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Hegel's Theory of the Emergence of Subjectivity and The FILOZOFIA LEŠKO, V. (2017f): Hegel, koniec metafyziky a otázka bytia. In: Leško, V. – Sobotka, M. a kol. Roč. 74, 2019, č. 6 (eds.): Heidegger a novoveká metafyzika. Košice: Vydavateľstvo UPJŠ. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2019.74.6.3 LEŠKO, V. – MAYEROVÁ, K. a kol. (2018): Heidegger a metafyzika v 20. storočí. Košice: Vy- davateľstvo ŠafárikPress. HEGEL’S THEORY OF THE EMERGENCE LÉVY, B.-H. (2003): Sartrovo století. Prel. M. Novotný. Brno: Host. OF SUBJECTIVITY AND THE CONDITIONS SARTRE, J.-P. (1997): Existencializmus a humanizmus. Prel.: J. Švanter. Bratislava: Slovenský spisovateľ. FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS SARTRE, J.-P. (2006): Bytí a nicota. Prel. O. Kuba. Praha: Oikoymenh. SIVÁK, J. (2005): Jean-Paul vo svetle Sartrovho storočia. Filozofia, 60 (5), 311 – 333. JON STEWART, Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, Slovakia THOMSON, I. (2013): Ontotheology. In: Raffoul, F. – Nelson E. S. (eds.): The Bloomsbury Com- STEWART, J.: Hegel’s Theory of the Emergence of Subjectivity and the Con- panion to Heidegger. London – New Delhi – New York – Sydney: Bloomsbury. ditions for the Development of Human Rights ______________________ FILOZOFIA, 74, 2019, No 6, pp. 456 – 471 Táto práca bola podporovaná Agentúrou na podporu výskumu a vývoja na základe Zmluvy Globalization and mass migration have raised anew the question of the nature č. APVV-14-0706. and origin of human rights. There have been a number of works that seek inspi- ______________________ ration on this issue from the philosophy of Hegel. Usually, the primary focus of Vladimír Leško these works has, naturally enough, been the main statement of Hegel’s political Katedra filozofie a dejín filozofie philosophy, the Philosophy of Right. Scholars go to this work in search of Filozofická fakulta UPJŠ a principle that can ground human rights in such a way that can be meaningfully Moyzesova 9 used in a political and legal context. This body of literature is important in that 040 01 Košice it draws attention to this aspect of Hegel’s thought and shows how it is relevant Slovenská republika for a problem of some topicality today. However, this approach, I wish to argue, e-mail: [email protected] takes up the issue at a fairly advanced stage in Hegel’s thinking and fails to see some much more fundamental elements in his way of understanding the concept of human rights, specifically, that the very idea of human rights presupposes a philosophical anthropology and a theory of history since human rights as a con- cept did not always exist. These aspects of Hegel’s theory have been generally neglected in the secondary literature on the issue of human rights. Keywords: Philosophical anthropology – Human rights – Philosophy of history – Subjectivity Globalization and mass migration have raised anew the question of the nature and origin of human rights. Scholars primarily in political theory have been concerned to find some kind of firm grounding for this concept which is so valued in the modern world. There have been a number of works that seek inspiration on this issue from the phi- losophy of Hegel.1 Usually, the primary focus of these works has, naturally enough, been on the main statement of Hegel’s political philosophy, the Philosophy of Right. Scholars go to this work in search of a principle that can ground human rights in a way that can be meaningfully used in a political and legal context. These discussions are often closely connected to those concerning Hegel’s concept of recognition in the 1 There have been a number of attempts in the secondary literature to return to Hegel for insight on this issue. See Hinchman (1984), Buchwalter (2013), Maletz (1989), Smith (1989), Stillman (1980), Mullender (2003), Douzinas (2002), Butler (2008). Filozofia 74, 6 455 456 sense that it is necessary that individuals recognize the rights or others or that the state in these one can discern the development of what we today would call “inwardness” or recognize its citizens as individuals who have rights.2 This body of literature is im- “subjectivity.” According to Hegel’s view, as human civilization took its first tenuous portant in that it draws attention to this aspect of Hegel’s thought and shows how it steps, it had a very limited conception of the individual. Instead, the dominant principle is relevant for a problem of some topicality today. was that of the wider group or people. Only in the course of history did the idea of what However, this approach, I wish to argue, takes up the issue at a fairly advanced we know as individuality begin to emerge. It took millennia for the notion of the indi- stage in Hegel’s thinking and fails to see some much more fundamental elements in