos­ was established by the Secretary of War on 3 sible assistance in furnishing nien, supplies, trans­ November 1944, pursuant to a directive from the port and information. The Survey operated from late President Roosevelt. Its mission was to headquarters established in Tokyo early in Sep­ conduct an impartial and expert study of the tember 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya, effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and with mobile used in connection with air attacks on Japan and teams operating in other parts of Japan, the to establish a basis for evaluating the importance islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland. and potentialities of air power as an instrument It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime of military strategy, for planning the future Japanese military planning and execution engage­ development of the United States armed forces, ment by engagement and campaign by campaign, and for determining future economic policies and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on with respect to the national defense. A summary Japan's economy and war-production plant by report and some 200 supporting reports contain­ plant, and industry by industry. In addition, ing the findings of the Survey in Germany have studies were conducted on Japan's over-all stra­ been published. tegic plans and the background of her entry into On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested the war, the internal discussions and negotiations that the Survey conduct a similar study of the leading to her acceptance of unconditional sur­ effects of all types of air attack in the war against render, the course of health and morale among Japan. The officers of the Survey in Japan, who the civilian population, the effectiveness of the are all civilians were: Japanese civilian defense organization, and the effects of the atomic bombs. Separate reports Franklin D'Olier, Chairman. will be issued covering each phase of the study. Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice The Survey interrogated more than 700 Jap­ Chairmen. anese military, Government, and industrial offi­ Harry L. Bowman, J. K. Galbraith, cials. It also recovered and translated many Rensis Likert, Franl{ A. MeNamee, documents which have not only been useful to Fred Searls, Jr., Monroe E. Spaght, the Survey, but will also furnish data valuable for Dr. Louis R. Thompson, Theodore P. other studies. Arrangements have been made tv Wright, Directors. turn over the Survey's files to the Central Intelli­ Walter Wilds, Secretary. gence Group, through which they will be available The Survey's complement provided for 300 for further examination and distribution. civilians, 350 off10ers, and 500 enlisted men. The military segment of the organization was drawn The present report was prepared by the Chair­ from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and man's Office rmder the editorship of Commander from the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both Walter Wilds, USNR.

iii CONTENTS JAPAN'S STRUGGLE TO END THE WAR

Page Page Foreword ______-- ______-- - - iii 2. Survey of National Resources as of 1- 10 Preface ______June 1945 ______16 I. Some Properties of the Political Target______3. Comparison of Military Strength of Jap­ II. Behind the Collapse of Tojo ______2 anese and the United States at the Out- III. The Koiso Government ______- 3 break of Hostilities ______18 IV. The Suzuki Cabinet ______6 4. Comparison of Estimated Japanese and V. The Political Target Under Assault______9 American Military Resources at the End of the War ______Appendix A. Japanese Documents : 19 1. E stimate of Japanese National Strength at 5. Memorandum of Konoye Conversation Outbreak of the G1:eater East Asia War with Hirohito, February 1945 ______- 21 (December 1941) ______14 Appendix B. Biographies of Japanese Leaders ___ _ 23

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y JAPAN'S STRUGGLE TO END THE WAR

Preface the course of events would not have been changed While the impact of Allied air operations in the materially had these persons been available for entire Pacific war bore directly upon the enemy's interrogation. military and economic capabilities for resisting, I. Some Properties of the Political Target only by translating these military and economic effects into political events could our announced To assess the events of surrender requires a war aim of unconditional surrender be realized. capsule reminder of the interrelated pressures, Japan's acceptance of defeat without invasion the interlocking mechanism of Japanese politics. while still possessed of 2}~ million combat-equipped The starting point is that Japan was governed troops and 9,000 Kamikaze airplanes in the home largely by a consensus among the oligarchy of ruling islands, reveal how persuasively the consequences factions at the top. No major decisions of of our operations were translated into political national policy could be reached until such a results. The nature of Japanese politics and its consensus had been obtained. This process in­ vulnerability and responses to air assault consti­ evitably took time and involved complicated tuted therefore a major and significant line of pressures and struggles of will among those of inquiry for the Survey. differing opinions. The "political target" comprised a ganglion of A flow-chart of the chief pressures would show Army, Navy, Government, and Imperial house­ the Lord Privy Seal (Marquis Koichi Kido hold factions which together decided major ques­ throughout the war period) as the Emperor's tions of national policy. Fortunately, most of political agent, an observer and estimator of the the pertinent questions relating to how Japan was current GovernmenVs problems and its capabili­ brought to acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration ties for coping with them. To one side, clear of find their answers in the simple chronology of responsibility or authority, but in this instance events which can now be narrated in some detail with pipe lines into the Government which in­ for the period from the collapse of Tojo in July formed them of the true state of affairs, were the 1944, to the imperial rescript of 15 August 1945. senior statesmen or Jushin. These ex-premiers The evidence is .chiefly in the testimony obtained could not enforce their views, but did apply by Survey interrogation of the Army, Navy, persuasive and informed pressure on the Privy Government, and Imperial household leaders who Seal and other Government leaders. The Jushin participated or were influential in the struggle also had interlocking membership with the within Japan over whether to continue the war or Privy Council which approved important decisions to accept surrender. The inquiry might have in foreign policy, and individual Jushin were benefited from testimony of certain key figures frequently close to the Emperor. Then there who were not available tv the Survey. Tojo, was the Cabinet, which once formed could perpet­ Koiso, Togo, and a few others impounded for trial uate itself so long as it was strong and successful. as war criminals could not be interrogated. A An important test of its strength and success few, notably General Anami, the War Minister in was its ability to absorb or modify the views and the Suzuki cabinet, had committed suicide. Since policies of the Army and Navy, who named their the Emperor's participation in the crucial events own Cabinet ministers, whose ministers and chiefs of the period preceding surrender had been re­ of staff had direct access to the Emperor, and who vealed and corroborated by other participants, an were influenced until the end by the fanaticism interview with Hirohito would not have been of the majority of Army officers and younger ' productive. It is felt that the general picture of Navy officers. One important wartime innova-

1 tion to this flow-chart, the Supreme War Direc­ useful to restate briefly the basis on which Ja.pan tion Council or Inner Cabinet, will be explained began the war in December, 1941. Japan en­ in a later section dealing with Koiso's time. tered the war securely in the hands of the radical This political mechanism had several special military clique that originally rose to power in characteristics which were peculiar to our eyes and Manchuria and was led and symbolized by Tojo. important to these events: (l) the Lord Privy This group had already achieved a police state Seal was the custodian of the Emperor's political and the controlling position in Japanese policy powers and chief protector of the "national during its uneasy coalition with the conservatives polity" or Tenno system; (2) the Japanese had a in the two preceding Konoye governments. It is fine penchant for diffusing political responsibility; noteworthy that the clique took Japan to war (3) politicians and ardent militarists, as did the without concrete minimum or maximum ob­ Japanese people themselves, viewed the Emperor jectives nor any clear conception as to how the and sacred homeland through an emotional and war could be brought to a close. The decision to reverent haze; (4) the system of Government attack was roughly calculated as a two-way afforded enormous areas wherein personal j udg­ gamble. If the European Axis defeated Soviet ments and estimates of a small group determined Russia, Japan would require chips to play on the ultimate policy; (5) opinions and attitudes of the winning side at the peace settlement with the general public had significance only as a single and United States and Britain that might well follow. subsidiary factor in the considerations of the On the other side, and independent of European leaders. events, a quick drive to the Southern Resources Area accompanied by a series of stunning and II. Behind the Collapse of Tojo crippling defeats of the United States forces In the period betwePn the Pearl Harbor attack would redre~s Japan's relative strength and create and June 1944, Japan's defeats at Midway, in the a situation in which the United States might be Solomons, New Guinea, and the Marshalls, willing to negotiate a peace by trading out the coupled with the crippling effects of her shipping issues on terms favorable to Japan. Great con­ losses, produced political consequences which were fidence was put in the eventual superiority of appa.rent in frequent cabinet shuffles, Tojo's in­ Japan's fighting spirit over the potential material crease of personal authority through the multiple superiority of the United St"'>i>es. This calcula­ Cabinet jobs he assumed, and tightened controls tion, whatever its other shurtcomings, obviously intensifying the Government's efforts to program contained at least two serious misreadings re­ military output for a protracted war. The first garding the United States, first, in failing to definitive break in the political coalition which appreciate the tenacious and passionate finality began the war occurred following our success at with which America would prosecute the war, and Saipan. Ti\n days thereafter, on 18 July 1944, second, in underestimating the military importance the cabinet headed by Gen. Hideki Tojo fell, after of the enormously greater economic potential being continuously in office since 20 October 1941. with which the United States would create and This marked a significant turn in the course of bring to bear a technically superior force. Japan's wartime politics, the importance of The risks involved were understood and asserted which in retrospect is difficult to overstress. It by some leaders in the debates which preceded was not merely the result of an immediate crisis. Pearl Harbor. Their original concern gave them Even at that. early date, there were symptoms a basis for recognizing as early as spring, 1944, that opposing elements had finally found means that Japan was facing ultimate defeat. By that of applying pressure against the fanatic exponents time United States determination to fight and in Japan's militarist clique. It revealed in clear her ability to mount successful thrusts in the trace the effective, though still undercover, in­ Pacific even before opening the second European tervention of factions which had either opposed front, had already been demonstrated for all who war before Pearl Harbor, or gone along, or "re­ knew the true situation to see. The political tired" in the first phases of the conflict. problem of those who saw the situation was to To explain the dilemmas and activities of those discover and circulate among other leaders in leaders who felt in the spring of 1944 that Japan retirement or outside the government a true pic­ was facing certain defeat or at least that the time ture of the war, and then to unseat the Tojo gov­ had come for positive steps to end the war, it is ernment in favor of one which would bring the 2 war to an end. Prime illustrations of such moves .the Jushin, refused Tojo's request that he join the at this time were the operations of Takagi and cabinet as minister-without-portfolio; and (3) the Sakomizu. resignation of Shigetaro Shimada, the Navy Rear Adm. Soichi Takagi, who was attached to Minister, which helped to force out Tojo 3 days the ministerial secretariat of the Naval General afterward, had been actively assisted by the Staff, made a study between 20 September 1943 senior statesmen. and February 1944, of the war's battle lessons up These steps give the pattern of the behind-scenes to that time. He concluded that Japan could not talks and illustrate the combined efforts of (1) win and verbally presented his findings in March those who already knew that Japan, facing defeat, 1944 to Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai and Vice Adm. should save itself by accepting Allied terms, Seibi Inouye. Takagi's study, interestingly (2) those who believed Japan should take active enough, was undertaken at the end of the second steps to end the war, hoping to achieve terms year of the war- the time beyond which, the better than unconditional surrender, and (3) those Japanese Navy's top command had estimated who realized Japan's situation was desperate, but before hostilities, Japan could not fight a successful thought improved resistance could be achieved war. Takagi's estimate was based on an analysis only by dropping Tojo. of fleet, air, and merchant ship losses suffered to date, the serious difficulties in acquiring essential III. The Koiso Government imported materials, the internal confusion in Japan, and a growing feeling among the "intelli­ The loss of Saipan, followed by Tojo's collapse, gentsia" that Tojo should be let out. It seemed marked a major turning point of the war and clear to Takagi that potential long-range air at­ brought forth the Cabinet of Kuniaki Koiso, a tacks on the home islands and Japan's inability retired Army general who was known as a Tojo to import essential materials for production had critic. This government was a disappointment to created a situation which dictated that Japan the more zealous peacemakers and conceivably an should seek a compromise peace. In Takagi's inept choice of that ever-cautious political litmus view Japan at this time should have envisaged paper, Marquis Kido. Nevertheless, Koiso's gov­ withdrawing from China and giving up both ernment broke the grip of the Tojo clique as the Korea and Formosa as part of the peace terms. ruling faction, took important and necessary steps His study in any case documented the fears toward peace, and may even have been an un­ Yonai and others held before the war and lent avoidable step in the transition from Tojo to the support to the increasing but still carefully guarded surrender Cabinet of Admiral Suzuki. - concern of their fellow Jushin that all was not well When designated to succeed Tojo, Kosio re­ with Tojo's prosecution of the war. ceived an Imperial admonition to give .Japan's Hisatsune Sakomizu is another early example of situation a "fundamental reconsideration" looking a connecting link between the unpleasant facts of to the termination of the war. If this murky in­ the war and the senior statesmen outside the junction was intended to seek peace, it early be­ Government. As a member of the Cabinet Plan­ came clear that the new government as a whole by ning Board in 1943- 44, he had given information no means understood its mission since the "recon­ as to the unfavorable war situation to his father­ sideration" resulted in a decision to continue the in-law, Admiral Keisuka Okada, who retailed it war with renewed vigor and further sacrifice. to Kido among others. Okada also had word sent At this time, in the late summer of 1944, in­ to Tojo that it would be best for him to resign. tensive air assault on the home islands had not yet All this was not only educational as to ,Japan's begun. But output of a number of essential true condition, but indirectly helped to build up items had already passed the peak, shipping political pressure for the fall of Tojo. Among losses had reduced imports of essential materials important examples of the wa.v this pressure below the needs of the existing industrial plant worked were: (1) Tojo had to reconstruct his capacity. Japan faced a declining output of such cabinet just before the Marianas campaign (Saipan war necessities as aircraft, oil, transport, steel, and was invaded on 15 June 1944), when Shinsuka coal. Although public confidence in the war re­ Kishi, the Commerce and Agriculture Minister, mained high, morale of the leaders and "intelligen­ and Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister, tsia" was falling, principally as knowledge of threatened to withdraw; (2) Y onai, supported by previous defeats and difficulties became more

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------generally spread to the further discredit of the among the peace seekers who increasingly opposed military factions. the intransigency of the militarists. Among the first moves of the new Koiso govern­ The Council accordingly was on one hand a ment was the creation of the Supreme War Direc­ symbol and test of how far Japan's original war­ tion Council. On 5 August 1944, 3 weeks after making coalition had been discredited and liqui­ the fall of Tojo, this new Inner Cabinet was dated, and on the other hand a successful reinte­ gration of the ruling factions which could act with formed. Announced purpose of the Council was authority and purpose in solving their dilemma. "to formulate a fundamental policy for directing The magnitude of this last point can be shown by the war and to adjust the harmonization of the citing the following considerations. First, the combined strategy for politics and war". It com­ two chiefs of staff (and their deputies) who prised six regular members-the Premier, Foreign formerly had been not merely responsible for Minister, Army Minister, Navy :Minister, Army executing operational plans but also almost auto­ Chief of Staff, and Navy Chief of Staff- who cratically capable of formulating them, were now could, however, bring in any other Cabinet min­ drawn into discussions of over-all national policy, ister as a regular member when necessary. In matters of economic capability, the political addition, the two deputy chiefs of staff attended realities, etc.; the military were finally harnessed meetings but did not vote, and the Council had and joined to political, economic, and civilian a secretariat. The group was formed originally requirements. Second, the Council afforded a as a liaison between the military and the Cabinet, few key ministers who were determined on peace but its composition and dominant role made it in a more effective and enhanced basis for achieving practice an inner war cabinet concerned with the it through domination of a small group, working highest policies and plans such as measures to in the greatest secrecy, with direct and official maintain fighting strength, central economic deci­ access to the Emperor. sions, whether to continue the war, etc. The Early in September 1944, Yonai, who had be­ agenda originated within the Council itself. Its come Vice Premier and Navy Minister under decisions had to be ratified by the full cabinet Koiso, directed Takagi to resume his secret studies before becoming final. It also had direct access of steps to get out of the war. Working with to the Emperor and the Emperor could himself Yonai and the Navy Vice Minister, Vice Adm. initiate meetings with the Council. The Council, Seibi Inouye, Takagi considered such questions as lilce the Cabinet, did not work on majority votes, (1) how to get Army agreement to end the war; but on general agreement or "unity". Important (2) issues involved in possible Allied terms such as issues on which unity was lacking were presented demands on Japan after the war, reparations, to the Emperor usually in the form of alternatives protection of the "national polity"; (3) the prob­ for his choice. To one acquainted with the Jap­ lem of public opinion and morale in the event of anese talent for divided authority and controls, peace; (4) how to reach the Emperor and work piecemeal responsibility and decisions, and con­ through him to accomplish their purpose. As sidering the past failures to cope administratively these studies progressed, private briefing sessions with the necessities of total war, the Council may were held with Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Kido, be taken as an outstanding accomplishment. Marquis Tsuneo Matsudaira, the Imperial House­ Nor is it possible to exaggerate the central hold Minister, Okada, and a number of others. importance of this committee, for certainly from Sometime later Admiral Koshiro Oikawa, the early May of 1945 until the August surrender the chief of naval staff, and Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, enemy's principal problem was to give expression the deputy chief of naval staff, were informed of to its political decision to end the war. During these maneuvers. Contacts were also established that period the military and economic and morale with Army people. Takagi testified that quite effects of our operations were significant chiefly as a number of them were convinced and some, in they bore directly upon the top political decision fact, brought pressure upon the Army minister. already made and the struggle between those This served, however, only to stiffen the Army's political leaders who had already determined to attitude against all peace moves and many on find a way out of the war and the militarists who the Army side recanted for reasons of discipline were determined to continue it. Cumulative and personal safety. difficulties and defeats bred further determination In these conversations some differences of opin-

4 ion emerged as to peace terms-some favored but what is significant here is that at least by giving up all occupied territories, whereas others March 1945, a specific peace overture was under thought Formosa and Korea were required for cabinet discussion. food. It was generally agreed that the only way In this desperate situation, and since important to reach the public was through the Emperor, if eleme.nts both within the government and among conformity to a peace decision were to be secured the leaders outside were favoring and initiating and a possible military coup avoided. Okada peace moves, it is legitimate to ask why the Koiso approached Kido frequently on this subject. cabinet did not end the war in the fall of 1944. Takagi reported that Konoye had already made Members of Japan's original war-making coalition, up his mind along similar lines before these talks though no longer in full control, still had great began. Takagi further stated that as a result of strength within the top Army command, the these activities they were prepared to carry middle ranks of both services, and the bureaucracy through toward peace in the face of Army oppo­ of the Government. They constituted a distinct sition, if need be even to the point of withstanding threat of revolt or a coup in the estimate of the an Army revolt. civilian and Imperial household leaders. Certain Although the peacemakers were well represented general and psychological factors also determined in the Koiso government, the cabinet's decision the further conduct of the war and the central was taken to continue and renew the war effort decision by the Koiso regime: (1) It is clear that hoping for an improved position from which to the Japanese leaders entered the war deeply con­ seek a compromise peace. The validity of the vinced that they were fighting for their very peacemakers' estimates was demonstrated by national existence and life, whereas the United further attrition of air forces and shipping, a States they believed was merely pressing for eco­ declining basic industrial production and a seri­ nomic advantages and a set of principles, but not ously lowered civilian livelihood. In the mean­ for vital security. (2) Japan had no specific plan time, the initial air raids on the Empire coupled other than negotiation for ending the war she with loss of the Philippines had a deepening effect began. A predilection for negotiation- demon­ upon these attitudes. The leaders especially strated in terminating the Russo-Japanese war, feared the threat to production, the decline in efforts to enlist the United States in bringing the public morale, and a break-up of Japan as Ger­ China Incident to a close, etc.- maintai'1ed a hope many even then was breaking up. that Japan could trade it out with the Allies. By December 1944 private conversations among (3) The Casablanca statement and the Cairo the top ruling factions, including Kido, Konoye, Declaration setting forth Allied terms for uncon­ Yonai, Okawa, Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, etc., ditional surrender were still considered by Japan's were addressed to problems created by urgent leaders to be just declarations, not actual final need for peace. The Emperor on his own initia­ terms to be imposed. (4) The desire to save face, tive in February 1945 had a series of interviews to preserve the Tenno system, and fear of the with the senior statesmen whose consensus was military and the police at this period helped the that Japan faced certain defeat and should seek factions favoring continued resistance. (5) The peace at once. information policy of minimizing United States Discussed at least, during March 1945, was the successes and capabilities, while distorting their plan to initiate peace steps through the mediation own losses and exaggerating their ability to con­ of China. Prince N aruhiko Higashikuni was duct effective operations, had left the people the chief ad vocate of this scheme, and it received ignorant of the fact of Japan's actual military some consideration and support among the Jushin situation at this time. Some Government factions and at the foreign office. Choice of China as feared internal chaos, "communistic revolts and Allied negotiator was based in part on the ingen- disorganization" if the true situation became . uous notion that since "she was a neighbor and lmown. fellow member of the co-prosperity sphere", her Thus so nicely balanced were the ruling factions mediation would be more suitable than direct and cliques that their interrelation conditioned approaches to the United States. Terms were the expression of policy as w~ll as its formation, to be based on Japan returning to her pre-1931 and accounts in part at least for the unusual time­ boundaries. There is no clear evidence available lapse between the top civilian political decision to to the Survey as to how far the plan was carried, accept defeat and the final capitulation. The 5 result in the Koiso cabinet at least was a tempo­ of 1-10 June 1945.") Suzuki, who agreed with rary stalemate. the estimate, presented it to the Emperor.. Con­ The Okinawa landings on 1 April were quickly currently he asked ex-Premier Koki Hirota to followed by Koiso's fall on 8 April and the desig­ sound out th(' Russian ambassador to Tokyo, nation of Admiral Baron Kantaro Suzuki as Y akov A. Malik, privately as to the Russian Premier. attitude toward interceding with America. Early in May (prior to the 18th according to IV. The Suzuki Cabinet a statement of Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Soemu Kido's estimate affords the best guide to the Toyoda) the Supreme War Direction Council political situation which produced the Suzuki began to discuss ways and means of ending the government. The Lord Privy Seal stated to the war. Concurrently other meetings of the Council Survey that Japan's situation called for a man who were goiug on with the view of obtaining Russia's could think fundamentally, had deep convictions services at an opportune time. Foreign Minister and great personal courage. Although many . Togo was leader of this. While Hirota was among the peacemakers had long favored · a .talking with Malik, Ambassador Sato had been stronger man than Koiso, Kido at least was con­ instructed in Moscow to prepare th~ way for vinced that so long as Germany remained in the a Japanese emissary to discuss improvement of war Japan would be in danger of a military coup Soviet-Japanese relations and Russia's intercession in the event firm and positive steps were taken to end the war. Specific terms for ending the war immediately to end the war. In any case the apparently did not come up at this time, but the hopes for positive steps under Koiso's aegis were Council was prepared that whatever the result not fulfilled, primarily becnuse he was not strong they "would be worse than prewar conditions". enough to stand up to the military. When Suzuki The Potsdam Declaration had not been issued, but was named Premier, Kido stated the question it was felt that the Cairo Declaration terms would was not whether to end the war, but by what not actually be applied; it was looked upon as means and how quickly. a declaration only, whose terms could be reduced Suzuki informed the Survey that when he by negotiating and by being in a position to exact assumed office "it was the Emperor's desire to "hea.vy sacrifices" if the war continued. make every effort to bring the war to a conclusion Thus during the forepart of May two separate as quickly as possible, and that was my purpose". but interrelated topics were before the Inner This created a position Suzuki described as diffi­ Cabinet, one dealing with Japan's inability to cult. On the one hand he had instructions from continue the war, the other initiating talks with the Emperor to arrange an end to the war; on the Russia for intercession. Shortly after the end other hand any of those opposing this policy who of the European war, 8 May, the War Minister, learned of such peace moves would be apt to attack General Korechika Anami, asked the Cabinet or even assassinate him. Thus with the general for an Imperial conference to decide the "funda­ staffs, Government in general, and the people, he mental principle of the war," that is whether to advocated increased war effort and determination continue it. This action, while not indicating to fight, whereas "through diplomacy and any that the army was ready to quit (on the contrary other means available" he had to negotiate with the war minister and army chief of staff urged other countries to stop the war. continuance of hostilities), did confirm Kido's Almost immediately, Suzuki ordered his chief belief that the Army would permit open consider­ cabinet secretary, Sakomizu, to make a study of ation of the question within the Cabinet only Japan's fighting capabilities and whether they after Germany's collapse. Perhaps even more were sufficient to continue the war. Sakomizu important it was an affirmative test of the wisdom concluded in May that Japan could not continue in selecting Anami as War Minister. For even the war, basing his estimate on Japanese studies though he held out to the last against uncondi­ as to the inability to produce aircraft, losses and tional surrender (Anami committed suicide on 15 damage to shipping, the precarious food situation August), at no time did he obstruct the positive and the antiwar sentiments. of the people. (A peace steps which were being taken by Suzuki copy of this estimate came into Survey hands and the others, although by resigning he might from Yonai in November 1945, and is appended have forced the Suzuki government out of office. in translation as "Survey of National Resources as This negative support of the peace moves by

6 certain Army leaders would have afforded an his real feelings. On 20 June the Emperor on interesting line of inquiry had Anami et al been his own initiative called the six council members available to the Survey for questioning. The to a conference and stated that it was necessary N a.vy of course was divided, with Yonai among to have a plan to close the war at once, as well as the foremost advocates of peace and Admiral a plan to defend the home islands. He asked what the council thought of that idea. The Soemu Toyoda, the Navy Chief of Staff, siding Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the with the Army. But Toyoda also was restrained Navy Minister stated that they fully concurred in his opposition to Cabinet peace councils; he with the Imperial view and that such steps were testified: then being taken to that end. Then the Emperor Only two persons in all of the Navy ·had any knowl­ in turn asked when the ministers expected they edge of the discussions relating to intervention of Russia, the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Navy General would be able to send a special ambassador to Staff. It may be (Toyoda continued) that since frequent Moscow. The reply was that it was uncertain conferences were being held some of the others high up but they hoped he could be sent before the Pots­ in the Navy Ministry might have had some suspicions. dam conference. Sakomizu testified that after and because I felt that such might be the case I stated this expression from the Emperor, Suzuki decided to my deputy chief of staff that although conversations were being carried out relative to the conclusion of the he could stop the war; when he returned from war, that was not an affair with which officers should be the conference he told Sakomizu "Today the concerned * * * I believe that a similar situation Emperor said what everyone has wanted to say prevailed in the Army, that only two officials had definite but yet was afraid to say." knowledge of these discussions. After that the Government redoubled its talks From June until the close of the war, the nan·a­ with Russia and decided to send Prince Konoye tive of political events in Japan is clear and rather to Moscow if he were persona grata. On <10 July detailed from the testimony of Y onai, Toyoda, the Emperor called Foreign Minister Shigenori Suzuki, Umezu, and Sakomizu, corroborated by Togo and said, "As it is now early July should not Kido, Konoye, Hiranuma, and others. After our special ambassador be dispatched to Moscow Anami's request for an Imperial conference without delay?" Since Soviet Ambassador Malik Sakomizu prepared a statement for that occasion was ill in Tokyo and the conversations the1·e were which opened by saying that the war should be not progressing, Sato was again instructed to put "accomplished", and the Emperor's reign and the the matter directly to the Vice Commissar for homeland kept intact. This was followed by the Foreign Affairs in Moscow. Russia asked for details of Sakomizu's estimate prepared shortly more details concerning the mis~ion and Sato after Suzuki assumed office. On 6 June the six was directed to explain the mission as follows: regular members of the Council discussed what (1) to make an improvement in relations between steps should be taken to prosecute the war. Also Russia and Japan (in view of Russia's denuncia­ at the meeting were the chief cabinet secretary, tion of the neutrality pact), and (2) to ask Russia the chief of the Navy's military affairs bureau, the to intercede with the United States in order to chief of the Army bureau of military affairs, the stop the war. The Soviets replied on 13 July that head of the Cabinet Research Bureau and the since Stalin and Molotov were just leaving for 1v1inister of Agriculture and Commerce. The Potsdam no answer could be given until their conclusion was that w1less some radical measure return to Moscow. On 12 July meanwhile the could be adopted to arouse the people, theN ation's Emperor had called in Konoye and secretly in­ war power was bound to decline very rapidly. At structed him to accept any terms he could get and this session, as Toyoda explained, to wire these terms direct to the Emperor. No one expressed the view that we should ask for Konoye also testified that when Sa to was sounding peace- when a large number of people are present it out the Russians he reported the Russians would is difficult for any one member to say that we should so not consider a peace role unless the terms were entreat. unconditional surrender, and that this reply had a On 8 June the six regular members of the Coun­ great influence on the Emperor. cil conferred with the Emperor. The statement In the days before the Potsdam Declaration, was read by the Emperor who made no comment at Suzuki, Togo, andYonai became pessimistic about this meeting. Each of the others expressed his the Russian negotiations. They expected even­ own official opinion, but none as yet expressed tually that they would have some answer; but 7 if it were unfavorable they concluded that their homeland; (b) that the Japanese military and only recourse would be to broadcast directly to the naval forces abroad would be withdrawn, dis­ United States. armed and demobilized by Japan itself; (c) that On 26 July the Potsdam Declaration was issued. all war crimes should be prosecuted by the Japa­ In their deliberations on that statement, which nese Government. began immediately, no member of the Inner Cabi­ Suzuki, Yonai, and Togo favored the first net had any objections to ending the war. Suzuki, opinion, whereas Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda Togo, and Yonai felt that the declaration must supported the second. When this three-to-three be accepted as the final terms of peace at once, split could not be resolved, the full Cabinet was whether they liked it or not. The War Minister called in, and after an explanation by Togo, nine and the two chiefs of staff on the other hand felt voted for unconditional acceptance, three voted that the terms were "too dishonorable". Discus­ for the conditional acceptance and three others sion centered around first the future position of favored intermediate positions. After a session the Emperor, second the disposition of war crim­ lasting until 2000 without achieving unity, the inals, ap.d third the future form of Japan's "na­ cabinet declared au intermission. In this impasse tional polity". Suzuki decided to request ·an Imperial conference On 6 August in the midst of these discussions for the Inner Cabinet at which the conflicting an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. views could be presented and the Emperor's own Early reports to Tokyo described very great decision sought. At 2330 on the 9th the conference damage, but the military did not think it was an was held, with chief cabinet secretary Sakomizu atomic bomb until President Truman's announce­ and Hiranuma, the Privy Council president, also ment and a mission of Japanese scientists sent to attending. The Potsdam Declaration was first Hiroshima confirmed it. On the morning of 7 read to the Emperor, then Togo expressed his August Suzuki and Togo conferred and then re­ opinion, followed by all of the others who stated ported the news to the Emperor, stating that this their views. Around 0300 on the lOth Suzuki was the time to accept the Potsdam Declaration. announced (as paraphrased by Sakomizu's tes­ The military side still however could not make up timony): their minds to accept it. We have discussed this question for a long time and These differences continued to be examined and everyone has expressed his own opinion sincerely without hope of favorable word from Russia had been all any conclusion being reached. The situation is urgent, so any delay in coming to a decision should not be tolerated. but abandoned when very early in the morning of I am therefore proposing to ask the Emperor his own wish 9 August the news arrived that Russia had de­ and to decide the conference's conclusion on that basis. clared war. Although considerable pessimism had His wish should settle the issue, and the Government prevailed regarding the outcome of the negotia­ should follow it. tions, the Government ·was not prepared for war The Emperor then stated his own view (again with the Soviets, nor the military capable of any paraphrased by Sakomizu), effective counter-plan. Suzuki calculated that he I agree with the first opinion as expressed by the foreign had a choice of resigning or taking immediate minister. I think I should tell the reasons why I have positive action, which could be either declaring decided so. Thinking about the world situation and the war on Russia and continuing until the whole internal Japanese situation, to continue the war means Nation was destroyed or accepting the Potsdam nothing but the destruction of the whole nation. My ancestors and I have always wished to put forward the Declaration. He conferred with the Emperor Nation's welfare and international world peace as our around 0700 and after a couple of hours decided to prime concern. To continue the war now means that accept the Potsdam terms, with which decision cruelty and bloodshed will still continue in the world and the Emperor agreed. A meeting of the six regular that the Japanese Nation will suffer severe damage. So, members of the Supreme War Direction Council to stop the war on this occasion is the only way to save the Nation from destruction and to restore peace in the was called for 1000. After two gloomy hours it world. Looking back at what our military headquarters remained deadlocked as before on the 1. wo opposing have done, it is apparent that their· performance has fallen opinions: (1) To accept the Potsdam Declaration far short of ·the plans expressed. I don't think this outright, with the understanding that it did not discrepancy can be corrected in the future. But when I alter the Emperor's legal position; (2) to accept think about my obedient soldiers abroad and of those who died or were wounded in battle, about those who have lost the declaration with the following conditions: their property or lives by bombing in the homeland, when (a) that the Allied forces would not occupy the I think of all those sacrifices, I cannot help but feel sad.