vidual, with one’s own sphere of inwardness, to be recognized and developed. The his way of understanding the concept of human rights. First, the very idea of human emergence of this conception of human beings had a sweeping impact on all aspects of rights presupposes a philosophical anthropology. Any statement of inalienable human culture, such as philosophy, religion, art, and law. It was with this conception that the rights in a sense dictates a specific vision of what a human being is since it is neces- idea of human rights arose. sary to know what kind of a creature humans are that they can be bearers of such Hegel is often conceived as an ethnocentric and Eurocentric apologist, whose the- rights.3 Second, this also presupposes a theory of history. Human rights as a concept ory is intended to justify, among other things, the abuses of European colonization in did not always exist. What were the historical circumstances that allowed this concept his own time.5 His account of history has thus usually been taken to be a traditional to arise? It is important to determine when an idea of human beings appeared that encomium for the virtues of Western civilization. But this interpretation is one-sided. allowed for the idea of human rights to arise and take root. Thus, Hegel’s theories of His thinking is dialectical, and so he always strives to find some kind of higher truth or philosophical anthropology and philosophy of history are of supreme importance for balance between conflicting positions. This includes what might be conceived as the this topic. These theories can be regarded as antecedent to the question of how to conflict between ancient and modern cultures. In fact, Hegel appreciated and valued ground human rights, since the latter already assumes their existence and value. But certain elements of pre-modern and non-Western cultures. the more fundamental question is how we came to have the concept of human rights My thesis in this paper is that the modern idea of human rights could only come in the first place. These aspects of Hegel’s theory have been generally neglected in about at a specific point in time when the anthropological conception allowed for it. the secondary literature on the issue of human rights.4 Only when humans came to be regarded as having an inward sphere of subjectivity and The broad story that Hegel wants to tell in his Lectures on the Philosophy of His- being capable of exercising their freedom, did the notion of human rights emerge. Thus tory concerns the nature and role of the individual. In traditional cultures the focus tends the concept of human rights is intimately tied to the conception of a human being that to be more on the group, with the person being primarily conceived not as an individual is present. I wish to argue that this view provides some valuable insight into discussions but as a part of a larger whole, e.g., the family, clan, tribe, etc. By contrast, in the West, concerning the status and origin of human rights. the focus is often more on the individual as such, devoid of any relations to others. Hegel presents a sweeping theory of history that, among other things, seeks to explain I. The Nature of Truth: Outward or Inward this difference in focus between traditional and modern cultures. In this story the idea Hegel’s theory concerns one of the perennial questions of philosophy: what is the of what it is to be human grows and develops. His theory can provide some insight into truth? The locus of truth can be regarded as something outward or something inward. the concept and development of human rights. According to one view, the truth is something external, some fact of the matter out in In his lectures Hegel presents a theory about the development of not just Western the world, which is wholly indifferent to one’s perception or understanding of it. Accor- Civilization but world history. The main line of argument concerns broadly what might ding to the opposite view, the truths of the external world are only illusory, and the be conceived as a theory of philosophical anthropology. It attempts to trace the various real truth is to be found in the inward sphere, the human heart or the mind of the self-conceptions of people in different cultures as they develop through time. These individual. Taken on their own, these are simply two logical possibilities, which cor- self-conceptions thus reflect different views of what it is to be human. His thesis is that respond better or worse to our intuitions about the truth in different areas. Most of us probably incline towards the former view in matters of science. When we think of mod- ern astronomical research on, for example, exoplanets, we believe that these are things 2 See, for example, Honneth (1995), Honneth (2012), Taylor and Gutman (1994).
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