8 ~~ --~-~~~-=~======~==~~~~~~~~~~~------

I decided that this war should be stopped, however, in munications between the two countries. The spite of this sentiment and for more important considera­ next morning, about 0800 the 14th, Suzuki decided tions. to go to the Emperor privately and ask him to Suzuki then said, call an Imperial conference, which the Emperor The Imperial decision has been expressed. This should could do at any time, but the Government could be the conclusion of the conference. not without the consent of the two chiefs of staff. Immediately thereafter the full Cabinet resumed The terminal conference was held before the its meeting and ratified unanimously a decision to Emperor at 1000. Present were the 16 Cabinet accept the Potsdam terms provided they did not ministers, the two chiefs of staff, Hiranuma alter the Emperor's · prerogatives. This was representing the Privy Council, the chiefs of the cabled to the United States through the Swiss bureaus of military and naval affairs, and the chief around 0700 the lOth. The United States reply cabinet secretary, Sakomizu. Suzuki announced was received from the San Francisco broadcast that the Emperor had called the meeting to con­ about 0400 on the 12th and officially about 0700 sider the American reply in his presence, so that the 13th. The broadcast reply was immediately everyone who had an opinion should express it studied by the Inner Cabinet and the official freely. Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda stated that documents put before the full Cabinet meeting the American reply was insufficient, that they around 1300 on the 13th. Acceptance was favored asking again for a more concrete answer, favored by 13 ministers, but 3 were opposed. or if that were impossible the war should be con­ Early in the evening the Cabinet recessed. tinued. All the others favored acceptance. Then Toyoda, the Navy Chief of Staff, stated the the Emperor, as quoted by Sakomizu, said: objections as follows: "It seems to me that there is no other opinion to sup• On the question of the Emperor's position, the American port your side (the military's). I shall explain mine. I reply made no direct statement but did state that the hope all of you will agree with my opinion. My opinion powers of the Emperor and the Japanese Government is the same as the one I expressed the other night. The would be subject to the authority of the Supreme Com­ American answer seems to me acceptable." mander for the Allied Powers. The main point . . . had He then asked the Government to draft an to do with the Emperor's position since it was the convic­ tion of the Japanese people that the Emperor was a living Imperial rescript to stop the war, and offered to god above whom there could be no earthly being. It was broadcast the decision to the people. The Cabinet feared that the Japanese people would not readily accept returned to their office and formally accepted un­ the wording of the reply which placed the Emperor in a conditional surrender. subordinate position . . . So the suggestion was made to query the Allied Governments as to whether it would not V. The Political Target Under Assault be possible to have the orders and instruction of the Supreme Commander go directly to the Japanese Govern­ From the foregoing calendar it remains first to ment and those orders passed on by the cabinet to the outline the nature of the political target presented Emperor who ... would carry out the work connected by Japan and second to assess various factors with the termination of the war. which contributed to the success of the assault on It is not clear whether this objection arose from the enemy's will to resist. a sincere endeavor to preserve the Tenno system A. To those who thought of Japanese resistance through a typically Japanese concern with seman­ ftS typified by a fanatical Japanese soldier who tics, or a last-ditch effort to void the decision for fought until rooted out of his last-ditch foxhole, peace, or fear of a military coup if the Emperor's the possibility of forcing a surrender appeared to position were not meticulously preserved. In any be remote. Our aim in the Pacific war was, case, it is significant that the two chiefs of staff nevertheless, to induce responsible Japanese leaders refused that evening to sign the document, with to admit defeat. Compelling such an admission the Premier, which was required for the Govern­ at the earliest moment constituted the objective ment to request a conference with the Emperor. of our attack. The two chiefs of staff stayed up all night with In total war Lhe nature of the political target is the Foreign Minister, pressing him to ask the linked to the political structure and the spirit of American Government for a more "exact" answer. the enemy. In the case of Japan that spirit The Foreign Minister refused, insisting that it differed as between the general populace and the would be construed as a refusal of the terms top ruling elements. This separation of public offered and thus disrupt the slim string of com- from leaders was an important consideration.

9 Japan had long been conditioned to oligarchic existed in Japan lay exposed and vulnerable to rule. Rigid police controls allowed the ideas and air attack, which fact goes far toward ,explaining spirit of the leaders to form separately from those the true basis for unconditional surrender without . of the people. Popular morale therefore became invasion of the home islands. That vulnerability just another factor in the reckonings of the ruling to air attack derived in part from the basic char­ group. At the war's opening and throughout its acter of the war in its decisive phases. It turned early stages, the spirit of both leaders and people out to be essentially a war to win air control .over was chauvinistic, aggressive, expansionist. After the Japanese homeland. This concept was not the defeats at Midway, Port Moresby, and merely central to much of the strategy guiding Guadalcanal, Japan went on the stratE-gic defen­ our operations, but was thoroughly understood sive. Though her advance had been stemmed, and feared by an effective sector of Japanese she had won an empire and needed only to con- leaders who sought and achieved political power 5olidate her conquest. Thereafter, under the to terminate the war. By the summer and fall pressure of our counter-offensive which eventually of 1944, and throughout the remainder of the war, exposed her home islands to direct attack, seriously the validity of their fear was being persuasively reduced her fleet and air forces, and blockaded her demonstrated by the application of our air power already inadequate economy, the early hope of in its several roles. Loss of fleet and air forces, victory was replaced by fear of defeat. Finally, without which, as the leaders knew, no effective a desperate determination to resist remained. defense could be mounted, was almost entirely Japan's will to resist, the core target of our the result of our air superiority. Vital perimeter assault, was supported mainly by military poten­ bases were lost when our air forces neutralized tial, pro-duction potential, morale of the people, them, sealed off both the air and sea reinforce­ and such political considerations of the leadership ment, and gave direct local support to our occupy­ as the preservation of the Tenno system, etc. So ing operations. Japan's limited war production, long as these factors supported resistance they already starved for materials through shipping operated, of course, as impediments to surrender. lost to our submarines, was further depleted by Thus affecting the determination of Japan's air interdiction of sea communications as new bases leaders to continue the war was not alone the eventually permitted almost complete blockade actual loss of an air force capable of defending the day and night. Heavy bomber and carrier raids home islands, but the loss of hope that this air against cities, military and industrial installa­ force could be replaced, let alone enlarged. It tions, further depleted her remaining resources, was not necessary for us to bum every city, to productivity and transport, lowered morale, and destroy every factory, to shoot down every air­ brought the true war situation home to the Japa­ plane or sink every ship, and starve the people. nese people. Thus the Japanese leaders lost It was enough to demonstrate that we were both power and hope of resistance as our air capable of doing all this-that we had the power weapons exploited air control over the home and the intention of continuing to the end. In islands. this fashion, those responsible for the decision to B. By relating them to the narrative set forth surrender felt the twin-impact of our attack which in the first sections of this report, it is possible to made them not only impotent to resist, but also treat separately the principal contributions to destroyed any hope of future resistance. surrender made by various factors which bore on The will of the political leaders to resist collapsed the terminal events of the war. well before the will of the people as a whole. The 1. Blockade of Japan's r;;ea communications ex­ leaders were, however, unwilling to move too far in ploited the basic vulnerability of an island enemy advance of public opinion. At the time of sur­ which, with inherently second-power resources, render, even though there was little pressure was struggling to enlarge its capabilities by milk­ toward surrender from the people, their confi­ ing the raw materials of a rich conquered area. dence in victory had been thoroughly undermined Acute dependence upon imports of such basic and they accepted the Imperial rescript, perhaps items as oil, iron ore, coal, bauxite, food, etc., with surprise, but not with active resistance as caused Japan's shipping position even in the fall some of the leaders had feared. of 1941 to appear deficient to several members of One further point should be developed and the Jushin, whose opinions were declared to Tojo stressed here. The political objective which before the Pearl Harbor attack. These fears were

10 well-founded, at least for long-term fighting, since peace-making factions into the succeeding Koiso Japan began the war with 6,000,000 tons of mer­ government quickly followed the loss of Saipan in chant shipping, which were barely sufficient for July 1944. Also, after the costly and vitiating estimated minimum requirements. Her capacity defeats in the Palaus, Philippines, and at lwo Jima, to build was quickly exceeded by losses. Eighty­ Koiso was in turn succeeded shortly after our eight percent of Japan's total merchant shipping Okinawa landings of 1 April 1945 by the Suzuki available during the war was sunk. United States cabinet, which was formed with the specific man­ submarines sank 55 percent of the total lost. Our date to terminate the war. In these campaigns, Navy and Army air forces made important con­ dictated by our need for air mastery and won by tributions by sinking 40 percent of Japan's total immediate air control, while Japan's loss of effec­ shipping lost, by interdiction of sea routes, and tive naval and land-based air forces was over­ by an aerial mining program carried out by B-29s whelming, her military attrition was not complete, in the last months of the war which sealed off the since our operations used up by no means all of vital Inland Sea and disrupted every major home her ground and Kamikaze forces. Japan's prin­ island port. The blockade prevented exploitation eipal land armies were in fact never defeated, a of conquered resources, kept Japan's economy off consideration which also supported the military's balance, created shortages of materials which in continued last-ditch resistance to the surrender turn limited war production, and deprived her of decision. It nevertheless appears that after the oil in amounts sufficient to immobilize fleet and loss of the Marianas in July- August 1944, the air units and to impair training. These effects military commands, though unconvinced of final were intimately associated with the political con­ victory, viewed defense against our subsequent ditions culminatiug in the fall of Tojo and Koiso. operations as affording an opportunity for only a The direct military and economic limitations im­ limited success, a tactical victory which might, so posed by shortages created virtually insoluble they hoped, have created a purchase from which political as well as economic problems in attempt­ to try for a negotiated peace under terms more ing to achieve war production adsquate for the favorable than unconditional surrender. defense of Japan. The special feeling of vulner­ 3. Fear of home island bombing was persuasive ability to blockade, to which a dependent island to the political leaders even before its direct effects people are ever subject, increased and dramatized, could be felt. News of the B-29 and its intended especially to the leaders, the hopelessness of their capabilities reached Japan in 1943. B- 29 raids position and favored the growing conviction that on Kyushu and southern Honshu targets began the defeat was inevitable. from China bases on 15 June 1944. With the loss 2; While the blockade was definitive in stran­ of Saipan in early July 1944, many leaders became gling Japan's war mobilization and production, it wholly convinced of Japan's eventual defeat, one cannot be considered separately from the pressure factor being that from Marianas bases the home­ of our concurrent military operations, with which land would be brought under the kind of intensive, it formed a shears that scissored Japan's military shattering a.ir assault even then being administered potential into an ineffectual remnant. In the to their German partner. The timing of the · early engagements that stemmed the Japanese strategic bombing attack affected its role in the advance and in the subsequent battle for bases, surrender decision. After the :Marianas were lost the application of our air power against vital forces but before the first attacks were flown in N ovem­ which Japan committed piecemeal in defense of ber 1944, Tojo had been unseated and peacemak­ these perimeter positions enabled us largely to ers introduced into the Government as prominent destroy her navy and reduce her air forces to elements. The war economy had already passed impotence before the home islands could be its peak, fleet 11nd air forces had been critically brought under direct air attack. Throughout weakened, confidence of the "intelligentsia" in the these operations we were employing air power Government and the military had been deflated, effectively and potently in ways the Japanese and confidence of the people in eventual victory leaders understood and feared, and had no ade­ was weakening. By mid-1944 shortages of food quate defense to withstand. Although a core of and civilian supplies were reflected in reduced liv­ bitter-end resistance lay in Japan's army and navy ing standards. Therefore the actual physical until the Imperial rescript was signed, it should be destruction wrought by strategic bombing as­ noted that Tojo's collapse and the introduction of sumed the role of an accelerator, to assist and

710381--46----3 11 expedite forces already in motion. It added a hassy at Tokyo revealed that Hitler was dead, the tremendous quantitative weight to those forces. promised new weapon had failed to materialize and Since the means of resisting direct air attacks had that Germany would surrender within a matter of already been largely destroyed, it represented the hours. Kido believed, presumably on Japanese full exploitation of air control by an air weapon. Army representations, that the Army would not These attacks became definitive in the surrender countenance peace moves so long as Germany decision because they broadened the realization continued to' fight. It is not clear whether this of defeat by bringing it home to the people and was a face-saving position, designed to avoid a dramatized to the whole nation what the small prior Japanese surrender. In any case on 9 May peace party already knew. They proved day in 1945, immediately after the Nazi capitulation, and day out, and night after night, that the United Gen~ral Anami, the War Minister, asked the Cab­ States did control the air and could exploit it. inet for an Imperial conference to reconsider the They lowered morale by demonstrating the dis­ war situation. The significant fact, however, is advantages of total war directly, added a vital that Japan was pursuing peace before the Nazis increment of both actual and clearly foreseeable collapsed, and the impoverishment and fragmen­ future production loss by both precision and area tation of the German people had already afforded attacks, and applied pressure on the surrender a portent of similar consequences fox an intran- decision by eliminating the hope of successful final sigent Japan. , resistance. 6. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs 4. When Japan was defeated without invasion, did not defeat Japan, nor by the testimony of the a recurrent question arose as to what effect the enemy leaders who ended the war did they per­ threat of a home-island invasion had had upon suade Japan to accept unconditional surrender. the surrender decision. It was contended that The Emperor, the Lord Privy Seal, the Prime the th:t·eat of invasion, if not the actual operation, Minister, the Foreign M:inister, and the Navy was a requirem0nt to induce acceptance of the Minister had decided as early as May of 1945 that surrender terms. On this tangled issue the evi­ the war should be ended even if it meant accept­ dence and hindsight me clear. The fact is, of ance of defeat on allied terms. The War Minister course, that Japan did surrender without invasion, and the two chiefs of staff opposed unconditional and with its principal armies intact. Testimony surrender. The impact of the Hiroshima attack before the Survey shows that the expected "viola­ was to bring further urgency and lubrication to tion of the sacred homeland" raised few fears the machinery of achieving peace, primarily by which expedited the decision to surrender before­ contributing to a situation which permitted the hand. Government and Imperial household lead­ Prime Minister to bring the Emperor overtly and ers felt some concern for the "destruction of the directly into a position where his decision for Japanese people", but the people were already immediate acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration being shattered by direct air attacks. Anticipated could be used to override the remaining objectors. landings were even viewed by the military with Thus, although the atomic bombs changed no hope that they would afford a means of inflicting votes of the Supreme War Direction Council casualties sufficiently high to improve their concerning the Potsdam terms, they did fore­ chances of a negotiated peace. Preparation shorten the war and expedite the peace. of defenses against landings diverted certain Events and testimony wh_ich support these resources from dispersal and cushioning moves conclusions are blue-printed from the chronology which might have partially mitigated our air established in the first sections of this report: blows. But in Japan's then depleted state, the (a) The mission of the Suzuki government, diversion was not significant. The responsible appointed 7 April 1945, was to make peace. An leaders in power read correctly the true situation appearance of negotiating for terms less onerous and embraced surrender well before invasion was than unconditional surrender was maintained in expected. order to contain the military and bureaucratic 5. So long as Germany remained in the war that elements still determined on a final Bushido fact contributed to the core of Japanese resistance. defense, and perhaps even more importantly to Slight evidence exists that some hope was held obtain freedom to create peace with a minimum for a long-promised German miracle weapon. A of personal danger and in.ternal obstruction. It telegram received on 6 May in the German em- seems clear however that in extremis the peace-

12 makers would have peace, and peace on any Japan nor materially hastened the acceptance of terms. This was the gist of advice given to surrender nor changed the votes of the Supreme Hirohito by the Jushin in February, the declared War Direction Council. Negotiation for Russia conclusion of Kido in April, the underlying reason to intercede began the forepart of May 1945 in for Koiso's fall in April, the specific injunction both Tokyo and Moscow. Konoye, the intended of the Emperor to Suzuki on becoming premier emissary to the Soviets, stated to the Survey that which was known to all members of his cabinet. while ostensibly he was to negotiate, he received · (b) A series of conferences of the Supreme War direct and secret instructions from the Emperor Direction Council before Hirohito on the subject to secure peace at any price, notwithstanding of continuing or terminating the war began on 8 its severity. Sakomizu, the chief cabinet secretary, June and continued through 14 August. At the alleged that while awaiting the Russian answer on 8 June meeting the war situation was reviewed. mediation, Suzuki and Togo decided that were On 20 Juno the Emperor, supported by the it negative direct overtures would be made to the Premier, Foreign Minister, and Navy Minister, United States. Efforts toward peace through the declared for peace; tho Army Minister and tho Russians, forestalled by the imminent departure of two chiefs of staff did not concm. On 10 July Stalin and Molotov for Potsdam, were answered the Emperor again mged haste in the moves to by the Red Army's advance into Manchuria. mediate through Russia, but Potsdam intervened. The Kwantung army, already weakened by diver­ While the Government still awaited a Russian sion of its units and logistics to bolster island answer, the Hiroshima bomb was dropped on defenses in the South and written off for the de­ 6 August. fense of Japan proper, faced inescapable defeat. (c) Consideration of tho Potsdam terms within There is little point in attempting more precisely the Supreme War Direction Council revealed the to impute Japan's unconditional surrender to any same three-to-three cleavage which first appeared one of the numerous causes which jointly and at the Imperial conference on 20 June. On the cumulatively were responsible for Japan's dis­ morning of 9 August Premier Suzuki and Hirohito aster. Concerning the absoluteness of her defeat decided at once to accept tho Potsdam terms; there can be no doubt. The time lapse between meetings and moves thereafter wore designed to military impotence and political acceptance of the legalize tho decision and prepare tho Imperial inevitable might have been shorter had the rescript. At the conclusive Imperial conference, political structure of Japan permitted a more rapid on the night of 9- 10 August, tho Supreme War and decisive determination of national policies. Direction Council still split three-to-throe. It was It seems clear, however, that air supremacy and necessary for the Emperor finally to repeat his its later exploitation over Japan proper was the desire for acceptance of tho Potsdam terms. major factor which determined the timing of (d) Indubitably the Hiroshima bomb and the Japan's surrender and obviated any need for rumor derived from interrogation of an American invasion. prisoner (B- 29 pilot) who stated that an atom Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts bomb attack on Tokyo was scheduled for 12 and supported by the testimony of the surviving August introduced urgency in the minds of the Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's Government and magnified the pressure behind opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, its moves to end the war. and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, 7. The sequence of events just recited also Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic defines the effect of Russia's entry into the Pacific bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had war on 8 August 1945. Coming 2 days after the not entered the war, and even if no invasion had Hiroshima bomb, the move neither defeated been planned or contemplated.

13

--- - - · ------APPENDIX A-JAPANESE DOCUMENTS

APPENDIX A-1. ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE Table 1 NATIONAL STRENGTH AT THE OUT­ [TN: Quantities given in kiloliters] BREAK OF THE GREATER EAST ASIA Oil output WAR AS OF DECEMBER 1941 Source of supply Domestic Synthetic of occupied! Total output oil territories

A. General First year ______200, 000 300,000 300,000 800, 000 Second year ______200,000 700,000 2,440,000 I 3, 340,000 In a greatly changing world situation, the Third year ______400, 000 1, 500,000 2, 770,000 6, 670,000 policy adopted by the Japanese Empire is to attain a position of self-sufficiency based upon 3. Shipping capacity.- The total transport ca­ national strength which it can maintain inde­ pacity for the fiscal year 1941 was 53,000,000 tons. pendently. At the outbreak of war, Japan will have ships In determining the over-all policy of war or totalling 6,100,000 tons at her disposal. The peace, it is always necessary to make a proper total estimated transport capacity for the fiscal estimate of the Nation's strength. year 1942 is approximately 85 percent of the 1941 However, because of extreme difficulty in ob­ total or 45,000,000 tons. taining complete data and because of the many complicated and unpredictable factors in the Table 2. Anticipated Damage and Replacement of changing material resources situation, an estimate Ships of the actual stTength of the Empire is not a simple [TN: Quantities given in tons] matter. Thus, it is a dangerous practice to translate national strength into mathematical Second year of Third year of First year of war war war terms and use them without hesitation as the Anticipated damage_ -1800, D00-1, 100, 000 I 700, OQ0-800, 000 I 700,000- 800,000 criteria in deciding on war or peace. Replacement______300,000 500,000 600,000 B. Scarce Items Preventing Complete Selj-sriffi- ciency Estimated (shipping) situation after the third 1. Rice. year of war: 2. Fuel. Total tonnage on hand ______5, 250,000 3. Essential war materials. Tonnage required by the Army and 4. Transport capacity. Navy______2, 400, 000 Tonnage required for civilian C. Examination of Principal Resources use ______2,850, 000 1. Rice.- Supplies of rice must be obtained 4. Iron.- Annual requirements if military prep­ from French Indochina and Thailand, and these arations progress at the present rate and current supplies can be had if transport space is made production capacity is expanded: available. Tons Military requirements ______2, 200,000 2. Fuel estimates: oil:-- Production expansion ______1, 600,000 (a) Amount stored as of 1 October 1941: Civilian requirements ______1, 500,000 9,050,000 kiloliters. Miscellaneous ______1, 200,000 (b) Estimated consumption: 5,500,000 kiloliters Total ______6, 500,000 per year after the outbreak of war. Navy, 2,500,000 kiloliters. The iron ore for the above requirement could Army, 600,000 kiloliters. be supplied from Japan, Manchuria, China (in­ Civilian requirements, 2,400,000 kiloliters. cluding Hainan Island) and French Indochina. (c) Estimated supply. 5. Nickel.- The shortage is great and there are

14 Table 3.-AnnuaJ Requirements and Supply of Essential Materials

Supply I I Potential supply Prospective supply Unit of quantity Total re- I Material quirements Stock Remarks Domestic French pile-re- British produc- Manchu- China Inrlo- Thailand Total claimed Dutch Philip- posses- tion ria china Indies pines slons ------ron ore ______Metric tons ...... 10,000,000 3, 950,000 300,000 2, 700, 000 70,000 0 7, 002,000 3, 000,000 0 2, 000,000 I, 400,000 Although shipping Is lacking in war- I (100, 000) [Sic] time, 4,000,000 metric tons of steel can be supplied. M anganese ore ...... do ...... 300,000 200,000 0 0 0 0 200,000 250,000 27.000 30,000 32,000 Increase production and economize in consumption. T ungsten ore ...•...... • ..... do .... ······-- 8,200 5, 500 0 700 500 300 7,000 1,000 50 0 I, 300 Amount from China can be increased . M olybdenum ore ...... do .•...... 2,000 300 400 0 0 0 700 500 0 0 0 Domestic production and amount from Manchuria can be increased. N ickel ore ...... do ...... 'I, 250,000 0 0 0 0 0 60.000 60,000 200,000 0 0 Economize in nickel consumption; [Sic] secure Celebes source of supply. c- obalt ore ...... do ...... 100,000 40,000 0 0 0 0 40,000 30,000 0 0 10,000 Control food \Sic. Possibly typo- graphical error ; limit use. c opper..... ----······-- .....do.------200,000 80,000 0 0 0 0 80.000 70, 000 0 I 300,000 0 Limit use; reclaim; secure Philippine • 60,000 source of supply . L ead ... ------.....do ...... __ 170,000 28,000 I, 200 0 0 0 29,200 32,000 0 0 2, 500 Limit use; Increase domestic and • 3,000 Manchurian production. zinc .... _. __ . ___ .. ______..... do .... ____ .... 80,000 70,000 3,000 0 600 0 79,000 8,000 0 I 80,000 I 100,000 '3,000 T in.------. . . .. do ...... 12,300 2,000 0 0 300 8, 200 10, 500 3, 000 5,000 0 500 Figures in parentheses represent pro- (500) (15, 000) • 500 (10, 000) (1, 500) duction. A ntimony ore ...... ___ .. do .. ····-···-- 4, 000 200 60 200 40 0 500 1, 0011 0 0 50 Secure Chinese output. M ercury ___ ------..... do ...... 450 !55 0 0 5 0 160 300 0 0 0 Limit use. .,... B auxite ...... _____ do ...... 480,000 50.000 0 0 0 0 50.000 330.000 350,000 0 100,000 VI A sbestos .• _---·-·-····- .....do ...... 9,000 2, 500 2, 300 400 200 100 57,000 • 71,000 0 0 0 Increase domestic and Manchurian prorluction; limit use. M lea ...... _._. ___ ... __ ....• do ...•...... _ 800 200 50 500 0 0 665 100 12 0 0 c rude rubber __ ...... • do ...... _ 65,000 0 0 0 40,000 25,000 65,000 0 (400, 000) (1,000) (400, 000) Figures in parentheses represent pro- (80, 000) (40, 000) duction. ndustrial salt._ ...... _...... do ...... 1, 500,000 150,000 400,000 800,000 80.000 70.000 I, 500,000 7 100,000 150,000 0 0 • (250, 000) (250, 000) R Ice ••...... •...... 1,000 koku s____ . __ 100,000 94,000 0 0 4. 000 2,000 1,000, 000 ------0 0 0 tfi

t Pl\renthesized 100,000 not explained, • May he 7,000. Figures blurrcrl. I First digit blurred. • Seconrl digit nnt clear. Possibly 220,000. I Ore. 7 Possibly 110.000. • Reclaimed, a 1 koku~4.96 bushels. no measures for obtaining supplies myhin our at this time to make careful preparations to cope present sphere of influence. It must be obtained with public reactions in case the Okinawa cam­ from occupied territories in the south. paign results in .a disaster and to provide proper 6. Crude rubber.-On the basis of an economic indoctrination against such an eventuality. More­ agreement, the amount expected from Thailand over, it is to be expected that in the future the and French Indochina is 45,000 tons. Domestic enemy's psychological warfare will intensify. requirements are 65,000 tons and the amount on C. Manpower hand is less than 500 tons. Unless the amount procured from French Indochina and Thailand is 1. As compared with material resources, there increased, or a supply of over 20,000 tons is secured is a relative surplus of manpower, but there is no from the Netherlands East Indies, the shortage will efficient exploitation of it. Although distribution have a great effect upon domestic industry andes­ and mobilization of manpower do not respond to pecially upon the progress of military preparations. shifting of production, there is still room for in­ 7. Tin.--Unless a supply of about 10,000 tons creasing war potential depending on its efficient annually is procured from Thailand and French application. On the other hand, the case of mili­ Indochina, not only would it be impossible to tary mobilization does not permit optimism. meet national requirements, but even peacetime 2. The physical standard and birth rate of the military preparations would come to a standstill. people are on the down grade. After 2 years of war, present stock piles would be NOTES: completely depleted. (a) Surplus manpower: Industry ______2,000,000 8. Ooppe1 .-Supplies on hand will soon be cut Commerce______500, 000 in half if the present trend continues. Thus, it Others ______500,000 will be necessary to develop sources in the Philip­ Ther e is a reserve of 3,000,000. At present, effort is pines for supplies of copper. being made to apply this surplus to agriculture and trans­ 9. Lead.- If the present situation continues, the portation where shortages exist. supply will be halved. If more lead can be ob­ (b) M obtli zati on and distribution of man po.wer.-Workers tained from Burma, the supply will be sufficient. available for various industries in December 1944 (between the ages of 16 to 60): 10. Oobalt.- Cobalt must be procured from the Male ______20,300,000. Netherlands East Indies. Female ______24,000,000. TotaL ______44, 300, 000 (37, 500, 000 al- ready engaged in industries APPENDIX A-2. SURVEY OF NATIONAL and armed forces). RESOURCES AS OF 1-10 JUNE 1945 (c) Rate of population increase per 1 ,000.-After 1940, there is a yearly increase of approximately 1,000,000: A. General 1940, 12.7; 1941, 15.2; 1942, 14.2; 1943, 13.8; 1944, figures unknown; it is estimated that since birth The ominous turn of the war, coupled with the rate decreased and infant mortality increased, increasing tempo of air raids is bringing about the figure is lower than that of the previous year. great disruption of land and sea communications and essential war production. The food situation D. Transportation and Communications has worsened. It has become increasingly diffi­ 1. Transportation and shipping.-The volume of cult to meet the requirements of total war. More­ available shipping space was sharply reduced and over, it has become necessary to pay careful atten­ at present comes to a total of 1,000,000 tons. tion to the trend8 in public sentiment. Transportation is faced with insurmountable difficulties because of fuel shortages, mounting B. National Trends in General fury of enemy attacks on our lines of communi­ lVIorale is high, but there is dissatisfaction with cations, and insufficient manpower in cargo the present regime. Criticisms of the government handling. and the military are increasing. The people are The question of whether or not we can maintain losing confidence in their leaders, and the gloomy communication with the continent will greatly omen of deterioration of public morale is present. depend upon the results of the Okinawa campaign. The spirit of public sacrifice is lagging and among If the campaign turns to our disadvantage, we leading intellectuals there are some who advocate cannot hope to maintain planned communication peace negotiations as a way out. It is necessary after June. For the same reason, the cargo-

16

i. carrying capacity of vessels will drastically 2. Ooal.- Accompanying the increasing severity decrease. of air raids and reduction in transport capacity NOTES and production, there is a strong possibility that Shipping a considerable portion of the various industrial Gross tons areas will have to suspend operation for lack of December 194L ______5, 500, ooo· December 1942 ______4, 600,000 coal. · December 1943______3, 700, 000 3. Industrial salts.- Shipping from the conti­ July 1944 ______------3, 100,000 nent has decreased and production of chemicals, April 1945______1, 250, 000 which is dependent on soda, is falling off at an Actual losses alarming rate. After the middle of this year, we Percent Previous average ______7- 10 will be confronted with a shortage of basic salts. This year______23 For this reason, not only will there be difficulty in producing light metals and synthetic oil, but 2. Transportation and railways .- Transport also in producing explosives. capacity of the railways will drop to half that of the previous year due to the intensified enemy air NOTES attack and our inability to maintain construction and repairs on an efficient level. It is feared that In the first quarter of 1945, the objective was to obtain 46,000 tons, but the actual result was approximately 40 railway transportation will become confined to percent. local areas, especially after the middle of this year. Aluminum production Ton• Shuttle transports (trucks, wagons, etc.) and 1941 ______73,000 cargo handling have become the bottleneck of 1942 ______110, coo land and sea transportation, because of the 1943 ______, ------140,0CO scarcity of fuel and labor. 1944 ______110,000 1945 ______------1 9, 000 N OTE.S I Projected for first qu art~ r. Railway transport capacity 'l'ons 1941______150,000,000 4. Liquid fuel.- Hereafter Japan, Manchuria, 1942------160, 000, 000 and China will have to depend upon their own 1943_------180, 000, 000 sources for fuel oil. With oil reserves on the 1944 ______19~ 00~000 verge of exhaustion and the delay in plans for 1945- ______I 90, 000, 000 increased output of oil, we are faced with an 1 Projected. extreme shortage of aviation fuel. This, of course, 3. Communications.- Maintenance of commu­ will have a serious effect on the planning of future nication will be exceedingly difficult after the operations, especially after the mid-year. middle of this year, because of enemy air-raid damage and shortages of materials and personnel. NOTES [Unit: 1,000 kl.] E. Material Resources 1. Steel.- Shipping of iron ore has become P roduction Storage difficult. The total production is about one-fourth Year Various Various ty pes of 1 Crude oil I Period types of 1 Crude oil that of the same period of the previous year. fuel proc- fuel proc- Construction of steel ships cannot be expected essed essed after the mid year. Even a shift to the use of 1941...... 1 1, 570 Apri1194L. ______3, 562 1942 ______3, 470020 I 1, 2fi6 I April1942 ______I 4, 4115571 1, 963 existing materials would mean overcoming numer­ 1943 ______3. 460 1, 969 April 1943 ...... 2, 940 1, 220 1944 ...... 2, 0.53 734 April1944 ...... 1, 822 558 ous obstacles before the plan could be executed. 194 5 ...... 1,362 330 April1945...... 752 779

NoTEs Steel production Tons 5. Modern weapons with aircraft as a nucleus.­ 194 L ______4, 200, 000 It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain 1942 ______~ 10~ 000 production of aircraft due to the ever increasing 1943------_·------4, 200, 000 tempo of air raids, the destruction of transporta­ 1944 ______~ 70~000 tion systems and production facilities, and the 1945_ ------1 270, 000 1 Projected for first quarter. lack of raw materials and fuels.

17 NoTES APPENDIX A-3. COMPARISON OF MILI­ PToduction of aircraft TARY STRENGTH OF JAPAN AND THE 1944, monthly production ______" ______2, 230 UNITED STATES AT THE OUTBREAK 1945, ApriL ______1, 800 OF HOSTILITIES 1945, May ______c ______1, 600 (Compiled from memory by innividuals concerned at that F. National Living Conditions time) 1. Foodstuffs.- The food situation has grown worse and a crisis will be reached at the end of A. Main Strength of the Imperial Navy in this year. The people will have to get along on an December 1941 absolute minimum of rice and salt required for 1. Surface strength: subsistence considering the severity of air raids, Battleships______10 difficulties in transportation, and the appearance Aircraft carriers ______9 of starvation conditions in the isolated sections of Heavy cruisers: the nation. It is apparent that the food situation First class______8 will become further aggravated this year. Second class______10 2. Living conditions.- From now on prices will Light cruisers ______16 rise sharply bringing on inflation which will Destroyers ______110 seriously undermine the wartime economy. Submarines______64 NoTEs Seaplane tenders______1 5 Anticipated supply and demand of rice for 1945 (estimate Submarine tenders______3 made 1- 10 June) [TN: 1 koku=4.96 bushels] 2. Air strength: Koku (a) Estimated supply, Japan proper______77, 165, 000 Fighter planes ______500 (b) Estimated demand ______84,258,000 Carrier-based born hers______180 (c) Estimated imports from Manchuria and ICorea ______4, 250,000 Carrier-based attack planes______300 Land-attack planes ______350 (It will become increasingly difficult to realize this figure Reconnaissance seaplanes______340 depending upon air raids.) Deficiencies will be alleviated with military rice and by Flying boats______15 placing restrictions on rice distribution. 1 Including 2 converted seaplane tenders. B. Japanese Navy Estimates of Allied Naval Strength at Beginning of the War Table I.-Estimate of Disposition of Main Surface Forces

United States Bnti; h

Indian OC<'an area Stren~th Dutch Hawaii areal Philippines! We;t_coast, .Aleutian .Atlantic (Including Au,trruian available area Umted Malay area I States area area East and area for transfer Southeast to Far Ea.' t Afrira) ------.1 I I I I I ·I I 1---1--- Battleships ______8 .Air1•raft carriers .. ______3 Com-et ted aircraft carriers ______------Heavy cruisers______12 Light cruisers______5 Small cruiser$______2 f\ostroyers______• 30 Submarines______(') Othe<". __ ------(') Sub tender·-·---- ______Seaplane tend~r ______Others __ ------______

I Pin.• 4 (!) . 'No reserve strength available for some time. • Approximately. • Several.

Non~ 1. Total United States strength: 2. Estimated .Additions During War: Battleships __ __ ------13 (a) United States: Aircraft carriers __ ------6 Year ending Dec. 1942-1 battleship, 2 aircraft carriers. Converted aircraft carriers.------2 Year ending Dee. 1943-4 battleships. 2 airrraft carriers. Henvy cruisers: (b) Enl!land: No increase of strength in Fnr Ea.qt until war situntion First cla.<;s ___ ------18 in Enroll<' improrcs. Second class __ _------9 (c) One cruiser, 1 destroyer, and several subm!U"ines moved to England Light cruisers.______10 from Holland and under construction may be added to strength Destroyers ______------_____ 250 in Far East by mid-1942. Submarines (excusive of coastal subs)______35

18 Table 2.-Estimates of Disposition of Allied Air Strength

[TN: All figures are approximate]

United States British

Strength available Dutch Hawaii Wake- !Philippines Aleutian for transfer Malay Burma India Australia area Midway area area to Far area area area East I 1----1 1----1--- Fighter planes ______Large planes (4 engines) ______Medium planes (2 engines) ___ _ Small attack planes ______Reconnaissance and observa- tion planes ______Reconnaissance seaplanes ______80 Flying boats ___ 'JO

!Wake •Midway NOTES I. Estimated increase in United States first-liue plaues: 2. Estimates of potential United States aircraft p1·ouuctiou: (a) Army and Navy first-line planes: Estimated planes on hand, December 1941: December: Army------_ 40, QOO 194L. __ ------2, 600 Navy------.------·------30,000 1942.------7, 100 1943_------16, 200 TotaL _------_____ 70,000 / (b) Fighter planes: Estimated planes on hand, December 1943 ______120, 000 December: Estimated production, 194L. ------__ 19,300 194L. _------900 Estimated production, 1942.------_ __ 47,000 1942.------2, 660 Estimated production, 1943. _------85,000 1943_---·------· --- 5, 480 (c) 4-engine bombers: December: 194L .. ------100 1942.------300 1943.------2, 690

APPENDIX A-4. A COMPARISON OF (ESTIMATED) JAPANESE AND AMERI­ CAN MILITARY RESOURCES AT THE END OF THE WAR A. Estimated A merican Military Resources N ear the End of the War 1. Main Na·oal Forces (l!JJ,.5):

End of End of Type of ship July August Notes -- Aircraft carriers 25/28 26/28 l. This table is based on figure~ pub­ lished in the United States at the end of April, modified by the re­ sults achieved by the OP!'ration for Escort carriers __ 70/85 74/89 defense of Okinawa. (The last figure represents total, the first represents the number assigned to Battleships ____ 23/23 I 24/24 operations against Japan.) 2. Of ships and vessels badly damaged in the operation for the defense of Cruisers ______-I 35/64 I 36/64 Okinawa, about half were made operational during the period from t February to March, while the Destroyers ______! 244/324 I 251/331 other half were rendered opera­ tional from March to April. 3. New aircraft carriers became opera­ tional as follows: Antietam, end of June, Tarawa, end of July, and Bo1·er, end of August. rrhe Sara· toga and RangfT used in training, are not included. 4. Escort carriers transferred to Eng­ land and those lost prior to the Okinawa operation are included in figures for total escort carriers.

19 2. Air Forces (191,.5):

End of End or End or End of End of End or Area July August I September Area July August ISeptember ------·-----1 1----I ------·------Northern area: New Guinea-Australia Area-Contd. Alaska ______400 400 400 Australia ______250 250 250 Aleutians ______300 300 300 South Pacific: Ellis-Gilberts-Samoa Area ______150 150 150 Solomon Islands ______200 200 200 Marshalls ______----- 200 200 200 New Caledonia: Espiritu Santo._. 300 300 :mo Marianas ______1,000 1,000 1,000 Fiji______100 100 100 Central Pacific: New Zealand ______100 100 100 Pcleliu; UlithL ------____ _ 250 250 250 India-Burma '£heater______I, .100 2, 000 2,000 Iwo Jima ______500 500 500 China: HawaiL _------______900 1. 200 1,500 American Air Force ______700 800 800 Transport planes.------200 200 200 American-Chinese Air Force ______150 150 150 (Philippine Islands) ------___ _ 3,100 4,100 5,100 India-China transport planes ______400 400 400 Ryukyu Islands (Nansei Shoto) ______f>OO G50 870 Fleet Air Forces ______3, 700 3.800 3,SOO New Guinea-Australia Area: Eastern New Guinea ______300 300 300 Totals ______Hi.OOO 17, S50 Hl,:l7!l Western New Guinea ______000 GOO ()()0

NoTE.-It is anticipatert that some of the forces now in the European ~ rheater of Occupation will make their appearancP in thufil' thpat,~rs f'tn rt.in ~ nbont the end of July. Supplementary Table (on Planes (1945))

End or July End of August End of Sppt. ~------1------l------l------Marianas (Islands) area_ B-29s. ______850 No change_ No change. Others. ______------TotaL ------1, 000 Iwo B- 29s. __ ------· ______50 No change. Not known whether No change. B-24s. ______!50 B- 29s are bein~ replaced with P-5Is. _------·- 250 B-29s. P- 61s . ______------30 Others. __------10 TotaL ------500 Ryukyu Islands (Nansei Shoto) __ __ P-47s, P-51s and P--61s ______300 P-47s, P-5ls and P--6ls ______300 P-47s, P -.1 1s and P--61s ______400 Carrier planes ------100 Carrier planes ______100 Carrier planes ______100 B-24s______150 B-24s. _------200 B-24s. ___ ------____ 300 PVs. ______------______30 PVs __ 30 PVs. ______------30 PBYs .. ------40 PBYs __ 40 PBYs ... ______------40 TotaL ------GOO TotaL 650 TotaL ______------870 [sic] [sic] Philippines arcn __------______ll'ight.rt'.S ______1. 500 Fighters. ______2, 000 Fighters ______2, 500 Bomhrr5 (i ncludin ~ 300 B-29s, Bomber~ (including 400 B-29s; Fighters (including 500 B-29s; R-17s, cl.c, an increase of 70 others same as prcced in .!! others same as preceding [sic])_ 2, 000 B-21s) ____ ------____ _ 1, 000 [sic]) ______2. 000 Others.______100 Others._ ------50 Others .. ------100 TotaL . -·------______5,100 '.l'otnl ______. ______2. MO Total .------· ______4. 100 [siej

3. Groundforces (191,.5): B. j apanese Military Resources Near the End of the War E nd or End or Branch or Arm July August Japan's national power has grown progressively ----- Army: weaker with the loss of the Philippine Islands and Infantry divisions ______53/90 70/90 Armored divisions ______7/22 10/22 Okinawa. All of our existing aircraft are being Airborne 'divisions ______3/ 10 4/ 10 Cavalry divisions ______._ 1/2 1/2 converted (to suicide planes). We are Goncen­ ------64/ 134 85/134 trating on the conversion (to defense of the home­ 7/ 10 8/10 ------land) of a large part of the special submarine 71 /144 93/144 attack forces, which can be turned out with com­

NOTES parative ease. We plan to enhance our military a. The figures in this table are based on the following estimates: resources through increased production of such (1) Since May, 2 divisions per month have been sent from the United States to participate in operations against Japan. items as twin-engine, twin-boom cargo planes (2) About one-hall of the approximately 60 divisions assigned to the western European Theater or Operations have been redeployed against Japan, as (KI 115). Nevertheless, a certain amount of shown below: apprehension is still felt. Military Departed Euro­ Arrived Philip­ 1. Air forces: strength pean Theater Ready for opera­ (number or pine Islands tions Fighters ______divisions) of Operations area 1, 170 Night fighters ______125 Small bombers ____ ~ ______(I) About 10 _____ 1 Middle to end of I End of July _____ l End of August. 636 May. (2) About20 _____ June ______End of August___ End of September. Fighter bombers______60 I Bombers. ______. ______3,10 Explanaiion: Equipment necessary lor redeployed forces and munitions Attack planes______266 reqwred for operations have been shipped to the Philippines area directly Medium bombers ______from the United States. 352 (b) In the monthly figures in the main table above, the second figure repre­ Medium land-attack planes______197 sents the total number of divisions; the first represents the number assigned to operations against Japan. Land bombers.______155

20 Seaplanes ______398 men and his intimates to solicit their views on Reconnaissance seaplanes______348 Japan's war situation and advice concerning the Flying boats______10 Seaplane bombers______40 immediate future of the Empire. On 14 February Single engine reconnaissance planes (MYRT) __ __ _ 70 1945 Prince Konoye had such an interview with Other serviceable planes ______75 the Emperor. In advance of that, Prince Konoye prepared a memorandum of his views which were SubtotaL ______2, 826 verbally presented to the Emperor. An English Trainers: Medium trainers ______1, 900 translation of tho memorandum, prepared by T. Shiragiku (reconnaissance trainers) ____ 318 Ushiba, Konoyc's long-time private secretary, is reproduced below. Copies of the translation and SubtotaL ______2, 218 the original memorandum were given to the Survey at Karuizawa on 30 November 1945. Grand totaL ______5, 044 Parts of the following translation arc not literal 2. Special attack .forcPs: renditions of tho original Japanese but represent Underwater demolition units ______100 an accurate summary of salient points. The Surface suicide boats (torpedo equipped) ______300 method of summarization employed by the trans­ ~ Manual torpedoes ______120 lator, Mr. Ushiba, consists of omitting the less Suicide boats (with bomb for explosion) ______2, 000 important examples cited by Konoye in support 3. Ships and small craft: of conclusions. For instance, the examples of Ships and small craft are not being stressed, alleged Russian political infiltration in France, because in view of the present state of the fuel Jugoslavia, Belgium, etc., have been omitted from supply, they can be used only as harbor anti­ the second paragraph. In all cases the conclusions aircraft defense ships. remain intact. It is believed that tho omission of minor supporting arguments in a few instances C. Enemy Losses Expected in the Operation fo r does not detract sufficiently from the import of the the Defense of the Homeland document as a whole to justify a literal translation 1. Estimate of the number of transports it of the original in its entirety. would be possible to destroy in the event of an American attack on the homeland * * * * * Estimate for the coming attack on the Kyushu I think that there is no longer any doubt about Area in about September. our defeat. A defeat is, of course, a serious stain on our history, but we can accept it, so long as we Total number of transports, about ______2, 000 can maintain our Tcnno system. Public opinion Probable number which would be sunk, about_ · 470 (Basis for calculations omitted.) in America and Britain on the whole is not yet, at least, so bad as to demand a fundamental change Thus, with about three-fourths able to make a in that system. ·what we have to fear, therefore, landing, it would be difficult to defeat American is not so much a defeat as a Communist revolution plans through annihilation on the sea. which might take place in the event of defeat. 2. If there should be successive delays in the Conditions, internal as well as external, point to attack, it would appear profitable from a purely tho danger of such revolution. In the first tactical point of view to build up gradually the place, there has been a notable ascendancy of submarine special attack forces. It will be difficult Soviet Russia in world politics. In the light of to maintain om air power unless, despite intense her recent activities in Europe, we must judge air raids, pwduction levels can be maintained, and that she has not abandoned the hope of bolshcvis­ special measures devised to increase the pro­ ing the whole world. She is prosecuting such a duction of fuels so that a monthly output of about policy vis a vis the Far East, and I fear interference 30,000 tons of aviation gasoline is assured. in our domestic affairs. APPENDIX A- 5. MEMORANDUM O F With regard to internal affairs, potentially K ON OYE CONVERSATION WITH dangerous factors include the rapid deterioration HIROHITO, FEBRUARY 194 5. of the people's living conditions, increase in the voice of the laboring classes, rise of pro-Soviet Early in February 1945 the Emperor initiated a feelings as enmity against America and Britain number of private interviews with the elder states- increases, attempts by an extremist group in the

21 military to achieve radical changes in internal twice during that period, and over-eager to bring politics, activities of younger bureaucrats sympa­ about national unity by accepting as much as thetic with that group, and disguised activities of possible of the doctrine advocated by those radical the Communists behind both the military and elements, I failed to perceive the true intentions bureaucrats. hidden behind their arguments. I do not pretend A majority of younger officers seem to think to find any excuse for my short-sightedness, but that the present form of the Japanese Government I feel responsible for it. is compatible with Communism- a conception In the last few months, the slogan "Hundred which, in any opinion, constitutes the basis of the Million Die Together" has become increasingly radical thought of the military. The Communists louder, seemingly among the right-wing people, are influencing them with the theory that, even but has its real basis in the activities of the Com­ under communism, Japan can maintain the Tenno munists. system. I have now come to seriously doubt Under such circumstances, the longer we con­ whether the whole series of events from the Man­ tinue the war, the greater will be the danger of churian Incident to the present war have not been revolution. We should therefore stop the war as what they have purposefully planned. It is a soon as possible. well-known fact that they openly declared the aim The greatest obstacle to ending the war is the of the Manchurian war was to achieve drastic existence of the military group which has been reforms in domestic affairs. A central figure of "propelling" the country into the present state theirs also declared that the longer the China ever since the Manchurian Incident-the group Incident continued, the better, for otherwise, the which, having already lost all hope of successfully intended reform would not be accomplished. Of concluding the war, nevertheless insists on its course, the "reform" aimed at by the military may continuation in order to save face. If we try to not necessarily be a Communist revolution, but stop the ·war abruptly, these military extremists the group of bureaucrats and civilians (both left together with both the right and left wings, might and right) who are in a close collaboration with attempt anything-even a bloody internal revolt, the military are definitely intending to bring about and thereby nullify our efforts. The prerequisite such a revolution. In the light of this conclusion, to the conclusion of the war, therefore, is to wipe I now realize that I have, during the last ten years, out the influence of these dangerous people and · come across many events the meaning of which reform the Army and Navy. I must urge Your I did not then fully appreciate. Prime Minister Majesty to make a serious decision to that end.

22 APPENDIX B- BIOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE LEADERS

ANAMI, K orechika Apr 1920- Lived in France, studied military 21 Feb 1887- Born, Oita prefecture. tactics. 1907- Graduated, Military Academy. 1926- Honorary President of Japan 1918- Graduated, Army War College. Newspaper Association. - Army General Staff. Dec 1929- Major general staff officer, General 1934- Director Military Affairs Bureau, Headquarters. War Ministry. 1930- Commander of Fifth Infantry Mar 1,938- Lt. General. Brigade. Oct 1939- Vice Minister of War (under Aug 1934- Lieutenant general; commander of General Hata, Sunroku, in Fourth Army Division. Abe and Yonai cabinets and Dec 1935- Appointed Supreme War Coun­ under General Tojo, Hideki, cilor. in second Konoye and Tojo Aug 1937- Chief of Military Aviation Depart­ cabinets.) ment. Apr 1941- Commander of an Army Corps on Apr 1938- Commander of Second Army; took China Front. part in China mainland fighting. 10 Apr 1943- General. Jan 1939- Supreme War Councilor. 1 Dec 1943- Commander of 2nd Army. Aug 1939- General. 26 Dec 1944- Inspector General of :Military 1940- Again served in China; awarded Aviation; Supreme War Coun­ the Order of the Golden Kite, cilor and Director of Army First class. Aviation Headquari:,ers. Dec 1941- Commander in Chief of Home 7 Apr 1945- War Minister in new Suzuki Defense Headquarters and con­ cabinet. currently Supreme War Coun­ 30 Apr 1945- Adviser to the War Relief Associa­ cilor. tion. 14 Aug 1945- Committed suicide with Japan's Jul 1944-Resigned as Commander in Chief, surrender and the fall of the Home Defense Headquarters. Suzuki Cabinet. 18 Aug 1945- Commaaded to form a new 16 Aug 1945- Funeral services held at the War cabinet. Ministry. 5 Oct 1945- President of Diet structure investi­ gation council.

HIGASHIKUNI, Naruhiko, Prince Personal background: Career: Higashikuni was an Imperial Prince who had 3 Dec 1887- Born, Kyoto. been little more th m a figurehead in any of his Nov 1906- Established House of Higashikuni army posts. Early in 1942 he was reported to by order of the late Emperor have been associated with Prince Konoye in Meiji. organizing the Showa Kenkyu Kai for the pur­ 1908-Graduated from the Military pose of overthrowing the TOJO regime and getting Academy. a peace with the United States while Jap m still 1914- Graduated, · :my War College. had vast empire and before the United Sta.tes 1915- Conimander of Twenty-ninth In­ could rearm. In December 1944, it was again fantry Brigade; captain. reported that he was active in organizing a party Jul 1918- Major; battalion commander of to overthrow the present regime, especially if the Seventh Infantry Division. United States were to invade Japan proper.

23 HIRANUMA, Kiichiro, Baron Jul 1941-Appointed Minister-without-port­ folio in third Konoye cabinet. Career: Mar 1941-Brought about drastic changes in 28 Sep 1865-Born, Okayama prefecture. the IRAA, and opposed totali­ 1888--Graduated, Tokyo Imperial Uni­ tarian reform of Hoshino, N aoki versity, Law school; entered the president of the Planning Justice Ministry. Board and forced him to resign 1890- Judge of Tokyo Imperial Court. in April 1941. Judge and Department Director Jul 1941-Forced out Matsuoka in Cabinet of Tokyo Court of Appeals shake-up. Councilor of Justice Ministry. Aug 1941-2 attempts on his life; on August 1905- Director of Civil and Criminal 14 wounded badly. Affairs Bureau, Justice Minis­ Aug 1942-Went on official visit to Nanking. try. 30 Jun 1945-Chairman of Council of Home Defense League. 1906- Went to Europe and America. 7 Aug 1945-President of Privy Council, suc­ 1907- Received LL.D. ceeding Suzuki who became Aug 1911-Vice Minister of Justice in second Premier. Saionji cabinet, serving under 2 Dec 1945-0rdered arrested as a war criminal. Justice Minister Matsuda. 1912-Appointed Procurator General, Personal background: Vice President of Privy Council. After World War I, Baron Hiranuma lent his 1918- Referred to as head of Tokyo support to various patriotic societies, the purpose Imperial University. of which was to combat Leftist tendencies among 1921-Appointed Chief Justice of the the students. Together with the leaders of these Supreme Court. societies he formed a group to carry on national­ istic propaganda beyond the university. This 1923-1924-Minister of Justice in second group formed the basis for the Kokuhonsha. As Yamamoto cabinet. Chairman of the House of Peers in 1924 and Vice 1924- Imperial nominee to the House of President of the Privy Council in 1926, under his Peers. guidance this institution restrained even the - Appointed to the Privy Council. insignificant attempts of the Kato and W akatsuki -Lecturer at Tokyo Imperial Uni- cabinets to introduce reforms. Finally in the versity. conflict arising with the Wakatsuki cabinet over -President of Kokuhonsha, a right­ the question of granting aid to the banluupt Bank ist organization. of Taiwan, Hiranuma secured the fall of the -President of Shuyodan, youth W akatsuki cabinet and the assumption of 'the auxiliary of Kokuhonsha. premiership by the leader of the most reactionary 1926-Appointed Vice President of the wing of the Japanese bourgeoise, Gen. Giichi Privy Council. Tanaka. When he became Premier in 1939 his 1927--Made a baron. extreme reactionary views toned down. The - President of Nihon University. attempts on his life in 1941 were instigated by 1936- Elected President of the Privy Nakano, Seigo, of the Tohokai, in collaboration Council and resigned as presi­ with certain members of the German Embassy. dent of Kokuhonsha and Shuyo­ He was reported opposed to the war with the dan. United States. Five members of his cabinet were Jan 1939- Premier, succeeding Konoye when in Koiso's cabinet. Koiso's Justice Minister it became clear that Konoye Matsuzaka, Hiromasa, was a protege of Hiranuma. could not liquidate the China Until General Tojo took over full power in War. October 1941, Baron Hiranuma was unquestion­ 1940-Minister-without-portfolio, then ably the most powerful and influential figure in Home Minister in second Ko­ Japanese politics. As Minister-without-Portfolio noye cabinet. in the second Konoye cabinet, he was in effect the

24 de fact() Premier. Lt. General Heisuke Yanegawa Jun 1942-Appointed special emissary to (ret.), Justice Minister in the second Konoye Thailand. Cabinet, was also one of Baron Hiranuma's 23 Oct 1943-Assisted in the organization of the proteges, and it was through him that Hiranuma Peace Society Heiwa Kai to attempted to effect drastic reforms in the IRAA to promote friendly relations with curb extreme reactionary activities. the Southern Regions. Ideologically, Baron Hiranuma was an arch­ 14 Jan 1944- Attended a meeting sponsored by fundamentalist. He did more than any other Tokama, Mitsuru; later was single individual to popularize nationalistic Shinto chairman for committee for and the politico-religious concept of Kodo, or the funeral of Tokama. Imperial way. His fundamentalism, however, did 14 Sep 1945- Removed from list of Black not keep pace with the more extreme forms of Dragon members wanted for nationalism and reaction which developed. under questioning. No explanation the guidance of the Tojo clique, and by 1941 gtven. Hiranuma found himself on the defensive. He 2 Dec 1945- 0rdered arrested as a war criminal. :was particularly concerned that the new totali­ Personal Background: tari"an principles expressed by the Tojo group would A libei·al, broad-minded, and able diplomat. tend toward a dictatorship in which the theoreti­ It is believed that the Army was behind his cally omnipotent position of the Emperor would appointment in replacing Uchida in 1933 in order be jeopardized. Hiranuma also strongly opposed to avert hostilities with Russia. Hirota was a the conclusion of the Axis alliance, partly out of protege of Tokama, Mitsuru; was also presiding fear that too close association with Germany would officer at directors meeting of the Black Dragon further encourage such totalitarian developments Society. Stated that the war with the United in Japan. States had best begin in December or February of 1941. HIROTA, Koki Career: INOUE, Shigeyoshi, Admiral 1878-Born Kukuoka-ken. Career: 1905-Graduated, Tokyo Imperial Uni­ 1889- Born. versity, politics; entered the 1909- Graduated, Naval Academy. foreign service, served in Peking. 1910- Ensign. 1909- Served in London. 1921- Lieutenant commander. Gradu­ 1918- First Secretary, Washington. ated, Higher Naval College. 1922-Subd.irector, Intelligence Bureau. 1924- Military Affairs Bureau; Naval 1926- Minister to Netherlands. Technical Council. 1932- Ambassador to Russia. 1927- Naval attache, Rome, Paris, and 1936--Foreign Millister in Saito and Berne. Okada cabinets. 1929- Captain. Mar 1936- Premier until February 1937. - Shipbuilding and ordnance in­ Jun 1937-Foreign Minister until May 1938 . spector, Technical Department; .5 Feb 1938-Spoke before the Diet about the ordnance inspector, Aviation progress of the China War and Department. relations with the United States. 1930-Instructor, Higher Naval College. 24 Feb 1938-·Busy defending the National Mo- 1932- 1933- Chief, First Section, Military ft,f­ bilization Bill. fairs Bureau; Naval Training 26 Feb 1938- "Japan plans to halt Naval Race." College. 4 Mar 1938-"Sorry for America if she fortifies - Commanding officer, BB Hiei. Hawaii", etc. 1935- Chief of staff, Yokosuka Naval 5 Mar 1938- Urged abolition of capital ships. District. 5 Mar 1938 - Said Japan would behead Chiang 15 Nov 1935- Rear admiral. · Kai-Shek. Said peace offers to 1936- Navy General Staff and Navy Chiang bad been rejected. Department.

25 15 Nov 1937-Director, Military Affairs Bureau; 1917 - Chief, First Section, Emergency Board of Admirals. Industrial Rationing Bureau. Oct 1939- Chief of staff, China Area Fleet. 1929- Delegate to Berlin International 15 Nov 1939- Vice admiral. Parliamentary Trade Congress. 1940- Director, Naval Aviation Depart­ 1930- Chief Secretary to Lord Keeper of ment. the Privy Seal. Aug 1941- Commander in Chief, Second Fleet. 1937- Education Minister. 1942- Director, Naval Academy. - Director, Bureau of Peerage and Nov 1942- Commanderin Chief, Fourth Fleet. Heraldry, Imperial Household. 5 Aug 1944- Succeeded as Director, Naval Ministry. Academy, by Vice Admiral 1938- Concurrently, Welfare Minister. Okochi, Denshichi; Navy Vice 1939- Home Minister. Minister, succeeding Vice Ad­ -:-House of Peers. miral Oka, Takazumi; Board of 1940- Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Admirals (Imperial Headquar­ Jul 1944_:_Active in selecting Premier Koiso ters). to succeed Tojo. 6 Nov 1944- Chief, Naval Technical Depart­ Dec 1944- Reported to be one of group ment, relieving Vice Admiral secretly plotting to overthrow Sugiyama, Rokuzo. present regime and to set up 18 Nov 1944- Relieved of above post by Vice new government headed by Admiral Shibuya, Ryutaro. Hih, Prince Higashikuni, N aru­ 1 May 1945- Chief, Naval Aviation Headquar­ hiko, and to ask United States ters (concurrent) . for peace terms. 15 May 1945- Admiral. Supreme War Counci­ 6 Dec 1945- 0rdered arrested as war criminal. lor. Succeeded as Navy Vice Minister by Vice Admiral Tada, Background: Talmo : Succeeded as Command­ A member of the Tokyo aristocracy, he had long er in Chief, Naval Aviation been associated politically with Prince Konoye, Headquarters, by Vice Admiral Fumimaro, and was backed by the latter and by Wada, Misao. the Army for the post of Lord Keeper of the Privy 15 Oct 1945- Relieved of posts in demobiliza­ Seal, to replace Yuasa, Kurahei, whom the Army tion of Navy personnel. considered too liberal an adviser to the Emperor.

KIDO, Koichi, Marquis KISHI, Shinsuke (Nobusuke) Career: 1889- Born, Yamaguchi Prefecture. Career: 1915- Graduated, Kyoto Imperial Uni­ Nov 1896- Born. versity (law and politics). 1920- Graduated, Tokyo Imperial Uni­ 1917- Inherited title. versity (law). - Secretary, Emergency Industrial - Secretary, Industry Department, Inspection Bureau, Agricultural Industry Rationalization Unem­ and Commerce Minister. ployment Problems Committee. - Councilor, Agriculture and Com­ -Director, Industry Bureau, Com­ merce Ministry. merce and Industry Ministry. · 1917- Secretary, F~shery Bureau. - Chief, Industrial Section, Indus­ 1936- Director, Industry Bureau, Man­ trial Bureau, Commerce and chukuo Industry Department. Industry Ministry. 1937-39-Vice Minister of Industry Depart­ - Chief, Accounts and Documents ment, Manchukuo. Sections, Commerce and In­ -Director, Patent Bureau, Man­ dustry Ministry. chukuo. 26 Mar 1939-Assistant director, General Affairs 29 May 1942- Governor General of Korea. Board, State Council, Manchu­ 19 J ul 1944-Retired as Governor General, Ko­ kuo. rea, in order to accept job of - Returned to Japanese Govern­ forming new cabinet. ment to assume post as Vice 22 Jul 1944- Formed new cabinet with himself Minister, Commerce and In­ as Premier. dustry. 10 Feb 1945---Reorganized his cabinet as the 1943- Relieved of post as Commerce and result of pressure from the Im­ Industry Minister. Post as­ perial Rule Assistance Associa­ sumed concurrently by Premier tion and other malcontent ele­ Tojo. ments, and made changes which - Minister-without-Portfolio and represented a personal loss rath­ Vice Minister of Commerce and er than a change of great Industry. political significance. Nov 1944-Member, House of Representa­ 19 Feb 1945- Chairman of wartime Price Inves­ tives. tigation Committee. 16 Sep 1945-Taken into custody as a war crim­ 2 Apr 1945- Commander in Chief of Volunteer Corps which was to be estab­ J -inal. lished on a national basis under Kishi and Lt. General Teiichi Suzuki drafted a central headquarters. the Munitions Company Act for the Tojo cabinet, 5 Apr 1945-Resigned with entire cabinet the which later caused much friction between Army same day Russia renounced and industrialists. Kishi was a civilian member Neutrality Pact with Japan. of the so-called Manchurian clique and his political Emperor immediately named and economic ideas were to a good extent shaped Suzuki to form a new cabinet. by experiences with state planning under the 19 Nov 1945- 0rdered arrested as a war crim­ aegis of the Kwantung Army. inal.

Personal background: K OISO, Kunikai, General Strongly pro-Axis and anti-Russian. At the Career: time of his appointment as overseas minister in Mar 1880-Born, Y amagata-ken. 1939, his outspoken and positive views were 190 1- Second lieutenant. expected to bring an immediate strengthening of 1901-31-Commander of Fifty-First Infan­ Japan's continental policy. An intimation of hi:; try Regiment; Director of Gen­ character may be obtained h·om his nickname eral Affairs Section, A v1ation "the Tiger of Korea" and the fact that he had Headquarters; member of Gen­ claimed to be a staunch believer that all problems eral Staff. could be solved by the "Imperial Way". He 1931- Director of Military Affairs Bureau was one of the most out-spoken of the politically " during the Manchurian Inci­ minded in the Army; was closely associated with dent; War Vice Minister. the single party movement; and had worked in 1932- Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army. the Kokuhonsha with Baron Hiranuma. Lieut­ 1934- Commander of Fifth Division enant General Kimura, Haruo, stated that Koiso (Hiroshima). gave the order to invade French Indochina. He 1935- ·Commander of Korean Army. was alleged also to have been a member of the Nov 1937- General, attached to Army Gen­ Black Dragon Society. He was a member of the eral Staff. Japanese Imperial Headquarters while he was 1938- Retired. Premier in order to have status equal to that of 7 Apr 1939- Assumed office of Overseas Minis­ the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff, an unpre~ ter, relieving Hatta, ' Yoshiaki. cedented action sanctioned by Hirohito. Other Held this post through Hira­ evidence indicates that there was considerable numa and Y onai cabinets. personal friction between Koiso and Tojo.

2 7 K ON OYE, Fumimaro, Prince 9 Oct 1945- Named adviser to the Lord Keeper Career: of the Privy Seal. 1891-Born. 23 Nov 1945- Relieved as special adviser to Lord 1904-Succeeded to title. Privy Seal after he submitted 1916- House of Peers. recommendations revising the 1917-Graduated, Kyoto Imperial Uni­ Japanese constitution. versity (lar' political science). Dec 1945- Committed suicide. 1918- Entered Home Ministry as non­ Konoye has been labeled at various times regular staff member, stationed radical, moderate, totalitarian. He was president in Europe. of the Far East, Siam, Indo-China, Japan-Nei, 1919- Delegate to Paris Peace Confer­ and South Seas Associations, and would seem to ence, in suite of Prince Saionji. have been fundamentally nationalistic, whatever 1924- Councilor, Bureau of Peerage and his temporary political attitude. He was con­ Heraldry. sidered friendly to the United States, and sent his 1926- Cultural Investigation Commit­ son to Princeton. tee. In 1942, he was active in the organization and - Lord in waiting of the Musk Hall. work of Showa Kenyu Kai, an anti-Tojo organiza­ 1927- Chief Commissioner of the Impe­ tion, and in late 1944 he was reported to be one of rial Coronation; charged with a group secretly planning the overthrow of the program of the accession to the present regime in favor of a new government throne of the present Emperor. headed by Prince Higashikuni, N aruhiko, should 1931- 1933- Vice President, House of Peers. Japan proper be invaded by the United States. 1933- President, House of Peers. This move included the possibility of asking the · 1933- 0ne of the founders of Greater United States for peace terms. Asia Society. Prince Konoye also enjoyed close connection 1934- Travelled to the United States to with some of the more extreme patriotic societies. promote friendly relations. This was probably a heritage of his father's close personal friendship with the late Mitsuru Toyama, JanJun 19371f - p rem1er,. F'rrst K onoye C a b'met. 1939 head or sponsor of some of the most violent JunJan 1939} - p res1.d ent, p nvy . C ounc1. 1. societies, including the famous Black Dragon 1940 Society. Although his father, Prince Atsumaro AugJan 1939} - l\,r··.umster-w1t. . . h out- p ort f ow,1. H.lra- Konoye, died in his 40's, he had promise of be­ 1939 coming an outstanding political figure and may Jul1940l nu~a Cabmet. . Jul f-Prem1er, second Konoye cabmet. be regarded as one of the first "nationalistic 1941 liberals" in Japanese politics. Jul 1941} p . Tl. d K b' Oct 1941 - rem1er, 11r onoye ca met. 1940- Founded Imperial Rule Assistance MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo Association. Career: 1942-Active in organization and work Apr 1877- Born, Tokyo. of Showa Kenkyu Kai. · 1902-Graduated, Tokyo Imperial Uni­ 1943- Adviser to IRAA. versity (political science.) At­ 1944- Representative of the Koa Dantai tached to Legation in Pekmg. Rengokai in the Greater East 1907- Third Secretary, Embassy in Lon­ Asia Ministry. don and Paris. - Representative of the Daitoa Rem- . 1910- Second Embassy Secretary. meL - Second Secretary, Legation m Jul 1944- Active in organization of Koiso Peking. cabinet. 1914-Consul General, Tientsin. Apr 1945- Active in organization of Suzuki 1918-Councilor, Embassy in Washing­ cabinet. ton, D. C. 16 Aug 1945-- Named Minister-without-Portfolio 1914-1920-Chief Diplomatic Commission, in Higashikuni cabinet. Siberian Expeditionary Force.

28 Sep .1923-Vice Foreign Minister. Nov 1932-Commanding Officer, First Air -Concurrently Director Intelligence Flotilla of First Fleet. Department. 15 Nov 1933-Vice Admiral. 1924-Ambassador to Washington. Dec 1935- Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. 1929-1930-Delegate to Tenth and Eleventh Dec 1936- Director, Naval Aviation De­ League of Nations Conferences, partment. Geneva. Apr 1938- Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. 1929-Delegate to London Naval Con­ 15 Nov 1939- Admiral. Commander in Chief, ference. Yokosuka Naval District. 1931-Delegate, Geneva Disarmament 1 Jan 1940- Commander in Chief, China Area Conference. Fleet. 1932-Delegate to League of Nations Sept 1940- Navy Minister. Conference at Geneva. 20 Oct 1941- Supreme War Councilor. until 1936-Ambassador to Court of St. Nov 1942- Director, Higher Naval College. James, London. 1943- Supreme War Councilor. Mar 1936-Minister of Imperial Household. 17 Nov 1943- Reported to be Commander in 30 Apr 1945-Adviser to Sensai Engokai (War­ Chief, Grand Surface Escort. time Relief Association). 9 Aug 1944- Chief, Navy General Staff, re­ 4 Jun 1945-Resigned as Imperial Household lieving Admiral Shimada, Shi­ Minister because of bombing of getaro. Palace: 29 May 1945- Supreme War Councilor; suc­ Matsudaira was the very epitome of the so­ ceeded as Chief, Navy General called "liberal, pro-American, pro-British" clique Staff by Admiral Soemu which allegedly surrounded the Throne and which Toyoda. was the prime target of the young officers and other patriotic assassins. Matsudaira's daughter Personal Background: married Prince Chichibu, the present Emperor's He was supposed to have had influence with the eldest brother. Emperor due to a close personal connection during Emperor's adolescence. Considered to be one of ablest Japanese naval officers. A strong pro­ ponent of southward expansion, but tende'd to OIKAW A, Koshiro, Admiral favor diplomatic and covert naval pressure in place of overt mi'litary action. Career: 1883- Born, Iwate prefecture. 1903- Graduated Naval Academy. OKADA, Keisuke, Admiral (retired) 1913- Higher Naval College. 1915- Graduated Higher Naval College; Career: aide to Grown Prince, served as Jan 1867- Born, Fukui prefecture. aide-de-camp for 7 years. - Graduate, Naval Staff College. 1919- Commander. - Director, Torpedo School. 1922- Commanding officer, Fourteenth - Commander, 2nd Squadron. Destroyer Division. - Commanding Officer, 1st and 3rd 1923- Captain. Torpedo Squadron. 1924- Commanding officer, CL Tama. - Director, Personnel Bureau, Navy - Navy General Staff and Naval Ministry. Training College. - Director, Sasebo Na:val Arsenal. 1926- Chief instructor and discipline - Director, Construction Bureau, officer, Naval Academy. Navy Ministry. 1928- Rear Admiral, Chief of Staff, - Chief, Naval Construction Head­ Kure Naval District. quarters. Jul 1932- Aide to special inspector ap­ - Vice Minister, Navy. pointed by Emperor. - Supreme War Councilor. 29 -Commander in Chief; First and SAKOMIZU, Hi.satsune Combined Fleets. Career: -Same, Y okosuka ~a val Station. Aug 1902- Born, Kagoshima prefectme. 1927-Navy Minister. 1926- Graduate, Tokyo Imperial Univer­ 1932-34-Same, SAITO cabinet. sity (law). 1934-36-Premier. - Joined Finance Ministry. 1930- Financial Attache, New York. Personal background: 1934-36- Private secretary to Premier Okada. Okada was reported in December 1944 to be - Director, Financial Planning Sec­ one of a group secretly organizing a party to over­ tion. throw the regime, set up a new government headed - Chief, General Affairs Bureau, by Prince Higashikuni, and ask the United States Financial Minis try. for peace terms. Hisatsune Sakomizu married - Staff, Cabinet Planning Board Okada's second daughter, Manki. In April 1945 under Tojo and Koiso. Sakomizu became chief cabinet secretary in the - Chief cabinet secretary, Suzuki SUZUKI cabinet. As a retired premier, or Jushin, cabinet. _Okada wielded considerable political influence. 1946- Candidate for Diet from Kago­ Today he is unquestionably one of the Emperor's shima. closest personal advisers. Personal Background: Sakomizu is the son-in-law of former Premier Okada: This important family connection gave OZAWA, Jizaburo, Admiral him considerable political influence despite his age. Career: 1886- Born. 1909- Graduated, Naval Academy. SATO, Naotake 1 Jan 1935- Cominanding officer of CA Maya. Career: 1 Jan 1936- Cohunanding officer of BB Haruna. 30 Oct 1882- Born, Osaka. 1 Dec 1936- Rear admiral. 1904- Graduate, Tokyo Higher Com­ 1 Jan 1937- Instructor, Higher Naval College. mercial School. 1 Jan 1939- Director, Torpedo School; Naval - Entered Foreign Service. Training College. 1906- Attache, Embassy in St. Peters- 1 Jan 1940- Commanding officer, First Air burg. Flotilla. 1914- Consul-General, Harbin. Nov 1940- Vice admiral. 1921- Minister to Poland. Sep 1941- Director, Higher Naval College. 1927-Director, Japanese Office, League 2 Jan 1942- Commander in Chief, First South­ of N atiors, Paris. e1·n Expeditionary Fleet. 1930- Ambassador to Belgium. 14 Jul 1942- Navy General Staff. 1933 ~ 1937-Ambassador to France. 11 Dec 1942- Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. Mar-Jun 1937- Foreign Minister. 1 Mar 1944- Commander in Chief, First Mobile Sep- Oct 1938- Advisor, Foreign Office. Fleet; Commander in Chief, Aug 1943- Ambassador to Moscow. Third Fleet. 8 Aug 1943- Received notification of Russia's 18 Nov 1944-Vice Chief, Navy General Staff; declaration of war. Director, Higher Naval College. - Interned in the Embassy at 29 May 1945- Commander in Chief, Combined Moscow. Fleet. Sato favored friendly relations with Russia, was _:_Commander in Chief, Over-all considered liberal and an internationalist and was Naval Command. reported to have stated in 1942 that the war be­ - Commander, Naval Escort Com­ tween Japan and the United States was a regret­ mand. table mistake, but "we cannot stop now."

30 SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru 1929- Commanding officer, CL Tama. Oa.reer: - Commanding officer BB Hiei. 29 Jul 1887-Born, Oita prt>fecture. 30 Nov 1929- Rear Admiral. 1911- Graduate, Tokyo Imperial Uni­ 1930- Chief of Staff, Second Fleet. versity (law). 1931- Chief of Staff, Combined and First - Entered Foreign Service. Fleets. 1911 - Germany. 1932-Director, Submarine school. 1914- England. - Chief of Staff, Third Fleet. 1916- Third Secretary, London. 1933- Chief, Third section, Navy Gen­ 1918- Consul in Poland. eral Staff; Naval Training Col­ 1919 - Germany. lege. 1920- Secretary, Foreign Office. 1934- Chief First section, Navy Gen­ 1923- 24 - Chief, First Secretary, Treaty eral Staff; Naval Training Col­ Bureau. lege. 1925- First Secretary, China. 15 Nov 1934- Vice Admiral. 1927 - Counsellor, Germany. 1936- Vice Chief, Navy General Staff. 1929- 30 - Consul-General, Shanghai and Dec 1937- Commander in Chief, Second Fleet. Embassy secretary. Nov 1938- Com.mander in Chief, Kure Naval 1931- Minister to China. District. 1933- Vice Foreign Minister. 1940- Comm.ander in Chief, China Area 1933- 34- Chief, Research Bureau, Foreign Fleet. Office. Nov 1940- Adm.iral. 1936- Ambassador to Russia. 1941- Commander in Chief, Yokosuka 1938- Ambassador to England. Naval District. 1939- First Ambassador to Nanking 16 Oct 1941- Navy Minister in Tojo cabinet. Government. 21 Feb 1944- Concurrently, Chief Navy General 1941- Named Foreign Minister after fall Staff, succeeding Admiral NO­ of Konoye Cabinet. mura, Naokum.i. 1943- Foreign Minister in Tojo Cabinet. 17 Jul 1944- Resigned as Navy Minister, suc­ 27 Jul 1944- Foreign Minister, Koiso Cabinet. ceeded by Admiral Nomura, -GEA Minister. Naokumi. 8 Apr 1945- Cabinet Minister privileges granted 2 Aug 1944- Relieved as Chief Navy General by Emperor. Staff by Admiral Oikawa, Ko­ 16 Aug 1945- Foreign Minister and GEA Min­ shiro. istry in Higashikuni Cabinet. - Supreme War Councillor. 18 Sep 194,15- Resigned his post as Foreign Min­ 20 Jan 1945- Placed on reserve list at own re­ ister. quest. 13 Sep 1945 - Arrested as war criminal. SHIMADA, Shigetaro, Admiral Oa,reer: SUZUKI, Kantaro, Admiral Baron 1883- Born, Tokyo. 1904-Graduated, Naval Academy. Career: 1924- Captain, graduated from higher 1867- Born, Chiba prefecture. Naval College. 1887- Graduated Naval Academy. -Naval attache, Rome; Navy Gen­ 1894- Lieutenant, commanding officer, eral Staff. Torpedo Boat No. 6, during 1925- Instructor, Higher Naval College. Sino-Japanese War. 1927- Commanding officer, Seventh Sub 1895- Sank two Chinese warships block­ Division. aded in W eihaiwei. 1928- Navy General Staff. 1896- Graduated Naval Staff College.

31

------1898-Staff, Naval Affairs Bureau. 7 Apr 1945- Premier, upon fall of Koiso Cabi­ -Staff, Naval Training Depart­ net; concurrently Foreign Min­ ment. ister and GEA Minister. (Later -Instructor at Naval and Military Shigenori became Foreign Min­ Academy. ister.) 1903 - Sent to Germany and appointed 10 Apr 1945-Succeeded as President, Privy to bring home Kasuga. Council, by Baron Hiranuma, 1904 -Commanding officer, Kasuga and Kiichiro. Succeeded as GEA Fourth Destroyer Flotilla in Minister by Togo, Shigenori. Russo-Japanese War. 14 Apr 1945- To the amazement of the Japa­ 1906-Instructor, Higher Naval College. nese press, Suzuki expressed 1907 - Captain, commanding officer profound sympathy for Ameri­ (OCL) Akashi and (OCL) Soya. cans in their loss of President 1908 -Captain, Akashi and Soya. Roosevelt. He said: "I must - Director, Naval Personnel Bureau. admit that Roosevelt's leader­ 1911-Director, Torpedo School. ship has been ·very effective, 1913 - Rear Admiral. Commanding offi­ and has been responsible for cer, Maizuru Torpedo Division. the Americans' advantageous - Commander, Second Squadron. position today. For that reason - Chief, Navy Personnel Bureau. I can easily understand the 1914- Vice-Minister of Navy in second great loss his passing means Okuma cabinet. to the American people, and 1916 - Director, Personnel Bureau. my profound sympathy goes 1917 - Vice Admiral. Commander m to them." The ,Japanese press Chief, Training Squadron. remarked that these words give 31 Dec 1918- Director, Naval Academy. evidence of Suzuki's calibre, 1919- Director, Naval Staff College. and show that he is sincerely 1921- Commander in Chief, Second and contributing to "achievement Third Squadrons and Kure of Japan's war aims and the Naval Station, First Squadron. welfare of all nations." 20 Feb 1922- Commander in Chief, Fifth Fleet. 23 Apr 194.')- For the first time since the as­ 31 Jul 1922- Commander in Chief, Kure Naval sumption of his premiership, District. Admiral Suzuki met in a con­ 1922- Commander in Chief, Sasebo Ad­ ference with senior statesmen miralty. including former premiers Baron 1923- Admiral. Kiichiro Hiranuma, AdmiralKei­ Jan 1924- Commander in Chief, Combll4.ed suke Okada, Prince Kanoye, and First Fleets. Gen. Hideki Tojo, Koki Hirota, 1 Dec 1924- Supreme War Council. and Gen. Kuniaki Koiso. The 15 Apr 1925- Chief, Navy General Staff. occasion was for an exchange -Supreme War Council. of views of the current situation. - Grand Chamberlain to Emperor. 9 June 1945- The Tokyo radio reported that 22 Jan 1929- Reserve. Grand Chamberlain; Premier Suzuki opened an extra­ Privy Council. ordinary 2-day session of the 26 Feb 1936- Seriously wounded. Imperial Diet to consider the Nov 1936--Resigned as Grand Chamberlain "present national crisis." and granted rank of baron. 11 June 1945- The Japanese radio reported that Jun 1940-Vice President, Privy CounciL the Lower Chamber of the 10 Aug 1944- President, Privy Council succeed­ Japanese Diet passed the war­ ing late Hara, Y oshimichi; suc- time emergency bill today with ceeded as Vice President by slight amendments, giving Ad­ Shimizu, Toru. miral Baron Suzuki, Japanese

32 Prime Minister, Virtual author­ TAKAGI, Sokichi, Rear Admiral ity to rule Japan by Imperial Career: Decree. 29 July 1945- The Tokyo radio said that Pre­ 1893- Born, Kumamoto, Kyushu. mier Suzuki at a press con­ 1915- Graduate, Naval Academy. ference declared that Japan 1928-Went to France to study. would ignore the Big Three 1930- Assistant Adjutant and Chief Sec- surrender ultimatum and con­ retary to the Navy Minister. tinue unswervingly the prose­ 1933- Instructor in Naval War College. cution of the war. - Commander. 1936- Member, Naval General Affairs Personal Background: Bureau, and research staff of Quiet, amiable, energetic, and clever. A good same. administrator, very popular with subordinates. 1937- Chief of research section, Naval An authority on strategy and torpedo tactics. General Affairs Bureau. He has had duty in England and Germany; - Captain. speaks good English and a little German. Upon his 1939- Instructor of Naval Administra­ retirement in 1929, he became Grand Chamber­ tion at the Naval War College. lain and member of the Privy Council. In these 1940 - 0nce more Chief of research sec­ two posts he became advisor to the Emperor. tion of the Naval General Af­ Later in 1929 he opposed the Tanaka Cabinet's fairs Bureau; attached to the efforts to saddle the Commander in Chief of Ministerial Secretariat. the Kwantung Army with the entire responsibility Jun 1942- Chief of Staff, Maizuru Naval for the mysterious death of Marshal Chang Station. Tso-lin, the Manchurian war lord. Suzuki and 1943- Attached to Naval General Head­ other advisors of the Emperor insisted that the quarters. War Minster should also share the responsibility. - Rear admiral. This issue was partly responsible for ihe fall of .Mar 1944- Chief, Education Bureau, Navy of the Tanaka Cabinet. In 1930, Suzuki was Ministry. also responsible for securing the ratification of Sep 1944- Again attached to Navy General the London Naval Treaty against the strong Headquarters. opposition of the Naval General Staff, the Su­ 15 Sep 1945- Retired. preme War Council, and high military and naval leaders generally." These acts in opposition to the more militaristic policies of the armed services earned Suzuki the hatred of the rising young TOGO, Shigenori officer faction. In the military uprising of 26 February 1936, he was on the assassination list, Caree1·: and was severely wounded by three revolver Dec 1882- Born, Kagoshima prefecture. shots. 1908- Graduate, Tokyo Imperial Uni- In December 1936, upon his retirement as versity. Grand Chamberlain, he was given the title 1912- Entered Foreign Service. "Baron." He continued to serve on the Privy 1913- Served at Hankow, Mukden. Council although he remained in virtual retire­ 1916- Switzerland. ment. In June 1940, he was named Vice President 1918- Second Legation Secre.tary. of the Privy Council and in 1944 became 191 9- Germany. President. 1920- Second Embassy Secretary. While Grand Chamberlain, Suzuki was a close 1921- 23-First Secretary, European and friend and colleague of such elder .statesmen as American Bureau, Foreign Viscount Makino, Nobuaki, Lord Privy Seal, Office. and Prince Saionji, Kimmochi, Japan's most 1925- First Secretary, Embassy m distinguished liberal leader who attempted to Washington, D. C. foster the growth of parliamentary government. 1929- Councillor, Embassy in Berlin. 33 Dec. 1933- Director, European and Ameri­ by Gen. Juzo Nishio and Gen. Gen Sugiyama and can Bureau. has enjoyed considerable support from the more 1934-Director, European and Asia extremist patriotic societies. Bureau. 1937-Ambassador to Germany. 1938-40-Ambassador to Russia. Apr-Aug 1945-Foreign Minister and GEA Min­ TOYODA, Soemu, Admiral ister, Suzuki cabinet. Career: 1885--Born, Tokyo. 1905- Graduated Naval Academy. 1917- Lieutenant commander, Gradu- TOJO, Hideki, General ated Higher Naval College. Career: -Naval attache to Great Britain. 1884- Born, Tokyo. - ·Naval attache to Germany. 1915- Graduate, Military Staff College. 1921- Commander, executive officer of 1919- Aide-de-camp, War Office. CLKuma. 1919- Resident officer, Germany. 1923- Military Affairs Bureau, Naval 1922- Instructor, Military Staff College. Training College. 1934- 35- Chief, Mobilization Section. 1925- Captain, Naval General Staff; in­ - Commanding Officer, First In­ structor, Higher Naval College. fantry Regiment. 1926--Commanding officer, CL Yura. - Commanding, Officer, Twenty­ 1927- -Commanding officer of Seventh fourth Infantry Regiment. Sub Division. 1937- Chief, Police Affairs, Kwantung 1928- Chief of first section, Training Bureau. Bureau; Staff of Special In­ -Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army. spector, appointed by the Em­ May-Dec1938-·- War Vice Minister. peror. Dec 1938 -·-Director-General, }.f ili tary A Yia­ 1930--- Commanding officer, BB Hyuga. tion. 1 Dec 1931-Rear admiral. Sep · 1941-Relieved Shigenori Togo as For­ 1932-Staff of Special Inspector ap­ eign Minister until appoint­ pointed J:-,y the Emperor. ment of Masayuki Tani. 1933- -Chief of Staff, Combined and 18 Oct 1941-Appointed Premier, War Min­ First Fleets. ister and Home Minister. 1934-Director, Training Bureau. 20 Apr 1943-Relieved Kunihiko Hashida as 1935- Director, Military Affairs Bureau. Minister of Education until 15 Nov 1935-Vice Admiral. Viscount Okabe was appointed 1937 -Commander in Chief, North China 23 Apr. Fleet, Fourth Fleet. 8 Oct 1943-Took over post of Commerce and Industry Minister. 1938- Commander in Chief, Second 21 Feb 1944-Chief of Army General Staff. Fleet. 18 Jul 1944-Relieved as above by - General 1939-· Director, Naval Technical De­ Yoshijiro Umezu. partment. -- ·Resigned with entire Cabinet. 1 Jan 1940-Board of Admirals; War Plans Also resigned as president of Reviewing Dept, Imperial Head­ IRAA. quarters. 11 Sep 1945- Attempted suicide. 18 Sep 1941-Admiral, Commander in Chief, 9 Nov 1945- -Held at Omori Prison Camp Kure Naval District. awaiting trial as war criminal. 10 Nov 1942-Supreme War Council. Relieved 29 Dec 1945-Entered Sugamo Prison. as Commander in Chief, Kure, Tojo typifies the Kwantung Army and the by Vice Admiral Takahashi, Manchuria "continentalists.'' He has been backt;ld Ibo.

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21 May 1943-Commander in Chief, Yokosuka Aug. 1939- Commanding general, Kwantung Naval District; Board of Ad­ Army, Governor, Kwantung mirals. leased territory, Envoy Extra­ 51-fay 1944- Commander in Chief, Combined ordinary and Minister Plenipo­ Fleet, succeeding Admiral Koga, tentiary to Manchukuo Govern­ Mineichi, who had been killed ment. in action. 1 Aug 1940- General. 1 May 1945- Concurrently, Commander in Chief, 18 Jnl 1944 - Chief of General Staff Headquar­ Over-all Naval Command; Com­ ters. mander in Chief, Grand Sur­ 1944- Succeeded General Tojo as Chief face Escort, succeeding Admi­ of Geneml Staff Headquarters. ral Nomura, Naokumi. 1945- Supreme War Councillor. 29 1[ay 1945- Chief, Naval General Staff, suc­ --Honorary Advisor, Concordia So­ ceeding Admiral Oikawa, Rosiro. ciety, Manchuria. 8 Oct 1945- Requested by Baron Shidehara to 2 Sept 1945- Signed surrender on board the U. serve as Navy Minister; Toyoda S. S. Missouri on behalf of the withheld consent pending sound­ armed forces. Later attended ing out of Allied opinion. rit~s reporting the end of the 2 Dec 1945- 0rdered arrested as a war crim­ war to the Imperial ancestors. inal. 15 Oct 1945 ---Relieved of position as Chief of Personal Background: the General Staff. Able and forceful, extremely nationalistic and Alleged to be a member of the Black Dmgon anti-foreign. He is noted for his work as Com­ Society. mander in Chief of Tsingtao landing, and as leader Like 'fojo, Umezu is a typical product of the of Kwangchow-wan landing, 1937-38. Kwantung Army.

YONAI, Mitsumasa, Admiral UMEZU, Yoshijiro, General Career: Career: 1880- Born, Iwate prefecture. Jan 1882- Born, Tokyo. 1901- Graduated, Naval Academy. 18 Mar 1904--Graduate, Military Academy. 1913- Graduated, Higher Naval College. 1904- 1905-- Russo-Japanese War. 1916- Commander. Attached to Em- -Stud.ied in Germany. bassy in Russia for study. - Military attache, Demnark. 1917- Sasebo Naval District. Aug 1930- Major general. 1918- N avy General Staff. 1930- Commanding general, First Infan­ 1923- Commanding officer, OBB Kasuga; try Brigade, First Division, To­ commanding officer, BB Iwate. kyo. 1923- Commanding officer, BB Mutsu. Aug 1931--- Chief, General Affairs Depart­ 1 Dec 1925- Rear admiral. ment, General Staff Headquar­ 1926- Chief of Staff, Second Fleet. ters. 1927- Navy General Staff. -Instructor, Military Staff College. 1928- Commander in Chief, First Ex- 1934- Commanding general, North China peditionary Fleet (Yangtze Garrison; author of Umezu-Ho River). Yingchin agreement. 1 Dec 1930- Vice admiral. Commander in 1935- -Comrn.anding general, Second Divi­ Chief, Chinkai Guard District. swn. 1932- Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. 1936--Vice-Minister of War in Haya­ 1933- Commander in Chief, Sasebo shi and Terauchi war cabinets. Naval District. 1938- Commanding general, First Army, 1934- Commander in Chief, Second North China. Fleet.

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' 1 Dec 1935-Commander in Chief, Y okosuka 16 Aug 1945-Named Navy Minister in Higashi- Naval District. · kuni cabinet. 1936- Commander in Chief, Combined 20 Nov 1945-Announced intention to retire fol­ and First Fleets; Naval Train­ lowing the abolition of theNavy ing College. Ministry. 2 Feb 1937- Navy Minister (In Hayashi, Ko­ Background: noye, and Hiranuma cabinets, YONAI is believed to have been responsible for until 30 Aug 1939). making Hayashi dissolve the Cabinet on 31 May 1 Apr 1937-Admiral. 1937. Grew, in "Ten Years in Japan," tellshow 30 Aug 1939- Supreme War Councilor (with Yonai assured Dooman on 19 April 1939 that status as Cabinet Minister). Japan would not join the Axis and would cooperate 14 Jan 1940- Premier. Imperial councilor. with the Allies. Fleischer, in' 'Volcanic Isle," states that a reactionary· plot attempted to assassinate 20 Jul 1944- Named, with General Koiso, Ku­ Y onai and Imperial Household Minister Tsuneo niaki, to form new Cabinet on Matsudaira, but was foiled by police with the fall of Tojo. arrest of 38 members of the troops. Reactionaries 22 Jul 1944- Vice Premier, and concurrently considered Yonai anti-Axis and against the New Navy Minister, in the new Structure. Col. Kingoro Hashimoto was believed Koiso cabinet. Restored to to have been one leader behind the plot, but police active service for tenure of office failed to arrest him. Yonai's cabinet fell when as Navy Minister. War Minister Rata presented Army demands for 7 Apr 1945- Navy Minister in new Suzuki strengthening the Nation internally and reorient­ cabinet. ing foreign policy. Yonai refused and Rata 29 Apr 1945- Adviser to Sensai Engo Kai (War resigned as War Minister. The Army would not R elief Association). name a successor and the Y onai cabinet fell.

36 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OfFICE: 1946